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A Metaphilosophical Reading of Plato's Phaedo

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**A Metaphilosophical Reading of Plato's *Phaedo***

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## Abstract

Although many of Plato's dialogues contain reflections on the correct method of philosophical argument, scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the *Phaedo* in this regard. This thesis explores Plato's *Phaedo* from an overlooked perspective, namely its metaphilosophical component and its prescriptions on the correct philosophical practice. The findings presented in this thesis thus help to better understand Plato's thoughts on philosophical argument and the possibility of human knowledge. In Chapter 1 and 2, I present a theoretical framework of the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing the correct philosophical conversation and argument. I claim that metaphilosophy is a significant component of the *Phaedo* and the epistemic norms rely on the idea of philosophical humility. Chapter 3 examines Socrates' so-called defence speech at the *Phaedo* 63-69. I argue that the content of the defence partially shapes the epistemic norms that are developed and put into practice in the *Phaedo*. I suggest that Socrates' defence speech specifies the limits of human cognition and that the concept of philosophical humility should arise out of the recognition of these limits. In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the argument against misology presented at *Phaedo* 88-91. I argue that the misology argument is metaphilosophical in the sense that it stresses the danger of putting all our trust in arguments before possessing expertise in argument; hence the misology argument adds to the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry. Chapter 5 investigates Socrates' autobiography portrayed in the *Phaedo* 96-101, with special emphasis on the meaning of second-sailing. I offer a novel interpretation of the second-sailing according to which the distinction is not *simply* between the best and the second-best method, but another contrast stems from the purpose-relative aspect of Socrates' choice.

### **Plato's Works Cited by Abbreviations**

Ap.	=	Apology
Crt.	=	Crito
Gorg.	=	Gorgias
Parm.	=	Parmenides
Phd.	=	Phaedo
Prot.	=	Protagoras
Rep.	=	Republic
Soph.	=	Sophist
Ti.	=	Timaeus
Theae.	=	Theaetetus

### **Note on Translations and Greek Texts**

All translations of the *Phaedo* are from Long & Sedley (2011). The translations of Plato's other dialogues are taken from Cooper & Hutchinson (ed.) (1993). All Greek texts are retrieved from Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library. Ed. Maria C. Pantelia. University of California, Irvine. <http://www.tlg.uci.edu>.

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## Table of Contents

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>9</b>
<hr/>	
<b>CHAPTER 1: A TERMINOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR READING PLATO'S PHAEDO</b>	<b>17</b>
<hr/>	
<b>1.1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>1.2 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE METAPHILOSOPHICAL READING</b>	<b>18</b>
1.2.1 THE SCOPE OF METAPHILOSOPHICAL READING	19
1.2.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENTS	19
1.2.3 THE PHAEDO ON DISAGREEMENTS	20
1.2.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCRATES' DEFENCE SPEECH	21
<b>1.3 THE NORMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL HUMILITY</b>	<b>24</b>
1.3.1 THE EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW	24
1.3.2 THE CONCILIATORY APPROACH	29
1.3.3 PESSIMIST EPISTEMOLOGY	31
1.3.4 EDUCATIONAL V. SCIENTIFIC REASONS	33
<b>1.4 CONCLUSION</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: THE EPISTEMIC NORMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT IN THE PHAEDO</b>	<b>36</b>
<hr/>	
<b>2.1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>2.2 PLATO ON PERSUASION AND AGREEMENT IN THE PROTAGORAS</b>	<b>36</b>
2.2.1 WHY THE PROTAGORAS?	36
2.2.2 AGREEMENT AND THE GOAL OF CONVERSATION	38
2.2.3 THE INTERVENTION OF LISTENERS	41
2.2.4 CASE I: THE EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW	43
2.2.5 CASE II: CAREFUL CHECKING	45
2.2.6 INTERIM CONCLUSION	47
<b>2.3 THE PHAEDO'S METAPHILOSOPHICAL COMPONENT</b>	<b>48</b>
2.3.1 SOCRATES' SECOND DEFENCE SPEECH	49
2.3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL HUMILITY AND PERSUASION	50
2.3.3 THE FIRST DISAGREEMENT	53
2.3.4 THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE	54
2.3.5 THE SECOND DISAGREEMENT	56
2.3.6 CEBES AND SIMMIAS	58
<b>2.4 CONCLUSION</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3: THE PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHERS</b>	<b>63</b>
<hr/>	
<b>3.1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>3.2 BECOMING A PHILOSOPHER</b>	<b>64</b>
3.2.1 TRUE PHILOSOPHERS	64
3.2.2 THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHOS	66

3.2.3 THE PRACTICE OF TRUE PHILOSOPHERS	68
3.2.4 THE PROHIBITION OF SUICIDE	69
<b>3.3 PURIFICATION, DYING AND BEING DEAD</b>	<b>71</b>
3.4.1 DYING V. BEING DEAD	72
3.4.2 THE PRACTICE OF DYING AND BEING DEAD	75
3.4.3 THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SOUL	77
3.4.4 WISDOM IN HADES	78
3.4.5 TRUE PHILOSOPHERS' OBJECT OF DESIRE	80
3.4.6. PURIFICATION, PURIFICATORY RITES AND VIRTUES	81
3.4.7. SHADOW-PAINTING AND PURIFICATION	86
<b>3.4 CONCLUSION</b>	<b>89</b>

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## **CHAPTER 4: HATRED OF ARGUMENTS** **91**

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<b>4.1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>4.2 THE ORIGIN OF MISOLOGY</b>	<b>93</b>
4.2.1 EPISTEMIC FEAR	95
4.2.2 THE ROLE OF THE MISOLOGY ARGUMENT	98
4.2.3 PHAEDO'S FEAR	99
4.2.4 SOCRATES' ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS FRIENDS AND INTERLOCUTORS	101
4.2.5 THE CURE OF MISOLOGY	105
<b>4.3 THE MEANING OF TECHNE</b>	<b>107</b>
4.3.1. THE MISCHIEF OF ANTILOGICIANS	107
4.3.2 ANTILOGIC IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC	108
4.3.3 THE YOUNG LADS OF THE PHAEDO	110
4.3.4 THE NOTION OF EXPERTISE	112
4.3.5 THE INTELLECTUAL VICE OF ANTILOGICIANS	115
4.3.6 EPISTEMIC BLAME, ARROGANCE AND MODESTY	116
<b>4.4 CONCLUSION</b>	<b>118</b>

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## **CHAPTER 5: SOCRATES' SECOND-SAILING** **124**

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<b>5.1 INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>5.2 THE MEANING OF ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟΨ</b>	<b>126</b>
5.2.1 SOME ANCIENT TESTIMONIES ON ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟΨ	127
5.2.2 A POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF THE STRONG (TRADITIONAL) SECOND-BEST READING	133
<b>5.3 ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ ΠΛΟΨ IN THE PHAEDO</b>	<b>136</b>
5.3.1 THE PRE-SECOND-SAILING PERIOD	136
5.3.2 ANAXAGORAS' NOUS	139
5.3.3 THE SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL EXPLANATION	141
5.3.4 SOCRATES' REFUGE	144
<b>5.4 THE MEANING OF SOCRATES' LOGOI</b>	<b>146</b>
5.4.1 INQUIRY IN THE SECOND-SAILING	146
5.4.2 THE NATURE OF SOCRATES' LOGOS	148
5.4.3 THE METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS	151
5.4.4. THE FORM-AITIA HYPOTHESIS (THE THEORY OF FORMS)	160
<b>5.5. CONCLUSION</b>	<b>163</b>

<b>EPILOGUE</b>	<b>166</b>
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<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>175</b>
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## Introduction

For Plato, establishing the correct epistemic (or intellectual) norms of philosophical argument is a precondition for attaining knowledge and the truth. Plato deals with this task in many dialogues such as the *Apology*, *Republic*, *Sophist*, and *Phaedo*. Plato even promised to write a dialogue called the *Philosopher*, as anticipated in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, but he never wrote it.

The purpose of my study is to shine new light on the discourse concerning Plato's view about the correct method of philosophical argument. To this end, I focus on the metaphilosophical and meta-dialogical components of the *Phaedo*, although analytical studies, such as the works of Gallop (1975) and Bostock (1986), interpreting the dialogue's individual arguments have their own merits.

Among the dialogues mentioned above, the *Phaedo* is the least studied with respect to Plato's thoughts on the correct method of philosophical conversation and inquiry. The relative paucity of criticism concerning the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo* seems to be a result of scholars focusing more on the proofs of the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms, which are 'the twin pillars of Platonism' for Cornford (1935). Besides, Plato's ideas on the right method of philosophical argument are rather implicit.

The overall aim of this thesis is to review the evidence for the metaphilosophy component of the *Phaedo* and to explore the relationship between the correct epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing philosophical argument/conversation. I also engage with the first-order investigations of the *Phaedo* to understand the correct philosophical practice since the results of these investigations are supposed to be used in the business of philosophy. I thus explore some first-order theories presented in the *Phaedo*, if these theories seem to contribute to our understanding of the metaphilosophical component.

Although scholars offer a variety of interpretations of the *Phaedo*, there is no thorough investigation into Plato's insights on the correct method of philosophical argument and his awareness of the assertional status of first-order arguments. Regarding the latter, Plato invites the readers to engage critically with the proofs of

the immortality of the soul (Peterson 2011). That said, I disagree with the view that Plato does not share Socrates' opinions on the practice of philosophy, and hence the weaknesses of the arguments do not pertain to Plato (Butler 2015). Instead, I suggest that not only do the weaknesses belong to Plato, but also that he is aware of these weaknesses. Plato believes some arguments are open for modification (or expansion) by means of either retracting or adding a hypothesis.

To this end, I scrutinize some of the much-discussed passages of the *Phaedo* by concentrating on their metaphilosophical aspect. Fundamental questions include:

- (A) What is the role of agreement and persuasion in describing the correct philosophical practice?
- (B) What is the relationship between the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophy and the limits of human epistemic access?
- (C) What are the metaphilosophical dimensions of Socrates' defence (63-69), the argument against misology (89-91) and Socrates' autobiography (96-101)?
- (D) How does philosophical humility (i.e. recognizing the fallibility of human understanding or of our epistemic faculties) contribute to the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo*?<sup>1</sup>

Regarding the first question, most of the works on the *Phaedo*, for instance those belonging to Archer-Hind (1883), Burnet (1911), Hackforth (1955), Bluck (1955), Gallop (1975), Dorter (1982), Bostock (1986), Rowe (1993), paid little attention to the fact that Socrates is defending himself as if in court, save for a couple of studies including Rowe (2007) and Peterson (2011). I presume that the concept of defence involves accusation and conflict; hence the goal of persuasion and agreement must be the chief aim of the defendant, namely Socrates. Then I argue that the structure of the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors (Simmias and Cebes) can provide a model of the correct norms of philosophical argument, as well as a method for productively dealing with disagreements (Long 2013).

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<sup>1</sup> 'Philosophical humility' and 'epistemic modesty' are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

Concerning the question of humility, some scholars (Chen 1990) claim that Plato's ideas on philosophical practice in the *Phaedo* point to a sort of epistemological pessimism, for according to the dialogue, full knowledge is impossible in this world. Although it may seem a *prima facie* case that Plato's ideas imply a sort of epistemological pessimism (since the soul's cognitive capabilities are diminished by the body), I describe Plato's position as a kind of epistemic optimism and modesty, since knowledge exists and is discoverable, but its acquisition is laborious and success cannot be predicted or guaranteed.

Concerning the three passages mentioned in (C), I suggest that Plato stipulates the conditions of correct philosophical practice, in addition to a theory of psychology and pleasure (in Socrates' defence), a critique of antilogic (in the misology argument), a method of philosophical investigation and a theory of causation (in Socrates' autobiography). I argue that these metaphilosophical norms are partly based on philosophical humility. Philosophical humility is then a condition of correct philosophical practice and a condition which should be fulfilled by true philosophers.

In Chapter 1, I suggest that the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component conforms with the norms governing philosophical humility. This chapter discusses contemporary views on epistemic modesty and disagreement to a certain degree. I draw on the contemporary literature on the epistemology of disagreements to develop the conceptual framework from which I develop my interpretation. Next, I explore the *Phaedo*'s overall metaphilosophical theme by using the model established through the most recent discussions on epistemic modesty.

In chapter 2, I claim that the goal of philosophical conversation is agreement. To this end, I draw on the *Protagoras* for inspiring a model of the philosophy of conversation. I then apply this model to the *Phaedo*. According to this model based on several epistemic norms, such as careful checking and epistemic peerhood, proper communication and mutual understanding are necessary for dissolving disagreements and completing a philosophical investigation (McCabe 2015). In this respect, one of Plato's aims in the *Phaedo* is to lay down the conditions of successful philosophical argument.

In the same chapter, I maintain that disagreements contribute to philosophical progress and the acquisition of knowledge in the *Phaedo*. That is, the dialogue

suggests that had interlocutors not disagreed with Socrates, he would not have advanced the proofs of the soul's immortality and the theory of Forms. In addition, Socrates encourages his interlocutors to proffer counter arguments. With this intention, Socrates considers them epistemic peers, whose cognitive capacity Socrates recognizes and respects.

In Chapter 3, I explore the practice of philosophers by focusing on the true philosophers' willingness to die (hereafter willingness-to-die) discussed at the *Phaedo* 61b7-c10. The willingness-to-die argument consists of three elements: [1] true philosophers' detachment from the body as much as possible, [2] their passion for knowledge and the truth, [3] and their awareness of the limits of human epistemic access.

Regarding [1], I agree with scholars who claim that Socrates does not promote an ascetic life; rather, Socrates suggests that we should correctly evaluate bodily pleasures and pains (Woolf 2004, Russell 2005). This interpretation of the theory of pleasure is also in line with the recollection argument at the *Phaedo* 73a6-77a5, where Socrates underlines that we should not ignore but correctly assess sensory data (Gordon 2007).

Concerning [2], I show that purification is central to the amelioration in our cognition and that purification is an activity belonging to the embodied soul. In this activity, true philosophers pursue wisdom and hope to attain it after they die. The awareness of the limits of human epistemic access and the nature of human cognition are the most relevant points to my purposes, since these points lay the foundations of Plato's view about the correct philosophical method and the epistemic (and assertional) status of arguments advanced in the *Phaedo*.

In Chapter 4, I scrutinize Socrates' warning against the hatred of arguments (or misology) at *Phaedo* 89b9-91b7. This argument plays a key role in developing the correct norms of philosophical argument. The misology argument stresses that if we lack expertise in argument, we should not put all our trust in arguments. In this respect, I argue that Socrates' warning against misology promotes epistemic modesty since the warning implies that we need to be careful and recognize our cognitive fallibilities.

In addition, I claim that Socrates introduces the warning against misology to show how to deal with arguments and how to overcome epistemic fear. Epistemic fear refers to the fear of being incapable of discovering sound and firm arguments. I also suggest that the misology argument partly classifies the correct norms of philosophical argument; it aims to encourage those who lack expertise in argument but care for knowledge and the truth. In this respect, I disagree with the scholars who claim that the misology argument is *only* a diagnosis of the dangers of sophistry or contradiction-mongering (Gallop 1975, Hackforth 1955). Rather, I suggest that the misology argument *also* endows the readers with the correct norms of philosophical arguments.

In Chapter 5, I first offer a new interpretation of Socrates' second-sailing in the *Phaedo* 99c-102a. In contrast to taking the second-sailing to mean "the second-best" without closely considering Socrates' motive (Bluck 1957, Hackforth 1955, Rose 1966, Gallop 1975, Taylor 1956), I suggest that the second-sailing should be interpreted in terms of its purpose-relative nature. From the perspective of purpose-relativeness, I ask (a) why Socrates decided to embark on the second-sailing, (b) which aspect(s) of the second-sailing might be better, and (c) why the second-sailing was successful.

The second-sailing, despite scholarly opinion to the contrary, is not completely worse than the first-sailing in an axiological scale. Although scholars do not say that the second-sailing is inferior in *every* respect, neither do they ask whether the second-sailing can be better in *some* respect. I thus hope to offer a multi-dimensional and more balanced reading of the second-sailing by considering both worse and better aspects of it. Socrates decided to embark on it because he was afraid of becoming incapable of discovering the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. The second-sailing is a better method since it is safer and feasible; it might be considered worse since it is more laborious and its outcomes are provisional (Martinelli Tempesta 2003).

Secondly, I argue that Socrates was interested in Anaxagoras' idea of *nous* when accounting for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, since this idea offers a universal explanation. That said, I do not ignore that Socrates was attracted to Anaxagoras' idea of intelligence (*nous*) as it orders everything according to what is best (i.e. teleological explanations). The concept of universal explanation refers to a theory

which can explain *all* coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. In this respect, the theory of Forms satisfies the condition of universality, although Socrates would still be happy to learn teleological explanations.

Thirdly, I distinguish the manner of the second-sailing and its goal (Benson 2015). I submit that its manner is the hypothetical method while its goal is to find a universal theory which explains each and all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be consistently. In contrasting the identification of Socrates' second-sailing with the theory of Forms (Rose 1966), I argue that it does not seem plausible that Socrates discovered the theory of Forms just after he had decided to take refuge in *logoi*.

Finally, I would like to comment briefly on the peculiar features of the *Phaedo* regarding the dialogue's metaphilosophical component:

[a] Socrates' speech is described as if a defence in court; hence his speech ought to involve the correct dialogical elements enabling him to persuade his jurors, Simmias and Cebes. Although most philosophical writing is supposed to be persuasive, especially those writings in the dialogue form, the idea of defence in the *Phaedo* strengthens the ideal of persuasion. In this respect, the meta-dialogical element is particularly significant to better understand the *Phaedo*, although other dialogues also come with metaphilosophical component.

[b] Socrates' wife Xanthippe says, 'Socrates, this is now the very last time that your friends will speak to you and you to them (60a)'. Firstly, these words underline that the conversation is reciprocal rather than Socrates is giving his interlocutors a lecture. Secondly, it is likely that Socrates, in their final conversation, would like to endow his friends with the correct method of philosophical argument and the correct epistemic (or intellectual) norms. That is, (i) not only does Socrates wish to give them "the doctrine" to preserve, (ii) but also wishes to give them the key to philosophising, and developing that doctrine as well as discovering other doctrines. My reading of the *Phaedo* focuses on (ii) and tries to show that Socrates' friends (and the readers of the *Phaedo*) are invited to take (ii) to be the legacy of Socrates.

[c] Socrates is talking to his inner circle and some of them will become philosophers. For instance, Euclides, founder of the so-called Megarian school, and *Phaedo* wrote Socratic dialogues. We are also told that the interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, are

students of the Pythagorean Philolaus. This specific dramatic framework tells us that the *Phaedo* exemplifies how we should talk to fellow philosophers and those who are oriented towards philosophy. In this respect, the *Phaedo* is similar to the *Theaetetus*, which also has a philosophical-minded interlocutor, namely Theaetetus, and in both dialogues we see the dominance of question-and-answer exchanges.

[d] As the conversation taking place in the *Phaedo* is reciprocal and interactive where Socrates and his friends talk to each other, the interlocutors play a key role in the dialogue. In addition, as this is the final conversation, not only does Socrates present some metaphysical/epistemological commitments but he also explores some metaphilosophical thoughts. The latter of the two, I submit, models the way in which Socrates discusses with his interlocutors some philosophical questions and Socrates' epistemic stance.

A full discussion of Plato's metaphilosophy lies beyond the scope of this study, and therefore this study cannot provide a comprehensive review of Plato's other dialogues, although other dialogues are involved in critical and analytical reflections on the right method of philosophical arguments. For instance, Plato's *Theaetetus* includes some metaphilosophical reflections.

In contrast with the *Phaedo*, the *Theaetetus* deals with the viewpoints of those who are not present (for instance Protagoras), and these views are presented by Socrates and two other characters of the dialogue, namely Theodorus and Theaetetus. The *Theaetetus* therefore provides a metaphilosophical framework to deal with the views of others who cannot defend themselves in person. The *Phaedo*, by contrast, explores how to examine dialectically the views that are represented by someone present.

The *Theaetetus* is thus worthy of attention to understand how to deal dialectically and skilfully with a specific sort of arguments, that is, the *Theaetetus* shows how other philosophers' views are examined in absentia. The *Phaedo* emphasizes how we should conduct a joint inquiry with our epistemic peers in person and how we should act if we lack expertise in arguments.

In addition, the *Phaedo* provides some insights on the manner by which we can save ourselves from becoming antilogicians. This manner is that 'if someone were to cling to the hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and not answer until you had managed

to consider its consequence and see whether or not you found them harmonizing with each other (101d)'. By saying this, however, Socrates does not advise against talking to those who cling to the hypothesis itself. Rather, Socrates renders a methodological judgment that we should first explore the consequences of a hypothesis; we then should discuss the hypothesis itself.

Finally, the reader should bear in mind that I am not attempting to generalize the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo*. That is, I have no claim about the applicability of the *Phaedo's* metaphilosophy to all dialogues written by Plato. Rather, I have a more modest claim: Plato explores the correct method of philosophical argument in the *Phaedo* and surveys the intellectual virtues governing that method. Moreover, Plato introduces a metaphilosophical model through the conversation of Socrates and his interlocutors/friends, and each character contributes to the display of intellectual virtues, and sometimes of intellectual vices. Thus, from a metaphilosophical perspective, I am not particularly interested in the question whether any of the characters express Plato's own position.

# Chapter 1: A Terminological Framework for Reading Plato's *Phaedo*

## 1.1 Introduction

As outlined in the Introduction, this study offers an investigation of the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component. In this chapter, I analyse the following epistemic (or intellectual) norms, which I refer to in this dissertation: the equal weight view, the conciliatory approach, and epistemic modesty. To this end, I examine the most relevant studies on epistemic modesty and the epistemology of disagreements. The aim of this analysis, however, is not to give Plato credit for the topic of disagreements that contemporary philosophers assume to be a significant aspect of philosophical conversation/inquiry. Rather, I submit that contemporary epistemology can help us understand the method of philosophical argument illustrated in the *Phaedo*.

The epistemology of disagreement is relevant to the *Phaedo*, as Socrates' speech is considered a defence as if in court. In this respect, the aim of Socrates' speech is persuasion and agreement.<sup>2</sup> Socrates says, 'I suppose you [his interlocutors Simmias and Cebes] mean that I must defend myself in answer to these charges [accepting his departure without a fight], as if in court'.<sup>3</sup> Here, Socrates modifies the idea of trial by saying as if in a court simply because this is not an official court.

In an actual court, we do not need to show our jurors the method that we use to persuade them, but we simply aim at persuading them. It might even be permitted to stray from the truth or misrepresent things in order to persuade our jurors. However, when we defend our actions before our friends, if we care about our friends and believe that they are sane, we would not try to deceive them.<sup>4</sup> In addition, if our

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<sup>2</sup> Note that I do not distinguish 'the historical Socrates', 'Socrates the mouthpiece of Plato' and 'Plato himself'. My aim is to find out what is going on in the *Phaedo*. Besides, nothing I argue hangs on the question of 'Socrates *contra* Socrates in Plato'. On this issue, see Vlastos 1991, *ch.2*.

<sup>3</sup> *Phd.* 63b4-5 together with Simmias' assent to be the jurors and how he waits for persuasion at *Phd.* 63d1-2. Rowe (2007, 99-101) argues that the *Phaedo* defence completes the *Apology* of Socrates by explaining 'the cheerfulness' of Socrates before death. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates's cheerfulness is explained with regard to true philosophers' willingness to die. The cheerfulness in the *Phaedo*, I submit, might result from the pleasure of philosophical conversation, as *Phaedo* tells Echecrates (to whom he relates the last day of Socrates in his eponymous dialogue) at *Phd.* 59a3-4.

<sup>4</sup> Peterson (2011, 172) appears to ignore the idea that Socrates aims at persuading himself primarily (See *Phd.* 91a5-b7), and hence she thinks that Socrates does not need to believe his speech. Although I cannot justly review her ideas here, I disagree

friends care about the truth and are able to understand philosophical arguments, we would try to persuade them by using philosophical arguments.

Now, I suggest that Socrates' interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, seem to meet certain philosophical criteria which warrant philosophical argument. They are sane, for they do not act like Apollodorus, who 'howled out as he wept and lamented' once Socrates drank the poison.<sup>5</sup> They appear to be students of philosophy because they are associated with Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus and are present at the prison during Socrates' last day.<sup>6</sup> Thus, readers of *Phaedo* are placed in a setting in which Socrates aims at persuading his interlocutors by using the correct method of philosophical argument.<sup>7</sup>

## 1.2 The Framework of the Metaphilosophical Reading

Besides developing metaphysical and epistemological arguments through and within the proofs of immortality of the soul, Plato carries out a metaphilosophical analysis in the *Phaedo*. The metaphilosophical component is significant to understand the epistemic (and assertional) status of metaphysical and epistemological arguments presented in the *Phaedo*. For instance, for Socrates, the affinity argument leaves room for misgivings (*Phd.* 84c5-8) while the theory of Forms and the proofs of the immortality of soul require further investigation (*Phd.* 107a7-b9). From a metaphilosophical perspective, the epistemic (and assertional) status of first-order arguments are compatible with epistemic modesty.<sup>8</sup>

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with the way in which Peterson (*ibid.*, 177-178, 193-194) explains Socrates' hesitance in the *Phaedo* and his lack of intellectual rigour. For Peterson, the arguments do not belong to Socrates and his aim is to persuade his interlocutors to follow the philosophical path defined in the dialogue. In contrast, I explain Socrates' hesitant and careful attitude in terms of philosophical humility.

<sup>5</sup> For Apollodorus' rather sentimental and weepy manner see *Phd.* 59b1 and 117d2-6.

<sup>6</sup> *Phd.* 61d

<sup>7</sup> By emphasizing dramatic setting, I do not mean that the *Phaedo* does not have a philosophical or metaphilosophical direction. Cf. Rowe 2015, 2. McCabe (2015, 126) argues that 'we must read him [Plato] whole, tackle the arguments in context, attend to the detailed settings in which his characters speak'. See also Dorter 1971, 279.

<sup>8</sup> One needs to bear in mind that 'judged by the standards of metaphilosophy, Plato seems hopelessly naïve and clumsy' (Griswold 1988, 147). This is because Plato does not make any systematic analysis of "metaphilosophical questions". Therefore, as Griswold (1988, 149) observes, we should focus on the dialogue form.

### ***1.2.1 The Scope of Metaphilosophical Reading***

Some philosophers argue that metaphilosophical investigation is not necessary if philosophers are able to solve philosophical problems.<sup>9</sup> For others, on the contrary, metaphilosophical studies are deemed to be a prerequisite for the practice of philosophers, as these studies might provide remedies for ‘the difficulties and disagreements’ in philosophy.<sup>10</sup> Again, some propose that reformulating philosophical expressions is essential to form a proper bond between ‘facts’ and ‘expression of these facts’.<sup>11</sup>

In this thesis, I focus on the following metaphilosophical questions: [1] what are the norms governing the correct philosophical inquiry/conversation, and [2] why are persuasion and agreement required to accomplish the aim of philosophical conversation.<sup>12</sup> Regarding [1], I suggest that if we lack expertise in arguments, we should not put all our trust in arguments (as is discussed in Chapter 4). Regarding [2], I argue that philosophical activity, for Plato, is by nature dialogical and the success of philosophical activity depends on effective and productive communication (discussed in Chapter 2).

### ***1.2.2 The Epistemology of Disagreements***

One major theoretical question that has dominated contemporary scholarship on disagreement explores the rational response of “epistemic peers” to disagreements.<sup>13</sup> In general, scholars suggest that we can choose either “the conciliatory approach” or “the steadfast approach”. In simple terms, the former view advocates that if we come to disagree with our epistemic peers, we ought to become much less confident about our argument.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Popper 1962, 66-68.

<sup>10</sup> Moore 1932, vii.

<sup>11</sup> Ryle 2009, 44.

<sup>12</sup> Contemporary debate on the question ‘what is philosophy?’ lies between two extreme positions: ‘philosophy-as-science’ and ‘philosophy-as-distinct-from-science’. See Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood 2013, 23-44. For Plato, however, there seems to be no distinction between science and philosophy. See Gregory 2000, Introduction.

<sup>13</sup> Epistemic peers are described as follows: ‘[W]here one has good reason to believe that the other person is one’s (at least approximate) equal in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, *etc.*’ (Christensen 2009, 756).

<sup>14</sup> The basic tenets of this approach are: ‘[1] that we may make mistakes in assessing evidence; [2] that the disagreement of others who have assessed the same evidence

Thesteadfast approach, on the contrary, asserts that notwithstanding our disagreement with our epistemic peers, we should ‘maintain [our] confidence in [our] initial beliefs despite knowledge of disagreement by those who seem, independent of the disagreement, to be as well positioned as [ourselves] to arrive at accurate views on the disputed matter’.<sup>15</sup> This approach can even result in thinking that our opponents are irrational because they have arrived at a different conclusion although we both look at the same evidence.<sup>16</sup>

### 1.2.3 The *Phaedo* on Disagreements

The *Phaedo* revolves around a disagreement about the immortality of the soul. Simmias and Cebes ask Socrates to show that the soul is immortal, then they disagree several times with Socrates about the strength of his proofs of the immortality of the soul. Socrates, in turn, produces many of his arguments in response to his interlocutors’ counterarguments and their disapproval. In this respect, the *Phaedo* presents an interactive conversation, that is, the interlocutors play a key in developing the proofs of the immortality of the soul. Analysing the interlocutors’ approach to philosophical argumentation would also help to understand Plato’s insights on the method of philosophical argument.

Now, I suggest that Simmias and Cebes generally adopt the conciliatory approach. At the outset, Cebes wants to hear arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. This, however, does not mean that Cebes does not believe that the soul is immortal; rather, he seems to be inquisitive. In fact, when Simmias and Cebes mention arguments openly against the immortality of the soul, they either attribute them to other people or desire to hear Socrates’ argument in a response to them.<sup>17</sup>

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differently provides at least some reason to suspect that we have in fact made such a mistake; and [3] that reason to suspect that we’ve made a mistake in assessing the evidence is often also reason to be less confident in the conclusion we initially came to’ (Christensen 2013, 76).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 78. Elgin (2010, 55) describes this position as resoluteness. She points that resoluteness ‘seems to deprive epistemic agents of resources for correcting their mistakes’ since resoluteness impede re-examining our own position, seeking further evidence, or advancing better methods of assessment. In addition, Elga (2010, 177-178) defines the stubborn epistemic view as follows: ‘according to which disagreement is never cause for changing one’s view on a disputed issue’.

<sup>16</sup> Elgin 2010, 66.

<sup>17</sup> At *Phd.* 70a1-3, Cebes tells that people have “strong doubts” about the immortality of soul and at *Phd.* 77e3-8 Cebes says not that we fear that our soul will disperse after death, but the child in us fears of the dispersal of the soul. At *Phd.* 86d1-3,

Socrates, in his turn, gladly receives the interlocutors' questions and they begin reflecting on the nature of the soul. On the one hand, as Socrates produces new arguments, Simmias and Cebes become less doubtful about the immortality of the soul. The interlocutors are eventually convinced, although Simmias is still willing to retain some doubts.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, Socrates takes his interlocutors' questions and arguments seriously, and he himself expresses his doubts a couple of times.<sup>19</sup> While defending the immortality of the soul, Socrates is not resolute but willing to re-examine the arguments about the soul's immortality, to seek further evidence on this topic and to adopt new methods to inquire further.<sup>20</sup>

#### ***1.2.4 The Implications of Socrates' Defence Speech***

The idea of defence clearly alludes to Socrates' actual trial, which Plato reports in the *Apology*.<sup>21</sup> The *Apology* of Socrates can also be considered as metaphilosophical. That is, if Socrates had persuaded the Athenians' jury that he was not guilty of wrongdoing, his ideas on a life worth living would be acquitted too.<sup>22</sup> The Athenians' jury basically convicted Socrates of impiety and of corrupting the youth with his

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Simmias asks, 'what we'll say in reply to this argument [*sc.* the soul-attunement theory]'. Regarding Simmias' statement, however, there is an ambiguity. A few lines above at *Phd.* 86b5-7, Simmias says 'we take the soul to be something of precisely this kind [*sc.* an attunement]'. It is a question whether 'we' refers to a Pythagorean circle or people in general. For the latter see Hackforth 1955, 101-3 and for the former see Burnet 1911, 86. Sedley (1995, 11 *fn.*8) rules out the options of 'the circle of Socrates' and of 'people in general', and he prefers 'the Theban [Pythagorean] circle' over 'Simmias and Cebes'. It is, I presume, not implausible that Simmias assumes himself to be a member of both Pythagorean and Socratic circle, though perhaps his commitment to each group may vary.

<sup>18</sup> See *Phd.* 106e-107b.

<sup>19</sup> For Socrates's seriousness see *Phd.* 95e7-9; for his doubts see *Phd.* 84c6-8, 91b1-7.

<sup>20</sup> By this, I do not mean that Socrates does not strongly believe that the soul is immortal. Rather, Socrates is willing to change and re-examine his beliefs no matter how strong his belief is. See *e.g.* *Phd.* 84c1-85b9, 107b6-9. Grote (2009 [1865], 157) suggests that 'the full liberty of dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate—is one of the most memorable characteristics of the *Phaedon*'.

<sup>21</sup> At *Phd.* 69e3-5, Socrates says, 'if you find me any more persuasive in my defence than the Athenians' jury did, that would be welcome'. Plato's report in the *Apology* is probably not totally accurate but it should be faithful to the original defence, at least to a certain degree. For the issue of historicity see Allen 1980, 33-36.

<sup>22</sup> *Ap.* 36a5-6.

philosophy. If Socrates was found non-guilty then this would have also proven that his philosophy is beneficial for the youth.<sup>23</sup>

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates' interlocutors accuse him of dying too lightly, and Socrates aims at gainsaying this accusation from the perspective of true philosophers., who are willing to die.<sup>24</sup> With this aim, Socrates tries to persuade Simmias and Cebes that 'there is something in store for the dead... [which is] much better for the good than for the bad',<sup>25</sup> and therefore Socrates is not resentful.<sup>26</sup>

Socrates then attempts to establish two sets of premises to convince Simmias and Cebes. They can be summarised as follows:

Set 1:

- [1a] True philosophers desire wisdom.
- [1b] Only those who practice philosophy correctly can attain wisdom and only they shall dwell with gods.
- [1c] The correct practice of philosophy is a release and parting of the soul from the body.
- [2] Wisdom can be attained only by the soul itself.
- [3] The soul can be by itself only after death.
- [C1] Therefore, a true philosopher is willing to die.

Set 2:

- [1\*] Socrates has striven in every way to practice philosophy aright.
- [1b] Only those who practice philosophy aright can attain wisdom and shall dwell with gods.
- [C2] Therefore, Socrates is not resentful of dying.

Besides proving Set 1 and Set 2 above, Socrates must demonstrate that the soul is immortal.<sup>27</sup> Otherwise, the practice of philosophers would be vain (no reward would

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<sup>23</sup> See *Ap.* 29d-30e. The *Apology*, too, seems to have a metaphilosophical aim, which is about the philosophical way of life. See Sellars 2014.

<sup>24</sup> See especially *Ap.* 23c-28a

<sup>25</sup> *Phd.* 63c5-7

<sup>26</sup> Socrates could not kill himself since 'it [*sc.* suicide] isn't sanctioned (*Phd.* 61c10)'. Xenophon interestingly reports that Socrates's motivation was to escape the evils of old age, and hence he 'talks big (*μεγαληγορία*)' so that the Athenians' jury would sentence him to death. Cf. *Apologia Socratis* 2.1-3.

<sup>27</sup> It is questioned by scholars whether the *Phaedo* brings in 'partial' immortality, which is implied by the phrase οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον at *Phd.* 95d1. It is suggested that soul can survive many deaths, hence it can be partially immortal, but this does not entail that it is 'fully' immortal, *i.e.* imperishable. I agree with Gallop (1965, 168-169) that the only immortality that is mentioned throughout the dialogue

be gained) because if the soul perishes once we die, we can neither attain wisdom nor dwell with gods. The primary aim of Socrates' defence, however, is neither to attain wisdom nor dwell with gods. That is, although Socrates is practicing philosophy in his defence, and his defence should contribute to the attainment of this aim, Socrates' success in defending himself alone is not sufficient to attain wisdom and dwell with gods.

Rather, a whole life that has been spent in accordance with the correct norms of the practice of philosophy is the condition of the reward, as [1b] above suggests. In this respect, the success of Socrates' defence depends upon persuading Simmias and Cebes that (a) true philosophers are willing to die and that (b) the soul is immortal.<sup>28</sup> The interlocutors are ready to assent to (a) if Socrates can show that (b) is true. Then Socrates' motive for proving (b) is to persuade his interlocutors to live according to (a).

However, in his defence speech, Socrates does not say anything about the immortality of the soul, although the immortality of the soul constitutes an integral part of his defence of philosophical practice. Socrates only makes them believe that true philosophers are willing to die. The inquiry on the nature of the soul begins once Cebes has raised his doubts about the immortality of the soul. In response to this, Socrates asks, 'Would you like us to spend our conversation on these very questions, and discuss whether or not it's likely to be so?'.<sup>29</sup>

Why then did Socrates remain silent about the immortality of the soul during his defence? Firstly, it is possible that Socrates expects his interlocutors to notice this gap in his defence.<sup>30</sup> Plato, likewise, may wish it to be observed by his readers, as he might want his readers to engage with the text. Here, I would like to underline that

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is 'full' immortality. Cf. O'Brien 1968, 67. In his final proof (see *Phd.* 105b-106a), Socrates aims to show that the immortal is also imperishable.

<sup>28</sup> Aiming at persuading others, of course, does not mean that Socrates does not also seek self-persuasion. Later at *Phd.* 90e-91b, Socrates declares that he is primarily trying to persuade himself on the immortality of soul, and if he persuades others too, it would just be incidental. This passage is discussed in Chapter 2. In his defence speech, however, Socrates primarily aims at persuading others, and he does not mention self-persuasion. An explanation of the need of self-persuasion can be as follow: after hearing his interlocutors' questions and objections, Socrates realizes that there may be some gaps in his arguments presented up to 90e, and hence he becomes relatively less confident about his belief.

<sup>29</sup> *Phd.* 70b5-c3.

<sup>30</sup> Similarly, the last argument for the immortality of soul is initiated with the objections of Simmias and Cebes. *Phd.* 95d2-d7.

Simmias and Cebes urge Socrates to give “reassurance (*παράμυθίας*)” and “persuasive arguments (*πίστεως*)” on the immortality of the soul.<sup>31</sup> If the interlocutors had accepted Socrates’ defence as complete, and had failed to see that Socrates must prove that the soul is immortal, either the dialogue would stop at the end of the defence speech or they would begin discussing something else. From a dialogical perspective, the interlocutors’ doubts and questions give rise to the proofs of the immortality of the soul.

Secondly, Plato emphasizes that we need to subscribe to the correct practice of philosophers before developing the conversation further. That is, Socrates might wish to test his interlocutors’ ability of philosophical and critical thinking, on the one hand, or Socrates might wish to check whether his interlocutors share some of his metaphysical and epistemological commitments, on the other. For instance, in the course of Socrates’ defence speech, Simmias agrees that there is a Just itself, a Beautiful itself, *etc.* and that bodily senses are not reliable.<sup>32</sup> To sum up, Socrates’ defence [1] establishes the correct practice of philosophers, [2] confirms the interlocutors’ intellectual capacity and [3] verifies philosophical like-mindedness.<sup>33</sup>

### [1.3 The Norms of Philosophical Humility](#)

#### **1.3.1 The Equal Weight View**

Thus far, I have suggested that the idea of defence stresses the role of agreement and persuasion; and that Socrates’ defence speech has a metaphilosophical aspect. In outline, Simmias and Cebes agree with Socrates about the true philosopher's willingness to die, yet they are uncertain about the immortality of the soul. Socrates welcomes their uncertainty, as he gladly receives their questions and is willing to give further explanation. Socrates is willing to do further inquiry and open to modify his arguments since he trusts his interlocutors’ intellectual capacity.

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<sup>31</sup> *Phd.* 69e6-70b4.

<sup>32</sup> Although Socrates addresses his defence to Simmias, once Socrates finished, Cebes approves everything Socrates says apart from the assumption that the soul is immortal. See *Phd.* 69e6-7

<sup>33</sup> Chen (1990, 53-57) argues that Socrates’ views on the practice of philosophers are in line with the ideas that will emerge later in the dialogue. He suggests that all philosophical methods of the *Phaedo*, such as the method of hypothesis, involve a kind of ‘epistemological pessimism’, a notion which Chen places at the centre of the practice of philosophers. Later, I object to the epistemological pessimism and argue that the correct norms of philosophical argument are partly based on philosophical humility.

For instance, Simmias tells Socrates that ‘ever since I’ve been considering what has been said [about the immortality of soul], both on my own and with Cebes here, it hasn’t seemed entirely sufficient’.<sup>34</sup> Socrates replies, ‘Yes, my friend, and maybe you’re right’.<sup>35</sup> Elsewhere, in reaction to Cebes’ question concerning the imperishability of the soul, we are told that Socrates ‘paused for quite some time and considered something’.<sup>36</sup> This pause indicates that the interlocutors are able to reveal critical weaknesses for Socrates, which require him to momentarily retreat from the conversation in order to seek a solution.<sup>37</sup>

In this respect, Socrates’ interlocutors are deemed epistemic peers. As defined above, we should give our epistemic peers’ intellectual capacity the same weight as our own;<sup>38</sup> therefore, if our epistemic peers come to disagree with us, we ought to become less confident about our position. That said, Socrates, not unexpectedly, has a central role in the *Phaedo* as he often advances the most complex arguments. Be that as it may, we must also observe that Socrates produces his arguments to counter his interlocutors’ queries.<sup>39</sup>

Socrates has some strong beliefs, and sometimes he seems to be dogmatic about his beliefs. For instance, it is supposed that Socrates suggests that things themselves, such as the Form of the Beautiful, exist without justifying this proposition.<sup>40</sup> Although I agree that Socrates firmly believes in the existence of Forms, his

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<sup>34</sup> *Phd.* 85d7-9.

<sup>35</sup> *Phd.* 85e1-2.

<sup>36</sup> *Phd.* 95e7-8. McCabe (2015, 90) maintains that argument may mean ‘giving truths with reasons’ and ‘a controversy between two (or sometimes more sides)’. For her, controversy and reasonable argument are intertwined, since controversy forces either side to give ‘vigorous reasons’.

<sup>37</sup> With regards to the dramatic setting, Plato might wish to indicate that Socrates is going to talk about a significant topic. This option is compatible with the idea that Cebes brings up an important difficulty.

<sup>38</sup> For Cohen (2013, 99), ‘EW [the equal weight view] says I should give my peer’s opinion the same weight I give my own. EW can seem quite plausible when one considers that our status as peers entails a symmetry between our epistemic positions.’

<sup>39</sup> Zagzebski (2012, 52) calls the following position ‘extreme epistemic egoism’: ‘I have reason to believe p only when the direct exercise of my faculties gives me reasons for p. The fact that another person has a belief p gives me no reason to believe it.’ For Zagzebski (*ibid.*, 61), ‘my reason to believe other persons are conscientious depends upon observation of them and inferences about their inner efforts and abilities from their external behaviour.’ Socrates, according to these definitions, is not an epistemic egoist, as he believes, at least *prima facie*, that his interlocutors might have a reason relating to conscientious grounds.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. Burnet 1911, 33; Hackforth 1955, 50; Gallop 1975, 97.

dogmatism is “forward-looking”. Forward-looking dogmatism may be defined as follows: if no existing argument can invalidate a proposition, then there is legitimate ground to assume that that proposition is true. In this respect, forward-looking dogmatism is based on “belief-revision” under necessary circumstances, such as the emergence of a valid counterargument.<sup>41</sup>

An argument against the theory of Forms, however, does not emerge in the *Phaedo*. Therefore, it is not possible to know whether Socrates dogmatically clings to the existence of Forms (and their role in explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be), and thus we cannot know whether he would flatly dismiss a counterargument. However, I suggest that Socrates does not suppose that he completed the exposition of the theory of Forms. With the aim of explaining my claim, allow me to quote:

[T1] ‘Well,’ said Simmias, ‘on the strength of what has been said I too no longer have any room for doubt. All the same, because of the magnitude of the issues discussed in our arguments, and because of my low regard for human weakness, I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said.’

‘Yes, not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but you’re right to say so, and, besides, even if you all find the first hypotheses trustworthy, nonetheless you should consider them more clearly. And if you analyse them well enough, you’ll follow the argument, I imagine, as far as a human being can follow it up. Should this itself become clear, then you won’t seek anything further.’<sup>42</sup>

This conversation is taking place after Socrates has finished the last proof for the immortality of the soul. Just before this conversation, however, Socrates comments on his proof: ‘more surely than anything, Cebes, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls really will exist in Hades’. Cebes agrees with Socrates and says, ‘I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any

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<sup>41</sup> See Fantl 2013, 37-38. Forward-looking dogmatism rules out ‘the flat dismissal principle’ too. Fantl (*ibid*, 34) defines the term ‘flat dismissal’ as follows: ‘It is “legitimate” to “flatly dismiss” the evidence or argument in the following sense: you know that the evidence or argument is misleading without knowing how it is.’

<sup>42</sup> *Phd.* 107a8-b9 Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἢ δ’ ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ’, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τὰς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλῃτε, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ’ ὅσον δυνατόν μάλιστα· ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.

way'.<sup>43</sup> It seems thus Socrates is both confident about his proof about the immortality of the soul and thinks that this proof and other arguments need further justification.

I find it curious that if Socrates is so sure about the soul's nature, why did he welcome Simmias' doubts? Above all, Socrates addresses all his friends when he says, 'you should consider them more clearly'.<sup>44</sup> In this respect, Socrates does not only welcome Simmias' doubts, but he invites all his friends to make further inquiry. Here we might ask whether Socrates casts doubt upon his own account as well. Otherwise, is he merely recommending that his friends examine by *themselves* the proofs of the immortality of the soul and all other arguments?<sup>45</sup>

If Socrates himself was so sure that his arguments are certain, I believe that he would not have easily approved of Simmias' doubts. At least Socrates could say that his arguments were as certain as possible for humans, and that his friends still had a right to doubt them. Moreover, Simmias admits that 'on the strength of what has been said I too no longer have any room for doubt'. Simmias thus believes that the proof is strong, but he does not accept that the issue of the soul's immortality is closed. Since the issues discussed are so great, and since human arguments are open to suspicion, Simmias prefers to keep some doubt. Socrates's subsequent position then becomes a delicate balancing act between the need to persuade interlocutors about the immortality of the soul and the need to encourage them to seek further support.

Earlier, Socrates also voiced his reservations about the limits of human understanding. To put it briefly, in his defence Socrates emphasized that human cognitive abilities are diminished during incarnate existence since the body makes reason go astray.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, when warning against the misology argument, Socrates stressed that if we lack expertise in arguments, we should not put all trust into arguments.<sup>47</sup> In this respect, Simmias seems to pay attention to Socrates' instructions and prefers to be careful.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> *Phd.* 106e9-107a3.

