

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King's Research Portal at <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/>



Chinese views of the role of morality in international relations and the use of force

Filler, Lukas

Awarding institution:
King's College London

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT



Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed

under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

licence. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work

Under the following conditions:

- Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
- Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
- No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

**CHINESE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF
MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND THE USE OF FORCE**

By
Lukas Filler

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF WAR STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE & PUBLIC POLICY
KING'S COLLEGE LONDON

LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM

SEPTEMBER 2016

Abstract

This study quantitatively tested whether the strategic preferences of China's future decision makers are consistent with non-coercive Confucian values. Students at six elite Chinese universities were surveyed to identify beliefs about the character of the international system, when and how it is permissible to use force, and whether morality should constrain state behavior. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to characterize and validate stated beliefs, strategic preferences, and moral reasoning as well as to determine the extent to which they reflected the theoretical Confucian system of values and conception of moral governance. Respondents' perception of a dangerous, zero-sum, conflict-prone international system was not consistent with a Confucian worldview. Neither was their strong proclivity to use force to counter most any potential threat or when in the state's best overall interests. There was substantial concern for noncombatants and the intentionality of harming them influenced the morality of doing so. However, moral ideals did not strongly constrain behavior. At the same time, such exceptional necessity also did not tend to make immoral behavior moral. There was also a consistent, strong bias to hold foreign states to higher standards of behavior and morality than the respondents' own state.

The results also showed that the framework of related issues which define and differentiate major IR theories only explained a small portion of respondents' beliefs about the international system, state behavior, and the role of morality in them. It is likely that respondents' reasoning about these issues were also influenced by nationalistic beliefs which combined Confucian and political realist ideologies.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS	3
TABLE OF FIGURES.....	7
TABLE OF TABLES.....	8
ABBREVIATIONS	9
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	10
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE	10
BACKGROUND	10
PROBLEM	11
PURPOSE.....	15
SIGNIFICANCE.....	18
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES	20
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	21
RESEARCH DESIGN.....	29
CHAPTER DESIGN.....	31
CONCLUSIONS.....	32
WORKS CITED	34
CHAPTER 2: CONFUCIANISM AND WAR	40
WHAT IS CONFUCIANISM?.....	41
THE STRUCTURE AND VALUES OF CONFUCIAN SOCIETY	43
CONFUCIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION.....	46
CONFUCIAN MODEL OF GOVERNANCE.....	48
CONFUCIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WAR	50
CONFUCIAN BEHAVIOR IN WAR.....	63
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFUCIAN MORALITY	69
MORALITY AND AMORALITY	74
CONCLUSIONS.....	76

WORKS CITED	79
CHAPTER 3: CONFUCIANISM AND CHINA’S STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR	85
CONFUCIAN ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	86
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF CHINA’S STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR	88
RECONCILING INCONSISTENCIES ACCORDING TO THE PARRABELLUM PARADIGM ...	92
AN ATERNATE CONFUCIAN PARADIGM.....	93
REFINING THE DEBATE	95
STRATEGIC CULTURE	96
THE RELEVANCY OF CONFUCIANISM	99
A CONFUCIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR MODERN CHINA POLICY AND BEHAVIOR	104
IMPLICATIONS OF CONFUCIAN OR PARRABELLUM VIEWS AND PREFERENCES	105
REVISIONIST OR STATUS QUO MOTIVES?.....	106
CONCLUSIONS.....	107
WORKS CITED	110
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY	115
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES	116
RESEARCH DESIGN.....	118
VARIABLES	119
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE.....	120
DEPENDENT VARIABLE.....	124
INSTRUMENTATION, QUESTION CONSTRUCTION, VALIDITY, RELIABILITY	129
POPULATION/SAMPLE	133
DEMOGRAPHICS	135
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS	144
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS	145
CONCLUSIONS.....	146
WORKS CITED	147
CHAPTER 5: THEORY.....	153
MORAL REASONING.....	154

CHINA, CULTURE, AND MORAL REASONING	169
BELIEFS, VALUES, MORALITY	173
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING	178
SUMMARY	189
WORKS CITED	191
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.....	201
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (FA).....	201
MEASUREMENT MODEL.....	202
GROUP COMPARISON BY GENDER.....	208
GROUP COMPARISON BY ETHNICITY	212
COMPARISON BY VERSION.....	215
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING (SEM)	217
SUMMARY	224
WORKS CITED	227
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION	231
H2: Respondents do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior..	231
H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used.....	238
H4: Confucianism does not influence how force should be and can be used.....	246
MORAL IDEALS	246
MORAL CONVICTION.....	249
H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.....	255
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE FINDINGS	257
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES	260
STRATEGIC CULTURE, NATIONALISM, EXCEPTIONALISM.....	270
CONCLUSIONS.....	281
WORKS CITED	282
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS.....	287
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES	288
H2: Respondents do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior..	289

H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used.....	290
H4: Confucianism does not influence how force should be and can be used.....	290
H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.....	291
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	292
GENDER.....	295
ETHNICITY	296
MEASUREMENT LIMITATIONS	298
SAMPLING LIMITATIONS	300
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY.....	304
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF (CHINA) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	310
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	312
CONCLUSIONS.....	313
WORKS CITED	316
APPENDIX.....	321
Standardized factor loadings and communality scores for SEM models.....	321
English Translation of Survey.....	322
Survey Questionnaire Chinese Version 1	329
Survey Questionnaire Chinese Version 2	334

Table of Figures

Figure 1 – Age Distribution	135
Figure 2 – Years of Education	136
Figure 3 – Structural Equation Model Version 1	219
Figure 4 – Structural Equation Model Version 2	220
Figure 5 – Factor Scale Composite Score Distribution Version 1	221
Figure 6 - Factor Scale Composite Score Distribution Version 2	222

Table of Tables

Table 1 - CFA Composite Reliability (R^2).....	132
Table 2 - Demographic Data.....	138
Table 3- Geographic Demographics.....	142
Table 4 - University Demographics I.....	143
Table 5 - University Demographics II.....	143
Table 6 - Goodness-of-Fit.....	207
Table 7 – Squared Multiple Correlation & Reliability of Factors.....	218
Table 8 – Composite Scale Scores for Factors.....	221
Table 9 – Factor Loadings	224
Table 10 – Views of IR Scale Top 3 Reference	233
Table 11 – Jus ad Bellum Scale Top 3 Reference	239
Table 12 – Jus in Bello Scale Top 3 Reference.....	247
Table 13 – Moral Conviction Scale Top 3 Reference	249

Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
Δ NCI	McDonald Non-Centrality Index
ΔX^2	Chi-Square Difference Test
BAS	Beijing Area Survey
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CCP	China Communist Party
DDE	Doctrine of Double Effect
df	Degrees of Freedom
DIT	Defining Issues Test
DWLS	Diagonal Weighted Least Squares
EFA	Exploratory Factor Analysis
EPQ	Ethical Position Questionnaire
EPT	Ethics Position Theory
GFI	Goodness-of-Fit Index
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Interactional Dual-Process Model of Moral Decision Making
IR	International Relations
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JWT	Just War Theory
MFQ	Moral Foundations Questionnaire
MI	Modification Indices
n	Sample Size
NBSC	National Bureau of Statistics of China
NFI	Normed Fit Index
p	Significance Level (.05 or less for this study)
PRC	“People’s Republic of China” or “China”
R^2	Reliability
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
SD	Semantic Differential
SEM	Structural Equation Modeling/Models
SMC	Squared Multiple Correlation
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
VS	Version
WLS	Weighted Least Squares
X^2	Chi squared statistic

Chapter 1: Introduction

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This study examines the role of Confucianism on China's strategic preferences using unique data from a large-*n* first-person Chinese-language questionnaire given to elite Chinese students. The survey, structured according to the defining principles of Confucian and Western international relations (IR) and ethical theories, characterizes normative and applied beliefs about the international system and the use of force. Factor analysis of the relationships within the statistical models precisely quantify the decision-making processes used as well as validate responses by testing for consistency and coherence.

The purpose of this study is to validate the findings deduced in earlier, qualitative studies by seeing if they reflect the beliefs and priorities of actual Chinese people. The same Confucian ideals and assumptions of rational choice theory and of strategic culture are used as standardized and falsifiable metrics. However, quantitative methodology allows for more nuanced accounting of the range of legitimate interpretations and applications of morality reflective of human reasoning. This investigation is framed by the following questions 1) Are the actual worldviews and moral beliefs of the surveyed Chinese population consistent with those of Confucianism? 2) Does this demographic have a demonstrable preference to pursue national security and state interests using nonviolent methods? 3) To what extent does any professed moral ideals actually influence their beliefs and preferences?

BACKGROUND

China's (PRC) rapid economic development has been accompanied by greater power and influence in regional and international affairs. It's rapid military modernization, increasingly coercive behavior, and frequent criticism of and disregard for the current, Western values-based international system signal the potential for dramatic changes to the status quo. China's

intentional obfuscation of its goals and how it intends to achieve them further increases anxiety about what kind of threat it represents.

The role of force in China's pursuit of state interests and security strongly depends upon its perceived efficacy, necessity, and perhaps morality. Political realist IR theory is based upon the assumption that the world is anarchic, zero-sum competition for survival and that states are "rational unitary actors" who seek to maximize power (Levy 5). As a result, state security depends upon pursuit of national interests - and states cannot afford to be constrained by morality. Confucian ideals are inconsistent with such goals and uses of coercion and force because they are believed to be counter to and ineffective at fostering a world based upon core ethical principles like compassion, harmony, benevolence, and reciprocity (Burles and Shulsky 80-82; Johnston 65-68, 188). The logical connection between views of international relations, the priorities of the state, and how they ought to be pursued allows for comparing stated beliefs about war to those about the character of the international system – and these to the normative ideals of the Confucian paradigm – to test the validity and legitimacy of professed values.

PROBLEM

The evolution of Western morality and international laws about war has been shaped by its religious, philosophical, and political history. China's beliefs about war may be dramatically different as they were shaped by its own, distinctive culture and history. Indeed, China claims that its goals and behavior have always been guided by its unique Confucian-based culture - which emphasizes pacifistic non-coercive values such as compassion, benevolence and humaneness (Scobell "China and Strategic Culture" 4, 8; Wang, Yi; Wang, Yuan 1; Zhang 200).

Yet, a substantial number of scholars have found that China's historical use of force appears to contradict these professed preferences (Burles and Shulsky 86; Johnston 27; Scobell

“China and Strategic Culture” 8; Wang, Yuan 181-182; Zhang 200-201). Rather than being constrained by Confucian morality, it has been employed whenever and however considered effective for countering threats (Johnston 150-152; Wang, Yuan 22-23, 181-184). Indeed, studies have found there to be a proclivity to counter even minor potential threats with offensive force rather than through less coercive means such as accommodation and compromise (Johnston 30, 37, 62; Wang, Yuan 182-184). One reason may be that, perhaps due to a long history of frequent conflicts with other states, Chinese leaders and advisers generally have held strong realist views of the international system - one of anarchy, zero-sum competition, and inevitable war (Christensen 37-53; Godehardt 11; Johnston 30, 62, 72, 180; Scobell “China and Strategic Culture” 7-8; Wang, Yuan 188).

In response to concerns about China’s recent, rapid development and, at times, coercive use of economic and military strength to pursue state interests, a new national strategy was developed. The core idea, that China will always adhere to a “developmental road of peaceful rise,” is a clear reference to its Confucian heritage (Glaser and Medeiros 292-293; Hu). Though many of the examples cited in support of this assertion have been criticized as misleading or false, China points to its “non-alignment” during the Cold War, its generous sharing of economic prosperity with other states that, unlike the US, does not come with interventionist political requirements, its traumatic experiences for a hundred years after the Opium Wars, and the supposedly peaceful trading explorations of Zheng He (1371-1435) as examples of its nonaggressive preferences (“China’s Peaceful Development Road,” Nosnjak).

In an official speech, Premier Wen Jiabao expanded on the “five essentials” for China’s peaceful rise to include “1. taking advantage of world peace to promote China’s development and safeguarding world peace through China’s development; 2. It would be based on China’s own strength and independent hard work; 3. It could not be achieved without continuing the “opening-up policy” and an active set of international trade and economic exchanges; 4. It

would take several generations; and 5. It would “not stand in the way of any other country or pose a threat to any other country, or be achieved at the expense of any particular nation.” (Suettinger 4). The “peaceful rise” also involves further “opening up” through mutually-beneficial globalization and economic development that shuns expansionism, oppressing others, and any other hegemonic, destabilizing behaviors (Glaser and Medeiros 295).

The concept, renamed “peaceful development,” has continued to receive official endorsement in both formal and informal mediums (Glaser and Medeiros 297-299). For example, President Xi Jinping in a recent speech credited Confucianism as the “Chinese traditional culture” which is the primary source for the values which guide its soft power, governance, relations, and development (“China Commemorates Confucius with High-Profile Ceremony”).

Accordingly, China not only seeks to foster a more harmonious society and world but prefers to do so through nonaggressive, non-expansionist, and peaceful domestic and foreign policies that reflect and promote these values (“China’s National Defense in 2010” 6; Wang, Yi; Wang, Yuan 1). As a result, China will continue to resolve disagreements through accommodation, compromise and other nonviolent means whenever possible (“China’s National Defense in 2010” 6; Johnston 249; Wang, Yuan 18). The immorality and inefficacy of coercion means that force will only be used to counter the most extreme threats and, even then, will be limited and defensive (Johnston 25; Scobell “China & Strategic Culture” 8; Wang, Yuan 14-15,19).

Yet, the “peaceful rise” and “development” strategies have received strong criticisms by Chinese as well as non-Chinese scholars (Glaser and Medeiros 302). Two Chinese concerns are that this strategy signals a lack of resolve and also will constrain China’s options to deter Taiwan independence and other territorial disputes (Glaser and Medeiros 302-303). Other

concerns include that the “external security environment” make it impossible for China’s peaceful rise; that it is too soon to claim China’s peaceful ascendancy so confidently; that it is not in harmony with President Deng’s (1978-1989) strategy for China to “bide its time and hide its capabilities;” that it would inhibit military modernization and so weaken China; and that it could “incite domestic nationalism and create political problems.” (Glaser and Medeiros 303-306).

The concept has evolved over time and caveats have been added to address some concerns. For example, to counter the possibility that other states see this as an exploitable opportunity, it has been emphasized that China’s peaceful, win-win strategy is contingent on the behavior of other states (Wang, Yi). A PhD researcher at a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) think tank states,

Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed that China will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up its legitimate rights and will never sacrifice its national core interests. He also noted that no country should presume that China will engage in trade involving the core interests or that China will swallow the “bitter fruit” of harming its sovereignty, security or development interests. From this perspective, the related countries should not underestimate China’s determination and willpower to safeguard the core national interests. (Chen)

Though worded defensively, some may see this as further evidence of thinly-veiled offensive realist views. Especially when directly supported by senior official government statements that there is a direct “dialectical relationship between peaceful development and China’s protection of national interests. As China’s peaceful development progresses, it will have more resources and measures to protect its national interests and become increasingly proactive in doing so. China will neither sacrifice other countries’ interests to achieve its own development, nor will it allow other countries to encroach upon China’s legitimate rights and interests” (Chen; Wang, Yi).

Frequent inconsistencies between China’s patterns of behavior and its professed moral principles cause many to believe that moral language is used symbolically to legitimate the

realist decision to use force (Burles and Shulsky 83; Johnston 14, 59, 153, 160-161, 247; Wang, Yuan 186). Other scholars disagree, arguing that Confucian preferences exist but a highly conflict-prone realist view of the international system amplifies the severity of threats to state security, allowing for nearly anything to meet the moral threshold of last resort in self-defense (Scobell “China’s Use of Military Force” 5,15; Scobell “China and Strategic Culture” v, 3, 22). It is also possible morality is an important factor that shapes preferences but is often disregarded out of perceived necessity due to exceptional circumstances. That the behaviors and justifications for each of these possible interpretations are mostly indistinguishable to the outside observer makes it difficult to use them to determine strategic preferences or the role of morality.

PURPOSE

This study is the first of its kind to examine Chinese beliefs about international relations and war through polling and focus groups that directly asks an important demographic to explain and clarify their beliefs about national security issues. It is further remarkable because ~5500 surveys about a very sensitive subject were successfully collected in China by a single, self-funded Western scholar.

The inability to query CCP elites and the uncertain influence of public opinion in China makes it difficult to examine directly the beliefs of current political decision-makers. However, there is “a growing body of scholarship that indicates how decision science research conducted on non-elite samples can generate plausible insights into national security decision making” (Friedman et al. 12-13). This is, in part because societies – including China - tend to have a single dominant “political-military culture” that is widely supported (Lantis 100, 106-107). This study, accordingly, targeted students at six top Chinese schools (four in Beijing, one near Shanghai and one in more remote Western China). As Chao explains,

Because universities have the ability to influence the new generations of children, at the top of every PRC university is the party affairs department, and the head of that department is the Party Secretary. One professor from a top university explained: If you want to control the next generation and how they think, you have to control what they are being taught. Historically speaking, schools indoctrinate their students with a belief system. And, in schools, the seeds of revolution are planted. Using the Cultural Revolution as one example of many, many examples, it was the universities, the elite ones, where radicalism began and then flourished...It is in the best interests of the state to have someone watching over the universities. That is the role of the Party Secretary. For some, the Party Secretary is a tool of the CCP and is wielded by the CCP to maintain control. (210)

Chinese universities not only actively seek to shape the political beliefs of students but membership to the CCP is still an important criterion for reaching the higher echelons of leadership so ambitious students pursuing especially military, political, or economic careers will join the CCP and receive even more indoctrination during university. Additionally, since career paths in Chinese society critically depend upon the university attended and those of privileged families are more likely to attend elite Chinese universities, they are most likely of their generation to be in positions of power and influence in the future (Bian 104-109; Chao 82-110, 193-194, 242-248; Huang 44-45, 56, 123; Rickards; Stafford 18-24; Stub 16, 35-69; Tsang 15-24; Zang 62-74).

Not all elite students will pursue political careers but social status, in general, is also related to higher education (Huang 121-123). The government's hierarchical, pervasive, and strict control over most any issue of national significance makes it likely that the political influence of elites in many career fields will increase as they climb social and professional ranks. This is certainly true for those involved in economic issues as this is the highest political priority for the state – and one that is directly tied to national security goals (Chao 134-144, 177). In fact, the authority and influence of economic and political leaders is so interconnected that “Chinese officials routinely bounce back and forth from corporate to government posts, each time at the behest of the CCP” (Scissors 28) and sometimes work for both at the same time (Chao 148-149).

Though it would be more relevant in the short-term to use current Chinese leaders as the demographic of this study, there are long-term advantages to focusing on elite Chinese students. The ongoing, rapid, and pervasive changes in China means that the views of the future leaders may substantially differ from those of the current generation of elite decision-makers - though it is difficult to predict where and how they will diverge (Egri and Ralston 6-7). Certainly, the unique formative experiences of the Cultural Revolution, of living in a country “closed” to foreigners, and then of China’s rapid industrialization starkly contrast those of growing up with domestic stability, a more “open” and prosperous country, and access to the vast information and communication resources of modern technology. At the same time, the influence on the beliefs of young elites by both their school environments as well as their families may be even more significant if the growing research showing that “precursors” of political attitudes are genetic and actual attitudes develop at a young age is true (Egri and Ralston 6-7; Verhulst et al. 4, 13-14).

Querying this demographic will help better understand the complexity and diversity of moral reasoning found in daily Chinese life also because their responses provide more detail than the “approved for public consumption” official information and the safe “party line” responses of actual leaders. Though forthright sharing of the beliefs of current leaders offer more immediately-useful insights, elite students are the best *executable* approach to improve understanding of the context, reasons, and the reasoning of the next generation’s attitudes towards foreign policy and war. Additionally, this demographic has a reasonably good chance of contributing valuable insights into future, if not current, Chinese foreign policy decision-making.

The overall methodology of this study makes it possible to investigate moral preferences, how conflicts between pragmatic interests and ideals are weighed, and how such decisions are justified. Doing so identifies causal relationships that provide greater fidelity to

how moral and amoral factors influence the moral reasoning. The questionnaire is structured to maximize the suitability and accuracy of comparing observed frameworks of beliefs to major Western ethical and international relations theories.

As a result, the similarities and differences between them also identify where fundamental values may be universal and where cultural differences create critical disparities. Similarly, the unprecedented access and exposure to foreign influences available to the current generation of students in China means that their beliefs also potentially offer unique insights into whether strategic preferences derive from cultural or structural conditions (Chao 91-93).

SIGNIFICANCE

The primary goal of this study is to test rigorously the current scholarly consensus about the role of Confucianism on China's strategic preferences. More specifically, it seeks to confirm or disprove China's non-Confucian strategic preferences found by most prior qualitative studies. The use of totally unique data and use of the statistical technique called Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is particularly well suited for validating the models and findings from case studies of China's contemporary and ancient use of force.

Whereas the approach of prior studies has been to test their thesis by looking for available evidence that fits it and then to construct from this a theoretically-representative model that best explains the behavior identified in select case studies, this quantitative study takes the next step by testing how well the notional models fit actual beliefs (Levy 22; Snidal 80). This approach follows the standard process for developing IR theories "that all theories are based on assumptions, that assumptions need to be judged based on their usefulness, and that assumptions need to be empirically validated from the theories that they are derived from by accounting for dependent variables, independent variables, measurement error and error due to assumptions" (Gladney 12).

Because the defining beliefs of political realism and Confucianism are not completely distinct and opposite, two different models would have to be constructed to test them both. The demands of necessary additional testing, respondent involvement, coding, and analysis was prohibitive. New, potentially-influential factors were not tested for several reasons. For one, the existing literature on the topic remains focused on the political realist vs Confucian debate with little disagreement that the current measures for them are incorrect. Additionally, as statistically testing the validity of prior studies' theoretical assumptions (also called "axioms" or "variables"), models, and findings requires using the same conceptual measures as they did - new variables would test the fit of a Confucian model too different to be of comparative value. However, an advantage of factor analysis (including SEM) is that it can identify if there is some other strong influence for which the model and its variables do not account – though it cannot tell you what that factor is.

The use of a survey and the statistical modeling used in this study does require operationalizing the variables more precisely than in past studies. New variables must be developed and validated to measure key assumptions/axiomatic beliefs of Confucianism, strategic culture, and rational choice theory as well as to characterize the critical components of moral reasoning about war. For example, the Confucian metric of preferring compromise and collaboration remains the same as in prior studies but how this is measured is based upon several different but thematically-related questions. Accordingly, this study's primary contribution is to advance IR and Chinese Strategic and Security Studies research methodology rather than to provide policy advice.

This is one of the few studies designed to clarify where theoretical assumptions explain historical behavior but may not accurately represent the reasoning, motives, and other causal factors for the behavior. In other words, it tests for "causation not just correlation." The detailed look at moral reasoning means that the strategic decision-making indicators and the

relationships discovered using this unusual approach also add new information to the fields of moral psychology and ethics.

Cumulatively, the findings contain significant insights into how China views the international system, how it perceives the behavior of other states with competing interests, and how it is likely to consider the use of force as a tool to pursue interests and address threats. Whether beliefs and preferences likely derive from structural or cultural (learned) conditions is briefly discussed but is not a primary focus as it is not a determinant for understanding the relationship between Confucianism and strategic preferences nor is this likely to lead to appreciably different behavior.

These more accurate interpretations of a “rising” China’s statements and actions help foreign policy and diplomatic engagements by clarifying intentions and avoiding unnecessary escalation and other common pitfalls of the classic state security dilemma. Also, a clearer understanding of where and why China ideologically disagrees with Western philosophy-based laws, norms, and institutions promotes stability by increasing the predictability of its future behavior.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

This study seeks to answer the central question, “*What is the role of Confucian morality in shaping elite Chinese beliefs about the use of force?*” (Johnston 29; Scobell “China’s Use of Military Force” 20; Wang, Yi; Wang, Yuan 5-6).

The primary null hypothesis is:

H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.

The three null hypotheses used to assess the primary one:

H2: Elite Chinese students do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior.

H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used.

H4: Confucianism does not influence how force should be and can be used.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Prior studies have sought to answer these questions by measuring whether political realist or Confucian beliefs best explain China's strategic preferences, as derived from the past statements and behavior of China's military, political, and academic elites.¹ However, this approach is controversial as the dearth of relevant data means that these studies rely heavily on inference to identify beliefs, biases, motives, and other causal factors – making educated assumptions from public behavior and the limited statements and texts available to scholars (Herrmann 129; Levy 22; Snidal 80).

The primary metric used in this study – “whether morality constrains selfish behavior” – reflects a fundamental disagreement in IR about whether “norms shape interests” (Herrmann, 129). As Herrmann states, “link[ing] this theoretical debate to evidence is complicated. It requires identifying what a state would do if it were motivated by material concerns that is different from what it would do if it were motivated by normative ideas” (129). It is easier and more accurate to do this by directly measuring beliefs and then using the relationships between them to characterize the decision-making process than by looking at past behavior and trying to determine which motive was responsible for it.

Without a sufficient range of primary sources to provide critical context and balance, the standards used to evaluate case studies must be quite general. For example, it is often

¹ Studies include those in Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*. Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2000. Web. 06 Jul 2009.; Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies*. 14.4 (2005) : 637-662. Web. 14 Feb. 2010.; Fravel, M. Taylor. "Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes." *International Security*. 32.3 (2008) : 44-83. Web. 14 Feb. 2010.; Finkelstein, David M. "China's National Military Strategy." *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, July 1998*, San Diego, CA. Ed. Mulvenon, James C. and Richard H. Yang. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999. Web. 16 Oct. 2009.; Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ : Princeton Univ. Press, 1998. Print.; Scobell, Andrew. *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.; Wang, Yuan-Kang. *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics*. New York: Columbia UP, 2011. Print.

necessary but too reductive to define Confucianism as a strict interpretation of pacifism where most any use of force is evidence of its lack of influence. Instead, like modern Christian ethics, a more nuanced position of strongly eschewing the use of force is a more reasonable standard. It is similarly misleading to consider any violation of the moral obligation to not do harm as sufficient proof that morality was irrelevant in the decision because the use of force inherently violates one moral principle to uphold another. The morality of this decision depends upon what ethical theory was used to weigh overall moral value of the options – what “ought” to be done. The three major normative theories – deontological, teleological, and virtue ethics – differently measure what is the ultimate good to evaluate whether a potential act does more harm or good.

Very briefly, deontological ethics holds that the highest moral good is “good will” – the intent to uphold moral duties, rules, and rights - as only it is both intrinsic (“good in itself”) and unqualified (doing this will never make things morally worse) (Alexander and Moore). Thus, an act is moral if it does what is “right.” That is to say whether, regardless of consequences, it upholds the universal rights of and duties to others. People are to be always treated “as ends and never as means” and rules are upheld for their intrinsic value not out of fear of punishment (Alexander and Moore).

Some believe that this emphasis means that there is a moral difference between intending to do harm and allowing an act to do harm as a side effect of the greater good (the “Doctrine of Double Effect” or “DDE”) (Alexander and Moore). Recognition that this approach may involve conflicting duties leads some to argue that these duties are “*prima facie*” (presumed correct until disproved) (Alexander and Moore). That upholding specific moral rules may not always bring about the highest good has led to the idea of “threshold deontology,” where, at some point “the consequences become so dire” that it is more moral to prioritize the best outcomes instead (Alexander and Moore).

Teleological ethics (interchangeably referred to as “consequentialist ethics”) base the morality of an act upon the net sum of all its intentional causes - anticipated and/or actual (Alexander and Moore; Sinnott-Armstrong). The consequences that can be considered must be consistent but can be those from specific acts, of upholding moral rules, the “utility” of the act

to bring about the most good to the most people, and many other desired ends (Sinnott-Armstrong). “Good” results are more important than “right” action however there is potential for abuse as this also establishes that numerous “ends justify the means” (Alexander and Moore; Sinnott-Armstrong). Though there are a number of different ways to measure what is “good,” the moral content of the act must be objective and impartial – it cannot vary based upon who does it or benefits from it (Alexander and Moore; Sinnott-Armstrong). As with deontological ethics, it is widely recognized that there are circumstances – especially in war – where morality ought not be based upon the good outcome alone as the accompanying violation of moral rights/duties is too egregious.

Virtue ethics holds that the highest good is neither the best results for the most people nor the upholding of universal rights and duties but, rather, creating conditions ideal for the spiritual “flourishing” of all (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). While both teleological and deontological ethics also consider the moral value of motive, virtue ethics considers whether the act expresses moral character rather than the goodness of consequences or the rightness of upholding rules (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). For example, not lying because of the consequentialist fear of punishment if caught or because it is a moral duty to always be truthful even if it is hurtful or results in greater harms does not make one an “honest person” – meaning one of overall high moral character (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). Hence, virtue ethics center morality on the actor rather than the act and on the good of the community rather than that of the individual.

It is often difficult in the complex, real world to know what is the most virtuous way to act so virtue is an ever-on-going process that improves with wisdom and “moral sensitivity” (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). Role models and education are key to acquiring these. It is also hard to test the legitimacy of acts justified according to virtue ethics as the defining centrality of virtuous motive means there are no “universal rules or principles” (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). This also leads to criticisms that what is “virtuous” can dramatically vary across

cultures and that such “moral relativism” proves that there are no absolute, universal morals, values, or truths (Hursthouse and Pettigrove). This threatens to reduce the gravity of acts such as rape, genocide, and slavery to the point where they are permitted with little objection (Hursthouse and Pettigrove).

Knowing which ethical theory is used to weigh the morality of possible uses of force is key to understanding the decision-making process and for verifying the legitimacy of moral justifications. For example, deontological ethics, concerned with the “means,” would believe there is more overall moral good done in a longer war that better avoids violating the rights of individuals. Consequentialist ethics would consider it morally preferable to have an unrestrained but faster war because, based upon consideration of the “ends,” this creates less overall harm. Yet, a war viewed from one perspective but conducted according to the rules of the other would see a pattern of immoral behavior.

Identifying motivating beliefs according to observed behavior/preferences is further complicated because these same behaviors/preferences could also derive from other motives and assumptions. Depending upon the specific situation, faster but more destructive wars or slower but more restrained wars can be consistent with the political realist belief that states should pursue its interests however most effective and without moral constraint as well as with an individual’s interpretation that either strategy, in its specific situation, best expresses virtuous character.

Initial baselines for “normal” moral reasoning can be created by whether the expected “ends,” “means” or moral obligations, or what best expresses fundamental virtues determine when it is acceptable to do harm because it will result in more overall moral good. The role of morality in shaping strategic behavior can then be determined by looking at what factors and conditions actually influence the permissibility of doing harm and how they do so. Once

identified, the reasons for what is considered moral to change are validated using the standards of impartiality, consistency, and coherence.

What is “moral” is highly variable because, for instance, there are many ways to interpret moral principles, weigh their relative importance, and apply them to any given situation. Situationally-defined conditions and considerations such as at what perceived severity of a threat and at what threshold of severity is a war in self-defense morally just are highly-subjective, ambiguously-defined, and not accounted for in most IR theories that assume states will behave rationally to maximize their gains. However, the wide range of legitimate interpretations can be tested because morality cannot vary based simply upon what is most convenient or most effective for pursuing the interests of oneself or one’s state. Consistency further requires that, under the same conditions, the permissibility of doing harm is recognized as being the same when it is to one’s own detriment as when it is to one’s benefit. Moral decisions must be objective and impartial.

At the same time, these nuanced standards for what qualifies as Confucian beliefs about and preferences for war do not make violence moral because it simply meets the requirements of consistency. The reasons to use force must still be coherent with the overall pacifistic preferences and values espoused by Confucianism. For example, consistent claims that countries may torture civilians any time doing so would help national security would still be immoral as it is contradictory to Confucian conceptions of benevolence, humaneness, etc.

It is also kept in mind that ethical theories provide a framework for considering morally complex situations, yet, they cannot account for every possible scenario. There are times when the best option is contrary to normal beliefs and reasoning. For example, many teleological ethicists would find terrorism or the torturing of civilians immoral even if doing so was believed likely to lead to substantial military advantage. Deontologists, similarly, may weigh

the morality of an act that harms noncombatants according to the military gains - such as choosing the option that kills one civilian rather than the option where two people die. As these would be indicated by patterns where such contradictions correlate to a common logical factor, again, the standards of consistency and coherence can differentiate between exceptions motivated by morality and by self-interest or efficacy.

Decisions contradictory to stated beliefs and preferences also may occur because the circumstances are considered so severe that exceptional necessity permits them. Walzer argues that it is permissible to override the normal prohibition of intentionally targeting civilians only if the threat is imminent and “of an unusual and horrible kind” (Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars” 252-253). In an effort to preserve the moral authority of Just War restraints, the severity of threat which permits moral transgressions is set very high (Coady). Unpleasant outcomes of “ordinary defeat” in war such as occupation or annexation do not qualify (Walzer, “Arguing about War” 47). As “the survival and freedom of political communities – whose members share a way of life, developed by their ancestors to be passed on to their children – are the highest values of international society,” only imminent threat of destruction of a “political community” is sufficiently severe (Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars” 252-254). Yet, the value of political communities as well as what conditions constitute sufficient “necessity” to permit violation of normal morality is a controversial and subjective matter (Coady).

Though “political and military leaders may sometimes find themselves in situations where they cannot avoid acting immorally, even when that means deliberately killing the innocent,” they may feel that necessity does not fully absolve them from having committed what is normally deemed a strongly immoral act (Walzer, “Arguing about War” 46). The “moral remainder” or “moral residue” from the recognition that what they did was simultaneously both moral and immoral is described as “Dirty Hands” (Walzer, “Problem of Dirty Hands” 161-162). This contradiction opens the door for self-interested interpretations of

ethics but recognizing that normal morality is not fully discarded even in the most extreme cases also helps preserve its relevance and legitimacy (Coady).

The moral content of such conflicts can widely differ depending upon ethical beliefs. While some consequentialists would have little qualms about harming innocent civilians to ensure state survival as it is moral to do the lesser evil, most other ethical theories are not able to resolve such a sharp contradiction quite so easily. For example, there is no easy answer about what ought to be done for those who believe in strict adherence to deontological rules/virtues or to the teleological utilitarian belief that there are “no exceptions “whatever the circumstances” to their basic rule of maximising satisfactory outcomes” for all parties involved (Coady; Walzer, “Problem of Dirty Hands” 161-162).

The concept of “threshold deontology,” where teleological morality takes over for the usual deontological prioritization of rights when the consequences become sufficiently severe, similarly acknowledges that moral rules are *prima facie* and can be reprioritized based upon the actual circumstances (Coady). However, this does not resolve the problem that the inconsistent use of ethical theories normally invalidates any claims of moral justification.

The overall morality of “supreme emergencies” is also defended by pointing out that the duties of politicians and the military create a special moral obligation to prioritize the good of their state and citizens (Walzer, “Problem of Dirty Hands” 162-164). This allows for the partiality of harming enemy noncombatants to protect one’s own people and state but the conflict between their morality as an individual and that based upon their special role remains. Still others – such as some political realists - propose that politics sometimes requires amoral decisions to trump - but not invalidate - morality so there is little-to-no moral fault to requisite immoral acts (Coady).

Examining the role of “supreme emergency” in the survey is illustrative as the degree of unresolved immorality varies depending upon the ethical beliefs of the individual. The severity and type(s) of threats which are believed to qualify as exceptional, whether the exceptionality of the situation is interpreted as well as applied to other states consistently and with coherence, and the perceived overall morality of such exceptional acts can help measure the ethic theory used and the degree of influence moral ideals played in the decision.

Although there are many reasons why inconsistencies may not indicate moral indifference, there still must be a demonstrable, substantial, and consistent preference for upholding moral ideals in order for claims of exceptional necessity to be legitimate. Such instances should correlate with state security and not just any and all pursuits of national or individual self-interests. They should also correlate with perception of relative severity of threat - not everything that is undesirable can be a severe existential threat. The strongest litmus test for moral constraint is whether or not the most effective selfish option is selected despite it being immoral.

Exceptional situations and inescapable conflicts between moral obligations act as “stress tests” that effectively elucidate beliefs and preferences. For example, the lower the threshold for what threat necessitates a coercive, violent, and aggressive response, the more zero-sum and conflict prone the world is perceived to be. The frequency of support for immoral uses of force in objectively-low severity of threat situations indicates its perceived acceptability and efficacy as a tool for resolving disputes and pursuing other national interests. If, instead, such uses were seen as legitimate self-defense due to a widespread high sensitivity to threat, then they would likely be considered moral.

Understanding the role of morality in strategic preferences and behavior is more complex than whether or not support for the use of force as a tool of national power tended to

be quick, frequent, and correlated with its perceived efficacy. Yet, it is difficult to gain deeper insight by looking at whether or not force was used or recommended to be used in a handful of case studies.

The critical distinctions which validate beliefs by testing their roles and relationships according to the principles of impartiality, consistency, and coherence require details, context, and perspective that come from methodical examination and testing of how the use of force is considered. Such an approach makes it possible to measure, and thus account for, the range of views about what is clear self-defense, last resort, and an extreme and dire threat which can vary widely by individual, culture, and situation. It also provides the insight necessary to test the moral content of justifications for war and of motives such as reciprocity and efficacy. These kinds of quantifiable limits, unique to this study, are critical to considering the diversity of beliefs, expressions of values, and the complex reasoning found in humans without slipping into moral relativism.

RESEARCH DESIGN

A carefully designed and tested Chinese-language questionnaire collected the information most useful for understanding actual beliefs and thinking about morality and war. To test more rigorously consistency and the role of partiality/bias on influencing beliefs, there are two versions of the survey which differ only by whether the respondent is told to consider “their own country” or “a foreign country.” Quantitative statistical analysis of survey responses is used to create models of beliefs systems and worldviews.

The legitimacy of stated preferences and beliefs are tested for internal consistency and coherency as well as whether the same assessments of moral permissibility and constraint are made regardless of its perceived benefit for the respondent. The models are then compared to established theories and derivative worldviews with emphasis on the relationships between

inter-related moral and amoral factors, as defined by deontological, teleological, and Confucian ethics as well as by political realist theory. Close conformity to formal theoretical structures further ensures that models are created and evaluated systematically, comprehensively, and accurately.

The points of difference between theoretical and empirical models indicate how and why established theories may not fully explain actual modern Chinese normative and pragmatic views of the international system and of state behavior within it. Because beliefs about international relations, war, and morality are logically connected, the similarities and differences between them as well as between models help to interpret observed results more fully and accurately. For example, having multiple points of related ideological differences better exposes potential sources of bias, fills in the gaps from missing information, identifies causal factors, and illuminate motives and justifications for observed behavior. These insights suggest how established theories can be refined to explain better China's strategic beliefs, preferences, and behavior.

Not only do the survey questions collect the relevant beliefs but they also explore the relationships between them to characterize the influence of morality. Intentional conflicts are designed to test the relative extent to which - normatively and in practice - moral principles from primary Western and Chinese ethical traditions guide or constrain behavior as well as to test how respondents choose between ideals and pragmatic self-interest. Questions with varying degrees of risk address the ongoing academic debate about if China's claims that it's not-infrequent uses of force have always been in strict self-defense is due to a (cultural or structural) high sensitivity to threats or a cultural inclination to justify unconsciously realist preferences using (Confucian) moral language (Johnston; Scobell).

CHAPTER DESIGN

The debate about when and how force can and ought to be used according to classic Confucian texts and historical records is addressed in Chapter 2. The discussion includes the Confucian conception of individual behavior, the relationship between the individual, the community, and the state, and preferences for conflict resolution. It explores how moral ideals can be legitimately and illegitimately interpreted and applied to justify strictly pacifist preferences, a moral obligation for regional hegemony, and most anything in between. It concludes that the standards for virtue, especially according to Confucianism, make it prohibitively difficult to determine from behavior if the motive was moral or selfish.

Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of earlier case studies and their conclusions about China's strategic preferences, worldview, and the role of Confucianism on them. Attention is given to the debate about unresolved questions, proposed answers, and the theories used to explain them are highlighted. How this study plans to examine some of the most contentious issues is also discussed.

Chapter 4 describes the methodology used to identify, model, evaluate, and validate beliefs, preferences, and methods of reasoning. Survey questions are explained in detail, to include their intended purpose. Information about instrument validity, reliability, and population demographics are reported.

The complexity of human reasoning and the issues that should be considered when trying to study it are discussed in Chapter 5. Some limitations are mentioned as they should be kept in mind when looking at the results of this study. Others are the lessons learned from the research of others which are incorporated into the planning and execution of this project.

In order to allow the reader to interpret the data without undue influence, Chapter 6 contains detailed information about the procedural aspect of statistical analysis without any

discussion about what they might mean. Measurement models are created using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) then structural models are developed using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Measurement scales for each hypothesis are examined and composite scores for each of them are reported. Differences based upon gender, ethnicity, and version are reported. The final models as well as the results/findings of statistical tests, their goodness-of-fit indices, and their reliability and validity are described in detail.

The results/findings of the factor analysis are interpreted and discussed in Chapter 7. Implications of responses to each question and their relationships to one another are explored. Identified patterns of beliefs and reasoning are also tested for consistency and coherence and then dissected for multiple aspects of meaning. Causal effects and other metrics reported in the models are used to assess whether the data supports the hypothesis or the null hypothesis.

The broad trends and interesting details for each hypothesis as well as for comparisons based upon gender, ethnicity, and survey version are summarized in Chapter 8. The most interesting discoveries not directly related to proving the hypotheses are also highlighted. The limitations of the study are discussed and the implications of the contributions from it are explored.

CONCLUSIONS

In a world that is becoming rapidly more interconnected and in which the balance of power is swiftly shifting, it is critical to understand a “rising” China’s strategic preferences in order to encourage peaceful and effective foreign policy engagements. This research fills scholarly gaps about Chinese strategic decision-making by creating targeted models that explain how the targeted population considers using force to address national security concerns.

The data from a survey administered to students at six elite Chinese universities identify key variables that most shape and influence views on morality, the use of force, and the

international system in the ideal and “real” worlds. Resultant models are then compared to established Western and Confucian ethical and international relations theories to determine the extent to which moral principles shape beliefs and effectively guide or constrain behavior. How results differ from the Confucian theory of international relations help understand how accurately current theories explain China’s actual strategic preferences. Thus, this research offers major contributions to the theoretical scholarship central to international security and Chinese strategic studies.

WORKS CITED

Alexander, Larry and Moore, Michael, "Deontological Ethics." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, Winter 2016. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.

Bosnjak, Stjepan. "How Peaceful is China's Peaceful Rise?" *Australian Institute of International Affairs*. 15 Aug. 2016. Accessed 20 Jun. 2017.

Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000. Accessed 06 Jul 2009.

Chao, Grace Lauren. *Elite Status in the People's Republic of China: Its Formation and Maintenance*. Dissertation. Columbia University, 2013.

Chen, Jimin. "Understanding China's Peaceful Development." *China-US Focus*. 17 Feb. 2014. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.

"China Calls US Culprit in Global 'Internet War.'" *Associate Press*. 3 Jun. 2011. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

"China Commemorates Confucius with High-Profile Ceremony." *China Central Television*. 25 Sep 2014. Accessed 19 Jun 2017.

Christensen, Thomas J. "Chinese Realpolitik." *Foreign Affairs*. 75.5 (Sept./Oct. 1996): 37-52. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010.

Coady, C.A.J. "The Problem of Dirty Hands." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, Winter 2016. Accessed 22 Jun. 2017.

Dhami, Mandeep K., David R. Mandel, Barbara A. Mellers, and Philip E. Tetlock. "Improving Intelligence Analysis with Decision Science." *Perspectives on Psychological Science*. 10.6 (2015): 743-757. Accessed 22 Jun. 2017.

Egri, Carolyn P., and David A. Ralston. "Generation Cohorts and Personal Values: A Comparison of China and the United States." *Organization Science* 15.2 (2004): 210-220. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.

Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies*. 14.4 (2005) : 637-662. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Finkelstein, David M. "China's National Military Strategy." *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, July 1998, San Diego, CA*. Edited by Mulvenon, James C. and Richard H. Yang. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999. Accessed 16 Oct. 2009.

Fravel, M. Taylor. "Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes." *International Security*. 32.3 (2008): 44-83. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Friedman, Jeffrey A., Jennifer S. Lerner, and Richard Zeckhauser. *Behavioral Consequences of Probabilistic Precision Experimental Evidence from National Security Professionals*. Working paper. 1-71. 2016. Accessed 10 Jun. 2017.

Gladney, Brent. *US Foreign Policy Towards China: Chinese Naval Expansion and Threat Perceptions*. Dissertation. Webster University, 2016. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.

Glaser, Bonnie S., and Evan S. Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of "Peaceful Rise"." *The China Quarterly* 190 (2007): 291-310. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China." *GIGA Working Papers*. 88 (2008). Accessed 06 Oct. 2009.

Herrmann, Richard K. "Linking Theory to Evidence in International Relations." *Handbook of International Relations*. Edited by Carlsnaes, Walter, et al., Sage, 2002. 119-136. Accessed 9 Mar. 2017.

Hu Jintao. "Hu Jintao's Speech at the 110th Anniversary of Mao Zedong's Birthday." *People's Daily Online*, 27 Dec. 2003. Accessed 20 Jun 2017.

Huang, Lihong. "Elitism and Equality in Chinese Higher Education: Studies of Student Socio-economic Background, Investment in Education, and Career Aspirations." *Studies in Comparative and International Education*, vol 68, 2005. Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Hursthouse, Rosalind and Pettigrove, Glen. "Virtue Ethics." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, Winter 2016. Accessed 22 Jun. 2017.

Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998.

Kaplan, Robert D. "The Geography of Chinese Power." *The New York Times*. 19 Apr. 2010. Accessed 4 Jun 2011.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review* 4.3 (2002): 87-113. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

Lee, Peter. "The New Face of U.S.-China Relations: 'Strategic Reassurance' or Old-Fashioned Rollback?" *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 29-1-10 (2010). Accessed 4 Jun. 2001.

Levy, Jack S. "Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." *H Leonie, DO Sears & JS Levy (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, (2013): 301-333. Accessed 9 March 2017.

Rajan, D.S. "China: US 'Hegemony' Comes Under Attack of Some Military Analysts Ahead of President Hu Jintao's Visit to Washington." *South Asia Analysis Group*. Paper 4280, 17 Jan. 2011. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

Rickards, James. Interview by Gabriel Dominguez. "Corruption and Elitism Fueling Inequality in China." *Deutsche Welle News*. 28 Jul. 2014. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Scissors, Derek. "Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China." *Foreign Affairs* (2009): 24-39. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Scobell, Andrew. *China and Strategic Culture*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. May, 2002. Accessed 02 Oct. 2009.

Scobell, Andrew. *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, "Consequentialism." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, Winter 2015. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Snidal, Duncan. "Rational Choice and International Relations." *Handbook of International Relations*. Edited by Carlsnaes, Walter, et al., Sage, 2002. 74-94.

Stafford, Glen. *The Unexpected Transformations of Chinese International Students in Australia*. Dissertation. 2011. Accessed 22 Jun. 2017.

Stub, Hanna Østby. *Party Membership - A Short Way to Heaven?: A Study of Individual Career Making Among Chinese Students*. MS thesis. 2012. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

The People's Republic of China. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *China's National Defense in 2010*. Beijing: IOOSC, 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

The People's Republic of China, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *Building of Democracy in China*. Beijing: IOOSC, 2005. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

The People's Republic of China, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010*. Beijing: IOOSC, 2011. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

The People's Republic of China, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *Progress in China's Human Rights in 2009*. Beijing: IOOSC, 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011

The People's Republic of China, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *China's Peaceful Development Road*. Beijing: IOOSC, 2005. Accessed 20 Jun. 2017.

Tsang, Mun C. "Education and National Development in China Since 1949: Oscillating Policies and Enduring Dilemmas." *China Review* (2000): 579-618.

Verhulst, Brad, Lindon J. Eaves, and Peter K. Hatemi. "Correlation not causation: The relationship between personality traits and political ideologies." *American Journal of Political Science* 56.1 (2012): 34-51. Accessed 9 March 2017.

Walzer, Michael. *Arguing About War*. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2004.

Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4th ed., New York: Basic Books, 2006.

Walzer, Michael. "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1973): 160-180. Accessed 26 Dec. 2010.

Wang, Yi. "Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation." *China International Studies* 1 (2014): 18-44.

Wang, Yuan-Kang. *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics*. New York: Columbia UP, 2011.

Zang, Xiaowei. "University Education, Party Seniority, and Elite Recruitment in China." *Social Science Research* 30.1 (2001): 62-75.

Zhang, Feng. "Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8.2 (2015): 197-218. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.

Chapter 2: Confucianism and War

The classic Confucian texts by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi provide guidance for how to apply morality to political affairs with the deliberate intention of trying to convince rulers of the moral and pragmatic merit of such an approach (Stalnaker 137). Recognizing that these are prescriptive ideals rather than hard rules or descriptions of how things actually are, the texts expound upon the fundamental virtues of Confucianism with a careful balance of historically-relevant specificity and timeless universality (Stalnaker 135; Twiss and Chan 126). As a result, interpretations of how Confucian beliefs should be applied to address threats can support behavior that compromises moral principles to varying degrees, conflates non-moral (selfish) arguments with moral ones, and vary widely according to context, perspective, goals, politics, audience, etc.

This chapter identifies the core principles of Confucianism, how they were likely intended to be applied to politics and war in an ideal world, and other ways they could plausibly be interpreted to address the more complex realities of political affairs. The goal is to identify falsifiable standards that can evaluate whether respondents are truly influenced by Confucian principles. However, the Confucian ethical system is intended to guide the development of virtuous character rather than to assess the morality of specific actions. So, unlike Just War theory's standards of what is most "right" (Deontology) or what leads to the most predicted "good" (Teleology), it lacks clear, falsifiable measures for determining the "best" course of action based upon motive.

Therefore, the beliefs and role of morality in China's strategic behavior can be better understood by determining the perceived morality of using force in various situations, what factors shape these beliefs, and if this affects decisions about how to respond to threats. These reveal commonly-shared assumptions, relationships, and preferences about state behavior and war which can be modeled and compared to Confucian norms.

However, this is insufficient for validating how well Confucianism “fits” - or explains - actual preferences and behavior. Factors like the moral imperative for China to be at the top of the hierarchy and the highly-subjective defining role of virtuous motive make it exceptionally difficult to differentiate between behavior consistent with Confucianism but may be motivated by morality and/or self-interest. The role of morality must be further evaluated by whether moral principles are weighed, interpreted, and applied with consistency and coherence to formulate assumptions, relationships, preferences, and the permissibility of behavior.

WHAT IS CONFUCIANISM?

Both Chinese and non-Chinese observers of China have argued that its history and culture have fundamentally shaped its strategic culture (Liu 559). Scobell defines strategic culture as “the set of fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of collective violence in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force interpreted by a country’s political and military elites” which “shapes the menu of options available to an actor in various situations as well as affects an actor’s perceptions or images of self and others” (Scobell, “Real SC” 213).

Over the past 2000 years, Confucianism has significantly influenced China’s societal and behavioral norms – including what are the preferred methods for resolving conflicts (Feng 22; Johnson 3; Kirkbride et al. 365; Liu 559; Locke 24, 27, 31). While other traditions such as Daoism, Mohism, Buddhism, and Legalism have, at times, supplanted Confucian thinking as the dominant philosophy within mainstream Chinese culture, Confucianism has remained relevant and most influential by adapting and then integrating aspects of these other traditions (for example, “Neo-Confucianism”) (Jones and Liu 366; Locke 27; Lo 13; Shusterman, 27; Yao 106). In the same way, Confucianism, Taoism, “as well as most other influential schools [of traditional Chinese thought] are creative reinterpretations” of earlier Chinese philosophies (Zhao 48). The result is the widespread, emphatic belief in China that its society and unique

strategic culture are strongly grounded in Confucianism but, while sincere, there is likely little agreement what this actually means (Bell 32; Liu 557, 559; MacDonald 14; Scobell, “China Strategic Culture” 3; Scobell, “CUMF” 20; Johnson 3-4; Zhang, Tiejun 79).

For example, China’s generally holistic and highly contextual approach to resolving conflicts, which includes making temporary sacrifices for long term gains, in part comes from Daoism (Locke 46-47). Similarly, Confucianism was influenced by the Daoist and Mohist belief in the power of virtuous governance and their stance to permit but strongly discourage war (Lo 13-14). The Confucian moral obligation of humanitarian interventions derives, in part, from adoption of the Mohist emphasis of “impartial love” (Lo 15). This is also the source for the Confucian belief in meritocracy (Stalnaker 140).

It is from Legalism that the “use of explicit, delimited job descriptions with pay commensurate for performance” was taken (Stalnaker 140). Similarly, when Confucian noncoercive methods of promoting proper behavior fail, rulers have drawn upon Legalist heavy handed use of law and punishment to maintain harmony (Stroble 170-172). Whether beliefs or recommended courses of action are overtly credited to Legalism has varied according to its reputational standing at the time but, remarkably similar to offensive realism, they still frequently appear in contemporary Chinese discussions about national security and war (Lo, “Chinese Just War Ethics” 7).

The cross-referencing and crosspollination of ideas makes it more difficult to classify which ones are “Confucian.” This means that Confucian conceptions of politics and governance “are either a watered-down version” or “a hybrid” of “existing schools of thought” (Lo 16-17). Despite this compounding the difficulty in classifying what are truly “Confucian,” numerous studies maintain that Confucian values continue to strongly define Chinese preferences for conflict resolution (Chew and Lim; Chen; Kirkbride et al.; Locke).

Discussions about the role of Confucianism in China's strategic culture often includes reference to *The Seven Military Classics*, especially Sunzi's *Art of War*. These highly influential texts are considered to be the best resources for understanding China's traditional beliefs about war but they are considered part of the distinct "military strategy school." (Lo 31). They also incorporate – and combine - elements of Daoism and Legalism with Confucian beliefs (Lo 30-31). There is frequent praise of Confucian moral ideals but, as they are practical manuals for winning wars, there is strong recognition of the pragmatic compromises required due to the necessity of war (Lo 32-33). It remains unclear if the referenced moral concepts were influential in decision making or were simply instrumental for excusing immoral wars.

Bearing these complexities in mind, the goal of this chapter is to examine the Confucian belief system, tracing how fundamental values can be interpreted and applied to state governance, international relations, and war. It is very likely that other belief systems influence China's views and behavior but the requirements to rigorously validate one theory using quantitative methodology precludes the rigorous testing of others. Accordingly, discussion of non-Confucian texts is limited to passages where they provide valuable insight into the Confucian conception of war.

THE STRUCTURE AND VALUES OF CONFUCIAN SOCIETY

Confucianism generally holds that the greatest benefits for the most people comes from living in a social system where all members work together towards the good of the community (*tianxia* or "all under heaven") rather than for one's own self-interests (Kang 48; Stalnaker 141; Zhao 55-59). As a result, the individual's identity and role in society are defined according to their relationships with others (Chew and Lim 145; Spina et al 146; Wong). Normative behavior is based upon meeting the obligations and responsibilities of that role rather than on what is protected as the rights of the individual (Locke 25; 33-34; Spina et al 146; Stalnaker 140). Since this system only works if there is strong support and widespread participation,

failure to meet one's obligations or responsibilities disrupts the efficacy of the system and so is a threat to (the interests of) everyone else (Lai 253; Sim 90). Thus, "conformism, collectivism, and social harmony" are existential, moral imperatives (Spina et al 146).

Rooted in the belief that humans are inherently good (or at least born neither good nor bad),² Confucianism asserts that the most effective way to encourage the correct behavior necessary for *tianxia* is through moral education and positive role models (Li 595; Locke 24; Yao 103). The "moral exemplar" – or *junzi* – is one who embodies *ren* - or benevolence or humaneness - to all humans (Cline 110; Wong). As *ren* can also be defined as "overcoming one's selfishness" (Chan 219), proper behavior rather than material gains or ego is the primary goal (Cline 113-114; Zhao 50).

The moral structure of the Confucian system should mean that those of higher integrity and character will naturally fill positions of authority and leadership, thus, serving as role models for ordinary citizens. Though their humaneness and benevolence towards others means that they are entrusted with greater power, this remains contingent on meeting a higher standard of selfless behavior than for those lower in the hierarchy (Chan 232-233; Lai 264).

It is the duty of all citizens to cultivate the highest virtue of *ren* by following codified behavioral norms or "social ethics" (Lo 8) known as the "rules of propriety" (*li*) (Wong). Indeed, *li* not only provides illustrative examples of how to express right intentions as action but, by doing so, it encourages harmonious engagement with the community (Chan 232-233; Lai 253). The more formal connection between conceptual ideals and tangible physical acts created by *li* also makes it a ritualistic practice that helps internalize Confucian ideals (Wong).

² Confucius said that humans had no inclination in either direction while Mencius believed people were inherently inclined to behave well

Proper behavior (*li*) includes moral duties that are explicated according to the five relationship types considered universal to all societies - father-son, sovereign-subordinate, husband-wife, elder-younger sibling, and friend-friend (Hwang 169). This typology codifies that “persons who assume the roles of father, elder brother, husband, elders, or ruler should make decisions in line with the principles of kindness, gentleness, righteousness, kindness, and benevolence respectively. And for those who assume the roles of son, younger brother, wife, juniors, or minister, the principles of filial piety, obedience, submission, deference, loyalty and obedience to instructions of the former group apply” (Hwang 170).

The near-universal familiarity with these dynamics and that most relationships fit fairly well within one of them makes this an effective way to promulgate social norms (Chew and Lim 144-145; Hwang 163-165). The inclusion of the “sovereign-subordinate” relationship not only establishes the government as a paternal authority figure but it taps into the Confucian virtue of filial piety (*xiao*) to foster loyalty and to provide additional moral legitimacy to the status quo hierarchy.

The core Confucian principle of reciprocity, an integral part of *ren*, guides all relationships and moderates hierarchical disparities by emphasizing that “we should not impose on others that which we do not desire” (Chan 223). The moral obligation to be “universally fair and impartial to all peoples” makes it a requirement of *tianxia* (as “virtuous governance of all under heaven”) that policies are not negatively prejudiced based upon geography, religion, cultural, ideology, etc. (Zhao 60). Neo-Confucianism develops this concept further by explaining that *ren* (spelled *Jen* in the following quote) “may be defined in one word: impartiality, but that impartiality is a principle of *Jen* rather than being *Jen* itself, so that *Jen* is both altruism and love, altruism being an application of *Jen*, love being its function” (Jones and Liu 367).

Though some may follow these conventions of appropriate behavior only due to social pressure, because humans are social creatures whose flourishing is connected to that of their community, the compassion for others of *ren* is cultivated only when the practice of *li* is done with *yi* – or sincere motive, “righteousness,” or “integrity and moral character” (Hwang 170). For example, it is through this practice that one’s concept of filial piety or “loyalty” (*xiao*) expands from blood relatives to encompass the community and then humankind. The nature of virtue also means that even an individual’s immoral behavior that does not harm others is still a serious offense because the negative impact it has on their character will affect their relationships and so overall wellbeing of their community (Chan 232).

CONFUCIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Faith in human nature combined with the strongly compelling moral rectitude and pragmatic benefits of the Confucian system means that the instructional practice of *li* and the desire to act with *yi* is believed to be more effective at promoting a harmonious community than law (Locke 26; Sim 91; Wong). As a result, errant behavior need only be corrected through the use of shame and face (Godehardt 24; Locke 37-50). As Confucius said, “Guide them with policies and align them with punishments and the people will evade them and have no shame. Guide them with virtue and align them with *li* and the people will have a sense of shame and fulfill their roles.” (*Analects* 2.3)

The impossibility of entirely avoiding all disagreements means there will be disruptions to peace. However, harmony is more important than peace because it “seeks reasonable resolutions of conflicts and stable security by building truly reliable correlations of mutual benefit in the long run, as well as reciprocal acceptance of the other’s values” (Zhao 48). When, inevitably, conflicts do arise, confrontation should be minimized as “harmony takes conflict as its primary opponent” (Chan 226-227; Li 595). Maintaining harmony via positive “interpersonal relationships over strict rule of law” (Locke 48) creates a strong preference to

resolve conflicts through accommodation, compromise, and avoidance (Li 595; Locke 70). How this should be done is further prescribed (*li*) based upon which, if any, of the five types of relationships applies and the relative “intimacy/distance and superiority/inferiority” between parties (Chew and Lim 145; Godehardt 24; Hwang, “Chinese Relationalism” 168; Locke 37-50).

