Abstract
This thesis essentially concerns the years from 1938, as the government in Wellington was deciding on its responses to the burgeoning crisis in Europe, until May 1943 when the New Zealand House of Representatives made the decision to retain its main (Second) Division in the Mediterranean theatre of war. It is concerned with the politico/military leadership of New Zealand during this time. At the outbreak of the Second World War, New Zealand was in the throes of a crisis. It had just secured a loan from Britain on quite onerous terms and its prime minister, Michael Joseph Savage was ailing with severe health issues. Yet by 1945, and with a population of just 1.7 million, it had made an impact out of all proportion to its size during the conflict, was much lauded as a founder member and supporter of the United Nations and treated with esteem in the post-war corridors of global power. Arguably, in 1945, New Zealand stood at the most influential moment in its history, having attained what historian F.L.W. Wood characterised as ‘small power rampant’ status.It is argued that this transformation in status came about as a result of its commitment to the Allied cause, notably during the onerous years of 1941 and 1942, as exemplified by the fighting ardour of its men at these crucial times and its political and military leadership. From the outbreak of war this leadership, despite severe misgivings at times, maintained its decision to align itself alongside the imperial strategic doctrine of concentrating its forces in the essential theatre of war. This thesis is essentially a thematic chronology of how Wellington negotiated the vicissitudes of this period, all the while acting, within the constraints of coalition warfare, as an independent nation with its own interests. A number of significant additions to the historiography are identified.
It reveals the patent inadequacy of Michael Savage as prime minister in a time of developing global crisis, and the fortuitousness that during the whole duration of the Second World War its de facto and official leader, Peter Fraser, was like his British counterpart, of a quality commensurate to the dire times.
The problematic relationship with its nearest neighbour and fellow dominion, Australia, whose condescension towards New Zealand throughout 1938 and 1939 is chronicled, and how this was rudely transformed by the Dominion’s decision to despatch its expeditionary force without consulting Canberra. It also identifies an overlooked aspect behind Prime Minister Menzies last-minute, forlorn appeal for this decision to be delayed.
Domestically during his first year in leadership, firstly as Acting and then actual Prime Minister, Fraser displayed his craft, subtlety and ruthlessness in establishing New Zealand on the path he wanted his country to follow. By July 1940 he had established conscription and some form of a coalition government. Simultaneously to these intense negotiations, he was having equivalent ones with London and Canberra over the sailings of the US2 and US3 troop convoys.
From 1941, with an increased confidence and not prepared to uncritically defer to British command, Fraser visited the Middle East and London and gained a comprehensive insight into imperial command. He questioned the whole premise of the Aegean campaigns and furthermore, his reservations about relative aircraft numbers in the weeks before Crusader caused the most profound anxiety in Whitehall and Cairo, lest the New Zealand Division be withdrawn.
Bernard Freyberg, brought up in New Zealand, but then following the First World War became a British general officer, was appointed to command the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). He is revealed to have misled his government over the Greece expedition and it is contended that there was a distinct Anzac dimension to this deception. Following a severe admonishment by Fraser, and a reiteration of his responsibilities in keeping Wellington informed. He firstly regained his military reputation by his standout leadership in the Crusader campaign, and in the following months, by his actions in his dealings with a completely unsuitable Commander-in-Chief (General Auchinleck), and thus regained the trust of his government.
Finally, following the Japanese entry into the war there was deep anxiety within New Zealand, with voices calling for the Second Division to be returned to the Pacific. Throughout 1942, on three main occasions Churchill contrived to avoid this scenario and was successful in the sense that the New Zealand House of Representatives, in the December, decided to keep its troops in the Mediterranean theatre at least until victory was achieved in North Africa. Following this until April 1943, Churchill was unrelenting in his efforts to evince a retain decision, but these had effectively gone as far as they could. With a month to go before Wellington’s parliamentary decision, Fraser, who it is argued almost certainly wanted a retention outcome for some months before, took the lead on this issue and skilfully guided the way to achieve this outcome.
| Date of Award | 1 May 2021 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Supervisor | Ashley Jackson (Supervisor) & Jonathan Fennell (Supervisor) |