# Everyday surveillance, Goffman, and unfocused interaction

Louise Eley & Ben Rampton

*King's College London*

## Abstract

It is often said that surveillance has massively transformed our social lives (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1), but this claim is weakened by the admission that its "effects are difficult to isolate or observe, as they are embedded within many normal aspects of daily life" (ibid.). Picking up the analytic challenge, this paper investigates the everyday interactional practice and experience of being surveilled, and to do so, it draws on Goffman's account of the interaction order, dwelling closely on *unfocused interaction*, in which people maintain a side-of-the-eye, half-an-ear awareness of the people, objects, and events in the space around them. After introducing key concepts from Goffman, the paper discusses three scenes of surveillance: a woman walking down a city street, two men putting up street stickers (a civil offence), and passengers being scanned at an airport (Pütz 2012). It shows how different senses of potential threat and illegality enter the experience of surveillance, and it builds a rudimentary model. The paper considers only a tiny fraction of contemporary surveillance, but it shows Goffman's value as an analytic resource that can hold large-scale generalisations about the surveillance society to account, allowing us to see agentive responses to surveillance that are too subtle to be captured by notions like subversion and resistance. Indeed, Goffman corroborates Green and Zurawski's (2015) suggestion that surveillance is a basic mode of the social, elaborated in different ways in different environments.

According to the first page of the *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies* (Ball, Haggerty, and Lyon (eds.) 2012), contemporary developments in surveillance have produced "social changes in the dynamics of power, identity, institutional practice and interpersonal relations on a scale comparable to the changes brought by industrialization, globalization or the historical rise of urbanization" (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). And yet there are empirical uncertainties: "[the] effects [of surveillance] are difficult to isolate and observe, as they are embedded within many normal aspects of daily life" (ibid.: 1; also 9). Comparably, Green and Zurawski argue from an anthropological perspective that surveillance studies tends to operate with an "*a priori* categorization of what constitutes surveillance," treating "surveillance as so large, and such a complex set of processes, that it can best be researched and understood through its systems and structures, at the expense of attention to embeddedness in everyday life" (2015: 31; see also Ball 2002, 2005, 2009; Ball and Wilson 2000; Ball et al. 2015).

In sociolinguistics, our own (sub-)discipline, there is a long tradition of ethnographic work that examines power, ideology, and social change in everyday communicative practice. This covers class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, generation, etc. across a host of sites (including homes, communities, schools, workplaces, clinics, mass and new media). So in principle, sociolinguistics ought to be able to contribute to the studies of everyday surveillance relations advocated by Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball and Green and Zurawski, particularly if surveillance is an interactional relationship between watcher and watched, as many suggest. But somewhat remarkably, there is very little sociolinguistic research on surveillance (see however Jones 2015, 2017; Rampton 2016, 2017: 11-12; Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 6).

To understand everyday experiences of being surveilled, the ambient monitoring that everyone engages in as a routine matter-of-course provides one obvious starting point. This is the kind of side-of-the-eye, half-an-ear awareness of other people, objects, and events that we rely on wherever we go, and there is a detailed account of how it operates in social situations in Erving Goffman's work on *unfocused interaction* – the interaction that occurs between people who are physically co-present but engaged in separate activities, focusing on different things. In studies of surveillance, Goffman is sometimes brought into descriptions of the surreptitious practices with which people in subordinate positions transgress, resist, or otherwise adjust to rules and regimes that they are unable or unwilling to follow to the letter (e.g. Jacobs and Miller 1998; Collinson 1999; Helten and Fischer 2004: 343; Ball 2005: 96, 102; Simon 2005: 6-8; Cherbonneau and Copes 2006; Lyon 2007: 82, 166-7; Smith 2007: 290, 302, 308; Gilliom and Monahan 2012: 409; Marx 2009: 299). But notions like "by-standing" and "civil inattention" – key elements in unfocused interaction – hardly feature. In sociolinguistics, Goffman has had a huge influence, providing concepts that are now accepted as basic to the description of communicative interaction. But both here and in adjacent fields of communication research, the overwhelming emphasis has been on what Goffman calls '*focused* interaction,' in which people do things together, rather than on people carrying out independent activities in each other's presence.[1]

So in what follows, we first outline Goffman's conception of the *interaction order*, and then within that, unfocused interaction, a notion that treats surveillance-like activity as inextricably bound into everyday social life everywhere, regardless of the institutional domain (Jones 2017: 170) (sec. 1). In the three sections after that, we bring out the links to surveillance commonly understood as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon 2007: 14). Section 2 examines a video recording of a woman's brief walk down the street from one shop to another, and it shows how ambient monitoring, a relatively relaxed demeanour, and institutional surveillance are closely interwoven, contributing to the normalisation of surveillance. Section 3 shifts to two men who engage in the (mildly) illegal practice of posting up stickers, and uses data from participant observation and interviews to bring out differences in their sense of the risks from surveillance, drawing on Goffman to attempt a more systematic account of thought and action at the point of committing an offence under surveillance. A rudimentary model emerges which is then elaborated in a brief discussion of the interactions with surveillance technology described in Ole Pütz's (2012) study of airport scanning (sec. 4). In the final section, we summarise the analysis and consider its

---

[1] In ethnomethodological and conversation analytic micro-sociology, there is a growing body of work that uses video-recordings to look at how people interact on the move in public places (visiting museums, walking, driving, cycling), but intentional communication remains the central concern, whether this is person-to-person or mediated by material texts or objects (Kendon 1990; Mondada 2009, 2016: 347ff.; McIlvenny, Broth, and Haddington 2014; Haddington and Raunioma 2014; but see Ryave and Schenkein 1974; Hindmarsh, Heath et al. 2001: 18-19; vom Lehn, Heath, and Hindmarsh 2001: 203-207; Haddington et al. 2012; Liberman 2013). In sociolinguistics, there is also a body of research that examines public signage in 'Linguistic Landscapes,' and this now extends beyond the analysis of verbal and visual text to a view of how people interact around signs, moving through space (Scollon and Scollon 2003). This is certainly one significant source of nascent sociolinguistic interest in surveillance (Eley 2019; Jones 2017; Kitis and Milani 2015; Stroud and Jegels 2014), but even so, the potential significance of Goffman's account of *un*focused interaction for understanding surveillance remains largely unexplored.

implications for understanding surveillance and social change, the politics of surveillance, and for the theorisation of surveillance itself.

