Abstract
The Pakistan Army is a politically important organization, yet its opacity has hindered academic research. We use open sources to construct unique new data on the backgrounds, careers, and post-retirement activities of post-1971 corps commanders and directors-general of Inter-Services Intelligence. We provide evidence of bureaucratic predictability and professionalism while officers are in service. After retirement, we show little involvement in electoral politics but extensive involvement in military-linked corporations, state employment, and other positions of influence. This combination provides Pakistan’s military with an unusual blend of professional discipline internally and political power externally–even when not directly ruling.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 74-103 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Journal of Strategic Studies |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 7 Aug 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2 Jan 2020 |
Keywords
- bureaucracy
- civil–military relations
- militaries
- Pakistan
- South Asia