Abstract
Britain's war with France, 1793-1801, was an unlimited war. From the beginning France had posed two existential threats: invasion and interference, each magnifying the other. Recognising the unlimited nature of the war, Britain had looked back to the unlimited wars with France, 1689-1714, to guide its military, political, and economic response. Success followed, and by 1795, the French Navy was defeated, the invasion threat receded, and political unrest was forced into a temporary lull. However, France did not negotiate for peace and instead escalated the war by closing the European littorals to British influence and forging a maritime federation with the Dutch and Spanish. The enemy’s unlimited threats of invasion and foreign interference had been resurrected. By 1797, Britain appeared to be strategically paralysed by the threat of invasion, in political and financial crisis and with every theatre in dispute.Contrary to this narrative of failure this thesis will argue that between 1795 and 1798 Britain was instead experiencing two critical transformations in the war against France: one an evolution in British strategy and the other a transformation of British culture, politics, and economics. These changes were critical to Britain's ability to continue in an unlimited war against France, they were also synergistic and the medium through which they communicated was British sea power. After an unprecedented level of upheaval, Britain defeated the federation, demonstrated that it could not be forced to accept the political will of the enemy, and the nation agreed to sacrifice its resources to save Europe.
| Date of Award | 1 Aug 2023 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Andrew Lambert (Supervisor) & Alan James (Supervisor) |