Methodologically, our discussion is offered as an interdisciplinary contribution to opening up the everyday interactional experience of being surveilled (Ball 2009: 640). In the cumulative process of comparative analysis that informs our (modest) theory-building, we draw on different types of data (audio-video recordings, participant observation, interviews) and different studies, not just our own. The only technical vocabulary we use is Goffman's (bolding the first use of terms which are especially significant in our analyses), and this is treated as a framework of "sensitising constructs," which "suggest directions along which to look" rather than "definitive" concepts which "provide prescriptions of what to see" (Blumer 1969: 148). In this way, we seek to contribute to ethnographic "research on the constitution of surveillance relations and processes in everyday life" (Green and Zurawski 2015: 38).[2]

With this view of the paper's scope and limitations in place, we should now turn to a sketch of the interaction order, within that concentrating on unfocused interaction.


## 1. Goffman, the interaction order, and unfocused interaction

Goffman's *oeuvre* roams across a plurality of empirical and documentary sources developing a rather coherent, cumulative career-long project of analytic distillation, focusing on what he came to call the **interaction order** (1983). This involves the very basic structural arrangements, forms of attention, and ritual sensitivities that arise whenever individuals are physically co-present, and his argument is that this underpins social activity everywhere. The interaction order is certainly always clothed in the kinds of cultural and institutional particularity that ethnographies describe, and these particularities have to be addressed in any empirical analysis of the interaction order. But Goffman insisted that the interaction order is only "loosely coupled" with institutional systems, roles and relationships, social statuses (age-grade, gender, class, etc.), cultural styles, and so forth (what he called "social structure" (1983: 2)), and as a result, the framework of concepts he developed is unaffected by "standard [sociological] contrast[s] between village life and city life, between domestic settings and public ones, between intimate, long-standing relations and fleeting impersonal ones" (1983: 2).

The interaction order has a "body to body starting point," and it comes into operation in "environments in which two or more individuals are physically in one another's… presence," whether they are on their own (**singles**) or in company (in **withs**) (1983: 2). "When individuals come into one another's immediate presence," says Goffman, "**territories of the self** bring to the scene a vast filigree of wires which individuals are uniquely equipped to trip over" (1971: 135-6). These territories cover a variety of preserves – our bodies, our personal space, our possessions, our reputations, the information about us (1971: chap. 2) – and in one another's presence, we "become vulnerable [not only] to physical assault, sexual

---

[2] We recognise that surveillance takes many forms (Green and Zurawski 2015: 29; Walby 2005: 158; Haggerty 2006) and at least two dimensions of surveillance that fall outside our concerns here: 'dataveillance' and the administrative design and management of information about individuals (Simon 2005: 4; van Dijck 2013; Lyon 2007: 23), and the surveillance that is pervasive in focused interactional encounters with bureaucracy (cf. Ball et al. 2015). Some observations about these can be found in Rampton and Eley 2018 (notes 28 and 31), together with a discussion of how our account of (un)focused interaction could be extended to the activity of official surveillers (2018: appendix).

molestation, kidnapping, robbery and obstruction of movement," but also "through their words and gesticulation to the penetration of our psychic preserves, and to the breaching of the expressive order we expect will be maintained in our presence" (1983: 4). A good deal of co-presence involves **focused interaction**, which, prototypically, arises when ratified participants come together "in a consciously shared, clearly interdependent undertaking, the period of participation itself bracketed with rituals of some kind" (1981: 7). But it also extends to activities in which talk plays a secondary role like "card games, service transactions," etc. (1983: 7); activities involving an audience and platform format (plays, movies, formal meetings, etc.) (ibid.); quite large-scale celebratory occasions (ibid.); and to mediated communication such as "telephonic connection and letter exchange" (1983: 6). In all these settings, participants "share a joint focus of attention, perceive that they do so, and perceive this perceiving" (1983: 3).

But the interaction order also involves the presence of people (either as singles or withs) who are engaged in adjacent activity within visual range but *beyond* the circle in which one is principally occupied. Goffman calls this **unfocused interaction**. When individuals participate in focused and unfocused interaction simultaneously, orienting both to "**ratified participants**" inside particular conversational enclosures and **bystanders** within range (who may simply overhear parts of the talk or actively listen in as eavesdroppers (1981: 131ff.)), their attention is necessarily divided. As well as being involved in the talk or task that is the main focus for ratified participants, they remain alert to the wider field of "communication in the round" and particularly in gatherings and public places, they may scan the surroundings out of the corner of their eye, checking that there is nothing nearby to alarm them (1971: chap. 1). Both within and beyond the project or encounter in which they are principally engaged, people notice but actively **disattend** objects and activities that can be safely ignored (1974: chap. 7; 1981: 132), although this distribution of involvement can shift, either gradually or suddenly, so that a person changes from "placidly attending to easily managed matters at hand" to being "fully mobilised, alarmed, ready to attack… or flee" (1971: 282; 1981: 101-4). Within the mutual monitoring environments that constitute unfocused interaction, people also usually design their own behaviour and appearance in ways that display to others that they're not a threat themselves. As well as being able to "transmit" linguistic signs in talk, people "exude" information through their **body idiom**, which is open to interpretation by anyone within perceptual range (1970: 5-11; 1963: 33-35). In addition, "this kind of controlled alertness to the situation will [often] mean suppressing or concealing many of the capacities and roles the individual might be expected to play in other settings" (1963: 24-25), and there are a host of "involvement shields" "behind which individuals can safely do the kinds of things that ordinarily result in negative sanctions" – pieces of furniture, objects, items of clothing, etc. (1963: 39ff.; 1971: 344-5).

Figure 1: Focused and unfocused interaction



Focused interaction between A & B                    Unfocused interaction between C, D & A+B

Key: ↔ : mutually ratified & reciprocated attention
- - - - : ambient awareness

As well as observing these **situational proprieties** in their own body idiom, participants usually collaborate in the maintenance of a normative "communication traffic order" (1963: 24), and much of the time they do so through **civil inattention**. In civil inattention, "one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present…, while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from [him/her] so as to express that [s/he] does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design" (1963: 84). But occasions do arise when civil inattention is abandoned. For a variety of reasons (acquaintanceship, business, etc.), someone may seek to transition from unfocused interaction to a face-to-face encounter, displaying to the person they're approaching that they're no threat with an **access ritual** like a greeting. Alternatively, some violation of situational propriety may occur – someone steps on a toe, talks too loudly, or drops something – and this can instigate either a **remedial ritual**, which involves a variable sequence of interactive moves like "primes" ("oi!"), explanations, apologies, remedies, appreciations ("thanks"), and minimisations ("no problem"), or alternatively, a "run-in" if for example the source of the infraction pointedly refuses to provide a remedy (1971: chap. 4; 1967). There are also "non-persons" – for example, children, servants, and animals – who don't observe situational proprieties and aren't accorded civil inattention (1963: 40, chap. 5), and there are others in **opening positions**, like police officers, who have "a built-in license to accost others" (1963: 129).

