The Will as a Capacity for Knowledge

Abstract

The topic of this thesis is a debate between proponents of two competing interpretations of the claim that our will is a capacity for practical knowledge. On one side of the debate are those who argue that practical reason is a capacity for knowledge of the good, which can be understood as analogous to theoretical reason, our capacity for knowledge of the true (e.g. Tenenbaum, 2009a). The rival conception construes practical knowledge as having non- evaluative content concerning one’s actions and their explanation (Setiya, 2012). On this view, the will is a capacity to non-observationally know what one is doing and why by forming intentions.

The thesis consists of three chapters. The first focuses on examining Kieran Setiya’s (2010) argument for his claim that the will is a capacity for non-evaluative knowledge of action and against the rival, evaluative conception of the will. This argument aims to show that evaluative representations are superfluous to an account of acting for a reason, which in his view requires no more than beliefs about the appropriate explanation rather than justification of one’s action. I will provide a preliminary case for taking his argument against the opposition to be inconclusive as well as questioning a key element in Setiya’s non-evaluative account of the will, namely his extremely thin account of practical knowledge, know-how, and their relation.

The second chapter examines the relationship between theoretical and practical reasoning.
Discussion of this issue is motivated by the observation that a theoretical analogue of Setiya’s argument, designed to establish that we can believe a proposition for a reason without taking that reason to be justifying, does not seem compelling. Hence, Setiya recognises the need to reinforce his arguments by undermining any temptation we might feel to treat theoretical and practical reasoning in a parallel fashion. I will introduce two lines of response to Setiya on this point. According to the first, pursued by Eric Marcus, there are, contrary to Setiya, reasons for thinking that actions relate to reasons in the way beliefs do. However, an alternative to this kind of approach seems to me to be to question Setiya’s claim that treating theoretical and practical reasoning as parallel necessarily commits one to thinking of action as the practical analogue of belief.

In the third and final chapter of my thesis, I take up a potential problem for Marcus’ view which has been identified by Matthias Haase, namely that the success of his account depends on its being able to provide an explanation of how knowledge of what we have done (rather than are doing) can be practical. I will suggest that Marcus’ reply to that objection is problematic, which provides some initial motivation for considering the alternative line suggested in chapter two.

My tentative conclusion will be that proponents of a view of the will as a capacity for knowledge of the good might benefit from considering an account of the relationship between practical and theoretical reasoning that differs slightly from that which they sometimes favour.

Date of Award	1 Jul 2022
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	King's College London
Supervisor	Matthew Soteriou (Supervisor), James Stazicker (Supervisor), Thomas Pink (Supervisor), Maria Alvarez (Supervisor) & John Callanan (Supervisor)