Parties of relatively equal status are both likely to accommodate, compromise, or avoid the conflict (Hwang, “CR” 172; Kirkbride et al. 372; Locke 55-58). A code of idealistic behavior based upon relationships also means that a conflict between strangers have little “collective good to consider” (Hwang, “CR” 172; Locke 56-57). While benevolence and preservation of harmony are still expected, the obligation to avoid confrontation is substantially less and even physical violence may be acceptable (Hwang, “CR” 170-172).

The rules of propriety stipulate that seniors shall be given deference in a disagreement - regardless of what *seems* fair or right (Chew and Lim 145; Kirkbride et al. 368). The promotion and preservation of harmony is a critical consideration for proper behavior but other Confucian moral values – such as those of humaneness and righteousness - should not be compromised simply for this purpose (Chan 221-223; Locke 32). Yet, while the senior party should still behave in a way that demonstrates moral leadership, because seniority indicates greater virtue, it is more acceptable for them to be confrontational (Hwang, “CR” 170; Locke 54). Though acts that deliberately cause subordinates to lose face can reflect poorly on the senior as well (Chen 7), the shaming of a junior may be justified as it is not only a reprimand but also a tool to “teach a moral lesson and to motivate the individual to” respect “the rules of propriety” (Locke 54-55).

The relational morality of Confucianism and the importance of right motive for *ren* and *li* means that there are few fixed rules and little accountability for how Confucian morality is

interpreted and applied (Wong). Resolving disagreements based upon preserving harmony by following the rules of a rigid hierarchy rather than according to an objective standard such as equity leaves little opportunity for junior parties to seek justice.

The importance of truth and who is objectively correct is further marginalized because the Confucian moral imperative to show greater benevolence/humaneness (*ren*) to closer relationships makes partiality and favoritism expected and acceptable (Hwang, “CR” 167-168). Filial piety, which serves as a model for the broader application of “love with distinctions,” reinforces the priority of close relations over even the law (Wong). Confucius establishes this in his oft-quoted response to whether a son should turn his father in to the authorities for stealing a sheep “The upright [righteous] men in my country are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness [Righteousness] is to be found in this” (*Analects* 13:18). Hence, it is neither uncommon nor inappropriate for the weaker party to find indirect and non-confrontational ways to pursue their interests anyway (Hwang, “CR” 172; Locke 60-61).

CONFUCIAN MODEL OF GOVERNANCE

The roles and responsibilities for the state and its citizens are structured according to the same Confucian hierarchical model where, like the ideal family, the people and the leaders work together to support and benefit the community by fulfilling the duties designated by their position (Chan 219; Lai 264-265; Sim 89; Spina et al 152; Stalnaker 140, 144; Xiang 156; Zhao 61). Governing with the priority of *ren*, *yi*, and *li* will foster the same sense of devotion in citizens and soldiers as the “familial love and affection” between father and son (Stalnaker 136-138). The political equivalent of the interpersonal concept of *ren* is *renzheng* (“benevolent or humane governance”) (Lo 8).

Unlike the Western individualistic system where all people have the same rights regardless of position in society, state officials in the Confucian social and professional hierarchies enjoy greater privileges but also are held to higher standards of conduct and have more weighty obligations. The idea is that if they are not concerned about their material needs then their concerns will be free to focus on the welfare of citizens rather than on their own. Their selfless virtue, which is why they occupy their positions, ensures that they will not abuse their power or privilege (Stalnaker 138). The greater virtue of higher authorities provides some leeway but they still must be seen by the general population as complying with mores and norms (Loy 235).

In fact, to encourage selfless devotion and sacrifice by government officials, Confucius emphasizes that a “noble man” (*chun-tzu*) dedicates himself to “a life of continuing struggle” for virtuous service regardless of reward or recognition (DeBary143-144). Some argue that this implies an additional moral obligation of the *chun-tzu* is to stand up for his principles even at great personal risk (De Bary 144-145).

Most rulers followed the Confucian practice of promoting government officials and ministers based upon virtue and competence yet it was commonplace to legitimate emperors and rulers of vassal states based upon hereditary relationships (Jones and Liu 368; Stalnaker 140). However, the ruler’s authority still derived from holding the Mandate of Heaven – which was contingent upon him continuing to fulfill his duties (Stroble 175; Twiss and Chan 96). Confucian thought maintains that if the leader was “competent and moral” in his duties then the people will follow suit - while disharmony within society is due the leader failing to create a properly ordered (governmental) system (Johnston, “CR” 66; Lo 8; Stroble 169). Such failures, if sufficiently severe, could result in the ruler losing the Mandate, which may justify a regime change (Scobell, “CUMF” 25; Yao 95-96).

Ensuring a harmonious environment where all people can develop *ren* was the ultimate goal (Godehardt 25; Twiss and Chan 96; Yao 94) but it was understood that this tended to require “adequate food, clothing, housing, education” as well as physical safety (Twiss and Chan 97). The Emperor’s moral legitimacy was also based upon him being the exemplary model of Confucian behavior by using his power to benefit his people rather than to promote his own interests (Johnston, “CR” 45; Lai 263; Yao 95). The modern analog of the Mandate of Heaven in China, the “support of the people,” is still a critical consideration for the CCP.

These standards conceptually helped avoid the potential for corruption from the required ruler-designated or hereditary inheritance of the Mandate and the practice of appointing “relatives to be rulers of vassal states” (Jones and Liu 368; Twiss and Chan 93-94, 96). The efficacy and legitimacy of this system is more difficult to determine as the narrative used *ex post facto* to justify most every regime change was that “each ancient dynasty was founded by a virtuous sage-king who militarily overthrew the wicked last king of the previous dynasty” (Loy 231).

CONFUCIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WAR

The belief that a society and system of governance based upon Confucianism is the best way for the most people to flourish means that the Confucian normative social construct extends to how the international system should be “ordered” - or governed - and how state conflicts should be resolved (Lo 8; Stalnaker 147; Zhao 51-52). As the birthplace of Confucianism, China best embodies the virtuous behavior of Confucian governance - which legitimates its rightful place at the top of the moral and political hierarchy (Burles and Shulsky 81). Confidence in the superiority of this system means not only that foreigners would immigrate to China (Stalnaker 141) but, especially after experiencing the benefits of China’s benevolence to others, smaller countries will desire China’s regional leadership (Chan 218-219; Zhao 51).

Feng Zhang summarizes that,

The early Ming neo-Confucian theory of foreign policy would be: the Chinese emperor, as the patriarch and ultimate authority of the world, should treat his subjects—internal ministers and peoples of the empire as well as outer vassals and peoples beyond his administrative realm—with moral excellence (*de* 德) expressed as humaneness (*ren* 仁) and grace (*en* 恩). Humaneness is practically manifested in China's nurturing and fostering (*fu yu* 抚育) of foreign peoples, while grace is expressed as its munificent care for their needs, both embodied in the term *rou yuan* (柔远) or *huai rou yuan ren* (怀柔远人 win the admiration of people from afar through kindness). The emperor should be humane by loving and nurturing the lives of all peoples with sympathy and compassion, and be gracious by being generous and tolerant towards them, so acting in accordance with the Confucian *li* (礼 propriety) and *yi* (义 appropriateness). He should try to develop integrity (*cheng* 诚) and trustworthiness (*xin* 信) in fulfilling these principles. Most important of all, he should always strive to cultivate his moral excellence as the ultimate means to attract the emulative submission of peoples from afar. (203-204)

Confucianism's optimism about human nature means that the international system is not seen as a “fundamentally antagonistic” place (Li 595). Confidence in the efficacy and rectitude of the Confucian system and in the innate inclination of humans to be moral means that ethical transgressions are often being attributed to a lack of proper understanding rather than evil intent (Johnston, “CR” 45). Especially since the inherently destructive nature of war only further disrupts harmony (Johnston, “CR” 25; Stroble 169), the use of force is considered “inauspicious,” “to be avoided,” and a “last resort” (Feng 647; Godehardt 10, Johnston, “CR” 62; Lo 10). A more effective and more humane corrective action than forcing compliance is to provide role models and (re)education that demonstrate the superiority of Confucian China and that encourages proper behavior (Stalnaker 149; Stroble 168; Yao 107).

Other states were permitted to subscribe to non-Confucian systems and often to retain autonomy as long as, in accordance with the power dynamics explicated in the Confucian model, they still “show submission in return for Chinese protection” and “pay tributes” to China (Dellios). These rules of propriety (*li*) indicated that the international system was properly ordered and that interstate relationships were in harmony. Thus, non-Confucian states were provided with the resources that would convince them of the superiority of the Chinese Confucian model of moral governance.

China's possession of the Mandate of Heaven, its conviction of moral and cultural superiority, and its belief to be the center of the universe meant that the ruler's authority extended to all on earth and it was his responsibility to make sure that all people enjoyed the benefits of living in a properly ordered society (Dellios; Godehardt, 9, 18, 24; Zhang, Feng 203; Zhang, Tiejun 76). As a result, there was little differentiation between internal and external threats or how they should be addressed (Godehardt 18, 24; Scobell, "CUMF" 24; Turner 305; Twiss and Chan 124; Zhang, Feng 203). Immediate threats resistant to moral measures may require being countered using deterrence, accommodation, and coercion (Dellios; Feng 647; Godehardt 10, 22; Johnston, "CR" 26) while the preferred method of long term enculturation takes effect (Burles and Shulsky 80-82; Johnston, "CR" 65, 68, 188). A similar argument for accommodation and enculturation was made when China was occupied by foreigners.

Avoiding or limiting war is ideal (Lo 76-77) but, when war was deemed the necessary response, as the contemporary Chinese scholar Tiewa Liu of Beijing Foreign Studies University sums, "they [Confucians] think moral principles rather than national interests should be the primary concern when launching a war" (Liu 560). Similarly, the most important consideration for how to use force morally is that it is done with *ren* and *yi* (Twiss and Chan 99). Still, as Mencius states, even "using force in the name of humaneness" was immoral and qualified as hegemony (Twiss and Chan 96). The corpus of military strategy, *The Seven Military Classics*, also acknowledges that the Confucian notion of a just or righteous war (*yizhan*) means that war may "sometimes be necessary" and so can be just/righteous (*yi*) but it "is deeply deplorable; it is bad and tragic" (Lo 32-35). That war is never fully moral implies there to be a moral remainder that closely resembles the Western notion of "dirty hands."

Lo seems to further allude to this by contrasting the Confucian view that "the prima facie wrongness of mass killing, intentional or collateral, persists in spite of being outweighed by other, weightier moral concerns" to the Western view that "[t]he morality or immorality of

any use of armed force is, finally . . . a matter of . . . who uses it, why, and how” (Johnson 2005, 27 qtd. in Lo 35). At the same time, the greater moral consideration of context and intent attributed to Western ethics than to Confucian virtue ethics is contrary to their general characterizations. Indeed, Confucianism’s lack of “moral absolutism” and, instead, its emphasis on the specific situation, suggests that there exists no concept similar to “dirty hands” (Kim, “Dirty Hands” 152-154). Even if the Confucian morality of war cannot consider context, as Lo argues, the prerequisite virtue necessary for someone to occupy a position of leadership makes it highly unlikely there was the belief that “a political leader must sometimes do the wrong thing to do the right thing” (Kim, “Dirty Hands” 154). Furthermore, Confucianism did not hold there to be “two separate standards for the political and the moral, which implies the impossibility of the problem of dirty hands” (Kim, “Dirty Hands” 158).

Notwithstanding the potential disagreement about the possibility of dirty hands, these preferences are consistent with Confucian pacifistic beliefs but they also could derive from other motives. The moral imperative of Confucian harmony creates little room for alternative views and beliefs (Zhang, Ellen 220). Morality that reinforces the status quo hierarchy for Confucians serves a similar purpose as the strict rules used by the Legalists (Zhang, Ellen 220). As Zhang points out, “the Confucian argument on a strong, unitary state is in line with the Legalist argument that domestic unity is the key to interstate competitiveness, a position also held by the Chinese government today” (220).

It is difficult to determine the sincerity of moral justifications since, for example, the morality and pragmatic efficacy of using force against an occupier or a competitor state powerful enough to resist China’s demands suggests that accommodation is the better option. Similarly, the moral basis of the tributary system could incentivize wars for self-interested reasons as, at times, it led to Chinese rulers seeking to expand the number of tributary states as a testament to the “virtue and legitimacy” of their rule (Zhang, Ellen 217).

The conditions that qualify for using force as “self-defense,” “defense of others,” and “only as a last resort” make it further difficult to distinguish the roles of self-interest and moral incentives. For example, the moral obligations of possessing the Mandate of Heaven includes ensuring that all people are governed according to Confucian humaneness and benevolence – which the Confucian ruler of China is most qualified to do (Lo 8). Tolerance for other states to use non-Confucian forms of governance is contingent on them fulfilling the rituals of the tributary system.

Yet, it is a moral requirement of virtuous behavior and a necessity for self-defense that China must be the most powerful state and other states must recognize China’s moral and physical superiority by complying with its stipulated norms (Godehardt 19). This demonstrates a deep insecurity and a low tolerance for disagreements that bears notable resemblance to the goals of a regional hegemon (Stalnaker 50).

The intertwining of ethics and politics (Kim, “Mencius” 33; Yao 94) generates both a moral and security imperative to correct those who willfully violate Confucian norms, which includes those who don’t recognize China’s rightful place at the top of the hierarchy (Dellios; Godehardt 19; Scobell, “CUMF” 20; Stroble 173-175; Lo 8; Yao 96-97). If the accommodation and education provided by the tributary system does not correct and convince – or even “are likely to fail” - then war is the only remaining option to punish the stubbornly-ignorant and poor leaders, rescue the people, and correct the immoral conditions (Godehardt 9; Twiss and Chan 127-128). In fact, “coercion and administrative control” to promote enculturation was often ineffective (Zhang, Feng 201-202). Even if nonviolent methods are preferred, the perceived superiority, moral obligation, and pragmatic necessity of the China-led, Confucian-based domestic and regional system very easily create the conditions where the actions of others require the use of force (Johnston, “CR” 68; Stalnaker 149).

Just as it is immoral to permit individual behavior that is contrary to *ren* (Chan 230), Confucian texts describe the tyrannical conditions that, in some combination, *require* interventions, or “punitive expeditions” (Lo 8-9; Twiss and Chan 99-100; Yao 97). They include “deprivation of peoples’ livelihood, separation of families, murder, misuse of the criminal justice system (e.g., impunity for perpetrators), barbaric treatment of individuals (e.g., torture), predation or stealing people’s goods, terrorization of the population at large, and what is effectively internal chaos or anarchy” (Twiss and Chan 124-125).

Interventions may also be conducted “for the sole just cause of rendering criminal justice for past crimes by a tyrannical ruler or government” (Twiss and Chan 130). Leaders or entire governments that violate Confucian virtues, rites, and practices have failed their people and proven themselves unfit to rule, so may need to be removed (Zhang, Feng 210). This logic means that the conditions that make war just also obligate rescuing the people through nothing less than regime change (Lo 8; Turner 299-300; Twiss and Chan 124-127). It could be argued that this is strikingly similar to classic revisionist intentions.

The importance of deontological rights is not clear from the rules of interventions because the threshold conditions for tyranny focus on material issues such as “the people’s material welfare and physical security” rather than “civil and political liberties” (Twiss and Chan 125). They don’t require or mention the obligation to provide conditions that permit or encourage the flourishing of virtuous character. Additionally, toppling a foreign government in order to uphold its “criminal law” seems disproportionate – as does the suffering and destruction inflicted from the war needed to intervene (Twiss and Chan 131).

In addition to mistreating its citizens (Bell 35; Kim, “Mencius” 52-56; Lo 36),³ Confucian texts list conditions that justify corrective applications of force including when

³ Bell and Kim disagree about some details of what kind of mistreatment warrants intervention

another state is experiencing political upheaval (Godehardt 19), is in violation of the rules of propriety towards China (Burles and Shulsky 83), or is experiencing most any source of disharmony (Godehardt 19; Lo 36). In fact, the citizens would be so grateful for China's virtuous rule that its invading force would be welcomed as "liberators" (Stalnaker 141).

No different than most other ideologies, historical interpretations of Confucian views of war range from pacifist to being permissible self-defense to counter even slight violations of the China-led Confucian world order. However, a pattern of claims that punitive force is moral and necessary because most any dissent has the potential to become a highly "infectious" threat to China's internal stability demonstrates the expansive and high degree of control China has felt it must have in order to be minimally secure (Godehardt 10, 14, 19, 25; Turner 300). Such anxiety heightens the sensitivity to possible disruptive elements and fosters the perception that existential threats are ever present.

This is further evidenced by the argument that resistance to China's moral rectification not only represents severe "potential danger" but it also makes China's wars against those who resist punitive in nature (Godehardt 19; Lo 8-9). According to this logic, the failure of *ren* and *yi* "to attain the desired [moral and political] objectives" (Lo 35-36) proves that nonviolent, moral options are ineffective so even preventative or preemptive war may be morally justified as a tough lesson as well as a necessary, last resort for self-defense (Dellios; Feng 647; Godehardt 19).

Punitive expeditions may help align state relations but not having embraced the China-led Confucian system is also a likely indicator that the people are fundamentally "immoral, if not subhuman" (Burles and Shulsky 83-84; Waldron 81-114). Thus, a properly-ordered status quo Confucian tributary relationship still requires China to maintain a high degree of control. The concept of "punitive expedition" is strongly coercive (Zhang, Feng 204) and the characters

for it, *zheng* (征) or *zhengfa* (征伐), reflect this as they suggest “conquest and subjugation” (Zhang, Ellen 209-210).

Though the Confucian worldview and underlying moral reasoning is rational and may be sincere, the low threshold for war does not demonstrate strong restraint nor is it consistent with Confucian ideals. The belief that ensuring a properly ordered world and social system permits using force not only to correct improper behavior but also to deter future moral violations is a rather expansive and intolerant interpretation of Confucianism (Dellios; Godehardt 19; Twiss and Chan 125). The same moral standards of behavior and war are also not extended to other states as would be expected from Confucian principles such as reciprocity. Furthermore, deliberate or not, the conflation of the “in defense of others” and the “in self-defense” just causes of war and of its moral and pragmatic incentives also obscure the actual motives. It may be that practical incentives are provided to help convince rulers to respect moral restraints but it also makes it easier for China to justify wars to pursue its interests.

The standards and reasoning for righteous wars also have striking resemblance to Legalist and realist beliefs (Yao 108). For example, some Confucians have admitted that not only may the use of force be justified to bring state relationships into proper order but sometimes it may even be the most effective means of doing so (Johnston, “CR” 72; Scobell, “CUMF” 20). Also, Legalism and Confucianism both consider war a punitive measure that should be minimized, only used with the right motives, and with measured severity (Turner 297-300). While some Confucians admit that punishments are not only important but must be appropriately severe to be effective, some Legalist authors have “recognized that appropriately severe punishments were important for maintaining order, but they also cautioned that harsh

punishments prevented further violence only if the ruler refrained from using them out of anger or revenge” (Turner 305-307).

Still, the ruler’s authority to engage in a war is presumably constrained because its righteousness depends upon the support of the people (Kim, “Mencius” 52; Turner 298-299). Classic texts warn that self-interested reasons for war such as for “vindictive motives” (Turner 297-298), “conquest,” “profit,” or any other “personal gain” (Godehardt 19; Stroble 173; Yao 99) demonstrate “moral weakness” that could result in the loss of the Mandate of Heaven (Godehardt 9). On the other hand, wars with moral motives generate greater commitment to a collective effort and greater willingness to help it succeed (Stalnaker 136-138).

The importance of the support, loyalty, and obedience of the citizens, military, and ministers – even over “technical mastery of strategy, tactics, and fighting skills” at times – is explained using moral language but is also a pragmatic argument to convince leaders of the efficacy of the Confucian approach to address persistent problems of rebellious vassal states, aggressive external states, and untrustworthy bureaucrats and populace (Stalnaker 136-138). Indeed, Xunzi saw the Qin Dynasty’s successful rise to power using Legalist principles of “proto-totalitarian social control” as a direct threat to the Confucian model and thus tried to “make the Confucian Way seem more effective, and not just more admirable” (Stalnaker 137). Neo-Confucianism similarly evolved during the Song Dynasty (979-1279 CE) in response to concerns about the growing influence of Buddhism (Jones and Liu 366).

Assuring rulers of the utility of Confucian morality raises doubts that the system of beliefs actually restricts their ability to pursue self-interests. While force is considered a tool appropriate only for political purposes (Godehardt 19; Lo 17), even the legitimate objectives tended to be ones that specifically benefited those currently in power (Godehardt 25). That only a ruler who possessed the Mandate of Heaven had the moral authority to authorize a war and

that it was not uncommon to appoint relatives to rule tributary nations (Lo 9-10; Twiss and Chan 93-95; Yao 96) presumably reduced the frequency of violent power struggles but it also made it difficult for citizens of China or tributary nations to challenge even a corrupt status quo distribution of power (Scobell, “CUMF” 20; Stroble 173).

The greater privilege and the supposed greater virtue of those in positions of authority restricts the ability of ordinary people to criticize, forget constrain, leaders who are trying to justify self-serving behavior that conflicts with the common good. The righteousness of using force largely depends upon motive and situational context rather than on specific rules (Johnston, “CR” 69; Lo 11). Yet it is not easy to disprove the veracity of stated motives, highly subjective interpretations of complex political problems, or the reasoning of what response is most virtuous. The lack of objective metrics to help determine the role of Confucian morality in the decision makes it easier for a leader to disingenuously claim or self-deceptively convince themselves of having virtuous motives (Lo 11; Zhang, Ellen 217).

Morality is valuable in of itself because it upholds fundamental ideals of what behavior that affects others is “right” and “good” but pointing out the pragmatic benefits of Confucianism in order to make the value of applying it to real world problems more convincing does not invalidate or diminish the legitimacy of its moral component. An important distinction is which benefit is the primary motivation for its use. That is to say whether virtuous behavior is done because it is right and for the greater good or because it is profitable.

The compelling moral value of Confucian thinking about war is that it promotes a humane, compassionate, and harmonious environment conducive for the development of character. This should be equally available to all or, perhaps, it is more important and more compassionate to provide to those most in need. However, the description of the properly ordered conditions best suited for promoting the moral benefits of Confucian governance in

classic texts resembles regional hegemony. Though rulers should not engage in wars for personal gains, ultimately, the benefits of punitive expeditions to restore a harmonious tributary system are largely material and are unevenly distributed, favoring the Chinese people over vassal states.

The moral legitimacy of interventions does consider the opinions of non-Chinese people but the metrics used are biased and self-validating. Texts argue that the success of an intervention demonstrates that it had popular approval by the citizens “rescued” from tyrannical rule and that third-party states demonstrate their support for these wars simply by the fact that China’s ruler possesses the Mandate of Heaven (Twiss and Chan 129). Thus, the lack of outright revolt by the citizens of China and the country it attacked validates the properly virtuous motive of the China’s leader, proving that the war is moral and “an expression of legitimate rule rather than a means of establishing legitimacy” (Stroble 175). After a punitive expedition has replaced an immoral government with a Confucian one led by a ruler loyal to China, the morality of annexing it is based upon similar metrics of “the people’s approval” (Twiss and Chan 129).

This logic conflates the moral and non-moral aspects of the efficacy of force, creating the risk that not only does “might make right” but might makes it morally right. Accordingly, virtue would be based upon power. Such a relationship between power and the use of force very closely resembles that of offensive realism.

Taken at face value, guidance from the progenitors of Confucian thought provide a check on such potential abuses of power by emphasizing the overriding importance of virtuous interpretation and application of Confucian ideals. For example, Xunzi argues that it is the obligation of ministers to do what is most moral for the state and its citizens even if it requires

manipulating, disobeying, or protesting their ruler to the point of banishment or execution (De Bary 144-145; Stalnaker 143).

However, this could make it just as virtuous to manipulate the people in order to garner their support for a ruler's decision that ministers felt benefitted the state - including to ensure society remains harmonious when a ruler makes an unpopular decision. The potential for abuse is further exacerbated because this check on power is not balanced. Even in the ideal Confucian society, the common people and common soldiers are not sufficiently virtuous to be trusted with this discretionary latitude (Stalnaker 143).

Concerns that a political-moral hierarchy based upon subjective conceptions of virtue may create conditions ripe for abuse are not unfounded. Though it is not clear who was really manipulating ideology for self-interest, it was claimed that the (ab)use of Confucian morality by rulers of vassal states to justify wars of "aggression and tyranny" led to both Mencius and Xunzi emphasizing the limited authority to authorize war (Twiss and Chan 95). It is similarly due to the recognized potential to "dogmatize" and (ab)use Confucianism's strict definitions of morality as purely "utilitarian calculation" that Daoism rejects virtues like *ren* (Zhang, Feng 213-214). Bearing in mind that Legalism was a competing ideology during the Warring States Period, the seminal Legalist Shang Yang rejected Confucian moral restrictions as merely "opportune" and "expedient" (Lo 249). In fact, instances in China's history where Confucian morality has been (ab)used or manipulated to acquire greater power or territory, legitimate the authority of rebel leaders, or justify immoral wars for other self-interests – including in the Han, Qin, Ming, Northern and Southern, Zhou, and other Dynasties – are so numerous that this practice has been described as "commonplace in imperial China" (De Bary 154-156; Jones and Liu 365-366; Lo 265; Twiss and Chan 94-95; Zhang, Ellen 217).

More contemporary examples of likely manipulation include Mao's moral justifications for the use of force which claimed legitimate just causes ranging from only by "oppressed people united to fight against the oppressors" to "establishment of perpetual peace" to "inducing progress" (Lo 48). Modern PLA writings assert that just wars are ones that "promote the fundamental interests of the people and advance social progress" (Lo 49). The examples given include "the oppressed and exploited peoples' fight for liberation, colonized countries' fight for independence and against international oppression, and sovereign nations' fight against aggression" while the "sources of unjust wars in the modern era are imperialism and hegemony" (Lo 49). Internal stability seems to be included as a just cause as demonstrated by the heavy-handed use of the PLA to deal with more recent incidences of domestic unrest (Scobell, "Real SC" 216).

The continued influence of Confucianism can be seen in how the provocative claim of a 1958 Manifesto by the "New Confucians" that "the West misunderstood Chinese culture and values, necessitating action by China to claim its rightful place in world affairs" has stoked the intensity of China's political-ideological clashes with the West over the past fifty-plus years (Jones and Liu 370-372). Though the Confucian worldview continues to influence China's foreign policy goals, the constraints of the contemporary international system have tempered China's use of force as a corrective measure (Jones and Liu 370-372). Yet, citing Xunzi's quote, "The humane man uses his state not just to maintain what he already possesses and nothing more; instead, he will unite people," Stalnaker prognosticates that, "since, by definition, a hegemonic power is far from perfect, it could and should be supplanted by any state that could do a better job, by its leaders' own lights. It is easy to imagine contemporary Chinese leaders viewing the United States in just this light, as a flawed hegemon worthy of being supplanted" (150).

CONFUCIAN BEHAVIOR IN WAR

“Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it." (*Analects* 12:19)

Although Confucianism can be interpreted to permit force in self-defense and to “remove tyranny” even *The Seven Military Classics* specifically state that wars are still expected to be fought in a moral way that minimizes suffering and destruction (Lo 8-9, 34). The strong distaste for violence clearly shown in Confucian primary texts mean that state behavior should show an obvious inclination for holistic stratagems to defensively deter and coerce when avoidance, compromise, and accommodation are not viable options (Dellios; Godehardt 10, 22, 25; Johnston, “CR” 25-26; Newmyer 492-493; Scobell, “C&SC” 3). Similar to the Just War theory principles of last resort, proportionality, and discrimination, there should be a high threshold for what severity of threat warrants the use force and, even when absolutely necessary, there is still a preference for “minimal violence and defensive wars of maneuver or attrition” (Feng 647; Twiss and Chan 100-105).

Because, as Turner says, “by Han times, the good ruler was defined in part as one who could control violence” (294), force was generally used to achieve specific, narrow political goals once the situation has been molded so that the probability of victory was high (Dellios; Newmyer 493; Stroble 181). Accordingly, the stratagems laid out in *The Seven Military Classics* ideally deter and coerce but also prepare the battlefield before the application of actual force (Dellios; Godehardt 10, 22, 25; Johnston, “CR” 25-26; Lo 17-18; Newmyer 492-493; Scobell, “C&SC” 3). The assertion that the use of such tactics is based upon the assumed inevitability of war rather than as a viable alternative to it is supported by lines in *The Seven Military Classics* such as, ““When these twelve measures are fully employed, the conditions

are ready for military actions to accomplish the goal...When the signs are favorable to us, attack the enemy” (Lo 43). Such “dual use” tactics include strengthening alliances while trying to divide those of the opponent as well as creating positive and negative diplomatic, economic, and psychological effects as well as symbolic confrontations to convey intent, to test the opponents resolve, to understand the enemy’s plans, and to identify points of weakness (Dellios; Godehardt 10, 22, 25; Newmyer 492-493; Scobell, “C&SC” 3).

The Confucian predilection for limited war means that once conditions are optimal, there should be targeted application of force intended to quickly lead to negotiations that achieve specific, narrow political goals rather than full-scale, open-ended warfare (Feng 647). Confucian texts provide a number of illustrative recommendations for how and why this is done.

For one, a characteristic of a skilled General is that he keeps the scale of the war limited so that he retains the ability to create and control conditions to be most favorable for victory (Burles and Shulsky 88-89). Additionally, since the intent of a just war is to punish the leader and correct the state for violating Confucian norms (Lo 37; Turner 304-305; Yao 96), the effects should be directed towards the guilty leaders and minimized for captured, surrendered, and fleeing combatants as well as for innocent civilians (Johnston, “CR” 70; Lo 8-9, 37-39; Stroble 181; Twiss and Chan 104; Turner 301; Yao 96). Chinese soldiers, accordingly, should refrain from activities like destroying crops, plundering, taking unnecessary prisoners, or harming/killing innocent civilians – especially the young and the elderly (Bell 37; Lo 8-9, 38-40; Turner 302). Once the war is won, the victorious party should consult the people when appointing a new ruler (Twiss and Chan 104) and refrain from imposing heavy demands or compliance with their cultural norms until there had been sufficient time to convince the occupied people that this regime change was beneficial (Lo 9, 39; Turner 302).

Limited wars also help minimize the disruptive impact on China's domestic stability. For example, since the Chinese army was mostly conscripted peasants, Confucianism advises that wars should not be conducted during planting and harvesting times (Turner 301; Yao 99) nor should they last longer than "a single season" (Twiss and Chan 103).

The moral benefits of reducing the suffering and destruction for both China and its opponent through restricting the scale of violent conflict just discussed are consistent with Confucian ideals (Yao 98-99). These guidelines also have significant similarities to the *jus in bello* principles of proportionality and discrimination (Twiss and Chan 100-105; Lo 18). Also like Just War theory, the Confucian preference to limit the scale and violent tactics of conflicts reflects holistic and long-term consideration of pragmatic efficacy (Johnston, "CR" 71). One notable difference, though, is that those who advocate for JWT tend to focus on the reduction of harm and suffering as the primary goal while Confucian texts argue for constraint by emphasizing how doing so will help China's wars achieve their intended political goals.

Another example is that Twiss and Chan support their assertion that there are both moral and pragmatic benefits to "limiting damage to soldiers and civilians alike, and on both sides of a conflict" by referencing Xunzi's statement,

When others defend the ramparts of their cities and send out knights to do battle with me and I overcome them through superior power, then the number of casualties among their population is necessarily very great. Where casualties have been extreme, the population is bound to hate me with vehemence . . . then each day their desire to fight against me will grow. . . . [Also] the number of casualties among my own population is certain to be very great . . . [if so] they are certain to have a fierce dislike for me . . . then each day they will have less desire to fight for me . . . so as others grow willing to fight, my own people will grow less willing to defend me. In this way the cause of my former strength is reversed. (Hsün-tzu 1990, 98–99; 9.7). (103-104)

The passages from *The Seven Military Classics* that Lo points to as evidence of *in bello* moral constraint further demonstrate how the morality of constrained warfare helps China achieve political ends. For example, *Master Wu's Art of War* proposes that minimizing the harm to noncombatants differentiates a righteous and unrighteous army because it demonstrates

the virtuous intent of “suppressing the violently perverse and rescuing the people from chaos” (Lo 39). The pragmatic benefit of such behavior is that it “will show the populace that you do not harbor vicious intentions” (Lo 39).

The text concludes its support for constrained warfare by making the moral argument that “when they had executed the guilty, the king, together with the feudal lords, corrected and rectified [the government and customs] of the state. They raised up the Worthy, established an enlightened ruler, and corrected and restored their feudal position and obligations” (Lo 39). Certainly, concern for innocent, oppressed people reflects humaneness and compassion but these guides for military strategy clearly show that the end goal is that the rescued population doesn’t revolt. A complacent population morally legitimates as well as creates the practical conditions for annexation or at least a properly ordered tributary relationship. As previously discussed, the moral reasoning for *tianxia* may be sincere but it benefits China more than vassal states.

Many of the cited passages directly or indirectly reference *yi* and *ren* to add a moral component to the benefits of restraint for achieving political goals. Lo concludes from them that there was seen to be both pragmatic and moral advantages to limiting behavior in war but he spends little time addressing their relative importance. For example, he recounts recommended restrictions and follows them with statements such as “Besides, as the goal of such a military campaign is to rectify wrongdoing and to restore proper order, such discreet conduct is needed to help reach this political goal,” “Hence restraining oneself from barbarity in the conduct of war is also for a political purpose, namely to win the hearts and minds of the populace so that order may be promptly restored *post bellum*,” and “in *The Seven Military Classics* the concern for noncombatants during war has both a moral and a political dimension; both are indispensable” (Lo 40-41).

Twiss and Chan do briefly discuss how the limits in war could be for deontological moral reasons or as a pragmatic military strategy to win “the hearts and minds of enemy forces and their civilian populations” (Twiss and Chan 104-105). They conclude that both may be operable but the professed moral motives are sincere because they are consistent with both Mencius and Xunzi’s deontological belief that the only acceptable political goals for a righteous war are to promote the good for all people (Twiss and Chan 105). While the moral duty to avoid unnecessary harm – especially to civilians – is consistent with an end goal of bringing about a greater good, it is not sufficient proof to claim, as they do, that this refutes Johnston’s analysis that Confucian texts indicate no *jus in bello* constraints as “in a righteous war the ends justify the means” (Twiss and Chan 114 note 21).

They discuss several other passages by Mencius which more convincingly demonstrate principled condemnation of killing innocents but notably do not address the concept of *in bello* proportionality (Twiss and Chan 105). This is consistent with other Confucian texts which advise that once the use of force is deemed just and the environment had been cultivated to strongly favor China, targeted but decisive force should be used to ensure victory (Dellios). Decisive force in this context means maximizing the odds at strategic points rather than launching large invasions but also implies aggressive use of overwhelming military power (Johnston, “CR” 25-26). The lack of principled objection to unnecessary, excessive harm in war is further evidenced by the fact that, contrary to deontological priorities, “the disproportionate use of some weapons is not explicitly prohibited in *The Seven Military Classics*” (Lo 43).

One of the historical examples cited to support the Confucian emphasis on not harming innocents is when one ruler’s (the Earle of Ge) army killed an innocent boy and stole his food supplies, the other ruler (Tang) sent his army “to punish Ge” for the offense (Twiss and Chan 105). As Twiss and Chan point out, the moral of this story centers on the deontological offenses

of theft and plunder (Twiss and Chan 106). However, claiming that it promotes noncombatant immunity is more of a stretch as the anecdote talks about starting a righteous punitive war rather than what is morally acceptable behavior in war. It also echoes the relative unimportance of the teleological principles of last resort and proportionality seen in other Confucian texts.

Furthermore, these passages are still rife with implied destruction. For example, the previously discussed admonition to spare the general population in order to prove there are no “vicious intentions” starts with “Now as to the Way [Dao] for attacking the enemy and besiege his cities: After his cities and towns have already been shattered, enter each of the palaces, take control of their bureaucrats, and collect their implements [of administration]” (Lo 39). There is little discrimination between civilian and military targets if cities and towns are “shattered” and such destruction seems disproportionate and unnecessary. Yet the passage and Lo’s analysis of it seem to assume that the siege and devastation of the city are such a given that they don’t address it when citing the passage in support of *in bello* constraints.

The role of Confucian ethics is further revealed by how *ren* and *yi* are applied to the normative discussions about wars of self-defense. Some Western scholars contend that states, as political constructs, do not possess the same right of self-defense as humans as state sovereignty does not justify violating a human’s right to life the way that a human’s right to life and liberty does (Cook 141-148). This is a particularly relevant criticism because Confucian standards of legitimate government and virtuous behavior render the preservation of the government even less worth the harms of war (Stroble 181). Weak states are a sign of illegitimate rule so, at some point, as Confucius states, it is more humane and just for the “corrupt” ruler and government to surrender or flee than to continue fighting (Stroble 181-182). However, this reasoning is not mentioned in recorded debates about China’s wars except as an *ex post facto* justification of regime changes. Instead, the morality of continuing wars of

diminishing chances of victory discuss the efficacy of achieving political goals rather than on humane, harmonious well-being of the people.

Discouraging wanton killing is much less politically controversial than suggesting to a ruler that he should abdicate or even refrain from using advantageous but destructive tactics. Indeed, objectionable acts like harming captured enemy soldiers and civilians, destroying crops, plundering, and imposing heavy demands after victory offer little advantage for winning the battle or war but they would create additional resentment and resistance once the enemy was defeated (Lo 17; Stroble 181). The multiple indications that Confucian guidance makes little effort, overall, to limit the primacy of military efficacy means that it is unclear how well Confucian constraints would hold up when they conflict with it.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFUCIAN MORALITY

There is no consensus about which of the three models of Western ethics best describes Confucianism. (Tiwald 58-60) Virtue ethics center on the actor rather than on the act but the best expression of character still involves weighing the relative desirability of the possible options. The righteousness of using force is based on when it is more humane and compassionate to do harm in order to bring about a greater good. This is done by considering what is “right” according to deontological moral duties, what is “good” according to teleological ends, or some combination of the two. Therefore, virtue ethics involves teleological and/or deontological considerations that can be examined to gain insight into the virtue of underlying motives.

Some argue that it is a virtue ethic because it considers more than whether moral rules and principles are followed and because it places the “primacy of virtue over right action and the maximization of goods” (Cline 107; Lo 11; Tiwald 58). Proper motive (of *ren*, *li*, *hsiao*,

etc.) is more important than “the best overall outcome or the inherent rightness of certain actions irrespective of consequences” (Cline 118).

However, other scholars point out the portions of classic Confucian texts that advise the best way to determine what is morally right is to consider the consequences (Tiwald 59). The relative value of possible consequences is evaluated according to whether proposed actions are expected to foster a harmonious environment. This is the desired goal, measured according to the action’s promotion of *ren*, *yi*, and *li*, because it benefits everyone within the community.

Those same motives and goals are used by others to counter that Confucianism is, ultimately, deontological because consideration of consequences inevitably becomes a matter of self-interest. As Tiwald says, “teleology and deontology exhaust the range of possible moral theories, and that deontology is distinguished from teleology by the fact that it ultimately grounds ethical claims in moral as opposed to non-moral goods” (Tiwald 58-59).

A counter-argument is that Confucianism is not deontological because rights are not absolute. It only protects an individual’s rights if used “to promote the ethical life or *ren*” - individuals have the “freedom to choose the good” but not the freedom to choose “the bad” (Chan 230). Additionally, the reasons ministers and Generals should disobey their rulers mentioned above is based upon moral decision making where “the good outcomes justify ignoring or directly thwarting” immoral orders from the ruler (Stalnaker 143).

Still others say that Confucianism does not fit any of these types, especially virtue ethics, because what is virtuous should be universally applicable, not variable based upon contextual roles and relationships (Tiwald 59). This is discussed in greater detail below.

It may not be possible to parse Confucianism into either deontological or teleological ethics but, at a minimum, it can be said that motive is a crucial determinant. The morality of behavior according to virtue ethics is measured by whether it promotes development of

character *qua* human flourishing (Cline 121). At the same time, virtue cannot be based only upon simply achieving this; positive results achieved immorally are still immoral (Cline 113-144).

Still, Confucianism has “a broadly consequentialist structure – specific ways of conduct or policies are moral if, when put into practice, they promote the world’s welfare, and immoral if they harm the world” (Loy 228-229). In other words, since “the only way to do what is right is to work for the good (by being virtuous), and the only way to work for the good is to accord with what is right (by being virtuous),” *immoral results demonstrate that the motive for the behavior was wrong* (Cline 121). There are sufficient usable standards for measuring results as “the relevant notion of welfare is explained in the text in terms of a plurality of specific goods, some of which are social or collective in nature. These goods include: peace and security, social harmony, care of the infirm and disadvantaged, fair treatment of the weak at the hands of the strong, political order, a thriving population, and material prosperity understood mainly in terms of people having sufficient food, clothing, and rest.” (Loy 229)

Turning more specifically to Confucian moral reasoning about war. The importance of minimizing the use of force depends upon whether it derives from deontological factors discussed by Twiss and Chan, utilitarian ethical thinking as Lo claims, or Johnston’s amoral efficacy (Lo 75). Calculating how best to express virtues such as *ren* should consider the means and predicted results. The priority of maintaining a properly ordered and harmonious environment is consistent with both teleological and deontological thinking.

Evidence of deontological priorities includes that wars are justified based upon right intentions for a just cause (self-defense or defense of others) and can be authorized by only the legitimate authority (Lo 37-38). Also, the required consent of the people is based on the Kantian rights of all humans to not be used as a means to an end. Confucianism also states that there is

a greater moral obligation for even Generals and other officers to die loyally carrying out their orders – as is their duty - than for them to win a battle (Stalnaker 144).

At the same time, all the teleological-based *jus ad bellum* factors are found in traditional Chinese thinking about war though “last resort” has a more overt role than “proportionality” or “reasonable chance of success” (Lo 38). However, the JWT principle of “last resort” comes from teleological reasoning but the Confucian version derives from the deontological belief that “military lethal violence is morally problematic” (Lo 38). The decision to use force rather than accommodation is predicated on not just whether there is a reasonable chance of success if used but also by weighing the harms from the existing threat to those from a war that eliminates it. Mencius suggests that the ruler should use the same teleological calculus to decide whether his abdication to allow for the opposition’s peaceful transition of power would be a greater good for his people (Twiss and Chan 102). As Lo summarizes, “to resort to war is a moral “expediency,” that is, a temporary deviation from the norms, and so is an alien work, not the proper work, of cardinal virtues. This alien work still has to be restrained by the proper work, and hence the emphasis of last resort and *in bello* norms” (Lo 51).

A value system that prioritizes the good of the community over protecting the rights of individuals is more consistent with a preference for a faster but less restrained war than for a longer but more constrained war. The greatest number of people benefit the most by quickly restoring a Confucian-based harmonious social system even if this means more combatants die. Such priorities are consistent with the belief that “the ends clearly justify the means” (Johnston, “CR” 70).

As this makes efficacy a primary concern, the teleological moral advantages generally outweigh the deontological immoral harms of using escalatory force to quickly resolve conflicts and restore harmony (Johnston, “CR” 70). The corresponding increased suffering and

destruction can be further justified by the fact that additional force is a teleologic proportional punitive measure necessary for those who otherwise refuse to correct their immoral behavior (Godehardt 19). The practice of dehumanizing those who do not accept the China-led Confucian system makes these harms even more acceptable (Burles and Shulsky 83-84; Waldron 81-114; Yao 107).

The *jus post bellum* freeing of captured enemy combatants and replacing the tyrannical rule of an offending state with Confucian leaders rather than punishing them for their resistance also reflects teleological (utilitarian) rather than deontological calculations. As does the discrimination between punishing innocent citizens and the offending soldiers and government. Thus, while conceptual limitations exist - especially for civilians - they derive more from weighing the expected consequences than from ensuring the most humane treatment possible during war.

Confucian views of war further weaken the normative restrictions towards enemy combatants. Beliefs that any use of force is undesirable, that it is a failure to find preferable alternative methods to resolve the conflict, that it should only be used once victory is assured, and that it is used to punish inferiors means that there is neither “honor nor glory” being a soldier (Burles and Shulsky 83, 89; Dellios; Godehardt 18-19; Stroble 168). Since the concept of occupational professionalism, accordingly, never developed, there was neither strong incentives nor role models to encourage moral behavior from the undisciplined peasant-citizens who did most of the fighting (Stroble 168). The moral partiality of the Confucian social structure, which mandates greater loyalty and concern to those with whom there is a closer relationship, means that the enemy – especially “barbarian” fighters - are given even less consideration (Bell 31).

Although reciprocity is a fundamental Confucian value, the lack of respect for professional conduct or the enemy means that, unlike in the West, it is not an important consideration in the conduct of war. Thus, unlike JWT, it did not create a moral objection to Sun Zi's advice that "unorthodox tactics" such as deception, manipulation, sabotage, ruses, and other exploitative measures are not only a fundamental part of conflict but a sign of intelligence (Burles and Shulsky 87-90; Godehardt 22-23; Newmyer 493). However, this is contradictory to the deontological reasoning for reciprocity - that moral prohibitions are *prima facie* so its applicability is not affected by the character or behavior of the opponent. This further suggests that Confucian thinking about war is largely based upon consideration of efficacy and the "ends."

It could be argued that, strictly speaking, Confucian views of war have few obvious deontological prohibitions because there are no specific protections afforded to all humans that should never be violated - regardless of the negative consequences of doing so. The texts consistently advocate for constrained war by citing the beneficial results from doing so; there is virtually no reference to deontological "absolutist ethic" such as (even collective) human rights "for utilitarian values to contradict" (Stroble 181). In other words, debates about virtuous governance do not argue against teleological-based behavior based upon the fact that it contradicts *prima facie*, absolute, and universally applicable deontological priorities.

MORALITY AND AMORALITY

The requirement of virtue ethics that actions are both good and right makes it difficult to rank their importance but, as discussed above, *immoral results demonstrate that the motive for the behavior was wrong* (Cline 121). Yet, differentiating between moral and amoral motives for achieving the "best" ends⁴ is more difficult than identifying the comparative importance of

⁴ The same standards are used for the best means though Confucian beliefs make it easier than for the ends.

means and ends but essentially centers on concern for “The Other.” The moral component of determining what is “right” or “good” requires that the decision is both objective and impartial. What is moral for one person should be moral for any other person in the same situation – regardless of who benefits from it.

This standard is recognized in both ancient and modern Chinese thinking. For example, Sun Zi says that a good leader is one who easily wins, “hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage” (Burles 89; Sun Zi 4.11-4.12). This emphasis on consequences over deontological protections recognizes that virtuous behavior in war includes some kind of fairness but that wars should not be fought fairly. In fact, Sun Zi’s emphasis on deception and utility are cited as reasons why some Confucians have “denounced” *The Art of War* “on moral grounds” since at least 206 BCE (Lo 67-68; Stalnaker 145; Twiss and Chan 113 note 12). It also suggests that the observed preference to consider the consequences of war is motivated by amoral pragmatism rather than moral ideals.

Lo’s examination of Mao and PLA writings provides further evidence of this. For example, a PLA General has argued that China’s official strategy of active defense could consider a state that “offends” China’s “fundamental interests” as an “attack” that justifies force as an appropriate response in self-defense (Lo 266-267). He then states that, right or wrong, the appearance of acting in self-defense makes a war seem just and, thus, helps create domestic and international support (Lo 267).

Lo also finds that Mao and PLA views of war largely derive from interpreting Sun Zi’s *Art of War* based upon its amoral “usefulness” (Lo 78). In particular, Confucian ethics is referenced only to establish that the morality of war is based upon just cause – there is no substantial discussion about what constitutes proper conduct in war (Lo 48-50, 78). Thus, “for

an amoralist, once war has started, there is no concern for “excessive” force and hence no need for self-imposed restraint” (Lo 77).

This has generated concern that the CCP is simply seeking to strengthen its legitimacy and justify its behavior by resurrecting a convenient interpretation of China’s Confucian “strategic culture narrative” and perpetuating it through holistic repetition of media, political and military leaders, and academics (Scobell, “Real SC” 215). Pointing to recent state-sanctioned writings, Lo similarly concludes that “As no *ius in bello* component from *The Seven Military Classics* is inherited, the term “just war” is sadly employed very much for the same purpose as the phrase “just army” (*yijun* or *yibing*) was employed in imperial China, namely for legitimation and propaganda” (Lo 49). Thus, China’s interpretation is intentionally shaped so that “*all* wars China may have to fight in the future will be forced upon her, for example, when territorial integrity, sea border rights, and national unification are under serious threat. Such wars will be just and defensive wars, and will be fought with no other choice” (Lo 50).

Mearsheimer makes similar comments about China’s efforts to re-appropriate Confucian ethics of war,

Of course, this justification for war is remarkably pliable. As almost every student of international politics knows, political leaders and policy-makers of all persuasions are skilled in figuring out clever ways of defining a rival country’s behavior as unjust or morally depraved. Hence, with the right spinmeister, Confucian rhetoric can be used to justify aggressive as well as defensive behavior. Like liberalism in the United States, Confucianism makes it easy for Chinese leaders to speak like idealists and act like realists.” (Mearsheimer 2014, qtd. in Lo 268)

CONCLUSIONS

Confucian normative behavior and preferences for conflict resolution, from the family level to interstate relations, prioritize maintaining a harmonious environment ideal for the development of virtuous character. Behaving with *ren* (humaneness, compassion) and *li* (propriety) are based upon virtuous motives - which is highly subjective, contextual, and dictated by one’s place in the familial-structured hierarchy. The presumed greater virtue of those in positions of authority

and their corresponding obligation to serve as role models self-validates the rectitude of their decisions and makes their leadership a moral imperative.

It also morally mandates that China maintains harmony so any potential threat to its tributary system is seen as severe and existential. Confucian texts and China's historical debates about war reflect the greater consideration of harmonious "ends" over "means" that insist upon upholding universal protections. So, despite pacifistic ideals and the importance of just cause, legitimate authority, last resort, and other moral considerations similar to those of Just War theory, aggressive corrective military actions are accordingly seen as clear self-defense, as necessary for ensuring a harmonious environment for the benefit of all people, and as an educational and punitive obligation.

Yet, Confucianism can be "conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity, and other humanistic values, or illiberally in terms of conformity, duty, and other authoritarian values" (Spina et al 145). It is also hard to tell whether behavior is truly considered virtuous or excused using that language but really seen as amorally necessary as these beliefs and behaviors are also consistent with Legalist, offensive realist, and regional hegemonic assumptions and preferences. The need to convince rulers that moral restraint is practical as well as moral method to address threats to the state further conflate morality and efficacy. The primary difference is whether or not the decision was objective and impartial.

The Confucian emphasis on virtue centers on the actor rather than the act and, thus, motive is the defining factor when deciding the best course of action. With virtuous motive, behavior will be both "good" and "right." Conversely, acts that either commit a moral wrong or have morally bad results indicate that the motives were not virtuous. Thus, ambiguities due to the difficulty of determining the veracity of stated motive and of its claimed virtue can be

clarified by examining the selected option for state security using the metrics of impartiality, objectivity, goodness, and rightness.

Having explored the principles of Confucianism and how they can be interpreted to define Confucian beliefs about war, the next chapter looks at how prior studies have compared Confucian beliefs to China's historical behavior. Particular attention is given to their methods of addressing the complexities and ambiguities discussed here as well as how this study can do so in new, insightful ways.

WORKS CITED

Bell, Daniel. "War, Peace, and China's Soft Power: A Confucian Approach." *Diogenes*. 56.1 (2009): 26-40. Accessed 28 Oct. 2010.

Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Accessed 06 Jul 2009.

Chan, Joseph. "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China." *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*. Edited by Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell. USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 212-237. Accessed 19 Jan. 2016.

Chen, Xunwu. "Justice as a Constellation of Fairness, Harmony and Righteousness." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 24.4 (1997): 497-519. Accessed 2 Feb. 2011.

Chew, Irene KH, and Christopher Lim. "A Confucian Perspective on Conflict Resolution." *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 6.1 (1995): 143-157. Accessed 9 Nov. 2010.

Cline, Erin M. "The Way, the Right, and the Good." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 37.1 (2009): 107-129. Accessed 12 Mar. 2017.

Cook, Martin L. "Michael Walzer's Concept of 'Supreme Emergency'." *Journal of Military Ethics* 6.2 (2007): 138-151. Accessed 27 Feb. 2011.

De Bary, WT. "The Trouble with Confucianism." *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (1988): 133-183. Print.

Dellios, Rosita. "Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 - The Heritage from the Past." CEWCES Research Papers. (1994). n. pag. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist? " *Security Studies*. 14.4 (2005): 637-662. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China." GIGA Working Papers. 88 (2008). Accessed 06 Oct. 2009

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. "Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical Construction and Methodological Considerations." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 30.2 (2000): 155–178. Accessed 25 Feb. 2011.

Johnson, Kenneth D. *China's Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. Accessed 2 Oct. 2009.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton University Press, 1998. Print.

Jones, David A., and Hanzhen Liu. "Balanced Discourses? China's Ancient and Modern Confucian Heritage Reflected in Historical and Contemporary Chinese Foreign Economic Policies." *Journal of Business and Economics* 5.3 (2014): 359-375. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.

Kang, David C. *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*. Columbia University Press, 2008. Print.

Kirkbride, Paul S., Sara FY Tang, and Robert I. Westwood. "Chinese Conflict Preferences and Negotiating Behaviour: Cultural and Psychological Influences." *Organization Studies* 12.3 (1991): 365-86. Accessed 9 Nov. 2010.

Kim, Sungmoon. "Achieving the Way: Confucian Virtue Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy East and West* 66.1 (2016): 152–176. Accessed 4 Jul. 2017.

Kim, Sungmoon. "Mencius on International Relations and the Morality of War: From the Perspective of Confucian Moralpolitik." *History of Political Thought* 31.1 (2010): 33-56. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.

Lai, Karyn L. "Confucian Moral Thinking." *Philosophy East and West* 45.2 (1995): 249-272. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

Li, Chenyang. "The Confucian Ideal of Harmony." *Philosophy East and West* 56.4 (2006): 583-603. Accessed 15 Nov 2010.

Liu, Tiewa. "Chinese Strategic Culture and the Use of Force: Moral and Political Perspectives." *Journal of Contemporary China* 23.87 (2014): 556-574.

Lo, Ping Cheung, and Sumner B. Twiss, eds. *Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and Dissent*. Routledge, 2015.

Lo, Ping Cheung. "Varieties of Statecraft and Warfare Ethics in Early China: An Overview." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 3-26. Print.

Lo, Ping Cheung. "The Art of War Corpus and Chinese Just War Ethics Past and Present." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 29-65. Print.

Locke, Christine A. *Chinese Methods of Interpersonal Conflict Management*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. May, 2007. Accessed 30 Dec. 2008.

Loy, Hui-Chieh. "Mohist Arguments on War." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 226-248. Print.

MacDonald, Eryn. "The Same, Only Different: Just War Theory, International Law, and Traditional Chinese Thought" *Annual American Political Science Association Conference*, 2 Sep. 2004, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL.

Newmyer, Jacqueline. "The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 33.4 (2010): 483-504. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.

Scobell, Andrew. "China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35.2 (2014): 211-226. Accessed 4 Apr. 2017.

Scobell, Andrew. *China and Strategic Culture*. Carlisle Barracks, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. May, 2002. Accessed 02 Oct. 2009.

Scobell, Andrew. *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.

Shusterman, Richard. "Pragmatism and East-Asian Thought." *Metaphilosophy* 35.1-2 (2004): 13-43. Accessed 15 Dec. 2010.

Sim, May. "Dewey and Confucius: On Moral Education." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 36.1 (2009): 85-105. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

Spina, Nicholas, Doh C. Shin, and Dana Cha. "Confucianism and Democracy: A Review of the Opposing Conceptualizations." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12.1 (2011): 143-160. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.

Stalnaker, Aaron. "Xunzi's Moral Analysis of War and Some of its Contemporary Implications." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 135-152. Print.

Stroble, James A. "Justification of War in Ancient China." *Asian Philosophy* 8.3 (1998): 165-190. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010.

Tiwald, Justin. "Confucianism and Virtue Ethics: Still a Fledgling in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy." *Comparative Philosophy* 1.2 (2010): 55-63. Accessed 3 Feb. 2012.

Turner, Karen. "War, Punishment, and the Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of the State." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 53.2 (1993): 285-324. Accessed 13 Jan. 2009.

Twiss, Sumner B., and Jonathan Chan. "Classical Confucianism, Punitive Expeditions, and Humanitarian Intervention." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 117-134. Print.

Waldron, Arthur. "'Chinese Strategy, Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.'" *The Making of Strategy*. Edited by Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein. Cambridge University Press, 1993, 85-114. Print.

Wong, David, "Chinese Ethics." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 20 Jun. 2017.

Xiang, Lanxin. "There Is No Such Thing as a Normative Chinese Model." *Readings in European Security Volume 5*. Edited by Michael Emerson. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, 155-161. Accessed 15 Oct. 2009.

Yao, Xinzhong. "Conflict, Peace and Ethical Situations." *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*. 4.2 (2004): 89-109. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.

Zhang, Ellen Y. "'Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments': The *Daodejing's* View on War and Peace." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 181-208. Print.

Zhang, Feng. "Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8.2 (2015): 197-218. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.

Zhang, Tiejun. "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features." *Comparative Strategy*. 21.3 (2002): 73-90. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011

Zhao, Tingyang. "All-under-heaven and Methodological Relationism: An Old Story and New World Peace." *Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives*. Edited by Dallmayr, Fred Reinhard, and Tingyang Zhao. University Press of Kentucky, 2012, 46-66. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.

Chapter 3: Confucianism and China's Strategic Behavior

The Chinese often point to their classic texts and historical record to demonstrate they have long followed a Confucian-influenced cultural preference for a non-expansionist, nonaggressive and pacifistic foreign policy (Scobell, "China & Strategic Culture" 4, 8; Wang, Yi). While Western scholars agree that China's "history and culture are critical sources of strategic behavior" (Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 22), the strong claims to eschew the use of force are seemingly contradicted by a record of frequent violent conflicts (Burles and Shulsky 86; Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 27; Scobell, "China & Strategic Culture" 8). By closely examining Chinese history, classical writings, and influential philosophies to identify and compare normative and actual strategic behavior, Western scholars have tried to reconcile China's professed beliefs with their actions.

As it has been difficult to fit China's behavior neatly within a strict interpretation of Confucian morality, some scholars have concluded that Chinese culture has, instead, fostered a political realist view of the international system (Godehardt 11; Scobell, "China & Strategic Culture" 7-8). It may even demonstrate a preference for *realpolitik*-like responses to threats – strong defense of state security often requires offensive, coercive, or pre-emptive uses of force (Christensen 37-53; Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 30, 62, 72, 180). Yet, because patterns of Chinese strategic behavior have also been inconsistent with political realist theory, Confucian morality may not simply serve to legitimate realist thinking and a *realpolitik* foreign policy.

Efforts to evaluate the role of morality in China's preferred and actual uses of force are complicated by the fact that Confucianism lacks a formal framework - such as Western Just War theory – whose overarching principles can serve as evaluative metrics. China's claims that its historical behavior strongly evidences its pacifist disposition made it an appealing benchmark for early studies but is now considered overly reductive. As a result, there has been

increased scholarly effort to create more realistic, nuanced paradigms for the Confucian system of governance and foreign policy.

This chapter addresses how strategic preferences and behavior consistent with Confucian morality discussed in the prior chapter factor into the ongoing academic debate about the extent to which Confucianism shapes China's strategic culture. Ultimately, it finds that the wide range of state behaviors that can be legitimately interpreted as consistent with Confucian beliefs and values means there are few reliable standards to assess the true role of morality in decisions to use force. Confucianism's emphasis on virtue further complicates such efforts because morality strongly depends upon motive and the inherent limitations of historical research about China's wars make it even more difficult to determine this.