In summary, unfocused interaction involves:

a) perceiving other people's activity from the outside, without being a ratified co-participant in the talk or task they are engaged in, and assuming that they are also aware of you;
b) styling your appearance and bodily conduct in non-threatening ways, broadly in accordance with the proprieties of the situation;
c) actively displaying civil inattention and a respect for the boundaries around the joint activity of "withs" and the territories of the selves of "singles";
d) only shifting into a focused encounter with an access ritual that provides reassurance that the approach is non-threatening, or if some un-ignorable infraction is jeopardising situational proprieties.

There are a lot more subtleties in Goffman's work, but this initial sketch should be sufficient to show that he sees unfocused interaction and the ambient monitoring it entails as an ineradicable aspect of our behaviour in social situations. How, though, is ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction linked with experiences of surveillance, defined as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon 2007: 14)?

We will explore this in the rest of the paper, and use the resources that Goffman provides to address their connection in everyday experience, beginning with data from Eley's fieldwork in the streets of Frankfurt.


## 2. Walking in a street and the normalisation of surveillance

Eley's doctoral ethnography developed an interactional perspective on the regulation, perception, and emplacement of signage in a large public thoroughfare in Frankfurt,[3] and the analysis here focuses on a 3 minute 52 second audio-video recording of a woman leaving one shop, going out into the street in search of another, seeing it, and then crossing the road to go into it – all in all, a process that would be hard to beat in terms of day-to-day mundanity (Green and Zurawski 2015: 40). As such, it is a good test of our ability to document some lived experience of unfocused interaction with Goffman as a guide, and in what follows, we will consider the woman's humming and general demeanour, different types of ambient attention, and fleeting experience of the city traffic police, which we recorded with a tiny audio-visual device built into the spectacles that the woman was wearing. Here is a sketch of the background and the main actions recorded on the video.

*Background*: It's around 3pm on Friday in mid-March. The walker (henceforth "Inge") is a middle-aged white German woman, who lived for several years in Turkey and speaks Turkish. She lives outside the neighbourhood, but likes to visit it from time to time, when "I'll run a few errands. I'll go to Her Şey [a kiosk (not its real name)], chat with [the owner]. Buy fruit. The usual. Drink tea" (taken from Eley's conversation with Inge about her plans before she set off wearing the video glasses). But Inge hasn't been in the neighbourhood for a while, and is looking for Her Şey because "every time I look for Her Şey, I [can] never find it." She starts wearing the video glasses at around 3pm and stops at around 4pm. A video-replay discussion takes place immediately afterwards.[4]

*Broad outline of actions:*
27.42: Inge starts to leave the Turkish bookshop with her purchase and begins humming softly as she moves to the door. (Inge hummed when walking on other occasions during Eley's fieldwork, including when walking with Eley without the video-glasses.)
27.46: turns left onto the pavement and walks along it, humming
28.28: crosses a side road (without stopping humming)
28.46: briefly interrupts humming to comment on an Indian bakery with papered up windows: "Oh it's closed or something. Gosh!" Then resumes
29.12: moves closer to the left to the shop window and slows down for 4 seconds in front of a display of Turkish books and CDs
29.26 and 29.37: Inge has been looking across to the opposite side of the main road from time to time (28.52 – 29.02) and continues to do so later (29.58 – 30.00; 30.10 – 30.14), but now she stops and looks across the road for 5 seconds and then again for 8 seconds at a small shop missing a shop front sign displaying its name, with 4 men standing outside (still humming) (Inge during replay: "there I'm looking for Her Şey"). Then carries on walking (and humming)
30.03: comments looking up at a shop: "This is new here. Okay?" Resumes humming
30.23: approaches a second side road, glances left twice at a small cluster of men (two in city traffic police uniforms), momentarily stopping the humming during the first glance (see below). Crosses the side road (humming again)
30.40: moves to the right of the pavement, and while looking up and down the main road, says: "((*unclear word*)) there seen it"

---

[3] Eley 2019; see also Scollon and Scollon 2003; Blommaert 2013; Jones 2017; Stroud and Jegels 2014
[4] Eley wasn't in audio contact with Inge during the walk, and did not follow her.

30.43: crosses the main road (humming until she reaches approximately half-way, resuming when she reaches the pavement)

31.05: slows down as she approaches Her Şey's shop front, which is covered with stickers and posters, and stops humming

31.09: stops walking for nearly 20 seconds to read a poster stuck to the wall outside, going close up to one (no humming)

31.28: moves along towards the shop door (resuming humming)

31.30: turns right through the door, sees the shop-owner close at hand, and slips straight from humming to a greeting

There are important clues to Inge's shifts of attention and experience of the surroundings in the humming that she keeps up for most of the walk, stopping at particular moments, and Goffman facilitates three observations.

First, Goffman sees humming as a "side involvement," one among a number of activities that "an individual can carry on in an abstracted fashion without threatening or confusing simultaneous maintenance of a main involvement... Humming while working and knitting while listening are examples" (Goffman 1963: 43, 70; Rampton 2006: chap. 3). This fits the video: Inge's main involvement is finding Her Şey, but she drops her humming when she refers out loud to changes that she notices (the shops that have closed and opened since her last visit [28.46, 30.03]), as well as when she stops outside Her Şey to look at a poster (31.09) – in other words, she stops humming when particular things catch or require her closer attention. Second, whereas full-voiced singing would draw attention, the softness of her humming is consistent with situational propriety and the display of civil inattention. This kind of private orientation to music (and other auditory artefacts) involves an "inward migration from the gathering": "[w]hile outwardly participating in an activity within a social situation, an individual can allow his attention to turn from what he and everyone else considers the real or serious world, and give himself up for a time to a playlike world in which he alone participates" (1963: 69). Third, Inge's humming suggests that she feels relatively safe in the street, presupposing an environment that doesn't demand full alertness, where she can "placidly attend to easily managed matters at hand" (1971: 282). There is, though, one episode relevant to *institutional surveillance* when this situation seems marginally less stable.

As Inge approaches the second side road, a man, who has just crossed it and is walking towards her, briefly turns his head right to look down the side road (30.18, see Figure 2), looks ahead again, and then glances back once more (30.19). He passes Inge on the inside of the pavement, and then as she moves closer to the corner with a view down the side road, she also turns her head to look down the side road. A group of three men standing and talking come into view, one of them behind a pedestrian barrier (30.22, see Figure 3). Two are in city traffic police uniforms, one with arms folded (behind the barrier), the other with hands held behind his back, while the un-uniformed man has his hands in his pockets. Another pedestrian, who had been walking ahead of Inge and has turned down the side street, can be seen glancing back in the direction of the group. As the threesome comes into view, Inge stops humming for about 2 seconds (30.22-24). She then resumes the tune, turns her head back to the direction she's going (to avoid the bollard ahead 30.26), but then looks back down the side-street once more for a couple of seconds, with the group of three to the left of her vision. After that, she turns her head back in the direction she's going, humming and walking forward across the side road.

