Abstract
This dissertation's background is Germany's reform of its defence procurement to deliver the capabilities the Bundeswehr demanded during the 2010s. Throughout the 2010s, German defence procurement policy has seen attempts at innovation. Only a few proved successful in their ambitions short- to mid-term. This dissertation investigates how German policymakers attempted to reform defence procurement policy and what made these attempts of policy innovation successful or ineffective. The theoretical context for this investigation is military innovation theory. The dissertation tests the primary explanations for innovation emergence provided by military innovation theory to understand how the various mechanisms within them determine innovation success. This includes how political motivations for reform, competitive dynamics within the military and procurement organizations, the organisational culture within the procurement organization, German strategic culture, path dependencies, and blame avoidance dynamics shaped the thinking in German defence procurement policy formulation. Thus, besides its apparent relevance to understanding Germany's ability to react effectively to the procurement challenges posed by the international security environment, the dissertation also seeks to clarify the causal mechanisms of established explanations of military innovation and their relationship to the effectiveness of the reforms they imply.Methodologically, the dissertation relies on 23 semi-structured elite interviews with decision-makers in the military organisation, bureaucracy, politics, and industry to establish how policy formulation gathered information on policy issues and potential approaches. Using thematic analysis enabled a triangulation of interview data, further supported by data from other sources within themes, where necessary. Arguably, this resulted in a reliable dataset for specific attempts at innovation. This dataset enabled a thick description of the underlying decision-making processes and an understanding of how they shaped innovation, leading to valid statements on the effects of these processes on innovation emergence and success.
Conceptually, this dissertation contributes to a more integrated understanding of the competing explanations of military innovation theory. It argues that the case of German procurement policy formulation indicates that while changing political priorities may trigger attempts at innovation, innovation success requires a positive information flow out of the organisation and the organisational ability to implement policy effectively. This depends on how the organisational culture and incentive systems reflect previous political priorities. Meanwhile, how political priorities are defined depends on the political perception of the larger political environment and strategic culture.
Specifically, this dissertation argues that Germany did not lack the political or organisational will to improve its procurement. Instead, policymakers could not resolve fundamental organisational issues such as an obsession with risk minimisation and disregard for project outcomes. This was because procurement was politicised in the political arena, focusing on specific, strategic culture-induced topics, such as the procurement organisation's proximity to industry. This changed ministers' areas of interest in procurement policy innovation away from effectiveness but towards political risk minimisation or point scoring, depending on their level of ambition.
| Date of Award | 1 Mar 2024 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Andrew Dorman (Supervisor) & Bence Nemeth (Supervisor) |