CONFUCIAN ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Confucian ideals clearly encourage nonviolent resolutions to conflicts. A state governed according to the Confucian ethical system should be based upon virtues including universal benevolence, compassion, and humaneness. This system of beliefs forms a strategic culture - or a "set of fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of collective violence in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force" that "shapes the menu of options available to an actor in various situations as well as affects an actor's perceptions or images of self and others" (Scobell, "Real Strategic Culture" 213). The role of ethics in international relations should, thus, be consistent with perceptions of the character of the international system.

Indeed, force should be avoided not only because it directly contradicts Confucian virtues but also because it disrupts the harmony that is central for promoting the collective good. It is less effective to destroy potential adversaries in this non-zero sum world than to accommodate or compromise with them until they recognize the superiority of the Confucian method of moral governance and, inevitably, convert into followers. In the process, China's

exemplary behavior also demonstrates a degree of virtue that legitimates its rightful place at the top of this moral hierarchy (Burles and Shulsky 81).

Yet the Confucian system of governance is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi's beliefs about war were strongly influenced by having seen the suffering and destruction from years of conflict and so their teachings are intended to convince rulers to pursue compassionate governance and limited wars (Twiss and Chan 95, 131 Note 1; Lo 8). Xunzi and Mencius in particular contrast the harms inflicted by violence-prone contemporary rulers with the flourishing that naturally springs forth from following the moral exemplar – called the *junzi* (Twiss and Chan 126).

Acknowledging that rulers may deem it foolish and dangerous to strictly comply with Confucian ideals in the less-than-ideal “real world,” between the saintly *junzi* and the selfish, immoral “tyrant” is the more realistic role model of the “hegemon” – one who “though morally imperfect, nonetheless, as a ruler, governs his own state with a modicum of justice, is non-aggressive towards other states, keeps his country strong and well-defended, husbands his country's resources, and keeps his word with friends, allies, and his own people” (Twiss and Chan 98).

These archetypes reflect the “widely accepted” conception of right and wrong at that time and were intended to leverage “social pressure” to subtly “guilt trip” rulers and citizens to good behavior (Loy 234-235). The pragmatic arguments - which warn of the dangers of ambition and hubris and marginalize historical examples of glorious conquests – aim to further dissuade rulers from war and so reveal the “implicit assumptions regarding the aims that motivated the rulers' actions” (Loy 236-238).⁵

⁵ These logically apply to Confucianism though discussed in context of Mohism - with whom there was cross pollination of ideas (Loy 228)

Though the authors of *The Seven Military Classics* are military strategists so cannot afford to be as idealistic as Confucian philosophers, they also often advocate for some restraint in the use of force (Burles and Shulsky 81; Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 93-94; Lo 17-18). To varying degrees and for a number of possible reasons, they suggest ways to pursue state interests, counter threats, and win wars that are effective but reduce unnecessary harm.

The strong social pressure for the state as well as its rulers and citizens to behave according to Confucian norms means that the moral aspect of behavior must be addressed in any discussion about its acceptability. The three most common ways this is done – which are not unique to China or Confucianism – is that the actor desires to behave according to stipulated norms and believes that they are doing so; the actor desires to behave according to the norms but admits that the exigent conditions of the specific situation or the constant existential threat of the international system exempt normal constraints; and that, for the same reasons, the actor does not think that morality should constrain options but feels they must (disingenuously) appeal to ideals to make their desired course of action socially palatable.

However, behavior does not meaningfully vary according to which belief about the role of morality in war was dominant in the decision-making process. There are also few available historically-derived metrics that can test the veracity of an individual’s interpretation of virtuous motive.

HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF CHINA’S STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

Scholars have analyzed the role of Confucianism by whether the historical evidence reflects China’s claims to have a “uniquely pacifistic” culture, that it has “never been an aggressive or expansionist state” and that it has only used force in self-defense (Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture 5,8). However, the limited amount of existing and available information about how China historically considered and used force - that largely comes from official government or

government-sanctioned documents - restricts the ability for modern scholars to consider important nuances of context, perspective, reasoning, and potential sources of bias. This makes it difficult to determine the sincerity of moral justifications for behavior that seems to contradict stated preferences to be “cautious and restrained” when resolving conflicts, to place “harmony over conflict,” “psychological and symbolic warfare” over direct confrontation (Feng 661; Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” 3), and for “stratagem, minimal violence, and defensive wars of maneuver or attrition” (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 25-26).

In his pivotal book, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Johnston sidesteps this obstacle and creates falsifiable standards by arguing that there is a conceptual connection between strategic preferences and beliefs about the “strategic environment” (Johnston, “Thinking about SC” 30-31). Insight into motives can be gleaned by the determining the decision makers’ beliefs “about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful)” (Johnston, “Thinking about SC” 30). For example, the motive of ambiguous behaviors such as those justified as “active defense” is likely to be seen as defensive if the decision makers also seem to hold the Confucian interpretation of this paradigm – where war is an aberration, adversaries are not always zero-sum, and force is the least effective option in all but the direst circumstances.

Johnston then examines *The Seven Military Classics* to identify its underlying preferences for the use of force and beliefs about the aforementioned assumptions. This includes how the texts rank and limit strategic choices as well as if these were due to cultural or structural influences. He then empirically tests his findings against the policy advice and behavior in the wars of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

Johnston concludes that beliefs about international system were not consistent with Confucianism but rather reflect the political realist perspective of a world dominated by anarchic, violent competition for the power necessary to assure survival of the state (Burles and Shulsky 79). He similarly finds that the Chinese viewed warfare, “as a relatively constant element in human interaction, stakes in conflict with the adversary are viewed in zero-sum terms, and pure violence is highly efficacious for dealing with threats that the enemy is predisposed to make” (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 30).

Johnston further concludes that China’s writings and behavior at that time demonstrate a particularly bellicose *realpolitik*-like foreign policy where little faith in the efficacy of law and little consideration of morality means that states must use whatever means of power possible to protect their interests (Christensen 45; Feng 647; Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 62). This version of realism further maintains that other states are aggressively seeking to destroy each other so any potential enemy must be eliminated before it becomes too powerful (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 62).

Johnston describes China’s perception of an exceptionally high risk and high stakes environment and its resulting preference for particularly aggressive *realpolitik* behavior as “*parrabellum*” - “if you want peace, prepare for war” (“Cultural Realism” 30, 106-107). In other words, “there should be no *a priori* moral or political limits on the application of force, regardless of how it is justified” (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 62). Although diplomacy, accommodation, and strict defense were still seen as ideals, they are also usually considered dangerously inadequate (Feng 647). The use of force – even preemptively - was usually the best or only option (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 72, 180). As Feng summarizes:

The *parabellum* strategic culture displays a high need for the exercise of power. Leaders see conflict as permanent under international anarchy. Any tactics or strategies may be appropriate, especially the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains. Thus, the ranking of strategic preferences favors expansive strategies and tactics over defensive and accommodationist ones. Military operations will be

the priority choice instead of diplomatic efforts to manage conflict and violence. In military operations, strategies and tactics to fight and win fast and completely will be favored. (647)

Despite close resemblance to the realist and *realpolitik* paradigms, Johnston claims that this set of assumptions and preferences were not based upon universal structural conditions but rather from specific “culture-based values” (“Cultural Realism” 2-3, 155). He uses the classic military texts which other scholars have said reflect China’s unique (pacifistic) strategic culture to support this argument. Johnston counters that the portions of the texts which other scholars said demonstrate China’s Confucian preferences were selectively (mis)interpreted and actually reflect *parrabellum* preferences (“Cultural Realism” 26). The pervasive pacifistic interpretation of *The Art of War* as advocating to avoid war altogether is not only incorrect but it is so strongly believed to shape and reflect China’s strategic preferences that it biases the conclusions of other texts so that they “end up confirming or buttressing the alleged preference for minimal violence embodied in Sun Zi’s concept of “not fighting and subduing the enemy” (“Cultural Realism” 26-27).

Johnston does not deny that the Confucian-Mencian strand of strategic culture exists but rather that it was seen by leaders as an impractical and inapplicable ideal (“Cultural Realism” 100, 153, 155, 215, 249). It was mostly used as a symbolic way “to clothe strategic choices in culturally acceptable language, and hence to justify the competence of decision makers, deflect criticism, suppress potential dissent, and limit access to the decision process” (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 14, 59, 153, 160-161, 247). The Confucian model, thus, served as “an “ideology” that justified the internal political structure of the regime without necessarily limiting the actual options available to policymakers” (Burles and Shulsky 83).

RECONCILING INCONSISTENCIES ACCORDING TO THE *PARRABELLUM* PARADIGM

Some of modern and ancient China's policy recommendations and strategic behavior contain significant inconsistencies to what would be expected by the *parrabellum* paradigm. One possible explanation is that certain aspects of Chinese thinking (such as a more holistic and contextual evaluation of the situation) allow for a particularly high tolerance for inconsistent and contradictory ideas to exist without them being found illogical or unsystematic (Dellios). Were this the case, the realist/*realpolitik* framework would only explain aggressive behavior while China's non-*parrabellum* actions would still derive from Confucian-Mencian values – and neither would be a good theory for explaining Chinese behavior (Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 102, 162-163, 251-252).

Consequently, Johnston claims that there existed a cultural notion of "absolute flexibility" (*quan bian*) for state security that prioritizes pragmatic consideration of the situation's context over adherence to any specific principles or rules ("Cultural Realism" 149-150, 169). Less violent behaviors such as (Confucian) accommodation or compromise were preliminary steps to understand and favorably shape the environment but there was always an underlying assumption that force would be necessary when the timing was most advantageous ("Cultural Realism" 96, 151).

Indeed, historical records showed little discussion about moral restraint - once deemed the most effective option, most felt that overwhelming force should be used (Johnston "Cultural Realism" 77, 96, 102, 152, 172, 180-181). Even consideration of the tactics that can be used in war were based upon amoral factors such as relative power and probability of success (Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 150). Confucian preferences such as stratagem, attrition, maneuver, psychological and symbolic attacks were only used to bring about more favorable conditions before using direct force (Johnston "Cultural Realism" 77 n.28).

Johnston further argues for the irrelevancy of Confucian morality by pointing out that policy recommendations did not often even address the morality of force. There was little effort to justify violating Confucian ideals by appealing to moral principles or that the severity of the threat required a rare and exceptional immoral response. It instead reflects the *parrabellum* assumption that most any threat was so severe it required completely abandoning morality – which was exacerbated by the commonly-accepted belief that those who refused to adopt the China-centric Confucian system were “unrighteous” and “irredeemably an enemy” (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 72, 128-129). Johnston also notes the belief that as long as the motives for going to war were just, morality should not limit how a war was fought was prevalent in the public statements of contemporary Chinese authorities (Johnston, “Cultural Realism” 150 n.58).

AN ALTERNATE CONFUCIAN PARADIGM

Some scholars have pointed to multiple examples where China’s strategic behavior has been consistent with Confucian values to argue that Confucianism has had at least some influence on China’s foreign policy. To reconcile these contradictions, Andrew Scobell argues that Confucian thought and realist/*parrabellum* views should not be considered complete opposites. He supports this by showing the passages in classic Confucian writings which indicate that Confucianism is not a “completely pacifistic” philosophy but, rather, that it acknowledges that force is, at times, a necessary part of politics (“CUMF” 20-21).

Scobell and others⁶ argue that China’s strategic preferences in more recent conflicts have not been as highly coercive and aggressively violent as described in Johnston’s

⁶ Examples include Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000. Accessed 06 Jul 2009.; Dellios, Rosita. "Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 - The Heritage from the Past." CEWCES Research Papers. (1994). n. pag. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.; Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies*. 14.4 (2005) : 637-662. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.; Yao, Xinzhong. "Conflict, Peace and Ethical Situations." *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*. 4.2 (2004): 89-109. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.;

realpolitik/parrabellum model and are more consistent with a Confucian paradigm that is less strictly pacifist as used by Johnston (Burles and Shulsky 80-81;93; Dellios; Feng 661; Yao 109; Zhang 73, 88). Though Confucianism was not solely symbolic (Scobell, “CUMF” 20; Bell, 32), Scobell admits that the overall frequency and conduct of China’s wars still strongly depart from China’s professed ideals and strategic preferences (Scobell, “CUMF” 16-17).

Scobell explains this disparity by positing that China’s strategic preferences are informed by a combination of *realpolitik* and Confucian beliefs (“CUMF” 5,15; “China & Strategic Culture” v). Strategic decisions tend to be made using a realist interpretation of the international system but “rationalized” and justified according to Confucian thinking (“CUMF” 15). Thus, China’s decision makers and citizens belief that they have long followed Confucian strategic preferences is sincere but the notion of absolute flexibility and a strong realist perspective - which “heightens threat perception” - blurs what is considered offensive and defensive behavior and allows for very broad interpretations of Confucian values (“CUMF” 15, 33-35; “China & Strategic Culture” 3).

The result is the sincere belief that force should be avoided and limited but, at the same time, the high sensitivity to threats makes the frequent actual use of force seen as a last resort necessary for self-defense – rendering its frequent use is neither morally problematic nor inconsistent with professed strategic preferences (Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” v, 3, 13, 22). It is difficult to determine the sincerity of such justifications for war because both the claims and the resulting use of force would be indistinguishable from the same done insincerely. More significantly, it is hard to claim that Confucianism meaningfully influences

Zhang, Tiejun. “Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features.” *Comparative Strategy*. 21.3 (2002) : 73-90. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011.

strategic behavior when morality does not constrain behavior, when it makes little distinction between degrees of threat, and when its use is based primarily upon efficacy.

REFINING THE DEBATE

In his book, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics*, Yuan-Kang Wang continues the discussion about whether China's strategic preferences and behavior derive from its unique cultural history by examining its use of force during the Confucian-based but weak Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE) and the Confucian-based but strong Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 CE). Like Scobell and Johnston, he finds that both sides of official debates about how China should deal with threats justified their positions by appealing to Confucian beliefs but that actual behavior better corresponded to realist calculations of efficacy based upon relative state power (Wang 36, 179). In his words,

Confucian culture did not constrain Chinese use of force: China has been a practitioner of realpolitik for centuries, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. In general, China's grand strategic choices were shaped by the country's power position, with Chinese leaders having adopted an offensive posture when relatively strong and a defensive one when relatively weak. The historical record shows that Chinese leaders have been sensitive to the balance of power with their adversaries and adjusted military policy accordingly. (Wang 2011, 181)

However, he attributes China's high sensitivity to threats and lack of moral restraint to the universal anarchic and zero-sum structural conditions of the international system rather than to a notion of "Chinese exceptionalism" derived from its specific historical experience (Wang 100, 184). In other words, "Imperial China might well have a peaceful culture, but the structural imperatives of anarchy overrode the peaceful inclination of Confucianism. Simply put, structural imperatives trumped Confucian culture" (Wang 2011, 185).

Wang's thesis is that the preponderance of debates about, and uses of, force during the Song and Ming Dynasties are consistent with realist theory. To test this, like Johnston, he ascribes behavior to realism if China "adopted an offensive posture when relatively strong and a defensive one when relatively weak" (Wang 181). In order for Confucianism to serve as the

falsifiable corollary to structural realism, Wang defines Confucian behavior as when China believed it was in a position of greater relative power but refrained from aggressive uses of force.

STRATEGIC CULTURE

The central issue is whether China's uses of force have been motivated by genuine desire to follow morally virtuous strategic options. Yet this is difficult to determine by looking at behavior – especially since the goals of both realism and Confucianism can similarly appear hegemonic and revisionist. As Waldron says, the existing historical evidence makes it difficult to determine whether, for example, the Song truly believed that it was morally necessary to launch punitive expeditions against wayward states in order to restore peace and order or, as Wang claims, these were excuses for expansionist wars (Waldron 1147). Even a moral use of force unavoidably requires violating one moral principle to uphold another so a war deemed overall just according to Confucian standards, like wars justified according to realist beliefs, would still be undesirable, regrettable, and would require violating some moral principle about not doing harm.

Additionally, at some level or type of threat, following Walzer's notion of "supreme emergency," many of those influenced by Confucian ideals will agree with realists that the threatening circumstances now qualify as "exceptional" and so the obligation to uphold ideals and/or beliefs about the general inefficacy of war no longer apply (169-173). Reflecting Walzer's notion of "dirty hands," whether decisions to use force were seen as moral, partially moral, immoral but necessary, or a convenient excuse is not by itself a good indicator of moral beliefs because it is strongly affected by the individual's perception of threat and their personal beliefs about what severity of threat creates "exceptional" conditions where "necessity" permits otherwise-unacceptable behavior (169-173).

Johnston, Scobell, and Wang turn to the concept of strategic culture to help discern the sincerity of ethical interpretations, applications, and justifications and, thus, whether Confucianism informs decisions about the use of force. This concept builds upon the contentious theory that states behave as rational actors by explaining how it can be rational for states to select different policy options to address similar issues despite the fact that this appears inconsistent or incoherent with the logical assumptions of realist theory (Johnston, “Strategic Culture” 33-64). It does so by arguing that countries may differ in the “set of fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of collective violence in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force” which, functioning as a “lens,” shape the “menu of options available to an actor in various situations as well as affects an actor’s perceptions or images of self and others” (Scobell, “Real Strategic Culture” 213).

This establishes a testable relationship between country/culture-specific worldviews and beliefs about how state security and interests should and may be pursued. Realist assumptions that war is inevitable, it is a zero-sum world, and that most states hold that force is often the most effective tool for maximizing the superior power necessary for survival logically means to many that a state’s use of force dare not be constrained by ideals (Johnston, “Thinking about SC” 30). On the other hand, the idealistic Confucian worldview and the universal applicability of moral obligation to not harm others should result in a strong preference for less aggressive moral means.

These scholars use strategic culture to extend rational decision making to argue that the underlying motive would also differ accordingly. Realist beliefs about the role and efficacy of violence would logically emphasize the imperative for greater power to ensure China’s survival while a Confucian worldview would logically support the creation of a harmonious society to encourage the flourishing of all humans. Therefore, offensive/expansionist wars which occur more frequently when China believes it possesses greater power than the threat are better

explained by realist theory while Confucianism would create opposite preferences for pragmatic as well as idealistic reasons.

At the same time, “as far as strategic culture analysts are concerned there is no universal model of rationality and what is rational for one state can be irrational for another” (Margaras 3). How ideals should and could be applied to national security issues may differ dramatically depending upon whether they pass through the “lens” of, for example, limited rationality (where “strategic culture simplifies reality”), process rationality (“where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or narrows options”), or adaptive rationality (“where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice”) (Johnston, “Strategic Culture” 33-64). Accordingly, the methodology of the studies not only make the controversial assumption that states behave as rational actors but, by expanding what is considered “rational,” there is greater variability in the views considered consistent with Confucianism than what is permitted by the current paradigmatic metrics.

The distinction between offensive and defensive wars and the correlation between wars and perceived greater military power are used as indicators to not only test how well the realist paradigm explains China’s strategic behavior but, in order for the same factors to also prove or disprove China’s claims of Confucian influence, these realist preferences are considered incompatible with legitimate interpretations of Confucianism. However, the preferences used as indicators are not sufficiently distinct to conclude that behavior consistent with realist theory also invalidates the possible influence of the Confucian one.

For example, Confucian values may align better with defensive options than offensive realist/*realpolitik* views but they do not require waiting until a growing threat has become the stronger military power to counter it using force. So, a correlation where the use of force increases with relative state power could derive from realist amoral aggressive calculations of

efficacy or from Confucian moral considerations of efficacy such as proportionality and likelihood of success.

Similarly, aggressive uses of force to counter threats when China has relative military advantage can be consistent with both the realist amoral goal to maximize state power and with the Confucian goal of a China-led harmonious society. Though the moral content may be opposite, the goal of both resemble regional hegemony and revisionist intentions.

The strong sense of insecurity and threat in both worldviews similarly promotes the belief that the necessity of countering a menacing, unfriendly state with force could qualify as strict self-defense, a preventative war of self-defense, or a war that deters aggressors by increasing China's relative power. As discussed in the previous chapter, these may appear offensive, expansionist, and revisionist but they can also fit within the Confucian idea of punitive expeditions.

The Confucian model also should not be rejected based upon the realist model fitting the evidence better because the models are also insufficiently comprehensive. For example, political realist theory and Johnston's *quanbian* ("absolute flexibility") don't explain why Ming Dynasty Confucian government officials justified their support for punitive expeditions against the weaker Mongols (Waldron 1147; Wang 39, 48) based upon China's moral superiority and obligation according to *tianxia* but also for why, even after China was much weakened from a series of defeats, they still refused to compromise with the barbarians (Wang 133-134, 187).

THE RELEVANCY OF CONFUCIANISM

P. C. Lo's study of Confucianism in Qin and Han Dynasty politics is a good example of the persistent difficulties in differentiating between "Confucian" and "realist" behaviour. It highlights how the desire for parsimonious and falsifiable models requires making broad assumptions while a more nuanced interpretation of Confucian strategic culture would make it

difficult to narrow down whether many of China's conflicts reflect legitimate historical/cultural interpretations of Chinese Confucian "active defense," structural offensive realism, or the belief that the extreme circumstances justify an exceptional response (Waldron 1146-1148). Consistent with prior studies of China's strategic culture, this further demonstrates that the *validation* of fit between models and actual beliefs should use distinguishing assumptions different than those used to qualitatively compare their relative suitability.

The violent anarchy of the Warring States Period inspired Mencius and Xunzi's pacifistic interpretations of Confucianism but, in contrast to such wishful thinking, it also allowed the Legalists to successfully argue that Confucianism's idealistic governance was ineffective at ensuring state security in this "time of struggle for survival in which the strong survive by preying on the weak" (Lo 250-252). It was through the use of ruthless Legalist practices, which Lo convincingly argues are quite similar to those of offensive realism,⁷ that the Qin eventually conquered its neighbors and established the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE) (Lo 250-254).

However, Qin rule only lasted 14 years before "rebellions erupted and chaos returned" (Lo 254). The victors of the ensuing power struggle, upon establishing the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), officially designated Confucianism the official state religion and made Legalism as well as all other non-Confucian ideologies illegal (Lo 255).

Official records of the debate about how Han Dynasty China should and how it did address its 400-year conflict with the neighboring Xiongnu, a nomadic group located in Central Asia and Mongolia, suggest a complex relationship between Confucianism, Legalism, and state behavior (Lo 268-271). Briefly, the Han Dynasty initially adopted an appeasement strategy

⁷ The striking similarities between offensive realist and Legalist beliefs have interesting implications for the debate about whether China's views of the international system derive from cultural or structural conditions. However, this is not relevant to the hypothesis of this study so will not be further discussed.

towards the Xiongnu so as to focus on strengthening its domestic situation after the destructive Warring States period. As the state's relative power increased, there was increasing support for China to shift to more aggressive measures.

The official adoption of Confucian moral governance, upon which the legitimacy of the Han Dynasty was based, meant that both the political faction that advocated to accommodate the Xiongnu and those who endorsed expansive, preventative, total war justified their strategies using Confucian language (Lo 255-260). Those promoting a more offensive strategy justified this as necessary because the current approach of accommodation was ineffective, “displayed weakness,” and was “incredibly humiliating” (Lo 269).

As a result, what began as punitive expeditions in response to the Xiongnu's regular border raids became an extended, expansionist campaign to create a larger “buffer zone” by conquering the small states in between the two rivals (Lo 256-257). These goals are consistent with both the Legalist and offensive realist belief that strong defensive capabilities are insufficient to guarantee state security – it is necessary to be unquestioningly be the most powerful (Lo 257). Yet their justification as being morally obligatory in order to properly order and harmonize the region according to *tianxia* and to create conditions for economic prosperity is consistent with Confucianism as well (Lo 256-257).

The inflation of what qualifies as necessary and “last resort” in self-defense to include preventative wars reflects the Legalist and offensive realist logic that “since there are only two choices in interstate relations, and interstate competition is a zero-sum game, a state should be proactive in dominating other states through force” (Lo 258). However, Confucianism could be interpreted to support, as was claimed at the time, that anything less would be a temporary peace where later generations would suffer from the aggressions of the immoral Xiongnu (Lo 258). Unconstrained war was also argued to be necessary because all of the less violent moral

options had already been proven ineffective at eliminating the “subhuman” Xiongnu (Lo 259). This is consistent with both Confucian and realist beliefs that harmony/security requires being the “unchallenged hegemon” (Lo 258).

Lo provides several reasons why he believes these behaviors derive from Legalist rather than Confucian beliefs. For one, he points to multiple references in official records that praise or claim to copy Legalist strategic preferences, teachings, and exemplars (Lo 260). He further questions the sincerity of Confucian strategies which do not seek to minimize violence but, instead, it appears that efficacy was the top priority and Confucian beliefs were interpreted to morally justify it.

However, Lo’s emphasis on efficacy as the primary measure for paradigmatic distinction has the same shortcoming as for Johnston, Scobell, and Wang. Lo questions the sincerity of those using Confucian ideals to advocate for minimally-violent actions because he assesses that this is too idealistic and “utopian” to defeat the Xiongnu and is more in line with China’s pragmatic need for a respite in order to recover from “decades of war” (262). He feels that the lack of “imminent and/or serious threat and the costs for an all-out war to annihilate the Xiongnu were too high to bear” demonstrates that the “Confucian” advisors as well as the Legalist ones were just using morality to justify “pragmatic pacifism” (Lo 255-262).

Assessing the influence of Confucianism based upon if there is evidence of the political realist (or Legalist) belief that the use of force correlates to its perceived efficacy ignores the fact that both belief systems would likely more strongly support minimally-violent methods to deal with an unfriendly group who does not pose an immediate or serious threat. Lo also uses contradictory standards when relating efficacy and war to the paradigms. He claims it is a disingenuous interpretation of Confucianism to support aggressive uses of force when this is believed to be the least amount needed to effectively defend against unavoidable war with the

Xiongnu and also to support nonviolent options because that, too, is considered the most effective option for China's interests.

Recognition of the severity of the Xiongnu threat by even the Confucian advisors would, then as now, foster a perception of persistent threats and frequent violent conflicts which would make it more difficult to convince rulers of "the potency of a pacifist, non-expansionist, defence-minded strategic stance" to counter domestic and international threats (Scobell "Real Strategic Culture" 211). Thus, the necessity of the circumstances makes it equally possible that Confucian language was disingenuously used to make the less-than-morally-ideal options more socially acceptable; that the circumstances meant that the more ideal Confucian options were legitimately considered but, regrettably, deemed not viable; and that such options were seen as consistent with the hegemonic obligations discussed as part of Confucian moral governance.

Regardless of the motive, Lo observes that the Han Dynasty's Confucian justification for the use of total, preventative, and expansionist wars to counter threats is the likely origins of contemporary China's belief that its official strategy of "active defense" derives from the Confucian tradition (Lo 266-267). Lo traces the support for more aggressive uses of force in Mao's as well as in current official PLA writing as further evidence of the "surreptitious merging of Legalist statecraft into imperial Confucianism [that] became a salient feature of imperial Confucian statecraft for almost 2,000 years" (Lo 7). If true, centuries of incorporating Legalist beliefs into Confucianism could be a substantial contributor to Scobell's belief that China's high sensitivity to threats is responsible for rendering most any use of force in self-defense justified according to Confucian beliefs.

A CONFUCIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR MODERN CHINA POLICY AND BEHAVIOR

The issues above further complicate determining the extent to which Confucian language has been used to justify amoral, expansionist pursuit of state interests. There may have been a sincere desire to uphold moral ideals but threats and appropriate responses to them were considered through a lens of “realist” assumptions about the character of the international system and a conception of Confucian morality that has assimilated key Legalist preferences (Scobell, “CUMF” 20; Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” 3; Feng 661). A correlation where the use of force is more likely when China perceives itself to be in a position of greater relative power can be consistent with both Confucian and realist beliefs. The hegemonic and revisionist nature of the Confucian system of moral governance and the obligation for punitive expeditions can make not only behavior but the motive and intent behind it very closely resemble that of political realism.

The ambiguity of contemporary China’s motives is exemplified by its claims that its principle goals of “sovereignty, modernity, and stability” derive from Confucian values such as harmony, humaneness, and the collective good (Finkelstein 103). Sovereignty is defined as territorial integrity, national unification, and maritime security (Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power” 127-129; Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” 11; Finkelstein 105, 117-118); modernity includes technological and economic progress (Finkelstein 106); and stability includes regime security, “internal peace,” and regional stability (Finkelstein 107; Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power” 127-129). Yet, China refuses to clarify its conceptions of territorial integrity, regional stability, and maritime security.

Although much has changed since the formative experiences occurred, China claims that many of the states which benefit from the status quo are using international law and organizations, bilateral treaties and agreements, economics and technology – backed by

superior military power - to “westernize and split China,” to contain it, to destabilize it, to restrict its development (Burles and Shulsky 58; Christensen 38; Dellios; Finkelstein 116; Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” 16) and to prevent it from occupying “its rightful place in the international order” (Dellios). Even complaints and criticisms “about China’s violations of international norms and laws [are viewed] as part of an integrated Western strategy, led by Washington, to prevent China from becoming a great power [and].... plots to keep Beijing off balance and encourage domestic forces bent on the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party or the breakup of the country” (Christensen 38).

Thus while “peace, development, and cooperation” are China’s claimed preferred foreign policies to achieve these goals, threats abound (Godehardt 6; Scobell, “CUMF” 33). Indeed, while China’s more recent conflicts have been limited to territories it considers its own or in immediate proximity (Christensen 41, 43, 46; Scobell, “China & Strategic Culture” 15), the belief that force was the necessary response was exacerbated by China’s perception of facing constant threat where even small risks to domestic stability is likely to cause a “domino effect” (Christensen 46; Godehardt 7). The geographical bounds and the categories of China’s national interests that must be defended are expanding as China continues to develop.

IMPLICATIONS OF CONFUCIAN OR *PARRABELLUM* VIEWS AND PREFERENCES

It is not unreasonable for China to pursue the capabilities for “area denial around the periphery” and for “limited regional force projection” intended to protect maritime interests and to keep others from seizing disputed territory (Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power” 130-137). China’s seizing and militarization of contested territories and its development of longer range and more lethal weapons is provocative and contradictory to such claims. Such behavior is even more concerning if motivated by realist rather than Confucian assumptions. For example, economic, technological, and political maneuvers that are ordinarily considered part of the

normal and acceptable competition between states might actually be efforts to holistically shape and control these environments prior to inevitable war.

REVISIONIST OR STATUS QUO MOTIVES?

The nature of the threat posed by China depends upon whether or not its actions and its dissatisfaction with international (Western-based) rules and norms reflect a coordinated stratagem to change the current structure of the international system. If China has revisionist intentions then, as it becomes more powerful, its efforts to reshape the international system may become more aggressive. This would increase the possibility that force will be used by one side or the other.

The concern that as China rises, like most rising powers, it will seek to balance against stronger powers or even seek regional hegemony is reasonable (Christensen 37-38; Johnston, “Status Quo” 6, 25-27). Aspects of China’s stated strategic culture, its ongoing military modernization, and its increasingly assertive use of holistic, coercive tools to challenge the status quo further stoke anxiety that China’s current restraint from using force is mostly because it does not yet feel strong enough to win a direct confrontation (Dreyer). However, China’s pursuit of greater power and influence will likely challenge the dominance of other states but this does not necessarily require revisionist or hegemonic intent (Johnston, “Status Quo” 49).

A 2003 study by Johnston examines China’s more recent behavior and concludes that “the evidence that China’s leaders are actively trying to balance against US power to undermine an American-dominated unipolar system and replace it with a multipolar system is murky” (“Status Quo” 49). Instead, he finds indications that China sees its recent behavior that challenges the status quo as a reaction to a “perception that other states, the United States in particular, are becoming more assertive in challenging what the Chinese leaders believe are their legitimate interests” (“Status Quo” 53, 56). This is consistent with Fravel’s findings that,

in China's modern conflicts, the likelihood of resorting to war increases when it perceives a weakening in its "bargaining power" (Fravel, "Power Shifts" 46-47).

Johnston also points out that even if China is engaging in a balance-of-power with the US, there is insufficient evidence that it is trying to promote its value system on others so does not meet the definition of a revisionist state (Christensen 37-38). This does not signal a change in strategic preferences as well because preferences derive from *parrabellum* assumptions and "refer to means of security, not to the political ends towards which they might be applied" (Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 111-114). On the other hand, the decision to pursue status quo or revisionist goals is based upon cost-benefit analysis through the lens of a *parabellum* strategic culture so substantial changes to estimated costs or benefits could convince China to shift to a more revisionist policy (Johnston, "Status Quo" 56).

CONCLUSIONS

The debate about whether China's strategic preferences are constrained or even shaped by Confucian morality is far from resolved. Patterns of actual and recommended uses of force often contradict China's claims to hold nonviolent and non-aggressive preferences yet they can be inconsistent with realist assumptions as well. Yet, qualitatively measuring consistency according to these cultural strategic preferences assumes that states behave rationally - as defined by the researcher. Even if true, the manner in which an ethical framework helps consider responses to a threat is highly subjective and variable depending upon context, perspective, and the individual's interpretations of the principles.

The consideration of cultural influences when defining assumptions about war and international affairs and characterizing what is a rational relationship between these assumptions and the use of force makes this an effective approach for testing but not validating explanatory theories. It provides flexibility to compare the "fit" between the normative strategic

preferences of different theories and when and how wars were actually fought but, as a result, there is limited available insight into how decision makers weighed moral and amoral factors as well as into their beliefs about the constraining role of morality in international relations.

War inherently requires frequent decisions about whether it is better or worse to violate the moral principle to not do harm in order to do a greater good as well as about when this consideration should constrain doing what is most effective. An outside observer who does not know how this weighing was done could see the resulting behavior as immoral or inconsistent with the professed ethical framework. The conduct of the war generally does not provide any insight, either, as it provides no meaningful clues whether the decision maker believed that the behavior, even if inconsistent with normative preferences, qualified as moral self-defense, was immoral but necessary due to an exceptional threat, or was immoral but necessary yet made more acceptable by using moral language.

The hegemonic and highly subjective nature of Confucian ethics makes it further difficult to discern the perceived moral content of a war based upon whether China counters threats using aggressive or minimally-violent strategies and whether the use of force increases with its perceived efficacy. The use of offensive, coercive measures and consideration of the efficacy of war are not mutually exclusive to realist or Confucian beliefs. Confucian strategic preferences derive from moral ideals which may not be an effective way to respond to less-than-ideal threats. Assumptions and preferences are not concrete rules so they don't indicate whether morality constrains using force when and how most effective.

The complex and diverse methods of moral reasoning about war and the limits to understanding how this was done by looking at historical behaviour mean that the relationships between moral ideals and paradigmatic beliefs, the roles of assumptions and preferences, and the rational connection between beliefs and behaviour should be examined more closely. Key

insight for resolving the ambiguities between the realist and Confucian models would come from identifying what issues besides efficacy are important when determining how best to pursue national goals; what severity of threat necessitates immoral uses of force; and what actions qualify as “self-defense.” Ultimately, the lack of absolute rules in (especially Confucian) ethics and moral decision making about war means that the most important testable metric of moral influence is the consistency and coherence of beliefs, decisions, and behavior.

These add context about how China views the international system and how it will most likely perceive and respond to threats. This, in turn, can help focus foreign policy and other efforts to peacefully resolve disagreements with China.

WORKS CITED

- Bell, Daniel. "War, Peace, and China's Soft Power: A Confucian Approach." *Diogenes*. 56.1 (2009): 26-40. Accessed 28 Oct. 2010.
- Branigan, Tania. "China Accuses US of Human Rights Double Standards." *The Guardian Online*. 11 Apr. 2011. Accessed 7 Jun. 2011.
- Brooks, David. "Harmony and the Dream." *The New York Times*. 11 Apr. 2008. Accessed 3 Jun. 2011.
- Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000. Accessed 06 Jul 2009.
- Christensen, Thomas J. "Chinese Realpolitik." *Foreign Affairs*. 75.5 (Sept./Oct. 1996): 37-52. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010.
- "The Debate Over Universal Values." *The Economist*. 30 Sept. 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.
- Dellios, Rosita. "Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 - The Heritage from the Past." CEWCES Research Papers. (1994). n. pag. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.
- Dreyer, June. "Grimm Foreign Policy?" *The Diplomat*. n.pag., 12 Feb. 2011. Accessed 6 May 2011.
- Erickson, Andrew and Lyle Goldstein. "Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China's Response to US Hegemony." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 29.6 (2006): 955-986. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011.

Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist? " *Security Studies*. 14.4 (2005): 637-662. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Finkelstein, David M. "China's National Military Strategy." *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, July 1998, San Diego, CA*. Ed. Mulvenon, James C. and Richard H. Yang. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999. Accessed 16 Oct. 2009.

Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Search for Military Power." *The Washington Quarterly*. 31.3 (2008): 125-141. Accessed 08 Jul. 2009.

Fravel, M. Taylor. "Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes." *International Security*. 32.3 (2008): 44-83. Accessed 14 Feb. 2010.

Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China." GIGA Working Papers. 88 (2008). Accessed 06 Oct. 2009.

Halper, Stefan. "Beijing's Coalition of the Willing." *Foreign Policy*. July/August 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

Ikenberry, G. John. "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*. 87.1 (Jan./Feb. 2008): 23-37. Accessed 11 Jun. 2011.

Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998. Print.

Johnston, Alastair I. "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*. 27.4 (2003): 5-56. Accessed 27 Oct. 2010.

Kopp, Carlo. "An Initial Assessment of China's J-20 Stealth Fighter." *China Brief*. Jamestown Foundation. 10.8 (2011): 9-11. Accessed 12 Jun. 2011.

Lo, Ping Cheung, and Sumner B. Twiss, eds. *Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and Dissent*. Routledge, 2015.

Lo, Ping Cheung. "Varieties of Statecraft and Warfare Ethics in Early China: An Overview." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 3-26. Print.

Lo, Ping Cheung. "Legalism and Offensive Realism in the Chinese Court Debate on Defending National Security 81 BCE." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 249-280. Print.

Loy, Hui-Chieh. "Mohist Arguments on War." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 226-248. Print.

Lubman, Stanley. "Citizen Rights and Police Conduct." *The Wall Street Journal: China Realtime Report*. 16 Aug. 2010. Accessed 4 Jun. 2011.

Margaras, Vassilis. "Strategic Culture: A Reliable Tool of Analysis for EU Security Developments." *European Foreign Policy Conference Paper. United Kingdom: London School of Economics*. 2004. Accessed 1 Jul. 2017.

Mearsheimer, John. "Trouble Brewing in the 'hood.'" *The Sydney Morning Herald*. 3 Aug. 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011.

Newmyer, Jacqueline. "The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 33.4 (2010): 483-504. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.

Osnos, Evan. "The Top Ten China Myths of 2010." *The New Yorker*. n.pag., 8 Dec. 2010. Accessed 28 Apr. 2011.

Ross, Robert S. "Assessing the China Threat." *The National Interest*. 81 (2005): 81-87. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011.

Ross, Robert S. "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia." *Security Studies*. 15.3 (2006): 355-395. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011.

Scobell, Andrew. *China and Strategic Culture*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. May, 2002. Accessed 02 Oct. 2009.

Scobell, Andrew. *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.

Scobell, Andrew. "China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35.2 (2014): 211-226. Accessed 4 Apr. 2017.

Tang, Shiping. *From Offensive Realism to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy*. Singapore: S. Rajaratnum School of International Studies, 2007. Accessed 05 Dec. 2010.

Twiss, Sumner B., and Jonathan Chan. "Classical Confucianism, Punitive Expeditions, and Humanitarian Intervention." *Lo and Twiss*, pp. 117-134. Print.

Waldron, Arthur. "Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. By Wang Yuan-kang. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 70.4 (2011): 1146-1148. Accessed 16 Apr. 2017.

Walzer, Michael. "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1973): 160-180. Accessed 26 Dec. 2010.

Wang, Yi. "Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation." *China International Studies* 1 (2014): 18-44.

Wang, Yuan-Kang. *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics*. New York: Columbia UP, 2011. Print.

Wines, Michael. "Behind a Military Chill: A More Forceful China." *The New York Times*. 8 Jun. 2010. Accessed 4 Jun. 2011.

Wines, Michael. "Geologist's Sentence Is Questioned." *The New York Times*. 5 Jul. 2010. Accessed 2 Jun. 2011.

Wong, Edward. "Chinese Warship May Be Nearly Ready." *The New York Times*. 7 Apr. 2011. Accessed 11 Jun. 2011.

Yao, Xinzhong. "Conflict, Peace and Ethical Situations." *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*. 4.2 (2004): 89-109. Accessed 25 Oct. 2010.

Zhang, Tiejun. "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features." *Comparative Strategy*. 21.3 (2002): 73-90. Accessed 8 Jun. 2011.

Zhong, Wu. "General and Scholar Test Reform Waters." *Asia Times Online*. 12 Aug. 2010. Accessed 6 Jun. 2011

Zhou, Minqing. "Continuation, Transition, and Challenge." *SWITCH*. 17 (2002) : n. pag. Accessed 7 Jun. 2011.

The 17th CPC National Congress. "Interpretation of Congress Terms: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." *The People's Daily Online (English)*. The People's Daily Online (English), 30 Sept. 2007. Accessed 5 Jun. 2011.

Chapter 4: Methodology

The goal of this study is to understand to what extent Confucian beliefs influence strategic preferences. Beliefs about morality, state behavior, and the use of force are modeled from new empirical data that was collected through an anonymous paper questionnaire administered to a random cross-sectional population of Chinese students at elite Chinese universities. Responses and patterns of responses are then compared to Western and Confucian ethical theories in order to identify moral reasoning and foreign policy decision-making preferences. Finally, questions that address views of the international system, when force can be used, and how force can be used are made into scaled measures of Confucian beliefs and then tested to see if they have a statistically significant relationship. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) are the primary methods used to identify relationships and patterns as well as to validate stated preferences.

The biggest challenges to understanding how China creates and implements foreign policy has been the lack of transparency about (Bobrow, Chan, and Kringen 27): “(a) elite perceptions and policy responses; (b) participants in decision making and their interactions; and (c) the analytic–cognitive basis for decision making” (James and Zhang 36). This study examines the first and third unknowns - the perceptions and preferences of future elites and their beliefs about the role of morality within the decision-making process.

The first step in this kind of moral reasoning is whether or not in the given situation it is morally correct to violate the basic principle of not doing harm in order to bring about a lesser harm or a greater good. Personal beliefs and ethics, which are strongly influenced by cultural values and norms, help individuals decide how to weigh conflicting principles. Thus, it is necessary to first examine whether or not the normative beliefs of Chinese respondents reflect Confucian moral values.

If the use of force is deemed immoral because it is likely to do more harm than good, then whether or not there are factors that trump the *prima facie* obligation to do what is moral is then considered. Similar to the reasoning of political realists, it may be that morality is considered a luxury that should not constrain options for ensuring state security. At the same time, at least for many realists, pragmatic pursuit of state interests (“egoism”) should not make what is morally wrong now morally right (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 19).

Prior studies have assessed China’s beliefs about war mostly using qualitative analysis of its past conflicts. As a result, this study’s alternative approach of performing quantitative analysis of actual beliefs render its findings and insights even more useful and significant. As Johnston says about the annual Beijing Area Survey (BAS), which only briefly touches upon perceptions of international relations, “These data are an additional method for tapping into Chinese preferences and attitudes on foreign policy that can be analyzed alongside qualitative and more impressionistic data. Indeed, findings that are similar across sources and methods should be considered especially robust. Findings that are inconsistent should compel us to rethink conventional wisdom whether it is derived from qualitative or quantitative sources” (Johnston 9).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The primary question of this study is, “*What is the role of Confucian morality in shaping elite Chinese beliefs about the use of force?*”

The primary null hypothesis is:

H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.

There are three null hypotheses used to assess the primary one. How and why this is done will be discussed shortly. The sub-hypotheses are:

H2: Elite Chinese students do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior. (“Views of IR”)

H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used. (“Jus ad Bellum”)

H4: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about how force should be and can be used. (“Jus in Bello” and “Moral Conviction”)

The primary hypothesis is H1 – Preferences derived from patterns of how respondents say force can (morally, amorally, and immorally) be used are not consistent and coherent with those based upon Confucian beliefs. The overall influence of Confucian values on the use of force (H1) is indicated by the relationship between patterns of beliefs measured according to hypotheses H2, H3, and H4.

Hypothesis H2 models the extent to which respondents agree that a Confucian worldview accurately explains the character of the international system, including how states tend to behave within it. This provides context regarding how dangerous the world is perceived to be and what states must do to ensure security within it. H3 addresses the extent to which Confucian ideals influence the normative permissibility and pragmatic necessity of going to war as well as if normative ideals actually constrain the use of force. H4 does the same about the permissibility of how wars may be conducted.

Questions about how the international system operates, how states should behave within it, and what role the use of force plays in addressing security concerns are used to create factor scores that measure the extent to which these beliefs are consistent with Confucian ideology. Such measures, following Johnston’s characterization of strategic culture, reflect beliefs about “the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under which applied force is useful).” (Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture” 30) The H1 (null) hypothesis is evaluated based upon how strongly each measure

agrees with Confucian beliefs and the degree of correlation between these three aspects of strategic preference.

The measures and the correlations between them are not only metrics for modeling beliefs but, because they are logically connected by the same framework of beliefs, measures are validated by comparing responses in each for consistency and coherence. The legitimacy of any stated normative preference is further tested by examining whether or not it actually constrains using force - especially when force would be the most effective option to address security concerns or to pursue state interests. This includes whether those a weak Confucian worldview still support nonviolent means to pursue state security and whether endorsement to use force may be due a “supreme emergency.”

RESEARCH DESIGN

The general design of the research project and the survey instrument are described in this chapter while the next chapter addresses the theoretical underpinnings of the actual survey in much greater detail.

The survey instrument consists of an anonymous Chinese-language paper questionnaire with 31 multiple-choice, Likert Scale and Semantic Differential questions (English and Chinese versions in the Appendix). The questionnaire is divided into three sections: views of how states behave within the international system; the overall and moral permissibility of when force may be used; and the overall and moral permissibility of how force may be used. Confucian ethics critically differs from Western ethics in that preferential consideration is moral – “justice” may still be defined as “fairness” but not “equality” (Chen, Xunwu; Cline; Deng; Fan; Gier; Hwang, “Chinese Relationalism”; Keller; Lai) Accordingly, there are two versions of the survey that only differ in whether respondents are asked to consider a foreign state’s (Version 1 of the survey) or their own states (Version 2) behavior and the use of force.

The survey targets the most pivotal facets of Confucian theory while providing room for the diversity of moral reasoning found in the real world. Questions based upon the fundamental principles of Confucian and Western ethics as well as of political realist theory are used to model beliefs about how states should behave and how respondents view the character of the international system. These overall views establish the background and context for evaluating decisions about war.

Respondents then explain their beliefs about when and how force can and should be used. This includes under what conditions it is acceptable and the perceived morality of the act. Patterns of responses are tested for consistent and coherent treatment of Confucian values. Possible sources of bias, especially a high sensitivity to threat and that from (state) self-interest, are taken into account.

Moral decision-making is too complex to create models which include all possible factors of influence. The goal of this study, accordingly, follows standard convention and seeks to prove or disprove the null hypothesis rather than to do so for its corollary. Though less satisfying, even failure to disprove the null hypothesis contributes useful information. This study is, ultimately, a test of whether Confucian ideals constrain respondents from doing what is most effective for pursuing their state's material interests when doing so contradicts moral beliefs. If this is found not to be the case, the study still makes a valuable contribution because it provides new data from a new source that there is an alternate source that shapes China's strategic preferences.

VARIABLES

The hypotheses H1 – H4 are tested by examining the degree of correlation and causation between 4 latent factors. Each latent factor is measured using a composite scale. The

scales/factors are labelled “Views of International Relations (IR),” “*Jus ad Bellum*,” “*Jus in Bello*,” and “Moral Conviction.” The sophistication of SEM means that it does not require specification of dependent and independent variables in order to test causal relationships. However, this terminology is used for this chapter for the sake of establishing clear understanding of the goals of the study and how the survey questions were used to accomplish them.

The scale for the independent variable uses factor scores from 5 indicators, the 3 scales for the dependent variable are based upon 13 indicators. The (other) indicators that were part of the survey but did not end up being part of the scales are also described because their irrelevance to overall beliefs also results in important insights.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable is Confucian beliefs. Though there is no official definition of Confucian beliefs about war, there is a general consensus about the framework of ranked beliefs, principles, and values espoused by the Confucian ethical and philosophical system. Previously discussed in detail, a broad summary of the Confucian system could be that harmony and moderation/middle way (*zhongyong*) are goals to be pursued through cultivation of virtues such as kindness/benevolence/forgiveness (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), ritual (*li*), wisdom (*zhi*), and trustworthiness (*xin*) (Godehardt ; Scobell 4,8; Wang 1-2).

Especially because virtue is highly dependent upon context, it is difficult to establish universal standards. To avoid making prohibitively broad generalizations, the independent variable is operationalized in two different ways. One is how Confucian values shape views of

⁸ These terms are borrowed from Just War theory where *Jus ad Bellum* (“right to war”) describes the criteria considered for if going to war is morally permissible, *Jus in Bello* (“right in war”) is the criteria for what behavior in war is moral.

the international system and the other is how they shape beliefs about normative and actual state behavior.

The Confucian worldview would not see the international system as a zero-sum game of constant severe competition where war is inevitable. Accordingly, there should be a preference for moral governance and nonviolent state behavior that emphasizes pursuing interests and resolving conflicts through accommodation, compromise, collaboration, and other generally pacifist/nonviolent alternatives (Johnston 249; The People's Republic of China. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 6; Wang 18). If force absolutely must be used, it is only in the most extreme circumstances and then only in limited and defensive ways (Johnston 25; Scobell 8; Wang 14-15, 19).

On the opposite end of the spectrum is the political realist worldview. As Nicholas Kitchen summarizes,

The state in the international system is analogous to man in the state of nature; thus international politics is most fundamentally about power, which is accrued, defended and wielded only in pursuit of the national interest defined as national security, the nature of which can be identified and assessed in terms of material capabilities. The international system has no sovereign and is therefore anarchic, and so state action within it can be reduced to the national interest: thus the security of the nation-state is the sole determinant of foreign policy. (124)

Assuming that states are rational actors, how the international system is perceived to behave and state behavior are logically connected. Yet the possibility that the world is perceived as anarchic and competitive but morality should strongly guide behavior is tested for as well.

For all Semantic Differential (SD) and Likert questions, responses are coded from 1-5 with lower values assigned for more Confucian/idealist/moral views. A response of "Neither/Don't Know" is coded as a 3. It is noted in Chapter 5 for which questions the "Neither/Don't Know" response option has been removed. A Chinese and English copy of each survey version is included as an appendix.

The indicators that measure worldview address the fundamental principles of Confucian and realist theories. These principles are especially useful because the theories often have opposing beliefs about them. One SD indicator variable measures how inherently violent and, thus, the normal degree of threat that exists in, the status quo international system. It does this by asking whether other countries are likely to see violence as a last resort in self-defense or a tool to be used anytime the benefits seem to outweigh the disadvantages.

A Likert indicator for perception of the international system is to what extent respondents agree with Thucydides that, “Justice is only an issue between countries of equal power. Strong countries do whatever they are capable of doing and weak countries suffer what they must.” This statement tests whether the world is seen as anarchic and in near-constant conflict.⁹

Confucian beliefs are also measured by looking at what values states should emphasize when considering the foreign policy and behavior of their state of interest. There are 6 indicators that measure this. First, for a general sense of the extent ideals should shape foreign policy, a SD question asks whether international relations decisions should be made by politicians considering “how the world ought to be” or “how the world actually is.”

This issue is examined in further detail by asking a multiple-choice question about what role morality should play in international affairs. The answers are considered categorical measures so coding does not reflect correlation to Confucian ideals. However, the strongest expression of Confucian norms is the response that “morality should shape politics even if doing so means that it constrains and sometimes disadvantages one’s own country.” A less strong Confucian view is that “what is morally correct should always be considered and usually

⁹ The patterns of responses for these first two questions do have a statistically significant relationship but it is not strongly linear.

followed. However, although it does not make it morally right, sometimes it is necessary for a country to behave immorally in order to protect its citizens.” At the other end of the spectrum is the response “...the world is too competitive and dangerous to allow these rules to limit the political and military options available to governments and countries.”

To differentiate between possible realist beliefs as well as those often heard from Chinese respondents in pilot tests and focus groups, several other possible options were given. One is that “there are universal rights and wrongs but they apply to how people should treat one another. The world is too competitive and too dangerous to allow these rules to limit the political and military options available to governments and countries.” Another option is “governments and individuals have different roles and responsibilities so they have different standards of what is right and wrong. For a government, what is morally right is what best meets its obligations to its people – the survival of the country and the good of its own citizens.” The last option is that “there are few or no universal moral standards, morality is just an excuse used by powerful countries to justify preventing weaker countries from challenging the way things currently are.”

A SD question directly addresses the Confucian belief that the world is not zero-sum by asking whether “there is more overall benefit (economic, security, political, cultural) for countries to compromise and work together while others think this involves too much sacrifice and too much risk.” The realist option is “competing to win” and the Confucian/moral options is “compromising cooperation.”

A Likert scale question addresses the same issue but intensifies the conflict of interest by increasing the potential risks of collaboration. This is done by asking to what extent does the respondent agree that governments should look out for their people first so they should do whatever is best for their citizens even at the expense of other countries.

Moving from beliefs about how states should behave more specifically to how states should use force, respondents are asked whether the best way to address concerns about state safety and security is through deterrence, alliances, or supporting international institutions like the United Nations. This multiple-choice question is coded 1-3 with 1 being for a more Confucian compromising, collaborative, nonviolent response of supporting international institutions. The fourth option of “Other (please write)” is dropped for most analysis.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable is the use of force. Three different indicators (latent factors), comprised of three scales, identify and assess beliefs about the permissibility of using force. The indicators address when force can be used, what uses of force are moral, and the extent to which morality constrains behavior in war. The logical connection and overlap between concepts and beliefs, central to all of them, create excellent metrics for evaluating a number of critical aspects of moral reasoning.

They provide the means to further test the reliability and validity of the instrument as well as to test patterns of responses for consistency and coherence. They also help differentiate between using force due to perceived exceptional circumstances (supreme emergency) and because it is thought moral to do so. Doing so elaborates the extent to which morality influences behavior and what conditions warrant exceptional behavior.

The survey has five self-defense scenarios that measure beliefs about when force may be used. They differ in severity of threat in order to quantify how quickly respondents resort to using force. This, in turn, measures how effective force is believed to be and whether its use is constrained by morality even if seen as effective. This also measures the threshold for when using force in self-defense is seen as immoral but necessary (supreme emergency) and when it is seen as morally legitimate self-defense.

There are an additional two scenarios that ask about using force in defense of others. These questions are included in the overall scale measuring the permissibility of going to war but are also compared to self-defense scenarios for several reasons. For one, doing so measures how morality is influenced by the relationship between who is doing harm and who is being helped. This also measures the moral obligation to help “others” compared to the sanctity of state sovereignty.

All scenarios have the same three answer choices: the given scenario makes the use of force moral, that “force may be used only because this is an exceptional circumstance but it is still morally wrong,” and that it “is not okay to use force for this reason.” This makes the critical (but difficult to determine) differentiation between uses of force that are justified by morality and those excused due to necessity. The strong inclination to use force (“morally okay”) is coded 3, recognition that this is not moral but that morality would not constrain (“force is immoral but may be used out for exceptional reasons”) is 2, and those most strongly principled (“it is not okay to use force for this reason”) are 1.

Described from lowest severity to highest, the first self-defense scenario asks about the strict realist view that force can be used “when it is the most effective way to pursue national interests.” Next is about a preventative war where “an unfriendly country is being increasingly threatening by rapidly building its military (so should be stopped before it becomes too strong).” Next is another preventative scenario, but with higher threat because the other state has already crossed the threshold of using force, “when an unfriendly country becomes more threatening because it invaded a country next to the one” the respondent is asked to consider. Preemptive war is tested next by asking about using force “when there is clear evidence that an attack is imminent.” The last - and most conservative - self-defense scenario is when the state “has been physically attacked by another military first.”

The two “defense of others” scenarios examine the applicability of Confucian beliefs within the context of modern concerns of sovereignty. In one, force would be used to “stop massive human rights violations occurring in another country’s internal conflict” and, in the other, it would be used “when a small country that is wrongfully invaded by a stronger country requests help.” Both involve those who need protecting having clearly been wronged but help has been requested against an aggressor state for one while the other requires interfering in another state’s domestic affairs.

The next latent factor - the morality of how force is used – explores the permissibility of three common behaviors in war which vary in their intentionality to harm innocent civilians. Though Confucian beliefs should lead to a preference for less suffering and destruction – especially for noncombatants – if a virtue ethic it is difficult to establish any standard from which to measure the morality of decisions. Accordingly, these questions not only offer particularly informative insight into Chinese moral decision-making but also provide empirical data that, when compared to other survey questions, identify the role teleological or deontological considerations might play.

All three are Semantic Differential questions, coded 1-5, with strong agreement that the act is “never morally okay” at 1, strong agreement that the act “is morally okay, part of war” as 5, and “Neither/Don’t Know” as 3.

The scenario with least intentionality to harm civilians directly asks if it is morally okay to plant “landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatant’s even though innocent civilians may step on them accidentally.” Next is whether it is okay for “enemy soldiers in populated villages or town be attacked in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many innocent civilians would be killed.” The tactic with the most intentionality to harm noncombatants is if

“soldiers and fighters deprive an innocent civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy.”

Consistency and coherence of responses to these specific situations and other questions are compared to a broader test of whether morality is based upon “means” or “ends” by asking “If it does not change who actually wins the war, do you believe it is better to have” a “longer but more restrained war” or “a quick but unrestrained war.” This also provides a baseline to examine if Confucian ethics is interpreted to support the idea that any potential disruption of harmonious society should be addressed immediately and removed expeditiously as this will minimize the self-induced chaos of war as well as the disharmony from the actual threat.

Both teleological thinking and an ethical theory that prioritizes virtuous behavior could rationalize the belief that a war started for the just reason of improving harmony would make it moral to do most any behavior that will bring about its end as quickly as possible. Patterns of responses for this question and those for the four latent factors are compared to investigate further if Confucian ethics places greater moral emphasis on *when* to use force than *how* to use force. However, there are substantial reservations that such behavior would qualify as virtuous since the Confucian virtues, especially of humaneness (*ren*), as well as classic Confucian texts support moral considerations similar to *jus en bello* proportionality and discrimination/noncombatant immunity (Twiss and Chan 88-91).

The extent to which moral ideals constrain behavior are then tested. There are four questions where an additional consideration is introduced and respondents are asked if it changes the permissibility of any of the three given behaviors in war which they previously said were immoral.

The response options are the same for all questions. The least moral constraint, coded as a 4, is that the new information means that “there now is no problem at all doing some” of

the immoral acts. Next is the “Dirty Hands” option, coded 3, “Although it would have been better to avoid some of these actions, the new circumstances make doing some of them morally okay.”

The stronger influence of morality is represented by “Although it is still against my moral beliefs, some of these actions may be done because of the exceptional circumstances.” Coded as 2, this preserves the legitimacy of moral standards while acknowledging the complexities of an imperfect world. It also describes an alternate definition of “Dirty Hands.” The greatest moral constraint, coded as 1, is that the new information does make any immoral behavior now moral.

The first scenario asks if the permissibility of using landmines; attacking towns/villages; or depriving civilians of food, water, and medicine changes “if it made a difference between winning or losing a battle.” This tests the effect of a stronger *jus in bello* teleological criteria of proportionality but unaltered deontological consideration of noncombatant immunity.

The effect a just cause/virtuous motive of clear self-defense has on behavior in war is further assessed by keeping the amount of harm inflicted unchanged while adding that “the other country physically attacked first.”

Exceptional circumstances due to a “supreme emergency” are stated as “the enemy’s goal is not just victory but total destruction of the country.” The proportionality and expected consequences of the situation remain unchanged to avoid altering the balance of harm and good. This question tests the mutability of moral standards as well as most directly measures how respondents define “Dirty Hands.”