Figure 2: Oncoming pedestrian turning head right to look down side road (circled in blue)



Figure 3: The scene recorded by the video-glasses at the moment when Inge is turning her head down the side-street and stops humming. (The two uniformed men are circled in blue, the un-uniformed man in white, and the pedestrian glancing back in yellow.)



So what can we learn from all this about ambient monitoring and experiences of surveillance in unfocused interaction? To answer, we can first focus on the walker, turning to studies of surveillance afterwards.

The video we've described lasts less than four minutes, but it provides quite a rich socio-cognitive view of Inge's fluctuating and multi-track attention to the circumstances around her (cf. Goffman 1974: chap. 7). Her overall *intention* is to locate and reach Her Şey, and the video captures her actively looking, walking forwards, and from time to time *scanning* the opposite side of the road, at one point stopping for over 10 seconds to look more closely

(29.26 and 29.37). There are also moments of *noticing* when she slows down (29.12; 31.05), stops (31.09), or comments (28.46; 30.03; 30.40) near things that catch her attention and speak to her cultural interests (in Turkish culture, in the poster at the kiosk which she thought was advertising a reading/exhibition, in the changing neighbourhood). For much of the time, she is "*away*" in the tune that she is humming, although she does this in a way that displays respect for the situation (1974: 345). In fact, she passes more than 20 pedestrians coming towards her on the pavement without any problem, and in doing so, she employs a "*dissociated vigilance*" that "provide[s] a running reading of the situation, a constant monitoring of what surrounds… out of the further corner [of the] eye, leaving the individual [her]self free to focus [her] main attention on the non-emergencies around [her]" (1971: 282). Of course the passers-by also contribute to avoiding collision, mutually monitoring and adjusting their own paths as well (Goffman 1971: 28; Ryave and Schenkein 1974; Haddington et al. 2012: para. 40-42, 47).

But beyond the different kinds of (often simultaneous) awareness displayed in Inge's practices, what about her experience of organised institutional surveillance? There is a non-smoking sign on the door of the bookshop that she leaves, and as Jones notes, this implies that "someone… is watching… to make sure that [customers] do not engage in these prohibited activities" (2017: 154). But in the recording, it appears only very briefly at the edge of the screen – Inge doesn't appear to pay any attention to this on the video (and doesn't light up when she gets outside). Nor does she look up at any of the CCTV cameras that she passes.[5] It is most likely that both types of surveillance are just taken-for-granted, but this is *not quite* the case with the two uniformed employees of the city traffic police she passes, even though their "opening position" means that they might also be taken for granted. Here it looks as though she is alerted to something non-normal by the two rightward glances of the pedestrian coming towards her, and she appears to pay greater attention to the scene with the traffic police when she glances towards the group for 4 seconds (30.22 – 30.26), momentarily stops humming (30.22 – 30.24), and then looks back for two seconds as she moves past (30.26 – 30.29). But that's it. The body idiom of the three men suggests nothing untoward (arms folded, hands clasped behind back, hands in pockets); "as the individual moves, some potential signs for alarm move out of effective range (as their sources move out of relevance)" (Goffman 1971: 301); and "the actions of passers-by form a chain of embodied events that signal and help maintain normalcy" (Haddington et al. 2012: para. 35) – the oncoming pedestrian whose sideways glancing Inge copied didn't look unduly concerned, and nor does anyone else. All in all, the official surveillance supported by organisations here seems to be inextricably interwoven with the routine practices of unfocused interaction that everyone performs in Inge's vicinity.

If we turn to the literature in surveillance studies, this account of the subjective experience of surveillance is very broadly compatible with the phenomenological approach suggested by Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith (2009) and Ball (2005: 96-98, following Crossley 1995, 2001), addressing "lived space, lived time, lived body, lived human relations" and "a-thematic consciousness" ("awareness that is not intellectual, interpretive or deciphering") (Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith 2009: 85, 88). But as an empirical method, the introspectively generated narratives that Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith recommend are unlikely to be able to capture the synchronised interplay of physical movement, built environment, body idiom, gaze, and vocalisation recorded in the 10 seconds of video in which Inge oriented to (non-)events with traffic police down the side-street. Indeed, more generally, the narratives produced in interviews are likely to have quite serious limitations as sources of insight into

---

[5] Judging from Eley's photographs of the street, there are at least three CCTV cameras that she walks past.

the lived experience of surveillance. This is because narratives tend to dwell on what's tellable (and often a little bit more dramatic), thereby missing the mundane unremarkableness of surveillance in a scene like the one that Inge experienced during her walk (cf. Green and Zurawski 2015: 28, 31). And yet it is essential to address this humdrum ordinariness if we are interested in the *normalisation* of surveillance (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). In fact, the combination of Goffman and an audio-video recording like this allows us to spotlight the very practices with which the normality of surveillance is produced and maintained – mid-afternoon on a Friday for Inge.

But of course our account has been closely tuned to the experience of one particular person, a respectable middle-aged woman. The links we've made to Goffman show that our case isn't utterly idiosyncratic, but even so, experiences of surveillance differ considerably, and it is worth now turning to a case study of two people with everyday interests that bring them closer to the borders of legality. In the process, we will develop another angle on how surveillance is experienced, and start to build a model to represent this.

### 3. Posting up stickers and the experience of feeling surveilled

It is a civil offence in Frankfurt to post up stickers (small pieces of adhesive material carrying text and/or images) in the street, and the local authorities and public transport operators employ cleaners to take them down. Eley's PhD fieldwork included a number of individuals and groups who regularly put up stickers in the neighbourhood she was researching (which also had more CCTV cameras than any other part of the city). While some engaged in stickering for fun, because they liked particular stickers and enjoyed seeing interesting or amusing ones around, others used them in social, political, and commercial projects that they were committed to, and their stickers carried messages about welcoming migrants, new musical outlets, and so forth (cf. Eley 2019). In both categories, people said that they liked to have some stickers ready in their pockets whenever they went into the streets. We didn't video anyone placing stickers, but we asked about and/or observed the process, and it is worth comparing what two of them told us.

Adnan was in his late twenties, was born in Turkey, came to Germany as a child, now ran a small business, and put up stickers if he liked the political message or found them entertaining. Talking about putting up stickers on trains, he said:

> Yeah because vandalism is anti-social ((*laughs*)). It's vandalism vis-à-vis the City… There are cameras everywhere... Yeah or ticket inspectors are there (translated from German).

And he explained how he actually posted them up:

> Just like that, put it in your hand... Sticker is here, you hold it so like ((*bends fingers inwards to cup hand, traces with other hand the rectangle shape of the sticker*)) you take the backing away and ((*stretches arm out as if leaning with hand against surface*))… Looks as though it was already there (translated from German).