<sup>44</sup> Socrates uses the second person plural: ὑμῖν at 107b6, διέλγητε and ἀκολουθήσετε at b7, and ζητήσετε at b9.

<sup>45</sup> See Gallop 1975, 222.

<sup>46</sup> See especially *Phd.* 66c5-67b5.

<sup>47</sup> See *Phd.* 88d1-91b7.

<sup>48</sup> Sedley (1995, 14-17) suggests that the misology argument was especially targeted at Simmias since he had been too quick to accept arguments throughout the *Phaedo*. Archer-Hind (1883, 137) writes: 'The contrast between the clear-headed logician

Further emphasis should be placed on the fact that Socrates says, ‘*you* all should examine’. This could mean that Socrates has already discovered the truth for *himself* and it is now his friends’ duty to do the same. That is, Socrates does not actually doubt his arguments, yet he tries to encourage his friends to attain the same degree of certainty, and to follow the philosophical path.

However, I disagree with this idea for the following reason: One reason of Socrates’ differing attitude towards Simmias and Cebes might be the philosophical character of each. As said earlier in the dialogue, ‘Cebes is always scrutinizing arguments, and refuses to be convinced straight away of whatever anyone says’ and ‘he’s [Cebes] more resolute than anyone in not believing arguments’.<sup>49</sup> In this respect, Cebes’ confirmation of the last proof of the immortality of the soul can be taken as an indicator of the proof’s strength.

Simmias, however, is assumed to be less critical; he ‘can be relied on on to say ‘yes’’ and this is why Socrates prefers to discuss the unwarranted matters with Simmias, such as the definition of death.<sup>50</sup> Sedley thus argues that ‘Simmias’ residual doubts are not meant to reflect entirely favourably on him as a philosopher. They are surely further signs of his misology - the legacy of his uncritical attitude to argument in the past’. In this respect, Simmias’ hasty acceptance of several arguments and incautious attitude towards argument make him doubt arguments in general; hence Simmias’ attitude ‘has now left him unconvinced even where conviction would have been justified’.<sup>51</sup>

Although I agree with Sedley that Simmias showed some signs of misology earlier and Plato does not consider Simmias to be a true philosopher, it is possible that Simmias has undergone a philosophical transformation. That is to say, Simmias has

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Kebeas and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought here. Kebeas, sceptical as he is [*Phd.* 77a8-9], has found an argument that is in his judgement free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in reasoning, but rather because the ‘child in him [*Phd.* 77e3-8]’ cannot be soothed by reason.’ However, we need to note that it is Cebes who mentions the ‘child in us’ and that Socrates recommends doing further inquiry not only to Simmias, but to all his friends. Moreover, his words do not allude to the fear of the child in us; rather, they allude to the limits of human understanding.

<sup>49</sup> *Phd.* 63a1-3 and *Phd.* 77a8-9 respectively. See Sedley 1995, 14-15.

<sup>50</sup> Sedley 1995, 15. Sedley (*ibid.*, 16) also underlines that ‘from his questioning of Simmias, it emerges that Simmias has accepted the harmony theory without strict proof, attracted by the plausibility which has made it such a popular view.’

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

now been cured of the symptoms of misology and decided to become more critical. Simmias now wishes to inquire further into the issues surrounding the nature of the soul himself, and Socrates encourages Simmias and others to search for further justification and evidence. In a sense, Plato warns the readers not to put all their trust in the last proof and other arguments.

Moreover, Socrates does not say that his arguments are certain nor that he believes that they are certain after Simmias voiced his suspicions. Due to the absence of such judgement, we cannot decide whether Socrates considers his arguments certain. It is also plausible that Plato intentionally keeps Socrates' final judgement open. In a sense, the case is left open for discussion since Socrates does not only wish to convince his interlocutors that the soul is immortal, but also wishes his interlocutors to convince *themselves*. And yet, his interlocutors seem to consider Socrates their epistemic superior, since Socrates is supposedly the only person who can properly give an account of Forms.<sup>52</sup>

Therefore, if Socrates claimed that his demonstrations are certain and complete (as much as is possible for humans), then the interlocutors would have become reluctant to conduct further inquiry, as they would have believed that Socrates had perfected his demonstrations. Socrates' strong belief might thus hinder his interlocutors to inquire further. In this respect, Socrates' epistemic modesty as a dialogical tool allows his friends to look for further evidence, and philosophical inquiry might benefit from epistemic modesty as epistemic modesty encourages critical thinking.

To sum up, although we cannot certainly know to what extent Socrates believes that his arguments are complete and certain, the crux of Socrates' approval of Simmias' doubt is that his final judgement stresses a sort of epistemic modesty. To conclude, I surmise that it would be strange if Socrates said that *we* should examine together, since he was going to die soon. Socrates' friends had been assigned the mission to inquire and to pursue the argument 'as far as a human being can follow it up'.

### ***1.3.2 The Conciliatory Approach***

The intellectual virtues governed by the conciliatory approach play a key role in the making of the method of philosophical argument in the *Phaedo*. The conciliatory approach can be defined as follows: I believe that P on the basis of some justification

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<sup>52</sup> *Phd.* 76b10-12.

E. My opponent believes that Q on the basis of some justification E\*, where E+Q no longer justifies belief that P. In this case, according to the conciliatory approach, I ought to acknowledge that my opponent's belief of Q *might* be true on the basis of E\*. The benefit of this approach is that we can attain greater knowledge (*i.e.* gaining more information about P), on the basis of further justification [E\*\*] to defeat Q, and we continue to believe P on the basis of some justification E\*\*. <sup>53</sup> In other words, I can expand my knowledge about P if I believe that my opponent might be correct that a certain case Q might defeat P. <sup>54</sup>

Chapter 2 explores what I mean by greater knowledge. For now, let it suffice to say that [1] Socrates acknowledges that his interlocutors *might* have an argument that defeats the argument that the soul is immortal. For instance, later in the *Phaedo*, Cebes would argue that Socrates' argument [the affinity argument] does not properly address the question that the soul continues to subsist once its present existence ends; hence a soul's current existence might be its last life. This is because, for Cebes, Socrates has only proved that the soul is 'long-lasting and existed somewhere previously for an unimaginably long time'. <sup>55</sup> That is, unless Socrates can show that the soul is imperishable, we cannot be sure whether the soul's current existence is its last life.

In response to Cebes' question, Socrates says, '[w]hat you're seeking is no small matter, Cebes; we must study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be'. <sup>56</sup> To this end, Socrates begins relating his intellectual autobiography and presenting his solution to the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. He next produces what is perhaps the most complex proof of the immortality of soul by using that solution, namely the theory of Forms. <sup>57</sup> Therefore, it is significant to observe that even though Cebes does not teach anything to Socrates as such, Cebes' question helped Socrates give birth to his ideas, as it were. <sup>58</sup> This

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<sup>53</sup> Long (2013, 64-67) argues that Socrates 'profits from the opposition of essentially *sympathetic* interlocutors (Author's Italics)'.

<sup>54</sup> Hawthorne & Srinivasan 2013, 11-12.

<sup>55</sup> *Phd.* 95c7-8.

<sup>56</sup> *Phd.* 95e8-96a1.

<sup>57</sup> Scholars question whether the final argument conclusively shows that the soul is immortal. See especially O'Brien 1967 and 1969; Frede 1978. Even though it assumed to be unsuccessful and inconclusive, we cannot ignore the significance of the hypothetical method and the theory of Forms, which result from Socrates' attempt to address Cebes' question.

<sup>58</sup> Blattberg (2005,121), in his study of the *Phaedo*, claims that 'Socrates is *never* shown to have learned something substantial through discussion with others

postulation does not mean that Simmias and Cebes midwife Socrates as Socrates claims to have midwived Theaetetus in his eponymous dialogue.<sup>59</sup> Rather, it is sufficient for my purposes to suppose that Simmias and Cebes accompany Socrates and assist him in his inquiries.<sup>60</sup>

One might question why Plato expects us to discern the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo* instead of explicitly addressing it. For instance, we, by reading *Phaedo*, may only wish to acquire some proofs of the immortality of the soul; hence we might ignore the metaphilosophical component. Regarding the *Phaedo*, however, it seems plausible to think that since Socrates is talking to fellow philosophers and students of philosophy, the *Phaedo*'s target audience should be those who wish to learn the correct practice of philosophy.<sup>61</sup>

### 1.3.3 Pessimist Epistemology

Epistemic modesty demands the recognition [a] of the limits (and fallibility) of human understanding, and [b] of the possibility of making mistakes because of the limitations of our method of inquiry.<sup>62</sup> The endorsement of [a] and [b] may lead to an unwanted consequence, namely epistemic pessimism.<sup>63</sup> What I mean by the term epistemic pessimism is that 'we can never attain infallible knowledge due to the fallibility of our cognitive capacities (supposing that until now we all have failed at

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(Author's italics)'. I strongly disagree with Blattberg, and I hope to establish that 'discussing with others' and following the correct norms governing conversation help Socrates to advance arguments.

<sup>59</sup> *Theae*. 148e-151d. On midwifery see Burnyeat 1977; Sedley 2004.

<sup>60</sup> Hackforth (1972, 14) observes that 'the argument [in the *Phaedo*] is perhaps more than anywhere one between men who genuinely like and respect each other'.

<sup>61</sup> Sedley (1995, 13-14) points out that Plato 'takes two students of philosophy who have had every opportunity to acquire understanding about the soul's survival from a Pythagorean teacher, and portrays them as still hopelessly confused on the issue'. For Sedley, Socrates is successful to this end. The success, on the one hand, results from the components of Platonic philosophy, such as the theory of Forms and the method of hypothesis. On the other hand, from a metaphilosophical perspective, I think that the success partially lies in the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophy, specifically the way in which Socrates and his interlocutors talk to each other.

<sup>62</sup> See Evnine 2001, 173-174.

<sup>63</sup> In his investigation of the epistemology of the so-called Socratic dialogues, Smith (2012, 29-31) suggests that epistemic optimism is inherent to the Socratic method and defines it as 'a form of optimism about the epistemic value of what we do when inconsistencies in our views are revealed to us'. According to epistemic optimism, even though we might propose something inconsistent again, this proposition 'is likely to be an improvement in [our] cognitive system'. I discuss how we can foster our optimism and rule out epistemic despair in Chapter 4 where I examine the misology argument.

least for once), and hence we should not trust any argument'.<sup>64</sup> The way we interpret the implications of [a] and [b], however, can lead to opposite directions, namely either epistemic pessimism or epistemic optimism.

Epistemic pessimism recognizes that we will *certainly* fail to attain knowledge no matter how rigorously we apply some rule or method. An example of the epistemic pessimist approach is: no matter how rigorously I inquire, I can never prove that the soul is immortal due to the limits of my cognitive capacities. Epistemic optimism, on the other hand, recognizes that while our arguments *may* go wrong, this recognition does not imply that rigorous application of some method or rule is doomed to failure.

An epistemic optimist, on the contrary, would say that although my current argument *might* not be complete and certain, and hence it might go wrong, if I conduct further inquiry, then I would be able to show that the soul is immortal. Epistemic pessimism suggests that we can never attain knowledge as we are cognitively incapable; it thus has negative effects on us since it discourages further inquiry. Epistemic optimism positively affects our inquiries as it motivates us to conduct further inquiry.

Socrates prefers epistemic optimism. Besides the passage I have discussed above about Socrates' comment on the last proof about the immortality of the soul, there is another passage which hints at the idea of epistemic optimism:

[T2] Now when Socrates had said that [about the so-called affinity argument], a long silence fell, and Socrates himself was absorbed in the argument he had given, or so it seemed from his appearance, and most of us were too. But Cebes and Simmias continued to talk with each other in an undertone. Socrates caught sight of them and asked: 'What is it? Do you think that there is something missing in what was said? Because of course it still contains many grounds for suspicion and counter-attack, at least if one is to go right through it properly.'<sup>65</sup>

In this passage, Socrates admits that the affinity argument 'contains many grounds for suspicion and counter-attack', if one would examine it sufficiently. As Socrates

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<sup>64</sup> This definition is adopted from Aikin (2011, 69-70) but is heavily modified for my purposes.

<sup>65</sup> *Phd.* 84c1-c7 Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἣν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι· Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὸ ἤρετο, Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μὲν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξιέναι.

similarly stresses in T1 above, in this passage Socrates underlines the possibility of misgivings, which could be revealed and corrected through further inquiry. That is, although Socrates recognizes weaknesses, he does not give up searching and even encourages his friends to accompany him in his examination.<sup>66</sup> In this respect, the recognition of the limits and fallibilities of human understanding above motivates Socrates to examine the nature of soul further.

#### ***1.3.4 Educational v. Scientific Reasons***

As argued, epistemic optimism is linked to epistemic modesty in that both encourage further inquiry and demand the recognition of cognitive fallibilities. Now, a significant difficulty of my reading of epistemic modesty is to determine its scope. One may argue that Socrates embraces epistemic modesty only for the sake of encouraging his interlocutors. That is, Plato, via Socrates, aims at presenting the fundamental values concerning teaching and learning (the pedagogical component), but the method of philosophical argument that Socrates uses in his inquiries has nothing to do with the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governed by epistemic modesty (the metaphilosophical component).

The pedagogical component seems to be less controversial, and hence I will only make some brief comments. As suggested above, Socrates advances most of his arguments in response to his interlocutors' questions and objections. The interlocutors express disapproving comments and Socrates welcomes their criticisms.<sup>67</sup> This picture could be taken as an emphasis on two principles of teaching and learning: [1] students should critical, and [2] tutors should encourage critical thinking amongst students.

Accordingly, one might limit the scope of epistemic modesty to the pedagogical component. Then it might be claimed that Plato does not use epistemic modesty in describing the method of correct philosophical argument. For instance, it could be argued that Socrates knows the affinity argument does not prove that the soul is immortal, but he presented it as a dialectical exercise. That is, Socrates uses epistemic modesty as a pedagogical tool to encourage his interlocutors to ask

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<sup>66</sup> See *Phd.* 88e-89c.

<sup>67</sup> See, for instance, *Phd.* 84d4-85d10 where Socrates encourages his interlocutors, who hesitate to ask questions, since they do not wish give trouble to Socrates.

questions and to actively participate; thus he can give new information without appearing didactic.<sup>68</sup>

Now, the most compelling evidence in favour of the pedagogical reading (which ignores any metaphilosophical component) is that Socrates does not seem to be willing to change his original position about the immortality of the soul. This, however, does not pose any difficulty to my reading. This is because, as mentioned above, epistemic modesty does not hinder believing in an argument. Nor does it lead to a lack of trust in our cognitive abilities and philosophical skill. Rather, by adopting epistemic modesty, we simply recognize the fallibilities of human cognitive capacities. That is, believing in an argument is compatible with epistemic modesty if we are willing to accept that we might be mistaken and to pay heed to counterarguments.<sup>69</sup>

Another objection can be made that by maintaining the hypothesis that Forms exist, that hypothesis is simply assumed and not defended.<sup>70</sup> Against this, I would like to note that the epistemic modesty I defend here basically governs the way we dissolve disagreements. In this respect, it is an open question whether Socrates would reject discussing or modifying the theory of Forms.<sup>71</sup> Socrates and his interlocutors agree on the existence of Forms; hence it is not possible to know how Socrates would react if he encountered an objection against the theory of Forms. However, even if the theory of Forms would seem to be assumed throughout the *Phaedo*, Socrates, as discussed above regarding Socrates' comment on the last proof of the immortality of the soul, implies that the theory of Forms is open for modification and extension, although Socrates' friends find it trustworthy.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> For a good discussion of Plato's pedagogical aim and its relationship with epistemological values in the *Sophist* see Leigh 2007. Her reading of the *Sophist* seems to be parallel with my claims about the philosophical and pedagogical values in the *Phaedo* such as open-endedness and critical thinking.

<sup>69</sup> As we shall see in Chapter 5, the method of hypothesis is in line with what I suggest here in the following ways: [1] 'I set down as true whatever I think harmonizes with it [the strongest *logos*]', and [2] I ought to be willing to examine the strongest *logos* too, which is my initial hypothesis. See *Phd.* 100a3-7 and *Phd.* 101d1-102a1 respectively.

<sup>70</sup> In the *Phaedo*, the theory of Forms is 'nowhere defended, but is simply accepted without argument by all parties (65d5, 74b1, 78d8-9, 92d6-e2, 100c1-2, 102a10-b1)' (Gallop 1975, 97).

<sup>71</sup> Long (2013, 68-69) underlines that agreeing on the theory of Forms has enabled the inquiry of 'afterlife and death'.

<sup>72</sup> See *Phd.* 107a7-b1.

## 1.4 Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter is to devise a model to understand Plato's metaphilosophy in the *Phaedo*. To this end, I reviewed some contemporary literature on the epistemology of disagreements to frame the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component, which, I submit, is partly governed by epistemic modesty. By stressing the idea of defence, I suggest that Plato directs our attention towards thinking about persuasion and agreement. Epistemic norms discussed in this chapter are careful checking, critical thinking, epistemic peerhood and epistemic modesty.

Next, I show that Socrates encourages his interlocutors to be critical on the one hand, and that his interlocutors show flexibility in changing their views on the other. Moreover, Socrates assumes Simmias and Cebes are epistemic peers and he respects their objections. Epistemic modesty suggests that arguments are analysed carefully and objections are received respectfully.<sup>73</sup> In doing so, Socrates and his interlocutors are able to expand their knowledge.

The metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo* suggests that we should assume that our opponents may have a legitimate reason for disagreeing with us and that our arguments are prone to failure. In this respect, if we encounter a disagreement, we should become less confident about our argument. By becoming less confident, I do not mean that we should not trust in our arguments and in our cognitive abilities.

On the contrary, epistemic modesty demands that we should not discard our arguments so quickly and easily, but be willing to examine counterarguments. As is the case in the *Phaedo*, Socrates attaches too much importance to the immortality of the soul, although attaching importance to it does not hinder Socrates from gladly receiving, or even prompting, criticism. In sum, the norms governed by epistemic modesty partially shape the dialogical structure of the *Phaedo*.

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<sup>73</sup> See Christensen 2009, 758-79; 2011, 8-9.

## Chapter 2: The Epistemic Norms of Philosophical Argument in the *Phaedo*

### 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Plato's *Protagoras* is first reviewed to set up a model for the method of philosophical argument. This model will be employed when reading the *Phaedo*, in terms of its metaphilosophical component. However, the *Protagoras* model must be approached with some caution, as the findings might not be consistent with all other dialogues of Plato. Rather, this model provides inspiration which assists in examining the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component.

In the former part of this chapter, firstly some reasons for choosing the *Protagoras* are given. Secondly, by investigating the preliminary conversation between Hippocrates and Socrates in the *Protagoras*, I argue that the goal of conversation is agreement, a goal which also frames the dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras. Thirdly, I examine the intervention of the listeners in the hope of arbitrating the dispute about the style of speech. Then I try to outline the norms governing communication and philosophical argument.

In the latter part, a reading of the *Phaedo* is offered in terms of the concepts of agreement and communication. I then claim that philosophical humility is a key component of effective and productive philosophical argument. Finally, I show that the *Phaedo* results in greater knowledge thanks to the disagreement of Simmias and Cebes. The phrase "greater knowledge" refers to the fact that Socrates and his interlocutors expand their knowledge about the nature of the soul and the practice of philosophers, for instance. There are two opinions which act as catalysts for the expansion of knowledge in the *Phaedo*: [1] Socrates and his interlocutors consider each other epistemic peers rather than epistemic rivals, and [2] the goal of agreement is the outcome of conversation.

### 2.2 Plato on Persuasion and Agreement in the *Protagoras*

#### **2.2.1 Why the *Protagoras*?**

My choice of examining the *Protagoras* is not random. Although nothing I claim hangs on the grouping of Plato's dialogues, it is safer to analyse a dialogue which is

widely acknowledged to be written before the *Phaedo*.<sup>74</sup> That said, just because the *Protagoras* was written beforehand cannot alone prove that it therefore must have provided the same vision on metaphilosophy as the *Phaedo*. Rather, my claim is that Plato's argument about his vision for the method of argument in the *Protagoras* offers a helpful comparison to the method in the *Phaedo*.

Some other dialogues (e.g. the *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* and *Republic*) are supposed to be written around the same period when Plato composed the *Phaedo*, though they probably came after the *Phaedo*.<sup>75</sup> Here, I am not going to discuss these dialogues because a thorough analysis of them would go beyond this chapter's scope and because they are not directly addressing my interpretation of the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component as much as the *Protagoras*.<sup>76</sup>

In addition, it seems convenient to me to stress the *Protagoras*' metaphilosophical component, since Socrates talks with a sophist in a dramatic setting where other sophists are present. Here I would like to note that the sophistic manner of speech is frequently criticized by Plato.<sup>77</sup> I suggest that Plato's aim in the *Phaedo* is to display the correct norms governing philosophical inquiry/conversation; hence it is fitting to examine a dialogue where a sophist and Socrates are talking. That is, Socrates and Protagoras seem to represent competing manners (or methods) of speech, thus the conversation of Socrates and Protagoras might provide valuable insights into the method of philosophical argument.

In reviewing the *Protagoras*, I do not aim to offer an interpretation of the content of Socrates' conversation with Protagoras, such as the question whether virtue is teachable. I instead examine the *Protagoras* with the aim of discovering some reflections on disagreement and philosophical argument. To this aim, I try to find

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<sup>74</sup> For a valuable discussion on the chronology Vlastos 1991, 45-47; Wolfsdorf 2008, 3-7, Irwin 2008, Benson 2015, 8-11. For a discussion that focuses on the place of *Protagoras* see Kahn 1981, 310-320.

<sup>75</sup> One of my examiners rightfully protested that the *Theaetetus* is a rich and interesting dialogue about metaphilosophy. I have tried to address these worries raised about the *Theaetetus* in the Introduction.

<sup>76</sup> Another dialogue addressing a similar issue is the *Euthydemus*. For an analysis on the nature of conversation in the *Euthydemus* see McCabe 2015, Ch. 7.

<sup>77</sup> See Nehamas (1990) for a discussion on the distinction between philosophy and sophistry in Plato's dialogues. Another problematic exclusion might be the *Gorgias*, which is supposed to be written before the *Phaedo* and depicts the conversation between Gorgias, who is a sophist too, and Socrates. However, like the dialogues mentioned above, the *Gorgias*, I have decided, would not assist my reading of the *Phaedo* as much as the *Protagoras*.

answers to the following meta-dialogical aspects: [1] the meta-dialogical norms that would enable agreement, and [2] the correct norms governing philosophical argument.<sup>78</sup>

### 2.2.2 Agreement and the Goal of Conversation

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates had a conversation with Protagoras at the house of Callias, which Socrates retells to an unnamed friend. Socrates went to Callias' house because a friend of his, Hippocrates, asked for his company. Hippocrates wished to meet Protagoras and to ask whether Protagoras would accept his wish and make him wise.<sup>79</sup> Socrates and Hippocrates initially decided to wait until morning to go to Callias' house, though Hippocrates was raring to go.

In the meantime, Socrates questioned Hippocrates about Protagoras' profession and what Hippocrates expected to learn from Protagoras. For Socrates, they should know the answer to these questions if Hippocrates was going to entrust his soul to Protagoras.<sup>80</sup> However, they were unable 'to decide on such an important subject (τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι)', most likely because, for Socrates, they were young; hence, they agreed to consult their elders.<sup>81</sup> Finally, Socrates and Hippocrates decided to go to Callias' house and talk to Protagoras and 'many other wise men (314c2 καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί) who are at the house of Callias'.<sup>82</sup>

My first point about the *Protagoras*' metaphilosophy is the relationship between the goal of conversation and agreement. Allow me to quote:

[T3] When we got to the doorway [of Callias' house] we stood there discussing some point which had come up along the road and which we didn't want to leave unsettled before we went in. So we were standing there in the doorway discussing it until we reached an agreement.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Long (2013, 26-27) argues that conversation is 'more resourceful' than any other sort of inquiry, although Socrates does not advocate the extreme thought that the only way of inquiry is conversation.

<sup>79</sup> *Prot.* 310d4-6.

<sup>80</sup> *Prot.* 312c8-b4. The issue is that if they do not know what Protagoras' profession, provides they cannot determine whether it is harmful or not.

<sup>81</sup> *Prot.* 314b5-9.

<sup>82</sup> *Prot.* 310a8-314c2.

<sup>83</sup> *Prot.* 314c3-7 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ τίνος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἴν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσασιν ἀλλήλοις.

This passage hints at the role of agreement, which seems to be the goal of conversation. We, unfortunately, are neither told what Socrates and Hippocrates are discussing nor why they disagree. Nor are we informed whether they disagree [Socrates says P, Hippocrates Q about E] or whether they do not have an answer about a topic, which would make both happy [neither of them has a satisfactory view about E]. No matter whether they are just ignorant about E, have opposing views about E, or are expecting satisfactory justification of E, it is significant to observe that they prefer to reach an agreement.<sup>84</sup> Thus, agreement is associated with completeness.<sup>85</sup>

I suggest that agreement, as the goal of conversation, is a theme underpinning the basic qualities of the conversation of Socrates and Protagoras. About the midpoint of their conversation, Socrates tells Protagoras that he has a bad memory, and, as a result, if someone ‘speaks at length’<sup>86</sup> to Socrates, he will ‘fail to recall what the *logos* was about’.<sup>87</sup> Then Socrates asks Protagoras to speak to him ‘as if...[he] happened to be hard of hearing’.<sup>88</sup>

Since Socrates' condition of having a bad memory is made analogous to being hard of hearing, there appears to be an association made between cognitive abilities and understanding, a link which is essential for successful philosophical argument. Imagine that we are speaking to a person who is hard of hearing: we should speak to her with the proper loudness and pace. Likewise, if Protagoras does not speak to Socrates in the proper manner, by changing his style of speech, Socrates would fail to understand Protagoras' argument or what the argument was about.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Long (2013, 39) argues that ‘the question-and-answer mode...allows Socrates to take his interlocutor through the argument step by step...So if Socrates can find the right argument for his current interlocutor, the exchange of questions and answers promises to deliver just what he needs to confirm his ideas, namely evidence of the interlocutor's agreement’. I agree with Long that a true agreement should result from the interlocutor's sincere approval of each step of the justification.

<sup>85</sup> See μή ἀτελής “not incomplete” at *Prot.* 314c5 with διαπερανάμενοι “finishing up” at c6.

<sup>86</sup> *Prot.* 335c9 μακρὰ λέγει.

<sup>87</sup> *Prot.* 334d1 ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ὁ λόγος.

<sup>88</sup> *Prot.* 334d1-2 ὥσπερ...εἰ ἐτύχανον ὑπόκωφος ὢν.

<sup>89</sup> It is debatable whether Socrates really has a bad memory or he is just ironic. If we are going to trust what Alcibiades says (*Prot.* 336d2-d5), Socrates does not have a bad memory, he is just joking. Even if Socrates is ironic, it would hardly be surprising that Socrates does not prefer to speak at length. That is, Socrates might be good at understanding lengthy speeches and at speaking at length, yet this, for him,

However, Protagoras is not willing to fulfil Socrates' wish, which is 'brevity in speech',<sup>90</sup> since he thinks that he would not surpass anyone if he accepted the manner 'his opponent (335a6 *ὁ ἀντιλέγων*)' requested. Socrates offers a solution: he could ask the questions and Protagoras could answer. Socrates, nevertheless, observes 'that he [Protagoras] was uncomfortable with his previous answers and that he would no longer be willing to go on answering in a dialectical discussion'.<sup>91</sup> The conversation thus is on the verge of collapse.

Socrates once more tries to persuade Protagoras to speak briefly as he is willing to hear Protagoras' arguments. Socrates thus says the following, which has some meta-dialogical implications:

[T4] But if you are ever willing to hold a discussion in such a way that I can follow, I will participate in it with you. People say of you—and you say yourself—that you are able to discuss things speaking either at length or briefly. You are a wise man, after all. But I don't have the ability to make those long speeches: I only wish I did. It was up to you, who have the ability to do both, to make this concession, so that the discussion could have had a chance. But since you're not willing, and I'm somewhat busy and unable to stay for your extended speeches—there's somewhere I have to go—I'll be leaving now. Although I'm sure it would be rather nice to hear them.<sup>92</sup>

Firstly, Socrates is willing to carry on the discussion if Protagoras would speak briefly (as he is able to speak briefly) so that Socrates could understand him. Secondly, if Protagoras is unwilling to make this concession, they cannot carry on the discussion. Now, as argued above, the goal of conversation is agreement. Here, too, we can think in terms of the idea of agreement. That is, if Socrates and Protagoras are unable to communicate, then an agreement is not even a prospective outcome for there would be no understanding.<sup>93</sup>

However, one can object to my claim above by maintaining that Socrates decides to leave, but not because he thinks that it is impossible to agree. For instance, we can suppose that Socrates wants to understand Protagoras' argument to refute him or to

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does not need to be the correct method of philosophical argument. Rather, Socrates wishes to establish an agreement step-by-step as it is the right way to do so.

<sup>90</sup> *Prot.* 335a2-3 *τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ*.

<sup>91</sup> *Prot.* 335a9-b2.

<sup>92</sup> *Prot.* 335b3-c7.

<sup>93</sup> McCabe (2015, 135-137) claims that in philosophical conversation, we listen to others to truly understand them, but not just to refute them like sophists.

defend the opposite argument. That is, Socrates can defend the opposite argument and refute Protagoras, yet Protagoras might still disagree with Socrates. However, as T3 above implies, the aim or *telos* of the conversation is agreement. Moreover, Socrates does not just wish to refute Protagoras, but, on the contrary, Socrates wants to understand Protagoras and hopes for agreement.<sup>94</sup>

### 2.2.3 *The Intervention of Listeners*

Socrates' decision to leave the conversation initiates an important episode. Once their listeners, including some sophists, see that the conversation would come to an end, they decide to intervene. This intervention provides significant insights for the *Protagoras*' meta-dialogical and metaphilosophical aspect in the sense that the intervention presents norms for productive communication and of manners of debate.

Productive communication is required, for if one cannot understand another because of the lack of communication, there is no reason for carrying on discussions. It therefore is not even *theoretically* possible to agree. I say theoretically because the *Protagoras*, as we shall see, did not end up with an agreement, but with a 'terrible confusion'.<sup>95</sup> That said, in the same section, it is also underlined that if Socrates and Protagoras would keep on talking and examining, it is still theoretically possible to agree in the future, although they cannot find an agreement that makes them both happy. In other words, if we can communicate successfully, it is theoretically possible to reach an agreement.

The listeners, however, are divided on the issue of the style of speech: whether Protagoras should compromise or should not accept the standards imposed on him. Alcibiades supports Socrates' demand of brief speeches, Callias backs Protagoras' uncompromising position and Critias, Hippias and Prodicus remain somewhat neutral in this conflicting situation.<sup>96</sup> Plato seems to show approval for the last

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<sup>94</sup> Long (2015, 34) rightly emphasizes that those whom we debate should confirm our discoveries, especially if they are strong and experienced adversaries. A confirmation coming from such adversaries might provide additional warrant. In this respect, an agreement might provide strong support for Socrates' position, of course, if it is a *sincere* agreement in favour of Socrates. I say sincere because I do not think that Socrates is trying to deceive Protagoras.

<sup>95</sup> *Prot.* 361c2-3.

<sup>96</sup> *Prot.* 336d7-e4.

group's intervention as the proposal presented in the *Protagoras* comes from them. Now, I would like to outline the structure of intervention:

[1] The listeners 'should not take sides (336e2 οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν)', rather they should encourage the discussants not 'to dissolve the conversation in the middle (336e3 μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν)'. The idea that there is a midpoint of the conversation seems to suggest that there is a goal of the conversation. If so, considering the implication of [T1] above (the goal of conversation is agreement), the neutral group appears to reiterate a similar thought.

[2] The listeners should listen 'impartially' (337a3 κοινοῦς),<sup>97</sup> but 'not without discrimination (337a4 ἴσους δὲ μὴ)'. Whilst 'distributing the value (337a5 νεῖμαι)', the listeners should not deem all sides as equals, since the wiser should have more value than the unlearned in the conversation.

[3] In conversations, friends should 'agree (συγχορεῖν)' to 'argue (ἀμφισβητεῖν)' about 'logoi' rather than to 'dispute (ἐρίζειν)' about *logoi*. This is because eristic is for enemies.<sup>98</sup>

[4] In a good conversation, the speakers would earn the good opinion of the listeners rather than their praise, as praise is 'merely a deceitful verbal expression'.<sup>99</sup>

[5] Regarding the style of conversation, the debaters should meet 'on some middle course' which is agreed by all sides.<sup>100</sup> In the case of the *Protagoras*, Socrates 'must not insist on that precise, excessively brief form of discussion', while Protagoras 'must not let out full sail in the wind and leave the land behind to disappear into the Sea of Rhetoric'.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> *LSJ* s.v. IV.3.

<sup>98</sup> *Prot.* 337a7-b3. I would like to note that ἐρίζειν is used to signify sophistical disputations, or eristic in general, and it is contrasted with dialectic. *E.g. Rep.* V 454a5 οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι.

<sup>99</sup> *Prot.* 337b4-7.

<sup>100</sup> *Prot.* 337e4-338a1 ὑπὸ δαιτυτῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον. See also *Prot.* 338a6 μέσον τι τέμνειν "to hold a middle course" regarding the length of speech.

<sup>101</sup> *Prot.* 338a1-9. Socrates says if Protagoras does not stick to the question by making long speeches which go off the subject, then he would 'ruin the conversation (*Prot.* 338d7-e1 διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν)'. This rule applies to Socrates too, as

Let me recap my initial argument: the goal of conversation is agreement; without understanding and communication, agreement is not even theoretically possible.<sup>102</sup> In this respect, the five points above, I believe, aim at providing the correct norms of argument with a view to supporting the constructive exchange of communication between Socrates and Protagoras.

In addition, the “arbitrators”,<sup>103</sup> as Hippias calls those who are going to monitor the conversation, do not take part in the discussion apart from arbitrating between Socrates and Protagoras. As this is the only occasion that temporarily breaks the core conversation off, it seems to mark a significant point, namely the method of successful and productive communication.<sup>104</sup> To look at the matter from a different point of view, Plato presumably steps in to give some reflections on the correct norms of philosophical argument.

#### 2.2.4 Case I: the Equal Weight View

So far, I have regarded the goal of agreement as the outcome of conversation and have suggested that the correct norms of conversation are presented in the intervention passage. In what follows, I will continue examining other passages of the *Protagoras* to describe some other norms of correct philosophical argument, namely the equal weight view, philosophical humility and careful checking.

The equal weight view suggests (a) our opponents might have legitimate ground for challenging our views, and that (b) we ought to assume that their cognitive abilities are as good and effective as our own. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates believes that excellence cannot be taught while Protagoras thinks that it can be taught. Socrates’ claim is that since the wisest and best citizens could not pass their excellence to their children, excellence cannot be taught.<sup>105</sup> Socrates then asks Protagoras to show him how excellence can be taught. Notwithstanding his judgement on this matter, Socrates is willing to listen to Protagoras and states:

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he (ἄπερ...ἐμοῦ) has already been asked not to do so. See also *Gorg.* 449b4-c8 for another example of Socrates’ demand for precision from another sophist, Gorgias.

<sup>102</sup> *Gorg.* 457c4-d5 for the role of respecting and listening to the other to ‘bring reconciliation to their conversation (διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας)’.

<sup>103</sup> *Prot.* 337e4 διαιτητῶν.

<sup>104</sup> Consider also that Hippias wants to expound his own views on the poem that Socrates examines, yet Alcibiades asks him not to do so. See *Prot.* 347a6-b7.

<sup>105</sup> *Prot.* 319e1-2.

[T5] But when I hear what you have to say, I waver (*κάμπτομαι*); I think there must be something in what you are talking about (*οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν*). I consider you to be a person of enormous experience who has learned much from others and thought through a great many things for himself. So if you can more manifestly (*ἐναργέστερον*) show to us how virtue is teachable, please don't begrudge us your explanation [*slightly modified*].<sup>106</sup>

Not only is Socrates ready to accept the explanation, should Protagoras show it (having a legitimate ground), but Socrates also thinks Protagoras is a learned and experienced person (possesses on par cognitive abilities). This, however, might not mean that Socrates adopts the equal weight view. Imagine that I believe that London is the best city, yet you believe that Paris is the best city, on the assumption that both of us have seen Paris and London. It, then, is clear that our views about what makes a city best are incompatible. When we decide to talk about this issue, I may listen to you not because I believe you have some legitimate ground, but because I think you are wrong; hence you need to be corrected.

In the *Protagoras*, however, Socrates does not seem to presuppose that Protagoras is wrong. Rather, as stated in the quote above, Socrates believes that Protagoras is learned and experienced.<sup>107</sup> In this respect, Socrates appears to credit Protagoras with the cognitive capacity that would enable him to demonstrate his point and convince Socrates. Even if Socrates is not convinced by Protagoras' argument, he still seems to believe that Protagoras can positively help him continue the inquiry.<sup>108</sup> In terms of the city analogy above, I assume that you have seen enough cities to decide that Paris is the best one, and I am eager to see how you are going to prove this.

In this respect, trusting in his argument does not hinder Socrates from listening to Protagoras, and he keeps an open mind while listening to Protagoras. Socrates considers Protagoras as having a par cognitive ability; hence the argument is between

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<sup>106</sup> *Prot.* 320b5-c1.

<sup>107</sup> *Prot.* 320b6-7. I do not think that Socrates praises Protagoras ironically. As Gagarin (1969, 133-34) suggests, Socrates and Protagoras seem to share some views about the importance of '*aretē* and *paideia*' and the purpose of the *Protagoras* is not to show that Socrates is superior to Protagoras although Socrates 'advances beyond Protagoras'.

<sup>108</sup> Long (2013, 42) argues that 'Socrates' reason for continuing to talk with Protagoras must be that Protagoras can help the inquiry into virtue'. By referring to the *Protagoras* 333b-c and 352c-353b, Long notes that Socrates and Protagoras 'have the same opinion'. Next, Protagoras assumes the role of the Many and answers on behalf of them, whose views conflict with Socrates' view.

epistemic peers.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, if Socrates persuades Protagoras, their agreement would indicate a solid and compelling position. If epistemic peers who hold opposite views would agree, the argument on which they agree is strongly confirmed.<sup>110</sup>

### 2.2.5 Case II: Careful Checking

Now, with the aim of explaining careful checking and the perils of steadfastness and overconfidence, I examine the passage where Socrates and Protagoras analyse a poem of Simonides. When Protagoras is concluding his analysis of Simonides' poem, he asks Socrates which qualities 'a fine and properly written poem (*καλῶς...πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς*)' should have. Socrates, then, agrees with Protagoras that to be considered to have composed a fine poem a poet should not 'contradict (*ἐναντία λέγει*)' himself. That is, a good poem should be consistent.

Before concluding the analysis of the poem, Protagoras asks Socrates, 'Do you know this lyric ode, or shall I recite it all for you?'<sup>111</sup> Socrates reports his reply: 'I told him there was no need, for I knew (*ἐπίσταμαι*) the poem, and it happened to be one to which I had given especially careful attention (*πάνν...μεμεληκός*).'<sup>112</sup> Protagoras, however, tries to urge Socrates again by saying, 'take a better look (*Ὅρα...βέλτιον*)', and Socrates replies, 'As I've said, I'm already familiar enough with it (*ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς*).'<sup>113</sup>

Protagoras proceeds by showing how Simonides contradicts himself. According to Protagoras, Simonides 'asserts (*ὀπέθετο*) himself that it is hard for a man truly to become good', but then Simonides also denies this. Protagoras then asks Socrates whether the lines mentioned are 'consistent (*ὁμολογεῖσθαι*)'. Socrates states that they seem consistent, although he adds, 'I was afraid he [Protagoras] had a point there

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<sup>109</sup> Protagoras, too, seems to consider Socrates as his epistemic peer: 'I commend your enthusiasm and the way you find your way through an argument. I really don't think I am a bad man, certainly the last man to harbour ill will. Indeed, I have told many people that I admire you more than anyone I have met, certainly more than anyone in your generation. And I say that I would not be surprised if you gain among men high reputation for wisdom (*Prot. 361e1-7*)'.

<sup>110</sup> See Long 2013, 43-44.

<sup>111</sup> *Prot.* 339b3-b5.

<sup>112</sup> *Prot.* 339b3-5.

<sup>113</sup> *Prot.* 339b9-c1.

(καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμεν μὴ τι λέγοι).<sup>114</sup> Protagoras concludes his analysis in the following way:

[T6] He [Simonides] forgets (ἐπελάθετο) and criticizes (μέμφεται) Pittacus for saying the same thing as he did, that it is hard for a man to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same thing that he himself said (οὐ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐαυτῷ). And yet, when he criticizes (μέμφεται) him for saying the same thing as himself, he obviously criticizes himself (αὐτῷ μέμφεται) as well, so either the earlier or the later must not be right.<sup>115</sup>

Socrates describes the events and his feelings resulting from Protagoras' analysis as follows: 'Protagoras got a noisy round of applause for this speech. At first I felt as if I had been hit by a good boxer. Everything went black and I was reeling from his speech and the others' shouting [in token of approval] (*slightly modified*).'<sup>116</sup>

I submit that the cause of Socrates' cognitive dizziness, as it were, is his belief that he studied Simonides' poem carefully and knew it well. Because of his confidence, Socrates turned down Protagoras' proposal to examine the poem closely. If Socrates had looked at the poem once more, he might have noticed that Simonides appeared contradictory. Then Socrates would not have felt as if he was hit by a good boxer, since Socrates, as we shall see, was eventually able to show that Simonides' poem is not inconsistent.

At any rate, having fallen into a sort of cognitive dizziness, Socrates asks Prodicus to assist him in saving Simonides from contradiction, although Socrates admits that he was merely finding extra time to examine 'what the poet meant'.<sup>117</sup> After analysing the relevant lines at length, Socrates demonstrates that Simonides is not contradicting himself by stressing that Simonides distinguishes being good and becoming good. That is, for Simonides, becoming a good man is possible, though difficult, but it is impossible to stay in the state of goodness, i.e. "to be", forever.<sup>118</sup>

This scene stresses the risks of overconfidence and recognizes possible shortcomings of it in analysis and argument. The message of this passage, then, is compatible with

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<sup>114</sup> *Prot.* 339c4-8.

<sup>115</sup> *Prot.* 339d3-d9. The distinction between "to be" and "become" good will be the basis of Socrates's rebuttal of Protagoras. However, how Socrates contests Protagoras is not relevant for my purpose.

<sup>116</sup> *Prot.* 339d10-e3.

<sup>117</sup> *Prot.* 339e4-6.

<sup>118</sup> *Prot.* 344b6-c3.

the norms governed by philosophical humility. That is, the metaphilosophical aspect of the passage is that we always benefit from reconsidering our arguments and beliefs; hence, we ought not to be so sure that our analysis is complete and our arguments are correct before we listen to counterarguments. If we are not careful and willing to have a second look, we can experience a cognitive dizziness, such as Socrates has suffered.<sup>119</sup>

In addition, Plato's characterisation of Socrates in this section is not just negative.<sup>120</sup> By inviting Prodicus to assist him, Socrates buys time to consider the case and find out whether Simonides is contradicting himself. Socrates' re-examination and explanation, I submit, shows the reader why overconfidence hinders us from further inquiry and why critical reasoning and careful checking are necessary for effective investigation and successful demonstration.<sup>121</sup>

### 2.2.6 *Interim Conclusion*

Let me take stock. I have argued that the goal of conversation is agreement and this goal is theoretically possible if the discussants are able to communicate. I have examined a couple of passages of the *Protagoras* to provide some norms for the correct manner of conversation and inquiry. In addition, I have suggested that Socrates adopts the equal weight view, which renders Protagoras an epistemic peer and maintains the belief that Protagoras might have legitimate ground for holding

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<sup>119</sup> In the *Gorgias*, there are, for Socrates, questions which he asks for "further inquiry (sc. ἐπανερωτῶ)" even though something seems "clear (δῆλον)". Such questions are not aimed at the opponent herself, but they allow 'the discussion to proceed in due order (τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαινεσθαι τὸν λόγον)'. These questions also prevent us from being 'accustomed to guess the other person's meaning because of jumping to conclusions'. See *Gorg.* 453b9-c5. This remark neatly illustrates the necessity of critical reasoning although an argument seems to be clear and the advantage of understanding what the other's argument is in its entirety.

<sup>120</sup> *Prot.* 339e5ff.

<sup>121</sup> However, note also that Socrates in the *Gorgias* stresses that an agreement should not result from having more than enough sense of shame (οὔτ' αἰσχύνῃς περιουσία). Any agreement, for Socrates, should stem from "adequate testing" of an idea if the opponent does not lack wisdom and has the "appropriate" amount of shame. See *Gorg.* 487e1-e6. If this is so, giving credence to others' skill and ideas does not mean underestimating one's own skills. See also *Ap.* 34d9-35a5 for the fine line between arrogance (αὐθαδιζόμενος) and esteem (δόξαν), and the relationship between esteem and shame. Simply, losing one's esteem, i.e. under-estimating oneself, is shame, or disgrace.

the opposite view. I also showed that careful checking and critical thinking have a key role in attaining deeper understanding.

As stated above, however, the discussion did not conclude with an agreement on whether excellence can be taught, which was the main point of disagreement. In fact, Socrates and Protagoras come to believe the opposite of their original opinion in the end: the latter believes that excellence can be taught while the former believes it cannot. Surely, the discussion is not totally in vain. On the one hand, each side has become aware of the fact that some cases or arguments do not support their original claim. On the other hand, Socrates, for instance, comes to have a better understanding of Simonides' poem, of the distinction between being and becoming, and of the nature of excellence.<sup>122</sup>

Moreover, from a metaphilosophical perspective, we see that although Socrates and Protagoras cannot reach an agreement, both showed flexibility, as they came to hold the opposite view to their original position.<sup>123</sup> The lack of agreement, however, did not undermine Socrates' eagerness. He suggests that Protagoras further examine the nature of excellence and whether it can be taught. Protagoras, too, agrees with Socrates that there is need to discuss these questions, but not now.<sup>124</sup> By underlining the need for further inquiry, Protagoras and Socrates stress that the conversation is not complete for there is no agreement yet. This picture, then, is in line with my initial claim that agreement is the goal of conversation. Agreement, I presume, is theoretically possible for [1] Socrates and Protagoras agreed on the style of speech, [2] they consider each other epistemic peers, and [3] they are not steadfast.