Reciprocity is a core moral principle and an important pragmatic consideration in Western Just War theory as well as Confucianism. To measure and to differentiate between

these two possible aspects, the survey asks how permissibility of immoral behavior changes if “the other side started violating these limits first.”

INSTRUMENTATION, QUESTION CONSTRUCTION, VALIDITY, RELIABILITY

The existing research into China’s views about the use of force has been almost exclusively conducted by examining China’s historical behavior and records. An extensive literature review indicates that there have been only prior two groups of studies that quantitatively measure views on the use of force in a manner similar to this one.

From 1989 to 1996, Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro conducted a series of survey studies exploring views about war. These studies identified the Western ethical, political, philosophical, etc. framework used to decide when war was permitted but did not look at the decision-making process itself (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro ; Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 83-109; Tamashiro, Brunk, and Secrest 139-152). Their methodology and lessons learned were closely examined during the construction of this study but a different questionnaire was necessary in order to test for Confucian beliefs, to measure the relative priority of different moral principles, and to compensate for how the Confucian emphasis on context, circumstance, and self-interest may influence reasoning.

The second relevant series of studies is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “People on War” survey done in 1999 and a more limited follow-up done in 2007 (Greenberg Research; Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 189-206). These studies focused on understanding attitudes about what behavior is acceptable and unacceptable in war (Greenberg Research; Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 189-206). Normative beliefs and factors which might change them were considered but the role of morality was only briefly examined as it was found that law would more effectively encourage limits in the conduct of war than appeals to morality (Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 189-206).

This project's first pilot study was conducted in China in 2010 using, with permission and support from the ICRC's Beijing Delegation, a modified Chinese-language version of the ICRC's 1999 survey instrument. It was approved by and complied with Harvard University Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements for ethical use of human subjects. The pilot study included 84 returned surveys and three different focus groups that consisted of 8-12 Chinese students each. Focus groups were used to confirm the face validity as well as to address possible cultural influences such as conceptual equivalence, operational equivalence, item equivalence, and scaler equivalence. Additional lessons learned came from comparing the findings of the pilot study to those from the earlier ICRC surveys.

The pilot studies, the ICRC's established approach to quantifying normative behavior, and Brunk, Secrest, and Tamiashiro's proven framework and theory for modeling ethical reasoning were used to create a new survey instrument with improved validity and reliability. Informal face validity testing and critiquing of this version was done by graduate students at Harvard and Tufts universities. After further adjustments, the survey was translated into Mandarin Chinese by a native-Chinese professional translator who had strong, proven familiarity with the concepts and technical terms. The quality of and possible cultural influences of the translation and survey design were checked by a Chinese project manager at the Beijing office of the professional survey company IPSOS. Content validity was tested by having the English version reviewed by two professors at KCL and a native Chinese speaker reviewed the English and Chinese versions.

In the fall of 2011, the validity was further evaluated by giving the Chinese and English surveys to five Chinese nationals who had very strong English skills. Three Chinese individuals had formal academic training in statistics, one majored in Government and one was a Professor of International Law (with strong interest in war). Slight linguistic adjustments were made based upon follow-up interviews. Several other Chinese academics and professionals who

worked in International Law (including a Chinese federal judge and an assistant dean of a large Chinese university) provided informal, positive feedback.

Two native English speakers with very strong Chinese skills also provided feedback. One was in the final year of a Government PhD program focused on China and the other was a professional Western diplomat very experienced with China.

A final pilot survey was conducted at Renmin University in Beijing, PRC in the late fall of 2011. This involved just under 50 surveys and focused on the desired target demographic (Chinese students at elite Chinese universities). It also included interviews with some participants to confirm the validity of the survey. The new study received IRB approval from King's College London.

Content and face validity are further established by requiring that stated moral beliefs are consistently applied to the given scenarios before considered influential. Where political realist beliefs are opposite to Confucian beliefs, tests measured against the political realist framework serve as another metric for face validity. Finally, logical validity is also used to establish content validity because many of the variables (beliefs) tested are derived from those used in the prior, proven surveys that measure realism, moral constraint, and Just War norms.

Tests for convergent and discriminant validity evaluate the survey's construct validity. In other words, the framework of variables used in the survey are examined to ensure that they accurately measure Confucian worldviews and beliefs about the use of force. The patterns of inter-correlation seen from the correlation coefficients provide strong evidence of convergent validity because the variables intended to comprise each measure in the survey correlate most strongly with the intended factor. Similarly, the low correlation between measures intended for different constructs indicates a good discriminant validity. In part, these results are aided by dropping measures found during pretests and pilot studies to be have weaker correlations.

Bias from order effect was addressed by using several different styles of question (Likert, Semantic Differential, write in, etc.) as well as organizing susceptible questions so that not all of the “more moral” responses are on the same side. Similarly, contrast effect is mitigated by having the questions that ask about using force in self-defense ordered so the degree of threat presented does not proceed linearly.

Pilot studies also found that Chinese participants are highly resistant to selecting any answer that were less than ideal. Yet, this is necessary since understanding moral reasoning requires observing the decision-making process when one moral principle must be violated in order to uphold another moral principle. Where this was an issue, Semantic Differential questions are used and the answer options are crafted to force hard choices - even if this means that the options are not direct opposites.

Factorial validity also supports good construct validity. Factor Analysis confirms that the data adequately conforms to the predicted and intended factor loading patterns. That is to say the intended constructs are statistically significant and correlate with the measures intended to comprise their scales.

Chapter 5, Data Analysis and Findings, discusses the reliability and validity of the statistical models in detail. Briefly, the composite reliability of the scales for CFA models are:

Table 1 - CFA Composite Reliability (R²)

Scale	Composite Reliability (R ²)	
	Version 1 CFA	Version 2 CFA
Views of International Relations (IR)	.43	.37
<i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.55	.54
<i>Jus in Bello</i>	.65	.63
Moral Conviction	.78	.79

While the value of .69 or greater is generally desired,¹⁰ as Graham et al. say about their Moral Foundations Questionnaire,

From our point of view, it is better to have dissimilar items that are moderately correlated but that each capture a different facet of a foundation than it is to have similar items that are highly correlated and capture only a small amount of the foundation's scope. As such, our aim in item analysis was not to maximize internal consistency via item redundancy. Instead, we sought a balance between achieving (a) sufficient internal consistency to believe that there was a common core, and (b) maximal item heterogeneity to increase confidence that we were representing the foundation in full. (7)

POPULATION/SAMPLE

There were 4771 usable surveys from a random cross-section of undergraduate and graduate students at six top universities in the PRC - Renmin University (Beijing), Peking University (Beijing), Beijing Institute of Technology (or BIT) (Beijing), Minzu University (or Minority University of China) (Beijing), Xi'an Normal University (Xi'an), and Zhejiang University (Hangzhou). These schools were specifically selected for several reasons that are discussed in the first chapter but will be briefly summarized here.

For one, in China, family wealth and connections (*guanxi*) help get into better schools and, correspondingly, the university attended strongly influences job opportunities and career progression - so those who went to the top universities are more likely to assume positions of power and influence (Bian 104-109; Carlson; Chen, Xi; Chao 82-110, 193-194, 242-248; Huang; Rickards; Stafford 18-24; Stub 16, 35-69; Tsang 15-24; Timmons and Yang; Wang et. al. 6, 10; Yuen; Zang 62-74). Additionally, the young age at which values and political attitudes are instilled further suggests the formative influence of schooling and parents (Egri and Ralston 6-7; Verhulst et al. 4, 13-14). Studies have also found that nationalism and cultural pride often lead to strong endorsement of Confucianism as it is considered a key component of

¹⁰ Which is the "internal consistency of indicators measuring a given factor." (O'Rourke and Hatcher 234)

China's traditional culture and a distinguishing characteristic of Chinese identity (Bhattacharya 235-236; Ralston et al. 425; Sayama 4-11).

Other connections that encourage Confucian views mentioned in the first chapter include that there is likely a single, dominant political-military culture and that Chinese universities actively seek to shape the political beliefs and moral values of students. Though many students will pursue career paths not strictly in the military or political realm, the expansive political sensitivities of authoritarian governments and CCP oversight makes it an important issue for many other professions. This is especially true for large corporations and state-owned enterprises as economic growth is an issue of national security so there is substantial overlap of many concerns, guiding political beliefs, decision-makers, and government influence.

While current leaders were not surveyed as the ones approached all declined to complete the anonymous survey, students offer some advantages anyway. For example, China's rapid modernization has likely shaped the views of students differently than the culture in which current leaders grew up and, as field research extensively confirmed, Chinese students are more likely to give honest responses than established leaders.

Though the role of public opinion in China appears to be fairly low compared to democratic countries, the distance between the consensus of China's public and government is shrinking and, accordingly, public opinion is becoming increasingly influential (Fewsmith and Rosen 151-187). As Johnston says, "It is not unreasonable to believe that just as the cultural, political and economic preferences of various sectors of the Chinese public may increasingly influence the domestic policies of the central government so too their foreign policy preferences may constrain the options of China's leaders" (3).

DEMOGRAPHICS

Of the more than 5500 surveys collected and 4771 used, 2386 were of Version 1 and 2385 were of Version 2. There was no statistically-significant difference between versions based upon gender, age groups, ethnicity, or years of education. Table 2 displays all the information in one location.

Figure 1 is a histogram of the age distribution combined with a normal and kernel density estimate. Throughout this project, “vs=1” means the results come from responses to Version 1 and “vs=2” indicates Version 2. Figure 2 is a similar plot of years of education for the surveyed population. These variables are further categorized into groupings based upon the findings from cognitive development theory discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure 1 – Age Distribution





Figure 2 – Years of Education



Respondents are placed into four age groupings. The first group is 16-18 years old because, as discussed in Chapter 4, studies have found that 90% of Chinese subjects were in Kohlburg's Stage 3 of moral development by 16 and in Stage 4 by 18 years old (Hwang 225-226). The next category of 19-25 years old is not only when most Chinese students are in an undergraduate or Master's program but it also covers the move for most from Kohlburg's Stage 4 to Stage 5 (Hwang 226). The 26-35 age group contains more mature students where there should be little moral development but greater exposure to world events as well as a shift towards more adult priorities.

For Version 1, the mean age is 21.86 years, the median is 22 years old, the mode is 22 years old and there is a Standard Deviation of 2.44 years. The Version 2 mean is 21.80 years old, the median is 22 years old, the mode is 20 years old, and the Standard Deviation is 2.45. As expected, the majority of respondents (87% in each version) were 19-25 years old. There was no significant difference between the distribution of ages by version.

The level of education is divided into three groups that generally correspond to secondary education or just starting university (1-12 years), being a second to fifth year undergraduate student (13-17 years), and being a Master's and/or PhD student or working towards having multiple degrees (18+) (Huang 134). The Mean, Median, Mode, and Standard Deviation for Version 1 is 15.16, 15, 15, and 2.34 years, respectively, and for Version 2 it is 15.13, 15, 16, and 2.28 years, respectively. The majority (77-78%) of respondents indicated they have completed 13-17 years of education thus far. There was no significant difference between the distribution of schooling by version.


Gender was close to evenly split with Version 1 having 51% men and 49% women and Version 2 having 52% men and 48% women. China's population is about 91.6% Han ethnicity. In the survey, 87% of the respondents indicated they were Han while 13% indicated one of the other 55 ethnicities found in China. This imbalance is due to the deliberate effort to poll minority ethnicities because their historical, cultural, and political background may result in different views about international relations and the use of force.

Table 2 - Demographic Data

		Version 1		Version 2		Total	
		n	%	n	%	n	%
Sex	Male	1225	51%	1241	52%	2466	52%
	Female	1158	49%	1140	48%	2298	48%
Age (yrs)	16-18	121	5%	135	6%	256	5%
	19-25	2058	87%	2053	87%	4111	87%
	26-35	183	8%	180	8%	363	8%
	36+	0	0%	1	<1%	1	<1%
		Mean: 21.86 Median: 22 Mode: 22 SD: 2.44		Mean: 21.80 Median: 22 Mode: 20 SD: 2.45		No Sig Diff between Versions	
Ethnicity	Han	2076	87%	2052	86%	4128	87%
	Non-Han	301	13%	326	14%	627	13%
Education (yrs)	1-12	172	7%	200	9%	372	8%
	13-17	1803	78%	1796	77%	3599	77%
	18+	343	15%	343	15%	686	15%
		Mean: 15.16 Median: 15 Mode: 15 SD: 2.34		Mean: 15.13 Median: 15 Mode: 16 SD: 2.28		No Sig Diff between Versions	

Two demographic questions were not analyzed. The first was because only 2% of student respondents said that they had served in the military. The second was the respondent's academic major because the coding of these responses proved to be too time consuming. Lastly, respondents were asked from which provincial administrative districts (which includes special administrative regions, autonomous regions, municipalities, and Taiwan) they came. Reporting demographics from each of the 34 units (plus Taiwan) individually is too detailed and not particularly meaningful as these lines do not correspond to the important factors such as "resources, dynamics, and historical character" (Chovanec 8/26/2014). Instead, these districts are divided into nine groups which, according to Professor Chovanec of Tsinghua University, each have "a unique set of challenges and opportunities" (Chovanec 8/26/2014). As he summarizes, "Anyone who wants to do business in China, make policy towards China, or simply comprehend the dramatic changes happening there should understand the Nine Nations and the role each of them is playing in shaping China's future" (Chovanec 8/26/2014).

Table 3 reports this information and Figure 3 displays the demographic distribution for the total student population according to home province over Chovanec’s original map.



As can be seen more clearly in the three columns on the right side of Table 3 below, the geographic distribution of respondents is somewhat different than that of the total population of China. However, the comparison presented is less than ideal as they measure different things. The “% of Total China Pop 2009” column reports the total population of each province compared to the total population of China while the column just to its left measures the geographical origins of the surveyed student population.

There is not enough information about China’s student demographics available to make an accurate assessment of how well the surveyed population represents key demographics. As

others have said, educational data for China is limited and the most useful and, thus, desired information does not seem to exist (Wang et al. 533-546; Yeung and Lai).

Though the number of students enrolled in higher education *from* each province is not available, the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) does track the number enrolled *in* most provinces. Yet, there is no information for Taiwan, Macau, or Hong Kong and the information provided for the other regions lack the necessary specificity.

The NBSC reports that there were about 15,142,422 students enrolled in undergraduate, Master's, and Doctoral programs in China in 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The provinces of "Shangri-La," for example, had 610,921 students graduate from senior secondary school in 2011 and 225,170 students enrolled in undergraduate courses in schools located in these regions (National Bureau of Statistics of China). It is impossible to know how many of the students who enrolled in universities located in these provinces came from these provinces or how many students who graduated from high school in these provinces enrolled in universities in other provinces.

Though not as useful, the numbers from the "Shangri-La" provinces can be compared to, for example, the "Yellow Land" provinces, which had 1,033,536 students enrolled in university in 2011 and 2,292,978 graduated from senior secondary school (National Bureau of Statistics of China).

There is also no data available to determine the percent of people from each province who go to institutions of higher learning. The official *national* rate in 2011 was 86.5% (National Bureau of Statistics of China). However, a brief fact-check where available data makes this possible illustrates the problems mentioned by (Wang et al. 533-546; Yeung and Lai). In 2005, the NBSC reports the national enrollment rate for university was 76.3% while

Wang et al. quote the Ministry of Education's figure of 31-35% (National Bureau of Statistics of China; Wang et al. 536).

The disproportionately higher sampling in this study's respondent population from the "Yellow Land" provinces as well as the affluent "Metropolis" provinces is in part likely due to an admissions bias that favors students from these areas being accepted to and matriculating in universities and better universities (Wang et al. 533-546; Yeung and Lai 3-4). For example, Yeung and Lai report that in 2000, national enrollment into university was 1.3% but in Beijing it was 6% and Shanghai was 5% - with likely an even greater disparity for graduate schools (Yeung and Lai 4-5). In 2007, the enrollment rate for Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai was about 54% compared to Wang et al.'s assessed national average of 31-35% (Wang et al. 3-4). Unable to find similar numbers for rural regions, Wang et al. estimate it to be about 16-20% (Wang et al. 536-537).

Table 3- Geographic Demographics

Provinces	Regional Groups	Version 1		Version 2		Total		% of Total China Pop 2009 ¹¹
		n	%	n	%	n	%	
Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi	Yellow Land	944	41%	868	38%	1812	39%	27%
Hong Kong, Macau, Guangdong, Hainan	Back Door	57	2%	70	3%	127	3%	8%
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang	Metropolis	340	15%	335	15%	675	15%	11%
Sichuan, Chongqing	Refuge	118	5%	118	5%	236	5%	8%
Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan	Crossroads	351	15%	339	15%	690	15%	17%
Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi	Shangri-La	101	4%	115	5%	216	5%	10%
Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang	Rust Belt	170	7%	206	9%	376	8%	8%
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet	Frontier	172	7%	203	9%	375	8%	6%
Fujian, Taiwan	Straits	57	2%	52	2%	109	2%	4%

No Sig Diff between Versions

Despite these problems, there are a sufficient number of surveys from each region to test with confidence if there are major differences in views and responses. There is also sufficient demographic data for the six universities surveyed to determine if the respondent population from each school is a good overall representation of their school's overall population. As shown in Table 4, somewhere around 14-18% of each school's student body was reached, resulting in a Confidence Interval of 3.3-3.7% with a Confidence Level of a

¹¹ Chovanec "The Nine Nations of China."

standard 95%.¹² The Confidence Interval for the 4771 students polled representing the total population of students enrolled in China’s normal higher education in 2011 is 1.42%, also with the Confidence Level of 95% (Table 5).

Table 4 - University Demographics I

	Version 1		Version 2		Total Surveyed	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Renmin	419	18%	424	18%	843	18%
Peking	424	18%	411	17%	835	18%
BIT	356	15%	361	15%	717	15%
Minzu	341	14%	327	14%	668	14%
Zhejiang	405	17%	422	18%	827	17%
Xi'an	441	18%	440	18%	881	18%
TOTAL	2386		2385		4771	

Table 5 - University Demographics II

	Total Student Population	% Pop Surveyed each School	Confidence Interval
	#	%	%
Renmin	21918	3.85%	3.3%
Peking	29584	2.82%	3.3%
BIT	25072	2.86%	3.6%
Minzu	15822	4.22%	3.7%
Zhejiang	44269	1.87%	3.4%
Xi'an	30329	2.90%	3.3%
TOTAL	166994		1.4%
CHINA ALL	15142422		1.42%

¹² Confidence Interval is the “range of values which is likely to contain the population parameter of interest.” It is the “margin of error” (NIST). The Confidence Level of 95% means that there is a 95% chance that any findings from the same population will also fall within the Confidence Interval (NY State Dept of Health).

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

The limitations of this study primarily derive from the challenges of researching a politically-sensitive topic, in a foreign language and culture, and of a population of 1.4 billion people and 56 ethnic groups.

Objective statistical analysis as well as having Chinese academics examine the results to identify subtle China-specific influences help overcome many cultural and linguistic challenges. Prior studies have found that moral reasoning and foreign policy decision-making generally follow the same process in China as it does in the West but this study carefully selects standards which are most likely to be universal while also making appropriate adjustments for relevant cultural differences.

Careful attention was given to the possible effects of the sensitive nature of the research topic in China. For example, this could, potentially, skew respondent demographics because, out of concern for safety/anonymity or lack of trust, some may decline to participate while others might select what they think is the “right” answer. The feedback this researcher received during pilot studies, focus groups, and while giving out over 5500 surveys confirms the assessment of others that such concerns generally are unfounded (Dowd, Carlson, and Mingming 371 Note 15). However, various steps were taken to avoid such problems.

Multiple trusted sources and preliminary field research indicated that the survey needed to use general scenarios rather than more sensitive real-world issues in order to minimize objections from government authorities. This also avoids the problem that respondents might not want to select an answer that contradicts the Chinese government’s official stance. General hypothetical scenarios also avoid having to decipher the often subtle, complex influences of a foreign culture, history, media/propaganda, and nationalism on how real-world events are interpreted.

During preparation, testing, and full-scale execution of the study it became clear that the best way to encourage participation was for only the researcher to give out and collect surveys. The survey instrument often uses semantic differential questions to set up specific, inescapable conflicts because early tests revealed that respondents would otherwise select the most idealistic answer choice.¹³ Also, as Johnston says about survey construction for use in China,

In contrast with Likert scales (e.g. strongly opposed, somewhat opposed etc.) semantic differential procedures allow respondents to make more active judgments/assessments of a wider range of possible responses: since they are being asked to place self (and/or other) on a logically inclusive range of possibilities, respondents are more likely to tap into an internally generated concept of self than they are with Likert scales. (Johnston 10 Note 25)

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Chinese-language (Mandarin) paper copies of the survey instrument along with an ethical participation cover letter were passed out by the researcher at various locations on school campuses. Participants were not formally recruited or incentivized but rather were approached as they were engaging in either studying or leisure. For example, libraries, classrooms, cafes, and cafeterias were canvassed. The full-scale survey was approved by and complied with King's College London Research Ethics Committee requirements for ethical use of human subjects.

A short verbal explanation about the project (in Mandarin) was given to each respondent. It was important to mention that there were no right or wrong answers, that no prior education was necessary, and that they should not write their names. To further foster a sense of anonymity while still being available to answer any specific questions, participants were instructed to leave their surveys, face down, in a specific place in the room while the researcher

¹³ Understanding the role of morality & moral reasoning requires knowing when it is acceptable to violate one moral principle to uphold another. A survey is not needed to determine if a population dislikes war.

alternated between remaining at a distance but within sight and regularly exiting for 10-20 minutes.

The completed surveys were hand coded and digitally scanned by the researcher. All responses were entered into a database at two different times, by different people, without seeing the other set. The two datasets were then compared using EpiData to check for and correct any errors during the data entry. Any Chinese handwritten on the surveys was translated to English by native Chinese speakers. The statistics computer programs SAS 9.4 and SAS Studio performed all statistical tests.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter describes the design and methodology used to identify elite Chinese student beliefs and model the decision-making process about the role of morality in international relations and war. The next chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings upon which the questionnaire and statistical analysis are based. Many of the complexities and challenges of survey-based quantitative analysis of human reasoning are addressed as well as how this project mitigated them.

WORKS CITED

- Bhattacharya, Abanti. "Chinese Nationalism and China's Assertive Foreign Policy." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (2007): 235-262. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.
- Bobrow, Davis B., Steve Chan, and John A. Kringen. "Understanding how others treat crises." *International Studies Quarterly* 21.1 (1977): 199-223.
- Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest, and Howard Tamashiro. *Understanding Attitudes about War*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
- Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest, and Howard Tamashiro. "Military Views of Morality and War: An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of Retired American Officers." *International Studies Quarterly* (1990): 83-109.
- Carlson, Benjamin. "Welcome to Maternity Hotel California." *Rolling Stone*. n.p., 19 Aug. 2015. Accessed 5 Aug. 2016.
- Chen, Xunwu. "Justice as a Constellation of Fairness, Harmony and Righteousness." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* 24.4 (1997): 497-519. Accessed 2 Feb. 2011.
- Chen, Xi. "Elitism and Exclusion in Mass Protest Privatization, Resistance, and State Domination in China." *Comparative Political Studies* (2016). Accessed 8 Apr. 2015.
- Chao, Grace Lauren. *Elite Status in the People's Republic of China: Its Formation and Maintenance*. Dissertation. Columbia University, 2013.
- Chovanec, Patrick. "The Nine Nations of China." *The Atlantic* 2014.8/26 (2009). Accessed 26 Aug. 2014.

Cline, Erin M. "Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism, Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy." *Dao* 6.4 (2007): 361-81. Accessed 27 Nov. 2009.

"Confidence Intervals - Statistics Teaching Tools." *New York State Department of Health*. April 1999. Accessed 5 Aug. 2016.

Deng, Feng. "Corrective Justice in the Confucian Legal Tradition: A Nonexistent Concept." (2013). Accessed 27 Nov. 2009.

Egri, Carolyn P., and David A. Ralston. "Generation Cohorts and Personal Values: A Comparison of China and the United States." *Organization Science* 15.2 (2004): 210-220. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.

Fan, Ruiping. "Confucian and Rawlsian Views of Justice: A Comparison." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* 24.4 (1997): 427-56. Accessed 28 Jan. 2011.

Feng, Huiyun. "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive Or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies* 14.4 (2005): 637-62. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

Fewsmith, Joseph, and Stanley Rosen. "The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does Public Opinion Matter?" *The making of Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of reform*. (2000): 151-87.

Gier, Nicholas F. "The Dancing Ru: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue." *Philosophy East and West* 51.2 (2001): 280-305. Accessed 15 Dec. 2010.

Godehardt, Nadine. "The Chinese Meaning of just War and its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China (GIGA Working Paper 88)." (2008) Web. 10/06/2009.

Graham, Jesse, et al. "Mapping the Moral Domain." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 101.2 (2011): 366. Accessed 13 Jun. 2014.

Greenberg Research, Inc. *The People on War Report – ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War*, 2000. Accessed 20 May 2010.

Huang, Lihong. "Elitism and Equality in Chinese Higher Education: Studies of Student Socio-economic Background, Investment in Education, and Career Aspirations." *Studies in Comparative and International Education*, vol 68, 2005. Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. "Two Moralities: Reinterpreting the Findings of Empirical Research on Moral Reasoning in Taiwan." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 1.3 (1998): 211-38. Accessed 25 Feb. 2011.

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. "Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical Construction and Methodological Considerations." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 30.2 (2000): 155-78. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

ICM Research, Inc. *People on War: ICRC Consultation on the Rules of War, 2007 Country Report, Great Britain*. International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007. Accessed 13 Jul. 2010.

James, Patrick, and Enyu Zhang. "Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1996." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1.1 (2005): 31-54. Accessed 17 Jul. 2014.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton University Press, 1998.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion, 1998-2002." (2003). Accessed 20 Feb. 2012.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." *International Security* 19.4 (1995): 32-64. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010.

Keller, Monika, et al. "Reasoning about Moral Obligations and Interpersonal Responsibilities in Different Cultural Contexts." *Morality in context* 330 (2005). Accessed 23 Sept. 2010.

Kitchen, Nicholas. "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation." *Review of International Studies* 36.1 (2010): 117-43. Accessed 18 Aug. 2014.

Lai, Karyn L. "Confucian Moral Thinking." *Philosophy East and West* 45.2 (1995): 249-72. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

Muñoz-Rojas, Daniel, and Jean-Jacques Frésard. "The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations." *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross* 86.853 (2004): 189-206. Accessed 20 Mar. 2010.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. *China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Sections 1, 3, 20*. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012. Accessed 26 Aug. 2014.

NIST/SEMATECH e-Handbook of Statistical Methods. Accessed 5 Aug. 2016.

O'Rourke, Norm, R. Psych, and Larry Hatcher. *A Step-by-Step Approach to Using SAS for Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling*. SAS Institute, 2013.

Ralston, David A., et al. "Doing Business in the 21st Century with the New Generation of Chinese Managers: A Study of Generational Shifts in Work Values in China." *Journal of International Business Studies* 30.2 (1999): 415-427. Accessed 10 Jun. 2017.

Rickards, James. Interview by Gabriel Dominguez. *DW*, 28 July 2014. Accessed 1 Aug. 2016.

Sayama, Osamu. *China's Approach to Soft Power: Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, Legitimacy and International Influence*. London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Accessed

Scobell, Andrew. *China and Strategic Culture*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002. Accessed 2 Oct. 2009.

Stafford, Glen. *The Unexpected Transformations of Chinese International Students in Australia*. Dissertation. 2011. Accessed 22 Jun. 2017.

Stub, Hanna Østby. *Party Membership - A Short Way to Heaven?: A Study of Individual Career Making Among Chinese Students*. MS thesis. 2012. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Tamashiro, Howard, Gregory G. Brunk, and Donald Secret. "The Underlying Structure of Ethical Beliefs Toward War." *Journal of Peace Research* 26.2 (1989): 139-52. Accessed 27 Jul. 2011.

The People's Republic of China. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *China's National Defense in 2010*. Beijing: IOSC, 2010.

Timmons, Heather and Gang Yang. "'Bostonian' Elitism in China irritates the Country's Other College Grads." *Quartz*. 8 Jan. 2014. Accessed 3 Aug. 2016.

Tsang, Mun C. "Education and National Development in China Since 1949: Oscillating Policies and Enduring Dilemmas." *China Review* (2000): 579-618.

Verhulst, Brad, Lindon J. Eaves, and Peter K. Hatemi. "Correlation Not Causation: The Relationship between Personality Traits and Political Ideologies." *American Journal of Political Science* 56.1 (2012): 34-51. Accessed 9 March 2017.

Wang, Xiaobing, et al. "College Education and the Poor in China: Documenting the Hurdles to Educational Attainment and College Matriculation." *Asia Pacific Education Review* 12.4 (2011): 533-46. Accessed 26 Aug. 2014.

Wang, Yuan-Kang. "Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics." (2011)

Yeung, Wei-Jun Jean, and Fang Lai. "Assessing the Impact of College Enrollment Policy in China." (2008) Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Yuen, L. "Why Chinese college graduates aren't getting jobs." *The Atlantic* (2013). Accessed 15 Jul. 2016.

Zang, Xiaowei. "University Education, Party Seniority, and Elite Recruitment in China." *Social Science Research* 30.1 (2001): 62-75.

Chapter 5: Theory

This study investigates to what extent Confucian morality influences Chinese university students' opinions about the use of force. Stated beliefs and views are tested for consistency and coherence with Confucian values. Ethical theories must be fairly broad in order to be useful for a wide range of situations but this also allows for numerous legitimate interpretations of what is moral while also not providing clear metrics for what falls outside of this spectrum. While the goal of this study is to validate the role of only Confucian ethical theory, the intricacy and diversity of human reasoning as well as the many potential sources of influence and bias complicate the creation of decision making models that are suitably comprehensive yet also necessarily succinct.

This chapter outlines foundational concepts and defines critical terms of ethical theory and moral reasoning. It discusses which challenges/limitations must be addressed in order to ensure the legitimacy of the research and how the findings from prior studies have been incorporated into the survey design and statistical analysis to allay them. First, the current consensus about ethical theories and moral reasoning as well as how best to build quantitative models of them are reviewed. The same is then done for their relationship with international relations and foreign policy decisions. Finally, since most of these studies are based upon Western ethical theories and use Western respondents, the implications of cultural differences between Western and Asia are considered. Particular emphasis is given to how the findings from prior studies are used to improve the accuracy of the survey instrument, of analyzing the results from the survey, and of the models built from this analysis. This provides critical context to understand how the limitations of this project are mitigated.

MORAL REASONING

Mearsheimer says of theories about state behavior (but acknowledges it applies in a wider context), “Normative theories can be valuable tools for understanding the constraints imposed on states by the international system, whether or not states actually heed them, and they can affect how states interact with each other” (Mearsheimer 253-254). Like other studies that seek to model moral decision making, this one uses the distinguishing characteristics of the established normative frameworks for the major Western ethical philosophies to categorize and scale the beliefs of respondents (Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 87-88). It also considers how Confucian values might lead to important differences.

The personal values and beliefs which comprise a normative system play a critical role in resolving moral conflicts - especially for situations where there is no way to sidestep the conflict (Glover et al. 110-111; Watson et al. 416). Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) suggest, and later studies support, that “an individual’s moral philosophy, or ethical ideology, is the key factor in ethical judgments” (Kung and Huang 483; Redfern and Crawford 2-3). This overarching system of beliefs creates an “ethical orientation” which “is the predisposition that influences an individual to distinguish right from wrong. It is a cognitive framework that affects...awareness of ethical issues, process of problem solving, choice of ethical principle, and administrative acts” (Feng-I 317-318).

Guided by underlying ethical orientation or ideology, James Rest (1986) adds that the process of ethical behavior involves 1) moral sensitivity/recognition; 2) moral judgment or reasoning; 3) moral motivation/intention; and 4) moral character/action (Lincoln and Holmes 56-57; O’Fallon and Butterfield 375; Rest). Moral sensitivity is the awareness that the issue contains a moral problem (Johnson 60; Lincoln and Holmes 60). Moral judgment/reasoning is the process used to find the most moral way to resolve the moral problem (Johnson 62; Lincoln

and Holmes 57). Moral motivation is the desire to actually do what has been identified as the best moral option – even (and especially) when doing so is to the detriment of self-interest or expediency (Johnson 62; Lincoln and Holmes 57). Moral character is the ability to pursue doing the right option despite the substantial difficulties that may need to be overcome to do so (Johnson 72; Lincoln and Holmes 57).

Schlenker and Forsyth were some of the first to explore the relationship between an individual's moral philosophy and the extent to which their decisions are influenced by moral beliefs. They propose that the likelihood of an individual to choose the ethical option when faced with a conflict correlates with the degree to which that individual has both idealist and relativist beliefs about morality (Kung and Huang 483; Redfern and Crawford 2-3). Moral idealism measures the extent to which it is believed that upholding moral principles will lead to the best consequences (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 377-378; Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 816; Kung and Huang 483-484; O'Fallon and Butterfield 379). In other words, whether doing the morally right thing will lead to the morally right result.

Moral idealists are more likely to identify, use, and strictly adhere to moral beliefs in their decisions and behavior (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 377-378; Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 816; Kung and Huang 483-484; O'Fallon and Butterfield 379). They also tend to be less tolerant of immoral behavior (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 377-378). The importance of moral beliefs and principles is primarily founded upon teleological¹⁴ considerations (Redfern and Crawford 2-3) so it is logical that idealists also exhibit altruistic tendencies such as strong “concern for minimizing negative consequences and maximizing gain, particularly for others” (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814-815).

¹⁴ Teleological ethical theory “contends the rightness or wrongness of actions is based solely on the goodness or badness of their consequences” (Regis University)

While idealism measures to what extent individuals believe that strictly following moral rules can ensure the best outcome, relativism is concerned with the universality and efficacy of moral rules to provide proper guidance for all moral conflicts (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 377-378; Kung and Huang 484; Redfern and Crawford 2-3). Strong relativists emphasize consideration of context and predicted moral or self-interested consequences rather than strict adherence to deontological¹⁵ universal moral rules (Kung and Huang 484; Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 377-378; Redfern and Crawford 2-3). Relativists are also more likely to acknowledge that “in some cases harm is unavoidable, and that one must sometimes choose between the lesser of two evils” (Forsyth, O’Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 815).

Forsyth (1980) developed the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) to test where an individual fell on these scales (Casali 2; Forsyth; Kung and Huang 484). Although the EPQ is still used in many studies, Forsyth and others admit that results from it do not tell the whole story. As Forsyth et al. say, “Indeed, as cross-cultural psychologist Bond (2000) noted, to assume that a measure that was developed with U.S. citizens can be used without reservation with those with widely differing cultural backgrounds is imperialistic, particularly when researchers focus so exclusively on idealism and relativism that they ignore other, indigenous, aspects of morality that are unique to a given cultural context” (Bond 63-72; Forsyth, O’Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 827).

Thus, the idealist/relativist categorical distinction contributes valuable insights about the nature of moral beliefs but it presents an incomplete picture. To fill in important gaps, studies have sought to identify overarching ethical theories that likely “reflect high-level systemization of approaches already intuitively taken in everyday decision-making” (Casali 5).

¹⁵ Deontological ethics is “one in which specific moral duties or obligations are seen as self-evident, having intrinsic value in and of themselves...moral actions are evaluated on the basis of inherent rightness or wrongness rather than goodness of a primary consideration of consequences” (Regis University)

These deontological and teleological frameworks provide simplified guidelines for ensuring that the weighing of conflicting moral values is done with consistency and coherence.

Studies have indeed found that “lay persons find the distinction between consequentialist and deontological considerations meaningful” and that even the deontological doctrine of double effect (DDE)¹⁶ “can reliably influence moral judgments” (Uhlmann et al. 480). Deontological and teleological moral reasoning are fundamental characteristics of moral reasoning as they “are two nomothetic regularities that appear consistently across most people” (Forsyth, O’Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 815).

Testing for this distinction within a quantitative study of moral reasoning is further insightful because it has also been found that those who are more inclined to use deontological reasoning rather than teleological reasoning also demonstrate greater inclination towards choosing the moral option (O’Fallon and Butterfield 379). This may, in part, be related to the finding that ethical decision making tends to place greater emphasis on the morality of how a goal is pursued than the morality of the actual goal (like peace or wisdom) (Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 89).

This study accordingly follows those others by creating conflicts between deontological and teleological principles to provide “a simple and clear measure of which principle an individual favors” (Uhlmann et al. 480). The survey also tests the requirement of consistency in moral reasoning by giving the same moral motive while varying which principle would justify the act (Uhlmann et al. 480). Because idealists are more likely to hold deontological beliefs while relativists are more likely to support teleological reasoning, this approach also

¹⁶ The DDE stipulates that the moral content of doing harm depends on the intentionality of the act. Deliberately harming someone is morally “worse” than if done as (even a predictable) by-product of an act.

addresses the idealist/relativist measures while better compensating for cultural bias (O'Fallon and Butterfield 379).

Normative ethical theory tells the individual how one ought to measure equally important but conflicting principles yet it does not help prioritize any moral value over another. For example, a deontologist would consider how to uphold moral duties rather than consequences but not whether honesty or filial piety is the more important duty. Thus, the ranking of values, where values are defined as “the individual’s prescriptive beliefs concerning the desirability of certain modes of conduct or end-states of behavior” (Glover et al. 110), as well as the normative moral philosophy of the individual “plays a dominant role in making ethical decision” (Glover et al. 110; Kung and Huang 480, 482).

Because moral values have an equal *prima facie* obligation to be upheld, there are many defensible ways to rank them. Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that the metrics used to rank values changes as an individual’s education and awareness of the world around them matures their moral philosophy. Following Plato, Kohlberg believes this process is essential to the discovery and pursuit of virtue – or what is the “ideal good” (Hwang 212). The least sophisticated method for judging what is moral – or what is the ideal good – is to do so based upon how the consequences of their decision would impact that individual (Graham et al. 2). As their concept of what is good/moral matures, their moral reasoning advances through Kohlberg’s six stages until, finally, morality is based upon justice (Hwang 211-238). Said another way, there is a shift “from simpler, punishment-oriented thinking to more principled thinking” where upholding justice is the highest goal (Forsyth, O’Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814).

According to Kohlberg, since it is the universal desire of all humans to discover the ideal good and since justice is universally that ideal, culture may influence the rate at which moral reasoning develops but the path and stages of moral development are the same for all

(Hwang 212). Yet this argument is predicated on a notion of justice that is defined by equality and reciprocity (Graham et al. 2). As a result, Kohlberg's scale and Rest et al.'s (1999) Defining Issues Test (DIT) - upon which it is based - have received substantial criticism.

The prioritization of the Western liberal notions of justice and the rights of the individual as the highest order values means that those who hold different views would be scored as having less mature moral reasoning according to the DIT (Casali 2; Graham et al. 2; Hwang 212-214). For example, some critics suggest that men are more inclined to evaluate ethical issues with the priority being justice while women are more inclined to account for situational context (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814). Thus, Carol Gilligan, one outspoken critic, proposes an alternate ideal good that prioritizes considerations of care rather than justice (Graham et al. 2).

Some also believe that culture, language, and other contextual sources of morality are underappreciated. Relatedly, other critics point out that both Kohlberg and Gilligan's notions from which morality is measured are similarly founded upon the individual as the basic unit of consideration and so fail to consider collectivist conceptions of morality that might prioritize "group-level concerns about social order, authority, duty, loyalty to one's family or group," etc. (Graham et al. 3; Hwang 213).

Investigations into the possibility that differences in values may lead to divergent methods of moral reasoning have found that "ethical priorities, not wholly different sets of values, underlie the variations in ethical perception and judgment" (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 385). In particular, the list of values considered relevant to moral reasoning is found to remain largely the same across cultures but there is substantial variation of which values are deemed more important to be upheld or even considered (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 376). Even organizational culture effects the objective importance of upholding moral values – that is to

say how important it is to actually do the right thing and choose the ethical option (O’Fallon and Butterfield 397-398).

One important way that organizations and communities legitimate and then promulgate what are normative values and how they should be used to address complex moral issues is by creating an ethical climate or culture that is purported to represent “social consensus” (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 374). As a result, studies of moral reasoning such as this one focus on how the ideologies of specific cultures or other organizational communities influence where values come from, how they are ranked, their role in moral decision making, and what other factors might influence this (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 373; Glover et al. 109; Iaydjiev ; Redfern and Crawford 2; Watson et al. 415) One of the earliest of such studies - and one of the most important to the validation of this theory - was done by Graham et al. In order to do this while accommodating cultural differences in how morality is defined based upon different ranking of values, they designed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ).

The MFQ asks individuals to define their conception of morality by assigning relative importance to the five value pairings or “psychological “foundations” upon which cultures construct their moralities” - Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity (Graham et al. 5). These categories, importantly, account for a morality that prioritizes virtues over rules; the interests of the group over those of the individual; and emotional/intuitive over more systematic reasoning (Graham et al 5). Doing so is especially useful when building a common framework so as to compare the ethical priorities of collectivist and individualist as well Confucian belief systems.

Indeed, results from the MFQ found that respondents from South, East, and Southeast Asia show more concern than those from Western cultures for the Ingroup and Purity values although they were about the same for Authority (Graham et al. 14). Also, somewhat

unexpectedly, the cross-cultural comparison of MFQ results found little difference between Asian and Western cultures in the importance assigned to Harm and Fairness (Graham et al. 15). Other studies similarly found consistency in the moral reasoning and the ranking of values of a specific culture and systemic variation of these between cultures (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814).

Forsyth et al. (2008) believe that their Ethics Position Theory (EPT) help explain these cultural variations. EPT breaks down an individual's "ethical ideology" into four categories, defined by the individual's beliefs and support for ethical relativism ("concern for principles") and idealism (consequences) (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814-815). The collectivist emphasis on "relationships, with moral obligations based upon respect, trust, and a sense of community rather than general, cross-situational moral dictates" leads to the expectation that Confucian societies would fall more on Forsyth's idealism side of the moral philosophy scale than Western individualist societies (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 817). At the same time, in comparison to Western society, the Asian/Confucian worldview is highly "contextual, relational, and dynamic but less dualistic and principle focused" – which creates the expectation of more relativistic views of moral principles (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 817). Cultures which have a more cynical, relativist view of morality should, logically, recognize moral ideals but should also be inclined to see these rules as neither universally applicable nor obligatory (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 385).

In fact, cross-national studies using the EPQ show that China was below the overall mean for Idealism and above the mean for Relativism (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 821). This places them in the Forsyth et al.'s Ethics Position of "Subjectivism" where the "Individuals' personal values and perspectives should guide their moral choices, rather than universal ethical principles or desire to achieve positive consequences" (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 815, 823). In comparison, the US was about equally below the international

mean for both idealism and relativism (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 821). The US was just slightly below China's mean for idealism and well below China's mean for relativism (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 821). This put the US in the ethics position of "Exceptionism" which is defined as "Individuals should act in ways that are consistent with moral rules, but one should remain pragmatically open to exceptions to these rules" (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 815, 823).

The US low score for idealism and for relativism demonstrates that there is stronger support for "self-expression values" than for "survival values" and greater prevalence of "individualism rather than collectivism" (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 824). China, with a low idealism score and a high relativism score, shows greater support for secular-rational values, low support for individualism, low tolerance for uncertainty, and an orientation to consider long term consequences (Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814).

Despite improvements in the models of operable ethical systems and their underlying values as well as progress in understanding the roles of individual, situational, and organizational variables, it remains difficult to predict accurately or to explain the outcomes of actual moral reasoning seen in many studies. As Ieydjiev warns, it would be a mistake to conclude that irrational decision making is the cause for moral decisions that are not easily explained by existing models. Rather, the predictive model used failed to account for many potential sources of bias such as those from

oversimplification, failure to remember all relevant details (Kahneman & Tversky 1982, 4-18), to build simple frames for understanding complex situations, to overlook contradicting information in order to preserve their beliefs, to emphasise causal relationships over probability, to make fundamental errors in attributing purposeful behaviour to others, and to be heavily influenced by whether decisions are framed as gains or losses (Strein 2008:104-109). The presence of others, social roles, emergencies and the stakes in the particular situation further interfere with the decision making process (Hudson 2007: 4750). Moreover, research has highlighted the crucial role of emotion in setting the agenda by focusing our attention (Simon 1983:2930), by influencing satisfaction from decisions and firmness of beliefs (Hudson 2007:4547), and in acting as an alternative mechanism of taking decisions. (Strein 2008:109-113)

For example, the complexity of most ethical issues means that not all factors can be incorporated into the cognitive or intuitive reasoning process. Thus, it is believed that humans often tend to simplify the problem by subconsciously employing “an omission bias that filters out the unfamiliar or ambiguous factors from consideration” (Watson et al. 415; Iaydjiev). Further guidance is often found by looking for “past normative behavior” that can help make moral decisions and can help develop moral “behavioral intentions” (Watson et al. 416-418).

This approach presents a simplified way to predict the possible outcomes of the options; it helps one behave in a consistent way that strengthens self-identification as a moral person; and it supplies advice by identifying a method for how, in the past, the desired result and moral behavior were achieved (Watson et al. 418). Accordingly, previous experiences play a critical role in how moral conflicts are perceived and evaluated (Martin et al. 128; Watson et al. 416, 418) but they also create preconceived expectations that risk oversimplifying the conflict or overlooking important considerations (Iaydjiev; Watson et al. 418).

It is also suggested that individuals often turn to “socially recognized ideas and principles” - or social consensus – for guidance on complex moral issues but then find arguments of “rational reasoning” and moral justification to make the decision seem more legitimate (Watson et al. 416). This makes it difficult to know if the explanations for the decision-making process upon which moral reasoning process theories are constructed and validated actually describe the process used or if the individual is simply couching their decision *ex post facto* in more acceptable language (Watson et al. 416).

As Watson summarizes, “a host of psychological factors have been shown to influence moral judgments and intentions: conscious moral rationality, subconscious intuitions, dispositional characteristics, situational contingencies, the health of the brain, issue-related factors, and dual or parallel processing theories” (416). How these factors interact and how

they shape the path from normative theory to actual decisions is not yet fully understood. Yet, recent progress has been made on several fronts.

To explain how these intuitive and cognitive components might work together in moral reasoning and, yet, why the same process may lead to different conclusions (Christensen and Gomila 1262), Seiler et al. (2011) developed the Interactional Dual-Process Model of Moral Decision Making (IDP) (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 454). The 5 components of the IDP are 1) Moral Perception; 2) Internal Dual-Process of Reasoning and Intuition; 3) Preliminary/Final Moral Judgment and Decision; 4) Post Hoc Reasoning; and 5) Social Interaction (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 454-455).

The first component, moral perception, is comprised of the individual's moral sensitivity and the perceived moral intensity of the conflict (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 454). The second component groups reasoning and intuition about the problem together because scientific studies "indicate that reasoning and emotions are indivisibly connected in the human brain" (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 454-455). There is much that is still not understood about the interaction between reasoning and intuition/emotion but there are indications that the extent to which each is used when considering a moral conflict is related to "the situation (e.g., moral complexity, time pressure)," "the problem at hand," and the ease of which a person grasps the related issues (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 454-455).

Studies in the field of neuroethics also support dual-process theory's idea that intuition/emotion and cognition/rational reasoning both operate in moral reasoning (Greene 18). Neurocognitive science has found medical evidence from studying brain activity that reasoning is associated with "utilitarian (or consequentialist) moral judgment aimed at promoting the "greater good"" while the intuitive/emotional component is linked to "processing with deontological judgment aimed at respecting rights, duties, and

obligations...that may trump the greater good” (Greene 11-13, 15). It has also been found that moral dilemmas with which the individual feels a personal connection show less brain activity in the working memory and cognitive areas of the brain (so are more emotional/intuitive decisions) than for impersonal moral conflicts (Greene 13).

Once reasoning and/or intuition arrives at a judgment and decision (the third component of the IDP), post hoc reasoning (the fourth component) - where “individuals continue to search for evidence to justify or change their initial judgment” - then occurs (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 455). Especially in professional situations, the fifth component, Social Interaction, then tests how other people react to the decision (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 455). Depending upon the feedback, the process may return to the earlier steps “in a recurring interaction loop” (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 455). “A final decision is reached only when this iterative process is terminated” (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 455).

Models based upon dual process and parallel cognitive process theories agree that there is an inherent interplay between rational and intuitive inputs but “in the dual process model, rational moral reasoning generally occurs after a more intuitive and subconscious cognitive process has settled on an intention, or decision. In parallel cognitive processing both subconscious and conscious reasoning may be taking place contemporaneously” (Watson et al. 416).

Though the theories and models above help account for much of the variation in what is considered moral and why, they do not address why individuals would choose the ethical or unethical option. Studies of business ethics have found that individual factors that promote ethical or unethical decisions include the degree the respondent feels like they can control their lives, the extent to which they subscribe to a realist/Machiavellian or moral worldview, their moral philosophy, religion, and their stage of moral development (Glover et al. 109; O’Fallon

and Butterfield 392; Watson et al. 416). Results about the influence of age, gender, and nationality of the respondent is inconclusively mixed (Feng-I 318; Forsyth, O'Boyle Jr, and McDaniel 814; Glover et al. 112, 114; Martin et al. 139; O'Fallon and Butterfield 377, 387-392) though there is some evidence that "age has a positive influence on ethical perceptions" while it "has a negative influence on ethical attitude" (Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 89-90).

The academic major and the "type of education" of the respondent has little effect on ethical reasoning (O'Fallon and Butterfield 379, 387) but years of education, type of employment, and work experience do correlate (Glover et al. 109; O'Fallon and Butterfield 379-387). It has also been found that the amount of time the individual has worked in the field or with the company, the more professional responsibility they have, and the higher their income has a negative effect on their ethical attitude (O'Fallon and Butterfield 379; Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 89-90, 96-97). Particularly relevant to this study is the finding that because "students and practicing business managers are comparable in their sensitivity to ethical issues in business decision-making" it is likely that students' moral reasoning is sufficiently developed to represent a larger age population (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 386).

The moral component of an issue is more likely to be an important consideration if one must choose between one's own interests and those of others (Hsiao and Yang 305). The weight assigned to doing what is considered moral is also linked to the degree to which an individual believes they should and actually do behave morally ("self-concept") (Watson et al. 415, 418). Similarly, "moral judgments have been found to vary according to the role expectations we have of ourselves and others, as well as the specifics of the relationships between these roles" (Iaydjiev; Mumford et al. 338; Watson et al. 415). For example, personal values becomes less influential if they conflict with an individual's strong sense of organizational duty and

responsibility (Glover et al. 111) or when there is “a conflict between individual values and organizational values” (Glover et al. 110).

The importance of moral considerations is not only affected by individual and organizational/cultural factors but also by those specific to the situation. The influential contextual factors are often collectively described as the moral intensity of the issue (Lincoln and Holmes 57). This is sometimes grouped together with moral awareness - the recognition that there is a moral conflict (Lincoln and Holmes 59). At the same time, results from multiple studies in business ethics strongly show that the individual’s values affect the perceived moral intensity of the situation (Kung and Huang 480).

Thomas Jones (1991) proposes that there are six aspects of moral intensity – Magnitude of Consequences, Temporal Immediacy, Social Consensus, Proximity, Probability of Effect, and Concentration of Effect – that affect all four stages of Rest’s moral decision-making process (Jones 366-395; Lincoln and Holmes 57). There is substantial support that organizational norms (Social Consensus) and severity (Magnitude) of consequences correlate with choosing the moral option but less agreement about other factors. Some studies have found that the relationship between the respondent and the impacted individuals (or their nations), how strongly the respondent identifies with the “other,” and the predicted amount of harm all strongly impact the importance of adhering to moral beliefs (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 375, 384; Iyadjiev ; O’Fallon and Butterfield 398; Uhlmann et al. 481; Watley and May 109). Yet, there is mixed results about the importance of Probability of Effect and Proximity, Temporal Immediacy, and Concentration of Effect seem to have little impact (Lincoln and Holmes 59). Additionally, while social consensus and consideration of consequences seems to have the strongest influence and the distance between the respondent and the effects of their decision have the least, “consequences are seen as more severe as proximity increases” (O’Fallon and Butterfield 398; Watley and May 110, 121).

As complicated as moral reasoning is by itself, its relationship to actual behavior is even less studied and less clear. Studies “show only a moderate link between moral decision making and moral behavior” and it is not clear what factors influence this relationship (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 466). For example, the extent to which an individual shows consideration and sensitivity to the moral component of a problem does not correspond to more moral behavior (Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 89).

There is strong evidence that often people know what the morally correct thing to do is but they still don't do it (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 466). Possible reasons why morality is not considered or followed include a lack of personal integrity and honesty (Smith et al., 1991), lack of moral motivation (Rest et al., 1999), low moral identity (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), a weak sense of moral agency, and little belief in the efficacy of morality (Hannah & Sweeney, 2008). Other causes may be “extrinsic motivations, interpersonal relations, and personal preferences and interests (Garz et al., 1999)” (Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 466).

At the same time, the link between personal values, moral reasoning, moral intentions, and behavior has been found to be stronger “in high involvement situations such as ethical dilemmas” (Kung and Huang 482; O'Fallon and Butterfield 400; Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 88; Watley and May 107). Moral conflicts with higher stakes or where “individuals would be held accountable for their choices” (Glover et al. 109-110) also seem to increase the influence of personal values (or may only then be operable) and encourage adherence to moral beliefs (Davis, Johnson, and Ohmer 376; Watley and May 108). Since a state's use of force in pursuit of safety and security is an inescapable ethical dilemma with high stakes and accountability, it has the optimal conditions for values and intentions to guide behavior.

CHINA, CULTURE, AND MORAL REASONING

Identifying the extent to which Confucianism influences Chinese views of the use of force requires evaluating stated beliefs according to standards of rational, consistent, and coherent decision making but also considering the effect of the many possible sources of bias that threaten doing so (Rosati 56; Walker 406-407). Another critical issue is how such analysis should account for differences between Western-based theories of ethics and moral reasoning and those from a non-Western culture such as China. Prior cross-cultural studies of moral reasoning suggest a number of ways that culture influences this process (Flaming, Agacer, and Uddin 66).

Flaming, Agacer, and Uddin propose that “culture could be defined as the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influence a human group’s response to its environment” (Flaming, Agacer, and Uddin 67). Kirkbride et al. provide the working definition that “culture is...at least in part, a system of shared values that both guides behavior and provides a means for constructing and attributing meaning” (Kirkbride et al. 366). Li, Triandis, and Yu expand that culture is “a shared pattern of categorizations, attitudes, beliefs, definitions, norms, values, and other elements of subjective culture” (Li, Triandis, and Yu 199).

These definitions of “culture” closely resemble that of “belief systems” – which are “interrelated sets of attitudes that incorporate many normative prescriptions” (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 51). Accordingly, identifying norms and attitudes regarding foreign policy and state behavior – including the permissibility of using force – are critical to uncovering the corresponding belief system and measuring the influence of culture on it (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 51). This is because “moral norms reflect one’s internalized moral rules” (Hsiao 305) and indicate the normative philosophies that “provide material for meta-ethical reflections or second order thinking when an individual is trying to define moral theory” (Hwang 215).

Hunt and Vitell, who believe culture is a huge influence upon ethical decision making, argue that “cultural norms affect perceived ethical situations, perceived alternatives, perceived consequences, deontological norms, probabilities of consequences, desirability of consequences, and importance of stakeholders” (Hunt and Vitell 10). Hofstede (1983, 2001), who similarly views culture as “the mental programming that distinguishes one group of people from another,” categorizes cultural norms according to 5 dimensions - power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs collectivism, masculinity vs femininity, and long-term vs short-term orientation (Hofstede 75-89; Hofstede). Yet cultural and other group norms, or “the rules that a group uses for appropriate and inappropriate values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors” (Scott and Marshall), may be based upon moral, amoral, or nonmoral goals (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 50-52).

Social psychology’s theory of social learning is based upon the view that normative values and behavior are defined by and specific to what a community agrees is appropriate (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 56). However, others within the field of social psychology disagree about the source of moral norms. Cognitive development theory, such as Kohlberg’s theory of moral development stages and Rest’s DIT upon which it is based, believe that culture is much less important because norms evolve as the individual and their worldview and self-awareness mature (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 56). Instead, they assert that the developmental stages of moral norms are universal – even if not all people progress to all possible stages (Hwang 212-213).

Yet, the results of studies conducted in the collectivist or communalistic societies of Turkey, India, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were found to not fit within Kohlberg’s model (Hwang 213-214). Some critics use these results to support objections that Kohlberg’s model is based upon values and norms derived from Western individualistic, rational, and liberal conceptions of morality - which substantially differs from those found in

Confucian collectivist morality (Hwang 213). These fundamental differences are critical considerations for creating the survey instrument used in this study as well as for analyzing the derivative statistical models.

A comparison of study results from the collectivist and individualist countries shows that moral development largely follows the same path for most cultures until around age 13. Most American subjects are in the 4th stage of Kohlberg's model by 13 while the average age for Chinese (Taiwanese) respondents to be there is 18 (Hwang 226). Americans start moving to Stage 5 – where they begin “valuing social contracts, utility, and individual rights” – around 14 while Chinese respondents start around 20 (Hwang 226). No Chinese (Taiwanese) respondents were recorded in Stage 6 – which is the final stage (Hwang 226).

According to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, it is not until the later stages of moral development that the consideration of justice exerts substantial influence on moral reasoning (Hwang 212-214). Stage 6, in particular, requires that ethical principles are recognized as universal and applied as such in order for the decision to be just (Hwang 226).

Confucian justice fundamentally disagrees with the Western notion that a precondition for something to be moral is that it is “universal and reversible” (Hwang 216, 228-230). Instead, Confucianism holds that decisions about the distribution of resources are made and disputes are resolved by superiors (procedural justice) and it is moral to favor those with whom there is a special relationship (distributive justice) (Hwang 218). Furthermore, Confucianism disagrees with the Western belief that the standards for determining what is just cannot change based upon contextual or situational bias (Hwang 228).

The inapplicability of Kohlberg's theory to collectivist ethics thus stems from the fact that Kohlberg uses the Western conception of justice as the standard from which to measure moral reasoning (Hwang 212). The root cause for this fundamental difference is that Confucian

natural law comes from “natural duties and goals rather than on natural rights” (Hwang 220, 222-223). This conception of “natural law was based on social roles and statuses rather than on a notion of the individual who was prior to society” (Hwang 220, 222-223). Thus, “all people were not seen as morally equivalent” (Hwang 220, 222-223).

One important implication of Confucian natural law being contrary to Western natural law is that while the belief that all humans inherently possess the same rights is fundamental to Western ethics, Confucian natural law holds that filial piety is actually a “mandatory unconditional positive duty” (Hwang 220, 222-223). Thus, at Stage 6, Kohlberg’s justice requires that “some non-relative values like life and liberty must be upheld in any society regardless of the majority opinion. This standard clearly reflects the Western value of individualism that considers the human rights of life and liberty to be non-relative values, while collectivist values or positive duties towards specific targets are disregarded as relative values” (Hwang 227).

That no Chinese (Taiwanese) respondents were recorded in this final stage (Hwang 226) provides more evidence that, as Hwang says, “The content of moral reasoning is very likely to be influenced by the normative philosophy of a given culture, especially in the later stages of development” (Hwang 214). It also supports the idea that Confucian “core cultural ideas constitute the collective reality that is reflected in philosophical or ideological texts telling people what is good, what is moral, and how to be a person. They are transmitted to individuals through the social psychological processes of child-rearing practices, educational systems, customs, legal systems, and become the individual’s reality (Markus & Kitayama, 1994)” (Hwang 225; Markus and Kitayama 339-351).

Psychologists administered Rest’s DIT in Taiwan and Hong Kong to see if it would support the results about cultural differences in moral reasoning seen from the cross-cultural

comparison of Kohlberg's theory (Hwang 228). The results showed that "though all samples showed increasing levels of principled judgment with higher age/education, Taiwan and Hong Kong samples tended to show a flatter rate of developmental increase than American samples" (Hwang 228). In other words, age/education led to faster development in the use of principled reasoning in Americans than in Taiwanese and Hong Kong respondents. However, like Kohlberg's use of the Western idea of justice as a critical metric, cross-cultural use of the DIT is also problematic due to the later stages of moral development being measured according to the *Western* concept of "absolute authority such as God or institutionalized legal authority" (Hwang 228).

