David Hume on the Reality of Moral Distinctions

: Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Hume’s Moral Philosophy

Abstract

My thesis is focussed on the moral philosophy of David Hume. Hume's moral philosophy contains an apparent paradox that has not been adequately dealt with, or even straightforwardly addressed, by commentators. However, it threatens to undermine the general coherence of Hume's moral system.

The apparent paradox concerns Hume's stance towards the tradition of moral scepticism. On the one hand, Hume is evidently sceptical about various claims concerning the foundation of morality - in particular, he is sceptical about the objectivity of moral qualities. On the other hand, Hume defends the existence of a real distinction between virtue and vice from sceptical arguments to the contrary. There is evidently a tension between these positions: how can there be a real distinction between virtue and vice if they are not objectively existing qualities?

My thesis explores how the apparent tension within Hume's moral thought can be resolved, by situating Hume's views historically, re-examining his texts and suggesting a more nuanced understanding of how sceptical and anti-sceptical ideas are coherently integrated into his overall theory of morals.

Date of Award	1 Aug 2019
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	King's College London
Supervisor	Thomas Pink (Supervisor), Maria Alvarez (Supervisor) & Jasper Reid (Supervisor)