### [2.3 The \*Phaedo\*'s Metaphilosophical Component](#)

The aim of this part is to review the epistemic (or intellectual) norms of philosophical conversation/inquiry in the *Phaedo* with reference to the model derived from the *Protagoras*. Since the *Phaedo* depicts a conversation consisting of epistemic/philosophical peers, the dialogue should contribute to understanding of the practice of philosophers. I also suggest that the *Phaedo* delivers more positive results

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<sup>122</sup> For the last issue see *Prot.* 328-334.

<sup>123</sup> *Prot.* 361af.

<sup>124</sup> *Prot.* 361d7-362a4.

than the *Protagoras* because the *Phaedo* takes place in a more philosophical environment.<sup>125</sup>

### 2.3.1 Socrates' Second Defence Speech

In chapter 1, I have emphasized the fact that Socrates' speech in the *Phaedo* was called a defence as if in court. The aim of conversation in the *Phaedo*, I suggest, is shaped by the idea of defence; hence the notions of agreement and persuasion have a key role in the successful philosophical conversation.<sup>126</sup> As also argued in Chapter 1, the *Apology* and the *Phaedo* have different contexts because each dialogue has a different target audience. While the former defence addresses the Athenians' jury, Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, defends himself against the allegations of Simmias and Cebes.

In fact, in the early stages of the *Phaedo*, Socrates stresses this context-dependency, i.e. the structure of conversation is shaped by the target audience and the participants' character. Socrates prefers to talk about their own arguments among themselves, rather than discussing others' opinions, although this does not mean that it is not possible to talk about others' opinions among themselves. At any rate, Simmias tells Socrates that for most people the philosophers do not deserve to live, and they are in a sense dead already since they do not care for bodily pleasures. Socrates replies, 'let's speak among ourselves [about the philosopher's willingness to die] and ignore them'.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> The *dramatis personae* of the *Phaedo* are extensively studied, and I do not wish to go over the issue thoroughly. In addition to the *Phaedo* commentaries, some valuable discussions of the *dramatis personae* are: the prosopographical work of Nails 2002; the examination of the philosophy of *Phaedo* of Elis in Boys-Stones 2004; the philosophical characters of Simmias and Cebes in Sedley 1995. Euclides, Antisthenes and Aristippus are supposed to be eminent intellectuals, if not philosophers *per se*. In addition, the first two are supposed to have established their own schools of thought, Euclides was 'the head of a philosophical school at Megara' and Antisthenes is the 'well-known founder of the Cynic school' (Burnet 1911, 9-11).

<sup>126</sup> By emphasizing the metaphysical aspect of the defence, Pakaluk (2003, 90) suggests that Socrates is 'offering an argument for a real distinction between soul and body'. For Pakaluk, the arguments in the rest of the dialogue 'articulate and defend, with some power and success, a philosophical dualism which is deeply problematic'. I am not going to examine the metaphysics of Socrates' defence, rather, I simply underline its metaphilosophical aspect.

<sup>127</sup> *Phd.* 64a10-c2.

The nature of the defence in the *Phaedo*, therefore, is different than that of the *Apology*. The difference lies in the fact that the jury of the *Phaedo*, Simmias and Cebes, are willing to understand Socrates and to learn from him. They also share some of Socrates' ideas, such as the existence of Forms and the value of philosophy.<sup>128</sup> However, the philosophical alliance might not grant a successful defence. I submit that Socrates needs to use a persuasive style of speech in addition to presenting persuasive arguments. That is, Socrates needs to make his interlocutors truly believe and care for his arguments. With the goal of persuasion, Socrates neither remains resolute nor receives his interlocutors' criticisms offensively, nor does he resent the fact that some of his arguments might be weak. This attitude is governed by the epistemic (intellectual) norms of philosophical humility.

### 2.3.2 Philosophical Humility and Persuasion

Now, I would like to discuss Socrates' insights into the notion of persuasion and its role in philosophical argument. For Socrates, we should primarily care for persuading ourselves and look for the truth. To explain the role of persuading oneself, Socrates discusses the idea of desiring argumentative victory:

[T7] It will be much better to assume that we are not sound yet, but must make a manly effort to be sound. You and the others should do this for the sake of your whole life to come, but I for the sake of my death considered in its own right, because concerning that very thing I'm now in danger of desiring not wisdom but victory, like those who are utterly uneducated. For when they are at odds about something, they also do not care about the facts of the matter they are arguing about, but strive to make what they themselves have proposed seem true to those who are present.<sup>129</sup>

Socrates reflects on the fact that he is going to die shortly and therefore tries to persuade himself that the soul is immortal. Socrates states that he is *in danger of* becoming a man who desires not wisdom but victory, and who does not care about

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<sup>128</sup> Long (2013, 72-73) appropriately defines them as "critical allies".

<sup>129</sup> *Phd.* 90e3-91a6 ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστεῖν καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἔνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὥς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπη μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.

the facts about the immortality of souls. In fact, Socrates believes that he is not dealing with the subject like those who desire victory:

[T8] I think that now I will differ from them only to this extent: I won't strive to make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as byproduct, but instead to make it seem so as much as possible to myself.<sup>130</sup>

T8 suggests that there is a fundamental difference between (I) desiring victory and aiming at persuading others and (II) to be in danger of desiring victory and aiming at persuading oneself. As is clear from T7, a person who acts in the spirit of (I) does not care about the truth. Socrates none the less primarily aims at persuading himself. That is, by straying from the way of truth, Socrates would primarily deceive himself, hence, as a byproduct, his friends.<sup>131</sup> Socrates, however, wants to deceive neither himself nor his friends. He advises his friends to care about the truth:

[T9] [I]f you take my advice, you'll give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth: if you think I say something true, agree with me, and if not, use every argument to resist me, making sure that my eagerness doesn't make me deceive myself and you simultaneously, and that I don't leave my sting in you, like a bee, before I depart.<sup>132</sup>

[T9] seems to indicate that Socrates esteems his interlocutors' cognitive capacities and their critical thinking skills; hence he calls for their critical contribution to the subject to save himself and others from deception. That is, Socrates cares about truth more than persuasion. He encourages Simmias and Cebes to resist his arguments and to save everyone from deception.<sup>133</sup>

However, one might assert that Socrates, whilst encouraging his interlocutors to be critical, does not say what he genuinely aims at. Socrates might be aiming at refuting

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<sup>130</sup> *Phd.* 91a6-b1 καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν.

<sup>131</sup> In the *Prot.* 337a7-b3, desiring victory is called eristic so that it is prohibited. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates does not say that he is desiring victory, but that he is in danger of desiring not wisdom but victory. To save himself from this danger, he requests, I submit, his friends' assistance and their criticism.

<sup>132</sup> *Phd.* 91b8-c5 ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃσθε, μικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν τε ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

<sup>133</sup> From a pedagogical perspective, Socrates might wish to underline the significance of critical thinking. In a sense, Plato may also want his readers to be critical.

his interlocutors so that he encourages them to present new arguments. This interpretation is plausible, yet the burden of proof lies with whoever claims that Socrates does not genuinely believe that his interlocutors can produce strong counterarguments or compelling questions. As I have claimed and will continue to claim, Socrates benefits from his interlocutors' counterarguments and Cebes' question about the soul's imperishability, which is especially compelling.

My second claim draws upon the fact that if persuading others is subordinate to persuading oneself, Socrates might not be aiming at an agreement. Firstly, Socrates is only in danger of desiring not wisdom but victory, as he has not yet become a man who desires victory. With the hope of escaping this danger, Socrates, as mentioned above, asks for his interlocutors' assistance and their criticism. Secondly, Socrates believes that he cannot deceive others without also deceiving himself. Thus, Socrates is still aiming at an agreement and he desires to find an argument which can satisfy, or persuade, himself as well as his interlocutors.

In addition, Socrates stresses that he does not try to convince others at the expense of the search for truth. The need of persuading himself, in this respect, 'motivates' Socrates' desire to discover the truth.<sup>134</sup> Here, another question might arise regarding the desire of self-persuasion: why would Socrates talk to others if he just wishes to persuade himself? Instead, Socrates could have asked for some peace and quiet, then waged an internal battle, so to speak, with himself on this matter and tried to persuade himself.

A plain answer is that Socrates can persuade himself only if he is conversing with others. This is unsurprising, not only because we are reading a dialogue written by Plato but also because examining with others is supposed to be Socrates' typical practice.<sup>135</sup> Besides, I think there is a second-order aim regarding the idea of self-persuasion: self-persuasion applies not only to Socrates but also to the interlocutors and the readers. That is, the interlocutors and the readers, too, are invited to try to persuade themselves rather than believing Socrates' argument without self-reflection.

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<sup>134</sup> *Phd.* 91a8 προθυμήσομαι.

<sup>135</sup> See Woolf 2008, 13-19 for the idea of Socrates's self-examination by examining others.

To reiterate, Socrates makes it clear that he is not going to deceive because of his eagerness to show that the soul is immortal. The bee analogy at T9 above would help us to understand the relationship between self-persuasion, the truth and deception. Imagine that if a bee stings us, it would die, though the person who is stung by a bee would survive unless she has an allergy to bee stings. Likewise, Socrates cannot deceive his interlocutors without deceiving himself, as though a bee stung but did not die at the same time. If so, it seems that deceiving others and deceiving oneself are inseparable, and we cannot achieve one without also achieving the other, if we care about the truth.

### 2.3.3 *The First Disagreement*

As suggested above, truly persuading ourselves, for Socrates, depends on our care about the truth and our proximity to it. Now, I show that the search for self-persuasion leads to the expansion of our knowledge. To this end, allow me to briefly scrutinize Socrates' argument against suicide. Socrates maintains that suicide is not permissible although it is better for some people, at certain times, to be dead than to be alive. This is because, for Socrates, gods take care of us and humans are one of the gods' possessions. If so, we would make gods angry by killing ourselves. For Socrates, we should not kill ourselves 'until god imposes some necessity'.<sup>136</sup>

Socrates, in this respect, believes that the Athenians' jury posed this necessity when they decided to put him to death; hence, Socrates is permitted to kill himself. Therefore, since true philosophers are willing to die,<sup>137</sup> though Socrates has not yet given any reason for this, Socrates is neither resentful of dying nor afraid of acting against the will of the gods.

Cebes, however, opposes Socrates by maintaining that it is unreasonable for the wisest people, true philosophers, to kill themselves because these people should know that the gods are "the best supervisors". As we are one of the gods' possessions, and they administer us in the best way, it is unreasonable to escape from gods and to be unresentful of leaving them. For Cebes, 'an unintelligent person,

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<sup>136</sup> *Phd.* 62a1-c5. For an analysis of this complex sentence see Gallop 1975:79-83.

<sup>137</sup> *Phd.* 61c1-9.

however, might well think so [*i.e.* he will take better care of himself after he has become free], namely that he should try to escape from his master'.<sup>138</sup>

Here, we need notice Socrates' welcoming attitude towards Cebes' argument, which praises critical thinking. Phaedo relates Socrates' reaction to Cebes' argument as follows:

[T10] When Socrates heard this he seemed to me delighted by Cebes' persistence, and he looked at us and said: 'As you can see, Cebes is always scrutinizing arguments, and refuses to be convinced straight away of whatever anyone says.'<sup>139</sup>

Simmias, too, agrees with Cebes and adds that not only should Socrates be reluctant to leave good masters behind but also his friends.<sup>140</sup> Socrates acknowledges what Simmias and Cebes are saying is fair and decides to defend himself 'in answer to these charges, as if in court'.<sup>141</sup> In the end, Socrates will persuade his interlocutors that true philosophers are reasonably willing to die since true wisdom can only be found after death.<sup>142</sup>

### 2.3.4 *The Expansion of Knowledge*

The interlocutors' opposition and Socrates' decision to convince them lead to an expansion of knowledge concerning the practice of philosophers and the nature of the soul. As I have already stated, the interlocutors' objections prompted further examination. If it were not for their disagreement, Socrates would probably not feel obliged to defend himself and to examine true philosophers' willingness to die.

Socrates then begins his defence by saying, '[I] am optimistic that there is something in store for the dead and, as we have long been told, something much better for the good than for the bad'.<sup>143</sup> Next, Socrates introduces the aim of his defence:

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<sup>138</sup> *Phd.* 62c9-e7.

<sup>139</sup> *Phd.* 62e8-63a3 Ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναι τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, Αἰεὶ τοι, ἔφη, [ὁ] Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πᾶν εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις εἴπῃ.

<sup>140</sup> *Phd.* 63a4-9.

<sup>141</sup> *Phd.* 63b1-2.

<sup>142</sup> I scrutinize the way in which Socrates persuades his interlocutors in Chapter 3.

<sup>143</sup> *Phd.* 62e5-7.

[T11] I want now to give the account I owe you, of how it seems to me to be reasonable for a man who has genuinely spent his life in philosophy to be confident about his imminent death, and to be optimistic that he'll win the greatest goods there, after he's met his end.<sup>144</sup>

Socrates subsequently presents some aspects of true philosophers' willingness to die, which are not correctly understood by many people (the ordinary people), namely 'the *sense* in which true philosophers are near death, the sense in which they deserve death, and what that death is like'.<sup>145</sup> Simmias and Socrates, firstly, agree that being dead is the following: 'the body has been separated from the soul and come to be apart, alone by itself, and the soul has been separated from the body and is apart, alone by itself'.<sup>146</sup> After that, Socrates asks Simmias to consider that 'if you too turn out to think what I do. I believe that the following points will **give** us a **better understanding** of the things we are looking into'.<sup>147</sup> Finally, Socrates argues and Simmias approves the following points about the practice of philosophers and the nature of reasoning:

[1] true philosophers disdain bodily pleasures and adornments except in so far as they need; [2] people think those who disdain the body are close to being dead and they are not worthy of living; [3] bodily senses are neither clear nor accurate; [4] the soul reasons best the less it has contact with the body; [5] there are things themselves such as a Just itself, a Beautiful itself, *etc.* ; [6] these realities can be discerned by intellect alone by itself and unsullied; [7] a person who separates the soul from the body as much as possible comes closest to each of them, *i.e.* Forms.<sup>148</sup>

Simmias agrees with Socrates about the seven points above, through which Socrates will try to expand their knowledge (or achieve a better understanding) about the true philosophers' willingness to die.<sup>149</sup> After their agreement, Socrates begins to explain the reasoning behind his optimism, which is clearly indicated in the text. The discussion summarised above takes place between the *Phaedo* 64d2 and 66a10. Then Socrates makes an inference by *Oύκοὖν* at 66b1. He says, 'then given all this [the seven points above] is it inevitable for those who are genuinely philosophers to be

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<sup>144</sup> *Phd.* 63e7-6a2.

<sup>145</sup> *Phd.* 64b7-8.

<sup>146</sup> *Phd.* 64c5-8.

<sup>147</sup> *Phd.* 64c10-d2 ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν.

<sup>148</sup> [1] *Phd.* 64d2-65a2, [2] 65a4-a8, [3] 65a10-b11, [4] 65c2-d1, [5] 65d4-d10, [6] 65d11-e5 [7] 66a1-10

<sup>149</sup> In a sense, it is also true that the "starting point" of philosophising' is agreement about an 'opinion' (Griswold 1988:165).

struck by the following sort of belief', and he introduces a discussion between true philosophers directed toward the exploration of knowledge and the truth.<sup>150</sup>

The defence of Socrates ends with Cebes' approval that Socrates had shown 'rightly (καλῶς)' that true philosophers are willing to die and the reason behind Socrates not being resentful. That said, for Cebes, the immortality of the soul is still in need of further examination. That is, Socrates should also show that the soul is immortal to complete his defence.<sup>151</sup> The outline of conversation about true philosophers' willingness to die is as follows:

(a) the interlocutors' disagreement about true philosophers' willingness to die and their protest to Socrates' eagerness to die; (b) the agreement about the seven points above through which Socrates offers to resolve the conflict; (c) the expansion of knowledge, or the attainment of better understanding; (d) a new disagreement about the immortality of the soul.<sup>152</sup>

In his defence, Socrates clearly assumes that the soul is immortal, since he portrays the soul's life in Hades, yet he does not say anything about the immortality of the soul. In fact, the question about the existence of the soul after death is first mentioned by Cebes, and the adjective 'immortal (ἀθάνατον)' has not been used prior to line 73a2 in the *Phaedo*.

### 2.3.5 The Second Disagreement

Why does not Socrates' defence speech address the immortality of the soul? Firstly, Socrates should be aware of the fact that the immortality of the soul is a key component of his defence. It would be odd if Socrates did not realize that true philosophers' willingness to die would be pointless unless the soul is immortal. Secondly, Socrates would not simply assume that his interlocutors believe in the immortality of the soul, since Socrates agrees with Cebes that the immortality of the soul requires 'no little reassurance and proof'.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> *Phd.* 66b1-3 Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις.

<sup>151</sup> *Phd.* 69e7-70b4.

<sup>152</sup> But note that if we give our consent to a proposition, this means neither that we are going to buy the whole argument nor that we share the same philosophical ideas.

<sup>153</sup> *Phd.* 70b1-7.

We can consider the unmentioned argument about the immortality of the soul from the perspective of Plato's portrayal of Socrates' interlocutors. Plato portrays the interlocutors as noticing the missing part in Socrates' defence speech. Surely, the interlocutors do not say that Socrates left the immortality of the soul out. Rather, Cebes says that people have strong doubts about the immortality of the soul and the soul's powers during its discarnate existence. Although Cebes does not directly point out Socrates' omission, the question about the immortality of the soul troubles Cebes; therefore Cebes asks Socrates to examine the topic.<sup>154</sup> At any rate, as I have argued above, Socrates produces arguments because the interlocutors come forward in noticing a weakness in the argument.<sup>155</sup> In this way, Plato stresses that the interlocutors also occupy a vital position in the conversation, which is the significance of reciprocal support and the necessity of such for philosophical argument.

That said, one might suppose that Socrates and his interlocutors would not be participating equally in a philosophical argument if Socrates deliberately leaves a key premise out. It can be argued that Socrates has all the answers to give, yet in the interests of teaching he does not give all the answers at once. Therefore, Socrates and his interlocutors are not epistemic peers, who have equal cognitive capacity. This, however, does not imply that Socrates is free from erring or that his interlocutors are not as cognitively capable as Socrates. It only implies that Socrates might have more knowledge and experience. Nonetheless, we need to notice that possessing knowledge and the cognitive capacity to know (as well as to question existing knowledge) are different, and that the interlocutors possess the latter, as they can wrap their minds around Socrates' arguments, criticize them and proffer counterarguments.

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<sup>154</sup> Blattberg (2015, 116) argues that 'given that the intended changes of position go in one direction only, *from Socrates to his interlocutors*, the two-way dynamic necessary for any sort of dialogue must be considered absent (author's italics)'. As we shall see, Socrates sincerely listens to his interlocutors, and Plato stresses that the interlocutors' criticisms contribute to Socrates' arguments about the immortality of the soul.

<sup>155</sup> At *Phd.* 103af., one of those present says that Socrates is contradicting himself (about the idea that an opposite thing [something large] comes to be from an opposite thing [something small]), though Socrates shows that he actually does not (since the opposite by itself [the Beautiful itself] could never come to be its own opposite). It seems, then, such interventions are encouraged by Plato.

Besides, the above quotation (T9) about caring for truth more than Socrates indicates that the *Phaedo* is not primarily about Socrates but about truth. That is, the dialogue is not only a eulogy for Socrates or a praise of his philosophical skills, but also a record of the discovery of truth, although the truth and Socrates' ideas may coincide. If we put aside Plato's admiration of Socrates' wisdom, we might observe that the interlocutors and their arguments have a key role in understanding the nature of the soul. From a meta-dialogical perspective, Socrates is an interlocutor as well, as it is not possible to know exactly to what extent Plato agrees with Socrates.<sup>156</sup>

### 2.3.6 *Cebes and Simmias*

To begin with, Socrates' interlocutors do not seem to consider Socrates their rival. They do not oppose Socrates with the intention of refuting him and winning the debate. For instance, Cebes asks for an investigation into the immortality of the soul since the issue requires further inquiry and support.<sup>157</sup> That said, Cebes' eagerness alone is not sufficient to call him a good interlocutor.

Besides his eagerness, Cebes seems to have some knowledge about the immortality of the soul. For example, it is Cebes who alludes to the theory of recollection, according to which 'our learning is in fact nothing but recollection...we must presumably have learned in some previous time what we recollect now. And that would be impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before it was born in this human form. So in this way too the soul seems to be something immortal'.<sup>158</sup> For Cebes, this is an excellent theory, which proves that we have knowledge and the true account in us and learning is actually remembering.<sup>159</sup>

Cebes' introduction of the theory of recollection has another implication. In addition to the fact that Cebes knows some arguments about the immortality of the soul, its introduction by Cebes suggests that he is willing to support Socrates' argument; otherwise, he would not bring the theory of recollection up, which is in favour of the immortality of the soul. That said, Cebes does not put all his trust in the theory of

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<sup>156</sup> For the mimetic aspect of the dialogues that invites the readers to the path of philosophy through the characters see McCoy 2016, 54-55.

<sup>157</sup> *Phd.* 70b2-4 τοῦτο δι' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δέεται καὶ πίστεως, ὥς ἐστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.

<sup>158</sup> *Phd.* 75c5-76d6.

<sup>159</sup> *Phd.* 73a6-b1.

recollection, as he believes that the theory is not sufficient to show that the soul is immortal.<sup>160</sup>

Simmias' reaction to the theory of recollection deserves some attention. Once Cebes has introduced the theory of recollection, Simmias asks for "proofs (αἱ ἀποδείξεις)" that would verify it.<sup>161</sup> Firstly, Cebes tries to explain the theory of recollection to Simmias, then Socrates steps in and asks Simmias: 'see if you agree when you examine the issue along the following lines. For are you in doubt about how so-called "learning" can be recollection?'<sup>162</sup> Simmias replies as follows:

[T12] No, I don't doubt it,' said Simmias, 'but I need to undergo the very thing that the theory is about: recollecting. And to some extent I already remember and am convinced, thanks to what Cebes started to say. None the less, I'd like to hear now how you yourself were starting to propound it.<sup>163</sup>

For Simmias, Cebes' attempt to explain the theory of recollection was not successful. It was a missed shot.<sup>164</sup> Although Simmias is nearly convinced, he desires to hear more about the argument. In this respect, Simmias seems to look for a better understanding of the theory of recollection. Next, Socrates begins to make a demonstration of the theory of recollection, and Simmias agrees that the soul has existed before birth and that learning is recollection are 'adequately proved'.<sup>165</sup> For Simmias, Cebes is also 'sufficiently convinced'.<sup>166</sup> Nevertheless, Simmias and Cebes have not yet been convinced that the soul will exist after death, and thus only half of the argument is complete.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Nothing in the text implies that Cebes introduces the theory of recollection for opposing it later. That is, Cebes does not remind the interlocutors of the theory of recollection to stress its weaknesses. On the contrary, both interlocutors believe in the theory, though they are suspicious as to whether it shows that the soul will exist after death. See *Phd.* 76e8-77a5.

<sup>161</sup> *Phd.* 73a4-5.

<sup>162</sup> *Phd.* 73b4-5 σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπούμεν συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν;

<sup>163</sup> *Phd.* 73b6-10 Ἀπιστῶ μὲν [σοι] ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντὰν ἤττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν.

<sup>164</sup> See Rowe 1993, 165; Burnet 1911, 53.

<sup>165</sup> *Phd.* 77a5 ἰκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

<sup>166</sup> *Phd.* 77a10 οὐκ ἐνδεῶς...πεπεῖσθαι.

<sup>167</sup> However, for Socrates if the recollection argument is combined with the cyclical argument, then one would attain a complete proof. See *Phd.* 77c6-e3.

Socrates will provide two more arguments (the affinity and the last arguments), along with a rebuttal (the soul-harmony argument) about whether the soul will exist after we have died. At this point, I would like to remind the reader of a passage that I often refer to in this dissertation: once Socrates has completed the last proof of the immortality of the soul, Cebes is convinced, but for Simmias there remains some reasonable doubt. Socrates also encourages his friends to continue to investigate, until they follow the argument as far as humanly possible.<sup>168</sup>

In this respect, agreement completes the current conversation, though the immortality of the soul is an issue that demands further inquiry.<sup>169</sup> As I have claimed whilst discussing the *Protagoras*, agreement is the goal (or completion) of philosophical conversation/inquiry. At the end of the *Protagoras*, Socrates and Protagoras cannot find an argument that both can agree on, yet they decide to meet at some other time to discuss further. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates and his interlocutors agree on the last argument, though Simmias voiced reservations about the issue and Socrates recognizes them. Unfortunately, Socrates cannot meet his friends again to philosophise, and he urges them to discuss among themselves. There is no time left to follow the argument further, although Socrates might have other opinions in mind or wish to discover new arguments.<sup>170</sup>

## [2.4 Conclusion](#)

The aim of this chapter is to propose a conceptual framework based on the correct norms of successful persuasion, agreement and philosophical argument. To this end, I examined the *Protagoras* from the perspective of philosophical agreement. Then these ideas were brought together and applied to the *Phaedo*. By comparing the *Protagoras* and the *Phaedo*, however, I did not aim at showing that they adhere to the same guidelines for philosophical practice. Rather, I simply suggested that both dialogues highlight that the goal of conversation is agreement, although the guideline suggested by each dialogue has its own specifics and scope.

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<sup>168</sup> See *Phd.* 107b4-10.

<sup>169</sup> Surely, this agreement does not conclude the *Phaedo*. Socrates is going to speculate about the afterlife and the geography earth at *Phd.* 107c-115a.

<sup>170</sup> It is germane to note that after finishing the description of the regions where the soul of the dead dwell except that of those purified adequately by philosophy, Socrates at the *Phaedo* 114c5-6 says ‘explaining these dwellings is not easy, nor is there sufficient time in the present circumstances’.

In the *Protagoras*, Plato stresses the significance of following the correct norms of conversation. Plato stages an intervention to that effect via the listeners, who aim at arbitrating a dispute between Socrates and Protagoras on the style of speech. I submit that this intervention underlines the significance of mutual understanding and communication, which are essential for making agreement theoretically possible.

Besides, it is reasonable that Plato did not stage an implicit intervention in the *Phaedo*, as the interlocutors and Socrates have similar views about the practice of philosophers.<sup>171</sup> That is, the *Phaedo* narrates a conversation between Socrates and his close friends. The *Protagoras*, however, is taking place in a sophistic atmosphere and Socrates talks to Protagoras, who does not seem to share Socrates' ideas about the practice of philosophers.<sup>172</sup>

The most relevant findings to emerge from my analysis are: that [1] the *Phaedo* and the *Protagoras* emphasize that the goal of conversation is agreement (the former by means of the idea of defence and the latter through the conversation between Hippocrates and Socrates); that [2] we ought to recognize our interlocutors as epistemic peers; that [3] we should not hold fast to an argument without listening to counterarguments and conducting further examination. However, I do not argue that Socrates in the *Phaedo* disavows knowledge, which might be regarded as the defining character of Socrates in the early dialogues.<sup>173</sup> Rather, I suggest that

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<sup>171</sup> Blattberg (2005, 113-114) points out that no negotiation or negotiators are found in the *Phaedo* since the participants of conversation are after a common cause. For Blattberg, the conversation in the *Phaedo* is between 'opponents' rather than 'adversaries' because they are 'truly listening to the reasons being given for each opposing position'.

<sup>172</sup> However, Griswold (1988, 143) claims that if Plato were writing for 'fellow philosophers', he would not have chosen 'the dialogue form', as 'a precise articulation of the subject matter' cannot be done in this form. Thus, Plato writes for 'potential philosophers'. I do not see any clear reason why the pedagogical and philosophical aims should be separated. That is, philosophy can be both 'practiced' and 'instructed' in dialogue form. Perl (2014, 19-22) discusses the relationship between the dialogue form and Plato's metaphysics and claims that 'Plato's ubiquitous use of myths, metaphors, and images, as well as the mimetic nature of the dialogue form itself, reflects the mimetic structure of reality, in which one level of being is an image of a higher level'. Although I do not advocate such a strong claim, the dialogue form and the norms followed by the participants provide insights on philosophical argument.

<sup>173</sup> See *Ap.* 21b-d, 29b; *Euthyphro.* 5a-c, 15c11-16a4; *Charmides* 165b-c, 166c-d; *Laches* 186b-187a, 200e1-2; *Lysis* 212a, 223b; *Gorg.* 509c. See also Wolfsdorf (2004); Politis (2006).

Socrates does not abandon philosophical humility, which is a key element of the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo*.

## Chapter 3: The Practice of Philosophers

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the way in which Socrates describes the practice of philosophers in the *Phaedo*. I argue that the true philosopher's willingness-to-die argument (hereafter the Willingness Argument) stresses that true philosophers are aware of the limits of their epistemic access. In this respect, I submit that true philosophers' awareness of the limits (and the fallibility) of human understanding provides a basis for the norms governing philosophical humility.

In explaining philosophical humility, I scrutinize the *Phaedo* 63-69, which is generally entitled Socrates' defence. In this section, as mentioned in the previous chapters, Socrates discusses the philosophers' desires, hopes and practice to expound why philosophers are willing to die.<sup>174</sup> The Willingness Argument states that if we desire wisdom and the truth, we ought to care for the soul; hence we ought to remain aloof from the body, its desires and bodily perception as much as possible. This is because, for Socrates, the soul can reason and approach knowledge best inasmuch as it is separated from the body.

Moreover, I argue that the Willingness Argument is a demarcation criterion which distinguishes a philosopher's practice from other sorts of inquiries. Therefore, the Willingness Argument partially shapes the ideas presented about correct philosophical argument. In a sense, by introducing the Willingness Argument, Plato sets the scene for the description of knowledge and of the method of inquiry.<sup>175</sup>

With the aim of explaining the relationship between the Willingness Argument and the practice of philosophers, I scrutinise Socrates' surprising question, whether Evenus is a philosopher, as Evenus is portrayed as a sophist/poet and an inventor of rhetorical methods, namely in the *Apology* and in the *Phaedrus* respectively. I suggest that Socrates uses the term *philosophos* in a narrow sense, as opposed to the idea that *philosophos* refers to any lover of wisdom in general. I argue that Plato underlines that sophists, whom he usually criticizes and whose practice he considers dangerous, can become philosophers by adopting the norms governed by the

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<sup>174</sup> Hereafter, when I write "the philosopher" or "the philosopher's practice", I specifically refer to "true philosophers" and "their practice".

<sup>175</sup> Plato does not explicitly say that knowledge (τὸ εἰδέναι) and wisdom (φρόνησις) are different. See *Phd.* 66e1-e6. That said, they seem to differ in that wisdom can be achieved through the knowledge of things themselves. See *Phd.* 67e4-68a6.

Willingness Argument; hence Plato gives a primary role to the Willingness Argument for the practice of philosophers.

In addition, I explore the nature of the embodied and disembodied states of the soul and compare their cognitive powers. I suggest that while the disembodied soul attains wisdom passively and instantaneously, the embodied soul tries to attain wisdom by actively practicing philosophy. I also submit that although the embodied and disembodied states of the soul are ontologically the same, their cognitive powers are different; hence they are epistemologically different. Their distinctive cognitive powers fashion the ways in which each state of the soul attains wisdom.

### 3.2 Becoming a Philosopher

#### **3.2.1 True Philosophers**

I would like to begin by discussing Socrates' message to Evenus. This message introduces the practice of philosophers and the true philosophers' willingness to die. Allow me to quote the passage in which Socrates questions whether Evenus is a philosopher:

[T13] 'So, Cebes, tell all this to Evenus, give him my best wishes and tell him, if he is in his right mind, to come after me as soon as possible. I leave, it seems, today: so the Athenians command.'

To which Simmias said: 'Fancy recommending a thing like that to Evenus, Socrates! I've often encountered him in the past, and from what I've seen I imagine there's no way that he will follow your advice willingly.'

'Really?' said he. 'Isn't Evenus a philosopher?'

'I think he is,' said Simmias.

'Then Evenus will be willing, as will everyone who has a worthy claim to this activity. Though perhaps he won't use violence on himself, for they say that it isn't sanctioned.'<sup>176</sup>

Socrates is expecting Simmias to reply that Evenus is a philosopher since his question begins with 'the negative of fact and statement'.<sup>177</sup> In his reply to this query, Simmias says, 'I think he is', although he does not strongly confirm that Evenus is a philosopher.<sup>178</sup> There are two questions to consider: [1] what does Socrates' question aim at, and [2] is Socrates ironical or serious? I suggest that Socrates tries to stress the significance of the Willingness Argument, thus he is serious about the advice that

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<sup>176</sup> *Phd.* 61b7-c10.

<sup>177</sup> *Phd.* 61c6 οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐηνος; See LSJ s.v. II.2.12.

<sup>178</sup> *Phd.* 62c7 Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Evenus can become a philosopher if he follows the norms governed by the Willingness Argument.

Before proceeding to examine the Willingness argument, it is necessary to decide in which sense Evenus is called a philosopher; that is, whether Socrates refers to true philosophers or wise people in general. To begin with, it is not Socrates who remembers Evenus. Rather, it is Cebes who reminds Socrates of Evenus, as Cebes tells Socrates a question asked by several people including Evenus:

[T14] You know those poems you've been composing, your versifications of Aesop's tales and the proem to Apollo? Well, some people were already asking me about them, and in particular Evenus asked the day before yesterday what on earth your idea was in composing them when you came here, given that you had never composed poetry before. So if you care at all about my having an answer for Evenus when he asks me again –because I'm quite sure that he will ask – tell me what to say.<sup>179</sup>

Socrates replies that he did not compose these poems to rival Evenus, yet he did so because of a certain dream, which visits him every now and then and orders him to 'make music and work at it'. Regarding the earlier occurrences of this dream, Socrates thought that 'it [the dream] was encouraging me and cheering me on to do what I was doing, like those who cheer runners'.<sup>180</sup> What Socrates must have been doing then was philosophy, which was 'the greatest music (*Phd.* 61a3-4 μέγιστης μουσικῆς)' for Socrates.

Socrates believed that his recent dream meant 'music as commonly understood (*Phd.* 61a7 τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν)' rather than philosophy. Therefore, Socrates first decided on 'making a composition dedicated to the god [Apollo] whose festival was currently being held', and then 'to compose stories, not arguments (ποιεῖν μύθους ἄλλ' οὐ λόγους)', as a poet ought to do if 'he was going to be a poet'. However, since Socrates is 'no story-teller (οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός)', he decided to use Aesop's stories and made compositions out of them.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> *Phd.* 60c8-d7.

<sup>180</sup> *Phd.* 60e6-7.

<sup>181</sup> *Phd.* 60d8-61c1.

In this section, I think, Socrates is not ironical, as some scholars argue.<sup>182</sup> I deny the idea that Socrates does not care about story-telling at all. If Socrates were not caring about story-telling, it would hardly make sense that Socrates was spending his last days dealing with some stories. Nor would it make sense that Socrates concluded his final conversation by telling a myth.<sup>183</sup> Equally important, it would be senseless to advise his interlocutors to ‘sing incantations (ἐπάδειν)’ to the child inside them to get rid of the fear of death.<sup>184</sup>

If myths are ‘spells’ in some way,<sup>185</sup> then Socrates would not rule out story-telling as a means of communication and persuasion, though he is careful about the proximity of the myths to the truth.<sup>186</sup> In this respect, Socrates is serious, though modest, when he declares that he is no story-teller, for composing stories is a difficult task that we should be careful about.<sup>187</sup>

### 3.2.2 The Meaning of Philosophos

Some scholars claim that Socrates calls Evenus a philosopher either in the sense that [a] Evenus is practicing a specific profession, namely the Socratic/Platonic concept of philosophy or that [b] Evenus is just a lover of wisdom.<sup>188</sup> It is argued that if we

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<sup>182</sup> For instance, Bluck (1955, 40) argues that Socrates’ modesty is ‘almost certainly ironical’ by referring to the devaluation of poets for distorting the truth in the *Republic*. Similarly, Hackforth (1955, 33 fn.5) refers to the *Apology* (20a-b) where Socrates discovered that poets are not wise but ignorant. However, if myth-making was essentially bad, it would be hard to make sense of the myth in the last section of the *Phaedo* (107c-115a) and Socrates’s offer to ‘both look at different ways and speculate about (*Phd.* 61e1-2 διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν)’ the journey to the afterlife.

<sup>183</sup> See *Rep. II*. 377-382; *III*. 387-392 for the correct use of myths in education.

<sup>184</sup> *Phd.* 77e2-8.

<sup>185</sup> See *Phd.* 114d7 where Socrates advises his interlocutors to repeat the myths about the afterlife like a spell.

<sup>186</sup> See Schofield 2009 for the myths as persuasive tools with reference to the Noble Lie in the *Republic III*. See also Rowe (1999) for the relationship between philosophical argument and myths.

<sup>187</sup> Consider Socrates’ cautious remarks about the myth he delivered at *Phd.* 114d1-d4. The use of myths by Plato is a delicate issue, and I have no claim to propose another interpretation. For instance, Tarrant (2012, 50-59) maintains that Plato distinguishes “*logos*” and “*muthos*”, and in many dialogues *muthos* comes only after *logos* has been done. Most (2012, 16-19) presents the eight criteria defining the use of myth in Plato’s dialogues. Dixsaut (2012, 28-35) argues that *muthos* reaches readers more easily than *logos*, which demands a certain acquaintance with the language used.

<sup>188</sup> Rowe (1995, 123) and Hackforth (1955, 34 fn.3) advocate broad reading. They suppose that when οἱ...φιλοσοφοῦντες signifies the lovers of wisdom in the narrower

accept [a], we ought to suppose that Socrates ironically calls Evenus a philosopher, as Evenus is not portrayed thus in the other dialogues.<sup>189</sup> If we assume [b], we would consider Socrates as being sincere. In what follows, I first explore and raise objections to [b], and I show why we should read [a].

Firstly, [b] does not seem to comply with the rest of Socrates' defence since Socrates scrutinizes the practice of true philosophers rather than that of wise people.<sup>190</sup> Secondly, Socrates can hardly expect that Simmias is going to approve that a lover of wisdom in general would embrace the Willingness Argument. In fact, Simmias observes that most people, including his own countrymen, would find it fitting that 'those who pursue philosophy really are near death, and that they themselves have realized that death is just what these people deserve', although most people, as Socrates says, do not really understand the Willingness Argument.<sup>191</sup>

Here Simmias seems to refer to true philosophers, though perhaps he did not totally understand what Socrates has meant. Otherwise, it would be strange that those who love wisdom in general, for Simmias, deserve to die according to most people. That is, poets and politicians, for instance, are possibly fond of wisdom, yet most people would hardly think that they deserve to die. It therefore seems that the popular image of true philosophers develops out of their way of life, for true philosophers remain aloof from the pleasures of the body, which are possibly indicative of a worthy life for most people.<sup>192</sup>

In the narrow reading, we get into some difficulties. Above all, Socrates' interlocutors, and the readers alike, might be perplexed about calling Evenus a

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sense, "aright [ὀρθῶς]" is supplied, i.e. those who practise philosophy aright, as is the case at *Phd.* 67e4. For other uses of 'aright' see *Phd.* 64a4, 67b4, 67e4, 69d2, 69d4, 80e6, 82c3. However, this only proves that the addition of 'aright' entails a narrow reading, not necessarily that its absence signifies the philosopher in a broad sense. Even if this use is consistent, it can well be a result of Simmias's confusion of true philosophers and any lover of wisdom. Noticing this, Socrates might have decided to remove this confusion for Simmias by suppling 'aright', not for himself.  
<sup>189</sup> Ebert (2001, 428-433) argues that when Socrates confers the title 'philosopher' on Evenus, he refers to him as a Pythagorean philosopher. However, I do not see any strong evidence either in the *Phaedo* or in the other dialogues that supports this claim other than hardly reliable doxographical reports. That said, I show that Evenus offers a special example of wise people. Cf. Peterson 2011, 169 fn. 7&8.

<sup>190</sup> See Ebert 2001, 426.

<sup>191</sup> *Phd.* 64a9-b6.

<sup>192</sup> See *Phd.* 64c10-65a8; 66b7-d7; 81c8-81e2; 82b10-c7; 83b5-c3. Burnet (1911, 29) notes that οἱ πολλοί 'think philosophers 'as good as dead', and look upon them as 'living corpses'.

philosopher, as the man is referred to as a sophist, poet and rhetorician by Plato.<sup>193</sup> It would also seem strange that Simmias did not know Evenus' profession, although he often encountered him in the past.<sup>194</sup> In this respect, Simmias' approval that Evenus is a philosopher might favour claim [b] above, for Socrates sometimes uses the term lover of wisdom in a broad sense.<sup>195</sup>

However, if Plato desired to ridicule sophists and poets, he would have preferred a stronger figure to that effect, who would easily remind the readers of sophists and poets. If Plato had done so, Simmias would hardly think that that person is a philosopher and the irony would work better.<sup>196</sup> Then the allusion to Evenus, for whom Plato shows relative respect, intensifies the perplexity of the reader, who is now invited to scrutinize Socrates' point for calling Evenus a philosopher.<sup>197</sup>

### 3.2.3 *The Practice of True Philosophers*

Socrates' message to Evenus quoted above (T13) has two interrelated components, which are indicated by a correlative conjunction (both/and).<sup>198</sup> The first part counsels Evenus 'to keep in good health' while the second part urges him to follow Socrates, who is going to die in a little while.<sup>199</sup> These two ideas, however, seem inconsistent, if not contradictory, as we cannot stay in good health and follow someone who is dying. However, Simmias does not seem to have a problem with the inconsistency

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<sup>193</sup> See *Phd.*60d9; *Phdr.*267a3. In the *Apology* 20a-b, Evenus is said to teach being a good citizen for a fee of five minas.

<sup>194</sup> *Phd.* 61c4-5.

<sup>195</sup> Rowe 1993, 123 and *Rep.*V.475b8-9.

<sup>196</sup> For instance, Plato could have used a character portrayed in the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*. At any rate, I do not see any strong reason to take Socrates's message to Evenus as historically accurate, therefore Plato could have used another figure if he wished to make fun of sophists. However, Burnet (1911, 60) notes that 'we know from the *Apology* 20a3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of Socrates.' However, this does not rule out the possibility that there are other sophists at Athens then.

<sup>197</sup> Vlastos (1991, Ch.1) challenges the view that Socratic irony aims at deception by maintaining that the purpose of Socratic irony is to introduce riddles without any purpose of deception.

<sup>198</sup> I take "καὶ...καί" at "καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καὶ...ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα" as corresponsive. That is, the first καὶ is "preparatory", the second is "connective". See Denniston 1954, 323.

<sup>199</sup> Rowe (1993, 122) notes that the imperative mood, ἔρρωσω, is 'a typical formula e.g. for ending a letter used in several of the pseudo-Platonic epistles', thus as we might say today "take care of yourself".

of Socrates' message, but does he have difficulty understanding how Socrates can advise Evenus to die as soon as possible.

In addition, the LSJ Greek Lexicon reports that 'ἐρρωσθαι (keeping well)' may also mean 'to have strength' and 'to be eager', and Plato frequently uses this verb to render these senses in different contexts.<sup>200</sup> As far as I know, apart from spurious epistles, ἐρρωσθαι is not used, at least by Plato, for saying an ordinary goodbye. Even in that case, it is striking that in the *Thirteenth Letter* (though it is possibly a forgery), the author finishes the letter by saying, 'keep well and practice philosophy (363d1 Ἐρρωσο καὶ φιλοσόφει)'. Even though these are not Plato's own words, it suggests that keeping well and practicing philosophy are used as correlatives. In this respect, the phrase 'keeping well' might have a slightly deeper meaning which implies a sort of eagerness. As we shall see below, eagerness (or willingness) is a crucial component of the practice of true philosophers.

### 3.2.4 The Prohibition of Suicide

As pointed out above, Simmias looks surprised at these words, but Socrates continues by saying that 'Evenus will be willing, as will everyone who has a worthy claim to this activity [philosophy]. Though perhaps he won't use violence on himself, for they say that it isn't sanctioned'.<sup>201</sup> This time, Cebes intervenes: 'What do you mean by this, Socrates – that it isn't sanctioned to use violence on oneself, but that the philosopher would be willing to follow someone who is dying?'<sup>202</sup> Socrates too admits that it would seem "a matter of wonder (θαυμαστόν)" that even if it is better for a person to be dead, they should not kill themselves but await another benefactor.<sup>203</sup>

Socrates, as was mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, argues that suicide is not sanctioned because humans are one of the gods' possessions and they take care of us so that we should not kill ourselves.<sup>204</sup> Otherwise, we would have acted against gods'

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<sup>200</sup> e.g. *Phd.* 100a4 λόγον...ἐρρωμένεστατον "the strongest *logos*"; in *Ti.* 89e8-90a1 τὸ δ' ἐν γυμνασίοις ἐρρωμένεστατον "the one [*sc.* a part of the tripartite soul] becomes [*sc.* γίγνεσθαι] strongest". Cf. *Xen. HG* 3.4.29 ἐρρωμένον τὴν ψυχὴν "having strength in soul". See *Sym.* 176b8 for "to be eager".

<sup>201</sup> *Phd.* 61c8-10.

<sup>202</sup> *Phd.* 61d4-5.

<sup>203</sup> *Phd.* 62a1-8. For an interpretation of these difficult lines see Gallop 1975:79-85.

<sup>204</sup> Note that in this case Socrates is explicitly talking about 'killing oneself (*Phd.* 62c1 ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι)'.

will.<sup>205</sup> Although Simmias and Cebes agree on this issue, it is still unreasonable, to them, to be willing to die, for dying is leaving the gods (and friends) behind.<sup>206</sup> In reply, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he hopes to enter the presence of other wise and good gods, who are very good masters too, so that he is not resentful.<sup>207</sup>

Here I am not going to examine Socrates' argument against suicide, but rather stress the idea that suicide is a sort of self-violence.<sup>208</sup> It is necessary to note that “βιάζεσθαι (to do violence)” has judicial and military connotations, *e.g.* “to use force on someone” or “forcibly make slaves”.<sup>209</sup> It is also reported that the absolute use of βιάζεσθαι is opposed to δικάζεσθαι, which means “to go to law” or “plead one's cause”.<sup>210</sup> In this respect, βιάζεσθαι implies a sort of injustice or overpowering by force; hence suicide is also an unjust and violent act.<sup>211</sup>

If an act of violence against one's self is committed without the gods' permission, the gods will punish us. Returning briefly to the subject of the practice of philosophers, Socrates states that it is up to god to decide whether he has rightly practiced philosophy and whether he deserves to dwell with gods.<sup>212</sup> Now, Socrates also believes that true philosophers ought to remain aloof from the pleasures of the body as much as possible.<sup>213</sup> Then gods would reward us if we practice philosophy, remain aloof from the bodily pleasures, and take care of our souls.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> This is the implication of the statement that ‘supposing one of your possessions were to kill itself but you hadn't given a sign that you wanted it to die, wouldn't you be angry with it, and if you had some way of punishing it, wouldn't you do so?’ (*Phd.* 62c2-4).

<sup>206</sup> See *Phd.* 62c9-63a9.