BELIEFS, VALUES, MORALITY

Western and Chinese standards of morality may rank the same values differently but many Confucian and Western normative beliefs can be distilled to very similar maxims. The Western "Golden Rule," with its emphasis on reciprocity, is the fundamental basis for the normative morality of Just War theory (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 63). Though phrased more passively, Confucianism is also strongly based upon reciprocity. As written in the Confucian *Analects*," Zi Gong asked, "Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?" Confucius replied, "It is the word *shu*--reciprocity: Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you"" (Yutang 186).

As evidenced by their differing notions of justice, Confucian and Western cultures may view and apply reciprocity and other moral values in different ways. For example, some scholars assess "that the Chinese are highly "relativist" in their approach to decision making, that is, that there are not moral absolutes and ethical behavior depends upon the situation" (Redfern and Crawford 7-8). As a result, the Confucian notion of intentionality (*yi*) assumes greater importance.

Yet, studies have also found that idealist consideration of others is less important and plays a smaller role in decision making for Chinese respondents than for their equivalents in the West (Redfern and Crawford 7). Instead, Chinese demonstrate greater consideration of self-interest and personal economic gain (Redfern and Crawford 7-8).

Given these differences, Redfern and Kylie administered Forsyth's (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) to 115 business managers in the northern (Beijing) and southern (Guangdong, Fujian) regions of the PRC in order to test empirically the suitability of Western philosophical frameworks for understanding Chinese moral philosophies (Redfern and Crawford 1, 9). The criteria used in Forsyth's EPQ to test support for idealist views were found to be a valid measure for this aspect of moral philosophy for Chinese respondents though there were some criteria that the Chinese did not consider relevant to measuring this component of morality (Redfern and Crawford 14-15). Additionally, because the questions that test idealist beliefs do so in a way that closely resembles the Confucian virtue of *ren*, or benevolence, it is possible that demonstrated support for these values is due to overlapping Confucian values rather than due to agreement with the intended Western definition of idealism (Redfern and Crawford 14-15).

The same study also found strong support amongst Chinese respondents for the validity and applicability of the EPQ's relativist measure that "there are no universal truths" but, rather, every situation should be evaluated independently (Redfern and Crawford 15-16). However, there was another small but important difference in the interpretation of this moral component. Although the question in Forsyth's test about whether morality should be based upon the weighing of the good and bad predicted consequences of the options is not intended to measure relativist beliefs, Chinese views about this utilitarian concept correlated to the test's relativist questions (Redfern and Crawford 15-16, 19). Redfern and Kylie posit that "this is consistent with the Confucian moral tradition that does not emphasize any ethical theory of hypothetical

choices to determine action in each situation, but relies on situational intuitions of the *xin* (heart) which are harmonious with nature” (15-16). The implication is that Chinese generally hold relativist views and tend to evaluate morality of the situation using intuition and considering virtue while Western relativists rely more upon rationale and evidence to do so (Redfern and Crawford 15-16).

Studies of ethics and counseling/clinical psychology in China further support this intuitive, contextual approach. One such study found that Chinese professionals strongly support common ethical principles - with the highest support for respect, responsibility, and justice - but, at the same time, “their ratings of ethical values fail to predict the result of their decision-making process in ethical dilemma scenarios” (Qian et al. 302). Another study similarly found that respondents would often assess behaviors as unethical when considered in the abstract but, when given related real-world scenarios, they would consider the same actions ethical based upon the same moral principle (Qian et al. 302).

Qian et al. suggest that the emphasis on context and the apparent inconsistencies of Chinese values come from “the influence of Chinese culture, especially its emphasis on interpersonal relationship networks, mutuality, and reciprocity, as well as hierarchy and respect of authority, which are all salient features in collectivistic cultures such as China” (302-303) Predictably but often not appreciated by either culture, “these cultural values may collide with ethical principles and standards that are widely accepted in individualistic cultures like the United States or European countries” (Qian et al. 302-303).

One important example is that the consideration of uncertainty does not seem to play a large role in the Chinese decision-making process but instead issues may be viewed “in absolutes” (Yates et al. 168-169). This, in part, could contribute to why Chinese respondents were found to be more inconsistent and “more overconfident in their judgments” (Yates, Lee,

and Shinotsuka 138-147; Yates et al. 145-171; Yates, Lee, and Bush 87-94).¹⁷ Collectivist cultures have also been found to be more willing to take risks because, more confident that the community will assist them in event of failure, they perceive the same situations as less risky than Westerners (Hsee and Weber 45, 165-179).

Especially compared to the Western individualist tradition, it is likely that the powerful influence of Confucian collectivist values includes strong expectations that its members will comply with group norms (Vitell, Nwachukwu, and Barnes 755). For example, Triandis et al. (2001) used existing data from sources such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and the Country Individualism Index to examine “the relationship between culture, personality, and deception in a simulated international management negotiation” (Li, Triandis, and Yu 201; Triandis et al. 73-90). They found that “collectivist cultures are more corrupt than individualistic cultures” (Li, Triandis, and Yu 201). However, the same study found that, when examining trends within any one Western or Asian country, people who are “independent as well as competitive” are also more likely to be corrupt because “highly competitive individuals must win at all costs” (Li, Triandis, and Yu 201).

In order to check if there really is a direct relationship between collectivism and corruption, Li et al. reexamine the data for Singapore. This demographic was selected because Chinese Singaporeans are more affluent than Chinese people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the PRC while they still have a “cultural orientation...consistent with that of other Chinese societies” (Li, Triandis, and Yu 202). Additionally, Singapore is consistently one of the least corrupt countries in the world – and the only country with low corruption that does not have an individualistic culture (Li, Triandis, and Yu 202). Using deception as a metric for corruption,

¹⁷ To be clear, these studies did not find the Chinese respondents necessarily to be any less accurate though.

Li et al. find that the results confirm its relationship with collectivism (Li, Triandis, and Yu 213).

Prior studies have also found that the degree of differentiation between in-groups and out-groups is strongly influenced by whether a culture holds collectivist or individualist values (Bond 259-276; Bond and Hewstone 153-170; Hui and Triandis 225-248; Triandis). Accordingly, Johnston investigates if there is a significant effect from Chinese collectivist ingroup/outgroup differentiation on views of international relations. This is done by conducting longitudinal analysis of questions that involve views of international relations and nationalism from the 2000 (757 respondents interviewed), 2001 (615 respondents interviewed), and 2002 (662 respondents interviewed) Beijing Area Survey (BAS) (Johnston 8). Though the BAS covers a wide range of subjects and though there are a number of potential issues with the survey and its data, it is the best information that exists on these topics in China at the time (Johnston 8-9).

Johnston creates a new “othering” scale from existing scales in the BAS to measure the perceived difference between ingroup and outgroup identities (Johnston 9-11). He finds that the Chinese respondents make substantial “ingroup-outgroup differentiation” where the ingroup (China) is believed to be “much more peaceful and moral by nature than Americans and Japanese” (Johnston 13). It should be noted that, though there are no cross-cultural comparisons that address this variable, studies of Western respondents also find that factors like the age of (authority) and the social distance to (ingroup) the affected people are important moral considerations (Uhlmann et al. 481).

Testing the influence of the “political generation” in which the respondents grew up, those of the “post-Mao generation” were less likely to make strong ingroup-outgroup distinctions than those from the “pre-Deng generation” (Johnston 12, 16). On the other hand,

there was no difference in “othering” between those of the pre-and post-Tiananmen generation (Johnston 12, 16). Johnston concludes that this does not support “the strong assumption in US policy and punditry discourse that younger Chinese are more nationalistic than older Chinese” (Johnston 16).

Johnston also finds that there is a statistically significant decrease in “othering” with higher education, that female respondents make stronger ingroup-outgroup distinctions between Americans and Chinese than male respondents, and that support for military spending correlated with stronger ingroup-outgroup distinctions (Johnston 14, 16-18). Though not directly linked with morality, Johnston finds that about 51% of respondents agree that “people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong” (Johnston 20-21, 27). Education but not gender was found to influence views about this (Johnston 21-22).

In a separate study, Johnston analyzes the responses from middle class participants of the 1998-2002 BAS to identify views of world affairs and international relations (Johnston 603-607). He concludes that within this population “there is some evidence that there are coherent worldviews” and that “there are clusters of views that we would normally identify [sic] as internally consistent packages of beliefs about international relations” (Johnston 605-607, 624). Furthermore, the extent to which respondents hold beliefs that correspond to a realpolitik worldview decreases with greater education, income, and awareness of “world affairs” (Johnston 624).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Foreign policy and international relations decision making frequently involves difficult decisions such as how to balance the interests of one’s own state over other states, when is it acceptable to do harm in order to address concerns of safety and security, and other consequential issues that contain moral content. Many IR models – especially those of political

realism (Morgenthau and Mearsheimer) – believe that state behavior (“foreign policy”) can be explained and predicted based upon rational and strategic pursuit of national goals (“international outcomes”) (Arrow 121-127; Gaenslen ; Mearsheimer 245-246). According to political realism, states will all similarly choose the option that logically best serves their self-interest – usually this is survival - which is often measured by power (Mearsheimer 244).

This theory is based upon the assumption “that governments, and their political leaders, think and act in a rational manner in their quest for power and order. Such rationality assumes that individuals perceive the world accurately and arrive at decisions through an open intellectual process: goals are ordered, a search is made for relevant information, a wide range of alternatives is considered, and the option that maximizes the benefits while minimizing the costs is selected” (Rosati 50). Other realists - such as Waltz - believe that because states too frequently act in “irrational” ways, “realism needs considerable help from other bodies of theories if it hopes to explain state behavior as well as international outcomes” (Mearsheimer 247).

Similar criticisms have been made about the ability of elite political decision makers to make rational decisions consistently (Gaenslen; Tetlock and McGuire 150). Not only is the rationality of decisions limited by complex, uncertain, and ambiguous situations (Gensler) but, as seen from the cognitive and social psychology studies of moral reasoning above, there is a great deal of evidence that moral decision making, itself, is complex and susceptible to many sources of potential bias.

Furthermore, numerous scholars believe that “Western rationality” is very different than Chinese “ways of thinking” (James and Zhang 36).¹⁸ Chinese subjectivist and relativist

¹⁸ see Whiting, 1975; Chan, 1978; Bobrow et al., 1979; Shih, 1990; Adelman and Shih, 1993; Yu, 1994; Shih, 1998; Johnston, 1998

inclinations that suggest a more intuitive approach to reasoning, thus, further emphasizes caution about the applicability of rational actor theory to Chinese strategic behavior.

The net result is that, although moral reasoning and political decision making are, indeed, guided by the desire for consistency and rationality, as experts such as Graham Allison, Janice Strein, and Robert Jervis say, “It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others” (Iaydjiev 28; Jervis 58). For the purpose of this study, a belief system is “an empirically verifiable configuration of ideas and attitudes connected in some organized manner that is stable and general enough to provide an individual broad guidance on more specific matters” (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 48). Attitude is defined as “a predisposition toward and object or a policy” (Tamashiro, Brunk, and Secret 141).

Beliefs act “as a *causal nexus* – that is, as a filter through which other factors pass...beliefs are naturally positioned between the environment and behavior” (Rosati 67) and serve as a “mental model” to “help order the world” (Iaydjiev). Beliefs about how the real world operates– “which are assumptions about the nature of the international system” – often conflict with (normative) beliefs about what is moral – which are based upon the ideal world (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 56). “Specific attitudes may be generated through interactions between reality beliefs and normative beliefs. An individual’s specific attitudes can, in turn, lead to intentions to behave, and eventually these intentions may lead to actual behaviors” (Brunk, Secret, and Tamashiro 56).

In fact, research shows that the individual’s fundamental moral “values (and the fundamental beliefs that link values to more specific attitudes)” play a large role in “belief systems” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1106) and are linked to “policy goals, preferences, and interpretations” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1104) as well as how foreign policy should be

conducted (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 9, 13; Rosati 61, 63). The “core values are an important foundation of...foreign-policy postures” and these postures “are crucial considerations in guiding an individual’s preferences on a variety of concrete issues in foreign affairs” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1111-1112).

Keohane and Goldstein dig deeper into the role and nature of beliefs in order to understand how they lead to decisions and behavior. They propose that there are three kinds of guiding beliefs - casual beliefs, principled beliefs, and worldviews (Goldstein and Keohane 3). Causal beliefs (like instrumental beliefs) “suggest actual strategies;” (Iaydjiev) principled beliefs (like philosophical beliefs) provide the standards of what ought to be done; and worldviews are the overarching models of international behavior in which causal and principled beliefs operate (Goldstein and Keohane 3-30; Iaydjiev). Causal and principled beliefs are often collectively shared within a community (Goldstein and Keohane) and the worldviews of at least the elite seem to primarily come from “formal study and socialization with other policymakers” (Mowle 563).

Causal and principled beliefs combined with assumptions about the character of the international system and state behavior create a worldview that provides basic guidelines for understanding observed (state) behavior (Mowle 562). “Beliefs set up expectations, and when an event occurs, we are likely to interpret the event in relation to our expectations” (Mowle 562; Voss and Dorsey 11). For example, elite decision makers “are profoundly colored by psychological and political assumptions they hold concerning (a) the most effective strategies for eliciting desired responses from other states and (b) the nature of other states and the probable responses of other states” (Mowle 563; Tetlock 326). Additionally, beliefs about international relations and those of foreign policy have been found to be related to the level of endorsement of broad international security concepts – especially deterrence and détente (Koopman et al. 378-379).

Further support for the role of and relationship between the three categories of guiding beliefs is found in the results of ethical decision-making studies for fields other than foreign policy. One study, which focused on the role of ethics in American marketing, found that those who showed low support for a Machiavellian worldview and a strong locus of control (the individual believes their behavior or personal characteristics define what happens to them) more strongly endorsed deontological norms (Hunt and Vitell 6). A different study using the same data set found that those with strong Machiavellian views “perceived ethical problems as less serious and were unlikely to view punishment of unethical behavior as a viable alternative” (Hunt and Vitell 6) Lastly, it was found that members of organizations that “strictly enforced their code of ethics...were more influenced by deontological considerations in forming their intentions to intervene and were less influenced by teleological considerations” (Hunt and Vitell 6)

Within business culture, frequent and “early exposure to poor ethical practices, apparently, undermines subsequent ethical decision making” (Mumford et al. 335). Also, attitudes like agreeableness, openness, anxiety, and conscientiousness have little effect on ethical decision making while character traits like cynicism and trust do (Mumford et al. 333-334). Though these were studies of business culture, the fundamental issues are sufficiently similar to international relations to believe that, in both environments, “cynical individuals who do not trust others are especially prone to make unethical decisions, perhaps as a self-protection strategy. Moreover...narcissism, an overinflated sense of self-worth, was found to be negatively related...to ethical decisions” (Mumford et al. 333-334).

The findings from other general studies of ethical decision making are relevant to how beliefs from worldviews likely influence foreign policy and strategic behavior. They also point out possible areas on which to focus to encourage foreign policies that emphasize morality. For example, studies have found that normative behavioral traits like honesty have a positive

relationship with ethical decision making while ambition has a negative one (Roozen, De Pelsmacker, and Bostyn 89). Similarly, a study of integrity and doctoral students found that “selfishness,” “avoidance of responsibility,” and “deception” (“unwilling to trust others”) have a negative relationship with ethical decisions while “seeking help” and “involving others” has a positive one (Mumford et al. 335).

It is prohibitively time consuming and difficult to consider and weigh all the relevant causal beliefs, principled beliefs, and worldviews when faced with complicated issues. Studies in social psychology find that “people tend to be *theory driven* in their beliefs about the world” (Koopman et al. 366; Tetlock and McGuire 159-161). This may be taken to the extreme where decisions are based upon theory without proper consideration of the actual facts of the specific situation (Koopman et al. 366; Mowle 563; Tetlock and McGuire 159-161). However, since the set of beliefs within an IR theory strongly influence the creation of agenda and policy, they “can profoundly structure outcomes, set out roadmaps to avoid uncertainty and affect strategic interactions” (Goldstein and Keohane 12). Though perhaps not as sophisticated as many policy elite, there is evidence that even normal people “foreign-policy attitudes function this way and so have been found to be substantially more organized” than originally thought to be (Hurwitz and Peffley 1102-1103).

It is still quite difficult to identify “the perceptions and motives of a nation’s leaders” (Rosati 57-58). This is partially because it is not easy to fit messy reality neatly within any theory (Koopman et al. 378). Also, elites tend not to use only very general outlines of IR theory to guide decisions because they must also consider the practicalities of complex and nuanced actual governance (Koopman et al. 366; Mowle 563; Tetlock and McGuire 159-161).

Social cognition theory and schema theory both suggest that humans have a general inclination to make these kinds of complex decisions by distilling the quandary into a few basic

issues and schema - the more complex the situation, the more this is done (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 16, 48-49; Rosati 53; Tetlock and McGuire 150, 161-163). Elite decision makers and normal individuals rely upon core values and heuristics derived from theory rather than specific situational details to form attitudes and preferences (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 9-10, 48-49, 59; Hurwitz and Peffley 1103; Iaydjiev ; Rosati 53). In fact, there is strong empirical evidence that “humans are “cognitive misers” who show a marked preference for simple, low-effort heuristics that permit them to make up their minds quickly, easily, and with confidence in the correctness of the stands they have taken” (Tetlock and McGuire 162).

Heuristics such as moral proverbs, commandments, maxims, and simple directives like The Golden Rule represent entire moral attitudes and many consider them an effective way to “focus people’s moral judgments in applied policy contexts” (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 91). Even “Aquinas...held that its [Just War Theory] underlying moral rules could be understood and even discovered by “ordinary folk” through the application of simple reasoning” (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 91). The heavy reliance upon heuristics has the added benefit of making the use of specific questions that target one or two fundamental principles sufficiently accurate for discerning operable moral beliefs and their relative importance.

Cognitive perception and analysis of moral conflicts – or how situations are simplified and what heuristics are selected – “are a result or a consequence of psychological and ideological constraints, different beliefs and values, misperceptions, emotions, framing effects, loss aversion” and other personal preferences (James and Zhang 36; Seiler, Fischer, and Voegtli 456). As a result, there are a number of common cognitive biases to rational decision making that come from trying to simplify complex issues. They include drawing “simplistic, superficial, and biased” lessons in an effort to find guidance from analogous situations in the past, avoiding situations where difficult value trade-offs must be made, sticking with an

incorrect decision once committed to it, incorrectly attributing external or internal causes to explain actions, and poor judgment under stressful crisis conditions (Rosati 57-58; Tetlock and McGuire 162-168).

Further cognitive bias comes from distortion of how the situation is perceived and interpreted in order to ensure that reality matches held beliefs and to ensure that responses to moral issues remain consistent (Iyadjiev; Rosati 63-64). Watson et al. summarize, “Even though situations may differ, there is evidence that we look for commonalities to support a selected behavior” (Watson et al. 418). Reliance on theory is so strong that people are often found to be “relatively impervious to new data” that might call its applicability into question (Koopman et al. 366; Tetlock and McGuire 159-161). So much so that it is unlikely that belief systems will change even when presented with substantial evidence to the contrary (Rosati 63). Instead, the contradictory information is discarded and the evidence is reexamined to locate more supportive evidence (Iyadjiev; Koopman et al. 378).

Moral reasoning is often adjusted in order to justify prioritizing the moral principles that best support primary goals or values as well as the in-group (Uhlmann et al. 488-489). The information determined relevant to the situation tends to also be selected according to what best supports the preferred theories and beliefs about international relations (Iyadjiev; Koopman et al. 366, 378). Policy elites, who “remain remarkably theory driven in terms of that data is organized and assimilated into existing belief structures,” are no less prone to such biases of information selection and theoretical options (Iyadjiev ; Koopman et al. 376, 379; Mowle 563).

The desire to do what is intuitively believed to be morally correct or morally motivated biases moral decision making in other ways as well (Uhlmann et al. 489). The use of a very small number of (over) simplified moral precepts to resolve (over) simplified moral problems

imbues the operable moral value(s) with greater importance. As a result, broad and general moral rules may be used to conclusively define what is “right” without also considering the specifics of the actual unique situation. The motivation to do what has been deemed moral “can influence not only our descriptive beliefs about how the world is...but also prescriptive beliefs about how the world *ought* to be” (Uhlmann et al. 489).

For example, studies have shown that in America, “political orientation and moral beliefs are deeply connected” – even as applied to the use of force (Uhlmann et al. 480, 487-488). Thus, it becomes morally correct or even morally obligatory to build a world based upon these political beliefs. The use of force, a moral issue, is more easily employed to pursue such goals when it is backed by such moral justification.

One way this occurs is that policy elites tend to consider difficult decisions by distilling the “goals, constraints, preferred solutions, and expectations of various tactics” according to their beliefs until the situation fits within their, generally speaking, realist or liberal worldview (Mowle 564). Even a poll of prior members of the US military found that their views about war were most strongly related to their political beliefs (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 100-101). Political orientation and the resulting worldview even influence the actual process of moral reasoning. Politically conservative military veterans were found more inclined to consider morality based upon overarching rules of conduct while those with liberal political views were more inclined to look at the specifics of each individual situation (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 100-101).

The same is true for the general population. A study that polled undergraduate students found that political conservatives show greater support for consequentialism and, as logically expected, less concern for collateral damage than political liberals (Uhlmann et al. 487). Conservatives felt that the importance of a moral principle was strongly determined by the

specifics of the situation while liberals did not see the legitimacy of moral constraints as contextual (Uhlmann et al. 487-488). For example, conservatives showed stronger support for “consequentialist military action” and less consideration for collateral damage when the victims’ were Iraqi rather than American. (Uhlmann et al. 487-488).

Humans show strong bias to fit situations and adjust reasoning to preexisting beliefs, worldviews, and goals but also in how one interprets their own behavior as well as that of others. According to studies of attribution theory, people are more likely to give credit to external conditions to explain or justify their own less-than-ideal actions while they often downplay the role of external conditions when explaining the behavior of others (Rosati 57-58; Tetlock and McGuire 162-163). The same bias is extended to those with whom there is a close relationship (Rosati 57-58). Replacing the “individual” with the “state,” the same attribution bias has been found to exist within international relations (Tetlock and McGuire 163).

Some argue that the differing hierarchy of values found in Confucian collectivist thought means that there is a different kind of attribution bias than what is explained by Western individualist-based attribution theory (Liu and Zhao 188-189). Liu and Zhao support this claim using evidence from previous studies which indicate “Western cultures promote that dispositional explanations of behavior are preferred [*sic*], whereas East Asian (EA) cultures tend to encourage both dispositional and situational explanations of behavior (Morris & Peng, 1994)” (Liu and Zhao 187). They further argue that the Confucian emphasis on harmony and emotion, its preference for “rule of man” rather than “rule of law” (where “group and leaders have the ability to decide your fate of career”), and its collectivist values of family and community rather than Western “self-value” biases Chinese people to attribute their success to external factors such as their community and close relations (Liu and Zhao 188-190). They also

claim that when others fail, Chinese people are likely to attribute this to fate or luck rather than to their own doing (Liu and Zhao 190).

Despite the many possible sources for bias in moral reasoning and foreign policy decision making, the expectation of and desire for consistency and coherence is universal and, thus, its presence will be apparent in patterns of decisions and behavior. Even the factors that create biases must do so with consistency in order to be noticed and considered influential. As a result, studies of social cognition theory suggest that otherwise unexplainable apparent contradictions or incoherence is often due to the outside observer not fully comprehending how an individual's complete belief system is "fragmented internally, with different belief systems or schema being invoked under different situations for making sense of the environment" (Rosati 53-54). Though "individuals bring different rules, criteria, and processes to bear in different policy domains" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1100), studies have found there to be compartmentalized but strong consistency between overarching, abstract beliefs and the more specific related policies endorsed (Hurwitz and Peffley 1100). This is even more likely if the individual's belief system has already developed from experience and/or expertise in similar situations (Rosati 62).

The proclivity to use a few, simple theoretical heuristics to characterize morally-complex situations and to decide what the appropriate response ought to be means that the preferences and fundamental beliefs elucidated from a survey, writings, or behavior are useful for understanding a wide range of foreign policy views and preferences (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 9-10; Koopman et al. 380; Mowle 563). The desire for consistency and prior knowledge of common sources of bias make efforts to model moral decision making more achievable (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 104).

SUMMARY

Studies of moral reasoning show that an individual's moral philosophy can be placed within an established ethical theory based upon the relative weight of principles/values and whether the option with the best consequences or right behavior determines what is moral. Such efforts need to consider how cultural differences such as those that derive from collectivist and individualist societies may create different norms and ranking of values. For example, China may not behave as predicated according to a Western expectation of the rational state actor. Whether common sources of bias can explain patterns of inconsistent or incoherent decisions must be tested before concluding that morality does not play a significant role in decision making. Identified preferences and beliefs should be tested for individual, organizational, and situational factors which have been shown to encourage or discourage choosing the moral option.

Cross-cultural studies have identified a number of important differences between Chinese Confucian collectivist values and those promoted in Western individualist societies. Dramatically different notions of justice, which disagree about the requirement for universality and reversibility, ultimately derive from a different conception of natural law. Thus, while both cultures share similarities such as a moral emphasis on reciprocity, the Chinese are more likely to be more contextual, intuitive, and preferential when making moral decisions.

Yet, the values, beliefs, and principles prioritized and considered normative are closely related to views of state behavior, the goals for foreign policy, preferences for pursuing these goals, and the role of morality within the decision-making process. It is possible to use a questionnaire to examine these issues – especially because humans simplify morally-complex situations according to heuristics that represent their general theories of the world and of morality. Modelling belief systems and worldviews is made easier because cognitive bias

emphasizes and highlights the values and issues considered most important and, thus, influential. China's collectivist emphasis on compliance with group norms make them more obvious as well.

WORKS CITED

Arrow, Kenneth J. "Rational Choice Functions and Orderings." *Economica* (1959): 121-7. Web. Accessed 10 Nov. 2012.

Bond, Michael H., and Miles Hewstone. "Social Identity Theory and the Perception of Intergroup Relations in Hong Kong." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 12.2 (1988): 153-70. Web. Accessed 8 Jun. 2013.

Bond, Michael H. "Localizing the Imperial Outreach: The Big Five and More in Chinese Culture." *American Behavioral Scientist* 44.1 (2000): 63-72. Print.

Bond, Michael H. "Mutual Stereotypes and the Facilitation of Interaction Across Cultural Lines." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 10.3 (1986): 259-76. Web. Accessed 8. Jun. 2013.

Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest, and Howard Tamashiro. "Military Views of Morality and War: An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of Retired American Officers." *International Studies Quarterly* (1990): 83-109. Web. Accessed 27 Jul. 2011.

Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest, and Howard Tamashiro. *Understanding Attitudes about War*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. Print.

Casali, Gian Luca. "Developing a Multi-Dimensional Scale for Ethical Decision Making: The Managerial Ethical Profile (MEP)." (2009). Web. Accessed 12 Dec. 2012.

Christensen, JF, and A. Gomila. "Moral Dilemmas in Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Decision-Making: A Principled Review." *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews* 36.4 (2012): 1249-64. Web. Accessed 18 Jul. 2014.

Davis, Mark A., Nancy Brown Johnson, and Douglas G. Ohmer. "Issue-Contingent Effects on Ethical Decision Making: A Cross-Cultural Comparison." *Journal of Business Ethics* 17.4 (1998): 373-89. Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Feng-I, Feng. "A Study on School Leaders' Ethical Orientations in Taiwan." *Ethics & Behavior* 21.4 (2011): 317-31. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Flaming, Linda, Gilda Agacer, and Nancy Uddin. "Ethical Decision-Making Differences between Philippines and United States Students." *Ethics & Behavior* 20.1 (2010): 65-79. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Forsyth, Donelson R., Ernest H. O'Boyle Jr, and Michael A. McDaniel. "East Meets West: A Meta-Analytic Investigation of Cultural Variations in Idealism and Relativism." *Journal of Business Ethics* 83.4 (2008): 813-33. Web. Accessed 7 May 2014.

Forsyth, Donelson R. "A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 39.1 (1980): 175-184. Web. Accessed 18 Oct. 2012.

Gaenslen, Fritz. "Political Decision Making." *Encyclopedia of Psychology*. Ed. Alan E. Kazdin. 6 Vol. New York: American Psychological Association and Oxford University Press, 2000. Web. 4 Aug. 2014.

Garz, Detlef, Fritz Oser, and Wolfgang Althof. *Moralisches Urteil Und Handeln*. 1393 Vol. Suhrkamp Publishers, 1999. Print.

Glover, Sandra H., et al. "Re-Examining the Influence of Individual Values on Ethical Decision Making." *From the Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey*. Springer, 1997. 109-119. Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Owen Keohane. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Cornell University Press, 1993. Print.

Graham, Jesse, et al. "Mapping the Moral Domain." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 101.2 (2011): 1-39. Web. 13 Jun. 2014.

Greene, Joshua D. "The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment." *The Cognitive Neurosciences* 4 (2009): 1-47. Draft. Web. Accessed 18 Jul. 2014.

Hannah, S. T., and P. Sweeney. "Frameworks of Moral Development and the West Point Experience: Building Leaders of Character for our Army and the Nation." *Forging the Warriors Character*. Ed. D. M. Snider & L. J. Matthew. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2008. 65-90. Print.

Hofstede, Geert H. *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*. Sage, 2001. Print.

Hofstede, Geert. "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories." *Journal of International Business Studies* (1983): 75-89. Web. Accessed 25 Jan. 2010.

Hsee, Christopher K., and Elke U. Weber. "Cross-National Differences in Risk Preference and Lay Predictions." *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 12.2 (1999): 165-79. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2014.

Hsee, Christopher K., and Elke U. Weber. "A Fundamental Prediction Error: Self-others Discrepancies in Risk Preference." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 126.1 (1997): 45. Accessed 5 Aug. 2014.

Hsiao, Chun-Hua, and Chyan Yang. "The Impact of Professional Unethical Beliefs on Cheating Intention." *Ethics & Behavior* 21.4 (2011): 301-16. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Hui, C. Harry, and Harry C. Triandis. "Individualism-Collectivism a Study of Cross-Cultural Researchers." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 17.2 (1986): 225-48. Web. Accessed 5 Feb. 2014.

Hunt, Shelby D., and Scott J. Vitell. "The General Theory of Marketing Ethics: A Revision and Three Questions." *Journal of Macromarketing* 26.2 (2006): 143-53. Web. Accessed 8 Aug. 2014.

Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. "How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *The American Political Science Review* (1987): 1099-120. Web. Accessed 17 Dec. 2012.

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo. "Two Moralities: Reinterpreting the Findings of Empirical Research on Moral Reasoning in Taiwan." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 1.3 (1998): 211-38. Web. Accessed 25 Feb. 2011.

Iaydjiev, Ivaylo. "Decision Makers, Personal Belief, and Foreign Policy." *E-International Relations*. 4 May 2011. Web. Accessed 25 Mar. 2012.

James, Patrick, and Enyu Zhang. "Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950–1996." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1.1 (2005): 31-54. Web. 17 Jul. 2014.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. 49 Vol. Princeton University Press, 1976. Print.

Johnson, Craig Edward. *Ethics in the Workplace: Tools and Tactics for Organizational Transformation*. Sage Publications, 2007. Print.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?" *The China Quarterly* 179 (2004): 603-28. Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2012.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion." (2003) Web. Accessed 20 Feb. 2012.

Jones, Thomas M. "Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model." *Academy of management review* 16.2 (1991): 366-95. Web. Accessed 22 Jan. 2014.

Kirkbride, Paul S., Sara FY Tang, and Robert I. Westwood. "Chinese Conflict Preferences and Negotiating Behaviour: Cultural and Psychological Influences." *Organization Studies* 12.3 (1991): 365-86. Web. Accessed 9 Nov. 2010.

Koopman, Cheryl, et al. "Stability and Change in American Elite Beliefs about International Relations." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 1.4 (1995): 365-82. Web. Accessed 24 Mar. 2012.

Kung, Fan-Hua, and Cheng Li Huang. "Auditors' Moral Philosophies and Ethical Beliefs." *Management Decision* 51.3 (2013): 479-500. Web. Accessed 13 Jun. 2014.

Li, Shu, Harry C. Triandis, and Yao Yu. "Cultural Orientation and Corruption." *Ethics & Behavior* 16.3 (2006): 199-215. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Lincoln, Sarah Hope, and Elizabeth K. Holmes. "Ethical Decision Making: A Process Influenced by Moral Intensity." *Journal of Healthcare, Science and the Humanities* 1.1 (2011): 55-69. Web. Accessed 12 Dec. 2012.

Liu, Liwei, and Erdong Zhao. "Research into Culture Difference of Attribution Theory." Web. Accessed 18 Jul. 2014.

Markus, Hazel Rose, and Shinobu Kitayama. "The Cultural Shaping of Emotion: A Conceptual Framework." *Emotion and Culture*. Eds. Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994. 339-351. Print.

Martin, Laura E., et al. "The Influence of Temporal Orientation and Affective Frame on use of Ethical Decision-Making Strategies." *Ethics & Behavior* 21.2 (2011): 127-46. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Mearsheimer, John J. "Reckless States and Realism." *International Relations* 23.2 (2009): 241-56. Web. Accessed 18 Jul. 2014.

Morris, Michael W., and Kaiping Peng. "Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical Events." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67.6 (1994): 949. Web. Accessed 10 Mar. 2012.

Mowle, Thomas S. "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict." *Political Psychology* 24.3 (2003): 561-92. Web. Accessed 9 Mar. 2012.

Mumford, Michael D., et al. "Validation of Ethical Decision Making Measures: Evidence for a New Set of Measures." *Ethics & Behavior* 16.4 (2006): 319-45. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

O'Fallon, Michael J., and Kenneth D. Butterfield. "A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 1996–2003." *Journal of Business Ethics* 59.4 (2005): 375-413. Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Qian, Mingyi, et al. "Professional Ethical Issues and the Development of Professional Ethical Standards in Counseling and Clinical Psychology in China." *Ethics & Behavior* 19.4 (2009): 290-309. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Redfern, Kylie, and John Crawford. "An Empirical Investigation of the Ethics Position Questionnaire in the People's Republic of China." (2004). Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Rest, James R. "Moral Development: Advances in Theory and Research." Praeger, 1986. Print.

Reynolds, Scott J., and Tara L. Ceranic. "The Effects of Moral Judgment and Moral Identity on Moral Behavior: An Empirical Examination of the Moral Individual." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 92.6 (2007): 1610. Web. Accessed 4 Aug. 2014.

Roozen, Irene, Patrick De Pelsmacker, and Frank Bostyn. "The Ethical Dimensions of Decision Processes of Employees." *Journal of Business Ethics* 33.2 (2001): 87-99. Web. Accessed 18 Mar. 2014.

Rosati, Jerel A. "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy." *Foreign policy analysis: Continuity and change in its second generation* (1995): 49-70. Web. Accessed 24 Mar. 2012.

Schlenker, Barry R., and Donelson R. Forsyth. "On the Ethics of Psychological Research." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 13.4 (1977): 369-96. Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Scott, John, and Gordon Marshall. "Oxford Dictionary of Sociology." *Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York* (2005). Web. Accessed 10 Jan. 2014.

Seiler, Stefan, Andreas Fischer, and Sibylle A. Voegtli. "Developing Moral Decision-Making Competence: A Quasi-Experimental Intervention Study in the Swiss Armed Forces." *Ethics & Behavior* 21.6 (2011): 452-70. Web. Accessed 18 Dec. 2011.

Smith, Todd S., et al. "Clinical Ethical Decision Making: An Investigation of the Rationales used to Justify Doing Less than One Believes One should." *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice* 22.3 (1991): 235. Web. Accessed 2 Mar 2014.

Tamashiro, Howard, Gregory G. Brunk, and Donald Secrest. "The Underlying Structure of Ethical Beliefs Toward War." *Journal of Peace Research* 26.2 (1989): 139-52. Web. Accessed 27 Jul. 2011.

Tetlock, Philip E. "Psychological Advice on Foreign Policy: What do we have to Contribute?" *Political Psychology: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. Ed. Neil Jeffrey Kressel. New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1993. 320-341. Web. Accessed 20 Jul. 2014.

Tetlock, Philip E., and Charles McGuire. "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy." *Political Behavior Annual* 1.1 (1986): 147-79. Web. Accessed 21 Jul. 2014.

Triandis, Harry C. *Individualism & Collectivism*. Westview Press, 1995. Print.

Triandis, HC, et al. "Culture, Personality and Deception: A Multilevel Approach." *International Journal of Cross-Cultural Management* 1 (2001): 73-90. Print.

Uhlmann, Eric Luis, et al. "The Motivated use of Moral Principles." *Judgment and Decision Making* 4.6 (2009): 476-91. Web. Accessed 14 Apr. 2011.

Vitell, Scott J., Saviour L. Nwachukwu, and James H. Barnes. "The Effects of Culture on Ethical Decision-Making: An Application of Hofstede's Typology." *Journal of Business Ethics* 12.10 (1993): 753-60. Web. Accessed 8 Aug. 2014.

Voss, James F., and Ellen Dorsey. "Perception and International Relations: An Overview." *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. 3-30. Print.

Walker, Stephen G. "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis." *Political Psychology* (1990): 403-18. Web. Accessed 1 Apr. 2012.

Watley, Loy D., and Douglas R. May. "Enhancing Moral Intensity: The Roles of Personal and Consequential Information in Ethical Decision-Making." *Journal of Business Ethics* 50.2 (2004): 105-26. Web. Accessed 3 Feb. 2013.

Watson, George W., et al. "Are Past Normative Behaviors Predictive of Future Behavioral Intentions?" *Ethics & Behavior* 19.5 (2009): 414-31. Web. 18 Dec. 2011.

Yates, J. Frank, Ju-Whei Lee, and Julie GG Bush. "General Knowledge Overconfidence: Cross-National Variations, Response Style, and "reality"." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 70.2 (1997): 87-94. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2014.

Yates, J. Frank, Ju-Whei Lee, and Hiromi Shinotsuka. "Beliefs about Overconfidence, Including its Cross-National Variation." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 65.2 (1996): 138-47. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2014.

Yates, J. Frank, et al. "Probability Judgment Accuracy: China, Japan, and the United States." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 43.2 (1989): 145-71. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2014.

Yutang, Lin. "The Wisdom of Confucius." *New York* (1938). Print.

Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Findings

This chapter reports the test results that will answer the primary null hypothesis, “Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.” First, Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) of survey questions (“indicator” or “measurement” variables) were used to create and validate models of underlying beliefs (“latent factors”) about the character of the international system (H2, “Views of IR”), the permissibility of going to war in self-defense and in defense of others (H3, “*Jus ad Bellum*”), the morality of key behavior in war (H4, “*Jus in Bello*”) and the extent to which morality constrains self-interested behavior (H5, “Moral Conviction”). Then, scales and scores, created from factor score regression coefficients of these models, quantitatively evaluated these hypotheses.

The extent to which key components of IR and ethical theory shape views and beliefs were tested by examining the relationships between questions and latent factors. These relationships were further evaluated to see the extent to which they reflect the standard theories of political realism, Confucianism, and deontological/teleological ethics. Finally, the models were examined to see if expressed beliefs as well as support for the theoretical components that measure them are coherent and consistent with each other, with the theory they seek to measure, and with the other measures with which there is a demonstrated relationship. Following standard convention, results are reported but not interpreted until the following chapter.

EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (EFA)

The data was first examined using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to see if there was sufficient shared variance between measured variables to suggest they had common underlying factors (latent variables) (Suhr “EFA” 1). In other words, EFA identified if response patterns between survey questions were related in ways that likely reflected underlying beliefs (Suhr “EFA” 2).

However, EFA can examine only correlation, not causation. While regression analysis can test causation, neither it nor EFA can separate sources of error from the data being analyzed. Regression analysis also requires that all variables are observed and on the same scale – which is difficult to do when examining more abstract factors such as beliefs and values (Ullman 37-38). Additionally, EFA has only the most basic ability to control variance and covariance of questions or underlying beliefs; regression analysis does not account for this at all.

Accordingly, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), which has none of these limitations, was used to build and test models. SEM is also the preferred method to create composite scores of beliefs because, “Theoretically... the estimation through the structural equation modeling technique is more accurate than if you just use simple sums of indicators to represent hypothetical constructs” (SAS 14.1 User’s Guide).

MEASUREMENT MODEL

Initial models were constructed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), the first step of SEM, of responses from twenty-five ordinal variables (T. Brown 160; Ling and Rijmen 16). These models reported the extent to which variables effectively measured the factors they were intended to measure, the relationships between the underlying beliefs¹⁹ and the reliability and validity²⁰ of the measurement models themselves (T. Brown 160; Furr 2; O’Rourke and Hatcher 182; Suhr “SEM” 1; Ullman 25-26). The use of nonnormally-distributed ordinal data meant that listwise-deleted polychoric correlations (Panter et al. 562-589) were analyzed using weighted least squares (WLS) and diagonal weighted least square (DWLS) methods of

¹⁹ CFA/SEM is preferred over EFA because “In EFA, a factor’s success is not determined by how much variance it explains because the model is not intended to explain optimal amounts of variance. A factor’s success is gauged by how well it helps the researcher understand the sources of common variation underlying observed data.” (Preacher and MacCallum 21)

²⁰ In other words, if “indicator variables effectively measure the underlying constructs of interest and that the measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit to data.” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 182)

estimation (Forero, Maydeau-Olivares, and Gallardo-Pujol 1; Li 2-3, 12; Ling and Rijmen 16-17; Mindrila 1).²¹

How well the survey data matched theoretical models was evaluated using four categories of goodness-of-fit indices: absolute fit, incremental/comparative fit, parsimony adjusted/residual fit, and predictive fit (Sinco and Chapman 3; Ullman 44-46). Although the chi-square difference test (ΔX^2) is most common, it is considered one of the least reliable with large sample sizes - for which this study qualifies (Furr 9-10; Holtzman and Vezzu 4; O'Rourke and Hatcher 215; Ullman 44-45). As a result, this study followed common practice and used the following other indices as well (O'Rourke and Hatcher 215; Ullman 45).

The absolute fit index GFI²² and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) should be $\geq .9$ for a good fit (Furr 10-11; Holtzmann and Vezzu 4; Sinco and Chapman 3; Suhr "SEM" 10). The incremental fit index CFI²³ should be $\geq .90$ or, even better, $\geq .95$ Holtzman and Vezzu 4; (O'Rourke and Hatcher 215; Sinco and Chapman 3; Suhr "SEM" 10; Ullman 44). The predictive fit index SRMR²⁴ should be $\leq .10$ (Furr 10-11; O'Rourke and Hatcher 215; Sinco and Chapman 3). The parsimony/residual index RMSEA²⁵ should be ideally $\leq .05$ but certainly $\leq .10$ (Furr 10-11; Holtzman and Vezzu 4; O'Rourke and Hatcher 215; Sinco and Chapman 3; Suhr "SEM" 10-11). The RMSEA was also used to evaluate Type II error/reliability.²⁶

Following Furr as well as Ling and Rijmen, the WLS method was used to examine and refine each measurement model/scale since it – but not DWLS - provides critical goodness-of-

²¹ The more accurate DWLS is used for analysis but, where it does not report relevant info, the slightly-less accurate WLS results are stated.

²² Which "estimates the proportion of the sample covariance explained by the model" (Sinco and Chapman 3)

²³ Which "compare[s] the hypothesized model to the null model with no predictors" (Sinco and Chapman 3)

²⁴ Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, which "estimate[s] model fit in samples of the same size and estimate[s] the model's ability to make predictions for the population" (Sinco and Chapman 3)

²⁵ Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, which examines the amount of unexplained residual or variance of the model. (Sinco and Chapman 3)

²⁶ Whether the study has enough data (respondents) and degrees of freedom (df) – aka "statistical power" - for the goodness of fit tests to be considered accurate nine out of ten times. (MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 147; O'Rourke and Hatcher 189-190)

fit indices as well as p -values for the individual variables (Baghdarnia, Soreh, and Gorji 25; Flora and Curran 3-7; Furr 1-3; Ling and Rijmen 16-17; Mindrila 63-65). Each test involved two rounds of CFA - the second CFA was run with variables weighted according to the inverted polychoric correlation matrix from the initial CFA. Latent factors freely covaried and their scales were fixed to 1.0 though indicator variables could only covary through their respective latent factors (T. Brown 62-63, 106-107).

There were no problems noted during the independent evaluation of each scale (latent factor) for reliability (internal consistency) and validity, and thus, their usefulness for measuring underlying beliefs (Furr 17-18). Tests of the factor loadings²⁷ between variables and latent factors indicated that the variables for the cause of wars and for why war is bad had insignificant standardized factor loadings on Factor 1 (Views of International Relations) and the variable asking about the permissibility of going to war if another country has already attacked had an insignificant relationship with Factor 2 (*Jus ad Bellum*). Comparison of nested models confirmed that eliminating these questions from the models substantially improved overall model fit (T. Brown 180; Holtzman and Vezzu 4; O'Rourke and Hatcher 152-153).

There was also low indicator reliability (R^2)²⁸ for the questions about how likely it is for a state to resolve its disputes through violence and about if it is better to have a faster but less restrained war or a slower but more restrained war. The balance between parsimony and accuracy favored removing these variables, however, their relationships with models will still be discussed in the following chapter.

²⁷ Also known as path coefficients, parameter estimates or regression coefficients (Yung 37) "reflects the degree to which differences among participants' responses to the item arise from differences among their levels of the underlying psychological construct being assessed by that item." (Furr 11)

²⁸ Which is the amount of the variance of indicator/question accounted for by its latent factor. (T. Brown 131; O'Rourke and Hatcher 146; Ullman 46)

CFA of the full models, comprised of all four scales, supported prior findings, however, modification indices (MI) suggested additional improvements. At the same time, though, there are many reasons to be very cautious about incorporating these suggested changes (T. Brown 119-125; MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 132-133; O'Rourke and Hatcher 150-166, 219-232; Ullman 47-49).²⁹ For example, "when researchers make many modifications in order to achieve a better fit, chances are good that the resulting model will fit data only from that specific sample; it will not generalize to other samples or the overall population" (O'Rourke and Hatcher 150). There is additional risk since MI are particularly inaccurate when nonnormally distributed data is used – which was the case in this study (Ullman 48). Accordingly, the comparative values of parameter estimates and how well suggested changes fit the theoretical underpinnings of the study were considered as well as the results of ΔX^2 tests (T. Brown 47-48, 119-124; O'Rourke and Hatcher 150-166, 176-178).

MI suggested having a question testing the concept of proportionality (if previously unacceptable behaviors in war would be more acceptable if doing these acts would determine the outcome of a battle) load on Factor 3 (*Jus in Bello*) as well as on Factor 4 (Moral Conviction). This made theoretical sense but tests showed that this modification made only small improvements to fit while dramatically increasing the complexity of the model. These results combined with the fact that this question had a stronger relationship with Factor 4 than with Factor 3 meant that no changes were made (O'Rourke and Hatcher 231-232).

MI also suggested allowing the error/residual terms of several variables to covary.³⁰ The strongest case for this was between the questions asking the permissibility of using force when a smaller country asks for help and when there are massive human rights violations going

²⁹ For example, overfitting, Type I error, unsubstantiated by overarching theory, interpretability, nonnormality of data used, mis-specified models, biasing other parameters.

³⁰ Which is the influence on the latent variable that is not accounted for by the manifest variables or "two indicators have some sort of correlation that is unexplained by their common factor" (Yung 133)

on in another country. It made theoretical sense for both of these questions to be influenced by some component that does not affect the other questions in the scale as these two questions focus on the permissibility of going to war in defense of others while the other questions center on self-defense. However, the very modest improvements seen by this modification was counterbalanced by the fact that either all or no error covariances supported by theory should be done else the researcher would be inducing selection bias (O'Rourke and Hatcher 166). Thus, no error covariances were added.

The full Version 1 model had $X^2= 404.28$, $df=129$, $n=2013$ and Version 2 had $X^2=349.53$, $df=129$, $n=2042$. All parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit tests for each final measurement scale as well as for the full WLS and DWLS measurement models were good. (Table 6) Factor 3 (*Jus in Bello*), with only 3 variables, was “just identified” and did not have enough degrees of freedom for goodness-of-fit statistics to be calculated. However, its parameter estimates, t-values, and reliability scores indicated no problems (Ullman 40-41). This was confirmed by testing the scale again with the “best” additional variable added. Despite this fairly weak variable lowering scores, the goodness-of-fit indices were all well above the minimums.

Table 6 - Goodness-of-Fit

	SRMR	GFI	RMSEA	CFI	NFI
Version 1					
F1 Views of IR	.017	.99	.019	1.0	.99
F2 <i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.055	.96	.032	.97	.96
F3 <i>Jus in Bello</i>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
F4 Moral Conviction	.020	1.0	.036	1.0	1.0
Model (WLS)	.044	.98	.033	.99	.98
Model (DWLS)	.041	1.0	N/A	N/A	.93
Version 2					
F1 Views of IR	.025	.97	.048	.96	.96
F2 <i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.038	.97	.014	.99	.97
F3 <i>Jus in Bello</i>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
F4 Moral Conviction	.019	1.0	.020	1.0	1.0
Model (WLS)	.040	.98	.029	.99	.98
Model (DWLS)	.036	1.0	N/A	N/A	.94

The reliability and validity of the full measurement models were then tested.³¹ The estimated statistical power of the models for both versions of greater than .99 (with a desired minimum of >.80) meant there were no problems with sample sizes or with Type II error.³² Convergent validity³³ was established for all scales because “all factor loadings for the indicators measuring the same construct are statistically significant” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 238-239). Confidence interval tests and selective ΔX^2 tests indicated no problems with discriminant validity.³⁴

Composite reliability³⁵ scores for each factor, fully listed in the SEM portion of this chapter, ranged from below the desired minimum of .69 to reasonably above it. Reexamination

³¹ Reliability is “the consistency of measurement”; Validity is “the extent to which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure.” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 232)

³² Type II error estimates the chances of failing to reject a model because the fit statistic RMSEA inaccurately estimates “that a model fits a population and the interval over which this estimated value is likely to fit the population nine times out of ten.” (MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 147; O’Rourke and Hatcher 189-190; Sinco and Chapman 3-4)

³³ Which is how well a scale measures what it is intended to measure.

³⁴ Which is whether a scale “does not measure a construct that [is similar to but] it was not designed to measure.” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 239-244)

³⁵ Which is the “internal consistency of indicators measuring a given factor.” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 234)

of variables with low indicator reliability scores³⁶ showed that models with these variables fit the data better than models with them removed, so no changes were made. As seen in the other studies discussed in Chapter 4, one possible cause of low composite reliability for the scales about international relations and when it is acceptable to go to war was that the questions in the survey captured some but not all of the issues that make up an individual's beliefs. It may also have been that many respondents hold inconsistent views about these complicated issues.

In sum, the final CFA models adequately represented the relationship between the four latent factors and their indicator variables. The retained survey questions acceptably measured the beliefs they were intended to measure. The somewhat weak composite reliability of the aforementioned two factors were kept in mind during further analysis but were not too concerning given the strength of all other measures of reliability and validity. Furthermore, as O'Rourke and Hatcher state, "Remember that the above [measures] represent an ideal that very often is not attained with real-world data even when the measurement model is quite good. Model fit need not meet all of the above criteria in order to be deemed "acceptable"" (244).

GROUP COMPARISON BY GENDER

It is possible that the beliefs that, according to IR and ethical theory, define the character of the international system, the permissibility of going to war, the morality of key acts in war and the strength of moral conviction could significantly differ between male and female respondents, between Han and non-Han respondents, and between those thinking about their own state or a foreign state. CFA/SEM's ability to precisely control numerous influences in models meant that each potential source of inequality between groups was examined individually to ensure

³⁶ Which is "the percent of variation in the indicator that is explained by the factor that it is supposed to measure." (T. Brown 131; O'Rourke and Hatcher 232)

that questions measured the same underlying beliefs and that scores were based upon the same scale values (Little 2).

A comparison by gender used the data from 1040 male/976 female (Version 1) and 1069 male/977 female (Version 2) respondents. Fit statistics for both were good although the female model for Version 1 was significantly better than that for males and the reverse was true for Version 2.³⁷ In other words, female respondent beliefs about foreign state behavior conformed to theory better than those expressed by men. Conversely, the considerations in the theoretical models better explained male beliefs about their own state's behavior.

Large sample sizes and large differences in size between compared models strongly influence the chi-square difference test (ΔX^2) as well as the related CFI, NFI, parameter estimate significance, modification suggestions and standardized errors (T. Brown 279, 301-304; Gu and Wu 520; Hirschfeld and Brachel 3; Little 1, 4). Thus, group comparisons also considered whether the RMSEA of each model fell within the confidence interval of the other's RMSEA; the ΔCFI was less than or equal to .01; and the Δ McDonald Non-Centrality Index (ΔNCI) was less than or equal to .02 (A. Brown 127; Cheung and Rensvold 233-255; Hirschfeld and Brachel 3-4).

It was first confirmed that "the number of factors and pattern of indicator-factor loadings is identical across groups" ("equal form") (T. Brown 268, 271; Hirschfeld and Brachel 2-3; Little 2). Next, factor loadings constrained to be equal for both models (Hirschfeld and Brachel 3; Little 2) showed that "the measures have the same meaning and structure for different groups of respondents" and "established the suitability of other group comparisons that may be of substantive interest" ("equal factor loadings") (T. Brown 279). In other words,

³⁷ Version 1 Male/Female $X^2=342.5/122.66$, $df=129/129$, $SRMR=.052/.039$, $CFI=.99/1.0$, $RMSEA=.04/0.0$, $NFI=.98/.98$; Version 2 $X^2=207.4/229.33$, $df=129/129$, $SRMR=.045/.044$, $CFI=.99/.98$, $RMSEA=.024/.028$, $NFI=.99/.95$.

there was no substantial difference in how questions were interpreted to be related to the underlying belief being measured (T. Brown 282).

Models were then examined to ensure that any differences in mean scores between genders were due to differences in the underlying beliefs rather than due to unmeasured influences such as bias or errors (“scalar invariance”) (T. Brown 282-290; Hirschfeld and Brachel 2-3; Little 2-3). Indeed, male and female responses to the questions had about the same mean value when the underlying factor was zero (“equal intercept”).

Response patterns which were reliable but unexplained by the models (“error/residual variances”) could have been caused by random error or by systematic effects. Random error would influence the question regardless of group so removing the error from factor mean scores eliminates unnecessary “noise” (Hoyle 383). However, error variance that differs between groups is more likely to be due to issues that should be preserved in the model – such as the presence of different untested considerations influencing beliefs or differing interpretations of the relationship between a question and the underlying belief it was measuring (Hirschfeld and Brachel 3; Little 3; Wu, Li, and Zumbo 15-19).

Tests determined that residual variances were likely due to random errors and could be removed for all but the following survey questions. For both versions, whether it is in a state’s best interest to compromise and cooperate or compete to win. For those thinking of foreign states, the morality of attacking villages as well as of denying civilians food, medicine and water in order to weaken the enemy. For those thinking about their own state, whether foreign policy should be based more upon an idealistic or realist view of international relations. That male and female respondents considered these questions somewhat differently was kept in mind during later analysis but, overall, the tests established that a comparison of male and female scores would be accurate and meaningful (T. Brown 290-291).

Because CFA can compare questions of different scales it can only report relative differences. Accordingly, mean scores for all composite scales were standardized to a range from 0 to 1.0 units - with 0 indicating “no difference” between groups and higher scores indicating greater difference. All scores are reported using the format Version 1/Version 2.

Women were, on average, .24/.29 units more idealistic than men in their reported views of International Relations ($p < .0001$). The biggest differences were about what a foreign state should do when it has a conflict of interest with another state and whether the foreign policy of the respondent’s country should be based more upon how the world should be or how it actually is. Regardless of the country being considered women were slightly less inclined to go to war than men (.04/.05; $p = .19/.03$). The biggest differences were about the permissibility of going to war when asked for help (Version 1) and to stop human rights violations (Version 2). Women were also .29/.27 units less likely to see the three proposed acts in war (*Jus in Bello*) as morally okay ($p < .0001$). The morality of using landmines was, by far, the biggest difference in Version 1 while there was no clear single point of disagreement for the those thinking of their own country. Women averaged .06/.05 units’ stronger moral conviction than men - with the largest difference for both versions about whether permissibility changes if doing the acts determined the outcome of the battle ($p = .0002$).

Gender did not correspond with many differences in the observed *range* of individual beliefs (“factor variance”).³⁸ One notable difference was that male respondents in both versions showed less consensus about the morality of all three acts in war as well as if the immorality of the act(s) would actually constrain behavior. Men also had a wider range of views about the character of the international system.

³⁸ “In an unstandardized solution, a factor variance expresses the sample variability or dispersion of the factor; that is, the extent to which sample participants’ relative standing on the latent dimension is similar or different.” (T. Brown 53, 291)

There were also differences in the perceived relationship between the measured beliefs. Both versions reported that there was a stronger link for men for than women between their views of IR and the morality of harming noncombatants in order to weaken the enemy (women felt that morality was less subjective). When thinking about other states, male beliefs about the morality of these acts were more strongly connected with beliefs whether such ideals could be easily changed or ignored due to extenuating circumstances. The opposite was true for respondents thinking about their own state. State self-interest corresponded with men seeing a three times stronger situational connection than women between views of international relations and their moral conviction about controversial acts in war.

GROUP COMPARISON BY ETHNICITY

Differences between those reporting their ethnicity as “Han” and those reporting their ethnicity as “Other” were also examined.³⁹ The analysis used responses from 1760 Han and 247 non-Han surveys for Version 1 and from 1763 Han respondents and 274 non-Han respondents for Version 2. All tests carefully considered the effects of the notably large differences in sample sizes (T. Brown 279).

Overall fit statistics for all models were acceptable however the model for Han responses of Version 2 fit better than for Version 1 while Version 1 fit better for non-Han respondents (as it did for female respondents).⁴⁰ Tests for equal form and for equal factor loadings indicated no major differences for either version (“invariance”). Although not significant enough to warrant adjusting the models, Han respondent beliefs about the overall permissibility of their own country going to war did not have as strong a relationship with their

³⁹ The survey asked for non-Han to report their specific ethnicity however all non-Han were a single group for these tests.

⁴⁰ Version 1 Han/Non-Han $\chi^2 = 405.7/65.92$, $df=129/129$, $SRMR=.046/.051$, $CFI= .99/1.0$, $RMSEA= .035/0.0$, $NFI=.98/.98$; Version 2 $\chi^2 = 306.72/109.24$, $df=129/129$, $SRMR= .041/.060$, $CFI= .99/1.0$, $RMSEA= .028/0.0$, $NFI=.95/1.0$.

views about whether their country should engage in humanitarian interventions as it did for non-Han respondents.

Results also revealed that, independent of their overall moral conviction, Han respondents were more inclined to change or ignore their prior *Jus in Bello* moral beliefs if the enemy's intent was total destruction of the country – though this disparity met the threshold of statistical significance for only respondents thinking of foreign countries. Different untested issues significantly influenced Han and non-Han respondents' agreement with Thucydides' explanation that state behavior is ultimately about power for those thinking about their own state and made a slight difference for those thinking about foreign states. Their beliefs about the morality of foreign states depriving civilians of food, medicine or water to weaken the enemy were also substantially shaped by considering different, unknown issues.

After adjusting the model based upon these results, the composite mean scores did not appreciably differ between Han and non-Han respondent's beliefs about a foreign state's permissibility to go to war or about the morality of the three acts in war - though the largest disagreements were about humanitarian interventions and the use of landmines ($p=.80$; $p=.40$). Han respondents did average a significant .14 units less idealistic in their views of international relations than non-Han ($p<.0001$). Differing opinions strongly centered on the role of idealism when creating foreign policy and on the accuracy of Thucydides' quote.