Figure 4: Preparing to place a sticker covertly (not demonstrated by Adnan)



In Goffman's terms, Adnan was using his hand as an "involvement shield," concealing the sticker and disguising his action as a mundane stretch or lean.

James, also in his twenties, was born in the UK but spent a lot of time growing up abroad. During a stay in Frankfurt he became increasingly involved in a third sector organisation and remained in the city, supporting himself by working as a waiter. His stickers promoted the work, projects, and politics of the organisation, and when we asked him about stickering, he said:

> no I don't care about cameras. a lot of people care about cameras, I don't... like I don't think anybody is gonna look at a camera twenty-four hours. and even if they see somebody sticker something they're like okay. like if you go graffiti something maybe be a bit more wary. but a sticker like yeah it's not much.

And here is Eley's field diary about walking with him from one of his organisation's events to the nearest tram stop:

> James left a trail of stickers along the route that we walked. While he walked, he took the backing from the back of the stickers and placed them on objects along our path, including two bollards, and he left one unstuck on a car. He appeared calm and unconcerned with who may be watching him, not looking around or over his shoulder at all, for example to see if CCTV cameras or any individuals were watching him. He took care and time to place the stickers straight, by holding them at the corners, and then wiped his hand over the top to stick them securely.

There are obvious differences in James and Adnan's approaches to being surveilled, and Goffman's account of the remedial interchanges that sometimes turn unfocused into focused interaction helps to systematise them. In remedial interchanges, says Goffman, it is important to distinguish between (a) an act and (b) its categorisation or not as an offence, and (c) the interaction following the act in which the moral status of the act and its perpetrator is negotiated (1971: 99, 102, 106). So when, for example, a person does something which appears to breach situational propriety (the deed), people in the vicinity are likely to display some concern, and it is how the actor then responds to their display – whether or not s/he appears repentant, convincingly disowns it, etc. – which determines whether the deed is

deemed inoffensive and normal order is restored, or whether further sanctions need to be pursued. Both Adnan and James are committed to the act of stickering, but in Adnan's account, bystanders and CCTV watchers would object to the act and initiate an interaction that could lead to sanctions. Adnan's concealment strategy was not only designed to hide the act but to provide him with a ready denial if held to account ("the sticker was already there"). In contrast, James didn't think that anything could happen (no one would be watching CCTV and stickering wasn't serious enough to pursue). But he did imagine other people reacting to his stickers, and this influenced where he placed them: he didn't put them up on surfaces belonging to local and migrant-run businesses as "they're… in the same bracket as us who are working class. They're the people we wanna get on our side." So overall, James worried less about being spotted doing something illegal than about creating a bad impression on people that he didn't want to alienate. Comparing the two, Adnan's concerns were much more immediate – being seen committing the act and being accused of an offence – and their differences are laid out in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of how Adnan and James anticipate the act of stickering
leading to remedial interchanges

a)  *who could observe the act and/or its outcomes, when?*:
      Adnan: CCTV cameras and ticket inspectors – now, during the emplacing
      James:  nobody will be watching the CCTV; later on, local business and car owners,
                  cleaners

b)  *what would they think of it?*:
      Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – vandalism
      James: CCTV operators – too minor to pursue; local car & business owners – a nuisance,
                  requiring time-consuming removal; cleaners – a work task

c)  *what actions would they be likely to pursue if they spotted the act?*
      Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – they'd pick you out and intervene, now or
                  later
      James: CCTV operators – nothing; locals – scrape off the stickers, and think badly of the
                  project being publicised; cleaners – scrape them off

d)  *what are the implications of all this for the here-and-now performance of the act?*
      Adnan: conceal the act of stickering, and be ready with a disclaimer
      James: ignore the CCTV and carry on stickering as normal; don't post stickers up on local
                  businesses, or use adhesive on local cars; put them on surfaces that cleaners seldom
                  work on

This difference no doubt partly reflects differences in their ethnicity and biographical experience: on other occasions, Adnan talked about racial profiling and encounters he had had with security personnel. But staying with the close-up exploration of experiences of surveillance, we can bring in Goffman's notion of the **Umwelt** to differentiate Adnan's perspective from James'. The *Umwelt* refers to "the sphere around the individual within which… potential sources of alarm are found" (1971: 297), and when stickering, Adnan's sense of *Umwelt* threats was quite pressing. We can't say for sure whether James' *Umwelt* orientation was closer to Inge's than Adnan's when he was posting up stickers, but if we

bring Inge back into the account, we can differentiate experiences of surveillance more clearly.

As Inge walked down the street, there was a ten second period when the gaze direction of another pedestrian and the sight of a scene in which there were uniformed men drew her attention, but there was no inkling of any untoward event, transgressive act, or perpetrator. More generally, other than the cars, oncoming pedestrians, and street furnishings that her dissociated vigilance helped her to avoid, there was little sense that Inge was watching out for particular threats or types of people who were likely to draw her into remedial interchanges. This was ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction, running along with a respectfully conducted side-involvement (humming), interspersed with noticings and scannings in search of her destination.

There was much more than dissociated vigilance or being "away" in the conduct that Adnan described. Rather than operating like Inge with a generalised awareness of whoever happened to be in the vicinity, Adnan was alert to the threat from very particular social types when he posted a sticker up – officials nearby or behind the CCTV – and he engaged in fabrication: "an intentional effort… to manage activity so that… others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is going on" (1974: 83). His actions appeared to take a determinate shape that he was able to reflect and report on, and if we combine this with concepts offered by Goffman, we can suggest a general structure for the experience of surveillance that Adnan described:

i. the experience starts when an individual considers carrying out an act that they know is sometimes regarded as an offence;
ii. s/he reckons with the *Umwelt*, and imagines co-present observers who are likely to see her/his act as an offence, to view him/her as a suspect, and to initiate particular kinds of remedial sequence (see Table 1);
iii. s/he decides whether to abandon the act or go ahead with it, concentrating on body idiom to conceal it if they opt for the latter;
iv. the experience ends either when he/she moves out of range of the observers and relaxes, or when the surveillers declare themselves, maybe in uniform or through a public address system, at which point some kind of synchronous focused interaction takes over (an arrest, a remedial interchange, etc.).[6]

As a short-hand for this kind of experience of surveillance, with its heightened but disguised concern with surveilling bystanders, we can perhaps refer to Adnan's only-apparently unfocused conduct as "crypto-focused" interaction under surveillance, distinguishing this, on one hand, from the fluid and multi-track ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction that we saw with Inge, and on the other hand, from the kind of focused encounter with officials that his targeted concealment seeks to evade.

