Abstract
Metaphysical vagueness, the idea that the world itself, independent of our thoughts and representations of it, is fuzzy or indeterminate in some way, is often taken to be incoherent, unconvincing, unmotivated, or all three. I argue that this is not the case, and put forward an account of metaphysical vagueness in which the vagueness is taken to be fundamental both ideologically and ontologically.I begin by clearing up what is meant by vagueness more generally, and coming to a neutral characterisation of it which can be accepted by all parties to the debate. I then address the general objections to metaphysical vagueness, arguing that it is coherent as an idea, and that the supposed arguments showing it to lead to contradiction do not achieve their aim. I remove the burden of proof from the proponent of metaphysical vagueness, arguing that there are actually general intuitions in favour of it, and that there is thus prima facie reason to consider whether there is an enlightening account of it on offer.
I consider the two most prominent alternative accounts of vagueness; first, that it is linguistic in nature, represented by supervaluational theories on which our language is underdetermined in cases of vagueness, but theoretically could be made more precise. I then consider the epistemic theory of vagueness, on which it is held to be characterised by a specific type of ignorance. I find that both of these theories face serious objections.
I then move on to discuss some previously offered theories of metaphysical vagueness. I begin with various theories which attempt to argue for the existence of specific types of metaphysical vagueness, for instance the existence of vague objects. None are found to be totally convincing, and I argue that we should look for a more general theory, given the widespread nature of vagueness. I then examine three ‘general’ theories of metaphysical vagueness, but again none are found to be both convincing and genuinely respectful of what I see as the fundamental nature of metaphysical vagueness.
Finally, I propose my own positive account of metaphysical vagueness, on which it consists in the obtaining of vague states of affairs; that is, those which contain a vague constituent. It is held to be a fundamental fact about the world that in some cases the world is vague, and we cannot explain or reduce this vagueness to any other concepts. We need to keep the concept of vagueness in our fundamental description of the world. I explain how this proposal can be accommodated into consistent theories of logic and reasoning, and how it helps us to solve the sorites paradox.
| Date of Award | 1 Nov 2024 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Christopher Hughes (Supervisor), Eliot Michaelson (Supervisor) & John Callanan (Supervisor) |