Han respondents also had an average .16 unit's stronger moral conviction about the (im)morality of foreign states engaging in acts which weaken the enemy but also harm noncombatants - though this did not include their greater inclination to ignore or change such morality if the enemy's intent was total destruction of the country ($p=.0002$). Test results weakly suggested that non-Han respondents more strongly allowed foreign states changing or

ignoring the morality of these acts if that country was attacked by the enemy first or if the enemy had first started doing the immoral acts.

Han respondents were more flexible when thinking about what their own country should and can do. Non-Han respondents averaged .06 unit's stronger moral conviction about the morality of the specified behaviors in war than Han respondents ($p=.02$). The biggest differences were about how the permissibility of immoral behaviors would change if the other side starting doing the acts first and if the acts would determine the outcome of the battle. Han respondents were also .19 units less idealistic in their views of international relations - the largest difference was the amount of agreement with Thucydides' quote ($p<.0001$). Han respondents felt that going to war for the examples given were .10 units' more permissible than non-Han respondents - the largest difference being that non-Han were more supportive of humanitarian interventions ($p=.006$). Finally, there were no significant differences in the perceived morality of their own state doing the three behaviors in war though the greatest difference was about the morality of denying civilians basic necessities ($p=.84$).

The range of beliefs about what foreign states should and can do did not notably vary by ethnicity. However, when thinking about their own state, there was greater consensus for Han respondents than for non-Han respondents about the character of the international system and about the morality of the acts in war.

The strength of the relationships between some factors/beliefs did differ between China's majority and minority ethnicities. Non-Han respondents thinking about foreign states felt there was a much stronger relationship between views of international relations and moral conviction as well as between beliefs about going to war and moral conviction. Han respondents believed that morality, for other states, was more absolute and less contextual.

Likely due to greater bias from state self-interest, beliefs differed even more dramatically for the Han and non-Han respondents asked to think about their own state. Non-Han respondents were more idealistic but believed there to be a stronger connection between the morality of harming noncombatants and the overall risk posed by the international system. Han respondents saw the world as more dangerous but the consequences from a greater likelihood of war did not tend to alter the acceptability of violating this moral ideal.

Yet, non-Han had stronger moral conviction while Han respondents felt there was a stronger connection between beliefs about the morality of harming noncombatants and the extent to which these beliefs constrain them from doing such acts. Additionally, Han respondents saw a strong relationship between their views of IR and moral conviction about behavior in war while these two beliefs had no significant relationship for non-Han respondents at all ($p=.85$).

COMPARISON BY VERSION

Beliefs about what a foreign state should and can do had equal form, equal factor loadings and equal indicator intercepts with those about what the respondent's own state should and can do. With 2013 respondents for Version 1 and 2042 for Version 2, there were also no problems with the fit statistics for either model. The only modification needed was to account for the different untested influence on beliefs about the morality of denying civilians food, medicine and water in order to weaken the enemy.

Though not significant enough to require changing the models, there were several points of notable strain which suggest that views of international relations were biased by state self-interest. There was a stronger relationship between overall views of IR and agreement with Thucydides' description of international affairs for those thinking of their own country than for those thinking about foreign countries. The same imbalance existed regarding beliefs if foreign

policy should be based upon the way the world should be or the way it actually is. And, independent of overall views of IR, those thinking of their own state more strongly endorsed the need for military power to ensure state security than those thinking about what foreign states ought to do.

Respondents thinking about foreign states were more idealistic on all scales than those thinking of their own state. They were .08 units more idealistic in their views of international relations ($p < .0001$), .06 units' less permissibility to go to war for the given scenarios ($p = .002$), .12 units more moral weight given to the harming of noncombatants compared to weakening the enemy ($p < .0001$), and .08 units less willingness to ignore or change previous assessments that those acts were immoral ($p < .0001$).

State self-interest had less of an effect on the variance of observed beliefs and on the relationship between beliefs. The only major differences were that those thinking about their own state showed less variance in/more consensus about views of international relations and that the relationship between beliefs about the permissibility of going to war and those about the morality of what can be done in war were twice as strong for those thinking about foreign states than for those thinking of their own state. This suggests that those thinking of other states gave greater consideration to the overall suffering and destruction of war.

These tests established that the versions have the necessary degree of equivalence so that their results can be accurately compared. Although this was done based upon CFA models, it applies to the coming SEM models as well. This is because there was no substantial change between CFA and SEM models that would influence tests of equal form, equal loadings, equal indicator intercepts and equal residual variances.

STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING (SEM)

Unlike in CFA, SEM latent factors did not freely covary but were instead constrained to test causality more precisely – that is, whether Confucian beliefs influence strategic preferences. The initial SEM models did this as delineated by both Confucian and political realist theories. Views of International Relations should predict *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* beliefs as well as strength of Moral Conviction. Beliefs about the permissibility of going to war should significantly define the permissibility of how wars may be conducted. And, finally, since the permissibility of the three behaviors in war center on the perceived moral weight given to noncombatant immunity and intentionality (the relative priority of deontological vs teleological considerations), *Jus in Bello* beliefs should moderate the degree reciprocity, Just Cause, proportionality, and supreme emergency influenced prior moral judgments.

There were no problems with goodness-of-fit indices for these models however their nomological validity⁴¹ was not passing. The only suggested modification supported by the theoretical underpinnings of the study was to add a predictive link from the respondent's strength of moral conviction to their beliefs about the permissibility of going to war. All tests indicated that these new theoretical models fit the data quite well,⁴² they improved upon the initial SEM models, and were as good as the final CFA models (O'Rourke and Hatcher 290-291).

Overall, the models resulted in reasonably good composite scale reliability (R^2)⁴³ of the latent factors though they did not account for much of the observed variation in beliefs (SMC)⁴⁴ (Table 7). In other words, the models were only able to explain a small portion of the observed

⁴¹ Which "indicates that the theoretical model is successful in accounting for the observed relationships between latent constructs." (O'Rourke and Hatcher 274-275, 289-290)

⁴² Both versions had RMSEA=.030, SRMR=.04, GFI=.98, CFI=.99, NFI=.98; statistical power >.99

⁴³ Which is how well the indicators measured their latent variable. (O'Rourke and Hatcher 234)

⁴⁴ Squared Multiple Correlations. O'Rourke and Hatcher describes R^2 of .51/.55 as "quite large." (O'Rourke and Hatcher 274, 283)

responses to questions but, that which it could explain, it explained fairly well. The Version 1 SEM accounted for 11% of Factor 2 (*Jus ad Bellum*), 21% of Factor 3 (*Jus in Bello*), and 10% of Factor 4 (Moral Conviction). For Version 2, it was 7% of Factor 2, 20% of Factor 3, and 9% of Factor 4. This measure was not available for the Views of IR scale because none of the other factors attempted to predict it.

Table 7 – Squared Multiple Correlation & Reliability of Factors

	Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC)		Reliability of Factor (R^2)	
	Version 1	Version 2	Version 1	Version 2
Views of IR	N/A	N/A	.43	.37
<i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.11	.07	.53	.52
<i>Jus in Bello</i>	.21	.20	.65	.63
Moral Conviction	.10	.09	.78	.79

The final DWLS SEM models are displayed in Figures 3 and 4 below. The single arrow lines indicate the specified direction of influence. The values next to these lines, their standardized factor loadings,⁴⁵ were all but one well above the recommended minimum of .05 - meaning the latent belief “significantly predicted” the responses to its respective observed variables (O’Rourke and Hatcher 275; Ullman 46). All scores are standardized so that questions which use difference scales can be easily compared (O’Rourke and Hatcher 149, 216). This also means that the sum of scores may not equal 1.00.

⁴⁵ Also known as “standardized linear regression weights” or “standardized path coefficients.” This reports how much change in score for the indicator/question will likely occur for every one standardized point increase in the factor scale score. (T. Brown 131)

Figure 3 – Structural Equation Model Version 1





Figure 4 – Structural Equation Model Version 2



The four validated factor scales, made up of only the variables with significant influence for each latent factor, were used to create refined multivariate regression factor scores (DiStefano, Zhu, and Mindrila 3-7). Item responses were first recoded to eliminate the “Neither/Don’t Know” option as this response, ordinarily coded as a “3,” would have erroneously influenced mean scores. However, this came at a cost of dramatically – but not problematically - reducing the *n* for Factors 1 and 3. The interpretability of factor scores was improved by rescaling them to 0-1.0 with, very generally, 0 considered most moral/Confucian/restrained and 1.0 being most realist/inclined toward using force.

The Version 1/Version 2 mean scores (M) for views of IR were .49/.52 with standard deviations (SD) of .19/.17; M's of .63/.65 with SD's of .19/.19 for beliefs about the permissibility of going to war; M's of .26/.30 with SD's of .21/.22 for the morality of the three given acts in war; and M's of .37/.38 with SD's of .26/.26 for strength of moral conviction about those three acts. (Table 8) As is visually depicted in Figure 5 and 6, all scales had non-normal distributions.

Table 8 – Composite Scale Scores for Factors

Version	# of Items		M (SD)		Median/Mode		Skewness		Kurtosis		n	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
1 - Views of IR	5	5	.49(.19)	.52(.17)	.49/.34	.52/.72	.09	-.01	-.48	-.27	1482	1413
2 - <i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	6	6	.63(.19)	.65(.19)	.65/.70	.67/.87	-.54	-.57	.10	.27	2253	2277
3 - <i>Jus in Bello</i>	3	3	.26(.21)	.30(.22)	.23/0	.30/0	.63	.48	.04	-.13	1819	1659
4 - Moral Conviction	4	4	.37(.26)	.38(.26)	.34/0	.38/0	.36	.27	-.60	-.72	2291	2284

Figure 5 – Factor Scale Composite Score Distribution Version 1





Figure 6 - Factor Scale Composite Score Distribution Version 2



The total influence/effect predictor factors had on predicted factors⁴⁶ were all statistically significant though some were fairly small (See Table 9). “Small,” however, is a very subjective term. All but two loadings were well above the recommended minimum of .05 (O’Rourke and Hatcher 275). Suhr states that a score less than .10 may be a “small” amount, around .30 is “medium,” and greater than .50 “large” (Suhr “SEM” 5).

The extent to which the world was seen as violent, zero-sum competition had a moderate effect on beliefs about the permissibility of going to war (.25/.25) and a more significant impact on beliefs about whether it is moral to harm noncombatants in order to weaken the enemy (.32/.37). Scores of .03/.10 indicated that the respondent’s worldview did not strongly influence their beliefs about the legitimacy and constraining power of their own

⁴⁶ Again, standardized factor loading scores convey how units of change the predicted variable will change for every one unit of change of the predictor variable. (O’Rourke and Hatcher 148)

moral assessments - though this was substantially more true for how other countries should behave than for the respondents' country.

SEM is capable of not only quantifying the direct effect of factors and variables but also their indirect effects as well. Factor loading scores of views of IR had on the permissibility of going to war increased to .27/.26 when the effects mediated by *Jus in Bello* beliefs and moral conviction were taken into account. The total effect of views of IR on the morality of using landmines, etc. increased to .38/.41. The total effects of views of IR on moral conviction more than doubled to .14 for Version 1 and exactly doubled to .20 for Version 2.

The effect that views of IR had on some beliefs about the use of force clearly differed by survey version. Views of IR more strongly influenced moral beliefs about both conduct in war and the extent to which morality should constrain such behavior for those thinking of their own state than for those thinking of foreign states. Unexpectedly, this bias of state self-interest/proximity of the threat did not have a notable effect on the relationship between views of IR and the acceptability of going to war.

With direct loading of .28/.25 and total loading of .29/.25, preference for whether to measure morality based upon the "ends" or "means," as represented by the harming noncombatants to weaken the enemy, had substantially more influence on whether extenuating circumstances justified immoral behavior for those more objectively thinking about what foreign states may do. Though not conceptually as strongly related, recall that those thinking about what is moral behavior in war for their own state were less concerned with collateral damage and felt less constrained by morality.

The permissibility of going to war influenced that of what is moral to do in war with standardized direct and total loadings of .22/.17. Respondents did not as strongly believe that, for their own country, what may be done in war depends upon if the war, itself, is moral.

Finally, despite the fact that they both involve concern for suffering and destruction that impacts civilians, direct and total effects of .14/.03 indicated that the strength of moral conviction about not harming noncombatants in war did not strongly affect the permissibility of starting a war. However, such moral conviction was much better at predicting the more idealistic morality of foreign countries going to war than the permissibility of the respondent's own country doing so.

Table 9 – Factor Loadings

Factor A---->Factor B		Standardized Factor Loading (Total Effect)	
		Relationship VS A	Relationship VS B
Views of IR	<i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.27	.26
Views of IR	<i>Jus in Bello</i>	.38	.41
Views of IR	Moral Conviction	.14	.20
<i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	<i>Jus in Bello</i>	.22	.17
<i>Jus in Bello</i>	Moral Conviction	.29	.25
Moral Conviction	<i>Jus ad Bellum</i>	.14	.03

SUMMARY

There were no substantial problems with the empirical data fitting the theoretical models created using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). There was a statistically significant connection between overall beliefs and the issues which define them according to established frameworks of IR and ethical theory. However, the small amount of commonality between many indicated that there may be other influential factors that should be considered when measuring these overall beliefs.

State self-interest often generated clear, strong bias. Those thinking of foreign states were more idealistic on all scales than those thinking of their own state. They also were more concerned about the suffering and destruction inflicted by armed conflict.

Women tended to be more idealistic, more concerned about harming civilians, more constrained by morality, and slightly less inclined to enter a war than men. Men were more

biased in holding other states to higher standards of morality and behavior than women. Men also felt more strongly that their state's behavior depended upon the threat posed by the international system while women were more objective.

Those of Han ethnicity were more biased than non-Han Chinese in how they thought states should behave. They saw the world as more dangerous, morality as less constraining for their state than for foreign ones, and were more inclined to support their country going to war than China's ethnic minorities. Han also felt more strongly than non-Han that what was permissible for other states was not affected by context (as it was for their own state).

There were notable causal relationships between logically-connected overarching beliefs though some were not hugely influential. Beliefs about the character of the international system had a small influence on the strength of moral conviction, a moderate effect on when it is acceptable to go to war, and a stronger impact on the morality of collateral damage. This relationship was more important for those thinking of their own state while expectations for other states were less subject to the severity of threat posed by the international order.

Whether morality of acts in war were evaluated based on the ends or the means (or, correspondingly, the "good" or the "right") was reasonably linked to whether extenuating circumstances changed their permissibility. However, of those who tended to feel that military advantages did not justify harming civilians, there was more flexibility for their own state to change this calculus due to extenuating circumstance than for foreign states. Similarly, the moderate relationship between when a state could reasonably resort to violence (despite the harm it will do in the process) and the justness of harms done to civilians in war was stronger for foreign states while the respondent's own state behavior was less conditional. The sanctity of not inflicting immoral harm on civilians in war had a small impact on the importance of not

inflicting harm by entering into a war for foreign states and very little effect on whether the respondents own state can do so.

The next chapter will discuss in more detail the meanings of and insights from the results reported in this chapter. These will be used to identify the moral reasoning processes used by respondents as well as their strategic preferences. The research hypothesis will be answered and their implications addressed.

WORKS CITED

Baghdarnia, Mostafa, Razieh Firozy Soreh, and Raheleh Gorji. "The Comparison of Two Methods of Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS) in Testing Construct Validity of Achievement Goals." *Journal of Educational and Management Studies* 4.1 (2014): 22-38. Web. Accessed 16 Oct. 2015.

Brown, Anna. "Measurement Invariance and Differential Item Functioning." University of Cambridge, Dept of Psychiatry. Course Notes. (2012): 1-162. Web. Accessed 4 Dec. 2015.

Brown, Timothy A. *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. Guilford Publications, 2015. Print.

Cheung, Gordon W., and Roger B. Rensvold. "Evaluating Goodness-of-Fit Indexes for Testing Measurement Invariance." *Structural Equation Modeling* 9.2 (2002): 233-255. Web. Accessed 15 May 2016.

DiStefano, Christine, Min Zhu, and Diana Mindrila. "Understanding and Using Factor Scores: Considerations for the Applied Researcher." *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation* 14.20 (2009): 1-11. Web. Accessed 5 Oct. 2015.

Flora, David B., and Patrick J. Curran. "An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative Methods of Estimation for Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Ordinal Data." *Psychological Methods* 9.4 (2004): 466-91. Web. Accessed 3 Nov. 2015.

Forero, Carlos G., Alberto Maydeu-Olivares, and David Gallardo-Pujol. "Factor Analysis with Ordinal Indicators: A Monte Carlo Study Comparing DWLS and ULS Estimation." *Structural Equation Modeling* 16.4 (2009): 625-641. Web. Accessed 14 Oct. 2015.

Furr, Mike. *Scale Construction and Psychometrics for Social and Personality Psychology*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011. Web. Accessed 16 Oct. 2015.

Gu, Fei, and Wei Wu. "Using SAS PROC TCALIS for Multigroup Structural Equation Modelling with Mean Structures." *British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology* 64.3 (2011): 516-537. Web. Accessed 16 Nov. 2015.

Hirschfeld, Gerrit, and Ruth von Brachel. "Multiple-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis in RA Tutorial in Measurement Invariance with Continuous and Ordinal Indicators." *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation* 19.7 (2014): 1-12. Web. Accessed 4 Dec. 2015.

Holtzman, Steven, and Sailesh Vezzu. "Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling of Noncognitive Assessments using PROC CALIS." *Statistics and Analysis. New Jersey, USA* (2011). Web. Accessed 12 Oct. 2015.

Hoyle, Rick H., ed. *Handbook of Structural Equation Modeling*. Guilford Press, 2012. Print.

Li, Cheng-Hsien. "Confirmatory factor analysis with ordinal data: Comparing robust maximum likelihood and diagonally weighted least squares." *Behavior Research Methods* (2015): 1-14. Web. Accessed 15 Oct. 2015.

Ling, Guangming, and Frank Rijmen. "A General Procedure to Assess the Internal Structure of a Noncognitive Measure—The Student360 Insight Program (S360) Time Management Scale." *ETS Research Report Series* 2011.2 (2011): i-37. Web. Accessed 2 May 2016.

Little, Todd D., and David W. Slegers. "Factor Analysis: Multiple Groups." *Encyclopedia of Statistics in Behavioral Science* (2005): 1-7. Web. Accessed 4 Dec. 2015.

MacCallum, Robert C., Michael W. Browne, and Hazuki M. Sugawara. "Power Analysis and Determination of Sample Size for Covariance Structure Modeling." *Psychological Methods* 1.2 (1996): 130-49. Web. Accessed 13 Nov. 2015.

Mindrila, Diana. "Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS) Estimation Procedures: A Comparison of Estimation Bias with Ordinal and Multivariate Non-Normal Data." *International Journal of Digital Society* 1.1 (2010): 60-66. Web. Accessed 14 Oct. 2015.

O'Rourke, Norm, R. Psych, and Larry Hatcher. *A Step-by-Step Approach to Using SAS for Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling*. SAS Institute, 2013. Print.

Panter, Abigail T., et al. "Factor analytic approaches to personality item-level data." *Journal of Personality Assessment* 68.3 (1997): 561-589. Web. Accessed 10 Oct. 2015.

Preacher, Kristopher J., and Robert C. MacCallum. "Repairing Tom Swift's Electric Factor Analysis Machine." *Understanding Statistics: Statistical Issues in Psychology, Education, and the Social Sciences* 2.1 (2003): 13-43. Web. Accessed 5 Oct. 2015.

"SAS/STAT(R) 14.1 User's Guide." *SAS/STAT(R) 14.1 User's Guide*. SAS Institute Inc., November 2015. Web. 03 May 2016.

Sinco, Brandy R., and Phillip L. Chapman. "Adventures in Path Analysis and Preparatory Analysis." Working Paper AA-05-2013 (2013): 1-19. Web. Accessed 15 Oct. 2015.

Suhr, Diana. "Exploratory Factor Analysis with the World Values Survey." *Proceedings of the SAS Global Forum 2012 Conference* (2012): 1-19. Web. Accessed 31 Aug. 2014.

Suhr, Diana. "The Basics of Structural Equation Modeling." *Presented: Irvine, CA, SAS User Group of the Western Region of the United States (WUSS)* (2006): 1-19. Web. Accessed 12 Oct. 2015.

Ullman, Jodie B. "Structural Equation Modeling: Reviewing the Basics and Moving Forward." *Journal of Personality Assessment* 87.1 (2006): 35-50. Web. Accessed 16 Oct. 2015.

Wu, Amery D., Zhen Li, and Bruno D. Zumbo. "Decoding the Meaning of Factorial Invariance and Updating the Practice of Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis: A Demonstration with TIMSS Data." *Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation* 12.3 (2007): 1-26. Web. Accessed 21 Jan. 2016.

Yung, Yiu-Fai. "Introduction to Structural Equation Modeling Using the CALIS Procedure in SAS/STAT® Software." *Computer Technology Workshop (CE_25T)*. (2010): 1-149. Web. Accessed 12 Oct. 2015.

Chapter 7: Discussion

This chapter answers research hypothesis H1-H4 by examining - individually and then collectively - the factor-factor and factor-indicator relationships of SEM models, the composite scores derived from them, and insightful response patterns of survey questions. Overarching themes and notable relationships are highlighted but the deeper meaning and implications of these results are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The results overall did not find respondents to have a Confucian worldview or to strongly endorse state behavior based upon the values of Confucian moral governance. Variation of responses were found to be fairly consistent when examined according to the assumptions of rational choice theory adjusted by the elements of strategic culture, especially if Chinese nationalist beliefs were added. Though observed preferences were also fairly consistent with a more permissive interpretation of Confucian views of war, the moral legitimacy of such claims was substantially weakened by the strong bias giving greater permissibility for the respondent's own country than for others. There was also little evidence that Confucianism influenced normative strategic preferences – what could also be called moral ideals about the use of force – and there was even less evidence that morality, Confucian or otherwise, influenced or constrained actual strategic behavior.

H2: Respondents do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior.

The latent factor that measured respondents' worldview, Views of IR, had *n*'s of 1482/1413 and moderate composite reliabilities of 43%/37%. Using a scale from 0 to 1.0 units, where stronger Confucian beliefs were lower scores,⁴⁷ the means and medians for this scale of .49/.52

⁴⁷ As stated in the prior chapter, only the primary/strongest variables were used to calculate composite scores and the "Neither/Don't Know" option was also deleted.

fell quite close to the middle of Confucian and political realist beliefs. Those asked about their own country had slightly more realist and substantially less variance in beliefs.

The meaning of abstract factor composite scale scores can be more clearly understood by looking at the combination of answers that resulted in the three most popular scores. This better conveys why composite scores close to the middle of the scale actually show weaker Confucian views than might otherwise be expected. All three for each version are listed, in order from most popular to third most popular, in Table 10, below. The second most popular scores for each are closest to the composite scale mean and medians.

The second most common score for Version 1, .437, correlated to respondents believing that a foreign state's security was best pursued through international laws and institutions. Respondents also mildly agreed that it was in a foreign states best interests to cooperate and compromise with other states, that foreign states should pursue their best interests even at the detriment of other states, with Thucydides' assessment that international relations is really about power politics, and that foreign policy should be based upon how the world really is.

The second most popular score for Version 2, .532, indicated that state security required the respondent's own country to possess superior absolute military might. There was also mild agreement that their state should cooperate and compromise, mildly disagreed that their state should pursue its interests at the detriment of other states, mildly agreed with Thucydides, and mildly agreed that foreign policy should be based upon how the world really is. Though the scaling means that scores fall close to the middle of a 0-1.0 scale, the patterns of responses actually show stronger endorsement of non-Confucian values and principles.

Table 10 – Views of IR Scale Top 3 Reference

Version 1	State Security	Competition	Conflict of Interests	Thucydides	Foreign Policy
.336	Int'l laws	Mildly Cooperate	Mildly Disagree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist
.437	Int'l laws	Mildly Cooperate	Mildly Agree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist
.628	Allies & Deterrence	Mildly Compete	Mildly Agree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist
Version 2					
.72	Absolute Strength	Mildly Compete	Mildly Agree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist
.532	Absolute Strength	Mildly Cooperate	Mildly Disagree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist
.373	Int'l Law	Mildly Cooperate	Mildly Disagree	Mildly Agree	Mildly Realist

Looking more carefully at individual questions, the majority of respondents of both survey versions mildly agreed that foreign policy should be created based upon how the world “actually is” rather than how it “should be” (38%/41%). However, the distribution of responses to this question was strongly biased according to state self-interest. Compared to those thinking about their own state, there was greater support for foreign states to pursue idealistic foreign policies ($p=.02$). Perhaps because it is easier to be idealistic when thinking very generally about foreign policies than when thinking about specific issues with clear tradeoffs, this idealism was less consistent with respondents’ overall views of international affairs than the more realist foreign policy recommended by the respondents thinking of their own country.

About half of respondents (51%/50%) believed that it was in a state’s overall best interests to compromise and cooperate with other states rather than to compete to win – though most of them expressed mild (41%/41%) rather than strong support (10%/9%) for a non-zero sum international system (Versions 1 & 2, $p=.23$). This question also had a notably large number of people who selected “Neither/Don’t Know” (15%/16%).

Asking if it was acceptable for a country to pursue its interests to the detriment of other countries tested whether Confucian values were equally supported when the pursuit of state interests was more conflicting. The majority of respondents still disagreed with pursuing a zero-sum approach (47%/45% disagreed; 41%/39% supported) however there was less support

for idealist behavior than in the prior question. There was, again, no significant difference in beliefs between survey versions ($p=.38$).

Beliefs about foreign and the respondent's state behavior became increasingly different as the stakes increased. Asked how best to pursue state security, the majority (47%) said that a foreign state should support international laws and institutions while the majority (37%) would advise their own state to possess sufficient superior military power so that, even when opposed, it can still achieve its vital interests ($p<.0001$). Alliances and a sufficiently strong military deterrent was the least popular answer for both survey versions (24%/30%).

Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with Thucydides' amoral and anarchic description of the international system. A 48%/48% majority of respondents mildly agreed, 66%/67% strongly or mildly agreed, and 28%/26% mildly or strongly disagreed ($p=.28$). Although responses were about the same for both versions, they were more strongly related to the respondent's overall views of international relations for those thinking of their own state. Thus, as was seen with the question about whether foreign policy should more consider how the world should be or how the world actually is, those thinking about foreign states tended to endorse more idealistic behavior while still holding realist views of the international system.

Respondents were asked whether "The world's history of violent and nonviolent international disagreements, conflicts and competition are largely" due to human nature or competition over limited resources. The insignificant relationship observed between this question and overall views of IR made sense since Confucian and political realism do not necessarily disagree on this issue. It is, however, a fundamental difference between classical and structural political realist theory. The overwhelming majority of respondents agreed with the structural notion that competition over limited resources was the primary cause of wars

(86%/88%) while 12%/10% said it was due to human nature and 2%/2% said for other reasons ($p=.21$).

These results may also be influenced by the Confucian-Mencian belief that humans are inherently good. However, human behavior should to be seen as the primary cause for most conflicts in order to believe that providing proper role models and moral education are more effective than using force to resolve them. Force would be considered necessary and more effective if survival depends upon winning the constant competition over limited resources in an anarchic world. Thus, the structural realist view supported by the majority of respondents was not coherent with the logic underlying Confucian strategic preferences.

Respondents were asked about how “politicians from [their own or of foreign countries] should in practice see the role morality plays in international affairs.” The versions had the same relative ranking of the answer options although the strength of support for each answer significantly differed ($p=.006$).

The most popular response, by far, was that “Governments and individuals have different roles and responsibilities so they have different standards of what is right and wrong. For a government, what is morally right is what best meets its obligations to its people - the survival of the country and the good of its own citizens” (46%/50%). With less than half the support – but still much more than for the remaining options – was another “Dirty Hands”⁴⁸ belief that “What is morally correct should always be considered and usually followed. However, although it does not make it morally right, sometimes it is necessary for a country to behave immorally in order to protect its citizens” (22%/22%).

⁴⁸ Reflecting Machiavellian thought, this term describes the idea that “a particular act of government...may be exactly the right thing in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” That personal moral remainder is the dirty hands. (Walzer 161).

Moral preference to those with whom there is a special relationship is acceptable according to Confucianism but not when it is at the strong detriment of others. The inextricable relationship between morality and politics means that politics and politicians are not subject to different moral rules or standards than regular citizens (Kim, "Dirty Hands" 154). The contextual nature of Confucian virtue ethics also means that there are no absolute moral rules to break and, thus, no concept analogous to Western Dirty Hands (Kim, "Dirty Hands" 153-154).

Strong (Confucian) moral beliefs were seen by the 14%/11% of respondents who felt that "Morality should shape politics even if doing so means that it constrains and sometimes disadvantages one's own country." A slightly smaller (9%/9%) portion of respondents held the opposing political realist amoral view that "There are universal rights and wrongs but they only apply to how people should treat one another. The world is too competitive and too dangerous to allow these rules to limit the political and military options available to governments and countries." Finally, 8%/7% said "There are few or no universal moral standards, morality is just an excuse used by powerful countries to justify preventing weaker countries from challenging the way things currently are."

Like Machiavelli, a notable majority recognized that international politics does have a moral component - though most of them also felt that, in one way or another, state self-interest was either a legitimate bias for assessing what is moral or that it served as a legitimate exemption from ordinary morality (Walzer 175-176). Subtler bias from state interest was also seen in the response patterns for this question. For example, there was greater support for the politics of foreign countries to be constrained by morality than for the respondent's own country to be so limited. Additionally, respondents thinking of their own country more strongly believed that governments have the moral obligation to prioritize its own people over those of other countries.

Compared to the responses above, which all presuppose that morality does belong in politics in some way, there was less bias from those who felt that politics are amoral. Consistent with political realist theory, respondents who believed that politics are amoral saw this as a universally true and applicable condition.

Response patterns for this question indicated that the majority's moral beliefs about state behavior and the use of force, as identified in this study, was based upon how well the proposed act meets the state's obligation to do what is best for its citizens (68%/72%). This suggested that the assessed morality of such acts would likely be fairly similar for both leaders as well as normal citizens who were reporting what they felt was moral for leaders to do. However, it was also possible that, instead, respondents based the morality of these acts on what they felt individuals rather than states may and may not do. If this were the case, many would consider using force even more permissible for their government if it fulfilled the obligation of the state to prioritize the good of its own people.

In summary, composite scores and responses to individual questions did not reflect strong Confucian views of the international system. Statistical models confirmed there to be stronger consensus about less idealistic views for those thinking about their own country than for those thinking of foreign ones. Some evidence of Confucian values was seen from the approximately half of respondents who supported compromise and cooperation though views became more biased as zero-sum direct conflicts of interest were introduced. Support for Confucian virtues was further tempered by an overall generally realist worldview and the fairly widespread belief that greater absolute military power was still essential for national security.

Despite morality largely being seen as a legitimate component of politics, it could be quickly disregarded or more favorably redefined when it conflicted with state self-interest. This was more acceptable for the respondent's own country and as the perceived stakes increased.

There was widespread recognition that states – especially China – should cooperate and/or compete not as how best expresses virtue or promotes a harmonious world but rather as is best for state self-interest.

H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used.

Moral ideals and their influence on the decision to use force were examined by asking whether it was “morally okay to use force,” “force may be used only because this is an exceptional circumstance but it is still morally wrong,” or if it “is not okay to use force” for five self-defense scenarios and two scenarios about coming to the defense of others. The country of consideration for all questions differed according to survey version.

The scales measuring the permissibility of going to war (*Jus ad Bellum*) had reasonably-strong composite reliabilities of .53/.52 and *n*'s of 2253/2277. The mean composite factor scores of .63/.65, medians of .65/.67, and modes of .70/ .87 showed there to be a strong inclination to use force for all the scenarios - though doing so was significantly less permissible for foreign states than for the respondents own. With severity of threat increasing going from left to right columns, the top three composite scores for each version are seen in Table 11 below.

Table 11 – Jus ad Bellum Scale Top 3 Reference

Version 1	When Effective	Enemy Building Military	Neighbor was Invaded	Attack Imminent	Humanitarian Intervention	Asked for Help
.696	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Morally ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok
.901	Immoral but Necessary	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok
.808	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Morally ok	Morally ok	Morally ok	Morally ok
Version 2						
.874	Immoral but Necessary	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok
.692	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Morally Ok	Morally Ok	Morally Ok
.674	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Immoral but Necessary	Morally Ok	Immoral but Necessary	Morally Ok

The use of force was overwhelmingly considered justified if the country of interest “has been physically attacked by another military first” - though respondents were significantly more permissive for their own country doing so than for foreign ones. 94% said that it was moral for their own country to use force in this situation and 5% said it was necessary but immoral while 92% of those considering another country said this was moral and 7% said it was necessary but immoral ($p=.006$). This question did not have enough variance in views to provide insight into moral reasoning and, thus, was not included in the models or scales.

A large majority also supported preemptively attacking a country “when there is clear evidence that an attack is imminent.” Again, more felt that it was moral for their own country to use force for this fairly clear case of self-defense (69%/74%) while it was seen as more immoral but necessary for foreign countries to do so (27%/22%) ($p=.0002$).

Respondents were asked about using force when an unfriendly country became more threatening because it invaded a neighboring country. In this situation, the actual threat to the country of concern was more uncertain than in the previous scenarios because, although force had been used, it was against a third country. Accordingly, a lesser 35%/36% of respondents

considered it moral to use force. However, 51%/52% felt that this was immoral but necessary so, overall, an overwhelming majority of 86%/87% still felt that such a preventative war was permissible. Views did not differ between versions ($p=.22$).

The fairly low degree of direct threat in this scenario should be below the threshold of making war “necessary” for self-defense for those who hold nonviolent preferences. Such a war against the aggressive occupier could be consistent with the more coercive strategy of “active defense” and the Confucian hegemonic notion of punitive expedition to restore harmony and to demonstrate humaneness. This would still reflect a fairly high sensitivity to threats and the belief that war is the preferred, effective response even when there may reasonably be alternative options to address potential threats.

The possible motives of “active defense” and punitive expedition - indicative of a less pacifistic interpretation of Confucianism - were not likely as the majority of respondents felt that such a war would be “immoral but necessary.” Additionally, this scenario is quite similar to China’s Legalist/offensive realist effort to use third countries as an expanded “buffer” between the Han and the Xiongnu discussed in Chapter 3.

A quarter of respondents (27%/29%) said that it was moral to use force “when an unfriendly country is being increasingly threatening by rapidly building its military (so should be stopped before it becomes too strong),” just under half felt that it was necessary but immoral to do so (48%/47%), and 25%/24% felt that this would not be acceptable at all. Even a more aggressive interpretation of Confucianism was not likely to have played a large role in responses as the unfriendly state has not actually used force yet nor has it clearly signaled an intent to attack the respondent’s country of concern. Although the results showed the support for war continuing to decrease as the severity of threat did the same, a large majority of 75%/76% still approved of it. There was no significant difference between versions ($p=.13$).

When asked about the use of force for the *realpolitik* reason of “when it is the most effective way to pursue national interests (economic, security, etc.),” the majority of respondents (61%/62%) said that this was “immoral but necessary.” The equal support for this response for both versions was consistent with the realist belief that the conditions which necessitate the amorality of politics are universal and, thus, equally applicable. A biased application of morality was seen from the 25% who said such a use of force was immoral for a foreign country compared to the 19% who said it was immoral for their own country. The corresponding 14% who said it was moral for other states to use force for this reason compared to 19% who felt it was moral for their country to do so further demonstrated the inconsistency of moral standards ($p < .0001$).

The use of force for state interests could be in line with an interpretation of Confucianism that requires China to maintain regional hegemony. Yet, it would be a stretch to fit a “moral” motive of material profit for China (and this being more moral than for other states) within the Confucian virtues. It also indicated a war-prone zero-sum view of state relations. While possible, again, claims that this was moral were strongly contradicted by the fact that even the majority of respondents believed that material profit as a motive for war was immoral but necessary rather than moral.

Overall, there was very strong approval (75%/81%) to use force even when not being threatened. The majority belief that a war for material gains is immoral but necessary, the greater morality for the respondent’s own country to do this, and the little reason for respondents to believe such wars will be to the benefit of all parties makes support for such behavior inconsistent with even a more aggressive version of Confucianism. This situation does not reasonably qualify as “last resort” and is a stretch to claim, even in a zero-sum world, that the harms are justified out of the right to self-defense.

The effects of state self-interest on Confucian morality and on the use of force was further investigated using two scenarios that centered on the defense of others. 67%/66% said that it was morally okay to provide military assistance “when a small country that is wrongfully invaded by a stronger country requests help” and 26%/28% said it was immoral but necessary. A smaller majority of 39%/37% believed that it was morally permissible to provide military assistance “to stop massive human rights violations occurring in another country’s internal conflict,” a slightly lesser 37%/36% said this was immoral but necessary, and 24%/27% said such assistance would be completely unacceptable. The similar distribution of responses between versions was consistent with the fact that both scenarios contained no appreciable state self-interest for respondents ($p=.49$, $p=.07$).

Military interventions for both of these situations could easily be justified according to the standards of punitive expeditions as well as by Confucian virtues though it should be more moral to stop the more egregious, deontological “massive human rights violations.” Instead, the morality and the overall permissibility of these uses of force to help others corresponded to whether or not the sovereignty of another state was violated. Protection of fundamental rights to safety is a straightforward deontological issue, consistent with Confucian virtues, while the sovereignty of states contains little moral import in contemporary Western thinking about human rights and even less according to traditional Confucian thinking. A more likely explanation for such strong emphasis on this relatively modern concept is China’s recent history of foreign state interventions and occupations.

Many of those who felt that it was not fully moral to use force to help others instead believed such interventions were immoral but necessary. This perception of necessity likely reflects the recognition of a moral obligation to help in such dire circumstances since there was no potential for the respondent’s state to receive any real material benefit. Thus, the majority of respondents felt that both the violation of sovereignty and the obligation to help those who

are severely suffering were moral issues. As a result, the strong support for using force to help others despite the non-Confucian but moral and pragmatic influence of state sovereignty demonstrated beliefs consistent with the Confucian concern for others and virtues such as humanness. At the same time, the highly-situational aspect of Confucian virtue as well as its emphasis on integrity make the recognition of moral conflicts unlikely (Kim, “Dirty Hands” 153).

This scenario has some important similarities and differences in concepts as well as response patterns to the one where “an unfriendly country becomes more threatening because it invaded a” neighboring country. There was significantly stronger belief that it is moral to help a wrongfully invaded country that requests it (67%/66%) than a more proximate invaded country that did not ask for help (35%/36%). There was also greater overall acceptability to do so (93%/93% vs 76%/73%).

Stronger support for a war in defense of others than in self-defense was unexpected based upon China’s principled and pragmatic strong dislike of interventions by third party states and its sensitivity to most any threat. It is not likely that this was because the wording “when a small country that is *wrongfully* invaded by a stronger country” more clearly conveyed the righteousness of an intervention because the other scenario also uses the verb “invaded” – which implies wrongful behavior. Similarly, respondents may have been more sympathetic to a *smaller* country invaded by a “*stronger*” one except that Confucianism doesn’t strongly consider power disparities when evaluating morality. Though not grounded in Confucianism, there is some anecdotal evidence that Chinese hierarchical thinking tends to reflect the opposite where “might makes right” and this benefits China as it is the large country in the region.

Confucian ideals would also more likely lead to a strong moral obligation for a punitive expedition to stop massive human rights violations in another country than to assist a country

that was invaded. Yet the moral support for an intervention to stop massive human rights abuses was similar as for countering an unfriendly country that invaded a neighboring country. This further suggests that respondents assign state sovereignty significant moral value.

State sovereignty may have had a notable moral component that was not quickly altered by self-interest but the sanctity of non-interference was consistently trumped by it. This was further seen by the fact that a clear, urgent humanitarian intervention by the respondent's country was less acceptable than a war to pursue economic, security, etc. national interests (27% vs 19% said "not okay for this reason") and was about the same for foreign countries (24% vs 25%) – though the intervention was more moral (39%/37% vs 14%/19%). In contrast, the morality of providing requested help to the country wrongfully invaded was almost the equivalent as in self-defense when "there is clear evidence that an attack is imminent" (67%/66% vs 69%/74%).

Respondents were also asked the more general question, "Primarily, war should be avoided because it" either "causes too much suffering and harm for everyone involved" or because it "is not an effective way for a country to pursue its interests and goals." Contradicting the clear readiness of respondents to recommend using force, a very strong majority (84%/83%) said it was because of the suffering and harm, 13%/14% said war was bad because of the realist amoral reasoning that it was ineffective (13%/14%), and 3% said "Other." The distribution of responses did not differ between versions ($p=.78$).

These responses could suggest that most respondents saw force as effective but it also could have been that they felt it was generally ineffective but the suffering and harm were more important drawbacks. There were several reasons why the first explanation was more likely.

For one, respondents who were against war because of the suffering it creates were more supportive of using force in defense of other states already experiencing armed conflict

than those who felt that war is an ineffective tool for resolving such problems ($p=.0002/<.0001$). This implies that force was seen as harmful but effective. This was also coherent with the belief that creating some additional suffering by such a use of force is counterbalanced by the fact that, especially since the country is already experiencing armed conflict, the predicted results of doing so could outweigh the results of taking no action. Yet, the lower support from those concerned about the efficacy of force is also coherent with the belief that the ineffective use of force would not improve conditions but instead would only create more harm. Thus, it could be argued that the disinclination to use force for either reason derived from Confucian moral thinking rather than from pragmatic realism.

However, those who felt that using force was ineffective were more permissive than those thinking about the suffering of war to let foreign states persist in such folly as they pleased. They were clearly less concerned about the unnecessary harm other states may create in their unproductive efforts for self-defense. Additionally, there was no correlation between those who felt that their state should avoid war because it unnecessarily created substantial suffering and destruction and how they assessed the permissibility of going to war ($p=.013/.80$). In other words, that war is generally ineffective made it no more or less permissible to be used in defense of their own country. This was not consistent with a Confucian moral position that it was the harm caused by the ineffectiveness of using force which makes it an undesirable act.

The scenarios with the lowest support for using force still had 75% of respondents endorsing foreign states going to war⁴⁹ and 73% for their own state.⁵⁰ This overall strong proclivity – and the implied belief that force is an effective tool for achieving goals - provided a strong case that Confucian beliefs did not influence strategic preferences. Individual

⁴⁹ When most effective for pursuing national interests and when enemy is rapidly building military

⁵⁰ To stop massive human rights violations

responses and CFA models further revealed that the use of force in self-defense was considered more permissible and more moral for their own state than for foreign states ($p=.002$). This disparity was increasingly true as the immediacy/severity of the implied threat increased. However, those with realist beliefs – likely due to recognizing that structural conditions affected the role of morality in politics the same for all states – saw the necessity of immoral uses of force as more equally legitimate for all states.

H4: Confucianism does not influence how force should be and can be used.

MORAL IDEALS

Evaluating the moral permissibility of many behaviors in war based upon whether doing this harm would bring about a better end than doing nothing or by whether this harm violates certain moral imperatives would result in opposite conclusions.⁵¹ Even acts thought to be immoral may still be acceptable if deemed necessary due to the severity of the situation. However, the use of force for any of these reasons would look exactly the same to an outside observer. That is why characterizing the moral content of observed behavior requires knowing which method of moral reasoning was used in the decision-making process and whether morality mattered at all.

A general sense of whether respondents evaluated morality based upon the ends or means was established by asking “If it does not change who actually wins the war, do you believe it is better to have” a quick but unrestrained or a longer but more restrained war? The majority of respondents felt that there was less overall harm done by ending the war quickly (58%/61%) rather than by limiting the day-to-day suffering and destruction of violent conflict (42%/39%). Yet, not only was there greater support that the ends morally justified the means for the respondent’s own state than for foreign states ($p=.05$) but, in fact, there was little-to-no

⁵¹ Virtue ethics varies depending upon subjective belief about which option would better express the ideal character of the actor.

relationship between how respondents of both versions answered this question and their composite score for moral tactics in war - which hinged on the same issue.⁵²

Ethical reasoning about when it is acceptable to harm noncombatants in order to weaken the enemy was examined in more detail by asking respondents about the morality of using anti-personnel mines, of depriving civilians of basic necessities, and of attacking enemy combatants in towns. Composite scores of .26/.30 indicated widespread belief that the military advantages from these tactics did not justify the harms they would likely inflict. The composite reliabilities for these scales were a very respectable .65/.63 and their *n*'s were 1819/1659. The top three composite scores for each version are displayed in Table 12 below.

Table 12 – Jus in Bello Scale Top 3 Reference

Version 1	Attack Villages	Landmines	Deny Civilians
0	Strongly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral
.11	Strongly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral
.333	Mildly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral
Version 2			
0	Strongly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral
.131	Strongly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral	Strongly Never Moral
.333	Mildly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral	Mildly Never Moral

Testing the permissibility of directly targeting noncombatants, a small 9%/10% of respondents felt that it was morally okay for soldiers and fighters to intentionally deprive “an innocent civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy” while the strong majority (84%/81%) said this was unacceptable. This was consistent with deontological and Confucian ethics. However, respondents felt more strongly that this was immoral for foreign countries to do and were more conflicted about whether their own country could (6% unsure for foreign countries vs 9% for own) ($p < .0001$).

⁵² The latent factor significantly loaded on this variable for Version 1 CFA model but only accounted for 2% of observed variation ($p < .0001$). The loading was insignificant for Version 2 CFA model ($p = .19$).

Testing the moral implications of intentionality (and the deontological Doctrine of Double Effect, or DDE) respondents were also asked whether “enemy soldiers in populated villages or towns [may] be attacked in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many innocent civilians would be killed.” The majority felt this was also immoral (73%/71%) though the decreased intentionality to harm noncombatants compared to withholding life-sustaining supplies did correspond to it being seen as more morally acceptable (19%/18%). It also caused greater uncertainty (8%/11%) – especially for those considering the behavior of their own military ($p=.04$).

The majority of respondents also felt that it was immoral to plant “landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatants even though innocent civilians may step on them accidentally” (55%/47%). This question had the least amount of intentionality to harm innocents of all three acts as well as the most support for being morally acceptable behavior in war (31%/36%). It also had the highest rates of uncertainty (14%/18%) and the strongest bias between versions ($p=<.0001$).

These patterns of responses as well as CFA models showed that many respondents considered it immoral to harm innocents even when it would weaken the enemy. The importance of moral principles and intentionality compared to the importance of the predicted results of behavior was consistent with deontological and virtue ethical theories as well as with Confucianism. Yet, this is contradicted by the fact that deontological considerations were much more inviolable for other states than for the respondents’ ($p=<.0001$) and/or what is virtuous in the same situation varies upon the agent (aka self-interest). Also, as seen with *jus ad bellum* beliefs, bias from state self-interest increased as the morality of the example became more difficult to evaluate.

MORAL CONVICTION

The ultimate test of the role of morality is whether it constrains from doing what is considered most effective when the two conflict. The survey measured moral conviction by testing how proportionality, reciprocity, just cause, and supreme emergency changed the permissibility of the aforementioned three behaviors in war. Respondents were asked if these considerations changed their mind about the use of the immoral tactics. The answers choices for all four questions were “No Change,” there is now “no problem at all doing some of these things,” it is now sufficiently necessary so “although it is still against my moral beliefs, some of these actions may be done because of the exceptional circumstances,” and the recognition of Dirty Hands where, “although it would have been better to avoid doing some of these actions, the new circumstances make doing some of them morally okay.”

Composite scores of .37/.38 indicated that respondents were not strongly constrained by morality but also not quick to change their moral beliefs about harming civilians as convenient. These scales had strong composite reliabilities of .78/.79 and *n*'s of 2291/2284. Details about the top three scores for each version are reported in Table 13 below.

Table 13 – Moral Conviction Scale Top 3 Reference

Version 1	Already Been Attacked	Other Side Did Acts First	Enemy Goal is Total Destruction	Determines Outcome of Battle
0	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
.333	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok
.041	No Change	No Change	Immoral but Ok	No Change
Version 2	Already Been Attacked	Other Side Did Acts First	Enemy Goal is Total Destruction	Determines Outcome of Battle
0	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
.048	No Change	No Change	Immoral but Ok	No Change
.333	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok	Immoral but Ok

Earlier, the results for the *jus ad bellum* scenarios showed that Just Cause was an important consideration for the morality of going to war. As discussed in Chapter Two, some scholars have suggested that Confucianism holds that a war started for the just cause of creating

a harmonious society under China's moral governance means it is moral to use whatever tactics are necessary to bring about this improved situation as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the Confucian virtues of *ren* and *li* would discourage inflicting unnecessary harm on one's own military, general population, and those of the enemy as well. These competing interpretations were further tested by asking if the permissibility of the three acts in war changed when "the other country physically attacked first."

Slightly over a third of respondents felt that even such a clear case of self-defense did not justify immoral behavior (36%/37%), about another third now believed that at least one of the acts could be done out of necessity but remained immoral (38%/34%), 19%/21% found doing the immoral act(s) regrettable but morally permissible, and 7%/8% felt the act(s) became morally acceptable. Although being the clear victim of another state's violent aggression did not convince most that it was now totally moral to harm civilians in order to weaken the enemy, it did convince many that immoral acts were necessary and even partially moral. There was no major difference in views between survey versions ($p=.60$).

The small portion of the increased support that came from those who felt the immoral tactics were now more moral (7%/8% said it was now totally moral to do them; 19%/21% said that it was now somewhat moral) did not demonstrate strong agreement that most any tactics are permitted once the righteousness of the war has been established. It also did not reflect the moral conviction of a punitive expedition or Confucian virtue ethics, more generally. Those who felt harming noncombatants was now partially moral plus the substantial 38%/34% who felt it was now immoral but acceptable to do so instead indicated recognition that having been attacked was not sufficiently severe to negate the immorality of harming innocents but it did hesitantly permit such acts.

This pattern of responses did not reflect the deontological belief that rights are absolute rather than contingent on proper behavior. The observed weakening of the enemy's right to

basic deontological protections did show the greater relative importance of the ends over the means. However, the small resulting increase in morality and the small additional military advantage of using the immoral tactics compared to the increased harms of doing so suggested that the shift in acceptability also did not derive from the teleological *jus in bello* notion of proportionality. The moderate change in views of most respondents most likely reflected the conflict between the righteousness that comes from a clear motive of self-defense and the unavoidable and unvirtuous accompanying increase in harm inflicted.

Reciprocity is a fundamental component of Confucian and Western morality but can be a pragmatic motivation as well. The moral power of negative reciprocity was seen from both the 23%/24% who felt that it became somewhat morally acceptable to do the acts “if the other side started violating these limits first” and the 8%/8% who felt that such behavior made the immoral acts completely moral. The 36%/33% who said that it was immoral but necessary to respond in kind saw reciprocity as an amoral pragmatic issue. The immoral behavior of the other state did not outweigh the moral conviction of the remaining approximate third of respondents (33%/35%). The responses, overall, showed that the transgressions of the enemy had greater influence on permissibility of harming innocents than a clear just cause. Interestingly, the legitimacy of reciprocity, a notion based upon justice *qua* fairness, did not differ between those thinking of their own state and those thinking of foreign ones ($p=.80$).

The results did not reflect strong respect for reciprocity as defined by Confucius in *Analects* 15.24, “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” Still, reciprocity had a larger effect on making immoral acts more moral than when the other country attacked first, indicating that *jus in bello* considerations have somewhat greater influence than *jus ad bellum* ones for what constitutes moral behavior in war. On the other hand, most of those who changed their mind about the permissibility of immoral tactics tended to see this as a pragmatic necessity.

This reflected a high sensitivity to threat and contradicted the Confucian stance that there is greater moral and/or pragmatic benefit to limiting the harms of war on civilians. Without the benefit of incentivizing the other side from escalating to additional harms, the albeit small military advantage (efficacy) from the immoral tactics took priority. Again, moral factors such as deontological noncombatant immunity, teleological consideration of proportionality, and the embodiment of humaneness and compassion were clearly not important enough to constrain seeking amoral small tactical advantages due to the additional suffering and harm they would inflict.

When told that the immoral tactics would make the difference between losing and winning a battle, 38%/35% said this would not change their mind, 33%/34% felt that the acts were now “immoral but permitted due to exceptional circumstances,” 20%/21% felt the improved proportionality made the acts “partially moral,” and 9%/10% felt there was now “no moral problem” doing them. The difference between the distributions of responses had a borderline p value of .06 (again, this study used a significance of $\leq .05$).

The most popular single response to this question was that there was no change in permissibility for the three acts but the overall majority felt the immoral acts could now be done. Thus, as seen with the other questions about moral conviction, morality largely did not constrain behavior but fundamental beliefs about harming innocents were also not readily redefined according to what was most convenient. Again, favorable consequences were more important than limiting the harms of war but, contrary to teleological proportionality and the defining role of motive in Confucian virtue ethics, it did not become significantly more moral even when done for the right reasons.

The accuracy of this finding, that of the survey questionnaire, and evidence of some degree of consistency in actual moral reasoning was further supported by the fact that CFA

showed strong coherence between how respondents weighed the teleological *jus in bello* principle of proportionality and the deontological principle of discrimination in this question and how they did so for the other survey questions that also centered on “ends versus means.”

When told that “the enemy’s goal is not just victory but total destruction of the country,” the majority of respondents felt that “there now is no problem at all doing some of these things” (38%/41%), 22%/20% did not change their mind, another 22%/20% felt that the acts remained immoral but could be done “due to exceptional circumstances,” and 18%/19% said that “although it would have been better to avoid doing some of these actions, the new circumstances make doing some of them morally okay.”

Of the four questions about moral conviction, this one resulted in the greatest change in the assessed morality as well as the overall permissibility of the acts. Though this use of force could, at a stretch, be considered a last resort for self-defense, which would be consistent with Confucian beliefs, the intentional harming of innocent people in exchange for the small increase in military advantage from doing any of these tactics would not be.

Furthermore, stating that the intent of the enemy was total destruction of the other country has no implications regarding the enemy’s probability of success. Increased severity of the enemy’s goals rather than increased severity of the threat they pose does not qualify as a true “supreme emergency.” The readiness which respondents still ignored or altered the moral beliefs in these scenarios thus demonstrated their high sensitivity to even superficial perceptions of threat.

These results further showed that, as was seen with the assessed permissibility of going to war, the moral standards for the respondents’ state and for foreign states to use force became increasingly partial and subjective as the immediacy/severity of the implied threat increased

($p=.01$). Such findings cast further doubt that Confucian virtues such as reciprocity, humaneness, and acting as the moral example truly influence the use of force.

There was, overall, little evidence of moral conviction. A total 64%/63% of respondents would permit previously-considered immoral acts when it was a clear case of self-defense, 67%/65% when the other side started doing the act(s) first, 62%/65% when it determined the outcome of a battle, and 78%/80% when the enemy's goal was total destruction. Composite scale scores also showed that respondents felt that their own state had significantly greater permissibility to do these immoral acts than foreign states ($p<.0001$). Clearly, moral ideals did not strongly constrain behavior in war, yet, at the same time, most did not consider morality in war wholly inapplicable - there was still an irreducible moral remainder - or "Dirty Hands." Such fine grained *post hoc* analysis – and even the ideal of Dirty Hands - is not expected from Confucianism which, as a virtue ethic, determines morality based upon holistic assessment of the overall situation (motive and result) (Kim, "Dirty Hands" 153-154).

The role of Confucianism was tested by examining not only whether beliefs and behavior remained consistent with moral ideals when this would be at the detriment of self-interest but also when the only reason to do so would be because it was the right thing to do. Morality according to virtue ethics, especially, requires doing what best expresses virtuous character regardless of whether this would also have material rewards. Especially since China is the third largest seller of weapons in the world and does not release full details of its deals, this was examined by asking, "When considering selling weapons to other countries or fighters, how much moral responsibility should *foreign countries/your country* have for considering how these weapons may be used?" (Lynch; Mizokami; SIPRI).

Almost half of respondents (46%/48%) said that "it is morally okay to sell weapons only to those who you strongly believe will use them only in ways in which you morally agree"

31%/25% believed “It is never morally okay to sell weapons because you would become at least partially responsible for the resulting death and suffering,” 17%/20% selected “It is morally okay to sell weapons to your allies and others who share common national interests,” 5%/6% said “Business is business so even if the weapons are used in a morally wrong way, the seller has no moral responsibility,” and no more than 1%/1% felt that “It is morally okay to sell to anyone who is willing to buy.”

The comparatively greater importance of the “means,” the strong influence of intentionality, and the lesser weight of common end goals seen from the results of this question were more consistent with deontological moral reasoning than teleological. Strong overall approval for enabling the expansion of violence in the world - and making a profit doing so - were not remarkably consistent with Confucian virtues though. Even more so since the answer choice which accepts partial responsibility for the harms done from selling weapons to others was where there was the largest difference between the standards for foreign countries and the respondents own country ($p=.0005$).

H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.

The Confucian worldview and the Confucian conception of moral governance are based upon a common framework of coherent moral principles. Political realist theory similarly posits there to be a direct, rational relationship between how the world is believed to operate and the appropriate role of morality in state behavior. Indeed, correlations between respondents’ composite scale scores indicated there was a meaningful relationship between fundamental beliefs and how they were interpreted and applied to international relations. Professed beliefs did influence preferences - but only very moderately.

The extent to which respondent’s saw the world as a collaborative idealist Confucian environment moderately influenced their beliefs about the permissibility of going to war

(standardized factor loading scores of .27/.26). The respondent's worldview had a substantial effect on whether, *in principle*, it was morally acceptable to harm innocents to achieve military objectives (.38/.41) but had substantially less impact on whether such moral ideals should actually constrain behavior (.14/.20). The morality of prioritizing the ends over the means as well as the importance of not violating moral ideals were more strongly influenced by how dangerous the world was perceived to be for the respondents' own country while these standards were stricter and more objective for foreign states. Stronger consideration of context for what the respondents' own state could do resulted in greater permissibility to use force because these respondents viewed the world as more competitive, zero sum, and dangerous.

Whether respondents prioritized weighing the ends or the means to determine what was morally acceptable moderately affected how readily they would abandon moral concern in favor of other considerations (.29/.25). So, even strong beliefs about what was moral to do in war inevitably exerted fairly modest influence on decisions about what could actually be done. Confucian values were more likely to influence moral ideals about war but did not strongly influence the actual use of force.

Beliefs about when the anticipated benefits of going to war warranted the accompanying suffering and destruction did not strongly predict beliefs about when the expected benefits of certain tactics in war warranted its accompanying suffering and destruction (.22/.17). The extent to which respondents felt that going to war would be immoral because the benefits would not justify the (intentional) harm to noncombatants only somewhat related to whether they felt that the morality of tactics in war was defined by the degree and intentionality of suffering that it would inflict on noncombatants. Put another way, whether there was a Just Cause to go to war had less impact on what was morally justified for the respondent's state to do in war while what foreign countries may do in war depended more upon whether the war, itself, was moral.

Respondents were inconsistent and incoherent in the interpretation and application of other, related moral beliefs. How strongly respondents believed that it was immoral to harm noncombatants in war had very little influence on how acceptable they believed it was to start a war that would inevitably also harm noncombatants (.14/.03). Again, these related issues were seen to be more strongly related for the more normative and impartial case of what foreign states should do.

DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE FINDINGS

Findings supported Johnston's assessment that the Chinese tended to view warfare, "as a relatively constant element in human interaction, stakes in conflict with the adversary are viewed in zero-sum terms, and pure violence is highly efficacious for dealing with threats that the enemy is predisposed to make" (Johnston, "Cultural Realism" 30). Respondents also showed a strong preference for offensive force, for prioritizing the ends over the means, for disregarding the immorality of unnecessarily harming combatants and civilians, and for believing these were necessary and legitimate (though not always moral) for self-defense.

While the correlation and causal relationships between these issues were found to be nontrivial, perceptions of the international system and state behavior in it explained only a small amount of respondents' beliefs (responses) about the use of force. This was true regardless of whether assumptions and beliefs more closely resembled Confucianism or realism. The two most logical questions from these findings are "what caused this divergence?" and "what would make the Confucian model more accurate?"