Adnan's conduct broadly matches the accounts of deception that feature most commonly when Goffman is cited in surveillance studies, but we have elaborated it here within a fuller account of unfocused interaction. Indeed, Goffman's framework can also be extended to at least some of the everyday practices that arise at "the surfaces of contact or interfaces between… life-forms and webs of information,… between organs/body parts and entry/projection systems" (Bogard 1996: 33, cited in Ball 2005: 94), where human bodies intersect with surveillant technologies (Simon 2005: 17; Ball 2005, 2009; Ball and Wilson

---

[6] There is another possibility: the surveilled address the surveillers, turning them into an audience - see Smith 2007: 293-4, 299.

2000; Lyon 2007: 164). This is demonstrated in Ole Pütz's (2012) ethnographic study of scanning at an airport security check point, which is briefly discussed in the next section.


## 4. Close-up interaction with surveillance technology

Pütz focuses on the brief but highly standardised process of preparing for an airport security check, stepping through a metal detector scanner, and being patted down by security staff if the scanner raises the alarm (2012: 164). This is a situation in which it is hard for travellers to ignore the fact that they are being actively surveilled as a potential security threat, but Pütz details the ways in which everyone intensifies the effort to act as if nothing untoward is happening. He notes that the closer passengers come to the checkpoint itself, the quieter they become, dropping conversation and turning off their cell phones (172). One adult enters the walk-through metal detector at a time and "if the scanner detects metallic objects, screeners must identify who raised the alarm and pat this traveller down to locate the source of the alarm on his body" (168). At this point, Pütz brings Goffman into the analysis, and proposes that this patting-down potentially violates the travellers' personal space (cf. "territories of the self" in sec. 1). But the screeners and travellers conduct this "breach of personal space in a way that reduces the social implications of bodily proximity" (173). The screeners use a hand-metal detector, "a lifeless technical object"; they wear gloves so there is no skin to skin contact; and they avoid "private parts and do… not linger long on any part of the body" (173). The travellers who are stopped and patted down "avert their eyes while being patted down and focus visually on a point in the middle distance. They thus minimise the appearance of [focused] interaction, because eye contact is a clear indicator of [this]… [But they] do not fully avert the eye or stare dreamily into space; they are able to observe the situation out of the corner of the eye and stay cooperative" (173).

In Goffman's terms, this seems to be one of those "'blind' transactions, in which persons come together to accomplish a joint activity but do not bracket this spate of mutual coordination ritually, that is, do not sustain a social encounter," which would involve "an exchange of words or other recognition rituals and the ratification of mutual participation in an open state of talk" (1971: 97; also 1963: 88ff.). Pütz uses the notion of civil inattention (cf. sec. 1) to explain the participants' conduct at the scanner, and in fact remedial interchanges are also potentially relevant, since at this particular point of the security process, the unstated question motivating the scanning of bodies (and personal possessions) is: "Do you carry weapons or contraband which is a source of risk?" (2012: 169). This question is in principle potentially offensive to travellers, casting doubt on their character, and this may also contribute to the de-personalising avoidance strategies that Pütz outlines (2012: 175).[7]

This airport scene obviously differs in a number of ways from our characterisation of stickering. The surveillance technologies work differently: CCTV scans the street and picks out individuals, often differentiating them by age, ethnicity, gender as well as activity and appearance, whereas the step-through substance detector at the airport is used on all the passengers, regardless of social and personal identity. Stickerers vary in their interpretations of potential reactions to their acts of sticker emplacement, whereas in the airport scanner, a standardised interpretation of *Umwelt* risks takes over and governs everyone's behaviour. And their orientations to remedial interchanges are different: the stickerers wanted to avoid them, whereas airport passengers were already drawn into a remedial sequence, positioned as suspects, and probed with technologies which investigated whether they were carrying

---

[7] Rampton and Eley 2018: sec. 5 elaborate the possibilities in more detail.

material they shouldn't. Even so, it looks as though Goffman's account of unfocused interaction, remedial interchanges, and the *Umwelt* are relevant to both.

## 5. Summary and conclusions

Our discussion of scenes from everyday life has tried to show that Goffman's work provides a multitude of empirical "entry points" into the (inter-) subjectively lived experience of surveillance, in all its "ubiquity and relative normalization" (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 9). Pütz characterises the airport scanning process as a "non-event" because it does not acknowledge the passenger as an individual (2012: 158), and if we accept this, we can use Goffman to develop the following schematisation of the experiences of surveillance that we have considered. So to begin with, we have

- focused interaction, which we can see, for example, whenever security staff abandon their surveillant position as overhearers/eavesdroppers and engage the (erstwhile) surveilled in a mutually acknowledged encounter such as a remedial interchange (as in stop-and-search). Alternatively, the (formerly) surveilled act up to the cameras (Smith 2007).

Then we have:

- *un-focused* interaction, exemplified by Inge's ambient awareness, her ease in an *Umwelt* characterised by normal appearances, doing nothing likely to provoke a remedial sequence, displaying only a very fleeting interest in uniformed personnel, taking surveillance for granted for the rest of the time;
- *crypto-focused* interaction under surveillance, involving the appearance of unfocused interaction even though the actor's attention and actions are directed towards co-present observers. This was Adnan, concealing his activity from the CCTV and uniformed personnel that he was now more acutely aware of, and was keen to avoid any remedial engagement with;

and lastly with Pütz:

- *non-focused* interaction under surveillance, involving surveillers and surveilled in a collaborative refusal to initiate a ritually ratified engagement, already finding themselves in a highly standardised remedial interchange, with the surveilled seeking to relinquish the status of suspect as soon as possible.

The lines between these four types of interaction are obviously porous – un-, crypto-, and non-focused interaction can swiftly become focused, crypto- can slip back to unfocused, and so forth. And this list certainly isn't offered as a comprehensive typology. But it does show that Goffman's framework allows rather a differentiated account of the experience of surveillance, and at least in our own work, this carries three implications.

First, one of the most obvious implications of our approach is to interrogate large-scale generalisations, providing resources with which to examine the manner and extent to which "technological innovations fundamentally alter the organisation, practice and effects of surveillance relationships" (Simon 2005: 1), changing "the dynamics of power, identity, institutional practice and interpersonal relations on a scale comparable to… industrialisation, globalisation and… the rise of urbanisation" (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). If some of the practices and relations that Goffman described in embodied interaction can be found in technologically mediated surveillance, then surveillance before and after technological

change can be compared, examining the alteration more closely. All the cases we have discussed involved at least partly embodied interaction, but the concepts we have used are also relevant to surveillance in entirely web-based communication (Jenkins 2010). For example, Marwick and boyd (2010; boyd and Marwick 2011; Marwick 2012) investigate US teenagers' concerns about "social surveillance" by friends and family, arguing that social media present them with entirely new experiences of exposure because of on-line "context collapse." Off-line, they suggest, "different social contexts are typically socially or temporally bounded, making the expected social role quite obvious [but] technology blurs the boundaries between formerly strict categories" (Marwick 2012: 386); "[s]ocial media technologies collapse multiple audiences into single contexts" (Marwick and boyd 2010: 114). There is, though, a challenge to this in Goffman's civil inattention (boyd and Marwick 2011: 25), deriving as it does from our ability to divide attention and handle the co-presence of a lot of different people as a matter of routine, managing a main involvement with ratified participants at the same time as disattending – but remaining alert to – others in the vicinity, known and unknown. In other words, the experience of public exposure notionally associated with context collapse isn't exclusive to on-line environments, and it isn't generally very problematic. Off- and on-line communication are obviously different, but with Goffman, we can investigate the differences with more specific questions, such as: what semiotic strategies and resources take the place of body idiom in displays of situational propriety in online gatherings? How far and in what ways does digital platform architecture provide new or different resources for concealing negatively sanctionable acts (involvement shields) and so forth (cf. Westlake 2008)?