<sup>207</sup> See *Phd.* 63b4-c7.

<sup>208</sup> *Phd.* 61c9 βιάσεται αὐτόν; 61d4 ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι. Cf. 61e5-6 ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτείνοναι.

<sup>209</sup> βεβιασμένοι in *Xenophon, Hiero.* 2.12.

<sup>210</sup> *Euthphr.* 4e7.

<sup>211</sup> We should note that Socrates initially uses βιάζεσθαι, and then talks about suicide. See fn. 208 above.

<sup>212</sup> See *Phd.* 65d6 ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ

<sup>213</sup> *Phd.* 64c10-e6.

<sup>214</sup> In a sense, the body and the soul have a mutually beneficiary life. On the one hand, if we remain aloof from excessive pleasures and do not pay heed to the body's unnecessary desires, our souls will become better, as the body and its desires contaminate the soul. On the other hand, if we want to keep our body in a healthy condition, we should stay away from excessive pleasures, such as the pleasures of drinking and eating; hence our soul will be less contaminated by the body and its desires. That said, remaining aloof from the pleasures of the body does not necessarily make us true philosophers.

The body, I submit, is the source of violence since Socrates says that ‘it is nothing but the body and its desires that causes wars, uprisings and conflicts. All wars arise for the sake of acquiring property, and we are compelled to acquire property on account of the body, enslaved as we are to its maintenance’.<sup>215</sup> That is, if we listen to the body and its desires, violent actions would become inevitable. In a sense, then, not only would gods punish those who commit suicide, but they would also punish those who act violently because of the bodily desires. In this respect, true philosophers would not commit suicide in much the same way they avoid the body and its desires.

To conclude, the argument against suicide is the first step towards understanding the practice of philosophers, although Simmias and Cebes could not yet understand why true philosophers are willing to die but against suicide. Socrates finds this surprising since his interlocutors had some dealings with Philolaus of Croton, the Pythagorean, who uttered similar views according to Socrates.<sup>216</sup> At any rate, the sanction of suicide initiates the discussion on the practice of philosophers and how the unphilosophical life might entail violence (both against others and one’s self) due to the body’s intrusions, and living thus will be punished by the gods.

### 3.3 Purification, Dying and Being Dead

In this section, I argue that philosophers, according to Socrates, ought to define their life and practice through the correct evaluation of bodily pleasures and pains.<sup>217</sup> By

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<sup>215</sup> *Phd.* 66c5-d2. Socrates later reiterates a similar idea: ‘The bodily desires cause wars and conflicts’, and Socrates later speculates that ‘those found [in court for the dead] to be incurable because of the gravity of their offences, who have committed either many grave sacrilegious acts, or many unjust and unlawful murders, or anything else that is of this kind, are flung by the fate they deserve into Tartarus, and never step out from there (*Phd.* 113e1-6)’. Plato often reproaches pleasures, for they are deceiving and bewitching us. See *Phd.* 81b3, *Rep.* III 413c1-2, *Phil.* 65c5.

<sup>216</sup> Here, I am not going to discuss Plato’s allusion to Philolaus. Socrates anticipated that not only did Philolaus talk to Simmias and Cebes about the sanction of suicide but also about other things. This is implied by the use of the plural at *Phd.* 61d6-7 (*περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων*). The explanations for the allusion to Philolaus frequently assume a historical and dramatic perspective. Traditionally, the reference is considered as a literary device by which Plato draws attention to the Pythagorean elements that will emerge in the *Phaedo*. For some valuable analyses of Pythagoreanism in the *Phaedo* see Guthrie 1962, 179; Ebert 2001, 428, Bostock 1986, 11-13; O’Meara 1989, 9-29.

<sup>217</sup> Scholars debate whether the philosopher’s practice amounts to “asceticism” or “correct evaluation of pleasures”. By asceticism, it is meant that it is the philosopher’s practice to “actively” avoid that which is bodily, such as pleasures, money *etc.* (Ebrey 2015, 2-14). By correct evaluation, scholars mean that the

living in philosophical terms, philosophers will promote the goodness of the soul in this life and receive valuable rewards from the gods after death. In addition, I scrutinize the following questions: [1] in what sort of practice should philosophers engage their interest, and [2] what are the limits to the practice of philosophers?

### 3.4.1 *Dying v. Being Dead*

Socrates defines “being dead (*τὸ τεθνάναι*)” as follows: ‘the body has been separated from the soul and come to be apart, alone by itself, and the soul has been separated from the body and is apart, alone by itself’.<sup>218</sup> Socrates then explains why this is the sole pursuit of philosophers:

[T16] It [the soul] reasons best when it is being troubled neither by hearing nor by sight nor by pain, nor by a certain sort of pleasure either, but when it as much as possible comes to be alone by itself, ignoring the body, and, as far as it can, doesn’t associate or have contact with the body when reaching out to what is real.<sup>219</sup>

Later, Socrates links the practice of philosophers with their eagerness to separate the soul from the body; he says, ‘according to us it is those who really love wisdom who are always particularly eager – or rather, who *alone* are always eager – to release it [the soul], and philosophers’ practice is just that, release and parting of soul from body’.<sup>220</sup> Here, it is necessary to observe that Socrates is talking about ‘*τὸ μελέτημα*’ of philosophers; he seems to consider their practice as ‘training oneself for an actual event or situation’.<sup>221</sup> In this respect, the correct philosophical practice consists of

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philosopher should evaluate bodily affections correctly, and feeling pleasures and pains is not wrong as such. See Woolf 2004, 98, Russell 2005, 87-92.

<sup>218</sup> *Phd.* 64c4-8. The use of the perfect infinitive, *τεθνάναι*, might denote either ‘the state of being dead’ or ‘the completion of the process of dying’ (Rowe 1993, 127). In this passage, “*τεθνάναι* (being dead)” and “death (*Phd.* 64c8 ὁ θάνατος)” are used interchangeably, and it seems to refer to the state of being dead. See also Gallop 1975, 226 n.3.

<sup>219</sup> *Phd.* 65c5-9. A similar thought reiterated at *Phd.* 66e4-5: ‘it is impossible to have pure knowledge (*καθαρῶς γινῶναι*) of anything when we are in the company of the body’. See also *Phd.* 65d11-e4.

<sup>220</sup> *Phd.* 67d7-10 Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος·

<sup>221</sup> See also “practice for death (*Phd.* 81a1-2 μελέτη θανάτου)”; “practise to be ready for really being dead (80e6-81a1 τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως)”; ‘they [the souls of the bad] are bound, in all likelihood, into whatever sorts of character they happen to have practised in their life (81e2-3 μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ)’. The LSJ Greek Lexicon reports that *μελέτη* is used to mean “to go through one’s exercises in actual war (II.2)” or “rehearsal of orators (II.3)”. See Rowe 1993, 145.

preparing ourselves for the state of being dead, i.e. our life in the other world, like an athlete who exercises for a championship, where she would be rewarded.<sup>222</sup>

For Socrates, ‘the sole pursuit of those who correctly engage in philosophy is dying and being dead’.<sup>223</sup> Now, I would like to quote a passage where Socrates discusses the relationship between the practice of philosophers and the concept of purification:

[T17] ‘And doesn’t purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently talking about in our discussion, namely parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters?’

‘Certainly,’ he [Simmias] said.

‘So is it this that is named “death”: release and parting of soul from body?’

‘Yes, entirely so,’ he said.<sup>224</sup>

Both the process of purification and the practice of philosophers aim to separate the soul from the body; hence we train for dying and being dead, no matter whether we occupy ourselves with purification or philosophy.<sup>225</sup> Moreover, there seems to be a distinction between “dying (*ἀποθνήσκειν*)” and “being dead (*τεθνάναι*)”. I suggest that by this distinction, Socrates stresses the difference between “the process of dying” and “its completion”.<sup>226</sup> I argue that dying and being dead correspond to the

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<sup>222</sup> What Long (2015, 107-110) remarks about the relationship between physical training and the practice of philosophers is noticeable: ‘Athletics and physical training provided Plato with the most obvious analogy he could find for elaborating his own ideal of a life devoted to training and perfecting the mind as distinct from the body.’ The soul/body analogy, for Long, goes as far as the idea that ‘a philosophical education as therapeutic, in the idea that faults of character are diseases of the soul, and in the idea that moral virtues are the manifestation of a soul that is stable, robust, and as glistening as the sheen on an athlete’s well-toned body. The ideal of mental/moral health promoted the importance of systematic exercise (*askesis*), meaning that living well requires constant practice, self-examination, and self-discipline’.

<sup>223</sup> *Phd.* 64a4-6 τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας...ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.

<sup>224</sup> *Phd.* 67c5-d6.

<sup>225</sup> Socrates later tells his interlocutors that ‘those who truly love wisdom are in reality practising dying, and being dead is least fearful to them of all people (*Phd.* 66e4-6 Τῷ ὄντι...οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν)’. Here, too, there is a distinction between dying and being dead.

<sup>226</sup> Burnet 1917, 21; Rowe 1993, 135. ἀποθνήσκειν (present infinitive active) stresses “continuance” while τεθνάναι (perfect infinitive active) emphasizes “completion with permanent result”. See Smyth 1920, 417.

two concepts related to purification, namely the process of purifying oneself and the final state of purity, respectively.<sup>227</sup>

In this respect, while we can practice dying and purifying during life, being dead and the final state of purity are *completions* that can only be achieved after actual death. On the one hand, I suggest that dying and purifying are contraries to living and pollution respectively.<sup>228</sup> Being dead, on the other hand, is contradictory to being alive. There is no third option to take that might render both the statements “Socrates is dead” and “Socrates is alive” false. That is, Socrates is either dead or alive.<sup>229</sup>

That said, it is possible to be neither fully pure nor fully impure. That is, we can be partially pure. The state of partial purity is not a completion, and it is not possible to be fully pure as long as we are alive due to the body’s influence. In this respect, although the state of purity and being dead do not have the same relation to their opposites, neither can be attained during life. This impossibility would suffice to illustrate my point that the pairs, of dying/purifying and being dead/final state of purity, denote different ontological statuses.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Socrates says that ‘as long as we have the body and our soul is fused with bodily evil, we’ll never properly acquire what we desire, namely, as we would say, the truth (*Phd.* 66b5-7)’.

<sup>228</sup> Regarding death, at the *Phaedo* 71d5-7 Socrates asks Cebes, ‘Don’t you say that being dead is the opposite of being alive? (οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φης τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;)’, and Cebes confirms. Regarding purification, although Socrates does not clearly say that pollution and purification are opposites, the following propositions implies oppositions: [1] thought alone by itself and unalloyed (αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ) can acquire wisdom and truth (*Phd.* 66a1-6), [2] the body contaminates the soul (*Phd.* 66b5-6), [3] thought can become alone by itself and unalloyed if it can totally get rid of the body (*Phd.* 67a1-b1), [4] ‘it is not sanctioned for someone impure to grasp something pure (*Phd.* 67b2 μὴ καθαροῦ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ)’.

<sup>229</sup> Pakaluk (2003, 91) observes that ‘there are things that are neither dead nor alive,’ e.g. stones. However, since Socrates is talking about humans as animated beings, they cannot be both dead and alive.

<sup>230</sup> See Williams 1969, 218 for a discussion about contraries and contradictories, though he does not distinguish the process of purifying oneself and the final state of purity. Bostock (1986, 47-51) notes that the scope of the cyclical argument is ambiguous since the relationship between life and death (contradictories) is not the same as that between small and large (contraries). Even if Socrates might not be aware of the difference between life/death and small/large, his unawareness does not harm my current purpose. This is because I focus on the difference between dying and being dead, a difference which Socrates seems to be aware of, as he mentions both.

### 3.4.2 The Practice of Dying and Being Dead

As stated above, pursuing dying and being dead are different. I have suggested that dying is related to our activities in this world, while being dead, not unexpectedly, is related to the soul's life in the other world. True philosophers are interested in pursuing dying and being dead since they both try to be truly virtuous in this world and desire to attain pure wisdom in the other world.<sup>231</sup> Besides, for Socrates, without pursuing true virtues in this world and without purifying ourselves, we cannot attain pure wisdom in the other world.<sup>232</sup>

I presume that it is possible for a person to pursue dying with a view to understanding it, yet being dead cannot be practiced as long as we are alive. That said, Socrates talks about the pursuit of both, being dead and dying; hence he seems to believe that we can practice being dead while we are still alive. As mentioned above, Socrates is talking about τὸ μελέτημα, the rehearsal or preparation, of philosophers to separate the soul from the body. In this respect, philosophers' business in this world is to prepare their soul for the afterlife by means of rehearsing being dead and dying, rather than achieving them. That is, τὸ μελέτημα of philosophers denotes the ways in which they live to purify themselves and try to be worthy of dwelling with gods.

However, we need to note that Socrates also mentions the pursuit (*Phd.* 64a6 ἐπιτηδεύουσιν) of being dead and dying. Unlike μελετάω and its cognates, ἐπιτηδεύω does not imply preparation, as Rowe finely remarks.<sup>233</sup> To support his point, Rowe refers to a passage of the *Gorgias*, which reads, 'if a man took care (ἐπετήδευε) to grow his hair long, his corpse will have long hair, too (524 c4-5)'. Then ἐπιτηδεύω indicates an action that is pursued and is actually done, and its effects continue after that action is complete.

Here, it is fortunate that Socrates uses ἐπιτηδεύω in the context of life and death. More fortunately, Socrates, a bit later, says, 'all that's in the soul is evident after it has been stripped naked of the body, both things that are natural to it and things that have happened to it, things that the person came to have in his soul as a result of **his**

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<sup>231</sup> *Phd.* 68b4 καθαρῶς...φρονήσει.

<sup>232</sup> See *Phd.* 69c2-d3 for the idea of initiation and purification. I will examine this topic further below.

<sup>233</sup> Rowe (1993, 135) points out that Socrates uses ἐπιτηδεύω 'in the sense of 'making it one's practice' (cf. *Gorg.* 524c), not in the sense that one practices on the piano'.

**pursuit** of each objective'.<sup>234</sup> In this respect, our pursuits in this life affect our souls. Since true philosophers' pursuit is being dead and dying, each action they do with a view to this pursuit brings them closer to the truth and wisdom, for the soul alone by itself can acquire them. Then *ἐπιτηδεύω* denotes that true philosophers' pursuit is being dead and dying (thus they are true philosophers' business or interest), while *μελετάω* and its cognates refer to their practice and preparation to pursue this business successfully.

Therefore, being dead and dying are the true philosophers' goals whereas the things they do to separate the soul from the body as much as possible are the true philosophers' preparations. That is, true philosophers ought to act from the perspective of their pursuit and business. Then, in their pursuit or inquiry of being dead, true philosophers scrutinize the immortality of the soul and its afterlife. On the one hand, Socrates adopts a cautious position about the soul's afterlife, probably because it is beyond the limits of human experience.<sup>235</sup> On the other hand, Socrates is firmer and offers more positive results about the immortality of the soul than the soul's afterlife, although Socrates still thinks that his friends should pursue the argument about the immortality of the the soul further.<sup>236</sup> At any rate, Socrates cautiously talks about the immortality of the soul and the soul's afterlife, though his trust in each account differs.

The pursuit of dying, on the contrary, is within the limits of human experience. That is, we can practice dying, which is associated with purifying ourselves. True philosophers can articulate what their experience *qua* philosophers is (as practicing dying); hence they can describe the ways in which they separate the body from the soul and what they feel during this process.

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<sup>234</sup> *Gorg.* 524d4-7. ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Socrates also says that 'each of his [the Great King's] actions has stamped upon his soul (*Gorg.* 525a1-2)'.

<sup>235</sup> See *Phd.* 114d1-8.

<sup>236</sup> For the necessity of further inquiry about the immortality of soul, see *Phd.* 107a1-9 and my comment on this passage in Chapter 1. For the possibility of misgivings, see *Phd.* 84c6-8.

### 3.4.3 The Embodiment of the Soul

As discussed above, true philosophers try to separate the soul from the body and this is their chief occupation. The purpose of this section is to examine the embodiment of the soul and its effects on the soul's cognitive powers.<sup>237</sup> I argue that the practice of dying, on the one hand, signifies a process in which philosophers try to purify their soul from the influence of the body. Being dead, on the other hand, is the final state of purity, which can be achieved after death if we have been successful in purifying ourselves during life.<sup>238</sup>

Firstly, the disembodied soul, if it is purified successfully, would directly and instantly attain wisdom in Hades and true philosophers encounter wisdom (or the truth) as a consequence of their practice in this world. In other words, true philosophers acquire wisdom in Hades automatically.<sup>239</sup> Secondly, true philosopher attain wisdom (or the truth) in this world as a result of their vigorous search, that is, true philosophers actively pursue wisdom in this world.

During both the embodied and disembodied existences, the soul's nature is the same. That is, both the soul by itself and the embodied soul are invisible and immaterial, no matter whether it is in Hades or in this world.<sup>240</sup> However, the soul's cognitive

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<sup>237</sup> The idea of embodiment seems to be referred to in the recollection argument. Cebes says, 'but it [sc. to be reminded] would be impossible, unless our soul were existing somewhere before it was born to this human form (*Phd.* 72e7-73a2 τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι·'. See *Phd.* 70b3-4 'It [sc. disembodied soul] has some power and wisdom (τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν)'. For Dorter (1972,212), soul's power is its permanent existence, and the disembodied soul's wisdom is '(pre-empirical) disposition for knowledge'.

<sup>238</sup> There can surely be degrees of purification. The most purified are philosophers, no matter what the purification amounts to. See Pakaluk 2003, 98-102. I agree with him that there are degrees of the separation of the soul and body, which indicates that the philosopher achieves separation "strictly" but "to some degree".

<sup>239</sup> By the term 'automatically', I do not mean that philosophers attain wisdom in Hades without conscious thought or attention. Rather, my point is that they come to have wisdom without actively searching for it.

<sup>240</sup> See *Phd.* 79b4-c1. Cf. 81c1-81d2 where Socrates says that some souls are 'drifting, as it is said around monuments and tombs, the very places where certain shadowy apparitions of souls (ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα) really have been seen'. In this case, however, what is seen is not *psychē* but *phantasma*. Moreover, Socrates does not commit himself to this view since he attributes it to others by saying 'as it is said (*Phd.* 81c11 ὥσπερ λέγεται)'. See Hackforth 1955, 89 *fn.*2; Gallop 1975, 143-144. cf. Archer-Hind 1883, 95-96 who claims that soul's long association with the body makes it "ingrained (81c6 σύμφυτον)". Moreover, in the

power varies according to the conditions of the realms in which it exists. That is, during the embodied existence, the body hinders the soul's search for truth and wisdom. In this case, philosophy, for Socrates, comes to help the soul. Let me quote Socrates' take on the role of philosophy in the purification of the soul:

[T18] [T]he lovers of learning are aware that when philosophy takes over their soul, the soul really is bound thoroughly in the body and stuck to it, and is forced to consider the real things through it as if through a cage, and not on its own through itself, and that it drifts in utter ignorance... Philosophy, they are aware, persuades the soul to distance itself from the senses, except to the extent that use of them is necessary, and encourages the soul to collect and gather itself alone into itself, and to trust nothing but itself, concerning whichever real thing, alone by itself, the soul has intelligence of, when the soul too is alone by itself.<sup>241</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Socrates has argued that philosophy is the pursuit of dying and being dead and true philosophers' practice is separating the soul from the body. In the quote above, philosophy helps the soul to become by itself as much as possible, as the senses are "full of deceit" and they exacerbate the soul's cognitive capacities.<sup>242</sup> In this respect, if the soul loses its ability to attain wisdom in this world, it would not be due to a change in the soul's nature, or essence. Rather, the soul is restricted by the body so that it cannot attain wisdom. That is, the body is a bad companion to accompany the soul on its search for truth; hence the body drives us away from the right course while, 'following philosophy they [those who care at all about their own soul] head in the direction in which it leads'.<sup>243</sup>

#### 3.4.4 *Wisdom in Hades*

For Socrates, philosophers are genuinely in love with wisdom,<sup>244</sup> and 'he [the true philosopher] will be quite sure that he will have a pure encounter with wisdom

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final argument for the immortality of the soul (See *Phd.* 105bff), Socrates talks about the soul as such, not the embodied or the disembodied soul, as not admitting of death.

<sup>241</sup> *Phd.* 82d1-83b2.

<sup>242</sup> *Phd.* 83a4-5

<sup>243</sup> *Phd.* 82d5-7.

<sup>244</sup> Socrates says 'they [those who truly love wisdom] hope to attain that with which they were in love throughout life (*Phd.* 68a1-2 οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστὶν οὗ διὰ βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν—ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως). Gallop (1975, 102) states that '*phronesis* is a solemn term for the condition of the soul for which the philosopher yearns'. See *Phd.* 66e3, 68a2, 68a7 and 68b4.

nowhere else but there'.<sup>245</sup> Encountering wisdom in Hades, I argue, is the immediate result of the practice of true philosophers in this world. Here I take *ἐντυγχάνω* to mean *happening upon*, and I believe that philosophers' acquisition of wisdom in Hades happens upon them thanks to their pursuit and practice in this world.<sup>246</sup> In other words, philosophers hope to encounter wisdom in Hades, thus practicing philosophy with the hope of attaining wisdom, and that encounter itself is "worthy of *logos* (*ἀξίως λόγου*)".<sup>247</sup>

Furthermore, Socrates also touched on the relationship between the soul and body during the embodied state when he was arguing that suicide is not sanctioned. In this passage, Socrates tells his interlocutors, 'what is said in secret accounts about these matters [relating to suicide], that we human beings are in a sort of prison [in the body] and that one must not release oneself from it or run away, that seems to me a weighty saying and one that is not easy to penetrate'.<sup>248</sup> Socrates, unfortunately, does not explain the body-prison (or ward) analogy, but I think it is plain that [1] "we"

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<sup>245</sup> *Phd.* 68b2-3 σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς **ἐντεύξεσθαι** φρονήσει ἄλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. Just before this, Socrates asks 'will someone who is genuinely in love with wisdom and has strongly conceived this same hope that nowhere but in Hades will he have a worthwhile encounter with it (**ἐντεύξεσθαι** αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου), resent dying and go there less than cheerfully?', then answers 'he will not, at least if he is really a lover of wisdom'.

<sup>246</sup> One of my examiners kindly remarked that 'in context, *ἐντυγχάνω* refers in quasi-personal terms to hope of "meeting" one's beloved in Hades'. Although I agree that *ἐντυγχάνω* could surely mean this, I believe that here Socrates might not be using it in that sense. When Socrates talks about the hope of seeing one's beloved, he says that 'very many people have readily consented to go after them into Hades, led by the hope that there they will see the people they longed for and be with them (*Phd.* 67a3-7)'. In this particular context, Plato uses *συνέσεσθαι* at *Phd.* 67a6, which might mean either "to be with", "to join with" or "to live with". In other words, these people hope to be with their beloved ones, while philosophers hope to encounter wisdom. This is because philosophers, including Socrates, are not sure whether they have practiced philosophy. My examiner also pointed out 'Socrates uses [*ἐντυγχάνω*] at the *Apology* 41b for the prospect of meeting Palamedes *et. al.* in Hades'. In the relevant section, however, Socrates assumes that if the soul is immortal, 'it would be a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met (*ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι*) Palamedes... to compare my experience with [him]'. It seems to me that Socrates comments on the life that he assumes to live in Hades and *ὁπότε* (whenever) seems to refer to an action that is often repeated.

<sup>247</sup> *Phd.* 68b1. *cf.* Herodotus 6.112.10 'worthy of record'; *Rep.* IV 436b3 'the standards of our argument'; *Phdr.* 270c1 'a serious understanding'.

<sup>248</sup> *Phd.* 62b3-6. For my purposes, there is no need to decide what "φρουρά (ward)" implies, that is, whether our soul is in guard-duty of its post, *i.e.* body, or the body is a prison where the soul is punished. For the possible renderings and the likely source of this idea see Strachan 1970. I prefer to use prison, as for my purposes it does not matter whether I use prison or ward.

implies that our souls define who we are, and that, [2] from the point of the view of the prisoner, the prisoner's presence in the prison does not alter her nature or essence.

Socrates seems to assume the first point throughout the *Phaedo* and I will not discuss it here.<sup>249</sup> Regarding the second point, it is pertinent to observe that a prisoner's (or ward's) power of sight does not change, unless of course her eyes are bruised.<sup>250</sup> Her vision none the less is limited to what she is seeing through the bars, on the one hand, and the bars distort her vision, on the other.<sup>251</sup> In this respect, the soul's presence in the body made the soul's cognitive capacity deteriorate and the soul's epistemic access is limited by the body.

### 3.4.5 True Philosophers' Object of Desire

Let me now consider what Socrates says about true philosophers in Hades and the conditions they live in there:

[T19] Those people who established the rites for us are no ordinary people, but in reality have long been setting a riddle when they say that whoever comes to Hades without initiation and the rites (*ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος*) will lie in filth, whereas someone who arrives there purified and initiated (*κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος*) will dwell with gods. For in fact, as those involved in the rites put it, "many carry the fennel-wand, but few are inspired". The latter, in my opinion, are none other than those who have pursued philosophy correctly (*οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς*).<sup>252</sup>

In the quote above, Socrates makes a two-stage distinction: firstly, he distinguishes the wicked (those who will lie in filth) from the good, and, secondly, the truly good (those who are purified and initiated) and those who appear to be good.<sup>253</sup> In other words, Socrates initially makes a distinction between the wicked and the virtuous,

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<sup>249</sup> *Phd.* 115c3-116a1 for Socrates's idea that after he drinks poison and dies, he will already be gone. At 115c6-8, Socrates says, 'I'm not convincing Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who is now holding a conversation...Instead he supposes that I'm that corpse which he'll shortly be seeing'. See also Long 2015, 54-55

<sup>250</sup> I do not think that the body has the power to alter the soul's nature or essence, although the body is a bad influence for the soul. See also fn. 237 above.

<sup>251</sup> It is not possible to know exactly what Socrates' prison cell looked like and what his conditions were. We are told that Socrates was chained (*Phd.* 59e6-60a1), there is a stool, a bed (89a8-b1) and a bathroom (116a2-3), and it is big enough for 10 or more people. No mention of a window is made, but we can conjecture that there was one since *Phaedo* could realize that 'it was already nearly sunset (116b6)'.

<sup>252</sup> *Phd.* 69c4-d2.

<sup>253</sup> In *Rep. II.* 363d5-6, Socrates states that those who are profane and unjust humans are buried in filth. See Rowe 1993, 151; Burnet 1911, 45.

then between the truly virtuous, i.e. between philosophers and illusorily virtuous people, whoever they are.<sup>254</sup>

Socrates classifies a non-philosopher as a “body-lover”, who is either a “money-lover or “honour-lover”, or both.<sup>255</sup> Philosophers, as mentioned above, are lovers of wisdom, and they hope to have a pure encounter with *phronesis* in Hades. In addition, encountering wisdom in Hades is worthy of *logos*. Here I take ἀξίως λόγου as denoting something “worthy of record” in the sense that encountering wisdom in Hades deserves attention and analysis. That is, although philosophers will have a pure encounter with wisdom only in Hades, examining and documenting this encounter is valuable. I submit that not only is practicing being dead and dying a philosopher's prime pursuit (so that they will have a pure encounter with wisdom), but philosophers should also attain a serious understanding of wisdom in this world.

It is now necessary to investigate how philosophers attain a serious understanding of a pure encounter with wisdom and how they can *actually* have that wisdom. To this end, I show that by distinguishing *catharsis* and *catharmos*, Plato, as it is suggested, draws a distinction between ‘the state of purification – if the virtues are states’ and ‘what brings it [*sc.* purification] about’.<sup>256</sup> That is, for Socrates, ‘temperance, justice and courage are **a kind of purification** from everything like this [pleasures, fears, *etc.*] and that wisdom itself is **a kind of rite to purify us**’.<sup>257</sup>

#### 3.4.6. *Purification, Purificatory Rites and Virtues*

Socrates describes *catharsis* in terms of the soul-body relationship and their separation:

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<sup>254</sup> See *Phd.* 69b5-8. I discuss this passage below.

<sup>255</sup> *Phd.* 68c1-3. For Socrates, non-philosophers live their life from the point of view of the body, its pleasures and pains; hence they think that what is bodily, or visible, is real (See *Phd.* 81b2-5). Their world-view, then, determines their ontology. That is, both philosophers and non-philosophers feel what is bodily and in the body, though the latter lives from the perspective of the soul. Robin 2003, 4-7 argues that a philosopher's ontology is different since she becomes aware that, or is shown that at some point, sense-perception does not attain that which is real.

<sup>256</sup> See Rowe 1993, 151. By the state of purification, I simply mean the state of complete purity.

<sup>257</sup> *Phd.* 69b8-c3 τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ καθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ.

[T20] Parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters.<sup>258</sup>

Earlier in the *Phaedo*, 61c8-9, Socrates argued that true philosophers are willing to die and he described death as the separation of the body from the soul in the *Phaedo* 64c4-7. Then *catharsis* is the pursuit of true philosophers and it is the result of practicing being dead and dying. That is, ‘those who really love wisdom who are always particularly eager – or rather, who *alone* are always eager – to release it [the soul] (translators’ italics)’, and *catharsis* is thus the aim of the practice of philosophers.<sup>259</sup>

As quoted above, virtues, for Socrates, are some kind of *catharsis*. Socrates distinguishes fake-virtue from true-virtue. Again, I suggested that Socrates distinguishes the wicked from the good people, then the truly virtuous and the fraudulently virtuous people. Socrates then relates the fraudulently good people to those who possess fake-virtues, as these people exchange pleasures for greater pleasures, fears for lesser pains, and pains for lesser pains.<sup>260</sup>

These people, for Socrates, appear temperate now ‘because they fear being denied other pleasures, which they desire, they abstain from one set of pleasures because they are overcome by another set of pleasures’.<sup>261</sup> That is, “those who keep their composure (hereafter well-ordered people)” are able to overcome some pleasures only because they are overcome by other pleasures.<sup>262</sup> For example, I might abstain from the pleasure of eating now so that my stomach will be empty for drinking wine later, which is more pleasant for me.<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> *Phd.* 67c6-d2.

<sup>259</sup> *Phd.* 67d7-10.

<sup>260</sup> The Greek is μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω (*Phd.* 69a7-8), which is in relation with pains and fears. It is probably ‘ἐλάττω πρὸς μείζω in the case of pleasures’ (Rowe 1993, 149).

<sup>261</sup> *Phd.* 68e5-7. Socrates calls this kind of temperance “simple-minded”.

<sup>262</sup> *Phd.* 69a2. See 68e1 οἱ κόσμιοι (well-ordered) = οἱ σώφρονες (temperate). Cf. Burnet 1911:41.

<sup>263</sup> Sedley (2014, 69) gives a more eloquent example: ‘The conventionally brave, for example, attach negative value to pain and death in battle, regarding both as fearful, but as nevertheless worth risking in order to avert potentially worse suffering, such as the enslavement of one’s entire city. What they are thus doing is treating pleasure, pain and the like as their currency, and using that currency to calculate the relative merits of alternative choices.’

For Socrates, the fraudulently good people exchange ‘pains for pains and fear for fear, greater for less, like currencies’.<sup>264</sup> However, ‘for the purpose of virtue this [*sc.* becoming temperate because of intemperance] is not the correct exchange’.<sup>265</sup> For Socrates, ‘just one thing is the correct currency, in return for which one must exchange all these [*sc.* pains, pleasures and fears]: I mean wisdom’.<sup>266</sup> Regarding the distinction between real and fake virtues, Socrates says:

[T21] Now when all things are bought and sold for this and with this— with wisdom — they really are, I suspect, courage, temperance, justice and in sum true virtue, regardless of whether pleasures, fears and everything else like that are added or removed. But when they are kept apart from wisdom and exchanged for one another, that sort of virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is really fit for slaves,<sup>267</sup> and contains nothing sound or true.<sup>268</sup>

There is need to remark that Socrates first says, “for this (τούτου)”, which is genitive of price, then “with this (μετὰ τούτου)”, which is genitive of accompaniment. The rendering of this phrase depends on the use of *καί*. [1] If it is copulative, Socrates would be saying pleasures and pains should be exchanged for wisdom and with wisdom. [2] If *καί* is linking alternatives, Socrates would be amending exchanging for wisdom to exchanging with wisdom.

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<sup>264</sup> *Phd.* 69a6-9.

<sup>265</sup> *Phd.* 69a6-7.

<sup>266</sup> *Phd.* 69a9-10. ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις.

<sup>267</sup> “ἀνδραποδώδης (slavish)” is opposed to “ἐλευθέριος (fit for a freeman)”. However, I do not think that possessing fraudulent virtues places their possessor into the class of wicked people. In the *Republic* IV 430b6-9, Plato distinguishes ‘this power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t is what I call courage’ and ‘the correct belief about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don’t call it courage but something else’. That is, the latter is ‘fitting for slaves (b8 ἀνδραποδώδης)’ too; hence it is not courage but something else. Note also that Socrates calls the temperance of well-ordered people “simple-minded temperance (68e5)”. Therefore, I presume that the two-stage distinction mentioned above still holds. There are coward, so not-virtuous, slaves in comparison with those appearing to be courageous but who are actually something else.

<sup>268</sup> *Phd.* 69b1-8 καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῇ, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθὲς ἔχει.

Some scholars favour [2] since [1] implies that wisdom can be decreased or increased through the exchange.<sup>269</sup> As it is the case regarding all analogies, there is need to be careful when we interpret the currency analogy.<sup>270</sup> That said, I submit that both uses, i.e. for wisdom and with wisdom, make sense in different contexts. For Socrates, true philosophers should give up pleasures and desires in exchange for wisdom. That is, philosophers should remain aloof from the body and its desires, and try to gain wisdom as much as possible.<sup>271</sup> On the other hand, true philosophers should always act with wisdom, since by using wisdom they would become truly virtuous and accumulate more wisdom.<sup>272</sup>

Moreover, since those who truly love wisdom would never buy pleasures and pains, they only care for accumulating wisdom. That is, true philosophers always sell pleasures and buy wisdom in exchange.<sup>273</sup> For instance, one might ask whether it is the case that, as it were, drinking costs 4 minas in my own scale of pleasures and eating 8 minas. If I am fond of drinking, but not eating, the latter would add more to my pleasure. That is, if I do not buy the pleasure of eating, then I can buy the pleasure

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<sup>269</sup> Rowe 1993, 149-150.

<sup>270</sup> Bluck 1955, 155. Russell (2005, 95) stresses that ‘surely in saying that wisdom can be ‘exchanged’ for other things, and that other things can be ‘bought’ with it, like a coin, Socrates does not mean to say that by exercising my wisdom I shall come to have less wisdom to exercise’. We should also remark that Socrates says, ‘as it were (69a9 ὥσπερ)’ a currency, which seems ‘to limit or modify an assertion or apologize for a metaphor (*LSJ*, s.v. II)’.

<sup>271</sup> We, naturally, can voluntarily stay away from pleasures. However, we might not be able to avoid pains, either physical (*e.g.* headache) or psychological (*e.g.* loss of a loved one) that are inflicted on us by external cause. For instance, we might suffer severe and frequent headaches, although there is nothing deliberate about it. Regarding the exchange analogy, well-ordered people might choose something less painful *now* in exchange for something more painful *then*, yet they do not do so with wisdom. In this respect, exchanging greater pains for lesser pains has the same mechanism that well-ordered people use in case of calculating pleasures.

<sup>272</sup> Sedley (2014, 70) argues that ‘virtues are genuine virtues only in so far as their possession or exercise is informed by wisdom, that is, enacted wisely’, since ‘wisdom inspires the virtues by motivating them, as their ultimate goal’.

<sup>273</sup> Gosling & Taylor (1982, 93) claim that currencies are instruments used for exchange so that they do not have any intrinsic value. Then if wisdom is a currency, no matter whether it is the right one, wisdom should be an instrument for ruling over pleasures and pains rather than being an end. I, however, agree with Russell (2005, 96): ‘the ‘exchange...for...’ relation is asymmetric: I can exchange (καταλλάττεσθαι) my nickel for (ἀντί) your piece of candy, but, of course, I cannot exchange your candy for my nickel. The exchange Socrates has in mind is not one of using wisdom to secure other things, but of trading those other things for wisdom—that is, I take it, managing one's dealings with other things so as to become a wiser person.’ In this respect, “for wisdom” seems to signify “for the sake of accumulating wisdom”.

of drinking, which is more pleasant for me. Thus, well-ordered people possessing fake-virtues are able to calculate how much they save by not buying the pleasure of eating and how much they need to pay for the pleasure of drinking.<sup>274</sup>

However, real-temperance, and perhaps other real-virtues too, belong ‘only to those who particularly disdain the body and live in philosophy’.<sup>275</sup> For Socrates, temperance ‘is not being in a flutter about one’s desires, but rather being disdainful towards them and staying composed’; hence true philosophers are really temperate. For Socrates, if we consider ‘other people’s temperance’, we find their temperance to be “absurd”.<sup>276</sup> This is because, as mentioned above, other people become temperate because of intemperance. That is, we might call someone temperate because she is not eating too much now, yet this avoidance is not because she cares for her soul, but because she loves drinking more than eating.

I suggest that the currency analogy should be read in terms of the market value, so to speak, rather than coins themselves. That is, while well-ordered people regulate the market value of actions from the perspective of the body and its pleasures, true philosophers determine the value of actions from the perspective of the soul. True philosophers primarily care about the soul, as they aim at ameliorating it as much as possible by accumulating wisdom and hope to have a pure encounter with wisdom in Hades. Therefore, for philosophers, wisdom is the most valuable and the only true currency.

In addition, it would be helpful to look at the relationship between exchange and currency. Fortunately, Plato offers a theory for this in the *Republic*. When discussing the economics of the primitive community and the way in which this community is sharing, buying and selling products, Socrates says, ‘[*Rep. II. 371b4-7* for sharing

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<sup>274</sup> See *Phd.* 68e1-69a4. I agree with Woolf 2004 and Russell (2005, 78-79) that the evaluative reading is more informative regarding the practice of philosophy. This is because this reading puts emphasis on the use of reason, which is a fundamental theme of the *Phaedo* and the theory of pleasure advanced in it. The behavioural avoidance, which is stressed by the ascetic reading, does not need to lead to a philosophical life. For instance, I might avoid pleasures of drinking, eating and so on and might ignore promoting the soul at the same time. On the other hand, the indifference to bodily pleasures, which is emphasized by the evaluative reading, demands a certain understanding. That is, for believing that eating and drinking are trivial, we need to understand the nature of pleasure and why bodily pleasures are deceitful and beguiling. This understanding, I think, is a must for the philosophical life. See Butler 2012, 105-106.

<sup>275</sup> *Phd.* 68c10-12.

<sup>276</sup> *Phd.* 68d2-3.

products by selling and buying], we will have a market-place and a system of coinage for the sake of exchange'.<sup>277</sup> If so, the need of sharing products comes first, which was the reason for establishing a city.<sup>278</sup> Secondly, we need a market-place and a currency for buying, selling and exchanging.

Likewise, in the *Phaedo*, the need of buying, selling and exchanging pleasures, pains and desires arises firstly. Then for the sake of fulfilling this need, we form an evaluative model. From an individual perspective, it is up to me to price each of the pleasures, pains and desires. In this respect, well-ordered people can calculate prices correctly according to their own scale of pleasures, yet they still do so for the sake of the body and maximise its pleasures.

To sum up, well-ordered people might sometimes seem temperate, as they are abstaining from a set of pleasures to maximize another set of pleasures. However, at other times, they would seem intemperate, for they are trying to maximize their pleasure. True philosophers, on the contrary, will always be temperate since for them only wisdom is worthy of accumulation. Since wisdom is maximized by means of separating the soul from the body, they determine the exchange rate with the purpose of nourishing the soul, as it were. That is, true philosophers exchange all pleasures and desires *for* wisdom and they act *with* wisdom in order to accumulate more wisdom. In a sense, then, true philosophers use wisdom to obtain more wisdom.

### 3.4.7. Shadow-painting and Purification

Let me now consider another metaphor used in the same section, which aims at explaining the difference between true and fake goodness. This examination, I think, will help us to have a better understanding of the role of purification. For Socrates, “true virtue accompanied by wisdom (b3 ἀληθῆς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως)”, e.g. “real (b8 τῷ ὄντι) courage, temperance and justice”, is a sort of *catharsis*.<sup>279</sup> However, as we have seen earlier, we can only have a pure encounter with wisdom in Hades. If so, do true philosophers use another kind of wisdom, say a less pure kind, in this world to exchange pleasures, pains and desires, and to become courageous, temperate and so on?

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<sup>277</sup> *Rep. II.* 371b8-9 Ἀγορὰ δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.

<sup>278</sup> *Rep. II.* 371b4-7.

<sup>279</sup> *Phd.* 69b3-c1.

Socrates argues that ‘when they [pleasures, pains, *etc.*] are kept apart from wisdom and exchanged for one another, that sort of virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is really fit for slaves and contains nothing sound or true’.<sup>280</sup> As quoted in the paragraph above, the accompaniment of wisdom makes a virtue real in contrast with an illusion of it. For instance, if we appear temperate now because we desire to maximize another sort of pleasure later, our temperance would not be a token of real virtue.<sup>281</sup>

Here, it would be helpful to review briefly what *skiagraphia* is. According to the LSJ Greek Lexicon, it is ‘painting with the shadows (*cf.* σκιαγραφέω), so as to produce an illusion of solidity at a distance’. *Skiagraphia* had to be viewed from a certain distance, since a viewer cannot get what the painting is about with a close-up look.<sup>282</sup> In the *Phaedo* passage, however, Socrates does not seem to focus on how a *skiagraphia* is viewed best, but how it is produced in the first place.<sup>283</sup> Since *skiagraphia* is painted by using various intensification of colours and the use of colours in the right amount is necessary for an effective *skiagraphia*, well-ordered people, likewise, are able to calculate the right amount of pain and pleasure which make them appear virtuous.<sup>284</sup>

Pains and pleasures are like colours through which well-ordered people draw an illusory picture of being virtuous. Here, there are two distinctions: the one is between the virtuous state (e.g. painting) and how that state is achieved (e.g. painting with shadows with right intensification colours), the other between fake virtues (achieved through exchanging greater fears and pains for lesser ones, and lesser pleasures with greater ones) and real virtue (achieved with wisdom). Now, as discussed above, true philosophers’ pursuit is separating the soul from the body as much as possible. They then should act from the point of view of the soul and maximizing wisdom because

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<sup>280</sup> *Phd.* 69b5-9 χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθὲς ἔχει.

<sup>281</sup> See Rowe 1993, 150.

<sup>282</sup> Keuls 1978, 74.

<sup>283</sup> If, surely, we have a closer look at well-ordered people, we realize what they really are, that is not truly virtuous. In the *Republic* II 365c3-4, Adeimantus tells Socrates that a person might think that ‘I should create a façade of illusory virtue (σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς) around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind it the greedy and crafty fox of the wise Archilochus’. Well-ordered people in the *Phaedo* seem to do the same, though Socrates does not tell us whether these people wish to deceive others.

<sup>284</sup> Keuls 1978, 81-83.

the accompaniment of wisdom would enable them to rule out the body, its desires and pleasures.

Again, as suggested above, *catharsis* refers to the state of true virtue and *catharmos* denotes that by which we attain that state, i.e. with wisdom. In this respect, I suggest that wisdom is a set of principles, or, theologically speaking, “rituals”, by which the state of purification, or of true virtue, is attained. These principles guide true philosophers in their pursuit and enable them to separate the soul and the body as much as possible. If we consider the relationship between knowledge, wisdom and virtue, *phronesis* has epistemological and methodological bearings, as it enables true philosophers to attain knowledge in this world. This is just as purificatory rites (*katharmoi*) and initiations (*teletai*) endow us with “blessedness”, such as “eating raw meat” in Bacchic mysteries.<sup>285</sup>

To sum up, true philosophers desire wisdom, yet they can have a pure encounter with it in Hades. The body hinders us, or more precisely our soul, to have a pure knowledge of something since it is not possible to view the things themselves with the soul itself as long as the soul is with the body. If true philosophers can only attain wisdom in Hades, then how does wisdom help them to become truly virtuous in this world?

Socrates comments on the acquisition of pure knowledge as follows:

[T22] But we really have shown that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of something, we must be separated from the body and view things by themselves with the soul by itself. The time when we will have that which we desire and whose lovers we claim to be, namely wisdom, will be when we are dead, as the argument indicates, and not while we are alive.<sup>286</sup>

If we cannot attain wisdom during life, then should true philosophers look for something else during life that will enable them to obtain real virtue? This would, nonetheless, be an embarrassment because Socrates frequently underlines that true philosophers desire wisdom and they would not content themselves with pursuing something else. Thus, I suggest that we do not need to possess pure wisdom to live

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<sup>285</sup> For these rituals see Burkert & Raffan 2013, 290-293.

<sup>286</sup> *Phd.* 66d7-e4 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ.

a virtuous life. Rather, if we live in respect of wisdom and for the sake of accumulating wisdom, we would separate the soul from the body as much as possible; we would thus purify ourselves. That is, a true philosopher's desire to attain pure wisdom motivates them to pursue separating the soul from the body and to purify themselves. In doing so, true philosophers get ready to have a pure encounter with wisdom and view things by themselves in Hades.<sup>287</sup>

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter set out to scrutinize Socrates' defence speech. I have examined the Willingness Argument and its role in understanding the correct practice of philosophers. According to this argument, true philosophers aim at separating the soul from the body, hence the reason they do not get any resentful feeling towards death, after which their soul will become alone by itself. I have suggested that to point out the connection between the Willingness Argument and the correct practice of philosophers, Plato stresses that even a sophist can become a true philosopher by pursuing dying and being dead, hence the reason for alluding to Evenus, the poet and sophist.

Moreover, I argued that dying refers to the process of purification while being dead denotes the final state of purification. I have suggested that the disembodied soul views things by themselves and has a pure encounter with wisdom. I have also suggested that encountering wisdom in Hades is an automatic consequence of the correct practice of philosophy in this life. The embodied soul, on the contrary, is disturbed by the body and its desires; therefore, it must actively engage in philosophy and purification.

By pursuing separating the soul from the body, true philosophers prepare themselves for the afterlife and try to come "closest" to the knowledge of the being of things themselves.<sup>288</sup> That is, true philosophers aim to develop the cognitive powers of the soul so that they can attain wisdom and knowledge in Hades. The impossibility of a

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<sup>287</sup> See Futter 2015, 57.

<sup>288</sup> *Phd.* 65d11-e4. Sedley (1989, 377-378) points that according to the myth in the *Republic* 10, Er learns the laws of the 'underlying principles of celestial motions' in a temporary disembodied state although the true astronomy is granted to philosophical souls in this life in the *Republic* 7. But still, Er's disembodiment, for Sedley, 'is used to symbolize the radical break from incarnate perspectives,' and hence it puts us back to the *Phaedo*.

pure encounter with wisdom, of viewing things by themselves and of the final state of purity during embodiment, is the source of philosophical humility, which partly shapes the practice of true philosophers. In this respect, the findings of this investigation complement those of earlier chapters: the *Phaedo* has a metaphilosophical aim, which is to provide insights for the correct method of philosophical practice.