As previously discussed, the standard process for the development of international relations/foreign policy theory generally starts "with qualitative methods to build an initial theoretical framework and then using the quantitative methods to test and extend that theory" (Shah and Corley 1831; Creswell 55). This study follows the common practice that "in

quantitative studies, one uses theory deductively and places it toward the beginning of the proposal for a study. With the objective of testing or verifying a theory rather than developing it, the researcher advances a theory, collects data to test it, and reflects on its confirmation or disconfirmation by the results” (Creswell 55). Accordingly, whereas “qualitative methodologies are inductive, that is, oriented toward discovery and process,” this quantitative study uses “deductive logic with precise empirical observations of individual behavior in order to discover and confirm a set of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human activity” (Tuli 99-100).

As the goal of this study was to confirm (or disconfirm) the influence of the Confucianism rather than to explore and identify unexpected factors potentially relevant to development or refinement of it as an international relations theory, Confucianism was treated as an *a priori* hypothesis/theory and its framework of causal axioms was intentionally kept the same as what was used by prior studies (Hurley et al. 672-673). This is also why Confirmatory Factor Analysis/SEM (CFA) was the primary method of investigation instead of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). The implications of the results are relevant to the political realist model as well because both theories use the same metrics and are based upon the same premise of rational choice - though any insights into the accuracy of the realist model should be considered informal as the study did not specifically test realist theory.

The CFA methodology quantifies the relationships between the concepts which constitute Confucian theory. The causal analysis CFA technique of SEM was used because “research...based upon case studies of historical events...often don’t provide the insights key for determining which, if any, of the potential factors might have been responsible” (Mercer 87-88). Correlation shows which issues are conceptually related to one another for respondents while causation shows which issues influence the decision-making process. These identify the issues which, in principle, are related, relevant, coherent, and consistent but, in reality, are not

an important component of foreign policy reasoning. Existing theory can be refined based upon the clarification of where inductive exploration has misinterpreted coincidence as correlation and where it has mistakenly assigned causation when there was only correlation. However, this process of “eliminating” superfluous issues does not provide any additional context about what other unidentified and not obviously-related factors might be involved.

More specifically, Confucian and realist IR theory assume that the issues most relevant to shaping strategic preferences and reasoning about the use of force are beliefs about the inevitability and efficacy of war as well as whether state relations are zero-sum. Results showed that these issues were conceptually related to one another and to overall worldviews for many respondents but beliefs about each one was more strongly shaped by other, unrelated considerations. However, precise quantification of the strength of the relationships between constituent issues does not provide suggestions for what else may have contributed to beliefs about whether international relations are zero-sum, violent, anarchic, and based upon power; whether it is better to compete or cooperate with compromises; and whether force is necessary and effective for pursuing state interests.

The respectable correlation but low causation between views of international relations and the use of force functioned similarly. Respondents generally felt that the world is zero-sum, highly prone to violence, and war was undesirable but often necessary. Their general proclivity to resort to war to counter most any threat – and also when it appeared to be the best way to pursue material benefits - despite such uses of force still having been seen as immoral but necessary was consistent with their expressed worldview. The connection between beliefs and preferences was also consistent with the axioms that define the theory of Confucian strategic culture but the low causality between them meant that the first did not very well explain the second. Especially since these findings did not eliminate any theorized issues of

consideration to narrow down the possible causes, they also did not provide any insights into potential reasons for the divergence.

While it is possible to broadly speculate about possible additional issues, the careful selection, control, and measuring of factors and sources of errors necessary to ensure statistical rigor meant that any post hoc discovery of potential influences should be noted for future study but they are neither valid as-is nor should the same dataset be used to validate them (George and Bennett 21, 34-35). One reason is that such “data dredging” or “data mining” increases the potential for inaccurate findings due to Type I errors such as spurious relationships, confirmation bias, selection bias, and chance (Hurley et al. 677).

Broadly speaking, the most likely reasons for the small causal relationships between assumptions and preferences were that respondents were inconsistent in how they considered foreign policy and war or that the axioms of the established Confucian model captured only some of the actual influential considerations. The most relevant indications from statistical analysis did not reveal any additional potentially-meaningful common factors nor did the error terms of the four tested factors show any unexplained, substantial covariance (relationships) that might indicate one. This roughly suggested there were no additional issues or considerations which substantially influenced overall or specific beliefs. On the other hand, irrational reasoning or decisions should lead to weak rather than the observed reasonably strong correlations between factors and between factors and variables.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES

The small influence of worldviews on preferences and behavior may have been, in part, due to the Confucian strategic culture model’s level of analysis. SEM latent factors are a conceptual depiction of the theoretical components of the rational decision-making process regarding the use of force. The variables, measures, and overall model design were based upon

the assumption that, though there are many potential confounding factors, rational states seek to identify and enact the option that minimizes risks and maximizes its interests – which, according to political realist theory is, ultimately, power or at least security (relative power) (Alden and Aran 30-31; Mintz and DeRouen 57-58; Morgenthau 4-15). As discussed in Chapter Three, strategic culture addresses one possible confounding influence by acting as a “lens” that helps explain how the decision to use force could be rational despite it appearing to be contrary to the best way according to political realist assumptions to pursue security (Scobell “Real Strategic Culture” 213). In this way, Confucian theory functions – and can be tested - according to the same “rules” of rational choice as political realism.

For example, prior studies point to the Confucian belief that war is less effective than harmony for promoting the near-universal development of virtuous character to explain how it could be rational to not use force when it is the most effective means to achieve political goals. In the same way, the high sensitivity to threats that may have derived from China’s long history of frequent conflicts may contribute to its belief that aggressive force in self-defense is required to counter most any contemporary danger and so is consistent with Confucianism (Scobell “Real Strategic Culture” 214-215).

International relations theories may differ in their key assumptions as well as derivative beliefs, preferences, and desired goals but, in order to be rational, the components of the theory must be coherent and consistent with one another. Similarly, rational decisions must show coherence between beliefs and “the desirability (or utility) of the outcome” (goals); they must be consistent with the ranking of preferences and with prior decisions; and they “rests on logic and adheres to the principles of statistical inference” (Mercer 80-81; Mintz and DeRouen 58). As a result, Confucianism and realism both function as normative theories because they represent how a perfectly rational decision ought to lead to selecting the best option to achieve the most logical goal.

The requirements for rationality and the assumption that Confucian and realist decision-making desire to follow them establish a conceptual connection so that observed behavior can be traced back to identify the operable preferences and beliefs (Mercer 85). Doing so allows the models to be tested against empirical evidence where the beliefs and preferences serve as falsifiable rules. Based upon this presumed relationship, prior studies have inferred whether motives and intentions come from Confucian beliefs and assumptions by looking at how consistent observed behavior is with these abstract norms. Demonstrated inconsistencies help locate which issues which were the likely the source of divergence but no additional context is provided to assist understanding what caused the difference in thinking.

Just as how realist assumptions did not strongly determine the preferences and decisions of those who demonstrated strongly non-Confucian beliefs, there was little evidence that sensitivity to threat had a strong deterministic role in the decisions of those who expressed Confucian worldviews. Similarly, there was clear evidence that war was seen as undesirable but likely, often necessary, and an effective means of dealing with threats though this was not substantially responsible for the observed proclivity to use it (Johnston, "Thinking about SC" 46-48). This suggested that the defining psychological factors of the strategic cultural lens were less influential sources of cognitive bias than assumed.

Reported results of respectable correlation but low causation from the strategic culture considerations may have been due, in part, to inherent theoretical constraints of testing Confucianism according to the assumptions of strategic culture theory. Evaluating the rationality of real world decisions that deviate from realist assumptions requires a comprehensive, alternate paradigm comprised of falsifiable, internally-consistent metrics. Studies of psychological influences on decision-making have found that "cognitive predispositions or mindsets," generally conforming to theory, have greater influence on perception than the relevant information (Levy 9). So, like realist theory, the concept of

strategic culture accordingly presumes that there exists only one rational decision for any situation and that following what is theoretically logical will always and exclusively reveal the best approach to achieving predetermined, theory-specific goals (Levy 5-9). The paradigm's underlying rationale also includes the assumption that the desire for coherency and for adherence to objective standards is universal, sufficient, and effective at limiting options and guiding judgments (Mercer 81). These assumptions establish a direct cause-effect relationship between the means from the ends so that theoretical beliefs and cognitive ideals function as testable injunctive norms (Mercer 80-86; Morgenthau 4-15).

In order to preserve the falsifiability and applicability of an agent-agnostic theory that selectively considers contextual bias, the cognitive factors of strategic culture are assumed to operate at the cultural-organizational level and are the only legitimate sources of subjective influence on impartial reasoning (Lantis 92-95). The result is that "culture is best understood as a supplement to and not a substitute for, realist theories of strategic choice. Strategic culture can certainly help to explain 'deviations' from balancing behavior, but since the very concept of such deviations presumes some sort of appropriate or expected response to international conditions, it is only within a realist framework that such explanations make any sense" (Dueck 20). In other words, strategic culture "solves the problem" of how realist theory didn't explain some behavior by incorporating cultural-psychological factors to "correct" the source of "irrational processes that resulted in mistaken judgments" (Mercer 77-78).

Altering the definition of rationality according to strategic culture makes it inherently different than that from political realist theory as it normalizes but keeps distinct the logic of a specific kind of irrationality. Normative assumptions, preferences, and goals still serve as prescriptive "rules and standards" but the influence of psychological factors is ultimately deemed irrational (Mercer 80-81). Thus, incorporating the concepts of strategic culture

circumvents the need to investigate the reason for some inconsistencies but fails to truly reconcile them either.

Though this method provides little information that can help refine the metrics for what qualifies as a rational choice, it creates favorable conditions for case study research (Levy 8). The assumptions of strategic culture allow the researcher to assess the rationality of decisions inconsistent with realism by logically inferring from historical evidence the actual and normative beliefs and preferences as well as what and how factors ought to and actually shape them (Levy 7-9). For example, inductive reasoning has been used to establish that perception of threat is an important causal factor, to create the standards for determining whether the effects of perception were rational, and to characterize the actual perception of threat of a given population.

As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett concluded, such “highly general and abstract theories (“covering law,” in Carl Hempel’s term), which set aside intervening processes and focus on correlations between the “start” and the “finish” of a phenomenon, are too general to make sharp theoretical predictions or to guide policy” (George and Bennett 7). These limitations combined with the assumptions of strategic culture theory mean that anything not explained by realist assumptions, moderated by how a specific culture may perceive the character of the international system and the efficacy of force, is irrational. The reasonable consistency but low causation seen in this study’s results suggest otherwise. Just as how strategic culture theory rationalizes the effects of differences in certain perceptions, it is possible that other instances of divergence from theoretical assumptions, rather than caused by erroneous logic, could be due to issues not considered during analysis. The self-sufficiency and organizational-level of analysis of the Confucian model, necessary for coherence, parsimony, and applicability/utility, may be a reason for the disconnect between respondents’ stated worldviews, preferences, and decisions (Alden and Aran 31; Levy 2).

Determining whether reasoning was to blame depends upon how the situation was perceived and judged (Johnson 11-14). In other words, how sense was made of the situation and how this information was evaluated in order to make decisions or form opinions. Yet, as Jervis says, “it is hard to know what a person’s perceptions were and even harder to know whether they were correct” – especially if this is done by examining historical evidence (qtd. in Mercer 88). The assumption of strategic culture theory that perceptions are either culturally monolithic or irrelevant makes this even more difficult.

This study avoided many of these unknowns by carefully controlling perceptions of the issues addressed by strategic culture theory. Even with known perceptions that can be evaluated for accuracy, numerous studies have shown that, contrary to the assumption of rational choice theories, “most people, most of the time, do not provide the normatively correct answers” (Mercer 87). Common sources of “errors and mistakes” uncovered by political psychology research include “the need for cognitive consistency, improper assimilation of new data to old beliefs, the desire to avoid value trade-offs, groupthink, idiosyncratic schemas, motivated or emotional bias, reliance on heuristics because of cognitive limitations, incorrect use of analogies, the framing of information, feelings of shame and humiliation, or a miserable childhood” (Mercer 87-88; Mintz and DeRouen 97-98). While determining the reason why decisions diverged from what was “normatively correct” in the controlled lab environment has been quite successful, it is difficult to extend “this approach to study decision making in international politics” (Mercer 87-88). This is because, as Mercer argues, “discovering the correct error is difficult in an uncontrolled field setting when so many errors are possible” (Mercer 88).

It is possible that error or bias could have caused thinking to stray from logical consideration of objective, prescriptive norms yet led to conclusions similar to those from objective reasoning. This would account for the observed correlation with low causation seen

in the study results. Though not perfect, the use of a survey rather than case studies improved the ability to reduce many of the likely sources of cognitive bias as well as of incorrect perceptions. The good correlation between beliefs, preferences, and decisions indicated these were not a problem and SEM's precise quantification of errors did not detect the presence of any other significant sources of bias or error.

Rather than there being widespread misperceptions or poor judgment, it could be that respondents' reasoning deceptively appeared irrational due to the assumptions of the established Confucian strategic culture model. Johnston's separation of strategic culture from behavior creates a falsifiable cause and effect relationship, tested according to how well paradigmatic Confucian assumptions "fit," or explain, the historical behavior. This process is well suited to "identify the difference between the normative answer and the actual answer as a reasoning bias needing explanation" (Mercer 87-88). Especially using statistical analysis in the carefully controlled survey environment, it can also identify from which prescriptive belief(s) the decision departed. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the use of theoretical axioms as causal factors and the prescriptive norms derived from them as constraining rules theoretically renders it unnecessary to consider that other issues - such as the complexity, nuance, and uncertainty of actual security concerns and the diversity of human reasoning - may have affected beliefs/assumptions, reasoning, and decision-making (Johnson 8-11; Johnston, "Thinking about SC" 48). When used to deductively test the validity of an established theory, this analytical procedure is of little help for determining what, if any, other factors had significant influence.

The viability of this context-free, rational choice, cultural-level model includes the assumption that reasoning will be clear-headed cost-benefit analysis based upon utility, and that this leads to only one goal and one "best" option to achieve it (Levy 5; Mercer 80-84). This is particularly problematic for judging the rationality of Confucian-guided decisions because

the virtuousness of motive is not based upon such context-free calculations of pragmatic efficacy. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, there is substantial flexibility for how Confucian beliefs and assumptions can be legitimately weighed, interpreted, and applied (Mercer 88-89). Though certainly true when operating in the realm of norms and theory, such variance is more likely to happen - and is more insightful - when applied to real situations.

These assumptions and their limitations have led to criticisms that Johnston's paradigm evaluates actual decisions according to how the "mind works in relation to the way it ought to work" rather than how "the mind works in relation to the way the world works" (Mercer 80-81). One such critic, Colin Gray, argues that the concept of strategic culture ought to account for the fact that "all strategic, operational, and tactical behaviour is 'done' by people and organisations that have been encultured supranational, nationally, or sub-nationally" (Gray 56). In other words, the assumptions and perceptions encapsulated in a strategic culture shape beliefs about both the process and the ends.

Though Gray concedes that his conception is not falsifiable because strategic culture can't be separated as an independent variable with behavior as a dependent one, he, indeed, counters that Johnston's positivist interpretation is too strong because "the idea of strategic culture does not imply that there is a simple one-for-one relationship between culturally traceable preferences and actual operational choices" (Gray 52-55). In other words, strategic culture doesn't simply mean that culturally-determined prescriptive norms will be directly applied to any situation where force is being considered. Instead, culturally-influenced consideration of the actual situation will also modify how this is done.⁵³ Therefore, at least

⁵³ Gray discusses the major British participation in the continental aspect of WWI despite having "an overwhelmingly maritime strategic culture" and US participation in coalitions despite having a strategic culture that emphasizes isolation and unilateralism to demonstrate the importance of including consideration of actual behavior rather than using it as the dependent variable. He sums that "when a preponderantly maritime culture commits to continental warfare on the largest of scales, or when an isolationist culture becomes a partner in coalition-style strategic ventures, the stamp of those basic moulds will be seen in the ways behaviour is adapted to the practical needs of the uncharacteristic roles" (Gray 59).

some decisions which appeared “irrational” according to normative expectations were likely believed to be rational by a decider who also took into account the specific issue at hand.

Ignoring potential influences may not only result in erroneous characterization of behavior and motive but it can also cause “attribution error” - where the wrong factor is believed to have caused the behavior (Mercer 87). One implication is that “irrational” decisions may be considered evidence that disproves the influence of proclaimed beliefs or theory when it could be that behavior consistent with norms was not a rational means to achieve goals if contextual specifics were considered. Conversely, behavior that was consistent with the rational application of assumptions and preferences may support the applicability of that theory (and dogmatic stubbornness) but may not have been the best way to achieve goals given the actual circumstances. Indeed, the use of rational actor theories for “inferring preferences from behavior resulted in empirical and theoretical problems” to such an extent that some believe this approach is “empirically useless” (Mercer 84). 54

This study’s use of a survey questionnaire more accurately met the requirement that “assessing the rationality of a decision-making process demands that three questions be addressed: What did the actor want, believe, and do?” (Mercer 88). Survey findings offered convincing proof that direct solicitation of prescriptive and descriptive beliefs and preferences – and statistical evaluation of their causality as well as correlation to intended behavior – better avoided attribution errors and other pitfalls of inferential case study methodology.

Most of those prior studies found that observed behavior and the preferences inferred from them were inconsistent with the assumptions of the normative, context-free pacifistic Confucian model and its inferred behavior. However, Chapters Two and Three showed how Confucianism could endorse militaristic behavior that was very similar to realist predictions if

⁵⁴ Though this is a description of economic decision-making theory, “the rational actor approach of microeconomics grounds rational choice theory” (Mercer 80-85).

certain contextual factors were taken into account. The prior studies would find this problematic because, for them, the falsifiability of the Confucian paradigm depended upon its assumptions and preferences being opposite of the competing realist paradigm – and that there was a fixed relationship between them and behavior. Incorporating additional contextual influences thus risks creating “problems of “overdetermination” – when two or more sufficient and distinct causes produce the same effect – which, in turn, diminishes the attractiveness of strategic culture as a useful explanation” (Tellis 6-7).

More specifically, the survey was set up so that the primary goal, what respondents’ “wanted,” was state security. There was reasonably strong belief that the international system was unfortunately anarchic, conflict prone, and zero-sum. Respondents, accordingly, generally felt it was morally wrong but frequently necessary to counter threats through the use of force. If forced to choose which theory better explained the empirical data, as was the case with most prior studies, the overall pattern of responses in this study appeared more consistent with realist theoretical assumptions than Confucian ideals.

An advantage of quantitative deductive analysis was its ability to objectively determine that, despite responses generally reflecting non-Confucian assumptions and preferences, behavior consistently varied (correlated) according to beliefs about international relations across the entire range of worldviews. Neither theory explained the evidence better than the other. At the same time, because this methodology was also able to test causality, it found that neither the normative Confucian nor the realist paradigmatic beliefs sufficiently explained behavior. In other words, it was likely by coincidence (Type I error) that the theories seemed to provide such good explanations of actual decision-making.

Survey results provide a few other clues to help narrow down the factors which may have accounted for variations in responses. For one, the unidentified consideration(s)

extraneous to the generally-accepted Confucian and political realist theories, while important, were not contradictory to fundamental beliefs or worldviews. On the other hand, it/they also did not contribute strong moral support for war. This further indicated that, as discussed in Chapter Five, decisions about the use of force were based on a number of different issues. Supported by the fact that the unidentified factors similarly influenced those stating realist and Confucian beliefs, statistical analysis further indicated that the potential additional factor(s) likely operated at the organizational/state/cultural level. Therefore, it is worth returning to the strategic culture concept to look for possible explanations.

STRATEGIC CULTURE, NATIONALISM, EXCEPTIONALISM

A more recent study argues that the “national culture variables...that consistently have effect on security policy and that are value-laden for that culture” are “identity, values, norms, and perceptive lens” (Johnson 11). There is substantial overlap in the factors that shape these four variables but they can be logically parsed according to how they influence strategic decision-making. Values and norms are conceptions of ideals and the behavior that, through consistency and coherence, embodies them. Identity centers on “the traits of its national character, its intended regional and global roles, and its perceptions of its eventual destiny” while the perceptive lens describes beliefs about one’s national-cultural history and international image; “what motivates others;” what are true “facts;” and the “capabilities of [national] leadership” and “natural resources, and other security-related ideas” (Johnson 13). The first set are more independent and inward-facing as they are strongly shaped by one’s own culture while interpretation of the latter is more externally-relational to “the other.”

As already extensively discussed, survey results did not indicate the strong presence or influence of Confucian values such as *ren* and *yi* – they were also inconsistent with Confucian behavioral norms such as *li*, filial piety (*xiao*), and reciprocity (*shu*) (Kung and Ma 133-135; Lai 253-260). This was true even when considered in the international context, when facing

varying severities of threat, and when the situation established clear moral justification for war. One notable possible exception was that the importance of harmony and li could be interpreted as incentivizing aggressive rectification of even small threats to a Chinese-led regional order. The widespread believed immorality of using force for these reasons made these exceptions unlikely to be a strong causal factor.

Findings that the perceptive lens, as it relates to perception of threat, did exert influence on reasoning but did not sufficiently account for its observed variation has already been discussed. The aspects that were have not yet been addressed focused on beliefs about cultural history and international image. It is very likely that these issues, as well as beliefs about national identity, are strongly shaped by Confucianism (Bhattacharya 237; Guang 491; Zhang, "Exceptionalism" 308-310). They are also the major constitutive elements of Chinese nationalism.

Nationalism can be defined as "a set of beliefs emphasizing the primacy and virtues of a shared ethnic, cultural and political identity for a discrete population" (Chong 4). The moral, cultural, and material superiority of the Sino-centric Confucian model of governance led to an innate sense of entitlement and civilizational supremacy that transcended territorial boundaries (Bhattacharya 238; Vaz Pinto 214; Zhang, "Exceptionalism" 308). China defined what "civilization" was, and the enculturation of invaders and the tributary system were some of the proof (Bhattacharya 238; Vaz Pinto 214). These affirmed the superiority and centrality of the "Central Kingdom" and established a normative, bilateral system of international relations where all others were uncivilized barbarians who were treated equally and with humanness (Gong 19; Vaz Pinto 214-215; Zhang, "Exceptionalism" 308). Confucian China's moral superiority was further demonstrated by the "perception that the tribute system was economically ruinous for China, since it paid more than it received" (Vaz Pinto 215).

The strong conviction of China's preeminence came to an abrupt end with the start of the Opium Wars in 1839 and continued until the founding of modern China in 1949. "When the assumptions of that civilization and its institutions were destroyed, nationalism arose as an alternative for Chinese emotions and energy. Not surprisingly, the national expression was strong because it drew upon values and traditions that had existed continuously for over 2,000 years" (Gong 19). "Rooted in China's imperial ideology of Confucian culturalism," China's narrative of their "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West and Japan created an "emotional imperative" of reassuming "its rightful place" as a "Great Power" (Bhattacharya 235-236; Gong 19; Guang 493; Vaz Pinto 217).

China has regularly insisted that, consistent with Confucian principles, it will pursue these goals in a peaceful, "orderly," and non-expansionist way (Bhattacharya 235-236; Vaz Pinto 217). Yet, "nationalism includes a more emotional and normative commitment to the political/economic/social status quo or putative status quo (in more extreme forms, blind support for the nation-state), as well as the denigration of the traits of out-groups (citizens of other nations, ethnonational groups, or both)" (Johnston, "Chinese Nationalism" 13-14). This helps "not only to ensure domestic stability" but also to give "the people a common agenda for unity and identity" (Bhattacharya 236-242). But modern China's "intense nationalistic pride over international recognition and acceptance" also means that Chinese nationalists are more likely to "feel slighted" and to "take offense" anytime they perceive that interference with China's ability to pursue, "on their own terms," territorial unity, independent sovereignty, and "international recognition" and "legitimacy" (Guang 497-501).

Additionally, because China's legitimacy as a state is "rooted in the Confucian concept of *fuqing* or wealth and power" (Bhattacharya 241-242)⁵⁵, "national salvation by removing the

⁵⁵ This concept originated from Legalist thinking but was incorporated into Confucian-based national identity during the Qing Dynasty (Schell and Delury 45-46).

stigma of a victim nation” requires a “proactive and assertive” foreign policy that creates “an international order favourable to China’s rise as a great power” (Bhattacharya 236-247). “Therefore, not only does China need to achieve strategic parity but it also needs to change the rules of the game in international relations. In a nutshell, to reflect politically and militarily its already economic weight” (Vaz Pinto 220).

Not only does Chinese nationalism contain strong signs of Confucian influence but it also has striking similarities with political realist theory. Indeed, Guang argues this is because “some of the prevailing norms of the Westphalian international system have been integrated into and thus made part of the Chinese national discourse” (Guang 489). The “fusion of political realism and nationalistic aspirations,” which he calls “realpolitik nationalism,” implies that “hard-edged realist ideals and ideas about state power and geopolitics [are] clothed in the garb of nationalism” (Guang 498). In his words,

Realpolitik nationalism is thus composed of a set of nationalist beliefs built around a fundamental set of realist ideas of power politics. In other words, it is an ideology that elevates realist considerations of power, articulated expressly in the ideas of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international legitimacy, to the level of a national imperative for the country and thereby makes these very ideas the constitutive elements of a modern Chinese national identity. (499)

According to this theory and echoing the theoretical function of strategic culture, nationalism may cause perceptions, behavior, or goals to deviate from what would be considered “rational” according to realpolitik’s “relentless pursuit of material powers and interests unencumbered by ideational factors” (Guang 499-500). Though it may be going too far to say that the power of realpolitik nationalism “derives not from citizens’ depth of feelings about their nation’s history or their ethnic identity, but from the key ideas in the international society,” survey results strongly support the notion that China’s strategic culture is influenced by an understanding of nationalism that combines Confucian ideology and political realist beliefs (Guang 509).

This perceptive lens emphasizes the pursuit and recognition of national wealth and power as these goals are consistent with both realist assumptions and the Confucian model of governance. Combined under the rubric of nationalism, this was likely an important reason for respondents' strategic preferences and decisions generally being inconsistent with Confucian pacifistic ideals. Whereas respondents who subscribe to either belief system would accordingly agree about the critical importance of military strength, those with more Confucian beliefs would be less likely to see war as moral and, perhaps, to consider it quite as permissible to attain the same goals. This would contribute to the observed variation in strategic preferences and endorsed behavior that, while still generally militaristic, correlated with stated worldviews and normative beliefs across the spectrum. In this way, nationalism functioned as a culturally-contextual perception of cultural history, international image, and national identity that contributed to "irrational" deviations between "how the mind works and how it should work."

The use of a strategic culture construct that omitted nationalism also was one likely reason why the widely-accepted paradigmatic axioms of Confucian and realist theory were found to be only moderately strong measures of actual worldviews. Beliefs about the character of the international system and state behavior in it certainly include the extent to which it is seen as anarchic, zero-sum, power politics where war is likely and effective - but it is equally logical that they are also shaped by perceptions of whether the status quo system specifically seeks to marginalize China and to deny it its right to territorial integrity and sovereignty. The use of two survey versions in order to vary the state which respondents considered allowed for this to be tested.

Nationalism, by nature, is based on "a common agenda for unity and identity" derived from belonging to same state (Bhattacharya 236-242). The component beliefs of nationalism and the resulting emotional content which affects their degree of influence, accordingly, are specific to the citizens of that state. The importance of shared identity is further highlighted

because the relational nature of nationalism involves “explicit comparisons between highly value in-group traits and the devaluation of out-groups (Johnston, “Chinese Nationalism” 13-14).

As would be expected if nationalist beliefs were a significant influence on strategic decision making but were not applicable for respondents considering a foreign state, the reliability (R^2) of the Views of IR latent factor – which indicated how well the indicators measured their latent factor - was notably stronger for the Chinese students thinking of other states than those thinking of their own (.43/.37). It was likely that the partiality of nationalism was also at least partially responsible for respondents giving substantially greater permissibility for when and how their own country ought to and can use force than for other countries.

Furthermore, the way in which nationalism shapes strategic preferences and decision-making is unique to each nation because it is the differences of each nation’s characteristic beliefs that define it. Though the name implies that these are differences between traditional nation-states, China’s beliefs about its cultural history, international image, and national identity cannot be separated from its (Confucian) culture (Bhattacharya 236-242; Guang 496). This stands in strong contrast to the component beliefs of strategic culture, where the inevitability of war, the “nature” and “threat” of the “adversary,” and the “efficacy of the use of force” may come from cultural or structural sources – or both. Not only are any of these possibilities plausible but it is very difficult to determine which one was the source.

The legitimacy of the postulated cultural or structural influence on what is “rational” depends upon its ability to uniquely and comprehensively explain deviations from behavior predicted by realist theory. Prior studies have little choice but rely on either structurally or culturally-specific factors for reconciliation. Because Chinese nationalism is a unique amalgamation of Chinese culture, if it is indeed the cause of at least some of the unexplained

covariance, it serves as strong evidence that the respondent's strategic preferences and decisions were more strongly influenced by cultural factors than structural ones. Moreover, if true, then nationalism, as a conveyor of strategic culture, would further homogenize elite and normal citizen's beliefs about the use force.

Lastly, it could be that the strategic preferences and foreign policy of respondents were shaped not just by nationalist beliefs but also by beliefs of Chinese exceptionalism. These concepts are closely related but differ in that exceptionalism contains the assumption that the country or culture possesses certain characteristics that make it uniquely better than all others (Walt). Especially because this concept "has long been written [about] as though exceptionalism were all of the American type or a variant of it," it is useful to briefly compare how American and Chinese exceptionalism have been characterized (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 306).

Walt describes American exceptionalism as the belief that American "values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration" so America is "both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage" (Walt). Addressing the possibility of Chinese exceptionalism, Zhang states,

If by exceptionalism is meant the unique qualities — from the particular set of political and social values to the special historical trajectory and foreign relations experience — that differentiate one country from another, then China certainly has its own version of exceptionalism...because China is a rising great power, the specific character and quality of its exceptionalism matter more than those of most other countries" (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism. (306)

Not so different than the American concept of Manifest Destiny, China's sense of unique "greatness" derives from its large geography and population as well as its conception as the Central Kingdom, "chosen by Heaven" to be at the top of the political hierarchy, and who's culture embodies the definition of civilization (Ho 166; Walt).

Whereas the American version further claims that being endowed with "unique responsibilities" that are "different from other powers and that these differences require them

to take on special burdens” (Walt), Zhang avers that, through “official and semi-official statements,” China’s government and elites, “having established imperial China’s pacifist tradition, emphasized China’s agonizing experience in the modern world, and professed China’s intention to never inflict similar sufferings on other countries, the PRC claims that it will always adopt a peaceful foreign policy, will never threaten anyone, and will help to maintain world peace through its own development” (Vaz Pinto 217; Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism” 310-311). Despite such pledges, much of this language is strikingly similar to Walt’s description that “American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace...Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers” (Walt).

As it would be “at best inappropriate and at worst self-humiliating” for China to follow the Western model of great power politics (Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism” 311), instead it emphasizes “great power reformism, benevolent pacifism, and harmonious inclusionism” as the basis of an “ethical system as the solution to the problems of the current international system” (Ho 165). Also aimed directly at the U.S., China further assures that its behavior as a great power is “defined by specific national interests rather than abstract principles, thus reflecting a more rational – and realistic – set of considerations...built upon a moral imperative, or *virtue*” (Ho 169, emphasis original).

Though there are many more claims from academic literature as well as nonacademic sources extolling China’s exceptional virtue and contrasting it to America’s behavior (Ho 170-171; Zhang, Weiwei), the pertinent issue is whether survey results found that such beliefs likely had significant influence on respondents’ preferences and decisions about the use of force. This complicated question will be briefly addressed.

In a 2011 article in the American publication *Foreign Affairs*, the Dean of Peking University's School of International Studies, Wang Jisi, argues that "while this [China's] search for a "grand strategy" is still open to debate, the Chinese people are not expected to be satisfied living by the rules of the international order that were established by Western powers" (Wang, Jisi 2011, qtd. in Ho 171). Supported by the historical evidence just discussed and China's recent resurgence – which attests to its virtue and "unique greatness" - this attitude could have encouraged respondents to make decisions about war that marginalized international laws, norms, and general regard for other states. Yet, probably not in an appreciably different way than if strong exclusivist nationalist beliefs were the primary motive. However, Chinese exceptionalism would probably foster further indifference for *immoral* uses of force because its Confucian ideological foundation is used to promote the belief that China's virtue rests on its "historical entitlement to great power status and moral authority" (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 309). Actual behavior has little impact on China's virtue because China's exceptionalism comes from the fact that it "had been and was now again a great power with superior moral qualities and that as such it automatically commanded a moral high ground in world affairs and deserved the respect and in some cases even...deference from other countries" (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 309).

Though belief in China's exceptionalism may be just as misguided as it has been for any other great power, more importantly, a strong argument can be made that it has not substantially shaped China's behavior (Walt; Wang, "Myth of Chinese Exceptionalism"). As just discussed, survey results suggested that the *realpolitik*-like behavior generally endorsed by respondents derived more from consideration of cultural-nationalist rather than structural influences. While nationalism's influence on perceptions and reasoning likely contributed to the strong support for behavior incongruous with Confucian ideals, it probably had little effect on respondents' beliefs about the morality of strategic options. This was because it only *codifies*

and *formalizes* the sanctioned cultural schema of political aspirations and ideology (including morality) in order to give “the people a common agenda for unity and identity” (Bhattacharya 236-242).

China’s beliefs about “the traits of its national [or cultural] character, its intended regional and global roles, and its perceptions of its eventual destiny,” which are strongly influenced by and consistent with Confucianism (Johnson 13), “evolved into a nationalist and then ideological direction” (Vaz Pinto 214). The continuity of China’s identity ensured that Chinese nationalist beliefs are the foundational basis of Chinese exceptionalism (Ho 169-171; Zhang, “Chinese Exceptionalism” 309-316). Thus, they functionally exert similar influence on identity and unity except that the ideological component of exceptionalism also fosters the conviction that these traits prove China’s uniqueness and superiority.

This makes China’s “rejuvenation” a moral imperative as well as a “national imperative” (Guang 499). Therefore, China’s pursuit of wealth and power - especially through coercion and force - should be seen as more moral if supported by exceptionalist beliefs than if by nationalist ones. The survey tested whether or not respondents shared similar beliefs about their cultural history, international image, and national identity but not whether these were believed to prove China’s unique superiority. Though it is unknown whether beliefs shaped by Chinese exceptionalism were any different than those shaped by just nationalism, some sense of the influence of exceptionalism beliefs can be gleaned from survey results.

The overall response pattern indicating that the same uses of force were considered to be somewhat more moral for China than for other countries was consistent with such influence but the more inconsistent reasoning for those thinking about their own country suggested this was not caused by a coherent framework of beliefs. Perhaps more telling was that, contrary to the what would be expected from China’s moral imperative to reassume great power status,

there was a stronger belief that China's use of force was, overall, more "necessary but immoral" rather than moral for most situations. Further inconsistent was that moral standards were more partially biased for the straightforward scenarios rather than the more morally complex ones where the ideological conviction would most likely tip the scales in favor of one's own country.

The nuanced meanings and implications teased out of such subtle but statistically significant differences ought not be marginalized but the techniques commonly employed to cope with the limitations of human reasoning make broader assessments valuable as well. Reliance on cognitive heuristics and schemas means that perceptions and decisions should be clearly consistent and coherent with the theoretical beliefs and assumptions responsible for shaping and guiding them. Nationalist beliefs may very well have emphasized the pragmatic necessity of war but it is more difficult for a moral imperative to achieve great power status, even if done with righteous motives and the Mandate of Heaven, to overcome directly-contradictory *prima facie* moral principles and obligations.

The strongly non-Confucian worldviews, strategic preferences, and decisions about the use of force reported in the survey results starkly contradict Chinese claims of exceptionalism based upon promises of being a "new kind of great power," that will not play "the zero-sum game of power politics," will engage only in "a peaceful foreign policy and will not threaten or challenge anyone," and will promote "international cooperation and accommodation by adopting an open, tolerant, and inclusive attitude" (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 311-312). For example, non-Confucian beliefs and/or cognitive errors rather than rational but partial perceptions better explain why ~19% of respondents believed that using "force when it is the most effective way to pursue national interests" and knowingly killing (but not "intentionally" targeting) innocent civilians by attacking cities inhabited by soldiers were morally consistent with humanness, compassion, benevolence, and harmony for all humans.

CONCLUSIONS

Statistical analysis of survey responses showed there to be no major problems with the reliability or validity of the stated worldviews, normative, or actual beliefs about behavior in international affairs and war. Respondents' *normative* beliefs were internally consistent as well as fairly reflective of deontological ethics – certainly more so than with teleological, virtue, or Confucian thinking. This further demonstrated that the survey accurately captured respondents' moral beliefs and that their beliefs could be reasonably well explained by established ethical theories.

SEM showed that the Confucian framework of fundamental principles did not closely correspond with respondents' stated beliefs and the relationships between them. Political realist international relations theory, though not directly tested, seemed to fit much better. At the same time, the results revealed that actual beliefs were significantly influenced by other factors as well. The point of biggest divergence between theory and measured beliefs was the relationship between the perceived character of the international system and how states should behave within it. The world was seen as anarchic, dangerous, zero-sum competition but respondents differentiated between issues that affected national security and those that did not.

Observed strategic preferences were not particularly influenced by or consistent with Confucian beliefs and values. Behavior was even less constrained by them though the observed strong inclination to use force was perhaps due to the observed high sensitivity to threat. Yet, while many felt that the necessity of using force meant that states cannot be constrained by morality, this generally did not mean that morality became what was considered necessary for survival rather than what would be ideal. At the same time, the unequal moral standards between survey versions rendered many of the instances of Confucian worldviews and strategic preferences less convincing. In comparison, respondents with realist views much more consistently felt that the amorality of state behavior was equally applicable to all states. Still,

respondents were generally inconsistent in their moral reasoning and strategic decision making regardless of whether they held moral or amoral beliefs.

The findings reported reasonable correlation but low causation between the factors that represent the political/ethical belief systems that make up rational choice theories and the concept of strategic culture. One untested factor that likely made a significant contribution to respondents' non-Confucian beliefs and decisions was nationalist beliefs and perceptions about China's cultural history, international image, and national identity. Likely a product of the combination of realist assumptions about the world and the imperative for China to govern it as a Confucian regional hegemon, the findings suggest that incorporating nationalism into the strategic culture concept would improve its explanatory power. While there was some moderate evidence of the influence of Confucian beliefs on worldviews, strategic preferences and decisions, they were interpreted and applied in a way that more closely resembled justification of pragmatic pursuit of national interests than virtuous expression of Confucian ideals.

WORKS CITED

Alden, Chris, and Amnon Aran. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. 2nd ed. New York and London: Taylor & Francis, 2017. Print.

Bhattacharya, Abanti. "Chinese Nationalism and China's Assertive Foreign Policy." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (2007): 235-262. Accessed 3 Aug. 2017.

Chong, Ja Ian. "Popular Narratives versus Chinese History: Implications for Understanding an Emergent China." *European Journal of International Relations* 20.4 (2014): 939-964. Accessed 20 Jul. 2017.

Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 3rd ed. Los Angeles: Sage, 2009. Print.

Dueck, Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008. Print.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, 2005, Cambridge, MA. Accessed 13 Jul. 2017.

Gong, Ted E. *China: Tradition, Nationalism and Just War*. Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College. 1999. Accessed 6 Sep. 2009.

Gray, Colin S. "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back." *Review of International Studies* 25.1 (1999): 49-69. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

Guang, Lei. "Realpolitik Nationalism: International Sources of Chinese Nationalism." *Modern China* 31.4 (2005): 487-514. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

Ho, Benjamin. "Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism: China's Rise, Its Goodness, and Greatness." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. 39.3 (2014): 164-176. Accessed 28 Jul. 2017.

Hurley, Amy E., et al. "Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Guidelines, Issues, and Alternatives." *Journal of Organizational Behavior* (1997): 667-683. Accessed 14 Jul. 2017.

Johnson, Jeannie L. *Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct*. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 2006. Accessed 10 Jul. 2017.

Johnston, Alastair I. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." *Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996. Print.

Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998. Print.

Johnston, Alastair I. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." *International Security* 19.4 (1995): 32-64. Accessed 16 Oct. 2010.

Johnston, Alastair I. "Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing." *International Security* 41.3 (2017): 7-43. Accessed 5 Feb. 2017.

Kim, Sungmoon. "Achieving the Way: Confucian Virtue Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy East and West* 66.1 (2016): 152-176. Accessed 4 Jul. 2017.

Kung, James Kai-sing, and Chicheng Ma. "Can Cultural Norms Reduce Conflicts? Confucianism and Peasant Rebellions in Qing China." *Journal of Development Economics* 111 (2014): 132-149. Accessed 25 Jul. 2017.

Lai, Karyn L. "Confucian Moral Thinking." *Philosophy East and West* 45.2 (1995): 249-272. Accessed 20 Dec. 2010.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review* 4.3 (2002): 87-113. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

Levy, Jack S. "Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd Ed. Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 301-333. Accessed 9 March 2017.

Lynch, Colum. "China's Arms Exports Flooding Sub-Saharan Africa." *The Washington Post*, sec. National Security: 25 Aug. 2012 Web. Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Mercer, Jonathan. "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics." *International Organization*. 59.1 (2005): 77-106. Accessed 9 Mar. 2017.

Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen Jr. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print.

Mizokami, Kyle. "A Look at China's Growing International Arms Trade." *USNI News*: 7 May 2015. Accessed 1 Aug. 2016.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Print.

Schell, Orville, and John Delury. *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Random House, 2013. Print.

Scobell, Andrew. "China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35.2 (2014): 211-226. Accessed 4 Apr. 2017.

Smith, John K. "Quantitative versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to Clarify the Issue." *Educational Researcher* 12.3 (1983): 6-13. Accessed 13 Jul. 2017.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford University Press: Stockholm, Sweden (2015). Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Tellis, Ashley J. "Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific." *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and

Michael Wills, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016, pp. 3-26. Accessed 21 Jul. 2017.

Tuli, Fekede. "The Basis of Distinction Between Qualitative and Quantitative Research in Social Science: Reflection on Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological Perspectives." *Ethiopian Journal of Education and Sciences* 6.1 (2011). Accessed 13 Jul. 2017.

Van Fleet, John D. "Japanese vs. Chinese Exceptionalism." *The Diplomat*: 28 Sept. 2016. Accessed 15 Jul. 2017.

Vaz-Pinto, Raquel. "Peaceful Rise and the Limits of Chinese Exceptionalism." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 57.Special Edition (2014): 210-224. Accessed 9 Mar. 2017.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Myth of American Exceptionalism." *Foreign Policy* 11 (2011).

Walzer, Michael. "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 2.2 (1973): 160-80. Accessed 26 Dec. 2010.

Wang, Yuan-kang. "The Myth of Chinese Exceptionalism." *Foreign Policy* (2012). Accessed 10 Jul. 2017.

Zhang, Feng. "The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 19.2 (2013): 305-328. Accessed 28 Jul. 2017.

Zhang, Weiwei. "The Analysis of a Miracle: The China Model and Its Significance." *Qiushi (Seeking Truth)* 22 (2011). Accessed 20 Ju. 2017.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

In a world that is becoming rapidly more interconnected and in which the balance of power is swiftly shifting, it is critical to understand China's strategic culture in order to encourage peaceful and effective foreign policy engagements. This research fills scholarly gaps about China's strategic decision making by creating models that explain how China's future generation of leaders consider using force to address national security concerns.

Prior studies of China's strategic preferences focus on whether political realist or Confucian beliefs best explain China's strategic preferences, comparing defining theoretical factors to those derived from the past statements and behavior of China's military, political, and academic elites. However, the dearth of relevant data means that these studies rely heavily on inference to understand beliefs, motives, and other causal factors – making educated assumptions from public behavior and the few pertinent statements and texts available to scholars. Without the necessary range of primary sources to provide critical context and balance, it is difficult to create detailed, reliable models or identify causal rather than correlational factors that explain – and can help policymakers understand – China's strategic decision making.

Determining strategic preferences requires more than just identifying patterns of behavior and comparing them to existing theories and norms. For example, preferences based upon analysis of China's compliance or objection to normative systems of global governances like International Humanitarian Law and the United Nations fail to account for the very different implications if objections are because these are considered ineffective, immoral, or tools used by powerful states to legitimate pursuit of their self-interests. Thus, the beliefs, casual factors, and reasoning for ideological disagreements – and not outward behavior alone – are critical to understanding the extent to which China accepts or seeks to revise status quo

systems of governance and will observe or violate the constraints of these norms when pursuing its interests.

Administering a survey questionnaire to the elite Chinese student demographic allows for careful survey design, strategic targeting of respondents, and minimizing potential sources of error and bias. This improves the reliability and validity of the study as well as the ability to shape and account for contextual factors, thus facilitating sophisticated interpretation of the reasons and the reasoning for China's current and future national security decision making. This research uniquely investigates moral preferences, how conflicts between pragmatic interests and ideals are weighed, and also explores justifications in order to identify causal relationships that provide greater insight to how moral and amoral factors influence Chinese decision makers. While qualitative analysis of case studies excels at developing international relations theory, deductive quantitative methodology is particularly well suited for testing how well existing theories, in this case Confucianism, explain actual beliefs. Models of the beliefs built from survey responses are also compared to Western ethical and international relations theories to identify where fundamental values may be universal and where cultural differences create informative disparities.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Respondents generally viewed the international system as anarchic, zero-sum, and fairly violent though they were somewhat more idealistic about how states should behave in this environment (H2). The strong overall support for and moral permissibility of war demonstrated a high sensitivity to threats and substantial faith in the efficacy of force (H3). Normative beliefs about conduct in war were more consistent with deontological ethics than teleological or virtue ethics and intentionality was an important consideration (H4). Morality did not strongly constrain behavior in war but the exceptional necessity that justified immoral harming of noncombatants did not tend to make the acts moral either (H4). Overall, stated beliefs and the

relationships between them demonstrated views, reasoning, and biases that were inconsistent with Confucianism (H1).

H2: Respondents do not hold a Confucian worldview of international relations and state behavior.

Respondents believed the world to be fairly anarchic, competitive, and dangerous. These predominantly-structural conditions meant that many felt national security, broadly defined, must, ultimately, be about absolute power rather than cooperation or alliances. However, it is not as much the character of the international system but, rather, how state's ought to behave within it that defined the role of Confucianism.

The census was that states generally should follow pragmatic foreign policies rather than options more reflective of a Confucian preference to avoid conflicts such as compromise and accommodation. Yet, there was greater optimism and willingness to compromise for less important issues and when there were less direct conflicts of interest.

A central premise of Confucianism is that a hierarchy of governance works because seniority is earned by moral behavior. Except in the most extreme circumstances, those of lesser moral character can be handled by providing them with moral leaders who serve as role models and inspire others through their humaneness/benevolence (*ren*), reciprocity (*shu*), righteousness (*yi*), and propriety (*li*). The common expectation that foreign states should behave more idealistically than the respondent's own state was inconsistent with such fundamental beliefs. This was not likely a moral bias derived from Confucian partiality to those with whom there is a special relationship because the stronger support that it was moral for the respondent's state to favor its own citizens than for other states to do so was not seen as universally applicable. This resembles self-interest rather than devotion or loyalty.

H3: Confucianism does not influence beliefs about when force should be and can be used.

The low severity of threat which the majority of respondents believed made it necessary or even moral to use force did not reflect the judicious standards of “strict self-defense” or “last resort” consistent with Confucian values. Even such justifications for the scenarios where most would agree that the use of force was a last resort and in self-defense were suspect because respondents felt that their state had greater permissibility than foreign ones. The robust support for coming to the defense of other states could be attributed to Confucian values such as humaneness were they not contradicted by respondents placing stronger moral weight on respecting state sovereignty than on helping humans clearly in dire need.

The observed amoral proclivity to use force in order to advance state interests was best exemplified by the 75%/81% of respondents who said that it was either “moral” or “immoral but necessary” to use force when it was in the state’s best interests to do so. The overall very strong endorsement for going to war even when deemed immoral demonstrated that Confucian norms – and moral ideals more generally – did not substantially constrain behavior. It, instead, showed that, contrary to Confucian beliefs, using force was widely seen as a more effective tool than non-coercive/nonviolent alternatives for addressing political problems. In sum, these beliefs about going to war did not reflect the moral leadership and humanness espoused by Confucianism.

H4: Confucianism does not influence how force should be and can be used.

Respondents felt that it was generally immoral to harm noncombatants in order to weaken the enemy though they consistently held foreign states to higher standards than their own state. The strong relationship between morality and the degree of intentionality to harm innocents rather than with what would bring about the best ends to the conflict was consistent with Confucianism as well as both deontological and virtue ethical theory.

However, respondents were quick to change or ignore their assessment that some tactics were immoral due to the harm done to noncombatants. About two-thirds felt that a state could use immoral tactics if it made a difference between winning or losing just a battle or, contrary to a central principle of Confucianism, if the other state had violated reciprocity by doing so first. Opposite to one popular interpretation of Confucian “Just War” thinking, the just cause of clear self-defense - when the other state attacked first - had the least impact on moral conviction and constraint.

Morality did not markedly constrain behavior but immoral acts were also not quickly redefined as moral if their use were permitted due to expediency or perceived necessity. Even the necessity of harming innocents due to the potential total destruction of the country did not fully justify immoral acts. Most approved of using force for this reason but still believed there to be an irreducible moral remainder similar to “Dirty Hands” – though this is an alien concept to Confucianism due to its belief in the inherent virtue of leaders and the highly situationally-dependent nature of its ethics.

H1: Confucianism does not influence the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students.

The patterns of responses and the scores for the four latent beliefs did not strongly reflect Confucian values, beliefs, or preferences. To some extent, normative beliefs more closely reflected Western Just War theory and its legal progenitor, International Humanitarian Law. The strong support for the use of anti-personnel mines was one obvious exception.

Beliefs about the international system and state behavior in it were not notably collaborative, compromising, or win-win. Respondents strongly supported using force to further state interests as well as to address even minimally threatening behavior of unfriendly states. It did not take much for respondents to deem it permissible to use force that violated virtues such as benevolence, reciprocity, and humanness. Many of the instances where majority

beliefs were consistent with Confucian values were contradicted by respondents holding foreign states to higher moral standards than for their own state.

Confucian morality did not influence strategic preferences; however, this does not mean that Confucianism has little influence on related societal norms and mores of contemporary China. Respondents felt quite strongly that governments and individuals have different roles in society and, so, have different moral responsibilities and obligations. For example, there was no evidence to contradict the widespread belief that morality - the rights, obligations, and privileges - of individuals strongly depends upon one's place in the relevant hierarchy. Actually, 3 years of related field research support both this assessment and that this system promotes non-confrontational conflict resolution through compromise, avoidance, and accommodation.

However, Confucianism and political realism blur together in that, as with morality in war, Confucian preferences and values are followed to the extent that relative power and other factors make it pragmatically beneficial or necessary to do so. The defining role of relative power combined with China's cultural-historical motivations to reassert itself as a great power also makes it difficult to differentiate between realist-driven regional hegemony and the Confucian hierarchal "tributary state" model of governance. These ambiguities were ultimately resolved based upon disparities in the perceived morality of behavior and the central Confucian tenet that following proper behavior rather than coercive tactics should be used to rectify improper/undesirable situations.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Respondents with scale scores more indicative of Confucian beliefs tended to answer the component questions of each latent factor with greater coherency than respondents with less idealistic scores. A holistic and relatively well-defined framework of principles such as Confucianism appeared to help guide decision making for complex issues. The lesser

cohesiveness of those with non-Confucian scores also suggested that their reasoning was not as strongly guided by an alternative theory such a political realism.

Though they demonstrated greater variance in their beliefs for each factor, they were fairer in their judgments. Reflecting realist assumptions about the role of ethics in international relations, those with a more pragmatic, amoral view were more likely to recognize the necessity for all states to not be constrained by ideals. In contrast, those who expressed stronger support for (Confucian) moral ideals were more likely to hold foreign states to higher standards of behavior than their own. They were also more inconsistent in their moral assessments, most likely because morality was used as an excuse rather than as a coherent framework to help guide decision making. Indeed, the morality of the same use of force that varies based upon a scenario that differs only in whether it's use benefits the respondents' self-interest further undermines the sincerity of such claims. The legitimacy of these moral justifications is further contradicted because such bias directly contradicts the core Confucian virtues of benevolence and humanness to all others – and even more so given the importance that Confucianism places on the virtue of reciprocity.

It was possible that the disparate permissibility of the respondents' state and of foreign states using force may not have been due to unequal moral standards but rather due to an inherent difference in how respondents perceived the threat. The relational proximity of a threat to the respondent's own state likely made it feel more immediate and personal and, thus, more severe than how they perceived the same threat to a foreign state.

However, contrary to what would be expected, whether the moral and overall permissibility of going to war for the scenarios provided were biased did not correlate with the situation's relative severity of threat. Instead, it correlated with the moral complexity of the situation. Bias was greater for the more straightforward situations – like when the other state has attacked first - and less so when the situation needed to be carefully considered.

There was also further evidence that deontological means were more widely considered legitimate, universal ideals while the acceptability of teleological reasoning was more subject to self-interest. For instance, it was less morally permissible for foreign states to use tactics that would harm noncombatants to weaken the enemy than for the respondent's state to do so. However, this correlated to the preferred ethical theory used for moral reasoning.

Those who evaluated the morality of these acts based upon what would likely bring about the "best" end (teleological evaluation of what is "good") were much more likely to say that the act was more morally permissible for their own state than for foreign states. Those who considered the means – whether these acts were "right" or would violate certain *prima facie* moral principles – felt the acts were more equally immoral for all states. Similarly, respondents felt that it was better for their state to fight a quick, unrestrained war while other states should have a longer but more restrained war.

The strong and common belief that it was an amoral necessity for states to counter even minor threats with offensive, unconstrained force was consistent with respondents' overall non-Confucian view of the international system. There was also significant bias observed where China had greater permissibility to use force, though only for the more straightforward situations - such as when the enemy wants to totally destroy the country, when the state will be attacked imminently or has already been attacked, etc. This disparity may have been due to respondents answering more instinctively whereas they needed more time to consider the complex scenarios.

The straightforward situations could be answered more quickly because it was easier for respondents to utilize fundamental beliefs as heuristics. Rather than weighing conflicting beliefs about the in-group and the out-group, respondents reflexively reacted to compelling emotions about their national identity, history, image being under threat. Unambiguous cases of self-defense were made even more necessary and more moral when considered in the context

of the widespread perception that China's inherent superiority proves its rightful place as a great power and that it has been a constant target of aggression by barbarians who seek to humiliate and dominate it. Though respondents were influenced by structurally-derived beliefs that Confucian idealism is an inaccurate description of how states behave and so should not constrain foreign policy, culturally-derived perceptions dramatized the severity of their implications.

GENDER

Women were, on average, more idealistic than men for all four factors. The most notable difference was that women were substantially less likely to see the three proposed acts in war (*Jus in Bello*) as morally okay. Men also had a wider range of views (less consensus) about all the issues except the permissibility of going to war. They were also more biased, holding foreign states to higher standards than their own state.

For men, moral concern for civilians in war decreased as their perception that the international system was zero-sum competition for survival increased while women were more concerned about civilians regardless of perceived threat. Men also felt that morality was more contextual and less binding for their state than for other states. Women, on the other hand, did not expect foreign states to be more strongly constrained by moral ideals in war than their own state.

Although IR theory assumes that the extent to which states should be constrained by morality is strongly related to how dangerous the world is perceived to be, neither gender showed a strong connection between these when thinking about foreign states. Women, who had more optimistic views and stronger moral conviction than men, felt that this relationship was even less important for their own state. In strong contrast, men felt that the importance of moral constraint for what their own state could do in war was dramatically more contextually

dependent (three times more so than women) upon existential threat inherent to the international system.

ETHNICITY

There were more differences in beliefs about international relations and war between those of Han ethnicity and those of non-Han ethnicity than there were between male and female respondents. Overall, Han respondents were substantially less idealistic about the international system than non-Han. Perhaps in recognition of the universality of structural conditions, they felt more strongly than non-Han that even the foreign policy of other states should be pragmatic.

However, not only did Han respondents more strongly agree with Thucydides' description that states ultimately care only about power but different (unknown) issues were responsible for shaping Han and non-Han views about this. Stronger identification with China may make Han citizens more sensitive to potential threats and more receptive to such nationalistic messaging. These groups also considered different issues when evaluating the morality of foreign states depriving civilians of food, medicine or water to weaken the enemy. This may be due to the historical experiences and socio-economic power disparities of China's majority and minority ethnicities.

Perhaps for similar reasons, state self-interest had a stronger effect on those of Han ethnicity than those of non-Han. Indeed, non-Han respondents were more conflicted than Han respondents about the character of the international system, how their own state's interests and security should be pursued, and whether their state's moral behavior in war was based upon the means or the ends. Additionally, though there was little difference in beliefs about a foreign state's permissibility to go to war, Han respondents felt that it was substantially more permissible for their own country go to war than non-Han respondents. One notable exception was that non-Han were more supportive of China conducting humanitarian interventions.

Both Han and non-Han felt that the more dangerous the international system was perceived to be, the more morality in war should be based upon the ends rather than the means. However, both groups also felt more strongly that morality was contextual for their own state and that morality was more objective and less mutable for other states. Non-Han also felt that this relationship was more important in defining their state's moral behavior while Han respondents saw less need for these beliefs to be coherent. Ethnicity did not influence normative beliefs about foreign states harming civilians in order to weaken the enemy.

At the same time, though, Han respondents perceived the international system as more threatening than non-Han but also held higher expectations that foreign countries ought to be more constrained by morality – except if the enemy's intent was total destruction of the country. Non-Han respondents felt much more strongly that, even for foreign states, the importance of moral constraint depended upon the severity of threat being faced. The severity of threat was strongly related to how dangerous the world was believed to be in general but even more to an immediate threat – indicated by how quickly an unfriendly state's behavior deemed it necessary to go to war in self-defense.

The reverse of these relationships was seen for those thinking about their own state; morality was a more objective influence on what non-Han respondents felt their own country could actually do in war. For example, Han respondents felt that the danger of the international system was twice as important for whether their state could engage in immoral acts in war while the higher expectation for other states remained less subjective.

While non-Han respondents had a more optimistic view of foreign relations and were more supportive of their own state's moral behavior than Han, unlike for Han respondents, these issues were not seen as related. Furthermore, non-Han were more likely to continue behaving morally in war even if the other side started using tactics that immorally harmed civilians or if doing these immoral acts would determine the outcome of the battle. Even non-

Han respondents who judged morality in war based upon whether the acts brought about the best ends rather than whether they violated specific moral principles showed greater moral constraint than Han respondents who used the same moral reasoning.

MEASUREMENT LIMITATIONS

The goal of this study was to identify the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students and to evaluate how well they reflected Confucian ethical, international relations, and decision making theoretical frameworks. Other theories were considered but the need for brevity and rigor meant that questions focused on the issues which define Confucianism. Especially given the diversity of human reasoning, not all possible interpretations, variations, and influences could or should be considered (James 133). Moreover, deductive quantitative testing of how well a specific theory fit new empirical data is more precise but also less exploratory than using inductive reasoning to discern a framework of theoretical principles from patterns found in specific case studies.

This project established broad yet definite bounds for what qualified as legitimate interpretations of Confucian principles in order to appropriately balance accuracy and diversity. This increased confidence in the results while also allowing for less popular patterns of beliefs and preferences to be identified, quantified, and characterized. Tests of validity, reliability, and of the relationships between principles and with latent factors reported no substantial problems with the measurements of beliefs and preferences. In other words, the survey questions accurately quantified the targeted beliefs, values, principles and their relationships to one another.

While the consistency between respondents' aggregate beliefs for each latent factor fit the predictions of the strategic culture rational decision making model, the latent factors had a not-insubstantial amount of covariance for which the models could not account. The issues that political realist and Confucian strategic culture theories traditionally examine to describe and

predict the international system and state behavior in it were also found to be weaker indicators than assumed. In other words, these theories seemed to explain preferences and behavior better than they really did because qualitative analysis relies upon inferred correlation for causation. Statistical modeling indicated that the core assumptions of Confucian strategic culture and political realist theories used in many prior studies only partially explained Chinese respondents' reasoning about the use of force and partially measured their beliefs about the international system and state behavior in it.

