Peace in whose time? Ripeness and local negotiated agreements

: The Sangin Accord, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2011

Abstract

Sangin District, in Helmand Province, was once described by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates as “the most dangerous not only in Afghanistan but maybe the whole world.” Nevertheless, Afghan Government officials received a written offer of peace from the principal local grouping aligned to the Taliban on the 29th May 2010, before NATO’s surge, or Sangin’s handover from U.K. to U.S. forces. This offer evolved into the local negotiated agreement known as the Sangin Accord, announced in January 2011. This is the first academic study of that agreement.

This work also considers relationships between motivations for negotiation at the local level, and international policy and actions: military power, stabilisation activities, and reconciliation (including the co-option and legitimation of enemies). It compares explanations for negotiated agreements from academic theory and military doctrine, especially I. William Zartman’s ripeness theory and its evolutions, and offers suggestions for other local reintegration or reconciliation scenarios.

The conclusions offer observations on applying Ripeness theory when intervening to seek political reconciliation in a local area removed from centralised authority, and without a permanent military advantage – which I term ‘fringe areas’. It highlights the impact of history (both received and remembered), and traumatic experiences, on memory, perception and rationality; vital factors for Ripeness theory. Finally, it explores the paradox between policymakers’ desire to negotiate from a position of strength, and Ripeness theory’s contradictory requirement for a mutually perceived hurting stalemate – simultaneously alongside a political Way Out – as essential preconditions to genuine negotiation.

Date of Award	2016
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	King's College London
Supervisor	Mats Berdal (Supervisor) & Theo Farrell (Supervisor)