The crux of this chapter is that even though true philosophers are aware that they cannot attain the final state of purity, they still pursue it and try to separate the soul from the body. That is, true philosophers are aware of the limits of their pursuit and cognitive capacity. Plato then tries to establish the epistemic norms which are compatible with our epistemic access. I submit that philosophical humility is an accurate basis of these norms, as it takes our cognitive fallibilities into account. In this respect, I believe that the metaphilosophical dimension of Socrates' defence speech frames the dialogical model and the philosophical method developed in the *Phaedo*.

In the next chapter, I am going to examine how the limits of our cognitive capacities fashion the norms governing our attitude towards philosophical arguments and disagreement. This mode of conduct is in line with the course of the *Phaedo*, as Socrates also defines these norms first, then discusses his method of inquiry. In a sense, the metaphilosophical component that I discuss in the next chapter (the misology argument) precedes the first-order investigation that I examine in the last chapter (the theory of Forms and the method of hypothesis). This preference, I submit, implies that we need to learn the norms governing the correct practice of philosophers before engaging with philosophical arguments.

## Chapter 4: Hatred of Arguments

### 4.1 Introduction

Examining the misology argument (hatred of arguments [*logos*]) at *Phaedo* 88c-91b is vitally important if we are to understand the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo*.<sup>289</sup> The objective of this chapter is to investigate Plato's ideas on the right method of philosophical argument in the misology argument. To this end, I critically examine the views that [1] the misology argument is *fundamentally* a critique of the sophistic method, which is described as arguing for and against the same proposition (*antilogike*), and that [2] Plato targets knowing through sense-perception.<sup>290</sup>

I dispute these views not only because Socrates' interlocutors and friends in the *Phaedo* are not *antilogikoi*, but also because staying away from *antilogike* alone might not rule out the danger of becoming misologists. The key aim of Plato's study of misology is to show the correct norms governing true philosophers' attitude towards arguments, which are based on epistemic modesty. However, with this challenge, I do not wish to suggest that Plato's discussion of antilogic is just incidental to the misology argument, rather antilogic offers a very vivid example of how people might become misologists. Understanding antilogic is thus essential to wrap our minds around misology, as this understanding can vividly reveal the process of becoming misologists.

In this respect, I suggest that the misology argument primarily offers a metaphilosophical model to lovers of wisdom. According to this model, true philosophers, who are lovers of wisdom, should follow the norms of epistemic humility and critical thinking in their search for knowledge and the truth. This is the reason why, I argue, Socrates is wary of claiming that he has already found totally firm and sound arguments.

Moreover, by introducing the misology argument, I submit that Socrates puts forward an outlook by which we can recover from epistemic despair. With this term,

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<sup>289</sup> Woolf (2007, 3) remarks that 'one would not, strictly, speak of arguments, as Socrates does here of *λόγοι*, as being true or false'. See also Gallop 1975, 154. As we shall see, *logos* has a larger connotation in the *Phaedo* and it is difficult to find a single English word that can account for all uses of *logos*. Thus, I either leave *logos* untranslated or render it in regard to the context it is used.

<sup>290</sup> See Archer-Hind 1883, 113-114; Hackforth 1955, 110-111, Gallop 1975, 153-155. Cf. Miller 2015 for a reading bringing Socrates and the misologists closer.

I refer to the damaging belief that there is nothing firm and sound either in things (the metaphysical problem) or in arguments (the epistemological problem). Socrates has already dealt with the metaphysical problem and his interlocutors consented to the idea that there are stable things, i.e. Forms, through which we can attain knowledge and the truth.<sup>291</sup>

The misology argument largely deals with the difficulty of establishing whether there are firm and sound arguments which can be attained. This difficulty is related to the content of Socrates' defence speech, according to which the body's influence on the soul hinders us from having a pure encounter with wisdom and from viewing things by themselves as long as we are alive.<sup>292</sup> Therefore, Socrates tries to find a cure for epistemic pessimism, which might arise out of the idea that our cognitive powers are imperfect and the truth is beyond our epistemic access. That is, the misology argument aims at soothing the fear of making mistakes and encourages us to continue searching for knowledge and the truth.

Moreover, I stress the use of the adverbs of degree (*e.g.* very much, at all), which Socrates uses to qualify both trust in humans and trust in arguments; hence it underlines the significance of philosophical humility. I argue that the misology argument highlights that those who lack skill in arguments (hereafter the unskilled) should not put all their trust in arguments. Rather, Socrates favours epistemic caution (i.e. recognizing the fallibility/limits of our methods and cognitive powers) and critical thinking (i.e. looking for further evidence in support of or against an argument).

Finally, I propose that Socrates does not present himself as an epistemic authority, who claims to own knowledge and the truth. Socrates only says that bad arguments are in the majority, though this does not imply that he is certain that he has discovered firm and sound arguments. For instance, Socrates might have encountered ten arguments and observed that nine out of ten are bad. This nonetheless does not mean that the not bad one should be totally firm and sound. That is, Socrates does not claim authority, but rather, by using conditionals, he emphasizes that if the firm and sound arguments exist, then those who hate and abuse arguments will be deprived of them, and hence of the truth and knowledge too.

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<sup>291</sup> See *Phd.* 65d11-e4, 66d7-67a2, 75c11-d5, 76d6-e7, 80b1-6.

<sup>292</sup> See *Phd.* 66d4-7, 67b7-c3.

In sum, I argue that the misology argument aims at comparing the epistemic (or intellectual) norms of epistemic authority and those of philosophical humility. Then not only does Socrates encourage his interlocutors to adopt the latter, but he also follows these norms in his conversation with Simmias and Cebes. That said, I will not discard the possibility that a character might be more knowledgeable since they, for instance, have intellectual experience. However, since an epistemic authority claims to have acquired knowledge and the truth, such authority does not occur in the *Phaedo*.

## 4.2 The Origin of Misology

Misologists, for Socrates, hate and abuse arguments, thus they would be deprived of knowledge and the truth.<sup>293</sup> If the hatred of arguments entails truth-deprivation, then knowledge and truth, for Socrates, must *only* be attained through arguments. That is, if there were another way other than arguments, which allows us to succeed in finding knowledge and truth, the misologists might not have been deprived of knowledge and truth. For instance, if divine revelation were also a method of attaining knowledge and the truth, we might have acquired them through revelation.

As mentioned above, it is often thought that the target of the misology argument is those taking the sensible world as true and real. According to this interpretation, since misologists do not believe that the intelligible world is really real, they would never study intelligibles; therefore, they could not obtain, or be deprived of, knowledge and the truth.<sup>294</sup> Be that as it may, the misology argument, I presume, also provides the correct norms of philosophical argument, in which true philosophers deal with *logoi*.

In this respect, Socrates tries to show how we search for the true *logoi*, besides offering a true *logos*, for instance, the theory of Forms.<sup>295</sup> That said, there is need to observe that Socrates has some reservations about the theory of Forms. As suggested in Chapter 1, after showing that the soul is immortal, Socrates advises his

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<sup>293</sup> *Phd.* 90d1ff.

<sup>294</sup> E.g. Gallop 1975, 154-55.

<sup>295</sup> Miller (2015, 153) suggest that hating *logos* and loving the sensible world are different manifestations of the same attitude. See *Phd.* 83c2-9; Baima 2015, 265. Although I do reject this point, we should pay heed to the fact that Socrates is not talking to ‘sight-lovers’ or ‘contradiction-mongers’, but to his closest followers. In this context, I submit that Socrates should aim at showing the correct norms governing philosophical argument, which the former two hardly care about.

interlocutors to examine further the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms.<sup>296</sup> In a sense, although the theory of Forms contributes to the elimination of epistemic fear (fearing that there is no firm and sound argument), Socrates does not claim that the theory of Forms is totally firm and sound so that there is no need to investigate it further.

Here we need to distinguish Socrates' elimination of his own epistemic despair from that of his interlocutors. To begin with, Socrates does not rule out his interlocutors' epistemic fear by offering them firm and sound arguments, as the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms are still in need of further inquiry. Rather, Socrates persuades them that if his interlocutors are going to find firm and sound arguments they should continue to inquire. To this end, Socrates endows his interlocutors with the ability to control their epistemic fear and with a special mindset that allows them to deal with arguments.

Moreover, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he is ambitious to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. If what Socrates is saying about the soul (*i.e.* the soul is immortal) is true, then 'it is quite right to be convinced', however, if the soul is not immortal, then Socrates will at least be 'less of a mournful burden' for his friends.<sup>297</sup> This is because, I presume, his friends will spend the last hours by doing philosophy, not lamenting the imminent death of Socrates.<sup>298</sup> Besides, it is also a good thing for Socrates that if the soul is not immortal, he will perish on dying; hence Socrates

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<sup>296</sup> *Phd.* 107b4-9. Note also that in the *Parmenides*, young Socrates's theory of Forms is criticized by Parmenides. From a philosophical perspective, the *Phaedo*, I presume, looks forward to the criticism of Parmenides. With respect to the dramatic setting, old Socrates seems to have learnt from young Socrates' mistakes. Even in the second part of the *Parmenides*, Socrates undergoes philosophical training, perhaps with a view to gaining skill to defend the theory of Forms. For the purpose of the *Parmenides*'s critique, among others, see especially Zuckert (1998); Runciman (1959).

<sup>297</sup> *Phd.* 91b1-5.

<sup>298</sup> I would like remind the readers of what *Phaedo* says early in the dialogue: 'hardly any feeling of pity entered me [although he was witnessing the death of a friend], as you would expect of someone at a scene of misfortune; nor did I feel any pleasure that we were caught up in philosophy, as our custom had been – for in fact our conversation was a philosophical one. Instead I had a quite peculiar experience, an unusual mixture blended together from both the pleasure and the pain, as I took in the fact that his life was just about to end' (*Phd.* 59a1-7). If Socrates' friends are persuaded of the blessedness of death, they would only be feeling the pleasure of doing philosophy.

thinks that ‘this folly [to believe that the soul is immortal] won’t stay with [me] – that would have been an evil – but will perish shortly’.<sup>299</sup>

Finally, I believe that by introducing the last proof of the immortality of the soul, not only does Socrates rule out his own epistemic fear, but he also guides his interlocutors through the research and improvement process; hence the defeat of their epistemic fear. Socrates provides his friends with the correct method of philosophical argument, by which they could study and develop the theory of Forms and the proofs of the immortality of the soul. In the end, Socrates is satisfied by his argument, although his friends should conduct further inquiry to discover a firmer and sounder argument. That is, following the argument to the furthest point that humans can achieve is the duty of Socrates’ friends, perhaps including Plato, since Socrates is going to die soon.

#### *4.2.1 Epistemic Fear*

Socrates thinks that arguments, like humans, are multifarious, e.g. some of them are firm and sound while others are not, although there are not extremely bad humans as there are extremely bad arguments. Apart from this difference in extreme ends of the spectrum, if the unskilled people put all their trust in arguments or humans, they are likely to become misologists and misanthropists respectively. As a solution to misology, I argue that Socrates’ cure for misology and epistemic fear is based on critical thinking, carefulness and epistemic modesty; especially should we lack expertise in arguments, we need to follow the norms governing them.

The misology argument aims at defeating the mistrust of arguments. In the relevant section, once Socrates has concluded the affinity argument, his friends, save Simmias and Cebes, thought that the affinity argument adequately proved that the soul is immortal. In simple terms, the affinity argument is that the soul is more like forms, which are unvarying and divine, while the body resembles what is changing and visible. Since, for Socrates, what is unvarying is superior to what is changing, the soul should be superior to the body. Therefore, the soul is ‘the sort to be altogether incapable of being disintegrated, or nearly so’; hence it must outlive the body.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>299</sup> *Phd.* 91b5-7.

<sup>300</sup> *Phd.* 78b4-80d4.

Whether the affinity argument is really strong or weak is not relevant for my current purposes.<sup>301</sup> What is of significance is that the listeners think that it is a good argument; as a result, they are alarmed once they have heard the challenges posed by Simmias and Cebes. Cebes scrutinizes whether the soul is completely immortal and imperishable, or whether it perishes after many birth-death cycles, and Simmias offers that the soul might be an attunement.<sup>302</sup> These questions arouse feelings of suspicion and fear among Socrates' friends, and Phaedo portrays those feelings:

[T23] Now when we all heard them [Simmias and Cebes] say this our mood took an unpleasant turn, as we later told each other, because we had been firmly persuaded by the earlier argument, but then they seemed to have disturbed us all over again and sent us plummeting into doubt, not just about the arguments given before, but also about what would be said later. We were worried that we might be worthless as judges, or even that the very facts of the matter might merit doubt.<sup>303</sup>

Firstly, the singular noun *logos* in ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου at the *Phaedo* 88c3 should refer to the affinity argument; otherwise we would have a plural noun if Phaedo refers to all the preceding arguments.<sup>304</sup> Secondly, ‘the arguments given

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<sup>301</sup> For some explanations about the weakness of the affinity argument, see Apolloni (1996); Dorter (1976); Elton (1997). The first of these claims that the affinity argument's underlying principle is mind/body dualism, which emphasizes the simplicity of soul; the second argues that Socrates tries to explain an abstract and philosophically difficult argument by a religious metaphor, which focuses on an inherent feeling about the existence of divinity; the third points out that Socrates aims at soothing his interlocutors' fear of dying rather than giving a proper argument as well as illustrating the problem of “analogical reasoning”.

<sup>302</sup> Simmias' challenge is the so-called soul-attunement view. According to this view, once the strings of a lyre are broken, there remains no attunement. Then if the soul is a kind of attunement and blending in due proportion of hot and cold, dry and wet, and the like, the soul should perish in case of the lack of proportion of these elements. For instance, if one relaxes or tightens the strings too much, the attunement would disappear. Even worse, if the strings are cut, there would be no attunement although the strings would continue to exist until they rot down. See *Phd.* 85e3-86d4. Cebes' argument simply is: to say that the soul has existed before embodiment does not show that the soul will not perish after one dies. That is, a soul might live in many bodies and be reborn many times, but its present incarnation might be the last. See *Phd.* 87c6-88b8.

<sup>303</sup> *Phd.* 88c1-c7 Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὥς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ἦ.

<sup>304</sup> Whilst talking about Socrates' attitude towards his interlocutors, Phaedo uses a plural noun to refer to the interlocutors' “arguments (τῶν λόγων)” at *Phd.* 89a5. Here, however, Phaedo does not refer to the affinity argument but to ‘the young

before (88c4-5 *τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις*)’ should either refer to the arguments advanced in the *Phaedo* so far or more generally to arguments that Phaedo and others have encountered until now, or both. In any case, Phaedo and others have doubts about arguments, their own cognitive skills, and the very facts of the matter. Thirdly, ‘what would be said later (88c5-6 *τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι*)’ designates the things that would be said either about the immortality of the soul or about any other issue.<sup>305</sup> At any rate, Phaedo and others worry that future talks might fail to establish an undoubted account about the immortality of the soul, as well as about other questions.

Let me now ask why Plato brings the epistemic fear of Phaedo and others to our attention. The reason for this is that Plato wishes to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the affinity argument at the same time.<sup>306</sup> While the argument seems strong to Phaedo and others, Simmias and Cebes are able to detect weaknesses and to find counterarguments. Therefore, the readers, in a sense, are left to pick a side. Besides, the interlocutors’ opposition to Socrates implies that the affinity argument might seem strong on the face of it, yet it is not immune to objections.

Therefore, I presume that Phaedo’s portrayal of their feelings of suspicion and fear emphasises that putting all our trust in an argument might lead to the state of epistemic despair: it might lead to doubting and fearing that the truth exists. The scope of this state of despair, as mentioned above, is not limited to the arguments about the immortality of the soul, though it is more likely that people should have epistemic fears about the immortality of the soul. This is probably because the immortality of the soul is an issue about which ‘knowing the clear truth...in our present life is either impossible or something extremely difficult’, as Simmias said earlier.<sup>307</sup>

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men’s argument (*Phd.* 89a3 *τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον*)’, that is, the arguments of Cebes and Simmias.

<sup>305</sup> Rowe 1993, 210.

<sup>306</sup> Gordon (2007, 219) finely observes that ‘despite the occasional failure of argument, we ought not to let that deter us from the life of philosophy. Socrates’ cure for anxiety, while assuring us that we ought to remain faithful to philosophy, at the same time warns us of our limitations’.

<sup>307</sup> *Phd.* 85c2-3. Woolf (2007, 12) notes that ‘trying to know too vigorously everything’ might result in a sort of “epistemic nihilism”. Be that as it may, once we determine the limits of human cognition and things that we can know, our inquiries should continue until we find something adequate, firm and sound. Indeed, as Simmias states, ‘not testing from every angle what is said about them [things like

#### 4.2.2 The Role of the Misology Argument

Having discussed how to construct the relationship between epistemic fear and the misology argument, I will now move on to investigate the role of the misology argument. Here, it is important to ask why Socrates scrutinized misology at length rather than immediately demonstrating the immortality (and imperishability) of the soul. Socrates, I submit, could have presented an argument that might persuade his interlocutors and alleviate the epistemic fear of his friends.

In fact, as we will see later, Socrates has that sort of argument up his sleeve, namely the last proof.<sup>308</sup> If Socrates had introduced the last proof (as well as the theories and methods used in this proof) at this stage, he could have said that “this is a good argument that you would agree to, and so don’t lose your faith in arguments”. This would be the best of both worlds, not to mention that it is shorter and easier: Socrates’ friends would regain their trust in arguments and Socrates would accomplish a goal of the *Phaedo*, which is to persuade his interlocutors about the immortality of the soul.<sup>309</sup>

As mentioned above, an explanation of the purpose of the misology passage is as follows: Plato wishes to criticize those who have spent their time dealing with the arguments used in disputation (*antilogike*) and to show why their practice is dangerous, should they desire to acquire knowledge and the truth.<sup>310</sup> Plato’s criticism

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the immortality of the soul], refusing to give up until one is exhausted from considering it in every way, is the mark of an extremely feeble sort of man (*Phd.* 85c4-6)’.

<sup>308</sup> *Phd.* 102ff.

<sup>309</sup> Arieti (1986, 129-131) claims that the *Phaedo* is not about the immortality of soul, but about “the heroic death of Socrates” and ‘only the philosopher – as epitomized in the person of Socrates – can meet death heroically’. This is because, for Arieti, ‘only the philosopher knows that he cannot know about the afterlife and the soul, and he is thus the only one who can die courageously’. Then Arieti concludes that the weakness of the proofs for the immortality of the soul implies that ‘Socrates is the most heroic when his arguments are weakest’. However, even if we accept that his arguments are weak, I do not think that this weakness aims at highlighting Socrates’ heroism and courage. As I claim throughout this thesis, Socrates does not think that his arguments are weak, yet he believes that they might not be totally firm and sound; hence in need of further inquiry.

<sup>310</sup> Hackforth (1955, 110-111) argues that these people are probably sophists and rhetoricians.

of the practice of sophists and rhetoricians is not unexpected, and I do not reject the idea that Plato criticises these people.<sup>311</sup>

Besides this, the misology argument makes a positive contribution to the practice of philosophy.<sup>312</sup> If Socrates' *only* aim were to prove the immortality of the soul, it would seem irrelevant to show how we should deal with arguments.<sup>313</sup> Thus, I think that not only does Socrates try to convince his interlocutors about the immortality of the soul, but he also aims at furnishing his interlocutors with the correct epistemic norms and intellectual virtues. In this respect, Socrates is looking forward to the time when he has long gone yet his friends remain in the business of philosophy.<sup>314</sup>

#### 4.2.3 *Phaedo's Fear*

Phaedo is anxious about finding knowledge and the truth, probably because of the death of Socrates, who is 'the wisest man alive'.<sup>315</sup> Simmias, in fact, comments on Socrates' expertise in arguments; he says 'I'm far more afraid that this time tomorrow there will no longer be a single human being who can do this properly [*sc.* 76b8-9 giving an account (*διδόναι λόγον*) of the beautiful, the good *etc.*]'.<sup>316</sup> Only Socrates can then give an account of things themselves (i.e. Forms) properly, or worthily (*ἀξίως*). Simmias, therefore, are not afraid of being deprived of the truth as long as Socrates helps him find it.

As a result of the impending departure of Socrates, his friends find themselves in a state of epistemic despair, stemming from the anticipation of failing to find that

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<sup>311</sup> See McCoy 2007, 2-7.

<sup>312</sup> From a metaphilosophical perspective, I think the misology argument is neither an 'interlude (Bluck 1955, 92-93; Rowe 1993, 210)' nor a 'digression' (Hackforth 1955, 109). Through the misology argument, Plato continues to examine some the epistemic norms governing the practice of philosophers.

<sup>313</sup> See Jacquette 2014, 5. Some argue that we should not separate the metaphysical theory from the proofs for the immortality of the soul. That is, the arguments that are advanced to prove the immortality of the soul play some role in advancing the theory of Forms. See Lee 2012, 3. Metaphilosophy, I take it, is another component and it is also connected to the metaphysical (and epistemological) theory. I discuss this relationship in Chapter 5.

<sup>314</sup> A famous quote is fitting: 'if you give a man a fish he is hungry again in an hour. If you teach him to catch a fish you do him a good turn (Ritchie, Anne Thackeray Mrs. Dymond 1885)'. Sedley (2004: 8-13) finely observes that 'Socrates's dialectical questioning' acted as a midwife to Platonic philosophy, which Plato has continued to exercise long after Socrates departed this life.

<sup>315</sup> See *Phd.* 118a15-17.

<sup>316</sup> *Phd.* 76b10-12.

which is not doubtful. Socrates notices their fear and encourages his listeners to continue searching for the truth. To this end, Socrates introduces the misology argument and maintains that it is not unusual to encounter bad arguments, though this does not mean that good arguments do not exist.<sup>317</sup>

Let me now consider the epistemic status of the affinity argument. As mentioned above, even though we assume that the affinity argument is weak, this does not mean that it is bad. In addition, although Simmias' objection is relatively easy for Socrates to refute, it can still be questioned whether Socrates deals with Simmias' argument charitably.<sup>318</sup> At any rate, the soul-attunement theory is rejected for good in the *Phaedo*.

Cebes' objection, however, is to the point. Above all, we need to observe that *Phaedo* tells Echecrates that 'Socrates paused for quite some time and considered something by himself' before answering Cebes' question. Then Socrates says, 'What you're seeking is no small matter, Cebes; we must study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be'.<sup>319</sup> As I will discuss in Chapter 5, not only does this study result in the last proof of the immortality of the soul, but also Socrates, as a response to Cebes' objection, introduces the method of hypothesis and expounds the role of Forms for explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

In this respect, even if we can overlook the strength of Simmias' argument, Cebes' argument is compelling.<sup>320</sup> Then *Phaedo*'s state of epistemic fear is understandable, as at least one of the arguments has merits that are undeniably vital. Now, I submit

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<sup>317</sup> McCoy (2016, 50-51) observes that 'to practice philosophy, then, always requires that I seek with the virtues of courage and humility: where humility is an awareness of both what I know and what I do not know, and where courage leads me to continue the pursuit without fear despite my own limits of knowledge.'

<sup>318</sup> Guthrie (1962, 316-319), for instance, argues that for Pythagoreans, the soul-body composite is not an attunement, but the soul itself is a *harmonia*, which is like the tripartite depiction of the soul in the *Republic*. See also Corrigan 2010, 148-151 and Hicken 1954 for a defence of Socrates's criticism of the soul-attunement doctrine.

<sup>319</sup> *Phd.* 95e7-96a1.

<sup>320</sup> Regarding Simmias' argument, although Socrates copes with it more easily than Cebes' point, there is need to observe Echecrates' reaction to the soul-attunement theory: 'this theory that our soul is a kind of attunement has an extraordinary hold on me, both at this moment and at all times, and now that it has been mentioned it has reminded me, as it were, that I myself too had already come to believe this. I really need some other argument, a brand-new one, that will persuade me that when someone has died his soul does not die with him (*Phd.* 88d3-8)'. In a sense, the soul-attunement theory has a strong hold on people, and thus it deserves a serious analysis and strong refutation.

that Phaedo's fear probably results from firmly trusting the affinity argument. That is, even though neither the interlocutors' arguments nor Socrates' argument is bad as such, Phaedo takes the first step forward to becoming a misologist.<sup>321</sup> Thus, the general principle is that inexperience, together with encountering bad arguments, makes us hate arguments, and that those who lack expertise in arguments would become misologists as a result of trusting an argument too much.<sup>322</sup>

#### 4.2.4 Socrates' Attitude towards his Friends and Interlocutors

After Phaedo has described their feelings, Echecrates asks [1] whether Socrates was also "upset" or 'came calmly to the argument's rescue', and [2] whether his help was "adequate" or "insufficient".<sup>323</sup> Phaedo answers by describing Socrates' attitude as follows:

[T24] Well, Echecrates, I'd often admired Socrates, but I never respected him more than when I was with him then. Now perhaps there is nothing surprising in his having something to say. But I particularly admired in him first (1) how pleasantly, genially and respectfully he took in the young men's argument, then (2) how discerningly he noticed the effect the arguments had had on us, and (3) next how well he cured us and rallied us when we'd taken to our heels in defeat, so to speak, and spurred us on to follow at his side and consider the argument with him.<sup>324</sup>

It is germane to observe Phaedo's stress on Socrates' way of talking to his interlocutors and his understanding of others' state of despair. Phaedo does not think

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<sup>321</sup> I say the first step because Phaedo, as quoted above, says that 'we were worried that we might be worthless as judges, or even (ἢ καὶ) that the very facts of the matter might merit doubt (*Phd.* 88c6-7)'. Simply, blaming oneself is not bad, but blaming things and arguments leads to the deprivation of the truth and knowledge, as Socrates states at *Phd.* 90d3-4.

<sup>322</sup> It is of significance to observe, with Sedley (1995, 14-15), that Socrates addresses his remarks on misology to Phaedo rather than Cebes or Simmias. For Sedley, this is because Socrates 'is covertly talking about Simmias and Cebes', and especially 'Simmias' doubts are symptomatic of incipient misology'. That said, we need to observe that they are neither misologists nor deal with arguments used in disputations. See below for *antilogike*.

<sup>323</sup> *Phd.* 88e1-3.

<sup>324</sup> *Phd.* 88e4-89a6 Καὶ μὲν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἦσθετο ὃ 'πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

that having answers is unusual (αἰ ἄτοπον) for Socrates. Rather, Phaedo particularly admires Socrates' attitude toward his interlocutors, their arguments and his awareness of the effect of interlocutors' arguments on the listeners. The stress on the dialogical aspect invites us to look at Socrates' manner of argument, besides the arguments themselves. That is, we are supposed to attend carefully to the epistemic (or intellectual) norms that Socrates embraces to deal with the interlocutors' counterarguments.

A cure for the state of epistemic despair is essential, since it may give way to misology. There are three components of Socrates' attitude: (1) receiving his interlocutors' arguments with respect and kindness, (2) recognizing the listeners' reaction to arguments and counterarguments, (3) curing epistemic despair and encouraging the listeners to pursue argumentation further. I believe that (1) does not need further comment since I have already argued in Chapter 1 that Socrates seriously and carefully receives the arguments of Simmias and Cebes, then he develops new arguments accordingly. The second component (2) is clear from the fact that Socrates, by introducing the argument against misology, tries to cope with the state of epistemic despair so that he provides a mindset for dealing with arguments.

Regarding (3), I suggest that Socrates is urging his friends to defeat their epistemic despair. To this end, Socrates aims at motivating his friends to trust arguments by observing how Socrates copes with the arguments of Simmias and Cebes. In a sense, Socrates does not invite Phaedo and others to help him to find a way to confront the interlocutors' counterarguments. Rather, Socrates asks Phaedo and others to adhere to his belief about the possibility of finding knowledge and the truth.

Then Phaedo asks how they are going to deal with the interlocutors' arguments. Socrates replies by referring to the story of Heracles by which Socrates makes metaphorical allusions to the process of philosophical inquiry:

[T25] [Socrates]: 'So tomorrow, Phaedo, I expect you'll cut off these beautiful locks.'

'I suppose so, Socrates,' I said.

'You won't, if you follow my advice.'

'What then?'

'I'll cut off my locks,' he said, 'and you'll cut off these ones today – if our argument dies and we can't revive it. As for me, if I were you and the argument

escaped me, I'd swear an oath like the Argive not to grow my hair long until I return to combat and defeat the argument of Simmias and Cebes.<sup>325</sup>  
 'But,' I said, 'even Heracles, as the story goes, couldn't fight against two.'  
 'Well, call for me,' he said, 'as your Iolaus, while it's still light.'  
 'Then I call for you,' I said, 'not as Heracles, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.'  
 'It won't make any difference,' he said. 'But first let's make sure that a certain thing doesn't happen to us.'<sup>326</sup>

The story referred to above goes like this: when Heracles was fighting the Lernaean Hydra, he was attacked by a giant crab, and his nephew, Iolaus, came to help him hearing Heracles's summoning.<sup>327</sup> Some scholars suggest that since Iolaus has only a supporting role in this fight, Socrates is ironical in calling himself Iolaus.<sup>328</sup> That is, it is actually Socrates himself, like Heracles, who fights back against Simmias and Cebes, and Phaedo assumes the supporting role; hence like Iolaus.

However, Phaedo does not seem to assume even the role of Iolaus, let alone Heracles, when Socrates fights back against the interlocutors' arguments. In other words, Phaedo has neither a leading nor supporting role. Now, if I presume that Socrates is not ironical but serious, then there is a need to ask whether the meaning of the metaphor is to accomplish something other than defeating the current counterarguments presented by Simmias and Cebes.

Although Socrates is the only one who fights back, and eventually defeats his interlocutors' arguments, the final goal might not be defeating the Lernaean hydra, as it were. To this end, the story told about Heracles should be considered. According

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<sup>325</sup> Rowe (1993, 212) notes that according to Herodotus (1. 82. 7), 'the Argives...swore that none of them would grow hair long [again]...until they recovered Thyreae'.

<sup>326</sup> *Phd.* 89b4-c12 [Socrates] Αὔριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὃ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῆ.

Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.

Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Τήμερον, ἔφη, κάγω τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἴος τε εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν.

Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.

<sup>327</sup> Cf. *Euthd.* 297c, Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca.* 2.77-80.

<sup>328</sup> Rowe 1993, 212.

to Apollodorus, Heracles fought against the Lernaean Hydra to accomplish one of the Ten Labours imposed on him by Eurystheus. As Heracles was told by the Delphian priestess Pythia, once he accomplishes them, ‘he would come to be immortal’.<sup>329</sup>

Defeating the Lernaean Hydra enables Heracles to achieve a higher goal, i.e. to become immortal, and there are other labours that Heracles needs to accomplish. Here, it is pertinent to note that Socrates’ aim is to show that the soul is immortal and to persuade his interlocutors. That is, Heracles fought the Lernaean Hydra to become immortal and Socrates fought back against the interlocutors’ argument to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. Besides the connection stemming from the idea of the immortality of the soul, the idea of a higher goal is telling. I presume that defeating the current counterarguments is just a step further to completing the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, just as Heracles is accomplishing one labour by killing the Lernaean Hydra.

According to the story, if Iolaus had not used a torch-flame to stop the heads cut by Heracles from re-growing, Heracles would fail to defeat the Lernaean Hydra. Besides, the Lernaean Hydra had an immortal head, and Heracles buried it and covered it with a heavy rock. In a sense, then, a part of the Hydra is still alive.<sup>330</sup> On the one hand, re-growing the heads seems to emphasize that even if Socrates defeats the current counter-arguments, new objections might emerge unless someone seals the source completely. On the other hand, the immortal head implies that even if Socrates and Phaedo were able to fight back against all counter-arguments now, there might remain at least an argument which they could not eliminate but only control and pacify, so to speak.

The connection between Heracles’ story and the current situation in the *Phaedo* might explain why Socrates makes little use of the role he assumes. If Socrates and his friends achieve the higher goal, it would not make any difference who turns out to be Heracles or Iolaus. In fact, as often referred to, Socrates seems to assign the task of completing the argument on the immortality of the soul to his friends.<sup>331</sup> There, in this respect, is a dis-analogy in the analogy: becoming immortal surely

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<sup>329</sup> *Bibliotheca*. 2.73 ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι.

<sup>330</sup> I would like to thank to Niels Christensen and Taichi Miura for bringing this to my attention.

<sup>331</sup> *Phd.* 107af.

carries some weight for Heracles himself. However, showing that the soul is immortal is not only necessary for Socrates himself but it is a task that ought to be pursued by all his friends. In a sense, there is an impersonal Heracles, so to speak, whose role can be assumed by anyone trying to show that the soul is immortal.<sup>332</sup>

In summation, Socrates does not claim that he has ruled out every possible counterargument and has discovered every proposition that verifies the immortality of the soul. In a sense, the reader is invited to assume the role of impersonal Heracles to make a stronger case for the immortality of the soul. After all, Plato, too, assumes this task, which emerges in other dialogues, such as the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*.

#### 4.2.5 *The Cure of Misology*

If the hatred of arguments hinders his friends to attain knowledge and the truth, then Socrates should eliminate this impediment to philosophical progress. As argued above, if Socrates' friends become misologists at some point, if not at the present moment, the practice of philosophers would seem so purposeless to his friends that they might abandon it. In this respect, Socrates' aim is not only to encourage his friends to pursue the current argument but also to embolden them to believe the possibility of a meaningful philosophical pursuit, which is not beyond their reach.

Socrates analyses the resemblance between misanthropy and misology by exploring how people become misanthropists and misologists as follows:

[T26] 'Becoming haters of arguments,' he [Socrates] said, 'like those who come to hate people. Because there's no greater evil that could happen to one than hating arguments. Hating arguments and hating people come about in the same way. For misanthropy sets in as a result of putting all one's trust in someone and doing so without expertise, and taking the person to be entirely truthful, sound and trustworthy, and then a little later finding him to be wicked and untrustworthy – and then again with someone else. When this happens to someone many times, particularly with those whom he would take to be his very closest friends, and he has been falling out with people again and again, he ends up hating everyone and

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<sup>332</sup> By emphasizing impersonality, I do not mean that Socrates does not care to persuade himself about the immortality of the soul. For sure, this would be at odds with the passage (*Phd.* 91a2ff.) where Socrates tells his interlocutors how ambitious he is about showing that the soul is immortal and about persuading himself. This, however, does not cancel out Socrates' request: his friends should follow the argument to the furthest point that can be achieved by humans.

thinking that there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Haven't you ever seen this happen?'<sup>333</sup>

For Socrates, we become misanthropists and misologists in the same way. Therefore, if we understand the underlying mechanism of misanthropy, we would have a better grasp of the concept of misology. One of the most significant aspects of that mechanism, I argue, is Socrates' qualification of trusting in humans by using certain adverbs. For one thing, Socrates does not just say that putting our trust in people, and doing so without expertise, and then finding them to be untrustworthy might make us misanthropists. Rather, Socrates emphasizes that putting *all* (or *exceedingly* [σφόδρα] putting) our trust in people and believing that they are *entirely* (τὸ παράπαν) truthful, sound and trustworthy is dangerous, and if we experience the trust-betrayal cycle many times, especially (μάλιστα) with our closest friends, we would become misanthropists eventually. The underlying mechanism of misanthropy is simply that [1] we lack expertise in human affairs but trust in people *exceedingly* and take them to be *entirely* trustworthy; [2] we find them to be untrustworthy; [3] this happens to us many times, and *especially* with our closest friends, and [4] we become misanthropists.

Let me now remind the reader of the opening of the misology passage. Whilst describing how they were feeling, Phaedo said that they were 'firmly (or exceedingly) convinced (*Phd.* 88c2 σφόδρα πεπεισμένους)' by the affinity argument. However, once Simmias and Cebes produced counterarguments, Phaedo and others have fallen into a state of epistemic despair, becoming doubtful about "the arguments given before" and "what would be said later". A cause of their current condition is to have been exceedingly trusting of Socrates' argument. Socrates, then, wished to encourage his friends, and on that account he introduced the argument against misology to eliminate his friends' fear.

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<sup>333</sup> *Phd.* 89d1-e3 Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὗς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντα καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἴσθῃσαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

### 4.3 The Meaning of *Technē*

For Socrates, expertise in human qualities endows us with the sort of ability thanks to which we are entitled to put all our trust in someone without the danger of becoming misanthropists. Socrates' point, I submit, is that expertise – both in human affairs and in arguments – enables us to discern the structure of a category (humanity and arguments) by discovering bad, good, and neither good nor bad constituents. This discovery, for Socrates, is to recognize ‘matters as they really are’.<sup>334</sup> For instance, if someone with expertise in human qualities were to deal with humans, they would be able to discern the structure of humanity, that is, ‘both the very good and the very wicked are few in number, and that those in between are the most numerous’.<sup>335</sup>

If only with expertise do we view matters as they really are, what would we do without expertise? In this case, how do we deal with arguments and advance our expertise? I argue that Socrates suggests to those who lack expertise in arguments that they should follow the epistemic norms of carefulness (not putting all our trust in an argument) and of modesty (being wary of making bold claims about knowledge). By following these norms, we would improve our expertise by expanding our grasp and familiarity with any subject. Thus, we can save ourselves from becoming misanthropists and misologists.

#### **4.3.1. The Mischief of Antilogicians**

One cause for becoming a misologist is spending time dealing with arguments used in disputations, i.e. antilogic.<sup>336</sup> Those who are practicing *antilogike*, for Socrates, exemplify a sort of epistemic vice: not only would they themselves be deprived of knowledge and the truth but also those who interact with them. This is because antilogicians would demolish the belief that there are firm and sound arguments. Rather, as I shall discuss below, antilogicians persuade themselves and others that ‘all things turn back and forth...and do not stay put for any time’.<sup>337</sup>

Another vice of antilogicians, for Socrates, is intellectual pride. This is implied by the following: Antilogicians think that [1] they are ‘very wise (σοφώτατοι)’ and that

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<sup>334</sup> *Phd.* 89e7-90a1 ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο.

<sup>335</sup> *Phd.* 90a7-9.

<sup>336</sup> *Phd.* 90b5ff.

<sup>337</sup> *Phd.* 90c3-6.

[2] ‘they alone have understood that there is nothing sound or firm in any thing or in any argument’.<sup>338</sup> By alluding to the intellectual pride of antilogicians, Socrates aims at showing why putting all our trust in arguments and cognitive abilities might hinder philosophical progress.<sup>339</sup>

In this respect, one of Socrates’ purposes is to distinguish intellectual vices from intellectual virtues, hence the reason for introducing antilogicians.<sup>340</sup> To this end, Socrates compares antilogicians’ intellectual pride with philosophers’ epistemic modesty and indicates that the latter would enable us to develop expertise in arguments and to attain knowledge. In this respect, not only does the misology argument target antilogicians themselves, but it also implies that we all might become misologists, if we do not follow the correct epistemic norms.

#### 4.3.2 *Antilogic in Plato’s Republic*

In this subsection, I will explore antilogic and the dangers involved in it. The most promising passage on antilogic is found in the *Republic* VII, where Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the education of the guardians in an ideal state. In the relevant passage, Socrates examines how and when these guardians should begin dealing with ‘arguments (538c5 τῶν λόγων)’.

Socrates begins by explaining why engaging with arguments too early is dangerous: if future guardians are asked what the fine is when they are young and do not know the truth, they will initially answer according to what they have heard from ‘the traditional lawgiver (τοῦ νομοθέτου)’. However, if arguments refute them ‘often and in many places’, and shake their convictions, they will end up thinking that ‘the fine is no more fine than shameful (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν)’. This sort of belief, then, will negatively influence their attitude towards the things that they particularly respect such as justice and goodness. Finally, not only would a future guardian

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<sup>338</sup> *Phd.* 90c1-4. See Cassam 2014:19 for the idea of intellectual pride.

<sup>339</sup> Griswold (1988, 157) claims that ‘the fundamental question of metaphilosophy concerns the “quarrel” between the proponents of philosophy and its various critics’ and that ‘the defence of philosophy requires conversation with the critics of philosophy (and not just with abstract formulations of their “positions”)’. In the *Phaedo*, although nobody criticizes philosophy and Socrates does not need to directly defend it, the correct practice of philosophers is discussed at length, especially in Socrates’ defence speech.

<sup>340</sup> For a brief discussion on intellectual virtues and vices see Cassam 2016.

dishonor and disobey their earlier convictions, but ‘he can’t discover the true ones [true convictions about justice, goodness, *etc.*] (τά τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὐρίσκει)’.<sup>341</sup>

After that, Socrates advises Glaucon, ‘if you don’t want your thirty-year-olds to be objects of such pity, you’ll have to be extremely careful about how you introduce them’.<sup>342</sup> This ‘precaution (*εὐλάβεια*)’ is ‘not to let them taste arguments while they are young’. For Socrates, this is because young people are not ready to deal with arguments and can be deceived and manipulated by antilogicians:

[T27] When young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a kind of game of contradiction. They imitate those who’ve refuted them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments...Then, when they’ve refuted many and been refuted by them in turn, they forcefully and quickly fall into disbelieving what they believed before. And, as a result, they themselves and the whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of others.<sup>343</sup>

In contrast with the young lads, an older person, as Socrates describes, would not wish to participate in such madness (*mania*), i.e. the game of contradiction. Unlike young lads, who ‘imitate those who’ve refuted them’, an older person ‘will imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at contradiction for sport. He’ll be more sensible himself and will bring honour rather than discredit to the philosophical way of life’.<sup>344</sup> Socrates concludes his argument by giving another version of the precaution above: ‘those allowed to take part in arguments should be orderly and steady by nature, not as nowadays, when even the unfit are allowed to engage in them’.<sup>345</sup>

We can thus glean at least two approaches from the *Republic*, namely a kind of game of contradiction, i.e. *antilogike*, and an attempt to attain the truth by means of dialectic, i.e. *dialegesthai*.<sup>346</sup> The former approach hinders not only the formation of

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<sup>341</sup> *Rep.* VII 538d7-e6.

<sup>342</sup> *Rep.* VII 539a8-9 ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἀπτέον;

<sup>343</sup> *Rep.* VII 539a11-c3.

<sup>344</sup> *Rep.* VII 539c5-d1.

<sup>345</sup> *Rep.* VII 539d2-6.

<sup>346</sup> What dialectic amounts to is a vital question, but it is not relevant to my current purposes. My aim is to explore the correct epistemic norms to gain expertise in arguments and attain knowledge. Besides, the dialectic of the *Republic* cannot be brought into play to interpret the *Phaedo* without running into philosophical troubles. See Sayre 2016, 82-83; Rose 1966, 466.

new beliefs but also a reliance upon previous beliefs.<sup>347</sup> Through the latter, on the contrary, we can dismiss both our old beliefs, if they are shown to be false, and form new beliefs.<sup>348</sup>

### 4.3.3 *The Young Lads of the Phaedo*

Turning to the *Phaedo*, it is necessary to observe that Socrates is talking to his young friends.<sup>349</sup> His advice against misology should thus apply to the young particularly, as they are more likely to lack expertise in arguments.<sup>350</sup> In the *Phaedo*, however, Socrates does not say that the young should not deal with arguments. In fact, Socrates encourages Cebes and Simmias to advance arguments.<sup>351</sup> This is probably because it is not dangerous to talk to and imitate Socrates. Unlike the bad examples discussed in the *Republic*, Socrates is not an antilogician, but desires to discover the truth and urges his interlocutors to care about the truth.<sup>352</sup>

One might think that antilogic poses a risk for the young alone, although it is a major risk factor for misology for all. That is, dealing with arguments used in disputation, i.e. practicing antilogic, is a danger that we all should try to avoid, no matter whether we are young or old.<sup>353</sup> It must be asked whether someone like Socrates, who has expertise in dealing with arguments and is not an antilogician, is immune to the lamentable fate of misology. In other words, if we have expertise in arguments, as one might suppose, it might not be a problem for us to put all our trust in an argument.

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<sup>347</sup> Socrates relates his similar experience a bit later at the *Phaedo* 96-100, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

<sup>348</sup> The significance of abandoning false beliefs and the role of rejecting them in forming new beliefs are widely discussed by scholars working on the philosophy of Socrates. For instance, see Vlastos 1991, 119-124; Tarrant 2000, 14-16; Politis 2006; 88-89, Kahn 1996, 99; 2006, 121.

<sup>349</sup> Simmias and Cebes are 'labelled *neaniskos*' at *Phd.* 89a3 (Nails 2002, 261).

<sup>350</sup> See also *Rep.* II. 378d5-8 for the exclusion of Homer and Hesiod from the education of the young since they cannot distinguish 'what the deeper sense (ὀπρόνοια) is and is not.' If this is so, especially the young should keep in mind that they might lack expertise, hence be much more cautious. See also Desjardins 1988, 112-113.

<sup>351</sup> *Phd.* 91a7-c5.

<sup>352</sup> *Phd.* 91b8-c4. Zuckert (2009, 494-501) argues that Socrates differs from sophists in his modesty, his openness to criticisms and his encouragement of the young.

<sup>353</sup> Probably, if we do not put our trust in arguments used in disputations, then antilogic might pose no danger to us. That is, if we have expertise in arguments, we would be able to discern arguments pertaining to antilogic. For the use of sophistry and antilogic by Socrates see Klosko (1987); McCabe (2015).

We nonetheless observe that Socrates is sometimes reluctant to put all his trust in (or prefers not to insist on) an argument or a statement in the *Phaedo*. For instance, Socrates does not insist whether he, as a true philosopher, is going to enjoy the company of good men in Hades, and by what exact mechanism Forms and particulars are associated with each other.<sup>354</sup> Besides, as discussed in Chapter 1, Socrates assumes that the last proof for the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms need further examination and justification.<sup>355</sup> Finally, Socrates, earlier, told his interlocutors that ‘do you think that there is something missing in what was said [the affinity argument]? Because of course it still contains many grounds for suspicion and counter-attack, at least if one is to go right through it properly.’<sup>356</sup>

Then should we think that Socrates lacks expertise in arguments, as he does not always put all his trust in his arguments, not even in the last proof of the immortality of the soul? Saying that would be an embarrassment for Plato, as Socrates is portrayed as a wise man and an expert in arguments.<sup>357</sup> For instance, as mentioned before, Simmias says that once Socrates dies, he is afraid that ‘there will no longer be a single human being who can do this properly [give an account of things themselves such as the Good itself, the Beautiful itself]’.<sup>358</sup> In this respect, not only can Socrates give an account of things themselves but he might be the only person who can do this properly. Besides, *Phaedo* concludes his account of the last day of Socrates by telling Evenus that Socrates was ‘a man who was, as we would say, the best of those whom we came to know in those days, and also the wisest and most just’.<sup>359</sup>

Here we need to observe that Socrates is the best, wisest and most just *only* among his contemporaries, whom *Phaedo* and others came to know. In this respect, we are left with three possibilities for understanding the meaning of Socrates’ wisdom: either [1] some of Socrates’ contemporaries, whom *Phaedo* and others did not know; [2] some of Socrates’ predecessors; [3] some of his successors might be better, wiser and more just. Concerning the evidence *Phaedo* had, however, there was no one wiser than Socrates. Socrates’ wisdom is not the all-time best and his arguments might be surpassed. Socrates’ arguments are not the all-time best, in the sense that

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<sup>354</sup> *Phd.* 62c1-2 and 100d7 respectively.