Second, our study has implications for political interpretations of surveillance. Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball claim that "surveillance, although a normal everyday process in many contexts, is one which is inherently political: its very application constitutes a polity" (2012: 1). In an important though abstract sense, this is true in so far as control and influence are at stake. But whether or not the people involved in a surveillant relationship *experience* it as political – as oppressive, necessary, acceptable, or nothing of note – is subject to the kinds of variation we have described. If this variation is overlooked, there is a risk of losing the distinction between "intrusive forms of intelligence and pervasive forms of everyday surveillance, including inside the academic literature" (Bigo 2017: 3). Such a conflation of the intrusive and mundane has at least two effects. First (and of immediate concern to Bigo), a failure to distinguish the intrusive from the everyday can be used by professionals in the security field to "justify an extension of intrusive intelligence" (Bigo 2017: 3), bolstering this with the claim that as a pervasive feature of daily life, people aren't worried about surveillance. Second, if it is all seen as intrusive, there is a temptation for research on everyday experiences of surveillance to emphasise resistance: "closing blinds, shredding documents, purchasing anti-surveillance devices, or learning how to 'hide in the light'" (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 4; Marx 2009). But how accurately would this view of agentive practice capture Inge's experience of surveillance, and how closely does it apply to the ways that security personnel and travellers collaborate in the production of unfocused interaction at the airport scanner?

Last, our analysis has implications for the theorisation of surveillance itself, which we can tie to one of Green and Zurawski's central questions: Can surveillance be seen as a basic mode of sociality that is elaborated in different ways in different environments – surveillance as "a dimension of the social" that becomes "manifest in other activities and practices" that are perceived (or not) as such (2015: 29, 35; also Simon 2005)? Our answer is "yes". Unfocused interaction involves: being alert to others beyond the task or encounter that you're focused on, and knowing you're also visible to them; styling your conduct and outward appearance to conform to the proprieties of the situation, restricting intrusive gazes either

way with civil inattention; and shifting to direct engagement only if you can display benign intent or there's some un-ignorable infraction. Most if not all these forms of awareness, practices, and concerns seem fundamental to sociality, and in the three case studies that we have cited, we have seen how different ways of enacting unfocused interaction contribute to the normalisation of institutional surveillance, as well as to the ways in which sharper experiences of being surveilled are differently configured.

In surveillance studies, Foucault's panopticon has been a cardinal reference point (1977). In contrast, Goffman's work has made only a rather minor contribution, being drawn into the description of how subordinates cope, often with references to Goffman's early work on impression management and *Asylums* (1959, 1961). But as we have tried to show, Goffman has a much broader view of interaction, seeing it as a fundamental form of sociality, and contemporary developments are likely to increase the relevance of this perspective. In Foucault's panopticon, the inmate "is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (1977: 200). Goffman also wrote a great deal about people being the objects of information, but his starting assumption was that even though people's agendas and constraints might be very different, this monitoring is *mutual*. Seen from this vantage point, the panopticon looks like an attempt to *limit* and *restructure* interactional capacities and practices of the kind we have discussed – indeed, in the C17th plague prevention order with which Foucault opens his account of panopticism, there is lockdown and a ban on gatherings, a primary site of unfocused interaction (1977: 195). More recently, however, the view has been growing that the panopticon is no longer adequate as a model of contemporary control (Deleuze 1992; Fraser 2003; Rampton 2016). Haggerty, for example, speaks of "[t]ear[ing] down the walls… demolishing the panopticon" (2006: title), and like others, he opts instead for Foucault's notion of governmentality, allowing more scope for the activity of the governed: "while governance inevitably involves efforts to persuade, entice, coerce or cajole subjects to modify their behaviour in particular directions, the targets of governance are understood to be a locus of freedom… subjects as active agents" (2006: 40). Haggerty conceptualises this interactional agency more narrowly than we suggest, prioritising "resistance, avoidance or subversion" (ibid.). Even so, if Goffman is given the kind of broader reading that we have attempted, his work can serve as a central point of departure for investigation of the everyday enactment and experience of surveillance in contemporary life.

--------------------

# References

Ball, Kirstie. 2002. Elements of surveillance: A new framework and future directions. *Information, Communication and Society* 5 (4): 573-590.

Ball, Kirstie. 2005. Organisation, surveillance and the body: Towards a politics of resistance. *Organization* 12 (1): 89-108.

Ball, Kirstie. 2009. Exposure: Exploring the subject of surveillance. *Information, Communication and Society* 12 (5): 639-657.

Ball, Kirstie, Ana Chanoto, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb, Maureen Meadows, and Keith Spiller. 2015. *The Private Security State? Surveillance, Consumer Data and the War on Terror.* Frederiksberg: CBS Press.

Ball, Kirstie, Kevin Haggerty, and David Lyon (eds.). 2012. *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies.* London: Routledge.

Ball, Kirstie, and David Wilson. 2000. Power, control and computer-based performance monitoring: Repertoires, resistance and subjectivities. *Organisation Studies* 21 (3): 539-565.

Bigo, Didier. 2017. *Beyond national security, the emergence of a digital reason of state(s) led by transnational guilds of sensitive information: The case of the Five Eyes Plus network.* MS. King's College London.

Blommaert, Jan. 2013. *Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Blumer, Harold. 1969. *Symbolic Interaction.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bogard, William. 1996. *The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

boyd, danah, and Alice Marwick. 2011. *Social privacy in networked publics: Teens' attitudes, practices and strategies.* https://www.danah.org/papers/2011/SocialPrivacyPLSC-Draft.pdf [accessed June 26, 2019].

Cherbonneau, Michael, and Heith Copes. 2006. "Drive it like you stole it": Auto theft and the illusion of normalcy. *British Journal of Criminology* 46: 193-211.

Collinson, David. 1999. "Surviving the rigs": Safety and surveillance on North Sea oil installations. *Organisation Studies* 20 (4): 579-600.

