Abstract
The thesis explores what contribution moral philosophy can make to the practice of the ECtHR.The first half of the thesis explains why ECtHR judgments need to be as complete and coherent as possible, and shows that the ECtHR has sometimes failed to achieve sufficient degrees of completeness and coherence in its judgments. It then demonstrates why, in order to achieve sufficient degrees of completeness and coherence, the ECtHR must engage with the implications of a range of normative ethical theories, rather than adopting a purely pragmatic solution.
The second half of the thesis argues for a particular, indirect utilitarian theory of human rights. It seeks to show that this form of indirect utilitarianism is capable of accounting both for the abstract moral rights that lie behind the ECHR, and for our well-established intuitive practical judgments about the resistance to trade-offs possessed by such moral rights. It then turns to the legal Convention rights themselves, and argues that the same form of indirect utilitarianism can not only provide a plausible account of the doctrine of proportionality (which is central to the Court’s jurisprudence on qualified rights), but also provide grounds for the Court’s interpretation of the absolute rights contained in Article 3 (which might seem to pose the greatest challenge for utilitarianism).
| Date of Award | 1 Jun 2022 |
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| Original language | English |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisor | John Tasioulas (Supervisor) & Guglielmo Verdirame (Supervisor) |