<sup>355</sup> *Phd.* 107a8-b3.

<sup>356</sup> *Phd.* 85c5-7.

<sup>357</sup> For Plato’s admiration of Socrates see Kahn 1996, 15 & 193.

<sup>358</sup> *Phd.* 76b10-12.

<sup>359</sup> *Phd.* 118a15-17.

they cannot be surpassed. Rather, Socrates' arguments in the *Phaedo* can either be rightfully challenged or be properly and correctly developed by someone else.

That said, one might still allege that Socrates is a wise man, if not the all-time wisest; he thus should have the right to put all his trust in arguments. It is surely possible that someone wiser than Socrates might live in the future, yet for *Phaedo*, and perhaps for Plato too, he is among those expected to have expertise in arguments. In fact, it is plain to see Socrates' expertise in argument, as there are many examples of firm and sound arguments (or at least propositions) in the *Phaedo*.<sup>360</sup> Be that as it may, we also need to observe that, Socrates, an expert in arguments and a wise man, is careful about putting trust in his arguments.

My point is that carefulness and epistemic modesty should not be abandoned, even if we come to have expertise in arguments or become really wise. On the one hand, Socrates has expertise, as his arguments are evidence of this. On the other hand, he still acknowledges the fallibility of his cognitive faculties and arguments, as well as admitting this openly. In this respect, Socrates demonstrates a fine line between overconfidence and reasonable trust, no matter the proper expertise in arguments. Socrates is not overconfident about his intellectual capacities, nor does he belittle others. Rather, Socrates knows better arguments and counterarguments might emerge. Socrates therefore encourages carefulness and modesty.<sup>361</sup>

#### 4.3.4 *The Notion of Expertise*

For Socrates, a person who has expertise would come to the following conclusion about human qualities: 'For surely if he had been doing so with expertise he'd have viewed matters as they really are: he would have recognized that both the very good

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<sup>360</sup> For instance, the recollection argument, the theory of Forms and the last proof for the immortality of the soul reflect Socrates' expertise, although they might possess various degrees of epistemic certainty.

<sup>361</sup> By claiming this, I do not mean that Socrates lacks self-trust. Rather, I think that Socrates follows the norms of 'epistemic conscientiousness', which is 'the quality of using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get the truth' (Zagzebski 2012, 48). 'A self-respective person', as Zagzebski (*ibid.*, 55-56) describes, forms her beliefs in an epistemically conscientious way, and she would also believe that 'other normal, mature humans have the same natural desire for truth and the same general powers and capacities that I have'. In this respect, I think that Socrates trusts both his own cognitive faculties and those of his interlocutors; Socrates thus takes their disagreement seriously and attempts to find further reasons/proofs to support his belief that the soul is immortal.

and the very wicked are few in number and that those in between are the most numerous'.<sup>362</sup> Then Socrates elaborates on what he meant:

[T28] 'It's just like the very small and large,' he said. 'Do you think there is anything rarer than discovering a very large or very small person, or dog, or anything else? Or similarly one that is swift or slow, ugly or beautiful, light or dark? Haven't you observed that in all such cases the far extremities are rare and few, while those in between are plentiful and numerous?'

'Certainly,' I said.

'So do you think,' he said, 'that if a competition in wickedness were set up, here too very few would come to the fore?'

'That's likely enough,' I said.<sup>363</sup>

Expertise in human qualities enables us to answer two questions: [1] who are the very wicked, the very good and those in between? [2] which of these three groups is in the majority? The first point refers to expertise in understanding human qualities; the second point necessitates experience in dealing with humans, as we need to encounter many humans to know extreme ends of the spectrum. In the case of humans, Socrates says, those in between are the most numerous and the far extremities are rare and few. In this respect, if we have expertise in human qualities, we understand whether an individual is very good or very wicked or in between, and we attain a set of statistical data that informs us about the nature of humanity.

Nevertheless, if we lack expertise in human qualities, how could we understand the qualities of an individual and how do we obtain the correct set of statistical data by gathering our knowledge together? Regarding the goodness of an individual, we must have expertise in human qualities, otherwise, Socrates states, we are likely to judge humans incorrectly. Now, if we lack expertise we have to choose between two alternatives: either those with expertise would inform us about every individual we meet or those experts would teach us their expertise in human qualities so that *we* can judge for ourselves.

Let us now consider the current situation about arguments, epistemic fear and Socrates' role. Socrates will no longer be in a position to tell his friends whether an argument is good or bad since he is going to die very soon. Nor can Socrates teach them expertise in arguments – on the assumption that they lack such expertise but

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<sup>362</sup> *Phd.* 89e7-90a1.

<sup>363</sup> *Phd.* 90a4-b3.

are not totally untrained – since there is no time for it. How, then, can Socrates help his friends and save them from becoming misologists?

I suggest that Socrates can help his friends by giving the statistical data about arguments and by telling them how they ought to act in terms of this statistical knowledge. As quoted above, Socrates says that very few humans would come to the fore in a competition in wickedness. However, for Socrates, regarding arguments, the case is somewhat different than humans:

[T29] All the same, arguments do not resemble people in that way (I was following your lead just now), but in the following way: when someone without expertise in arguments trusts an argument to be true, and then a little later thinks that it is false, sometimes when it is, sometimes when it isn't, and when he does the same again with one argument after another. This applies particularly to those who have spent time dealing with the arguments used in disputation. As you know, they end up thinking that they have become very wise, and that they alone have understood that there is nothing sound or firm in any thing or in any argument, but that all things turn back and forth, exactly as if in the Euripus, and do not stay put for any time.<sup>364</sup>

Socrates points out that the first-class arguments in a competition of badness are not very few, unlike the case of human qualities. We are therefore more likely to encounter first-class bad arguments, and hence we are more liable to make mistakes.<sup>365</sup> If we lack expertise in arguments, then the odds for judging arguments incorrectly are higher than the odds for judging humans incorrectly.

Therefore, since Socrates can neither improve his friends' expertise in arguments nor tell them whether an argument is really bad, he can only help his friends by informing them about the realm of arguments. The statistical data states that many arguments are bad; hence we are more likely to fall for bad arguments than bad humans. If many arguments are bad, then we should be prepared only to trust few arguments. Socrates

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<sup>364</sup> *Phd.* 90b3-c6 Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἥ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· —καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.

<sup>365</sup> Rowe 1993, 212.

thus advises his friends to be careful and modest whilst making a judgment about the validity of an argument.<sup>366</sup>

#### 4.3.5 *The Intellectual Vice of Antilogicians*

Let me now consider the qualities of bad arguments. Although Socrates does not make a detailed assessment of this issue, he seems to imply that bad arguments are not ‘sound and firm’.<sup>367</sup> Now, the antilogicians think that there is no firm and sound argument; hence they become misologists. That is, antilogicians come to hate arguments, like a misanthropist who hates all humans by maintaining that there is nothing sound in anyone.<sup>368</sup>

Antilogic is generally understood as ‘causing the same thing to be seen by the same people now as possessing one predicate and now possessing the opposite or contradictory predicate’.<sup>369</sup> As claimed above, if we practice antilogic and believe its results, eventually we will become misologists. That said, practicing antilogic alone might not be an intellectual vice. Besides practicing antilogic, we need to assume that we are very wise, as we have discovered that there is no sound and firm argument. The problem arises out of dealing with arguments used in disputation and putting all our trust in such arguments.

With regards to the passage in the *Republic* discussed above, antilogicians pursue the following procedure, which is an example of intellectual (or epistemic) vice: [1] convincing A by showing that P is true, [2] convincing A by showing that P is false, and [3] then convincing A there is no true and secure argument by repeated practicing of the first two steps.

For Socrates, in the *Republic*, antilogicians seem to maintain a sort of moral scepticism, namely that we can never know whether a moral belief is true or false. By doing so, antilogicians make young guardians suspicious about what is right and

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<sup>366</sup> Sedley (1995, 17) notes that ‘in cooperative dialectic the main danger is not hasty disagreement, but hasty agreement’, and this sort of dialectic is described at *Phd.* 101d.

<sup>367</sup> *Phd.* 90c3-4 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον.

<sup>368</sup> *Phd.* 89e2 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς.

<sup>369</sup> Kerferd 1961, 61. In the *Phaedrus*, ‘to speak on opposite sides (262c5 ἀντιλέγουσιν)’ is defined with an example: ‘Whoever does this [sc. ἀντιλέγειν] artfully makes the same thing appear to the same people sometimes just and sometimes, when he prefers, unjust? (*Phdr.* 261c4-6).’

wrong regarding goodness and justice, according to the *Republic* argument. In the *Phaedo*, too, antilogicians make sound and firm arguments obsolete; therefore, not only does their attitude deprive themselves of truth and knowledge, but those who believe them also suffer from this deprivation.

It is necessary to underline that antilogicians are “particularly (μάλιστα)” at risk, which indicates that antilogicians are not the only people vulnerable to misology. Those who are not antilogicians might also become misologists, though perhaps they are in less danger of misology. That is, some become antilogicians first, then thereby haters of argument. Others might become haters of arguments even if they do not frequently encounter antilogical arguments. The non-antilogicians might still become misologists, as the bad arguments – including antilogical arguments, but also those not limited to them – are in the majority, because one has to possess expertise in arguments to discern bad arguments.

Now, I would like to note that antilogicians do not care about the truth; hence they would not think that the deprivation of truth and knowledge is a great misfortune. That is, antilogicians do not care about truth because they do not believe that there are good arguments and disregard looking for good arguments. Socrates and his friends, on the contrary, care about the truth, and this is the reason why *Phaedo* and others have fallen into a state of epistemic despair once they have heard the interlocutors’ objections to Socrates’ argument.<sup>370</sup> Socrates thus aims to encourage those who care for truth and who are neither antilogicians nor practicing antilogic.

#### ***4.3.6 Epistemic Blame, Arrogance and Modesty***

Socrates lastly explores the outcome of misology and the attitude of misologists towards argument, truth and knowledge:

[T30] ‘Now, *Phaedo*,’ he said, ‘it would be a lamentable fate if there really were some true and firm argument that could be understood, and **(a)** yet from associating with arguments of another sort – the very same ones seeming true at some times but not at others – someone were to blame not himself or his own lack of expertise, **(b)** but instead because of his agitation were to end up gratefully transferring the blame from himself to the arguments, and from that point to spend

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<sup>370</sup> Perhaps except Aeschines of Sphettus. Nails (2002, 5-6) reports that Aeschines is traditionally supposed to be a rhetorician and ‘dubbed as a sophist in Lysias’ speech’.

the rest of his life hating and belittling arguments, deprived of both truth and knowledge about things.<sup>371</sup>

Let me begin by making a distinction between antilogicians and quasi-antilogicians, a distinction which, I submit, is implied above. I think that antilogicians, not unexpectedly, practice antilogic, they do not care about discovering the truth, and they convince others that sound and firm arguments do not exist. Quasi-antilogicians, I argue, desire to attain knowledge and the truth, yet they are deprived of them because of their lack of expertise, or deal with arguments used in disputations, and put their trust in antilogicians and their arguments. I thus suggest that the one (section (a) above) experiencing agitation is a quasi-antilogician while the other (section (b) above) who hates and belittles arguments is an antilogician, and thus already a misologist.

How can we intercept the transition from the quasi-antilogician stage to the antilogician stage? Firstly, we ought to blame ourselves (or hold ourselves responsible) and our lack of expertise in arguments, if we fail to find a sound and firm argument. Secondly, we must stop spending time with antilogicians themselves or with their arguments. Next, we should start dealing with some other sort of argument and follow a different method. Taking these steps would reduce the likelihood of becoming a misologist, which is due to engaging in antilogic without being an antilogician as such. Socrates' friends, I submit, have already taken these two steps. However, antilogic is not the only route to misology.

As mentioned above, antilogicians consider themselves very wise. However, this is a false impression, for antilogicians should blame their lack of expertise instead of their arguments. That is, antilogicians misjudge the object of epistemic blame. Antilogicians incorrectly assume that only they understand that there is no sound and firm argument; hence they incorrectly consider themselves very wise.

Socrates diverges from antilogicians regarding his position towards self-wisdom and self-trust. Unlike antilogicians, Socrates does not claim to be very wise in the

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<sup>371</sup> *Phd.* 90c8-d7 Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λαιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στέρηθείη.

*Phaedo*.<sup>372</sup> Nor is Socrates totally sure whether he has practiced philosophy correctly.<sup>373</sup> Then antilogicians are egotistical, as they think that they are very wise and have discovered the truth about both things and arguments. However, antilogicians, for Socrates, are neither wise nor experts.

The reader should be inclined to see Socrates as an expert thanks to his arguments. Socrates himself does not voice his expertise in arguments, although Socrates comes across as having better arguments. Moreover, Socrates is silent about his expertise in arguments and wisdom. Besides, Socrates is modest regarding the epistemic status of his arguments. As I have often stressed, once Socrates has completed the last proof of the immortality of the soul at the *Phaedo* 107b-c, Simmias decides to keep some doubt in his mind. Socrates, too, encourages Simmias and advises all his friends to consider the arguments more clearly and to analyse them well enough.

#### 4.4 Conclusion

Let me remind the readers of my interpretative framework of Plato's *Phaedo*. I argue that the dialogue has two levels. One consists of Socrates' arguments and demonstrations (first order investigations), while the other contains his reflections on the method of philosophical argument (the metaphilosophical component). This dissertation focuses on the latter component and this chapter explores the contribution of the argument against misology and antilogic to offer new aspects of the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component.

One of the most significant results to emerge from my analysis of the misology argument is that Plato offers some epistemic norms for dealing with arguments. I suggest that the misology argument is neither a digression nor an interlude, but the argument plays an indispensable part in the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical aim, namely providing the correct norms of philosophical argument. As I have stressed earlier, in addition to exploring the proofs of the immortality of the soul, a theory of causation and the method of inquiry *etc.*, Socrates aims at bestowing on his friends the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry/conversation.

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<sup>372</sup> It is tempting to recall Socrates' disavowal of knowledge (or wisdom) in the *Apology* 20d-23b. See also *Euthphr.* 5a3-c8, 15c11-16a4; *Charmides* 165b5-c1, 166c7-d6; *Laches* 186b8-187a8, 200e1-2; *Lysias* 212a4-7, 223b4-8; *Gorg.* 509c4-7.

<sup>373</sup> *Phd.* 69d4-6.

To this end, I investigate the reason for the state of epistemic despair that Socrates' friends have fallen into. The results of my investigation show that one of the aims of the misology argument is to eliminate the fear that there is no sound and steady argument. I argue that the lack of expertise leads to this epistemic fear, yet once we come to possess expertise in arguments, we would realize that our fears are quite groundless. Next, by examining the relationship between misanthropy and misology, I suggest that without possessing expertise we ought not to put all our trust in humans or in arguments. Rather, if we are to escape from becoming misologists and to attain expertise in arguments, we should follow the norms governed by epistemic modesty.

It is now possible to state that epistemic modesty and carefulness are two epistemic norms that would help us to conduct successful philosophical conversation/inquiry. This analysis has also provided a deeper insight into the relationship between antilogic and misology. Although antilogic increases the risk of becoming misologists, ruling it out alone might not be sufficient to escape from misology. If we lack expertise in arguments, not only should we stay away from antilogic (because we might be deceived into believing the results of antilogic), but we also should not put all our trust in argument (because we might be mistaken due to our lack of expertise).

Now, I would like to conclude this chapter by considering a possible objection to my reading. Socrates has a right to put all his trust in an argument, such as the immortality of the soul, even though he has not been able to prove it completely. This is because Socrates is an epistemic authority and his epistemic modesty is only a pedagogical tool by which he encourages his interlocutors to search for themselves.

I submit that Socrates' epistemic modesty is a pedagogical tool. Besides, I argue that epistemic modesty plays a key role in the correct practice of philosophers. In the rest of my conclusion, I review a recent article written by Baima (2015), who argues that the Socrates of the *Phaedo* is an epistemic authority and is speaking from the perspective of a philosopher ruler of Plato's *Republic*. By criticizing Baima's reading, I will try to support my own reading.

Let me begin with explaining Baima's reading briefly. Baima suggests that 'Socrates is a fully accomplished philosopher', he can thus rightly judge whether he should pursue the truth about the immortality of the soul or he should prefer living well at

the expense of the pursuit of knowledge.<sup>374</sup> His interlocutors, on the contrary, are not “epistemic authorities”, as they both lack “the philosophical expertise” of Socrates and their epistemic dispositions are not stable.<sup>375</sup>

Drawing on the philosopher of the *Republic*, who is the only person allowed to lie for the benefit of non-philosophers, Baima claims that the Socrates of the *Phaedo* is a similar epistemic authority; hence he can follow a probable falsehood (or an incomplete argument), namely, the soul is immortal.<sup>376</sup> However, Simmias and Cebes, as they lack the philosophical skill, should not believe in an incomplete argument, because it is so risky for them that they might become “self-deceivers” or “wishful thinkers”.<sup>377</sup> The interlocutors thus should follow the philosophical path, i.e. they should not put all their trust in a probable falsehood. Simmias and Cebes should believe in the immortality of the soul, as this belief makes them value the soul over the body. They nonetheless should try to find better arguments in support of the soul’s immortality.

In addition, by drawing on the education of guardians in the *Republic*, Baima argues that ‘developing skill in arguments before loving the truth is dangerous’ and that the misology argument, too, emphasizes that we need to love the truth first.<sup>378</sup> Although Baima’s stress on the role played by loving the truth is accurate and fitting, the misology argument’s target, as suggested above, is to eliminate the epistemic fear of those who love the truth. As I have also argued, antilogicians would not be agitated if they fail to find sound and firm arguments, for they have already stopped caring about knowledge and the truth. However, quasi-antilogicians, who love the truth, are agitated by their fear of the absence of sound and firm argument; hence they are afraid of failing to discover what they long for, namely truth and knowledge.<sup>379</sup>

Baima next draws our attention to the practical value of the belief that the soul is immortal. For Baima, this belief would motivate us to separate the soul from the body as much as possible and it would convince us to live a philosophical life. This

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<sup>374</sup> Baima 2015, 273.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, 275-278.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, 266-267.

<sup>379</sup> *Phaedo* does not say that we do not love the truth. Rather, he tells Echecrates that ‘we were worried that we might be worthless as judges, or even that the very facts of the matter might merit doubt (*Phd.* 88c6-7)’. In this respect, it would be strange if they were worried about losing something that they neither care about nor love.

practical aspect, Baima suggests, is valuable for both Socrates and his friends. However, unlike Socrates, his friends should continue to look for a better exposition. Since Socrates' interlocutors are not epistemic authorities, as Baima argues, they ought not to believe in an incomplete argument and depart from the way of philosophy (which is to care for truth). That is, instead of firmly believing a probable falsehood, Socrates' friends must discover a complete demonstration about the immortality of the soul.<sup>380</sup>

In support of this interpretation, Baima provides in-depth analysis of the philosopher ruler and the noble lie discussed in the *Republic* 382-389, showing their relevance to the Socrates of the *Phaedo* and his belief about the immortality of the soul. For Baima, the Socrates of the *Phaedo* is allowed to believe that the soul is immortal even if he cannot show it properly, and believing in a falsehood is a right given to epistemic authorities only. Then Baima labels Socrates' attitude as an example of epistemic vice.<sup>381</sup> However, I think that Baima's argument lacks support. Above all, Baima does not provide sufficient philosophical evidence to prove that the Socrates of the *Phaedo* is similar to the philosopher ruler of the *Republic*, apart from the argument that he aims to prove.<sup>382</sup>

Now, let us accept Baima's point about the similarity between the philosopher ruler of the *Republic* and the true philosopher of the *Phaedo*, namely Socrates. I do not think that the concept of epistemic authority is the best way to explain Socrates' final comments on the immortality of the soul at the *Phaedo* 107b-c. Epistemic modesty, as I have been arguing up to this point, is a better way to explain Socrates' final comments.

In general, it seems problematic that epistemic authorities would say that they are believing in falsehoods. In other words, epistemic authorities, as defined by Baima,

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<sup>380</sup> Baima 2015, 274.

<sup>381</sup> 'By "epistemically vicious", I mean a process that commonly or likely results in falsehood such as believing on the basis of little evidence' (*ibid.*, 267 *fn.* 11)'.

<sup>382</sup> Interestingly, Baima (*ibid.*, 277) himself seems to accept this, as he states that these examples [of the *Republic* and of the *Phaedo*] are not perfectly analogous. The other similarity according to Baima (*ibid.*, 278) is as follows: 'Plato's conception of philosophers in the *Republic* is similar to his conception of philosophers in the *Phaedo* in the important respect that in both dialogues philosophers love truth, knowledge, and wisdom, and despise falsehood, wealth, and the things of the body (*Republic* III.416e–417a, V.474b–475c, VI.485c–d, VI.490a–c)'. Be that as it may, it is hardly possible to find a dialogue where Plato does not say these things about philosophers.

should be aware of their lie and persuade others that it is not a lie (or a falsehood) but the truth. Epistemic authorities would not really believe a lie because I cannot believe that X is F when I take X not to be F. In fact, the philosopher rulers of the *Republic* know that they are using a lie, though a noble one, yet Socrates really believes in the immortality of the soul and has no purpose to deceive his interlocutors.

In the *Phaedo*, after the last proof for the immortality of the soul (*Phd.* 107b-c), Socrates neither says that his proofs are complete nor urges his friends to believe it without further ado. Socrates is pleased that his friends, particularly Simmias, are still wondering whether the argument they discussed really works. Rather, Socrates highlights the need of conducting further inquiry.<sup>383</sup>

Although Socrates' comment on the epistemic status of the last proof of the immortality of the soul might not say much about Socrates' ability to pronounce on the soundness of the argument, it shows the reader that it is not our place to say that the argument works or does not work. In addition, Socrates' comment indicates that Socrates considers his interlocutors/friends epistemic peers and believes that they are capable of finding more support for the argument. In this respect, Socrates does not regard himself as an epistemic authority, who firmly trusts his arguments on the basis of little evidence and strays away from the philosophical path.

From a metaphilosophical and meta-dialogical perspective, moreover, Plato emphasizes the importance of epistemic modesty in philosophical inquiry/conversation. He thus portrays Socrates as embracing the norms governed by epistemic modesty. To this end, Plato furnishes Socrates with strong arguments (at least his interlocutors are eventually persuaded to a certain degree), and at the same time presents Socrates to the reader as being careful and modest regarding the

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<sup>383</sup> One of my examiners noted that Socrates does not obviously say that he himself shares Simmias' doubts. If I take it right, my examiner's point is that Socrates believes that his demonstration for the immortality of the soul is complete, but Simmias (who shows some symptoms of misology) and others should enquire further. In a sense, Socrates is not an epistemic tyrant or dictator, as it were, who would bar others from philosophical inquiry. However, we need to observe that neither does Socrates tell Simmias that he has discovered the most sound and firm argument. In this respect, we might also think that Socrates is sharing Simmias' doubts, though perhaps to a lesser degree. I examined the relevant passage (*Phd.* 107b-d) in Chapter 1.

truth of his arguments. This portrayal is presumably a prescription for readers about how to practice philosophy and deal with arguments/counter-arguments.

## Chapter 5: Socrates' Second-Sailing

### 5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have suggested that metaphilosophy is a key component of the *Phaedo*, in addition to first order investigations, as with the nature of the soul and causation, for instance. I argue that philosophical humility is of great value to Plato's metaphilosophy in the *Phaedo*. In Chapter 4, I have pointed out that if we do not have expertise in arguments, we should not put all our trust in arguments and that Plato portrays Socrates, who has expertise in arguments, as following the epistemic norms governed by epistemic modesty. Plato's portrayal of Socrates thus emphasizes the importance of epistemic modesty and carefulness, even though we might have expertise in arguments.

In this chapter, I explore the autobiography of Socrates. I basically divide Socrates' autobiography into two parts, namely the pre-second-sailing phase and the second-sailing phase. In his autobiography, Socrates begins with mentioning his desire to find an explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. In the pre-second-sailing phase, Socrates engages with natural science and Anaxagoras' philosophy. Socrates then goes for the second-sailing once he failed to discover teleological cause. As his attempt to find teleological cause was unsuccessful, he tries again in a different way, namely the second-sailing, to find another explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

Firstly, the second-sailing is generally taken as inferior to the first-sailing. Most scholars assume that the second-sailing analogy refers to taking to the oars in the absence of a wind while the so-called first-sailing refers to sailing with wind. Although I do not categorically reject the difference between the first and the second-sailing, I also suggest that we need to take purpose-relativeness of Socrates' choice into account. That is, sailing with the wind, even with the favourable wind, does not need to be the best in every respect, for taking the oars can sometimes be the better and more feasible option. Then purpose-relativeness should be a concern to better understand the nature of second-sailing.

Secondly, I subscribe to the view that Socrates does not change his philosophical goal in his second-sailing, but adopts a new method to attain the same goal, namely a theory of causation. As we shall see, Socrates needs a theory of causation to prove the immortality and imperishability of the soul. By examining the relevant section

on the Anaxagorean notion of intelligence (*nous*), I show that there are philosophical reasons to maintain that Socrates is *not only* attracted to the notion *nous*, as it explains in terms of what is best (the teleological *aitia*).<sup>384</sup> Besides, Socrates is attracted to the mind's power of explaining causation *universally*.

In this respect, I argue that Socrates' second-sailing was *partially* successful as he discovered a universal theory of causation, namely the theory of Forms. This theory fulfils the notion of universality, as it can explain all natural and mental phenomena, although Socrates is still willing to learn or discover the teleological *aitia*. For now, however, Socrates is partly satisfied with the theory of Forms, for by using this theory he was able to persuade his friends that the soul is immortal.

Thirdly, I offer that second-sailing is not inferior to the first-sailing in every respect. Although the second-sailing refers to a second attempt and *might* be worse in some respects, its association with the first-sailing should be read from the perspective of its purpose. That is, a ship which sets its destination in the second-sailing is not aiming at something worse or different than the primary preference. Rather, I argue that the second-sailing involves a different set of skills.

Fourthly, I argue that the method of the second-sailing is the hypothetical method and its goal is to discover a theory of causation. I also show that the second-sailing is not a mere transitional phase from the immature to mature practice of philosophy. That is, whatever metaphilosophy comes with the second-sailing automatically transfers to the mature stage. The tentativeness implied by the hypothetical method, I conclude, is in line with philosophical humility, which invites us to be careful whilst putting trust in arguments. This tentativeness also allows us to take a more flexible, cautious and open-minded stance before disagreements

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<sup>384</sup> Throughout this chapter, I will either leave *aitia*, *aition* and *aitiai* as untranslated or render them freely, such as reason, explanation or cause. It is a great difficulty to pin down a conclusive rendering. For my purposes, I need not to be precise, as nothing I argue hangs on what *aitia* means. Rather, I scrutinize the way in which Socrates searched for *aitia*. For seminal works on this issue see Vlastos 1969 (*aitia* has both a logical and metaphysical function); Sedley 1998 (τό αἴτιον is the thing responsible for X, which has logical or quasi-logical relation to the effect); Annas 1982 (forms as *aitiai* are explanations, though Plato's original puzzlement is about causal explanation); Frede 1987 (Plato consciously uses *aition* for referring to cause and is an entity, while he refers to *aitia* as an account of *aition*, hence it is the reason or the explanation).

All in all, the nature of second-sailing confirms that Socrates has not abandoned philosophical humility, even during his philosophical maturity, although he has the proper expertise. Besides, it is possible that Socrates' expertise in its current form does not allow him to claim certainty about the theory of Forms and the immortality of the soul; hence he encourages his friends to develop his philosophical method and attain certainty in these matters.

## 5.2 The Meaning of *δεύτερος πλοῦς*

To understand Plato's ideas on philosophical method, we may begin by examining the meaning of the second-sailing (*δεύτερος πλοῦς*). Scholars have defended two different readings until now. The first of these, the ironical reading, does not offer much regarding the epistemology of the second-sailing, for no informative role is given to the analogy. For adherents of this view, Socrates does not think that his method, which is the theory of Forms, is a 'makeshift' or 'a last resort', but Socrates intentionally aims to downgrade the strength of the second-sailing by comparing it ironically with natural science. Nothing hangs on what the meaning of the second-sailing analogy is, as Socrates is not serious and its meaning does not positively contribute to understanding the nature of Socrates' method.<sup>385</sup>

The serious reading, on the contrary, offers a variety of interpretations regarding the meaning of the second-sailing and its influence on understanding the strength of Socrates' method. Scholars have proposed three alternatives on the subject of the second-sailing. It is either the method of hypothesis, or the theory of Forms (or explanations in terms of formal causes), or indirect knowledge. The first alternative claims that Socrates' second-sailing is the second-best since it lacks an unhypothetical principle, 'the unconditioned supremacy of 'the Good'' of the dialectic in the *Republic* VI.<sup>386</sup> That is, the hypothetical method is the second-best,

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<sup>385</sup> Burnet 1911, 108.

<sup>386</sup> Rowe (1992, 95) argues that 'the *Phaedo* does not accord any special place to the Form of the Good; where it is mentioned, it is simply listed along with others (100b5-7, 75c9-d3, 76d8-9; cf. 78d3-4)'. However, Archer-Hind (1883, 36) remarks that 'τὸ βέλτιστον [the highest Good] is postulated as the ultimate αἰτία [cause], to which all other causes are merely subsidiary'. I am inclined to agree with the former view by assuming that if Plato had already in mind the highest Good, we would expect him to make a less ambiguous mentioning of the highest Good. I also think that it is much safer to assume that Plato might have a glimpse of the highest Good in the *Phaedo*, yet he had not established a powerful theory based on it; hence the absence of any clear reference.

as it is tentative and falls short of giving an explanation in terms of an unhypothetical principle.<sup>387</sup>

Those who interpret the second-sailing as the theory of Forms (or the explanation of things in terms of formal causes) claim that it is inferior to teleological explanation. According to this view, since Socrates was deprived of an explanation in terms of what is best, he has resorted to ‘the realm of Forms’.<sup>388</sup> The reading of indirect knowledge points out that Socrates’ method is the second-best since it refers to the indirect grasp of Forms (or things themselves). In other words, having failed to apprehend Forms directly, Socrates has had recourse to ‘concepts’, which are either formed through ‘the observation of phenomena’ or used ‘in place of forms themselves’.<sup>389</sup>

Here, I am not going to challenge each of these interpretations about the second-sailing, rather I focus on their common feature, notwithstanding the divergence of details in the explanations. As we have seen, most of the rival interpretations read *δεύτερος πλοῦς* as the second-best in comparison with the method or explanation that they are offering as *πρῶτος πλοῦς*, i.e. the best. However, the relationship between the literal and metaphorical sense of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* has not attracted much attention. I therefore submit that most scholars have adopted the inferiority thesis without sufficient justification, save for Martinelli Tempesta (2003).

### **5.2.1 Some Ancient Testimonies on *δεύτερος πλοῦς***

The LSJ Greek Lexicon refers to Menander the Comic Poet for a definition of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* and most scholars have hitherto adopted this definition. As a nautical metaphor, *πρῶτος πλοῦς* is considered as the best navigation, which is using sails in a favourable wind. *δεύτερος πλοῦς* is regarded as the second-best option, which is taking the oars, and is used when the wind fails. As the second-sailing seems to refer

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<sup>387</sup> Goodrich 1903, 382-383. See also Scott 2005, 204; Murphy 1936, 46.

<sup>388</sup> Rose 1966, 466-467.

<sup>389</sup> Gaye 1901, 249 and Bluck 1957, 24-25 respectively. See also Hackforth 1955, 138-139. More recently, Benson (2015, 110-111) argues that since a philosopher cannot completely separate the soul from the body during life, he cannot directly view Forms. Therefore, grasping Forms indirectly in the embodied state is the second-best to the direct view of Forms. As we cannot view Forms directly, Socrates needs to find another approach through which we can understand them. I am thus inclined to accept that Socrates’ study of things in *logoi* implies indirectness, yet the indirectness of his method need not to make its outcomes *totally* worse than a direct method.

to the second-best option, it is assumed that the second-sailing implies inferiority.<sup>390</sup>

Allow me to quote the two versions of a fragment of Menander:

[T31] The second-sailing perhaps means if someone fails [to sail] with a fair wind, he sails by taking to the oars.<sup>391</sup>

[T32] The second-sailing perhaps means if someone fails [to sail] at first, he sails by taking to the oars.<sup>392</sup>

A significant analysis on the meaning of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* was conducted by Martinelli Tempesta (2003). In his study, Martinelli Tempesta reviews the ancient literature and finds an overwhelming evidence for the second-best reading. Martinelli Tempesta reported that:

(a) Accepting some ancient testimonies, (1) *δεύτερος πλοῦς* must be understood, as the use of rowing in navigation in case the wind fails; it is therefore a slower and more tiring navigation to which we must turn as a last resort in the absence of better alternative, (2) others regarded *δεύτερος πλοῦς* as an alternative route, long and difficult, which nevertheless reaches its aim.

(b) Regarding the testimony of other ancient sources, the proverb refers to a safer and less risky navigation; the metaphorical expression second-sailing thus would have been connected to the image of the raft (*σχεδία*) proposed by Simmias of *Phd.* 85c-d, and particularly would allude to the *λόγος θεῖος* of *Phd.* 85d4.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>390</sup> Sedley (2004, 10) suggests that we need to take *δεύτερος πλοῦς* simply as second voyage, though he does not argue for this in detail.

<sup>391</sup> *Fragmenta* Fragment 241 *δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχη τις οὐρίου, κόπαισι πλεῖν.*

<sup>392</sup> *Thrasyleon* Fragment 2 *ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχη τις πρῶτον, ἐν κόπαισι πλεῖν.*

<sup>393</sup> According to *Schol. in Phd.* 99c and *Schol. in Plt.* 300c, the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς* means a “safer (ἀσφαλῶς)” course. Burnet (1911, 108) claims that the second sailing refers to ‘a less adventurous course’. Damascius (*Ph. I.* 416) argues that ‘it is easier and simpler to assume and posit prototypes as the causes of sensible things...than it is to understand the final cause’. In the previous section (*Ph. I.* 415), Damascius suggests that ‘the ‘alternative course [the second sailing]’ is after the final cause the exemplary cause’. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 107) argues that Damascius relates the image of the raft to that of the second navigation, inextricably as a second-best in the scope of an axiological scale, not as a safe and successive navigation to a first, that is, Damascius does not refer to a chronological scale. As Martinelli Tempesta suggests, for Damascius the risky navigation is the second sailing, not the first sailing. This is because Damascius says that ‘it [the dialectical argument] is ‘human’ and therefore ‘risky’ and comparable to a ‘raft’, inasmuch as it does not offer the best crossing possible (*In. Ph.* 391)’. Damascius thus does not think that the meaning of the second sailing indicates safety.

(c) The expression would allude to a drastic change in the route or navigation, and someone, without considering the ancient tradition, understood it as a passage indicating a change from the coastal navigation (the method of physiologists) to that of deep-sea (Platonic-Socratic method), which is more audacious.<sup>394</sup>

Martinelli Tempesta's comprehensive philological analysis concluded that it is not possible to accept those interpretations that consider the second-sailing safer than the first one since the meaning of the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς* cannot be this. The conceptual structure that the proverb implies, for Martinelli Tempesta, is the following: there must be a "first" method to reach a goal (the discovery of the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be), which would be the optimum, but because we run into insurmountable limitations, we must be satisfied with a fall-back solution to try to reach the goal, as far as possible.<sup>395</sup>

Here, I am not going to delve into a further philological analysis of *δεύτερος πλοῦς*. The study by Martinelli Tempesta (2003) offers the most comprehensive analysis of *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, and its results should be welcomed. I generally agree with his observation:

The proverb is always used to denote a second-best. It is always a fall-back solution, which is used in the absence of a better one; even when the second-best is an expedient chronologically 'second' to a previous action, which proved to be a failure, it is still something that the subject considers axiologically inferior. The pattern is constant: the first-sailing is optimum, it would be nice to get it, but since it is impossible, or it happens rarely, we must be satisfied with a second-best. The

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<sup>394</sup> Martinelli Tempesta 2003, 92-93. See also *ibid.*, 102.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, 112. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 99-100) stresses that in the scholia on Plato, it is not explicitly mentioned that **'the first voyage is clearly a voyage helped by a fair wind, while the second is voyage in which sailors rely on rowing'**, in contrast to the Menander fragments. Martinelli Tempesta points out that the scholia on Plato only say that after the failure of the first sailing, one starts the second sailing, which can mean many things, for instance, a route better studied, a voyage better prepared, using better equipment, *etc.* There can be several possible reasons for failure, and entrusting with a favourable wind in the first time is *only* one of the several reasons. Therefore, in the absence of a precise indication of this in the text, the hypothesis above in bold seems rather risky. Besides, Martinelli Tempesta (*ibid.*) observes that the editor, who is well-informed on the passage of Menander in which the proverb occurs, omits precisely the section that implies the second-best reading. An operation of this kind, for Martinelli Tempesta, seems to presuppose a precise interpretative aim and it is very probable that the editor of the scholium considers the explanation of Menander incompatible with his own.

idea of security can also exist, but it is always secondary to the second-best and it is never conveyed by the proverbial tradition...<sup>396</sup>

Although one has little choice other than accepting the results of Martinelli Tempesta's philological analysis, I scrutinize whether the axiological relationship between the first and second-sailing is based on only a single value. In other words, I mostly agree with Martinelli Tempesta's hypothesis, albeit with an important qualification, namely purpose-relativeness. In this respect, it is puzzling that many commentators seem to assume that preferring one course of action over another one makes the former option better in every respect. Goodness or efficiency, I submit, may be the ultimate purpose of our choices, yet we also need to ask which things are good (or make something good) and how good they are (or how they make something good).

To illustrate, we might prefer to take a cab to go to dinner not because it is the better option without any qualification, but because it, for instance, is faster than using public transport. If we were to call this the best option, we should have been assuming that speed is the value (hence it makes our choice better by enabling us to arrive quickly). Under different conditions, however, taking a cab might be a safer option, if, for instance, we are returning home late. In this case, the safety is our value (hence it makes our choice better by saving us from the dangers of the night).

Imagine now that if we do not find a cab or do not have enough money to afford it, we have no other choice than using public transport, or perhaps walking. However, the reason why we prefer to take a cab *at first* depends on our initial purpose (and value-judgement) and the reasons of our failure of not taking a cab depend on the circumstances (*e.g.* we have no money, no cab is available, *etc.*). Let me call this sort of axiology "the multi-dimensional second-best reading", in contrast to "the one-dimensional second-best reading", which assumes that the first-sailing is better without considering purpose-relativeness.

Before proceeding to examine the second-sailing, I would like to review an earlier passage which some commentators relate to the second-sailing passage.<sup>397</sup> In the relevant section, Socrates encourages his interlocutors to voice their objections to the affinity argument, as his interlocutors seem reluctant to Socrates. Before

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<sup>396</sup> Martinelli Tempesta 2003, 108.

<sup>397</sup> *E.g.* Kuperus 2007,9; Huby 1959.

presenting his counterargument, Simmias comments on the nature of human knowledge as follows:<sup>398</sup>

[T33] Well, I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that knowing the clear truth about things like this in our present life is either impossible or something extremely difficult, but that all the same not testing from every angle what is said about them, refusing to give up until one is exhausted from considering it in every way, is the mark of an extremely feeble sort of man. Because concerning them one ought surely to achieve one of the following: either to learn or discover how things are, or, if it is impossible to do that, at least to take the best human proposition – the hardest one to disprove – and to ride on that as if one were taking one’s chances on a raft, and to sail through life in that way, unless one could get through the journey with more safety and less precariousness on a more solid vehicle, some divine proposition.<sup>399</sup>

These scholars thus associate Simmias’ thoughts above, about learning and discovering, with Socrates’ following words: ‘I was denied it [the truth is about that sort of cause that is good and binding] and haven’t been able either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else’.<sup>400</sup> It is then suggested that Socrates’ second-sailing is to take hold of the option mentioned by Simmias above, i.e. adopting the best *logos*.<sup>401</sup> I think, however, that although Socrates states that his answer to the *aitia*-question is safer (e.g. it is because of the Beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful), he does not explicitly state whether the second-sailing *itself* is safer or more dangerous.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Socrates tells Simmias that ‘maybe you’re right (*Phd.* 85e1-2)’.

<sup>399</sup> *Phd.* 85c1-d9 ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκратες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὀχήματος, [ἢ] λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.

<sup>400</sup> *Phd.* 99c8-9 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθη καὶ οὐτ’ αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγένετο.

<sup>401</sup> Huby 1959, 13. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 100) states that the editor of the scholia seems to have the above quoted passage in mind when he explains the second sailing. For this reason, Martinelli Tempesta argues that the editor does not look at the immediate context for explaining the second journey, it thus seems to be derived from the wider context of the *Phaedo*, where Socrates repeatedly refers to the safest *logos*.

<sup>402</sup> See *Phd.* 100c9-d3, especially d8 ἀσφαλέστατον, safest. The argument against argument aims at showing us a way to defy the risks of hating arguments. If the

That said, we need to notice that Socrates was afraid of suffering an intellectual blindness, as it were, and preventing this was a reason for the second-sailing.<sup>403</sup> That is, Socrates was afraid of becoming blind due to looking at the sun during the solar eclipse, and he suggested looking at ‘its [the sun’s] image in water or something of the kind’ in order to escape this dangerous and undesired effect, to become completely blinded.<sup>404</sup>

In this respect, a reason for Socrates’ second-sailing is to save himself from blindness. There is a sense of safety stemming from the visual metaphor and this safety is integrated into the second-sailing analogy. That said, we cannot still say that the second-sailing is better without qualification just because it is safer. It is obvious that the second-sailing has *some* redeeming factor, as we go for the second-sailing when the first one did not work out. The second is thus better at least insofar as it brings us to, or nearer to, the goal we wanted to attain.

The second similarity of the words of Socrates and Simmias is that both allude to divinity. As quoted above, for Simmias, finding “some divine proposition”, which he calls “a more solid vehicle” than “the best human proposition”, and embarking on that divine proposition would allow us ‘to get through the journey with more safety and less precariousness’. Socrates, too, implies that he was looking for ‘divine might’,<sup>405</sup> and he would be glad if he had succeeded to discover by himself or to learn from others. That is, *nous* as a principle ordering everything has pleased Socrates, which seems to possess divine might, and thus ‘it is good that intelligence should be cause of everything’.<sup>406</sup>

As matters stand, Simmias thinks that a divine proposition endows us with more safety and less precariousness while Socrates’ second-sailing implies safety and

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second sailing refers to the way in which Socrates deals with arguments, it might be thus considered as a safer journey, as Huby (1959, 12) also suggests.

<sup>403</sup> Sallis (1996, 41-42) emphasizes the significance of ‘an awareness of danger’, and adds that the second sailing indicates ‘an awakening to an ignorance intrinsic to oneself’. This ignorance is about the way in which one should inquire into things rather than ‘an ignorance with regards to this or that’.

<sup>404</sup> *Phd.* 99d4-e1.

<sup>405</sup> *Phd.* 99c2-3 δαίμονιαν ἰσχὺν. As mentioned above, both Simmias and Socrates are talking about divinity. While Simmias refers to a divine *logos*, Socrates refers to *nous*. Sedley (1995, 19) remarks that the lack of divine account drives Simmias away from the search for certainty, and hence he is satisfied with probabilities. Socrates’ method, however, does not seem to make the compromises necessary to maintain its course.

<sup>406</sup> *Phd.* 97c2-4.

escaping danger of becoming blind.<sup>407</sup> From the purpose-relative perspective, the second-sailing can be better with respect to a certain value (or purpose) while the first-sailing can be better with respect to another.<sup>408</sup> While the first-sailing provides stability and more explanatory power, it is not feasible and poses the danger of intellectual blindness. The second-sailing offers safety but it is provisional and more laborious.<sup>409</sup>

### 5.2.2 A Possible Origin of the Strong (Traditional) Second-Best Reading

A possible origin of the strong second-best reading (which I call the traditional reading) of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* might be Plato's *Statesman*.<sup>410</sup> By maintaining that the *Statesman* clearly implies the second-best course, one might argue that the use of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* in the *Phaedo* should indicate the same meaning. Concerning this

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<sup>407</sup> Another use of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* seems to underline the idea of danger and purpose-relativeness too. In the *Philebus*, one of Socrates' interlocutors, Protarchus, says 'I am afraid that this is so. But while it is a great thing for the wise man to know everything, the second best (*δεύτερος...πλοῦς*) is not to be mistaken about oneself (19c1-c3)'. Note that "knowing oneself" is "the second-best" in the sense it will prevent one from falling into "universal confusion (20a3-4 τῶν...τὴν πάντων...ἀπορίαν)". It seems, then, that there is a purpose-relative choice here, which results from the fear of universal confusion. Similarly, in his analysis of another occurrence of *δεύτερος πλοῦς* outside the *Phaedo*, Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 100-101) maintains that Aristotle (*E.N.* 1109a34), in fact, is not saying that the safest way to reach the middle (Aristotle's so-called doctrine of the mean at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1106a26-b28 argues that each ethical virtue is a state intermediate between the state of excess and the state of deficiency) is to stay away from what is the opposite, but that it is difficult to fully reach the middle. One must be thus content to keep away from what is the most opposite, an action which Aristotle calls *δεύτερος πλοῦς*. In a sense, for Martinelli Tempesta (*ibid.*), as it is difficult to fully reach the middle, the second-best option is to stay away from the extremities, if we would like to become as virtuous as possible. Our purpose (or value) is to achieve the state of virtue, hence we act from the perspective of this purpose (or value).

<sup>408</sup> 'The notion that the acquisition of truth can never be regarded as something absolute or definitive does not imply that there is no truth at all; rather, it suggests that truth manifests itself to man – at any rate to the degree that he is confined to the temporal dimension – as the "least refutable [*Phaedo*, 85c9-d1]" conclusion reached by the enquiry so far, and not as an irrefutable outcome beyond which there is nothing more to seek' (Trabattoni 2016, 217). Trabattoni's point is compatible with my claim that epistemic modesty suggests that we recognize the fallibilities of our cognitive abilities, rather than putting all our trust in an argument or suspending judgement.

<sup>409</sup> Freydberg 2013, 200. As suggested above, the idea of safety does not directly stem from the second sailing analogy, but from Socrates' fear of becoming blinded.