Factor analysis indicated that it was not likely that these discrepancies came from respondents considering an additional underlying belief or assumption. Nor did it reveal a pattern of stated beliefs indicative of a different guiding theory or of a different interpretation of Confucian theory. There was some evidence that Chinese nationalist beliefs acted as a lens that influenced perceptions in a similar manner as Confucian strategic culture. The unifying premise is that China's salvation from its century of victimization and humiliation at the hands of barbarians requires that it reclaims its Confucian-based "historical entitlement to great power status and moral authority," by reestablishing the modern-day equivalent to a China-led tributary system (Zhang, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 309).

China refers to this goal as the "China Dream" though it seems to have important similarities to the concept of the regional hegemon. Specifically, China's existential right to great power status requires possessing superior economic, military, and political power in order to favorably alter status quo international norms and achieve its expansive conceptions of "territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international legitimacy" (Guang 499). This is consistent with political realist assumptions of power politics, the Confucian hierarchical model of international relations, and the Qing Dynasty incorporation of *fuqiang* (wealth and power) into Confucian national-civilizational identity (Bhattacharya 241; Schell and Delury 45-46). It thus is a logical contributor to respondents' overall zero-sum, violent view of international relations

and their correlated endorsement of immoral uses of force to pursue national interests and to address even minor threats. It is possible that respondents further believed that China's unique superiority and Mandate of Heaven means that China is morally obligated to reestablish the modern equivalent to the Confucian concept of *tianxia*. Though some may have felt that way, survey results did not exhibit the significant influence expected from such a moral imperative.

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS

Nearly every study that has examined China's strategic culture or the strategic preferences of its leadership did so by analyzing the limited historical records and testimonials available. The context in which these documents were written contain many unknowns and contemporary Chinese have been extremely reticent to comment on these issues – save for the occasional carefully-crafted-for-the-public narrative. This made the perspective gleaned from this primary-source, large-*n* study particularly insightful.

Though it would have been ideal to survey China's current political decision makers, the topic of the survey very clearly proved to be too sensitive. Elite Chinese students were a very good alternative demographic for this study of China's strategic culture. One reason was because they are a good representation of the generation and perhaps even demographic likely to make up a significant portion of China's future leaders. Due to the confluence of factors such as corruption, the Confucian concept of *guanxi* (reciprocal social networks), and disparities common to many hierarchies, those in positions of leadership and influence have a greater ability to give their children the values, perspectives, skills, and opportunities key to achieving success (Carlson; Chen, Xi; Huang 121-123; Rickards; Timmons and Yang; Wang et al. 6, 10; Yuen). Because parents tend to pass on their formative experiences, beliefs, and influences to their children, the views of elite students have the potential to provide more insight in current elites than many other accessible populations in China (Egri and Ralston 6-7; Verhulst et al. 4, 13-14).

Even the comparatively less privileged students who attend China's top universities have an advantage to become a future elite whose political and political-moral perspective were similarly shaped (for example, by mandatory CCP propaganda and "patriotic education" classes that shape values and worldviews) with the expectation that they likely will assume leadership positions in the coming years (Chao 210; Chubb 11; Huang 44-56). Though many will pursue careers outside of the government and the CCP, the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of political ideology throughout Chinese society means that many other elites, especially those involved in education and economic issues, will likely accrue political influence (Chao 134-177; Scissors 28).

Traditional cultural emphasis between the "in-group" and the "out-group" reinforces "groupthink" (Sitaraman 545) and heightens the "identity difference perceptions" of Chinese elites, which has been found to serve as "important explanations of policy differences" (Johnston, "Chinese Exceptionalism" 12, 31; Vaz Pinto 215). At the same time, recent research has suggested that the growing average level of education – especially in Beijing – and the "opening up" of China due to globalization and technology has provided recent generations of students with a more balanced perspective of the international system and a less prejudiced inclination to negatively interpret the behavior of other states (Johnston, "Chinese Nationalism" 31-35).

If true, then the findings of this study are even more valuable for understanding China's future leaders. Additionally, should the findings that China's elite students hold strongly non-Confucian views and strategic preferences not be applicable to China's current cadre of leaders, it is very likely that the current decision makers hold even more pessimistic views of the international relations and are even more inclined to use coercion and force.

It is impossible for social science survey research to resolve or even adequately address all possible differences of a population but the legitimacy and value of this methodology is

widely recognized even with its unavoidable limitations in measures and sampling (Axelrod 6; Friedman et al. 12-13). Indeed, many Western studies of cultural, psychological, political, and other components of social science continue to use students to represent a much broader demographic.

That this study focused on China's strategic culture further reduced the significance of as well as the potential for unresolvable shortcomings due to the targeted population. Gray argues that,

The policymaker, the military professional, and the concerned citizen, cannot approach contemporary challenges in a strategic cultural void. Human beings are encultured as people who live in communities, and because, alas, those communities are communities for security, humans have no choice other than to undergo a process of strategic enculturation. (60)

Therefore, "the principal purveyors of China's strategic culture narrative today are political and military elites and scholars...but the narrative resonates powerfully with the ordinary people of China who also serve as keepers in the era of a rising new Central Kingdom" (Scobell, "Real SC" 223). Those who grew up fully immersed in Chinese society should be even more inculcated with the influential cultural (including nationalist) beliefs (Wang) due to China having a single dominant political-military culture (Lantis 100-107). For these reasons, understanding a strategic culture should include identifying its norms by "tapping into the population" using methods such as "polling and focus groups" (Johnson 16-19). In sum, the fact that strategic beliefs are presumably shaped by and reflect broader cultural ideology means that they should be statistically discernable from the beliefs of normal citizens with enough data points (Tellis 8).

Variance is still expected due to the diversity of human reasoning but the systemic origin of structural realist causal conditions means that influences below that level of analysis matter only insofar as they created biases and error that led to irrational behavior. There were surely additional influential considerations, as evidenced by the variance and covariance for which the models did not account, but the comprehensiveness of a theory must be balanced

with parsimony. “Strategic culture as instrumental rationality bounded by the ideational constraints emerging from a certain national style” serves no useful purpose if it is too broadly permissive of perceptual deviations from the standards of rationality (Tellis 13). The Confucian strategic culture model used in this study, following common convention established by prior ones, necessarily restricted the number of acceptable influences on political realist theory,

While most of those studies assessed China’s strategic culture according to historical accounts of discussions by actual decision makers and of actual behavior, the same paradigms were used and the same assumptions were tested because this followed the conventional, proven, and accepted method of analyzing China’s strategic culture at the cultural and structural level. Using the same theoretical models based upon the same causal variables operating at the same level of analysis – which deliberately doesn’t consider variations of the underlying population – as prior studies (specifically the preeminent ones from Wang, Scobell, and Johnston) should help prove the validity of this survey’s results.

Though there were some importance differences regarding the source of beliefs as well as the role of Confucianism on them, Johnston, Wang, and Scobell all found that Chinese strategic culture was fairly consistent with political realist assumptions. This study similarly found that the strategic beliefs and decisions of the elite Chinese student demographic generally complied with what would be expected given the assumptions of strategic culture (“rational”) – especially if Chinese nationalism was taken into account. In other words, this study confirmed that elite Chinese students were consistent with what those seminal studies found to be true at the structural and cultural level of analysis. It is, therefore, possible that the elite Chinese student demographic was not an accurate representation of current Chinese leaders but the results suggested otherwise.

Especially given China’s 1.4+ billion people and 56 ethnicities, targeting one specific group for the survey demographic was also a necessary and advantageous limitation. It is to be

expected that there will still be differing opinions about how well the explanations just provided resolve potential drawbacks of targeting elite Chinese students but, even should these concerns remain, not only was there no better viable alternative but they were overall still a good choice. The key aspects of geographic and ethnic diversity, the survey's large *n*, and including aspects of qualitative methodology helped further mitigate sampling and measurement limitations. For example, the findings from quantitative analysis of the survey population were further validated by comparing them to those from qualitative studies of historical records about Chinese decision makers. The occasional points of disagreement provided additional context that aided in the interpretation of identified response patterns.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

US foreign policy⁵⁶ has generally sought to alter China's behavior by convincing it that the international system is not a zero-sum, amoral, existential competition that unfairly favors the status quo powers. However, substantial uncertainty and disagreement about whether China's strategic goals and behavior are shaped by Confucian moral ideals has divided such efforts. This study provided convincing, detailed clarification that many in China feel beset by constant, severe threat and that the beliefs and preferences of China's next generation of leaders were not strongly influenced or constrained by Confucian moral ideals.

There are neither easy nor plentiful policy prescriptions for dealing with states which believe that politics and war are too dangerous for their behavior to be constrained by moral ideals. As a result, the US has largely pursued a pragmatic but norms-based approach towards China. The insights from this study indicate that "hedging" remains the best overall strategy (Jackson 333).⁵⁷ They also suggest how this approach may be used more effectively.

⁵⁶ The United States ("US") will be used in this section for the sake of brevity but are considered to apply to Western liberal democracies more generally as the policy implications derive from conceptual and perceptual differences of Western and Chinese norms and beliefs.

⁵⁷ Hedging is "a strategy of pursuing opposing or contradictory actions as a means of minimizing or mitigating downside risks associated with one or the other action" (Jackson 333).

The improved understanding of how China is likely to interpret and react to various policy options from the findings of this study can help policy makers find the best balance between deterrence and incentives as well as how best to operationalize it. Doing so provides a wider range of specific, scalable, flexible military and non-military options while preserving the US's deterrent and moral credibility.

More specifically, findings suggest that China would be more willing to compromise and cooperate on less threatening and less contentious issues. Efforts to accommodate China on its "core" issues will not likely be answered in kind so maintaining the status quo for them through hard power deterrence is recommended. Efforts to resolve these and, even more so, lesser disagreements should thoroughly explore holistic, indirect options which avoid issues of "face" like stark contrasts between "winner" and "loser." They should also emphasize consideration of the desired results rather than the value qualities of the process. It should be expected that the "fairness" of proposed outcomes will be evaluated based more upon what it implies about the relative power of the parties within a hierarchal relationship than on whether it seems equal.

Disagreements should acknowledge the reality of state competition and should be discussed in terms of legitimate state interests rather than appealing to aspirational ideals of governance. The pragmatic win-win economic benefits of proposals should be stressed in order to engage China's prime concern of state self-interests while also mediating suspicions from the belief that this is a zero-sum game. At the same time, though, pessimistic beliefs about the self-serving behavior of other states mean that China will view agreements with narrow limitations on specific issue. The importance of context, fostering harmony and good relations, and motive mean that even agreements are quite flexible and cooperation likely will last only as long as deemed advantageous.

Due to the observed relative unimportance of morality for many Chinese, disagreements involving values and principles should be kept separate from amoral ones. Especially since suspicion and resentment of Western moralizing makes it an unpersuasive tool in negotiations, moral components of disputes should be broached with caution. Even if possible to address moral concerns separately, it should be broached with caution due the very different roles which morality traditionally plays. Due to the demonstrated mutability, partiality, and hierarchical prerogative of virtue, it should be expected that China will agree to broad principles but may reinterpret them according to the situation. As seen in the survey, this may be done so “moralistic appeals and denunciations” can be used to help justify self-interests (Ho 170).

The reported strong belief that morality should not constrain China’s foreign policy and that other states are also not constrained by it contributes to the perception that Western appeals to morality are actually just tactics of manipulation and deception. While China will likely feel little hesitation to contravene moral principles when convenient, the US is generally more constrained by moral conviction, concern for reputation, and the desire to preserve the regulative authority of moral principles. Particularly for high profile disputes, this can give China a strong asymmetric advantage. Not only can China leverage this to achieve its material goals but using Western morality to constrain US behavior offers them the opportunity to also score a psychological and reputational victory. Their loud protests of hypocrisy if the US ignored its vaunted Western moral norms would be considered an even better victory.

US foreign policy has remained fundamentally based upon the belief that its reasoning, logic, and behavior will, inevitably, alter China’s belief that it is under constant, severe threat. Findings indicated this will be quite difficult for several reasons. For one, this is made more difficult due to China’s view being tied to the emotionally-charged sense of victimization and humiliation inflicted by the “duplicious” West. Two, the hegemonic conditions necessary to

assuage this, if possible at all, would be untenable for most other states. The difficulty of altering these views combined with the fact that views of the international system were found to only moderately shape opinions about the use of force indicated that efforts to develop an effective response to China's foreign policies and behavior should look for less intransigent beliefs.

The influential beliefs of strategic culture and nationalism reported in the survey results offer another option. It is more advantageous for the US to address conflicts of interest and greater room and flexibility for bargaining where historical experiences, cultural differences, and mirroring increase the potential for China to have radically different interpretations of what the US believed were quite rational policies. These are the places where China's strategic cultural and nationalist beliefs create inconsistent goals and preferred methods to pursue them.

For example, where interests conflict, strategies should prioritize those which offer a comparatively greater cost-benefit ratio because strategic culture-influenced perceptions make them "irrationally" less important to China. The messages from increasing economic, political, and military activities in Africa, the Americas, and Europe as well as soft power tools like entertainment media can have a significant effect on China's international and domestic behavior while being disproportionately less provocative because they don't overtly threaten its "core interests."

Conversely, gestures that are objectively low threat but symbolically confrontational – like anything that remotely could impinge on China's sweeping and expanding notions of territorial integrity and sovereignty – are likely to make China feel "slighted" and offended (Guang 499-501; Nanda). This conveys strong, pointed signals that remain below the conventional threshold of war. Inciting nationalist passions involves the risk of miscalculation but also increases the potential for strategic blunders that offers additional advantages to the other competitor.

The overlap of Confucian and political realist beliefs seen in the survey findings suggest that the CCP and Chinese government's reputations are a significant "center of gravity." Though less important than China's economic performance as both a material and nationalist priority, their legitimacy as well as that of its leaders are linked to virtue at least to the extent where it exerts some influence on their decisions and behavior. Though there are likely other motives as well, the most obvious example is the growing intolerance for corruption and the fairly aggressive effort to rectify it. Moreover, face and shame remain fairly effective means of controlling behavior. Thus, "naming and shaming" poor behavior - especially when it also has pragmatic implications to the material interests of Chinese citizens - is an avenue of influence that also have a fairly low risk of escalation.

It is likely that the many challenges China is facing as it rapidly develops - as well as the heightened sense of threat due to its greater immediacy/conceptual proximity to the respondent - contributed to the observed widespread bias of holding foreign states to higher standards than the respondents' own state. Thus, the (pragmatic and moral) normative behaviors of other states can serve as role models that appeal to and legitimate the idealistic aspirations identified in the survey. Showing how nations, especially other than the US, derive greater overall benefit by complying with international laws and norms - despite having to accept the same risks posed by the international system - can help emphasize to Chinese citizens the pragmatic value of the domestic and international law.

This would not be a difficult strategy to implement as it is neither expensive nor does it substantially compromise US interests. Though it should include placing greater emphasis on how Chinese citizens will likely interpret proposed US behavior, it is largely a matter of coherent, strategic messaging that highlights the US's strengths and beneficial contributions to the international community. Efforts should focus on using acceptable and effective forums such as educational and cultural exchanges and should include continuing to offer young

Chinese an alternative worldview and a more nuanced interpretation of American behavior within it.

The incremental gains from these kinds of policies can, in aggregate, moderate tensions so that competition over national interests are less likely to lead to war. They may even help gradually reduce inflammatory perceptions that it is a zero-sum, anarchic, violent world. The options available to moderate China's deeply ingrained beliefs and perceptions are limited and grow increasingly unappealing in relation to efficacy. Most extreme, cognitive research has shown that "potential catalysts for change...might be 'dramatic events or traumatic experiences [such as revolutions, wars, and economic catastrophes]' that would 'discredit thoroughly core beliefs and values.' Such change would be accompanied by extreme psychological stress and would require a resocialization process, involving participation by various groups in crafting a compromise on a new political cultural orientation" (Duffield 1998, qtd. in Lantis 110-111).

Avoiding full scale conflict while still deterring China from unacceptable expansion and coercion is best done using a hedging strategy. Indeed, "the decision to pursue status quo or revisionist goals is based upon cost-benefit analysis through the lens of a *parabellum* strategic culture so substantial changes to estimated costs or benefits could convince China to shift to a more [or less] revisionist policy (Johnston, "Status Quo" 56). The aspects of China's strategic culture just discussed can be combined with hard power deterrence for an overall more persuasive effect. For example, in conflicts, "the key to dealing with China is to properly manage China's perception of prestige while making it obvious that exercising its military option will not be inexpensive" (Gong 23). Though even the use of nonviolent, coercive uses of military power as a deterrent is less than ideal, it may be a necessary measure while other avenues are also pursued.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF (CHINA) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Directly addressing the central theory of Chinese Strategic Studies, this study clearly affirmed that the foreign policy views and the strategic preferences of elite Chinese students were not strongly influenced by Confucian values. The unique data and methodology of this project allowed for rigorous and precise measuring and validation of Confucian strategic culture theory to real world reasoning and makes the findings more significant. Contrary to a fundamental assumption of rational choice theory, there was strong correlation but not causation between personal values, beliefs about the international system, strategic preferences, and state behavior. Additionally, the beliefs about the international system used to define and differentiate IR theories were found to be poor measures of respondents' actual views.

Most international relations research centers on testing the ability of IR theories to explain specific historical examples of state or leader behavior (Lamont 15-19; Moravcsik 663-669, Walt "Relationship" 25-26, 34-35). Qualitative analysis is often advantageous for developing and refining an IR theory because "the analyst enjoys considerable flexibility in the role, weight, and meaning assigned to each piece of evidence" as well as the interpretation of IR theory used (George and Bennett 22-23; James 134; Moravcsik 669, 681-682).⁵⁸ Adjustments can be made so that the behavior predicted from the theoretical worldview and underlying beliefs is more consistent with what was observed.

However, this adaptability makes evaluating the theory's ability to explain empirical data imprecise, hard to measure and validate, and more susceptible to bias (Gay and Weaver 26-29; George and Bennett 6, 19-22; James 133-134). It is difficult to determine whether a paradigm which failed to adequately explain the behavior of a state or a leader was because it was the wrong theory, the wrong interpretation of the theory, or misdirected logical comparative reasoning (Bennett and George 30; Gay and Weaver 26-27; James 88-91, 133-

⁵⁸ See Moravcsik 681-682 for much greater detail about this.

134). In essence, researchers often must decide whether the cause was the theory or their own incorrect reasoning and judgment.

This project's quantitative methodology, first-person large-*n* data, and targeted questionnaire rigorously and objectively identified possible interpretations of Confucian IR theory, how well these interpretations explained stated beliefs and preferences, and the meaningful patterns from where theory was consistent and inconsistent with the evidence (Axelrod 6-7; Crovelli 105-106; Kaufman 2-5, 10; Moravcsik 663-669, 681-682, Walt "Relationship" 25-26, 34-35).⁵⁹ The findings are even more compelling because the results from statistical analysis can easily be examined and reproduced by others (Gay and Weaver 29).

The study design also provided the usual opportunity to examine the fundamental tenet of rational choice theories - that a specific worldview, characterized by beliefs about a few related issues, shapes strategic preferences, which strongly guide state behavior (Axelrod 6; Crovelli 105-106; Gay and Weaver 26; George and Bennett 22-23; James 113-115; Kaufman 2-5, 10; Walt "Relationship" 26-27, 34-35). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) found that respondents' beliefs about the issues assumed to define and differentiate worldviews according to rational choice theory were strongly connected by a common factor. However, SEM found these beliefs were incomplete indicators or measures of overall worldviews. There are other unidentified issues that significantly contribute to beliefs about modern geopolitics.

CFA also showed that respondents recognized the theoretical connection between overarching worldviews, strategic preferences, and endorsed behavior. However, more precise Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) indicated strong correlation but fairly weak causation between these components. In other words, the theoretical relationships may be "logically

⁵⁹ The number of explanatory variables used were based upon balancing parsimony and completeness as well as length of survey rather than the limits of qualitative human reasoning.

consistent and empirically valid” but they didn’t shape the actual decision-making process of elite Chinese students as strongly as studies that used qualitative inference of historical behavior concluded (Crovelli 105-107; James 91-95, 122-123; Korab-Karpowicz; Walt “Relationship” 26-27).

This could be evidence that inconsistencies between observed beliefs, preferences, and behavior were due to states and leaders not being as rational as assumed by theories. It also could be due to common sources of researcher bias such as evaluating the “rationality” of observed beliefs, views, and behavior based upon standards that were consistent with their own (cultural) values (Kaufman 2-5, 10). It was more likely that respondents’ strategic decision making was strongly influenced by political realist assumptions supported by a strategic culture that included Confucian beliefs about China’s cultural-national identity, history, and international image.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study contributes compelling new evidence that states don’t behave as predicted by structurally-based rational choice theory. Future research should look for additional – possibly intermediary/moderating - factors that would improve the ability of existing theories to explain behavior. The results of this study highlight a number of ways where further study would likely yield additional valuable insights about this. Perhaps most interesting would be to see how the results of this survey compare to those of an equivalent population from a different country/culture. Another good project would be to examine how well the models from this study explain China’s past strategic behavior. This would help refine the models so they can provide better insight into contemporary strategic decisions and behavior. The possibility that Chinese nationalism was an important influence on decisions about the use of force suggests strong potential to improve the explanatory power of strategic culture theory. Indeed, “a good theory,” as Walt states,” does not leave us wondering about the causal relationships

as work...” such as “when it identifies an important causal factor but not the factor(s) most responsible for determining outcomes” (“Relationship” 27).

There are also a number of ways that the existing data could be further analyzed to provide additional detail and insights. For example, the ~1000 surveys completed by non-students could be tested and the findings compared to those from the students. The effects of demographic variables such as education, which school was attended, and home province could also be examined in more detail.

The findings from this study should be used to inform future research that seeks to identify other influential factors and to determine whether they are additional facets of existing theories, intermediary/moderating influences to them, components of a totally distinct theory, or evidence that respondents tend to be inconsistent in their beliefs or methods of reasoning. Such research should give particular attention to the possible influence of Communist and Legalist value systems. For the reasons mentioned earlier, it would be more effective to use qualitative analysis to do this.

Often an entire doctoral project by itself, this study tested new scales and methodology for measuring normative and pragmatic beliefs as well as for the decision-making process used to consider foreign policy and the use of force. They, accordingly, make unique contributions to the related fields of political and moral psychology, comparative military ethics, international relations theory, and ethical decision making. These instruments could be used with different populations to further refine them while providing additional context and insights into issues at the heart of international relations, security theory and practice.

CONCLUSIONS

This study systematically examined the major components of Confucian and political realist international relations theory as well as of deontological, teleological, virtue and Confucian ethical theory. Quantitative analysis of a large-*n*, first-person, and theory-based survey

questionnaire created detailed models that were well suited to consider the diversity of human reasoning. Elite Chinese students were an excellent population to examine because they are likely to have been influenced by the structural and/or cultural conditions most likely responsible for China's strategic culture. They also share many of the advantages that have traditionally been most helpful for achieving elite status in China's hierarchy. As a result, measuring beliefs about the character of the international system, how states should behave within it, and the permissibility of using force contributed a new, policy-relevant perspective to the central issues of Chinese Security and Strategic Studies while also providing theoretical insights derived from precise quantitative testing of their fundamental assumptions.

The dramatically different methodology and unique source of data confirmed that respondents' views of international relations and strategic preferences were not particularly consistent with Confucian moral ideals. Beliefs of elite Chinese students felt that the world was quite dangerous and had a strong inclination to use force despite generally believing that it was immoral to do so. However, there was less consensus about how states should behave on issues not directly related to national security. There was some indication that these views derived from structural rather than cultural conditions.

Harming noncombatants was seen as generally immoral though the intentionality of doing so was an important consideration about this. Respondents were also quick to feel that the severity of the circumstances justified ignoring morality in war. However, necessity did not tend to make immoral uses of force now moral. Additionally, respondents consistently held other states to higher moral standards than their own.

The issues which define political realist and Confucian strategic culture paradigms were incomplete measures of respondents' actual worldviews. Their worldviews, strategic preferences and decisions were inconsistent with the predictions of structural realist theory but better followed the assumptions of rationality that included the influence of a non-pacifistic

interpretation of Confucian strategic culture. Significantly, the beliefs of this version of Confucianism, combined with a political realist view of contemporary international relations, provided an excellent explanation for the beliefs and goals of contemporary Chinese nationalism. This likely explained the observed strong correlation but low causation of the models as it was conceptually substantially different than those represented by the existing but its effects would have been consistent with observed beliefs and their effects on strategic preferences and decision making.

This study contributed a number of insights useful for future policy makers. For one, the future leaders of China have a high sensitivity to threat and are not inclined to interpret and respond to the behavior of other states based upon moral ideals. Additionally, foreign policy discussions regarding how to engage China should not assume that existing IR theories guide China's decision making nor should they overly depend upon existing IR theories to interpret China's behavior. A potentially effective way to influence China's foreign policy and strategic behavior would be to focus on where the combined beliefs of a non-pacifistic Confucian strategic culture, Chinese nationalism, and political realism exaggerate or downplay what would be expected according to rational decision making.

This project successfully achieved its primary objective - to identify and characterize the beliefs and decision making process of an important Chinese demographic using statistical analysis of responses collected through strategic, controlled, direct solicitation. The unique findings from this research provide critical context that can help reduce the chances of unnecessary conflict due to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation. These findings would be even more valuable if they were compared to those of an equivalent Western population.

WORKS CITED

- Bhattacharya, Abanti. "Chinese Nationalism and China's Assertive Foreign Policy." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (2007): 235-262. Accessed 8 Mar. 2017.
- Carlson, Benjamin. "Welcome to Maternity Hotel California." *Rolling Stone*. 19 Aug. 2015. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2016.
- Chen, Xi. "Elitism and Exclusion in Mass Protest Privatization, Resistance, and State Domination in China." *Comparative Political Studies* (2016). Web. Accessed 8 Apr. 2015.
- Chao, Grace Lauren. *Elite Status in the People's Republic of China: Its Formation and Maintenance*. Dissertation. Columbia University, 2013.
- Chubb, Andrew. "Exploring China's "Maritime Consciousness": Public Opinion on the South and East China Sea Disputes." *Perth USAsia Centre*. January 2014. Accessed 10 Feb. 2015.
- Crovelli, Mark R. "Toward an A Priori Theory of International Relations." *Journal of Libertarian Studies*. 21.4 (2007): 101-121. Web. Accessed 30 Apr 2016.
- Egri, Carolyn P., and David A. Ralston. "Generation Cohorts and Personal Values: A Comparison of China and the United States." *Organization Science* 15.2 (2004): 210-220. Accessed 18 Jun. 2017.
- Friedman, Jeffrey A., Jennifer S. Lerner, and Richard Zeckhauser. *Behavioral Consequences of Probabilistic Precision Experimental Evidence from National Security Professionals*. Working paper. 1-71. 2016. Accessed 10 Jun. 2017.

Gay, Bruce, and Sue Weaver. "Theory Building and Paradigms: A Primer on the Nuances of Theory Construction." *American International Journal of Contemporary Research* 1.2 (2011): 24-32. Web. Accessed 15 May 2016.

Gray, Colin S. "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back." *Review of International Studies* 25.1 (1999): 49-69. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, 2005. Print.

Gong, Ted E. *China: Tradition, Nationalism and Just War*. Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College. 1999. Accessed 6 Sep. 2009.

Huang, Lihong. "Elitism and Equality in Chinese Higher Education: Studies of Student Socio-economic Background, Investment in Education, and Career Aspirations." *Studies in Comparative and International Education*, vol 68, 2005. Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Web. Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

James, Patrick. *International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered*. Ohio State University Press, 2002. Print.

Johnson, Jeannie L. *Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct*. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 2006. Accessed 10 Jul. 2017.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security* 27.4 (2003): 5-56. Accessed 27 Sep. 2010.

Johnston, Alastair I. "Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing." *International Security* 41.3 (2017): 7-43. Accessed 5 Feb. 2017.

He Kai & Feng Huiyun. "Xi Jinping's Operational Code Beliefs and China's Foreign Policy." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 6. 3 (Autumn 2013): 209-231. Web. Accessed 30 Apr 2016.

Huang, Lihong. "Elitism and Equality in Chinese Higher Education: Studies of Student Socio-economic Background, Investment in Education, and Career Aspirations." *Studies in Comparative and International Education*, vol 68, 2005. Institute of International Education, Stockholm University. Accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

Jackson, Van. "Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (2014): 331-356. Web. Accessed 5 Sept. 2014.

Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Web. Accessed 8 Aug. 2016.

Lamont, Christopher. *Research Methods in International Relations*. Sage, 2015. Web. Accessed 10 Mar. 2015.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review* 4.3 (2002): 87-113. Accessed 13 Feb. 2010.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Trust, but Verify: The Transparency Revolution and Qualitative International Relations." *Security Studies* 23.4 (2014): 663-688. Web. Accessed 6 Dec. 2014.

Nanda, Prakash (2017, March 21). China's Demand to Respect Its 'Core Interests' is an Ugly Manifestation of Its Newly Acquired Power. *Firstpost*. Accessed 20 Jul. 2017.

Rickards, James. Interview by Gabriel Dominguez. *DW*, 28 July 2014. Web. Accessed 1 Aug. 2016.

Schell, Orville, and John Delury. *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Random House, 2013. Print.

Sitaraman, Ganesh, and David Zionts. "Behavioral War Powers." *New York University Law Review* 90.516 (2015): 517-588. Accessed 9 Mar. 2017.

Tellis, Ashley J. "Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific." *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016, pp. 3-26. Accessed 21 Jul. 2017.

Scissors, Derek. "Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China." *Foreign Affairs* (2009): 24-39. Accessed 21 Jun. 2017.

Scobell, Andrew. "China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35.2 (2014): 211-226. Accessed 4 Apr. 2017.

Timmons, Heather and Gang Yang. "'Bostonian' Elitism in China Irritates the Country's Other College Grads." *Quartz*. 8 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 3 Aug. 2016.

Verhulst, Brad, Lindon J. Eaves, and Peter K. Hatemi. "Correlation not causation: The relationship between personality traits and political ideologies." *American Journal of Political Science* 56.1 (2012): 34-51. Accessed 9 March 2017.

Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories." *Foreign policy* (1998): 29-46. Web. Accessed 7 May 2016.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 8 (2005): 23-48. Web. Accessed 7 May 2016.

Wang, Xiaobing, et al. "College Education and the Poor in China: Documenting the Hurdles to Educational Attainment and College Matriculation." *Asia Pacific Education Review* 12.4 (2011): 533-46. Web. Accessed 26 Aug. 2014.

Wang, Yi. "Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation." *China International Studies* 1 (2014): 18-44. Web. Accessed 5 Aug. 2016.

Yuen, L. "Why Chinese College Graduates Aren't Getting Jobs." *The Atlantic* (2013). Web. Accessed 15 Jul. 2016.

APPENDIX

Standardized factor loadings⁶⁰ and communality⁶¹ scores for SEM models.

Construct & Indicators	Standardized Loading	Reliability	Standardized Loading	Reliability
SEM	Version 1 – Foreign Country		Version 2 – Own Country	
F1 Views of IR		.43		.37
Idealism	.20	.04	.22	.05
State Security	.43	.19	.29	.09
Competition	.39	.15	.33	.11
Conflict of Interests	.49	.24	.49	.24
Thucydides	.30	.09	.29	.09
F2 <i>Jus ad Bellum</i>		.53		.52
Efficacy	.46	.21	.53	.28
Human Rights	.18	.03	.13	.02
Imminent Attack	.52	.27	.52	.27
Asked for Help	.20	.04	.19	.04
Neighbor Invaded	.52	.27	.47	.22
Enemy Building Military	.49	.24	.47	.22
F3 <i>Jus in Bello</i>		.65		.63
Attack Villages	.65	.42	.59	.35
Deprive Civilians	.56	.31	.54	.29
Landmines	.64	.41	.67	.45
F4 Moral Conviction		.78		.79
Been Attacked	.73	.53	.76	.57
Reciprocity	.80	.63	.78	.60
Total Destruction	.57	.33	.61	.37
Determine Battle Outcome	.64	.41	.63	.40

⁶⁰ Also known as regression coefficients – or how much effect the underlying belief has on the questions.

⁶¹ Which is the “percent of variation in the indicator that is explained by the factor it is supposed to measure.” (O’Rourke and Hatcher 232)

English Translation of Survey

In a world where not everyone behaves ideally all the time, determining a country's foreign policy is often very complicated. Sometimes how a country should balance conflicting responsibilities and obligations is not clear. This is especially true when all of the possible options have undesirable but unavoidable side effects. This survey is interested in understanding the different opinions about how countries should interact given these complexities. For these survey questions, 'should' means how you think traditional ideas of what is right and wrong (what would be done in a perfect world) should *actually* be applied to international politics in the real (not perfect) world. In other words, if your job was to advise the leader(s) of a country about how to deal with other countries, what advice would you give them?

There is no right or wrong answer and it is okay if you do not know a lot about this topic. Please select only *one* option. If you are unsure of how to answer any question, please select the choice you think is best. If you have any questions, please ask me for clarification.

Please Select Only One Answer

1 VERSION A: Do you believe that, in general, the international relations decisions of foreign countries should be made by their politicians considering...? Please select only one answer.

VERSION B: Do you believe that, in general, the international relations decisions of your own country should be made by your politicians considering...? Please select only one answer.

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
How the world ought to be	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	How the world actually is

2 VERSION A: How would you advise a foreign country to address its concerns about safety and security? Please select only one answer.

VERSION B: How would you advise your country to address its concerns about safety and security? Please select only one answer.

- By supporting strong international laws and institutions (like the United Nations) to resolve disagreements even if this means that sometimes the best economic, political or military option is not done.
- Because, ultimately, international law is unenforceable and international institutions are unreliable, security should be done by primarily creating alliances and having a strong enough military to deter attacks from rivals.
- Deterrence is not enough, true security requires acquiring enough power compared to other countries to ensure that even when strongly opposed, it can still achieve its vital interests (by using force if necessary).
- Other (please write) _____

3 Some believe that there is more overall benefit (economic, security, political, cultural) for countries to compromise and work together while others think this involves too much sacrifice and too much risk. When thinking mostly of the interests of the country you are advising, would you recommend a country to develop a foreign policy based upon....? Please select only one answer.

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
Compromising Cooperation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Competing to Win

4 Generally speaking, when are countries other than your own likely to resolve their international disagreements through violence...? Please select only one answer.

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
Anytime they think the benefits would outweigh the disadvantages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Only as a last resort in self-defense

5 The world's history of violent and nonviolent international disagreements, conflicts and competition are largely...? Please select only one answer.

- an unavoidable part of human nature (because of different ideas, beliefs and other natural human behavior).
- usually due to politics related to economic disputes over limited resources (desire for oil, land, water, food, etc.).
- Other (please write) _____.

6 There are different views about how national interests that may negatively affect other countries (such as access to natural resources or trade agreements) should be pursued. How much do you agree with the statement,

VERSION A: *“Foreign governments should look out for their own people first. So, they should do whatever is best for their citizens even at the expense of the other countries.”?*

VERSION B: *“My government should look out for our people first. So, we should do whatever is best for our citizens even at the expense of the other countries.”?*

Strongly Disagree	Mildly Disagree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

7 VERSION A: Please select the statement you most agree with about how politicians from foreign countries should in practice see the role morality plays in international affairs. Please select only one answer.

VERSION B: Please select the statement you most agree with about how politicians from your country should in practice see the role morality plays in international affairs. Please select only one answer.

- There are universal rights and wrongs but they only apply to how people should treat one another. The world is too competitive and too dangerous to allow these rules to limit the political and military options available to governments and countries.
- What is morally correct should always be considered and usually followed. However, although it does not make it morally right, sometimes it is necessary for a country to behave immorally in order to protect its citizens.
- Governments and individuals have different roles and responsibilities so they have different standards of what is right and wrong. For a government, what is morally right is what best meets its obligations to its people - the survival of the country and the good of its own citizens.
- There are few or no universal moral standards, morality is just an excuse used by powerful countries to justify preventing weaker countries from challenging the way things currently are.
- Morality should shape politics even if doing so means that it constrains and sometimes disadvantages one's own country?

8 How much do you agree that relations between countries in the modern world can be described as *'Justice is only an issue between countries of equal power. Strong countries do whatever they are capable of doing and weak countries suffer what they must.'* Please select only one answer.

Strongly Disagree	Mildly Disagree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Now for some questions about a slightly different subject. Questions 9-19 ask for your opinion about when and how it is permissible to do some harm to achieve a greater good or at least a lesser evil. There are no right or wrong answers, only different views and opinions.

9 VERSION A: For each of the following situations, please indicate how acceptable it is for foreign countries to use force? Please select only one option for each circumstance.

VERSION B: For each of the following situations, please indicate how acceptable it is for your country to use force? Please select only one option for each circumstance.

Situation	Is morally okay to use force	Force may be used only because this is an exceptional circumstance but it is still <i>morally</i> wrong	Is not okay to use force for this reason
When it is the most effective way to pursue national interests (economic, security, etc)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When an unfriendly country is being increasingly threatening by rapidly building its military (so should be stopped before it becomes too strong)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When there is clear evidence that an attack is imminent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When it has been physically attacked by another military first	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When an unfriendly country becomes more threatening because it invaded a country next to the one you are advising	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When a small country that is wrongfully invaded by a stronger country requests help	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
To stop massive human rights violations occurring in another country's internal conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10 Primarily, war should be avoided because it...? Please select only one answer.

- causes too much suffering and harm for everyone involved.
- is not an effective way for a country to pursue its interests and goals.
- Other (please write) _____

11 VERSION A: May enemy soldiers in populated villages or towns be attacked in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many innocent civilians would be killed? Is it never morally acceptable for foreign militaries to do this or is just part of war? Please select only one answer.

VERSION B: May enemy soldiers in populated villages or towns be attacked in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many innocent civilians would be killed? Is it never morally acceptable for your country's military to do this or is just part of war? Please select only one answer.

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
Is never morally okay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Is morally okay, part of war

12 VERSION A: May foreign soldiers plant landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatants even though innocent civilians may step on them accidentally? Please select only one answer.

VERSION B: May your country's soldier's plant landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatants even though innocent civilians may step on them accidentally? Please select only one

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
Is never morally okay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Is morally okay, part of war

13 VERSION A: May foreign soldiers and fighters deprive an innocent civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy?

VERSION B: May your country's soldiers and fighters deprive an innocent civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy?

	Strongly Agree	Mildly Agree	Neither/Don't Know	Mildly Agree	Strongly Agree	
Is never morally okay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Is morally okay, part of war

Do any of the following circumstances change the way you feel about the permissibility of any of the limitations in the previous three questions (questions 11-13)?

	No Change	Although it is still against my moral beliefs, some of these actions may be done because of the exceptional circumstances	Although it would have been better to avoid doing some of these actions, the new circumstances make doing some of them morally okay	There now is no problem at all doing some of these things
14 The other country physically attacked first	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15 The other side started violating these limits first	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16 The enemy's goal is not just victory but total destruction of the country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17 If it made a difference between winning or losing a battle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18 If this does not change who actually wins the war, do you believe it is better to have...? (please select one and share why)

- A quick but unrestrained war because _____
- A longer but more restrained war because _____

19 VERSION A: When considering selling weapons to other countries or fighters, how much moral responsibility should foreign countries have for considering how these weapons may be used?

VERSION B: When considering selling weapons to others countries or fighters, how much moral responsibility should your country have for considering how these weapons may be used?

- It is morally okay to sell to anyone who is willing to buy.
- It is morally okay to sell weapons only to those who you strongly believe will use them only in ways in which you morally agree.
- It is morally okay to sell weapons to your allies and others who share common national interests.
- It is never morally okay to sell weapons because you would become at least partially responsible for the resulting death and suffering.
- Business is business so even if the weapons are used in a morally wrong way, the seller has no moral responsibility.

Finally, here are just a few questions for statistical purposes

20 What is your age? _____

21 From primary school, how many years of school have you had? _____ years

22 What was your major in school? _____

23 At some point, did you serve in the military or have you never served in the military?

- Yes – have served
- Did not serve.

24 What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

25 How would you describe your primary job or career field? (please select only one)

- Student
- Government Employee
- Military
- Teacher/Professor/Intellectual
- Private Company Employee
- Other (Please write) _____

26 What ethnicity are you ?

- Han
- Other (please write) _____

27 What province in China do you come from?

<input type="checkbox"/> Beijing	<input type="checkbox"/> Hubei
<input type="checkbox"/> Tianjin	<input type="checkbox"/> Hunan
<input type="checkbox"/> Hebei	<input type="checkbox"/> Guangdong
<input type="checkbox"/> Shanxi	<input type="checkbox"/> Guangxi
<input type="checkbox"/> Qinghai	<input type="checkbox"/> Hainan
<input type="checkbox"/> Liaoning	<input type="checkbox"/> Chongqing
<input type="checkbox"/> Jilin	<input type="checkbox"/> Sichuan
<input type="checkbox"/> Gansu	<input type="checkbox"/> Guizhou
<input type="checkbox"/> Shanghai	<input type="checkbox"/> Yunnan
<input type="checkbox"/> Jiangsu	<input type="checkbox"/> Tibet
<input type="checkbox"/> Zhejiang	<input type="checkbox"/> Shaanxi
<input type="checkbox"/> Anhui	<input type="checkbox"/> Heilongjiang
<input type="checkbox"/> Fujian	<input type="checkbox"/> Inner Mongolia
<input type="checkbox"/> Jiangxi	<input type="checkbox"/> Ningxia Hui
<input type="checkbox"/> Shandong	<input type="checkbox"/> Hong Kong&Macau
<input type="checkbox"/> Henan	<input type="checkbox"/> Xinjiang
<input type="checkbox"/> Taiwan	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please write)

Survey Questionnaire Chinese Version 1

在一个并非人人表现都总尽如人意的世界上，确定一个国家的外交政策常常非常复杂。有时，一个国家应如何协调相互冲突的责任与义务不太清楚，尤其是当各种可能的选择都有不良但却不可避免的副作用时。本调查旨在了解人们对各国在这些复杂因素下应如何互动的看法。在以下调查问题中，“应该”意指你认为传统的是非观念（在一个理想的世界里会做什么和不做什么）应如何实际应用于现实（非理想的）世界中的国际政治。换言之，如果你的工作是向国家领导人就如何与其他国家打交道提供建议，那么你会提出什么建议？

答案没有对错，而且你对这个主题了解不多也没关系。如果你不肯定如何回答，请选择你认为最合适的选项。有问题欢迎垂询。

请只选择一个答案

1 你认为一般来说其他国家的国际关系决策应该由这些国家的政治家根据对.....的考虑做出吗？（只能选择一个答案，只能选择一个‘□’）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
世界应该是什么样子	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	世界实际是什么样子

2 你如何建议其他国家处理国家安全问题？.....（只能选择一个答案）

- 通过支持强有力的国际法律和国际机构（如联合国）来解决分歧，即使这意味着有时不能达到最佳的经济、政治和军事目的。
- 因为，从根本上说，国际法效力有限，同时国际机构不可靠，安全应该主要通过建立同盟和拥有一支可以阻吓敌人攻击的强大军事力量来实现。
- 阻吓是不够的，真正的安全需要获得相对于其他国家的强大力量，以确保即使遭到强烈反对也仍然可以获得重要利益（必要时使用武力）。
- 其他（请注明）_____

3 有人认为国家间妥协和合作有更多的整体利益（经济、安全、政治、文化等），而有人认为这样会带来过多的牺牲和风险。在主要考虑你为之提供建议的国家的利益时，你会建议该国根据.....制定外交政策吗？（只能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
妥协式合作	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	为利而争

4 一般来说，什么时候除你们国家外的其他国家可能通过暴力解决国际分歧？……（只能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
任何他们认为利 大于弊时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	只在迫不得已 自卫时

5 世界上暴力和非暴力国际分歧、冲突和竞争的历史原因主要是……。只能选择一个答案。

- 人性使然（由于不同的观念、信仰和其他自然人类行为）。
- 通常是由于与针对有限资源的经济纷争有关的政治（对石油、土地、水、食物等的争夺）。
- 其他（请注明）_____

6 关于应该如何追求可能对其他国家造成不利影响的国家利益（比如获取自然资源或加入贸易协定），人们看法不一。你在多大程度上同意以下说法：

“外国政府应该首先考虑他们自己的国民利益。所以，他们应该以最能维护他们国民利益的方式行事，即使这样做对其他国家不利。”……（只能选择一个答案）

非常 不同意	基本 不同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本 同意	非常 同意
1	2	3	4	5

7 关于其他国家的政治家应该如何实际对待国际事务中的道德问题，请选择你最同意的说法。……（只能选择一个答案）

- 世上有普世性的是非曲直，但它们只适用于人与人之间应该如何互相对待。世界竞争太激烈，也太危险，不能让这些个人意义上的道德规则限制政府和国家可用的政治和军事选择。
- 道义上正确的事或行为应该一直受推崇，并经常被遵循。然而，有时一个国家为保护自己的国民而采取不道德的行为是必要的，尽管这样做在道义上不正确。

- 政府和个人有不同的角色和职责，因而有不同的是非标准。对政府来说，道义上正确的事就是最好地履行对本国公民的义务，即维护国家的生存和自己公民的利益。
- 普世道德标准几乎不存在，道德只是强国用来为阻止弱国挑战现状涂脂抹粉的借口。
- 道德应该影响政治，尽管这样做会约束自己的国家，而且有时会使自己的国家处于不利地位。

8 你在多大程度上同意以下说法，即：现代世界上国家间的关系可以被描述为“公平只是力量平等国家之间的事。强国为所欲为，弱国忍受欺凌”。 ●●●●●

非常不同意	基本不同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意
1	2	3	4	5

以下问题的主题稍有不同。问题 9 至 19 是询问你对何时和如何可允许为获得更大的善或去除更多的恶而实施一些伤害行为的看法。答案没有对错，只是看法和观点不同。

9 请指出在下列各种情况下你对其他国家使用武力的接受程度。每种情况只能选择一个答案。

情况	使用武力在道义上是 可以的	特殊情况下可以使用武力，但这样做在道义上 仍然是错误的	为此而使用武力是 不可以的
当使用武力是追求国家利益（经济、安全等）的最有效方法时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一个有安全威胁的国家正在快速扩军，不断加大威胁时（应该在其变得过于强大之前阻止之）	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当有明显证据表明行将受到攻击时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当他国军队先发动实际攻击时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一个国家因为入侵你为之提供建议的国家的邻国而变得更具威胁时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一个小国受到强国不正当入侵而求援时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一国因发生国内冲突而出现大规模人权侵犯现象时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10 总体来说，应该避免战争，因为战争……。(能选择一个答案)

给每个受影响者都会造成太多的痛苦和伤害。

不是国家追求利益和目标的一种有效方法。

其他（请注明）_____

11 在明知会殃及许多无辜平民的情况下，为削弱敌人可以攻击敌方士兵所在的人口稠密的乡村或城镇吗？其他国家的军队这样做在道义上是决不可接受的还是这只是战争中不可避免的？……（能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的，战争中不可避免的

12 即使地雷可能伤害无辜平民，其他国家的士兵也可以为阻止敌方战斗员活动而埋设地雷吗？……（能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的，战争中不可避免的

13 其他国家的士兵和战斗员为削弱敌人可以剥夺无辜平民居民对食物、药品或水的使用吗？……

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的，战争中不可避免的

前面三个问题（问题 11 至 13）涉及有关限制，在以下各种情况下，你的允许施加这些限制的想法有所改变吗？

	没有改变	虽然这样做仍然有违我的道义信念，但有些行为因为情况特殊是可以实施的	虽然这些行为有些若能避免更好，但新的情况使得有些行为的实施在道义上是可行的	这些行为有些现在完全可以实施
14 敌方先实施攻击	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15 另一方先开始违反这些限制	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16 敌方的目标不只是取胜，而是全部摧毁这个国家	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17 如果这样做关系到一场战斗的胜负	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18 如果这改变不了战争的胜负，你认为以下做法更好吗？（请选择一项并注明原因）

进行一场快速而无限制的战争，因为_____

进行一场漫长但施加更多限制的战争，因为_____

19 当考虑向别国或战斗员出售武器时，其他国家应该有多少道义责任来考虑这些武器可能被如何利用？.....

谁想买就卖给谁，这样做在道义上是可行的。

只把武器卖给你坚信会以你在道义上认可的方式使用这些武器者，这样做在道义上是可行的。

把武器卖给你们的同盟国和其他与你们拥有共同利益的国家，这样做在道义上是可行的。

出售武器在道义上是决不可行的，因为你至少要对造成的死亡和苦难部分负责。

卖武器就是做生意，所以即使售出的武器被以道义上错误的方式利用，出售者也没有道义责任。

最后几个问题用于统计

20 你的年龄？ _____

21 从小学开始你上过多少年学？ _____ 年

22 什么是你在学校的主要专业？ _____

23 你在军队服过役吗？或者说，你从没有在军队服过役吗？

是的，在军队服过役。

没有服过役。

24 你的性别？

- 男
- 女

25 你的主要工作或职业是什么？（请选择一个）

- 学生
- 政府工作人员
- 军人
- 教师/专业人员/知识分子
- 私营企业员工
- 其他（请注明）_____

26 你是什么民族？

- 汉族
- 其他（请注明）_____

<input type="checkbox"/> 北京市	<input type="checkbox"/> 湖北省
<input type="checkbox"/> 天津市	<input type="checkbox"/> 湖南省
<input type="checkbox"/> 河北省	<input type="checkbox"/> 广东省
<input type="checkbox"/> 山西省	<input type="checkbox"/> 广西壮族自治区
<input type="checkbox"/> 青海省	<input type="checkbox"/> 海南省
<input type="checkbox"/> 辽宁省	<input type="checkbox"/> 重庆市
<input type="checkbox"/> 吉林省	<input type="checkbox"/> 四川省
<input type="checkbox"/> 甘肃省	<input type="checkbox"/> 贵州省
<input type="checkbox"/> 上海市	<input type="checkbox"/> 云南省
<input type="checkbox"/> 江苏省	<input type="checkbox"/> 西藏自治区
<input type="checkbox"/> 浙江省	<input type="checkbox"/> 陕西省
<input type="checkbox"/> 安徽省	<input type="checkbox"/> 黑龙江省
<input type="checkbox"/> 福建省	<input type="checkbox"/> 内蒙古自治区
<input type="checkbox"/> 江西省	<input type="checkbox"/> 宁夏回族自治区
<input type="checkbox"/> 山东省	<input type="checkbox"/> 香港特别行政区
<input type="checkbox"/> 河南省	<input type="checkbox"/> 新疆维吾尔自治区
<input type="checkbox"/> 台湾省	<input type="checkbox"/> 其他（请注明）

27 你来自中国哪个省？ →→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

Survey Questionnaire Chinese Version 2

在一个并非人人表现都总尽如人意的世界上，确定一个国家的外交政策常常非常复杂。有时，一个国家应如何协调相互冲突的责任与义务不太清楚，尤其是当各种可能的选择都有不良但却不可避免的副作用时。本调查旨在了解人们对各国在这些复杂因素下应如何互动的看法。在以下调查问题中，“应该”意指你认为传统的是非观念（在一个理想的世界里会做什么和不做什么）应如何实际应用于现实（非理想的）世界中的国际政治。换言之，如果你的工作是向国家领导人就如何与其他国家打交道提供建议，那么你会提出什么建议？

答案没有对错，而且你对这个主题了解不多也没关系。如果你不肯定如何回答，请选择你认为最合适的选项。有问题欢迎垂询。

请只选择一个答案

1 你认为一般来说你自己国家的国际关系决策应该由你们国家的政治家根据对……的考虑做出吗？（只能选择一个答案，只能选择一个‘□’）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
世界应该 是什么样子	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	世界实际 是什么样子

2 你如何建议本国处理国家安全问题？……（只能选择一个答案）

- 通过支持强有力的国际法律和国际机构（如联合国）来解决分歧，即使这意味着有时不能达到最佳的经济、政治和军事目的。
- 因为，从根本上说，国际法效力有限，同时国际机构不可靠，安全应该主要通过建立同盟和拥有一支可以阻吓敌人攻击的强大军事力量来实现。
- 阻吓是不够的，真正的安全需要获得相对于其他国家的强大力量，以确保即使遭到强烈反对也仍然可以获得重要利益（必要时使用武力）。
- 其他（请注明）_____

3 有人认为国家间妥协和合作有更多的整体利益（经济、安全、政治、文化等），而有人认为这样会带来过多的牺牲和风险。在主要考虑你为之提供建议的国家的利益时，你会建议该国根据……制定外交政策吗？（只能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
妥协式合作	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	为利而争

4 一般来说，什么时候除你们国家外的其他国家可能通过暴力解决国际分歧？……（只能选择一个答案）

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/ 不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
任何他们认为利 大于弊时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	只在迫不得已 自卫时

5 世界上暴力和非暴力国际分歧、冲突和竞争的历史原因主要是……。只能选择一个答案。

- 人性使然（由于不同的观念、信仰和其他自然人类行为）。
- 通常是由于与针对有限资源的经济纷争有关的政治（对石油、土地、水、食物等的争夺）。
- 其他（请注明）_____

6 关于应该如何追求可能对其他国家造成不利影响的国家利益（比如获取自然资源或加入贸易协定），人们看法不一。你在多大程度上同意以下说法：

“我国政府应该首先考虑我们自己的国民利益。所以，我们应该以最能维护我们国民利益的方式行事，即使这样做对其他国家不利。”……（只能选择一个答案）

非常 不同意	基本 不同意	不置可否/不知道	基本 同意	非常 同意
1	2	3	4	5

7 关于你们国家的政治家应该如何实际对待国际事务中的道德问题，请选择你最同意的说法。……（只能选择一个答案）

- 世上有普世性的是非曲直，但它们只适用于人与人之间应该如何互相对待。世界竞争太激烈，也太危险，不能让这些个人意义上的道德规则限制政府和国家可用的政治和军事选择。
- 道义上正确的事或行为应该一直受推崇，并经常被遵循。然而，有时一个国家为保护自己的国民而采取不道德的行为是必要的，尽管这样做在道义上不正确。
- 政府和个人有不同的角色和职责，因而有不同的的是非标准。对政府来说，道义上正确的事就是最好地履行对本国公民的义务，即维护国家的生存和自己公民的利益。

- 普世道德标准几乎不存在，道德只是强国用来为阻止弱国挑战现状涂脂抹粉的借口。
- 道德应该影响政治，尽管这样做会约束自己的国家，而且有时会使自己的国家处于不利地位。

8 你在多大程度上同意以下说法，即：现代世界上国家间的关系可以被描述为“公平只是力量平等国家之间的事。强国为所欲为，弱国忍受欺凌”。

非常不同意	基本不同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意
1	2	3	4	5

以下问题的主题稍有不同。问题 9 至 19 是询问你对何时和如何可允许为获得更大的善或去除更多的恶而实施一些伤害行为的看法。答案没有对错，只是看法和观点不同。

9 请指出在下列各种情况下你对你的国家使用武力的接受程度。每种情况只能选择一个答案。

情况	使用武力在道义上是可能的	特殊情况下可以使用武力，但这样做在道义上仍然是错误的	为此而使用武力是不可以的
当使用武力是追求国家利益（经济、安全等）的最有效方法时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

当一个有安全威胁的国家正在快速扩军，不断加大威胁时（应该在其变得过于强大之前阻止之）	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当有明显证据表明行将受到攻击时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当他国军队先发动实际攻击时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一个国家因为入侵你为之提供建议的国家的邻国而变得更具威胁时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一个小国受到强国不正当入侵而求援时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
当一国因发生国内冲突而出现大规模人权侵犯现象时	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10 总体来说，应该避免战争，因为战争……。 (能选择一个答案)

给每个受影响者都会造成太多的痛苦和伤害。

不是国家追求利益和目标的一种有效方法。

其他（请注明）_____

11 在明知会殃及许多无辜平民的情况下，为削弱敌人可以攻击敌方士兵所在的人口稠密的乡村或城镇吗？你们国家的军队这样做在道义上是决不可接受的还是这只是战争中不可避免的？…… (能选择一个答案)

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的，战争中不可避免的

12 即使地雷可能伤害无辜平民，你们国家的士兵也可以为阻止敌方战斗员活动而埋设地雷吗？…… (能选择一个答案)

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的， 战争中不可避免的
-----------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	----------------------

13 你们国家的士兵和战斗员为削弱敌人可以剥夺无辜平民居民对食物、药品或水的使用吗？……

	非常同意	基本同意	不置可否/不知道	基本同意	非常同意	
道义上是决不可以的	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	道义上是可以的， 战争中不可避免的

前面三个问题（问题 11 至 13）涉及有关限制，在以下各种情况下，你的允许施加这些限制的想法有所改变吗？

	没有改变	虽然这样做仍然有违我的道义信念，但有些行为因为情况特殊是可以实施的	虽然这些行为有些若能避免更好，但新的情况使得有些行为的实施在道义上是可行的	这些行为有些现在完全可以实施
14 敌方先实施攻击	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15 另一方先开始违反这些限制	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16 敌方的目标不只是取胜，而是全部摧毁这个国家	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17 、如果这样做关系到一场战斗的胜负	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18 如果这改变不了战争的胜负，你认为以下做法更好吗？(请选择一项并注明原因)

进行一场快速而无限制的战争，因为_____

进行一场漫长但施加更多限制的战争，因为_____

19 当考虑向别国或战斗员出售武器时,你们国家应该有多少道义责任来考虑这些武器可能被如何利用?.....

谁想买就卖给谁,这样做在道义上是可以的。

只把武器卖给你坚信会以你在道义上认可的方式使用这些武器者,这样做在道义上是可以的。

把武器卖给你们的同盟国和其他与你们拥有共同利益的国家,这样做在道义上是可以的。

出售武器在道义上是决不可以的,因为你至少要对造成的死亡和苦难部分负责。

卖武器就是做生意,所以即使售出的武器被以道义上错误的方式利用,出售者也没有道义责任。

最后几个问题用于统计

20 你的年龄? _____

21 从小学开始你上过多少年学? _____ 年

22 什么是你在学校的主要专业? _____

23 你在军队服过役吗?或者说,你从没有在军队服过役吗?

是的,在军队服过役。

没有服过役。

<input type="checkbox"/>	北京市	<input type="checkbox"/>	湖北省
--------------------------	-----	--------------------------	-----

24 你的性别？

- 男
- 女

25 你的主要工作或职业是什么？（请选择一个）

- 学生
- 政府工作人员
- 军人
- 教师/专业人员/知识分子
- 私营企业员工
- 其他（请注明） _____

26 你是什么民族？

- 汉族
- 其他（请注明） _____

27 你来自中国哪个省？

→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

<input type="checkbox"/>	天津市	<input type="checkbox"/>	湖南省
<input type="checkbox"/>	河北省	<input type="checkbox"/>	广东省
<input type="checkbox"/>	山西省	<input type="checkbox"/>	广西壮族自治区
<input type="checkbox"/>	青海省	<input type="checkbox"/>	海南省
<input type="checkbox"/>	辽宁省	<input type="checkbox"/>	重庆市
<input type="checkbox"/>	吉林省	<input type="checkbox"/>	四川省
<input type="checkbox"/>	甘肃省	<input type="checkbox"/>	贵州省
<input type="checkbox"/>	上海市	<input type="checkbox"/>	云南省
<input type="checkbox"/>	江苏省	<input type="checkbox"/>	西藏自治区
<input type="checkbox"/>	浙江省	<input type="checkbox"/>	陕西省
<input type="checkbox"/>	安徽省	<input type="checkbox"/>	黑龙江省
<input type="checkbox"/>	福建省	<input type="checkbox"/>	内蒙古自治区
<input type="checkbox"/>	江西省	<input type="checkbox"/>	宁夏回族自治区
<input type="checkbox"/>	山东省	<input type="checkbox"/>	香港特别行政区
<input type="checkbox"/>	河南省	<input type="checkbox"/>	新疆维吾尔自治区
<input type="checkbox"/>	台湾省	<input type="checkbox"/>	其他（请注明）