Crossley, Nick. 1995. Body techniques, agency and intercorporeality: On Goffman's *Relations in Public. Sociology* 29 (1): 133-149.

Crossley, Nick. 2001. Merleau-Ponty, the elusive body and carnal sociology. *Body and Society* 1 (1): 43-63.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. *October* 59: 3-7.

Eley, Louise. 2019. *Linguistic Landscape: An interactional perspective.* Unpublished PhD dissertation. King's College London.

Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fraser, Nancy. 2003. From discipline to flexibilisation? Rereading Foucault in the shadow of globalisation. *Constellations* 10 (2): 160-171.

Friesen, Norm, Andrew Feenberg, and Grace Smith. 2009. Phenomenology and surveillance studies: Returning to the things themselves. *The Information Society* 25: 84-90.

Gilliom, John, and Torin Monahan. 2012. Everyday resistance. In *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, edited by Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty and David Lyon, 405-411. London: Routledge.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Goffman, Erving. 1961. *Asylums.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Goffman, Erving. 1963. *Behaviour in Public Places.* New York: Free Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1967. *Interaction Ritual.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Goffman, Erving. 1970. *Strategic Interaction.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Goffman, Erving. 1971. *Relations in Public.* London: Allen Lane.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis.* Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk.* Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1983. The interaction order. *American Sociological Review* 48: 1-17.

Green, Nicola, and Nils Zurawski. 2015. Surveillance and ethnography: Researching surveillance as everyday life. *Surveillance & Society* 13 (1): 27-43.

Haddington, Pentti, Sami Frogell, Anna Grubert, Heidi Huhta, Pauli Jussila, Juha Kinnunen, Antti Korpela et al. 2012. Civil inattention in public places: Normalising unusual events through mobile and embodied practices. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 13 (3).

Haddington, Pentti, and Mirka Rauniomaa. 2014. Interaction between road users: Offering space in traffic. *Space and Culture* 17 (2): 176-190.

Haggerty, Kevin. 2006. Tear down the walls: On demolishing the panopticon. In *Theorising Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, edited by David Lyon, 23-45. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

Helten, Frank, and Bernd Fischer. 2004. Reactive attention: Video surveillance in Berlin shopping malls. *Surveillance & Society* 2 (2/3): 323-345.

Hindmarsh, Jon, and Christian Heath, Dirk vom Lehn, Luigina Ciolfi, Tony Hall,

Liam Bannon, Katie Best, and Jenny Hall. 2001. *Interaction as a public phenomenon*. Stockholm: CID, Centre for User Oriented IT Design.

Jacobs, Bruce, and Jody Miller. 1998. Crack Dealing, Gender, and Arrest Avoidance. *Social Problems* 45 (4): 550-569.

Jenkins, Richard. 2010. The 21st century interaction order. In *The Contemporary Goffman*, edited by Michael Jacobsen, 257-274. London: Routledge.

Jones, Rodney. 2015. Surveillance. In *Routledge Handbok of Language and Digital Communication*, edited by Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Teresa Spilioti, 408-411. London: Routledge.

Jones, Rodney. 2017. Surveillant landscapes. *Linguistic Landscape* 3 (2): 149-186.

Kendon, Adam. 1990. *Conducting Interaction: Patterns of Behaviour in Focused Encounters.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitis, Dmitri, and Tommaso Milani. 2015. The performativity of the body: Turbulent spaces in Greece. *Linguistic Landscape* 1 (3): 268-290.

Liberman, Kenneth. 2013. *More Studies in Ethnomethology.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Lyon, David. 2007. *Surveillance Studies: An Overview.* Cambridge: Polity.

Lyon, David, Kevin Haggerty, and Kirstie Ball. 2012. Introducing surveillance studies. In *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, edited by Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty and David Lyon, 1-11. London: Routledge.

Marwick, Alice. 2012. The public domain: Social surveillance in everyday life. *Surveillance & Society* 9 (4): 378-393.

Marwick, Alice, and danah boyd. 2010. I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. *New Media & Society* 13 (1): 114-133.

Marx, Gary. 2009. A tack in the shoe and taking off the shoe. *Surveillance & Society* 6 (3): 294-306.

McIlvenny, Paul, Mathias Broth, and Pentti Haddington. 2014. Moving together: Mobile formations in interaction. *Space and Culture* 17 (2): 104-106.

Mondada, Lorenza. 2009. Emergent focused interactions in public places: A systematic analysis of the multimodal achievement of a common interactional space. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41 (10): 1977-1997.

Mondada, Lorenza. 2016. Challenges of multimodality: Language and the body in social interaction. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 20 (3): 336-366.

Pütz, Ole. 2012. From non-places to non-events: The airport security checkpoint. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 41 (2): 154-188.

Rampton, Ben. 2006. *Language in Late Modernity: Interaction in an Urban School.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rampton, Ben. 2016. Foucault, Gumperz and governmentality: Interaction, power and subjectivity in the 21st century. In *Sociolinguistics: Theoretical Debates*, edited by Nikolas Coupland, 303-330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rampton, Ben. 2017. Interactional sociolinguistics. In *Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies* Paper 205. https://www.academia.edu/30796363/WP205_Rampton_2017._Interactional_Sociolinguistics [accessed June 26, 2019].

Rampton, Ben, and Louise Eley. 2018. Goffman and the everyday interactional grounding of surveillance. *Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies* Paper 246. https://www.academia.edu/37680030/WP246_Rampton_and_Eley_2018._Goffman_and_the_everyday_interactional_grounding_of_surveillance [accessed June 26, 2019].

Ryave, A. Lincoln, and James Schenkein. 1974. Notes on the art of walking. In *Ethnomethodology*, edited by Roy Turner, 265-274. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Scollon, Ron, and Suzie Scollon. 2003. *Discourses in Place.* London: Routledge.

Simon, Bart. 2005. The return of panopticism: Supervision, subjection and new surveillance. *Surveillance & Society* 3 (1): 1-20.

Smith, Gary. 2007 Exploring relations between watchers and watched in control(led) systems: Strategies and tactics. *Surveillance & Society* 4 (4): 280-313.

Stroud, Christopher, and Dmitri Jegels. 2014. Semiotic landscapes and mobile narrations of place: performing the local. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 2014 (228): 179-199.

van Dijck, Jose. 2013. *The Culture of Connectivity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

vom Lehn, Dirk, Christian Heath, and Jon Hindmarsh. 2001. Exhibiting interaction: Conduct and collaboration in museums and galleries. *Symbolic Interaction* 24 (2): 189-216.

Walby, Kevin. 2005. Institutional ethnography and surveillance studies: An outline for inquiry. *Surveillance & Society* 3 (2/3): 158-172.

Westlake, E.J. 2008. Friend Me if You Facebook: Generation Y and Performative Surveillance. *TDR* 52 (4): 21-40.