<sup>410</sup> For instance, Hackforth 1955, 137. Rowe (1992, 90) also claims that 'the phrase 'second voyage', as *Politicus* 300c seems to confirm, has connotations of 'second-best'.

reading, I must admit that the *Statesman* passage seems to favour the strong second-best reading, at least it is more explicit than the *Phaedo*, as the former refers to “the first choice (τὸ πρῶτόν)” and “the next rightest and finest (ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστ’ ἔχον ὡς δεύτερον)” of government.<sup>411</sup> On the face of it, alluding to the *Statesman* is quite reasonable, for a Greek reader would easily notice the strong second-best connotation if its use in the *Statesman* is well-attested at that time.

Now, in the relevant section of the *Statesman*, it is argued that the kingly man possesses wisdom and expert knowledge; hence he can amend the laws for the better. The kingly man is thus the best-choice for government, the next-best is to govern strictly with respect to the intelligent laws devised by the kingly man. The government of the kingly man is the best because ‘law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just (τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιοτάτον)<sup>412</sup> for all and always, and so prescribe what is best (τὸ βέλτιστον) always for everyone’.<sup>413</sup>

Then it seems that good ruling comes from intelligence. If a city has a kingly man, it would be best as he can react to changing circumstances. In case of the absence of a kingly man, the city needs to rely on the intelligence embodied in the law. The intelligence encapsulated in the law, however, would only govern finely and justly inasmuch as the circumstances stand still. In this respect, the intelligent law is the second-best as it might fail to react to new situations: the intelligent law is limited time-wise and in scope.

Therefore, there is need to pay heed to the possible connotation that the second-sailing can be as good as the first-sailing inasmuch as the conditions do not change. The *Statesman* also mentions ‘for all’ and ‘for everyone’. This is not about a change of general conditions, but about special circumstances. Moreover, as noted above, Socrates has resorted to the second-sailing as he was not able to either learn ‘an explanation in terms of intelligence (*nous*) and according to what is best’ from someone else, or to find it by himself. Now, consider the difference between the intelligent king and the intelligent law concerning governing: it is possible that Socrates’ second-sailing can fail under new circumstances, for he cannot function as

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<sup>411</sup> *Pol.* 300e1-6. cf. 300c2 where δεύτερος πλοῦς is referring to the section discussed at present.

<sup>412</sup> Considering that ἄριστος can mean that best in any way, it can be taken, for instance, as the most useful. LSJ s.v. I.1. e.g. ἄριστον πόλει Euripides *Fragment* 194.

<sup>413</sup> *Pol.* 294a10-b3.

a man ‘making use of his intelligence’.<sup>414</sup> That said, as far as it can explain corruption and generation, Socrates’ method is as good as the first choice, though he cannot be sure that it would work always and for all cases.<sup>415</sup>

The relationship between the *Statesman* and the *Phaedo* might be problematic, because it presumes that the meaning of the second-sailing can be lifted from the *Statesman* and simply transferred to the *Phaedo*. My aim, however, is not to bring material outside the *Phaedo* and support my reading. Rather, my point is that even if the material from the *Statesman* is used to understand the meaning of the second-sailing in the *Phaedo*, as some scholars do, it can support both the one-dimensional and the multi-dimensional reading.

In this respect (if I am right in stressing that there is no explicit evidence for the one-dimensional second-best reading), some scholars must, on the one hand, have begun examining the second-sailing with the assumption that teleological explanation is superior to formal explanation.<sup>416</sup> On the other hand, others must have believed that an explanation based on an unhypothetical principle is better than that which is based on a hypothesis.<sup>417</sup> Then scholars seem to presuppose, before interpreting the second-sailing passage, that either an explanation based on the unhypothetical principle or teleological explanation is superior to the sort of explanation discovered in the second-sailing.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> *Phd.* 98b8-9 ‘I was swept away from my marvellous expectations, for as I went on reading it [Anaxagoras’ book] I saw the man [Anaxagoras] making no use of his intelligence’. Here, Socrates seems to use ‘intelligence’ in two senses: “Anaxagoras’ intelligence” and “cosmic intelligence”. See Rowe 1993, 236.

<sup>415</sup> As frequently mentioned in this dissertation, the proofs for the immortality of soul and the theory of Forms need further analysis. For Socrates, his friends need to consider the hypotheses more clearly even if they find them trustworthy now. In a sense, then, the hypotheses are working well for now but they are not so good that we can stop searching for anything further. Besides, allow me to remind the readers of the criticism made in the *Parmenides* (which I will briefly discuss in my epilogue) against Socrates’ answer to the explanation of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, namely the theory of Forms. Like the city governed by the intelligent laws rather than the intelligent king, the theory of Forms will eventually fail to answer some questions, if it would not be amended, say, by an intelligent king.

<sup>416</sup> See e.g. Rose 1966.

<sup>417</sup> See e.g. Bluck 1955, App. VI.

<sup>418</sup> Benson (2015, 105-106) argues that the distinction is not between two methods of inquiry into the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, but the answers given to that question. That is, explaining in terms of formal causes is the second-best in comparison with teleological explanation.

As mentioned above, the fragments on which the traditional reading is based do not plainly imply that taking to the oars is completely inferior than sailing with the favourable wind. I also think that scholars generally overlook the concept of purpose-relativeness: the method of δεύτερος πλοῦς, for Socrates, should be compatible with human cognitive abilities, and this method should endow us with the technique for discovering knowledge and the truth.<sup>419</sup> Although the first-sailing provides a particular philosophical technique, it is not compatible with our abilities to know; hence it fails to grant a teleological explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

### 5.3 Δεύτερος πλοῦς in the *Phaedo*

I argue that the multi-dimensional reading takes the various factors into account while the one-dimensional one only focuses on the axiological relationship without considering the possibility of various purposes inherent to Socrates' goal. Since Socrates was afraid of becoming blind, he has preferred to follow a different course of action, namely his second-sailing. I have also suggested that it is not safe to assume that the second-sailing is worse in every respect, but that the second-sailing offers something more positive than the traditional reading of the second-sailing.

To understand the more positive connotations of the second-sailing, I have also emphasized that we need to consider the idea of purpose-relativeness. In what follows, I show that the second-sailing is an inevitable reaction to those confusions and absurdities caused by the Anaxagorean philosophy and natural science. I will then argue that the method of the second-sailing signifies how Socrates practices philosophy (i.e. both the method of hypothesis and Socrates' reflection on the right method of philosophical argument), rather than the outcome of this practice (i.e. the theory of Forms).<sup>420</sup>

#### **5.3.1 The pre-Second-sailing Period**

One of the most interesting passages of the *Phaedo* is the so-called autobiography section. In this section, Socrates relates to his interlocutors a part of his intellectual journey, which is about his study of the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

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<sup>419</sup> McCabe (1994, 29-30) notes that 'our capacity and the structure of the world should coincide'. Since we cannot change how the world really is, we should discover the accurate and 'real' aspect in the world's structure to which we have epistemic access.

<sup>420</sup> Benson 2015, 106.

Socrates' studies had begun with the examination of 'the sort of wisdom that they call research into nature', and he concluded the first phase of his studies (the pre-second-sailing phase) once he had finished his investigation of Anaxagoras' philosophy.<sup>421</sup> After that, Socrates has started his second-sailing in search of the cause.<sup>422</sup>

During his studies on research into nature (or natural science), Socrates came to feel that he was 'uniquely unqualified for this inquiry'. As evidence for his incompetence, Socrates says, 'I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry with regard to the very things that, at least as I and others supposed, I had previously known clearly that I unlearned those very things that earlier I had thought I knew'.<sup>423</sup> Next, Socrates tells his interlocutors why he stopped studying natural science:

[T35] I can no longer persuade myself that by using this approach [of research into nature] I know why one comes to be, nor, in short, why anything else comes to be, or perishes, or is. Instead I throw together on impulse my own different kind of approach, and I don't adopt this one at all.<sup>424</sup>

After this, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he heard someone reading from Anaxagoras' book and what he heard attracted his attention.<sup>425</sup> Now, it is important to observe that when Socrates heard Anaxagoras, Socrates had already discovered a Socratic approach post-natural-scientists.<sup>426</sup> I think that the present tense [throw

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<sup>421</sup> This story starts at *Phd.* 96c2 and ends at 99c6.

<sup>422</sup> *Phd.* 99c6ff.

<sup>423</sup> *Phd.* 96c3-6 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ὥμην εἰδέναι. The blindness metaphor re-emerges in the second sailing passage. On that occasion, Socrates was afraid of becoming 'wholly (*Phd.* 99e2 παντάπασιν) blinded'.

<sup>424</sup> *Phd.* 97b3-7 οὐδέ γε δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἑμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

<sup>425</sup> *Phd.* 97b8.

<sup>426</sup> Rowe (1993, 234) argues that Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας at *Phd.* 97b8 suggests that 'we return to the past'. At the time of conversation presented in the *Phaedo*, Socrates is no longer interested in Anaxagoras' philosophy, although Socrates might still be glad to learn explanations in terms of *nous* and what is best. Besides, at *Phd.* 96e5-7 Cebes asks Socrates 'now what do you think about them [to become more numerous, to seem to be larger]?', and Socrates replies to him 'I'm no doubt a long way indeed from thinking that I know the cause of any of these'. Socrates cannot explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of natural science, yet he has a theory of his own (the theory of Forms), as we shall see later at *Phd.* 100-107, which Socrates discovered through his own approach.

together (*φύρω*) and adopt (*προσίεμαι*)] that Socrates uses whilst mentioning his own approach implies that Socrates is *still* following that approach.<sup>427</sup> Socrates might have developed this approach since then, though in these early periods he may not have yet achieved a wholly systematic approach.<sup>428</sup>

In this respect, Anaxagoras should have attracted Socrates partly because Anaxagoras seemed to offer a more systematic and comprehensive answer to the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, unlike Socrates' impulsively thrown together approach. Socrates' expectation for a more comprehensive answer, I think, is one of the reasons Socrates thought that 'I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things who fitted my own intelligence'.<sup>429</sup>

Turning now to the second-sailing analogy, it seems that Socrates prefers to count on another method. Firstly, Socrates does not seem to have been able to learn that sort of cause from someone else or to find it by himself.<sup>430</sup> Secondly, Socrates still wishes to learn this particular sort of cause, hence he might prefer such a cause over what he discovered in his second-sailing; or perhaps he might combine his own theory of causation with the sort he expected to find in Anaxagoras' philosophy.

If Socrates still prefers to learn what is good and binding, that sort of theory of causation should offer some additional content and explanation to his own discovery. In brief, Socrates gave up searching for the teleological ideal, as neither Anaxagoras nor he himself could work out that ideal. Socrates therefore decided to follow a different kind of approach to the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

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<sup>427</sup> Burnet (1911, 103) claims that Socrates' words are ironical. However, Archer-Hind (1883, 129) supports a mitigated reading: although Socrates does not think that his method is inferior to natural science, it is still incomplete and less comprehensive.

<sup>428</sup> *Phd.* 97b6-7. See εἰκῇ φύρω at b7. Gower (2008, 342) finely points out that calling it a jumble is an incentive for Socrates's interlocutors 'to reveal a systematic philosophical position'. This idea is stressed at *Phd.* 107b5-9, where Socrates encourages his interlocutors to follow the argument 'as far as a human being can follow', and 'should this itself become clear, then you won't seek anything further'.

<sup>429</sup> *Phd.* 97d6-7.

<sup>430</sup> Socrates says, 'I would gladly become anyone's pupil to learn just what the truth is about that sort of cause [what is good and binding] (*Phd.* 99c6-7 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τριαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὅτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην)'.

### 5.3.2 Anaxagoras' Nous

I would like to begin by reviewing Anaxagoras' philosophy, as presented in the *Phaedo*.<sup>431</sup> Most of all, Anaxagoras, for Socrates, was peculiar because of his introduction of intelligence (*nous*), which orders everything and is the reason for everything.<sup>432</sup> Although Socrates would later notice that Anaxagoras was no different than natural scientists in explaining things,<sup>433</sup> in the beginning *nous* as the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be seemed good to Socrates.<sup>434</sup> But in what sense did *nous* seem good? Did the *initial* attraction stem from the fact that *nous* explained coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of what is best, or was it from the fact that *nous* could explain everything at once and universally, or was it both?<sup>435</sup>

It is generally assumed that Socrates became fascinated by Anaxagoras' idea of *nous* because it seemed to offer an explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, in terms of what is best (teleological explanation).<sup>436</sup> I do not oppose the idea that to explain a phenomenon by means of *nous* is teleological, since *nous*, for Socrates, is

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<sup>431</sup> It is hard to say whether Plato does justice to Anaxagoras's philosophy. At any rate, whether Plato makes a charitable reading is not relevant for my purposes. See Sedley 2008, 21-24 & 89-92.

<sup>432</sup> *Phd.* 97c1-2 νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος.

<sup>433</sup> *Phd.* 98b7-c2.

<sup>434</sup> *Phd.* 97c3.

<sup>435</sup> Here, I refer to a universal theory of explanation, such as Newton's theory of gravitation which would explain 'the phenomena of the heavens and of our seas by the force of gravity (Newton, *Principia*, General Scholium)'. However, Newton refuses to explain what it is that operates gravity in this way, yet he only expounds the laws by which gravity operates. On the contrary, we might imagine that Socrates would expect to learn why gravity operates in that way, and an explanation in terms of *nous* should tell us why it is best for gravity to operate in that way.

<sup>436</sup> For instance, Sedley (2007, 24) argues that 'Anaxagoras is a creationist in a much stronger sense than Plato was prepared to recognize' and that '*Nous*, like human farmers, makes the earth grow all kinds of things, but we may infer that it does so for the sake of the best things to emerge from it'. Sedley's claim about creationism thus goes even beyond teleology. It is about whether a divine force plays a role in the becoming or maintaining of the universe. Graham (2009) suggests this is not the case, whether or not Anaxagoras goes in for teleology. In his review of Sedley's work, Graham (2009, 426) states: 'Anaxagoras is never explicit about a creator god; what he says is the *nous* started a vortex motion (B12). He hints that there was method in his action, and asserts that *nous* exercises control, but he also says that the revolution causes all the separations, as if the results were automatic.' Caston (2017, 28-29) suggests that 'although *nous* does not, at least explicitly, provide the sort of specific, good-directed explanation that Socrates wished, Anaxagoras has not eliminated teleology even as he utilizes physical explanations.' Here, my claim is not that we cannot discover the idea of teleology if we scrutinize Anaxagoras' fragments. Rather, my point is that Socrates might be attracted to the idea of *nous* as it also explains phenomena universally, besides explaining them teleologically.

supposed to order ‘in whatever way is best’.<sup>437</sup> Rather, my point is that Socrates was *also* attracted by the way in which *nous* can explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, namely universally and systematically, in addition to how mind should explain, teleologically and in terms of what is best.<sup>438</sup>

Here, I quote the passage where Socrates explains his attraction to Anaxagoras and why he was pleased with Anaxagoras’ idea of intelligence:

[T36] However, one day I heard somebody reading from what he said was a book by Anaxagoras, and saying that it turns out to be intelligence that both orders things and is cause of everything. I was pleased with this cause, and it struck me that in a way it is good that intelligence should be cause of everything, and I supposed that, if this is the case, when intelligence is doing the ordering it orders everything and assigns each thing in whatever way is best.<sup>439</sup>

As I suggested above, Socrates had already adopted his own method of inquiry and decided not to follow the approach of natural science before he heard someone reading from a book by Anaxagoras. Socrates should have initially thought that Anaxagoras would not follow the approach of natural science, as Socrates tells his interlocutors that ‘I don’t adopt this one [the approach of natural science] at all’.<sup>440</sup>

Now, I believe that Socrates could not have heard from someone reading Anaxagoras’ book as to how *nous* is used to explain the ordering of everything and how each thing is assigned in terms of what is best. That is, Socrates did not know what Anaxagoras’ teleological explanations are *at that point*, and this is implied by the use of an indefinite clause, ‘in whatever way is best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ)’, since Socrates did not yet know the operations of intelligence.

Socrates thus heard (1) that Anaxagoras uses *nous* to explain *all* coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and (2) he thought that *nous* should explain everything in teleological terms. (2) is the result of Socrates’ own reflection, and he expects from Anaxagoras

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<sup>437</sup> *Phd.* 97c5-6.

<sup>438</sup> McCabe (2015, 88-89) finely remarks that ‘what Socrates hoped for was an entirely systematic and exhaustive account of the universe...Anaxagoras’ theory failed where Socrates’ answer succeeds,’ which is ‘its simplicity, its economy’.

<sup>439</sup> *Phd.* 97b7-c6 Ἀλλ’ ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ.

<sup>440</sup> *Phd.* 96b3f.

an account in terms of (2). In fact, Socrates says ‘if this [(1)] is the case (*εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει*)’, then intelligence should order in terms of what is best. Simply, Socrates first accepted the proposition that intelligence should order things and be the cause of everything, then he supposed that intelligence should order according to what is best.<sup>441</sup>

If Socrates heard neither about a detailed reflection on the idea of teleology nor about particular teleological explanations, teleology could not be the *only* source of attraction. Otherwise, we need to assume that Socrates was interested in teleology, then he heard about a cause (i.e. *nous*), which Socrates thinks could teleologically explain things. Although it is not totally implausible that Socrates was interested in teleology before Anaxagoras, nothing in the relevant passage indicates that this is the case. We only know that Socrates adopted a method of his own and it is different than that of natural science.

By saying this, I do not mean that an explanation according to *nous*, for Socrates, is not linked with an explanation in terms of what is best. For Socrates, *nous* should give teleological explanations. In fact, after reading the book itself, Socrates saw ‘the man [Anaxagoras] making no use of his intelligence and not laying any causes at its door with regard to ordering things’.<sup>442</sup> Therefore, Socrates could not have heard about particular teleological explanations from Anaxagoras, since Anaxagoras, for Socrates, did not have any, but Socrates is fascinated by the simple fact that Anaxagoras offers intelligence to explain all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and in doing so Anaxagoras would consider what is best for each.<sup>443</sup>

### 5.3.3 The Search for Universal Explanation

If I am right about the conditional relationship between *nous* and particular teleological explanations, we should look at another aspect of the idea of *nous* to

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<sup>441</sup> Mason (2013, 205) notes that Plato’s idea of *nous* in the *Phaedo* is more comprehensive than that of Anaxagoras. For Mason, Plato’s idea of *nous* is ‘the demand of a fundamentally moral universe that may serve as a model and basis for human morality and moral betterment’.

<sup>442</sup> *Phd.* 98b7-c1.

<sup>443</sup> It is also probable that Anaxagoras, for Socrates, gave a wrong account about *nous*. Desjardins (1988, 118) claims that the true account should take *nous* as a principle which orders everything in terms of what is best. In any case, this does not undermine my reading since Socrates could not have known the details of Anaxagoras’ *nous* before reading the whole book.

understand why it seemed good to Socrates that *nous* should be the cause of everything, besides *nous* being teleological. My answer is that an explanation in terms of *nous* is a universally applicable theory. What I mean by universal is that Anaxagoras' idea of *nous* pertains to a single theory that is supposed to explain each and every coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

Consider now the following statements: [a] 'when he [Anaxagoras] assigned the cause [intelligence] to each of them and in common to them all, he would also explain what was best for each, and the good common to them all (*Phd.* 98b1-3)'. [b] 'It is because of intelligence that Socrates does everything that he does (*Phd.* 98c3-4)'. The idea of explaining everything is in both quotations, and this, I think, implies that Socrates expects Anaxagoras to offer a universal theory of explanation that can account for each and every coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

As I shall discuss in detail further below, Socrates offers the Form-Cause Hypothesis to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.<sup>444</sup> I submit that the Form-Cause Hypothesis satisfies the epistemological requirement that Socrates discovered during his study of Anaxagoras' idea of *nous*. The theory of Forms can account for how each thing (*e.g.* a flower) comes to have a particular attribute (*e.g.* being beautiful): 'it is because of a Beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful (100d7-8)'.<sup>445</sup>

It is true that the form of Beautiful does not explain why a large thing is large. However, the generic Form-Cause Hypothesis fulfils the epistemological

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<sup>444</sup> Scholars offer two alternative readings for Socrates' *initial* hypothesis which he appeals to later in the dialogue: [1] the Form-Hypothesis, and [2] the Form-Reason Hypothesis. The latter is defended by Gallop (1975, 179-182): (i) 'hypothesizing that beautiful, good, large, and other Forms exist [100b5-7]' and (ii) 'particular things are beautiful, large, etc. because they participate in corresponding Forms' is 'the Form-Reason Hypothesis' as a whole, and this is Socrates' initial hypothesis. The former is adopted by Benson (2015, 195): 'the answer to the original question—that is, the *aitia* thesis—is obtained from the Form-Hypothesis, or the being of Forms. That is, for Benson, Socrates' *aitia* thesis '(the F itself is the *aitia* of x's being F)' agrees with his Form-Hypothesis, and hence...the Form-Hypothesis has already been used at least twice, namely in Socrates' defence speech (*Phd.* 65d3-66e4) and in the recollection argument (*Phd.* 72e3-78b3)'. However, neither of these cases can be considered as a proper application of the method of hypothesis. In this respect, I presume that the search of *aitia* of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is the first proper application of the Form-hypothesis. Then I think that the Form-Cause hypothesis (the conjunction of 'Forms exist, which are objects of knowledge' and 'Forms are causes of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be') is a new hypothesis, through which Socrates aims at explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

<sup>445</sup> *Phd.* 100d7-8.

commitment: it is because of the Form of F that all F-things are F (the safe-answer).<sup>446</sup> This is a single principle that explains everything. Even though Socrates later replaces the safe-answer with the safe-and-subtler answer, this second answer also offers a universally applicable explanation: ‘x is [odd] because, being G [trio], it must participate in Γ [the Form of three]; and since Γ entails Φ [oddness], x must also participate in Φ, and hence x must be F’.<sup>447</sup>

To sum up, Socrates was attracted by the idea of *nous* both as a teleological cause and as a universally applicable theory. The idea of universality is *another* source of appeal, besides Socrates’ attraction to the teleology in Anaxagoras’ idea of *nous*.<sup>448</sup> Although Socrates did not learn or discover how teleology works exactly, he is attracted by the teleological ideal. That is, Socrates did not exactly know how a teleological cause should operate before reflecting on Anaxagoras’s philosophy in detail, and even after reading the book Socrates failed to find a theory of causation based on the teleological ideal.

As suggested above, the idea of *nous* was attractive because it provides both a teleological ideal and a universally applicable theory that can explain each and every coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Then Socrates expected that Anaxagoras would use *nous* in this way to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.<sup>449</sup> Nevertheless, like natural scientists, Anaxagoras eventually credited ‘airs, aethers, waters and many other absurdities’ as causes; thus Socrates was disappointed again.<sup>450</sup>

Now, if the universal explanatory power of *nous* pulled Socrates towards Anaxagoras’ philosophy, besides its teleological aspect, Socrates’ aim in the second-

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<sup>446</sup> *Phd.* 100c8-e3.

<sup>447</sup> *Phd.* 105b5-c7. The formulation is taken from Vlastos (1969, 317).

<sup>448</sup> Sedley (1989, 260) observes that for Plato explaining in terms of ‘why it is better’ and explaining ‘in terms of *nous*’ refer to the same type of explanation. Then if an explanation in terms of *nous* does not involve good-directedness, I presume that such an explanation cannot be properly called teleological; hence the reason of its failure.

<sup>449</sup> Socrates also says that ‘I beheld a man who did not use his mind (ἄνδρα τῷ...νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον *Phd.* 98b8-9).’ It seems that not only does Anaxagoras fail to use *nous* (as cosmic mind), but the way in which he argues for this theory lacks the use of *nous* (as the intelligence of an individual). However, the idea is not that Anaxagoras is not intelligent enough to use *nous* in his theory, for it would mean that neither is Socrates, as he also fails to find. Rather, the point is that Socrates is aware of the limits of his own intelligence and of his inability to use *nous* (as cosmic mind) properly. See Rowe 1993, 235-236; Sedley 2008, 90.

<sup>450</sup> *Phd.* 98c1-2 ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.

sailing could also be in discovering a theory that explains coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be universally. He can thus satisfy himself partially, as he was not able to learn or discover an explanation in terms of what is best.<sup>451</sup> In what follows, I explore what Socrates did to satisfy himself; what Socrates' refuge in *logoi* was; whether the second-sailing was worse than the first-sailing in every respect; and to what extent Socrates is satisfied with his discovery.

### 5.3.4 Socrates' Refuge

I would like to begin by remarking that Socrates' second-sailing is something involuntary, which is the reasonable connotation of the phrase taking refuge.<sup>452</sup> Taking refuge is to escape something undesirable, like refugees running out of their countries to seek asylum in a safe country, and we would not escape unless we are forced to do so, say, because of war, persecution or hunger. Now, in like manner, Socrates took refuge in *logoi* for he was afraid of becoming 'totally blind'.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>451</sup> Sedley (1998, 126-127) notes that the Platonic idea of causation rests on the principle that 'like causes like'. Then teleological causation, for Sedley, is 'a special application' of formal causation, according to which, for instance, 'the beautiful itself is the cause of all beautiful things.' If so, the teleological idea is 'good bringing about the good'.

<sup>452</sup> At *Phd.* 99e2, Socrates described his feelings as he went on reading Anaxagoras' book: 'I was swept away from my marvellous expectations (Ἀπὸ...θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος...ᾧχώμην φερόμενος). φερόμενος in the passive means (*LSJ* II.1.), among other senses, to be carried away "involuntarily". Gower (2008, 338-340) argues that Socrates' disappointment emphasizes the problem of believing in authorities. Socrates, as Gower suggests, "disproportionately" hopes to find an answer from "an authoritative thinker". For Gower, the idea of disproportionate hope is related to the misology argument, where Socrates emphasizes the danger of putting all our trust in argument, if we lack expertise in arguments. However, Socrates does not seem to put all his trust in Anaxagoras. On the contrary, once Socrates has finished reading Anaxagoras' book, he immediately stopped trusting him. The point, I think, is that Socrates does not make hasty judgements before studying closely, though he is willing to learn at the same time. Completely trusting authorities and being optimistic about someone's proposal are different. The latter is positive since it urges us to listen and to inquire. The former is negative because extreme trust either hinders us to do further inquiry or results in hating arguments. The *Phaedo*, as I argue, exemplifies the latter.

<sup>453</sup> 'I might be wholly blinded in my soul (*Phd.* 99d3 παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν)'. As we have seen, as a result of natural science, Socrates said 'I was utterly blinded' (*Phd.* 96c5 σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη). In the latter case, Socrates *actually* suffered from blindness but was cured of it, as the aorist ἐτυφλώθη suggests. In the former case, however, Socrates has not suffered from blindness, but he worried that he might be wholly blinded, as the optative (of secondary sequence) τυφλωθείην suggests. Moreover, the first occurrence of the blindness analogy is qualified by σφόδρα, which implies an utter or severe case, while the second is παντάπασιν; hence

Once Socrates had finished discussing his criticism of Anaxagoras' philosophy, he offered Cebes a display of his own second-sailing to find an *aition* of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be as follows:

[T37] But since I was denied it [what is good and binding] and haven't been able either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else, would you like me to give you a demonstration, Cebes, of how I've pursued my second voyage in search of the cause?<sup>454</sup>

Although I agree that *ταύτης* at *Phaedo* 99c8 is the teleological cause,<sup>455</sup> I do not think that *τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν* is contrasted with *ταύτης*, in the sense that the second-sailing has its own cause inferior to the teleological cause.<sup>456</sup> As suggested above, I think that the second-sailing refers to the method of hypothesis and its outcome is the theory of Forms. As the method of hypothesis operates with provisional arguments, its current result, namely the theory of Forms, is provisional and lacks stability; hence Socrates urges his friends to inquire into it further.<sup>457</sup> This, however, does not necessarily imply that the theory of Forms is worse than a more stable theory (which is probably a theory using teleological explanations) in every respect, inasmuch as the theory of Forms enables us to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

Now, Socrates decided to 'take refuge in *logoi*' (a phrase which refers to theoretical investigations) and hypothesizes (a) 'that there are such things as a Beautiful alone

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the case of absolute or total blindness. It is thus understandable why Socrates decided to begin his second sailing when he was faced with the prospect of total blindness, rather than just after its onset.

<sup>454</sup> *Phd.* 99c8-d2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης [99c5 sc. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον] ἐστερήθην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὃ Κέβης;

<sup>455</sup> *ταύτης* at *Phd.* 99c8 refers to τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας (that sort of cause) at *Phd.* 99c6, and then goes back to τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον (what is good and binding) at *Phd.* 99c5. In addition, *ταύτης* is the object of ἐστερήθην (I was denied), and 'with the implied change of case, of the infinitives εὐρεῖν, μαθεῖν' (Vlastos 1969, 296-297 & *fn.* 15).

<sup>456</sup> Wiggins (1986, 3) claims that Socrates "was denied" by stressing the aorist so that it does not mean that Socrates has given up the search for teleological explanations. For Wiggins, such interpretation needs the perfect tense.

<sup>457</sup> Not unexpectedly, I again allude to *Phd.* 107a-c. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 122) finely points out that the possibility of a sceptical drift is excluded for Plato, because, at least, there can be no doubt about the real existence of the supersensible world, i.e. the realm of Forms. This is the region for which, despite the fragility and the structural weakness that the *logos* carries, it is worthwhile to venture into the streets to deal with research, as Socrates later says, 'for fair is the risk (*Phd.* 114d6)'.

by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest', (b) 'it is because of the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful', (c) 'what...makes the thing hot...is fire', (d) 'it will never have the nerve to admit the coldness and continue to be just what it was, fire, as well as cold'. Here, I think that each of the four components is a *logos* (proposition) that Socrates hypothesizes, and, through them, Socrates offers the *logos* (theory) of Forms (or the Form-Cause Hypothesis), by which Socrates explains coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.<sup>458</sup>

Now, as suggested above, the second-sailing and the first-sailing aim at the same destination, namely finding *aitia*; the former is more demanding, yet safer, as Socrates aims to escape intellectual blindness through the second-sailing. I also presume that Anaxagoras' *nous* is not an object of inquiry as such, but it is a higher principle in terms of which the objects of inquiry (*e.g.* the earth and its position) are explained.<sup>459</sup>

In what follows, I suggest that Socrates' second-sailing does not have new objects of inquiry. Rather, it has a different set of rules which are used to explain phenomena (the method of hypothesis), as well as new principles in terms of which phenomena are explained (the theory of Forms). That is, Socrates offers a new approach to examine things, and so to speak sailing with a different method, while the aim of second-sailing is to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of another universal theory of explanation, which will be the theory of Forms.

## 5.4 The Meaning of Socrates' *Logoi*

### **5.4.1 Inquiry in the Second-sailing**

I would like to begin by quoting the section about Socrates' refuge in *logoi* to understand Socrates' aim and method in the second-sailing:

[T39] 'Well then,' said Socrates, 'I decided after that, when I'd given up looking into things, that I must make sure I didn't suffer the fate of those who view and study the sun in an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes, I believe, if they don't study its image in water or something of the kind. I too had that sort of

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<sup>458</sup> Here, I clearly take the liberty of translating *logos*. As most of the commentators (*e.g.* Hackforth 1955, 138; Gallop 1976, 177-178) note, it is hard to find an English word which would suit the different meanings of *logos*.

<sup>459</sup> See *Phd.* 97d7-98a6. Sedley (1989, 361-62) suggests that the myth of the *Phaedo* (107ff.) tries to explain the shape of the earth and its position in the cosmos that Socrates expected to find in Anaxagoras' book.

thought, and I started to worry that I might be utterly blinded in my soul through observing things with my eyes and seeking to get hold of them with each of my senses. So I decided that I should take refuge in theories and arguments and look into the truth of things in them. Now maybe in a way it does not resemble what I'm comparing it to. For I don't at all accept that someone who, when studying things, does so in theories and arguments, is looking into them in images any more than someone who does so in facts'.<sup>460</sup>

A significant question arises regarding the reading of the phrases *τὰ ὄντα* (99d5 and 100a2) and *τὰ πράγματα* (99e3): do they refer to things themselves (Forms) or things in general? Regarding this question, I agree with those who suggest that the phrases *τὰ ὄντα* and *τὰ πράγματα* refer to things in general rather than things themselves (Forms).<sup>461</sup> Regarding *τὰ ὄντα* at d5, Forms have not yet been introduced since Socrates was commenting on his study of natural science and Anaxagoras. Regarding *τὰ ὄντα* at a2, Socrates was talking about “studying things in facts”, yet it is hardly plausible that we can study things themselves (or Forms) in facts. *τὰ ὄντα* at a2 thus refers to the things in general too.

Then what does *τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν* (the truth of things) at the *Phaedo* 99e6 refer to? Some scholars argue that this phrase introduces Forms for the first time in the autobiography section.<sup>462</sup> However, I presume the phrase *τῶν ὄντων*, too, should be read as things in general: at this point of his philosophical journey, Socrates had not yet discovered the relationship between knowledge, the truth and forms. Taking *τῶν ὄντων* as Forms would thus imply that Socrates had discovered the theory of

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<sup>460</sup> *Phd.* 99d4-100a3 Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ ἀάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἐνίοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθην, καὶ ἔδωκα μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] ἔργοις.

<sup>461</sup> *E.g.* Burnet 1911, 109; Hackforth 1955, 136; Gallop 1975, 177-178. Gaye 1901, 249 claims that *πράγματα*=ἥλιος=ὄντως ὄντα, i.e. things themselves (Forms)=the sun=the things as they really are. However, Goodrich (1904, 5) argues that *τὰ πράγματα* alone cannot signify Forms. For Goodrich, we should have had *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* if Plato were referring to Forms since *αὐτὰ* is essential for Plato's designation of Forms. See, for instance, *Phd.* 66e1-2: ‘we must view the things themselves with the soul itself (*αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα*)’.

<sup>462</sup> *E.g.* Gallop 1975, 177-178.

Forms immediately after he had begun his study in *logoi*, an idea which seems to be extraordinary as Socrates had not yet conducted any research in *logoi*.

To put it differently, Socrates' refuge in *logoi* (or the second-sailing) marks the introduction of a new sort of approach rather than the results attained by following that approach. This different kind of approach is the one that Socrates has thrown together on impulse and adopted after his failure in discovering the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in natural science. As I shall argue below, Socrates developed this approach thanks to what he had learnt from Anaxagoras and formed a more systematic methodology, namely the method of hypothesis. Through this method, then, Socrates had discovered the theory of Forms, and then he came to realize that knowing the truth of things is actually knowing Forms.

#### 5.4.2 The Nature of Socrates' Logos

Until now, commentators have offered various translations of *logos*. The main problem of these translations is that commentators consider *logos* as (a) an item by which we inquire (as an item analogous to the microscope through which biologists study organisms) rather than as (b) an approach by which we inquire (as an approach to things analogous to the microscopic study of organisms).

As a result of thinking in terms of the former view, (a) some argue that *logoi* are “concepts” derived from Forms, and through *logoi* we attain knowledge mediately. Although I subscribe to the view that studying things in *logoi*, which are “images” in a sense, implies indirectness, I do not think that concepts can capture the sort of indirectness that Socrates has in mind. I do not see any reason for thinking that *logoi* are concepts since this would imply that *logoi* are mental representations existing in thought only.<sup>463</sup>

Others prefer to render *logoi* as “definitions”, which I disagree with as well.<sup>464</sup> This is partly because the “definition” does not fit the illustration of *logos* which comes later, when Socrates is ‘hypothesizing that there are such things as a Beautiful alone by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest’.<sup>465</sup> This hardly looks like a definition

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<sup>463</sup> Pace Archer-Hind 1983, 135-136; Gaye 1901, 249.

<sup>464</sup> Bluck 1955, 13-16; 111-113; 160-173; 198-200.

<sup>465</sup> *Phd.* 100b5-6. ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ. Otherwise, it can be translated ‘a beautiful, itself by itself, is something’, as, for instance, Gallop 1975

in the sense of a Socratic definition, which was supposed to be referred to at the *Phaedo* 99e5 and 100a4.<sup>466</sup>

The third alternative is to translate *logoi* as “theories”.<sup>467</sup> “Theories”, I think, is the most accurate translation since it can account for Socrates’ broad use of *logoi* covering propositions, statements and even in some cases definitions and arguments.<sup>468</sup> That said, we might need to be careful about taking *logoi* as theories, if theories are taken as mature and fully-fledged explanations, such as the theory of relativity. As argued above, Socrates’ refuge in *logoi* indicates the inauguration of a new approach rather than an approach based on strong theoretical, epistemological and metaphysical foundations shaped by the theory of Forms.

Now, I think that examining the contrast between *logoi* and *erga*, both of which are taken to be images of things, would be helpful to better understand what *logoi* amount to.<sup>469</sup> That said, it seems to be untenable to stress the idea that both *erga* and *logoi* are images. Socrates’s point is neither that both *erga* and *logoi* are images by the same token, nor that both would fail us in the same way when we aim at knowing things as they really are. In fact, Socrates himself emphasizes the untenable relationship between *logoi* and *erga*, as both being images, and undermines the

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did. Cf. Sedley 2007:73 who underlines that the force of τὸ necessitates ‘there is ‘a’ Form of F.’

<sup>466</sup> Cf. Gallop 1975, 178-179. Karasmanis (2006, 130-37) notes that a Socratic definition is supposed to answer ‘what a thing is’, for instance ‘shape is the limit of the solid (*Men.* 76a)’. ‘There is such a thing as a Beautiful alone by itself’ is not an instance of Socratic definition

<sup>467</sup> E.g. Gallop 1975. Long & Sedley 2010 translates *logoi* as ‘theories and arguments’.

<sup>468</sup> Rose 1966, 470.

<sup>469</sup> Trabattani (2016, 42-43) suggests that ‘perfect knowledge requires direct insight (condition 1) into the forms (condition 2)’, but such knowledge is ‘only permissible to disembodied souls’. For Trabattani, while the knowledge of sensible things can satisfy condition 1 (since it has direct access to its objects), it fails to fulfil condition 2. On the contrary, ‘the act through which the soul gains a persuasion about propositions concerning forms’ satisfies condition 2 (since ‘its objects are ideal entities like justice, beauty and good in themselves’), it cannot fulfil condition 1 (since ‘it must settle for propositional judgements ruled by persuasion’). Trabattani then argues that ‘the two metaphors of δεύτερος πλοῦς and of the mirror of water used to watch solar eclipses’ emphasize that ‘intellectual cognition...can do no better than make use of *logoi*’. In this respect, ‘the flight towards the *logoi*’ can satisfy condition 2 (if it aims at knowing forms), but not condition 1 (since *logoi* are images). I agree with Trabattani’s analysis of the conditions of knowledge and ‘the relative weakness of δεύτερος πλοῦς [which] is emphasized by its implicit subjectivism’. I also endorse Trabattani’s interpretation of the second sailing as it is more positive than it is usually assumed to be. See also *ibid.*, 74-75; 192-193

comparison by claiming that the solar eclipse analogy emphasizing the idea of ‘looking at images’ is in a way misleading.<sup>470</sup>

As we can study things both in *logoi* and *erga*, they are two different approaches that we can adopt in our dealings with things.<sup>471</sup> It seems that *logoi* should not be taken as images or copies *per se*; hence Socrates is at pains to remove this possible misunderstanding.<sup>472</sup> At this point, it should be asked what sort of *logoi* are contrasted with *erga*.<sup>473</sup> Consider the solar eclipse analogy: for Socrates, we can either look at the sun directly or look at its image. If we look at the sun directly, we would become blind. It seems that those who become blinded are natural scientists (probably most people as well) and they have already been blinded and mistaken, though perhaps they are not aware of it.<sup>474</sup>

If *logoi* are compared with facts, then it seems reasonable that studying things in *logoi* is a sort of approach that excludes studying in facts, though we need not completely overlook facts in our inquiries.<sup>475</sup> Accordingly, I submit that studying things in *logoi* is conducting theoretical investigations, surely with some help of sense-perception and empirical data. As suggested above, studying things in *logoi* is

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<sup>470</sup> See Burnet 1911, 109; Gallop 1975, 178; Bostock 1986, 159-161. I agree with Bostock that it is not clear for Plato in what sense *logoi* are images or likenesses, and hence ‘no close parallel is intended’. Gallop

<sup>471</sup> See, for instance, *Gorg.* 461c8, *Rep.* VII. 563a6-7 for Plato’s customary use of *logoi/erga* in the same verb-noun phrase, *e.g.* to do something in respect to both words (*logoi*) and deeds (*erga*).

<sup>472</sup> See Sallis 1996, 43.

<sup>473</sup> Note that *ἔργον* is contrasted with various types of things-spoken-of, such as *ἔπος* (utterance), *μῦθος* (tale) *ῥήμα* (saying), *ὄνομα* (name). See LSJ *s.v.* *ἔργον* I.4.

<sup>474</sup> Socrates said earlier, ‘I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry [natural science] (96c5 ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην)’. The natural scientists, as well as most people (οἱ πολλοί), confuse ‘the real cause’ with ‘that without which the cause could never be a cause’, and hence Socrates describes their situation ‘groping about for it as if in darkness (*Phd.* 99b2 -5 *ψηλαφῶντες...ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει*).’ See also Rowe 1993, 237; Gallop 1975, 234 *fn.*61. The latter translates it ‘feeling it over blindfold’.

<sup>475</sup> The recollection argument depends partly on seeing equal sticks and stones. By seeing them we are reminded what equal is. See *Phd.* 74d4-75d5. The second sailing and the study of *logoi*, then, refers to the period after one has discovered that equal sticks and stones resemble the Equal itself but fall short of it. That said, recollecting the Equal itself is not discovering the theory of Forms which is discussed at *Phd.* 100b4-101b3. The argument that there is something besides all equal things, the Equal itself, is less sophisticated than the Form-Cause Hypothesis, which aims at explaining all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

not studying theories as such, rather Socrates suggests studying things from the perspective of *logos*.<sup>476</sup>

What does studying from the perspective of *logos* mean? In order to answer this question, let me go back to the practice of true philosophers, which was discussed in Chapter 3. Here, let it suffice to say that true philosophers [1] aim to separate the soul from the body as much as possible in order to attain the truth and knowledge, and to [2] remain aloof from the body, its pleasures and sense-perception, in order to grasp (or view) things themselves, such as the Beautiful itself.<sup>477</sup>

In this way, true philosophers aim at using their reasoning and intelligence as much as possible. The most efficient way to do so is to engage in theoretical studies, in which we use our intelligence and reasoning in contrast to relying heavily on our senses (as the study in facts does). It is reasonable that the second-sailing (Socrates' refuge in *logoi*) describes the way true philosophers study things, as Socrates adopts it instead of other approaches; hence his practice in the second-sailing should exemplify the correct practice of philosophy, though perhaps not the best practice in every respect.<sup>478</sup>

### 5.4.3 The Method of Hypothesis

As argued above, the second-sailing is the method of hypothesis and the true philosopher's practice is theoretical investigation of things by this method. I have also suggested that this method is more laborious but safer, and because of this method's tentativeness, its results (*e.g.* the theory of Forms and the proofs of the immortality of the soul) are subject to modification and/or development.

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<sup>476</sup> As mentioned above, it is hard to find an English translation that is fitting for all occurrences of *logoi* in this passage. For instance, while λόγον at 100a4 seems to mean a "proposition" or "theory", the phrase ἐν τοῖς λόγοις at 100a1 appears to denote arguments in general. In the latter, for Hackforth (1955, 138), 'λόγοι seem to be arguments themselves, trains or processes of ratiocination; and the contrast there drawn is between observing physical objects (ἐργα) and constructing arguments, as alternative methods of studying reality'. See also Bluck 1955, 164-166.

<sup>477</sup> See *Phd.* 65e9-67b5.

<sup>478</sup> I agree with Benson (2015, 184) that the method of hypothesis 'is not Plato's entire philosophical method. A philosophical method, plausibly, consists in more than inquiry. It also consists in, for example, justification, teaching or persuasion, and perhaps demonstration'. That said, I am inclined to think that some aspects of the method of hypothesis, for instance its step-by-step progression, are consistent with Plato's ideas on teaching and persuasion.

Socrates' first description of the method of hypothesis is as follows: [1] 'on every occasion I hypothesize whatever theory I deem most robust'<sup>479</sup>, and [2] 'I set down as true whatever I think harmonizes with it – both about cause and about everything else – and as false whatever doesn't'.<sup>480</sup> Let me now briefly comment on the metaphilosophical aspect that the method of hypothesis would imply, before proceeding to examine its epistemological side.

One well-known study that is often cited in research on the method of hypothesis is that of Robinson (1953), who argues that "to hypothesize" is used to refer to "a future action", although Plato does not consistently use to hypothesize for referring to "an absolute beginning of a deduction".<sup>481</sup> Moreover, Robinson shows that for Plato hypothesizing is "deliberately" choosing an opinion rather than "adopting" an opinion "unconsciously".<sup>482</sup>

The idea of deliberately choosing the strongest *logos* seems to indicate a sort of expertise in *logoi*. Otherwise, we would hypothesize a weak *logos*, then we might go astray in our inquiries and fail to discover knowledge and the truth. Issues arise surrounding expertise in the arguments of Chapter 4, for if we lack expertise in arguments (hence unable to choose the strongest *logos*), we might become misologists, due to putting all our trust in an argument which is later falsified.

Even if we are able to choose the strongest *logos*, the method of hypothesis suggests that it can turn out false, thus we should not put all our trust even in the strongest *logos*. The method of hypothesis, in this respect, seems to solve the problem of misology. If we hypothesize a weak *logos*, we would not be utterly disappointed when seeing later that it is false, since our *logos* was a hypothesis, we consider it provisional and tentative. If we believe we choose the strongest *logos*, we would also know that it is not refutation-proof.

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<sup>479</sup> Rowe (1992, 93) argues that with the strongest *logos*, which implies a multiplicity, Socrates is referring to 'his form-participation hypothesis whatever seems to him at the time ('on each occasion') the strongest'.

<sup>480</sup> *Phd.* 100a3-7. Robinson (1953, 131-134) suggests that 'harmonizing with' can mean either 'to be consistent with a hypothesis [everything that is consistent with a hypothesis is true]' *contra* 'to be implied by a hypothesis [if something is not implied by my hypothesis it is false]'. I will discuss the issue surrounding the meaning of 'harmonizing' below.

<sup>481</sup> Robinson 1953, 99-103.

<sup>482</sup> *Ibid.* 109.

Furthermore, Robinson maintains that the method of hypothesis suggests that one avoid ‘positing at the same time the truth and falsity of the same proposition’, though this ‘does not mean never changing one’s mind’.<sup>483</sup> In other words, for Robinson, ‘what is posited [by the hypothetical method] is always provisional and tentative’, and ‘the hypothetical method consists in holding one’s opinions *provisionally* and not dogmatically (author’s italics)’.<sup>484</sup> In support of the idea of provisional opinion, Robinson refers to the *Republic*, where Socrates, when commenting on his opinion about the stories suitable for their young people, says, ‘we must be persuaded by the argument, until someone persuades us with another and better (*Rep.* 388E)’.<sup>485</sup>

The notion of provisional opinion, I submit, implies that the method of hypothesis demands a sort of self-awareness and the recognition of our cognitive fallibilities, both of which hint at a sort of forward-looking dogmatism indicating belief revision. Epistemic modesty thus steers a course between the extremes of scepticism and dogmatism in the *Phaedo*.<sup>486</sup> As discussed in Chapter 4, Socrates suggests that his friends must be careful about trusting arguments and allow some room for the possibility of rendering wrong judgements. The method of hypothesis suitably comes with epistemic norms, which allow us to deal with arguments properly (hence to attain the truth and knowledge about things) and to escape misology. With regards to the discovery of a method which provides the correct epistemic norms, Socrates’s second-sailing is also productive.<sup>487</sup>

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<sup>483</sup> *Ibid.*:110. Cf. also *Phd.* 90b4-c6 for a criticism of the procedure above.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid.*:98. But cf. Wolfsdorf 2008 claims that hypothesis refers to cognitively secure propositions.

<sup>485</sup> *Ibid.*: 111. For the author’s similar examples of tentativeness and rigour until being refuted Cf. *Phd.* 107b, *Rep.* 610a, *Soph.* 259a.

<sup>486</sup> Trabattini (2016, 86) partially encapsulates my reading of the *Phaedo* about the limits of human understanding: Plato aims at ‘paving a new path for human thought, a difficult yet possible one, founded on the careful use of *logos*, of dialectics, and of critical reasoning: a path as removed from scepticism, which deprives man even of the capacity to attain knowledge he actually possesses, as it is from dogmatism, which harbours the illusion of being able to attain certain and infallible knowledge. While granting *logos* a foundational character with respect to truth and knowledge, Plato does away with the dangerous illusion that makes *logos* infallible’.

<sup>487</sup> I partly agree with Robinson (1953, 149), that young Socrates adopts the method of hypothesis after his study of Anaxagoras. My worry is that Socrates’ adoption of his own approach mentioned at *Phd.* 97b6-7 is before his study of Anaxagoras. Then either Socrates does not talk about the method of hypothesis in *Phd.* 97b6-7 or after his disappointment with Anaxagoras Socrates re-adopted an advanced version of the same method. Although it is not clear how fully formed Socrates’ stance was, he was at least interested in enquiry by using the method of hypothesis.

Having discussed a metaphilosophical aspect of the method of hypothesis, let me now turn to an exchange between Socrates and Cebes about this method. In the relevant section, Socrates explains how he is going to use the method of hypothesis and what he is going to hypothesize:

[T40] ‘I want, though, to tell you more clearly what I’m talking about. I think that at the moment you don’t understand.’

‘Indeed I don’t’ said Cebes, ‘not altogether.’

‘This is what I’m talking about,’ he said, ‘nothing new, but what I’ve never stopped talking about, on any other occasion or in particular in the argument thus far. Well, I’ll set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which I’ve pursued. I’ll go back to those things that have been our frequent refrain, and start from them, first hypothesizing that there are such things as a Beautiful alone by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest. If you grant me these and accept that they exist, I hope to use them to demonstrate to you the cause, and to discover that the soul is immortal.’<sup>488</sup>

Scholars generally assume what Socrates has never stopped talking about are Forms, which are called by Socrates “our frequent refrain”.<sup>489</sup> In this case, Socrates is aware of the fact that Cebes might fail to understand, as Cebes might not fathom that Socrates would use Forms in explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. That is, Cebes is familiar with Forms, yet he fails to link Forms with a theory of causation. What is new is that Socrates hypothesizes the strongest *logos*, namely the Form-Cause Hypothesis, to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and to demonstrate that the soul is immortal.<sup>490</sup>

It is important to observe that when Socrates made a similar remark about demonstrating his second-sailing at *Phaedo* 99c9-d2, he asked Cebes, ‘would you like me to give you a demonstration (*ἐπίδειξιν*), Cebes, of how I’ve pursued

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<sup>488</sup> *Phd.* 100a8-b9 βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

Ἀλλ’, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὥδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ αἰεὶ τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γάρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ’ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ ἄλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὥς ἀθάνατον [ἢ] ψυχή.

<sup>489</sup> Gallop 1975, Burnet 1911, Rowe 1993, Bluck 1955.

<sup>490</sup> Trabattoni (2016, 194) rightly observes that ‘the *logos* in question here is not an idea as such, but the discourse stating the existence of the ideas’.

(πεπραγμάτευμαι) my second voyage in search of the cause?’<sup>491</sup> Similar wording is used at *Phaedo* 100b3-4 too, as quoted above, where Socrates tells Cebes that ‘I’ll set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which I’ve pursued’.<sup>492</sup>

In the earlier sentence, the second-sailing refers to Socrates’ study of things in *logoi* in order to find the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, yet I do not think that Socrates, *at that moment*, has decided on the strongest *logos*, which is the Form-Cause Hypothesis. In the earlier instance, Socrates is retelling the story. In the latter, however, Socrates has already committed himself to the Form-Cause Hypothesis, the strongest *logos*. By next using this hypothesis, he will try ‘to demonstrate to [Cebes] the cause [of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be], and to discover that the soul is immortal’.<sup>493</sup>

Now, let me quote the second description about the method of hypothesis where Socrates explains how one should deal with other people’s criticism of the initial hypothesis and its conclusions:

[T41] But you for your part would, as the saying goes, be scared of your own shadow and inexperience, and you’d cling to that safe part of the hypothesis,<sup>494</sup> and answer accordingly. **But if someone were to cling to<sup>495</sup> the hypothesis itself,**

<sup>491</sup> τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὃ Κέβης;

<sup>492</sup> ἔρχομαι δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι.

<sup>493</sup> *Phd.* 100b8-9. In the second sailing, Socrates talks about ‘search of the cause (τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν)’ while in the form-hypothesis passage he refers to ‘the sort of cause (τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος)’. In this respect, I presume that in the former Socrates does not decide on what sort of cause he will search for whereas in the latter he comes to a decision about the sort of cause.

<sup>494</sup> Rowe (1993, 247) suggests that ‘ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς’ should be translated as ‘holding onto to that safety of hypothesis...since no part of the hypothesis has been identified (ἐκείνου) as ‘safer’ than any other’. This is because Rowe seems to think that there are two parts: [1] Forms exist and [2] Forms are causes [it is because of the beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful]. Rowe is right that Socrates does say anything about whether [1] or [2] is safer. Benson (*ibid.*, 200) argues that ‘according to which the safe part of the hypothesis should be understood as the safe consequent of the hypothesis [*aitia* thesis], which bypasses the necessity of the conjunctive Form-Reason hypothesis’. That is, for Benson (*ibid.*, 201), ‘the *aitia* thesis “agrees” with the Form hypothesis, the latter somehow reveals the former, and other answers [which are proposed by natural scientists] to the *aitia* question do not “agree” with it’. My suggestion is that ‘safe part of the hypothesis’ is ‘the Form F in x is the *aitia* of x’s being F’ while the other part is the way Forms are related to particulars. Socrates has already raised his hesitation about the latter at *Phaedo* 100d4-6. I will have more to say about these lines below.

<sup>495</sup> The meaning of ἐχοίτο at 100d3 has been the subject of much debate. Here, I adopt the reading of Burnet (1911, 101): “if anyone fastens on’ or ‘sticks to

**you would ignore him and not answer until you had managed to consider its consequences and see whether or not you found them harmonizing with each other.** When, however, you had to give an account of that hypothesis itself, you would do so in the same way, first giving again as another hypothesis whichever higher one seemed best, until you came to something sufficient. But you wouldn't throw together what you were saying all at once, would you, like those who practise disputation, by holding a conversation about both the starting-point and its consequences, at least if you wanted to discover something real?<sup>496</sup>

Here, it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term 'harmonizing (*συμφωνεῖν*)'. As mentioned above, Socrates initially described the method of hypothesis as follows: (1) hypothesizing the strongest *logos*, and (2) setting down as true whatever harmonizes with it and as false whatever does not. One of the most cited studies on the meaning of *συμφωνεῖν* is Bailey's, who stresses the musical connotation of the term. Regarding the second description, Bailey points out that Socrates' point 'makes good methodological sense', because 'if inconsistent propositions follow from a hypothesis [the *διαφωνεῖν* relation]', it is sufficient to consider that hypothesis false. That said, it is not logically sound to accept a hypothesis as true if all its results are consistent with each other (the *συμφωνεῖν* relation).<sup>497</sup>

However, Bailey finely points out that the consistency reading of *συμφωνεῖν* is not consistent with Plato's use of it in other contexts.<sup>498</sup> What is more problematic about the consistency reading, for Bailey, is its application to the first definition: 'for any hypothesis, there will be an infinite number of propositions which are consistent with it, but which we have no independent reason to assert...[and which might be] inconsistent with each other'.<sup>499</sup> For instance, I might hypothesize that '[H] it is snowing', and put down the proposition that '[P1] it is -4°C'. H and P1 are consistent

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*ὑπόθεσις*', that is, if he refuses to consider the *συμβαίνοντα* till the *ὑπόθεσις* has been completely established'.

<sup>496</sup> *Phd.* 101c9-e3 σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφ' ἧς ἄν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἄν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἄν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἄν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν;

<sup>497</sup> Bailey 2005, 96.

<sup>498</sup> *Ibid.*, 97. In the *Cratylus*, it is suggested that all the names they have discussed *συμφωνεῖ* with each other, as all their referents are in flux. Bailey observes that names 'have more in common than that [being consistent or in agreement] by virtue of all telling the same story about the world'.

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.*

with each other, yet I have no reason to consider P1 true unless I go out and use a thermometer to measure the temperature. Similarly, I might propose that '[P2] it is  $-6^{\circ}\text{C}$ ', which is also consistent with H, yet both P2 and P1 cannot be true at the same time.

Accordingly, Bailey suggests that the *συμφωνεῖν* relation must offer something stronger than consistency, namely entailment: I can accept that those propositions are entailed by my hypothesis being true (*e.g.* it is snowing, it therefore must be cold). However, the entailment reading, for Bailey, does not work in the second description:

It is true that water is H<sub>2</sub>O; from this, it follows that water is a compound; and it also follows that water contains oxygen. But neither of these results entails the other. A stuff need not contain oxygen in order to be a compound, while there is at least one stuff which contains oxygen without being a compound, namely oxygen itself, or at any rate a pure sample of it. If Socrates means "entail one another" by *ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ*, then the results of the hypothesis that water is H<sub>2</sub>O do not *ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ*. But that is no reason to deem false the hypothesis that water is H<sub>2</sub>O.<sup>500</sup>

I cannot do justice to all the facts and arguments involved in Bailey's study. Allow me to instead conclude by presenting Bailey's solution to the problem. Bailey begins by suggesting that the musical connotation of *συμφωνεῖν* can help us to better understand its logical implications.<sup>501</sup> For Bailey, the relation of a hypothesis and its results 'holds between propositions if they stand as *explanations* of one another,

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<sup>500</sup> *Ibid.*, 98. For Bailey, the entailment reading also makes the first definition ludicrous: 'From the hypothesis that water is H<sub>2</sub>O it does not follow that I am in my office; nor does it follow, from the same hypothesis, that I am outside my office. But we had better not put down as false both these non-entailed propositions, for it cannot be that I am neither in my office nor outside'.

<sup>501</sup> Bailey (*ibid.*, 104-5) suggests that 'the *Phaedo* is a dialogue thoroughly soaked in musical allusions', and hence the accuracy of alluding to musical systems. Unfortunately, I am not able to discuss the relation between musical and logical systems. Let me just quote: 'Two notes an octave apart do not bear the same relation to one another. For while blending is a symmetrical relation, the precise relation of lying in such and such a ratio to another pitch is asymmetrical... in both cases, the musical and the theoretical, something new emerges from the combination of the two things so related - a blended unity - which does not emerge, for instance, when we sound a pitch together with another six semi-tones above it, or when we conjoin truths such as "Cats are mammals" and "Sydney is in Australia". The two pitches do not form a *συμφωνία* and blend into a musical unity, just as the two propositions do not blend into an explanatory unity'.

albeit in different ways'.<sup>502</sup> One relation is what Bailey calls 'generalizing explanation', which is exemplified as follows:

**P1** Electrons in such-and-such a relation conduct electricity.

**P2** Metals are conductors.

**P3** Copper is a conductor.

**P4** Pennies conduct electricity.

Moving from P4 to P1, according to Bailey, we 'explain particular facts by subsuming them under more and more general laws – "higher principles", as Plato would call them'.<sup>503</sup> Bailey then offers another relation, which he calls 'particularizing explanations': Every proposition below gives explanatory support for the ones above, *e.g.* P4 supports P3, P3-P2, P2-P1. Bailey applies the figure above to the Form-Cause Hypothesis:

*Hypothesis.* There is such a thing as the  $\Phi$ , and if anything else happens to be  $\Phi$ , then it is  $\Phi$  by the  $\Phi$ .

*ὁρμηθέντα.* 1. When something is  $\Phi$ , then  $\Phi$ -ness is somehow in that thing.

2. Anything that is  $\Phi$  by the  $\Phi$  is different from that by which it is  $\Phi$ . (It is by Simmias' largeness that he overtops Socrates, not by his nature.)

3. If  $\Phi$  and  $\Psi$  are opposites, then the  $\Phi$  or  $\Psi$  in things will not tolerate the advance of the other: either it will retreat or perish on the approach of its opposite.<sup>504</sup>

According to Bailey, each pair (hypothesis and 1, 1 and 2, and 2 and 3) has both generalizing and particularizing relations. For instance, (Result 1) if a flower is beautiful, then the Form of beauty in the flower is explained by (hypothesis) there being a Form of the beautiful, and if anything else happens to be beautiful, then it is beautiful by the Form of the beautiful. This is the generalizing explanation. The particularizing relationship is as follows: 'The things that can have  $\Phi$  in them - Simmias' size, Socrates' fingers, Phaedo's face - are not the sort of things that have opposites: *this* is why such things must be different from the causal agents in them, as 2 asserts. 2 gives particularising explanation for 1'.<sup>505</sup>

Bailey concludes that there is something special about the *συμφωνεῖν* relation, which does not hold between *every* consistent proposition, 'as certain privileged intervals form stronger and more interesting relations between their pitches than other equally musical intervals within the *ἀρμονία*'. As we have seen above, there might be other

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<sup>502</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>503</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>504</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>505</sup> *Ibid.*

ὁρμηθέντα consistent with the Form-Cause Hypothesis, yet they might not form a ‘symphonic’ relation as the above three propositions explain, and are explained by, that hypothesis.<sup>506</sup>

Let me now quote Bailey’s comment on the idea of provisionality: ‘[t]he whole point of calling something a hypothesis in the first place is to indicate its provisionality, the fact that it is not yet *known* for all that it is supposed, and is to that extent revisable.’<sup>507</sup> In this respect, we should observe that the *συμφωνεῖν* relation, which Bailey finely demonstrates, is not easy to form. It is demanding and laborious, as is suggested by the second-sailing analogy. Finally, we should notice that the *συμφωνεῖν* relation is not only hard to form, but also that the *συμφωνεῖν* relation might become better. Bailey brilliantly relates this notion of provisionality and indeterminacy to music, and the mysterious expertise in choosing a particular proposition:

From the starting point C, one will get a *συμφωνία* with the F a fourth above it, or alternatively the G a fifth above – both notes are suitably related to the original. But one cannot, as it were, go for both of these pitches together. For the F and the G do not blend into a *συμφωνία*. They are not related to one another as each is to C. One must choose one of them at a time if one intends to develop a musical complex of the right sort from C, and there may at first be no more reason to choose one rather than the other. This strain of indeterminacy brings out the element of unexplained talent that will be required for a successful application of the method. Socrates has no story to tell about why you should put down as true one particular proposition from the many candidates that will emerge.<sup>508</sup>

I think this is why it is hard to utilise the method of hypothesis. The *συμφωνεῖν* relation is demanding, provisional and even indeterminate. One needs to choose one from many premises which harmonize with the initial hypothesis, yet why we should a particular proposition among many “symphonious” ones is left somewhat obscure. This obscurity probably stems from Socrates’ emphasis on self-discovery, which is stressed at the end of the final proof of the immortality of the soul at the *Phaedo* 107b-c. All the hardship inherent to the method of hypothesis and in forming the *συμφωνεῖν* relation fit with the point about the second-sailing, which is that it is more laborious.

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<sup>506</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>507</sup> *Ibid.*, 100 *fn.*5.

<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

#### 5.4.4. The Form-Aitia Hypothesis (the Theory of Forms)

Here, it is not necessary for my purposes to discuss the theory of Forms in detail and to review alternative interpretations of it.<sup>509</sup> Rather, I will briefly comment on how Plato uses the theory of Forms in the *Phaedo*. Some scholars argue that the *Phaedo* presupposes a certain metaphysical system. They suggest that Socrates tries to prove the immortality of the soul by using this metaphysics, yet he does not justify his metaphysical system. These scholars defend their reading by stressing [1] that Socrates refers to Forms as ‘those things that have been our frequent refrain (*Phd.* 100b5)’, so that the interlocutors and readers are supposed to be familiar with the metaphysics, and that [2] the interlocutors clearly express their knowledge of it, as they do not ask for further clarification.<sup>510</sup>

On the other hand, some scholars claim that Plato does not presuppose a metaphysical system, but he tries to justify it in the *Phaedo*. To this end, Plato introduces the theory of Forms step by step and uses it for proving the immortality of the soul. For instance, it is argued that Socrates discusses five different aspects of the theory of Forms, each of which is used in the proofs of the immortality of the soul.<sup>511</sup> It is also suggested that Plato begins the *Phaedo* with some presuppositions and ontological commitments found in the so-called early dialogues, such as the *Meno*, *Euthyphro*, etc., then he ‘develops a comprehensive metaphysics’.<sup>512</sup>

Moreover, one of the most fundamental difficulties about the theory of Forms is the Form/particular relationship. Socrates says:

[T42] I ignore those other explanations, because I am confused when they are all around me, and I keep the following at my side, in my straightforward, amateurish and perhaps simple-minded way: nothing makes it beautiful other than that Beautiful’s presence, or association, or whatever its mode and means of accruing may be. For I don’t go so far as to insist on this, but only that it is because of the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful.<sup>513</sup>

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<sup>509</sup> For some seminal readings see Vlastos 1954, Fine 1993 and McCabe 1994.

<sup>510</sup> *Phd.* 65d5, 74b1, 78d8-9, 92d6-e2, 100c1-2, 102a10-b1. Some adherents of this view are Archer-Hind 1883, 36-38; Burnet 1911, 33, 60, 110; Bluck 1955, 11 *fn.*1, 16; Hackforth 1955, 50, 142-143; Gallop 1975, 97.

<sup>511</sup> Grube 1935, 291-294.

<sup>512</sup> Dimas 2003, 181.

<sup>513</sup> *Phd.* 100d3-6 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐὼ, —ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι— τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ’ ἐμαυτοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως

I think that scrutinizing this difficulty might help us find an explanation about the epistemic nature of the theory of Forms in the *Phaedo*, as Plato does not seem to suggest an answer for this issue.<sup>514</sup> In this respect, I agree with the scholars that Socrates, or Plato, is noncommittal here.<sup>515</sup> That said, I do not think Plato is noncommittal if this implies either that Plato has not thought extensively about the Form/particular relationship or that he did not find it significant for his purposes, or that he is not serious.

Above all, I believe that Plato is serious about his noncommittal stance. This is because Plato knows that he does not have a model that could explain the Form/particular relationship even to his own satisfaction. Regarding the existence of Forms, and their causal and explanatory role, Plato offers a detailed account, which offers a sort of *συμφωνία*, though it does not seem to be as clear and rigorous as we might wish to have.

At any rate, Socrates' position regarding the Form/particular relationship is in line with his own approach, namely the method of hypothesis. It seems to me that Socrates (or Plato) has not discovered the strongest *logos* about the Form/particular relationship. Moreover, as mentioned above, choosing the strongest *logos* is not a random act, as we need to choose 'consciously'. Socrates does not know a well-reasoned proposition about the Form/particular relationship that harmonizes with the hypothesis itself and its consequences. That is, instead of breaking the harmony by adding a random proposition, Socrates prefers to maintain the harmony until a proper proposition is found.

In a sense, we do not bet on the strongest *logos* randomly, but we need to have some justification for it. Socrates, I presume, could not make a rational choice among several alternatives, and hence the rational act is not to insist on the strongest *logos* about the Form/particular relationship. Then there seem three philosophical stages: [1] determining the nature of the real causes, [2] showing that Forms are real

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προσγενομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ [γίνεται] καλά.

<sup>514</sup> However, Fujisawa (1974, 40-45) divides the idioms used for the Form/particular relationship into three groups, namely (1) ἔχειν-idioms (x has F), (2) μετέχειν-idioms (x participates in Φ), (3) παράδειγμα-idioms (x has F in virtue of being a likeness of Φ). He argues that Plato only uses ἔχειν-idioms after the interruption at *Phd.* 102a3, which implies that Plato has an answer for the Form/particular relationship. Even if this is so, it is still a mystery why Plato did not clearly say so.

<sup>515</sup> E.g. Gallop 1975, 183; Hackforth 1955, 143; Bostock 1986, 147; Dorter 1982, 138-139.

causes,<sup>516</sup> and [3] discovering that the soul is immortal by using the theory of Forms and the method of hypothesis.

To conclude, Socrates has gone through four distinct phases of intellectual development:<sup>517</sup>

[1] The study of natural science (96a6-97b6) by which Socrates attempts to find causes (*aitiai*) among facts (*erga*).

[2] Socrates adopts a different approach (97b6-b9), although Socrates did not express what it is. Socrates simply tells his interlocutors that once he impulsively threw together his own kind of approach, he did not adopt the approach of natural science.

[3] The study of Anaxagoras (97b8-99b6): This is the first-sailing by which Socrates hopes to find teleological explanations. Besides this, I suggest that Socrates was attracted to the idea of universal theory, also found in Anaxagoras's concept of *nous*, which could explain all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Socrates was denied teleological explanations, though he would still be glad to learn them, and he had decided to find another universal theory by using the method of the second-sailing, namely the method of hypothesis. With a view to find that sort of theory, Socrates took refuge in

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<sup>516</sup> Here, I follow Sedley's (1998, 121) formulation of Plato's 'Three Laws of Causation': if x is a real cause (a) x must only be F, and not also not-F (head example at *Phd.* 101a) (b) x must not be the cause of the opposite of F-ness (Socrates sitting in a cell example at *Phd.* 98c<sub>ff.</sub>) (c) x's opposite must not cause this F-ness (addition example at *Phd.* 101b-c).

<sup>517</sup> Ross (1951, 29) claims that the autobiography section is a display of the discovery of the theory of Forms. From a metaphilosophical perspective, I think, it also depicts the correct practice of philosophy. Moreover, Benson (2015, 199) raises the possibility that 'Plato may think that the entire passage from 95B through 107B represents an inquiry—that is, an application of a method for learning the immortality of the soul'. I do not think, with Benson, that the section from 95b to 107b is an application of the method of hypothesis. That said, I also believe that the section from 95b to 99d offers valuable insights about the correct practice of philosophy, which cannot be reduced to the method of hypothesis. For instance, Socrates' enthusiasm for natural science stresses the significance of an inquisitive mind; the restoration of Socrates' intellectual sight, so to speak, emphasizes the importance of vigorous inquiry; Socrates' refuge in *logoi* to escape intellectual blindness underlines that we ought to be aware of the limits (and the nature) of cognitive faculties.

*logoi* and had studied in them the truth about things by means of the method of hypothesis.

[4] The three steps above enabled Socrates to discover the theory of Forms and to show that the soul is immortal to a certain degree (100b-107a).

### 5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out with the aim of explaining Plato's insights on philosophical method in the Socrates' autobiography section. I have developed a model for the second-sailing by maintaining that Socrates' second-sailing is not inferior to the first-sailing *in every respect*. I have argued that Socrates' choice of taking refuge in *logoi* (the second-sailing) is purpose-relative, the second-sailing may be better than the first-sailing with regards to its safety and feasibility, while it is less sturdy and more laborious. In this respect, I submit that we can gain a better understanding of the second-sailing if we interpret it from the perspectives of safety, provisionality and laboriousness, instead of *only* highlighting the axiological relationship (superiority-inferiority) between the first and second-sailing.

Therefore, the axiological relationship between the first and the second-sailing is more complex than usually assumed, as we also need to consider purpose-relativeness. If this is so, we should be more thorough and careful regarding the axiological relationship between teleological explanations and explanations in terms of formal causes. Although Socrates would still be glad to learn how *nous* explains in terms of what is best, there is no reason to think that the method of second-sailing is totally worse, as it is safer and more feasible, but also more laborious. That is, it would have been better, with respect to stability and comprehensiveness, if Socrates were successful in finding teleological explanations in the first-sailing.

Inasmuch as the theory of Forms properly and consistently explains coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, it is not worse than teleological explanations. On the other hand, since the theory of Forms is still in need of further inquiry and development, the theory of Forms is worse than teleological explanations with respect to stability and completeness. However, since the second-sailing is safer and more feasible than the first-sailing, with regards to the compatibility of its method and human cognitive faculties, it is better than the first-sailing in *this* respect. The two sailings share the

same goal, namely explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and the second-sailing gets there in the end.

Finally, I have argued that the second-sailing is the study of things in *logoi* by means of the method of hypothesis. I also maintained that Socrates was attracted to Anaxagoras' idea of *nous* not only because *nous* is supposed to explain in terms of what is best (teleological explanations), but also because *nous* can explain everything (a universal theory of explanation). To this end, I have suggested that Socrates was denied teleological explanations, though he would still be glad to learn, yet he was able to find a universal theory of explanation, namely the theory of Forms.

This chapter adds to my discussion of the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo* in the following manner: the tentativeness implied by the method of hypothesis requires us to be cautious and careful whilst putting trust in arguments, as discussed in Chapter 4. The meaning of Socrates' second-sailing is safer, though this is not a philological but a philosophical claim, yet it is more laborious and the results are less stable than the other. The safety of the second-sailing would help us to escape misology, since it helps us to escape intellectual blindness. However, as it is more laborious and its results are less certain, we need to be careful and thorough in following the method of hypothesis. In this respect, we should not put all our trust in an argument too quickly, but we need to work hard to find safer and more steady arguments, or, as Bailey (2005) suggests, to form a more complex and symphonious theory.

The relationship between the method of hypothesis and philosophical humility also helps us to better understand the epistemic status of first-order theories dealt with in the *Phaedo*. If we consider the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo*, we would partially save Plato from the criticism of being reckless in the way he proves the immortality of the soul and explores the metaphysical theory, namely the theory of Forms. In this respect, we can observe the rationale behind Socrates' demand for a further inquiry, simply because his method does not easily and quickly provide certainty.

To summarize, I submit that the development of the theory of Forms and of the proofs of the immortality of the soul are incomplete. Therefore, Socrates' friends and Plato's readers are invited to search for stronger arguments. In doing so, I believe that Plato is strongly hinting at philosophical humility in the *Phaedo*, and the

structure of conversation (the way in which Socrates and his interlocutors interact), comprised of Socrates' approach to arguments and his conclusions (his demand for further inquiry and epistemic carefulness), exemplifies the correct epistemic norms (which are based on epistemic humility) governing philosophical argument.

## Epilogue

The present study was designed to determine the effects of metaphilosophical components to better understand the *Phaedo*. To this end, I explore the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing philosophical inquiry and conversation. It is not unexpected that Plato presents insights on the correct method of philosophical argument, as he studies metaphilosophy in other dialogues, such as the *Theaetetus*. One of the more interesting findings of the *Phaedo* is that the meaning of the second-sailing analogy and the hypothetical method appear to be in accord with the metaphilosophical component, namely epistemic modesty.

It is also appealing to see that the way in which Socrates and his interlocutors converse is in agreement with the *Phaedo*'s metaphilosophical component. We might explain this relationship by maintaining that a better way of exploring the norms governing philosophical argument can be demonstrated through a display of correct philosophical conversation. In this respect, the findings of this investigation complement those of earlier studies emphasizing the relationship between the dialogue form and philosophical arguments (McCabe & Gill 1996, Peterson 2011, Long 2013).

The second major finding was that Socrates encourages his friends to examine the arguments discovered in the *Phaedo* further, for them to arrive at an argument located at the uppermost point within the scope of human epistemic access. We thus need to consider that Socrates encourages open-ended argument and stresses that his arguments do still have room for improvement, although he does not suggest an endless open-ended investigation. I therefore submit that Socrates recognizes that human understanding is limited in the purification passage discussed in Chapter 3, a recognition which is a basic tenet of philosophical humility; hence Socrates acknowledges that his first-order theories might be amended and developed.

The epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing philosophical conversation/inquiry in the *Phaedo*, as I suggest in Chapter 1, consist of the following: [1] we ought to consider our adversaries being as cognitively capable as ourselves (as our epistemic peers), [2] we ought to be both critical and flexible (in the case of Simmias and Cebes), and [3] we ought to be willing to develop our views and welcome objections (in the case of Socrates).

In Chapter 2, I stress the fact that Socrates' initial speech in the *Phaedo* is considered a defence as if in court. Although any philosophical work aims at persuasion, the idea of defence further stresses Socrates' aim to persuade his interlocutors and reach an agreement that the soul is immortal. This is why, I argue, it is significant to look at the meta-dialogical and metaphilosophical component of Socrates' speech. In addition, I partially analyse the *Protagoras* to reveal insights on productive communication, critical thinking and careful checking. I then use these insights to trace the meta-dialogical element of the *Phaedo*.

Chapter 3 examines the section on the true philosophers' willingness-to-die. I submit that if we adopt the norms governed by the willingness-to-die argument, we would become worthy of philosophy and true philosophers. That is, the willingness-to-die argument has a powerful principle which operates in the practice of philosophers; it thus adds to the metaphilosophical component of the *Phaedo* by underlining the limits of human cognition during embodiment and the fallibility of human knowledge.

In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the misology argument from a metaphilosophical perspective. I suggest that the misology argument stresses that we are all prone to becoming haters of arguments, although those who are dealing with arguments used in disputations (*antilogike*) are more so. I argue that Socrates, as a remedy for hatred of arguments, proposes that if we lack expertise in arguments but desire to attain knowledge and care about the truth, we ought to follow the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing the attitude of philosophical humility.

Chapter 5 focuses on Socrates' second-sailing, for by spelling out its meaning, we can gain a better understanding of the correct norms of philosophical argument. I suggest that the second-sailing, despite scholarly opinion to the contrary, is not inferior to the first-sailing in every respect. To this end, I explore the second-sailing in terms of the concept of purpose-relativeness. On the one hand, the second-sailing is safer and more feasible; hence it is better in this respect. On the other hand, since the method used in the second-sailing (namely the method of hypothesis) offers provisional results and is more laborious, the second-sailing can be considered worse in these respects.

I submit that the meaning of the second-sailing is compatible with the overall philosophical tone of the *Phaedo*, namely epistemic modesty. Besides, the

provisionality of its results is stressed by Socrates, as he advises his friends to inquire further until they reach a point where they need not look for further justification. Although Socrates is confident with his demonstration to a certain degree, he does not explicitly tell his friends what the highest point is, nor what they should expect to discover. I thus submit that either Socrates is not sure how to define that furthest point or he expects his friends to decide on their plan of action by themselves.

From a metaphilosophical point of view, I think, either option seems to indicate that Socrates (or Plato) does not wish to look like an epistemic authority, who claims to possess certain knowledge and who knows the correct philosophical direction we should journey. This lack, however, does not mean that Socrates (or Plato) is unable to set a philosophical course and inform us of our philosophical destination. We, for instance, might suppose that true philosophers should set off in the direction of the Good (as Plato did in the *Republic*) or teleological explanations (as Plato did in the *Timaeus*), as it is usually assumed to be. Nevertheless, I think that the lack of clear allusion to any destination implies that Socrates is not an epistemic authority in the *Phaedo*.

My point, accordingly, is that such directions are not clearly mentioned in the *Phaedo*, though Plato might be aware of some possible directions; hence the reader is not given the right direction by an authoritative voice. From a metaphilosophical perspective, the readers, too, are invited to provide freedom of choice to others and to refrain from using an authoritative voice. The reasons for this avoidance are (a) that humans, during the embodiment of the soul, do not have direct epistemic access to the objects of knowledge, and (b) that human cognition is fallible. Our inquiries are thus likely to go astray. In short, the correct epistemic norms that would endow us with the power to face up to the challenges posed by (a) and (b) are governed by epistemic modesty.

In the rest of the epilogue, I would like to comment on the theory of Forms with respect to its epistemic status in the *Phaedo* and in the *Parmenides*. To this end, I review a passage from the *Parmenides* where Plato allegedly criticizes the theory of Forms, before I compare this passage with the *Phaedo*.<sup>518</sup> The aim of this

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<sup>518</sup> The most devastating argument of the *Parmenides* is supposedly the ‘Third Man Argument (TMA)’. It is a paradigm case criticizing the theory of Forms since the idea of ‘separation’ assumed in the theory leads to ‘infinite regress’. The scholarship on TMA is vast but the following two seminal works are quite essential: Vlastos 1954 and Waterlow [Broadie] 1982.

investigation is neither to achieve a thorough understanding of the criticism nor to explain the philosophical purpose of the criticism in detail. The *Parmenides* is interesting because we can compare young Socrates and old Socrates with regards to his position on the epistemic status of the theory of Forms.

Before exploring the *Parmenides*, I would like to note that Socrates does not strongly cling to the theory of Forms in the *Phaedo*. He is especially careful about the Form/particular relationship. Although Socrates discussed several aspects of the theory of Forms, the readers are given hints that Socrates' arguments can be pursued further. The theory of Forms can thus possess a stronger explanatory power, and the initial hypothesis and its results can be further harmonized.

The Form/particular relationship is one of the main points of attack of *Parmenides* in his eponymous dialogue. From a metaphilosophical perspective, the *Parmenides* can be considered criticism about how Socrates presents the material about the theory of Forms. In this respect, the *Parmenides* provides an antidote to its readers. That is, there is a metaphilosophical component in the *Parmenides*, which reminds the readers of a sort of philosophical humility.

To put it simply, Socrates in the *Phaedo* talks about the theory of Forms in line with a sort of philosophical humility, while Socrates in the *Parmenides* makes several claims on the theory of Forms, as if he is an epistemic authority and *Parmenides* challenges Socrates. Socrates of the *Phaedo* thus illustrates the epistemic norms of philosophical argument governed by epistemic modesty, while the way Socrates presented and defended the theory of Forms in the *Parmenides* depicts other epistemic norms governed by the idea of epistemic authority.<sup>519</sup>

By stressing the difference between the *Parmenides* and the *Phaedo* regarding Socrates' defence of the theory of Forms, I would like to underline how young Socrates is troubled by his strong convictions of the arguments that surround the theory of Forms. The tribulations of young Socrates, in defending the theory of Forms, is somewhat similar to the fate of misologists. In other words, it is suggested to the reader that they need to be careful about putting trust in an argument if they lack expertise in arguments, as discussed in Chapter 4. Similarly, the second part of the *Parmenides*, which is the so-called philosophical training (or dialectical) part,

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<sup>519</sup> No scholar places the *Parmenides* before the *Phaedo*. It is also generally accepted that the *Phaedo* antedates the middle books of the *Republic*, and the *Parmenides* comes after them. See Brandwood 1990 for the stylometric analysis of Plato's dialogues.

might relate to the misology argument, as this part is about gaining expertise in arguments to defend the theory of Forms.

Before briefly commenting on the dialectical part of the *Parmenides*, let me make some remarks on the theory of Forms presented in the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*: [1] the theory of Forms criticized in the *Parmenides* is almost identical with that of the *Phaedo*,<sup>520</sup> [2] the *Parmenides*'s criticism of the theory of Forms is neither fatal nor insignificant,<sup>521</sup> [3] the criticism results probably from Plato's self-reflection or from his discussion with others,<sup>522</sup> and [4] Parmenides's criticism is of positive value; hence Parmenides is not 'the destroyer of the theory of Forms', but 'a guide' who tries to help young Socrates to develop and defend it.<sup>523</sup>

Here, I am not going to comment on the idea that the "Deductions" in the second part of the *Parmenides* might appear fallacious; as some scholars argued that Plato aims to reproduce and criticize 'Eleatics' deductive form of reasoning' and that the 'Deductions' expose the ambiguities of "the One" and "being" of Parmenides.<sup>524</sup> Nor will I examine whether the Deductions provided 'basic conditions for the instantiation of characters in particular things' on which Plato bases his late ontology.<sup>525</sup> No matter what Plato's purpose is exactly, I subscribe to the view that Plato intended the antinomies to be genuinely compelling.<sup>526</sup>

To put it simply, Parmenides' critique of the theory of Forms is serious, and Parmenides genuinely wishes to save Forms, and the 'Deductions' are compelling. Here I will neither examine the problems of the theory of Forms indicated by Parmenides nor discuss whether Parmenides' worries are well-founded. For my purposes, it is significant to observe that Socrates does not have relevant solutions to Parmenides' objections. If Socrates offers a solution, another problem arises.<sup>527</sup>

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<sup>520</sup> Robinson 1942, 58; Fine 1995, 36-38. But *cf.* Brumbaugh 1980, 42-45 who claims that Parmenides criticizes 'other' theories of Forms.

<sup>521</sup> Robinson 1942, 58-59; Runciman 1959, 91-92; Ryle 1939a: 314-317

<sup>522</sup> Cornford 1939, 101; Fine 1995, 39-42 for an analysis of Aristotle's criticism of the theory of Forms and Plato's own critique.

<sup>523</sup> *Parm.* 135b5-c7. See Runciman 1942, 90; Sayre 1978, 134; Cherniss 1932; 128-130; Ryle 1939b, 131-135; Schofield 1977, 140-142.

<sup>524</sup> Cornford 1939, 112-114.

<sup>525</sup> Sayre 1978, 134.

<sup>526</sup> Schofield 1977, 140-142.

<sup>527</sup> Rickless (1998) argues that part II of *Parmenides* solves some of the problems.

Now, I limit my argument about the *Parmenides* to the objection to the scope of Forms, as it can shed light on Socrates' philosophical expertise and the correct norms of philosophical argument:

[T43] 'Not at all,' Socrates answered. 'On the contrary, these things [*sc.* a form of human being, or fire, or water and things that are like hair, mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless] are in fact just what we see. Surely, it's too outlandish to think there is a form for them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn't troubled me from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them.'

'That's because you are still young, Socrates,' said Parmenides, 'and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth (*Parm.* 130d3-e4).'<sup>528</sup>

There is need to observe that young Socrates is talking to old Parmenides, although the encounter is probably Plato's fiction.<sup>529</sup> By mentioning Socrates' age, I do not wish to point to the philosophical and dramatic absurdity that Socrates has already developed the theory of Forms in his early life.<sup>530</sup> Rather, I argue that Socrates in the *Parmenides* suffers from a sort of confusion that is similar to the one he related in the autobiography section of the *Phaedo*.

Both in the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides*, we observe Socrates's self-reflection, through the eyes of Plato, on his intellectual fear. In the *Parmenides*, due to the difficulty pertaining to the scope of Forms, Socrates is 'afraid of (δείσας)' falling into some pit of nonsense and being harmed, and hence he 'hurries away (φεύγων)' and clings to the agreed on moral sorts of Forms such as the Just, Beautiful and Good (see *Parm.* 130b8-9). Similarly, as we have seen in Chapter 5, in the *Phaedo* Socrates was 'utterly blinded' because of his study of natural science and was afraid of becoming 'totally blinded' in his soul through observing things with his eyes, like

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<sup>528</sup> Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταῦτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταῦτη στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μὴ ποτε εἰς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκέισε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὥς ἔτι ἀντιλήπεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

<sup>529</sup> Cornford 1939, 64.

<sup>530</sup> More 1916, 123; Rickless 2006, 3-4.

those who look at the sun during eclipse; hence he decided to take refuge in *logoi* (see *Phd.* 99d4-e6).

Secondly, it is pertinent to note that Parmenides tries to eliminate Socrates' fear by telling Socrates that he has not yet been 'gripped by philosophy', as Socrates still cares about people's 'opinions (*δόξας*)'. Although it is not clear who these people are and what they believe, it is safe to assume that these people are not philosophers, as Socrates benefits from listening to Parmenides, who is a philosopher. Now, let me remind the readers of the lines of the *Phaedo* where Socrates is considered to be the only person who can give an account of Forms properly (*Phd.* 76b10-12). Turning to the *Parmenides*, Socrates has not yet been gripped by philosophy; hence he probably lacks expertise in philosophical argument. One might thus expect that Socrates of the *Phaedo* and Socrates of the *Parmenides* have different philosophical proficiencies.<sup>531</sup>

There is no clue that might make us think that the theory of Forms which Socrates presents in the *Parmenides* is worse than that of the *Phaedo*. In fact, it is not important that the theory of Forms is identical in both dialogues. It is sufficient that the theory of Forms is a philosophical theory, and the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides* might be presenting different but related versions of the theory of Forms. At any rate, I argue that the way in which young Socrates argues for the theory of Forms is different in these two dialogues.<sup>532</sup> It is thus possible to see how Socrates stands towards the theory of Forms in each case.

The difference between the young and old Socrates arises out of the epistemic (or intellectual) norms that govern Socrates' attitude towards the theory of Forms. It is pertinent to observe that Socrates has not yet been gripped by philosophy; hence Socrates cannot yet be a philosopher in the *Parmenides*. In the *Phaedo*, on the contrary, philosophy most probably has gripped Socrates, if we would consider Parmenides' comment on Socrates' future life to be true. Socrates, however, acts as if he is an epistemic authority in the *Parmenides* although he does not have the necessary expertise in arguments.

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<sup>531</sup> That said, it might seem implausible that Socrates in the *Parmenides* lacks expertise in arguments but is able to describe the theory of Forms at least as well as he did in the *Phaedo*. For instance, compare *Phd.* 102b1-2 and *Parm.* 130e5-6. Dramatic and philosophical consistency, I believe, are not of profound concern for Plato.

<sup>532</sup> For a view that the theory of Forms defended by Socrates in the *Parmenides* is different than that of Plato's middle period dialogues such as the *Phaedo*, see Rickless 2006, 5-6.

Similarly, we also need to observe the contrast between the attitude of Zeno/Parmenides and Socrates. While Socrates is rather pretentious and even uses an *ad hominem* argument against Zeno,<sup>533</sup> Zeno and Parmenides welcome Socrates' attempt and admire his enthusiasm. Besides, Parmenides can detect the problems that might arise out of the theory of Forms, yet Socrates seems to be unaware of these problems.<sup>534</sup> Now, let's recall Socrates' attitude towards his interlocutors in the *Phaedo*: Socrates was kind, welcoming and encouraging, as I have argued in Chapter 4.<sup>535</sup> In this respect, old Socrates' attitude towards his young interlocutors in the *Phaedo* is similar to old Parmenides' attitude towards young Socrates.

Besides, the *Parmenides* suggests that young Socrates lacks expertise in arguments, and thus his excessive trust in arguments (*e.g.* the theory of Forms) might not be appropriate, especially if we consider the epistemic norms devised for those who lack expertise in arguments in the misology argument. Now, I would like to quote Parmenides: 'Socrates, that's because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the Forms, too soon, he [Parmenides] said, before you have been properly trained'.<sup>536</sup> The difficulty stressed by Parmenides is that if someone 'won't allow that there are forms for things and won't mark off a form for each one, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same'.<sup>537</sup>

The nature of training and expertise that Socrates lacks is not relevant for my purposes.<sup>538</sup> What is of significance is to notice that after completing his training Socrates will be able to 'achieve a full view of the truth' and to defend the theory of Forms, philosophy and dialectic.<sup>539</sup> If Socrates cannot defend the theory of Forms, knowledge would become impossible for humans, and even for Gods.<sup>540</sup> In a sense,

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<sup>533</sup> See *Parm.* 128af. See Zuckert 1998, 885-886. *cf.* Cornford 1939, 67-68 for the idea that Plato does not care much about Zeno as a philosopher.

<sup>534</sup> Rickless 2006, 54.

<sup>535</sup> See *Phd.* 88e4-89a6. Meinwald (1991, 6-8) underlines the resemblance of Parmenides and Socrates of the middle and early period dialogues, such as the *Phaedo* and *Meno*, regarding the role of cross-examination.

<sup>536</sup> *Parm.* 135c8-d1 Πρὸ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν.

<sup>537</sup> *Parm.* 135b6-c2.

<sup>538</sup> Some candidates are: [1] 'the construction of antinomies in the manner of Zeno (Schofield 1977, 140)' [2] 'the dialectical training (Runciman 1959, 99)' [3] 'the procedure is to resemble Zeno's in so far as it takes a hypothesis such as 'that x exists' and deduces the consequences (Cornford 1939, 104)' [4] 'a necessary propaedeutic to the search for truth but not itself that search (Cherniss 1932, 129)'.

<sup>539</sup> *Parm.* 136c5.

<sup>540</sup> *Parm.* 134e7-8.

then, misology and Socrates' underdeveloped argument about the theory of Forms might lead to the same consequence: like misologists, and those who believe in them, the believers of the theory of Forms would be deprived of knowledge and the truth, although Socrates in the *Parmenides* might save himself (and everyone else) thanks to Parmenides' help and dialectical training.

In writing the *Parmenides*, not only did Plato aim to save the theory of Forms but he also intended to briefly touch upon the subject of the correct method of philosophical argument. As I have argued, it is dangerous to put all our trust in arguments if we lack expertise in arguments. In a sense, then, the *Parmenides* is both an attempt to develop and modify the theory of Forms and Plato's metaphilosophical study about one's attitude towards theories and arguments.

One might, however, object to my story by maintaining that the *Phaedo* looks forward to the *Parmenides* for the improvement of the theory of Forms.<sup>541</sup> I agree with the idea of looking forward, as any Platonic reader can hardly be startled to discover very specific links between the dialogues. However, I do not think it can harm my claim that the Socrates of the *Phaedo* follows the correct epistemic norms, as nothing I argue fundamentally hangs on the question which of the two dialogues is philosophically more appealing and advanced regarding the theory of Forms. Rather, it is interesting to observe that Plato clearly has some interest in metaphilosophy in the *Parmenides* and in the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry/conversation.

To conclude, one of Plato's aims in writing the *Phaedo* is to develop the correct norms of the practice of philosophers and to display these norms through the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. These norms are based on philosophical humility and they naturally sit with Plato's views on the method of inquiry in the *Phaedo*, namely the method of hypothesis. I thus think that the *Phaedo* endows the reader with intellectual virtues, along with the proofs concerning the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms.

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<sup>541</sup> E.g. Taylor 1896, 308; Rickless 2006, 25.

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