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**Soldiers and warriors
mythology and martial identity in the British Army**

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Soldiers and Warriors:
Mythology and Martial Identity in the British Army

A Dissertation
Presented to the Defence Studies Department
School of Security Studies
Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy
King's College London
**In Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**Shay Marks
2020**

Thesis Word Count: 99,261
Appendices and Bibliography: 17,380

'Warrior: it's a made-up thing; it sounds funny; you get called it by putting a uniform on; it's like being called a legend...'

Junior Non-Commissioned Officer
Focus Group, 1st November 2018

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Abstract

In recent years, the British Army has begun to refer to its soldiers as 'warriors'. This thesis asks as its central research question whether the term is appropriate. It explores the types of warrior represented in academia and examines the idea of 'Warrior Ethos'; draws on concepts from evolutionary and social psychology; considers the warrior archetype; and discusses how these inform recent thinking about modern day warriorship. To see how the notion informs and reflects contemporary British Army martial identity, the views of soldiers, primary research collected through discussion groups, are documented; the opinions of a cohort of infantry Commanding Officers, offered by questionnaire, are recorded; and, finally, the thoughts of a number of senior officers, obtained through interview, are collated. In total over one hundred serving personnel were canvassed for their perception of martial identity and their sense of the word warrior. This is the first time that this issue has been examined in depth. The thesis makes an original contribution through extensive primary research with serving British soldiers in the immediate aftermath of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

My argument is that the term warrior whilst superficially attractive, has a complex and multifaceted character which makes its adoption problematic. Other conclusions are that there is no agreed definition of a warrior in academia, in mythology, across armies, within the British Army or amongst British soldiers, and that the term can be simultaneously meaningful and inspiring but also banal or misleading. Further, it lacks authenticity, and in its current guise is an imposition rather than an organic reflection of British army culture. Accordingly it doesn't resonate with British soldiers, and so is unlikely to gain purchase. This would not be the worst outcome: a more worrying consequence is a selective reading of the word that creates momentum toward behaviour in small groups or more broadly, that is contrary to army norms, the culture of the British Army and societal expectation.

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Acknowledgements

This journey would never have been completed had it not been for those who helped and encouraged my efforts. Ken Payne, my supervisor, is due most thanks. Ken was always available to assist with queries or ideas that required validating (and dismissing), and guided me in my reading and research. Matching aspiring PhD candidate to supervisor is more important than I realised at the outset of this project and I am fortunate that, from my point of view at least, the match was ideal. Thanks also to Jonathan Fennell as second supervisor; to Christopher Ankersen and to Paddy Bury for their reviews and helpful comments, and to colleagues, who prefer to be unnamed, for their expert military eye and input.

I also wish to acknowledge the support of my employer not least for assistance in funding the thesis but also, importantly, for facilitating access to archival material. The staff at the Land Warfare Centre and in the Whitehall Library in particular were of great assistance. For her advice on copyright and referencing I thank Helen Cargill, Head of Open Research at Kings. I am especially grateful to all those who contributed to the research and especially the soldiers who spoke to me. Their take was insightful, considered and often entertaining: without their opinions this would be a much poorer piece of work. The Commanding Officers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of The Royal Irish Regiment and the 1st Infantry Training Battalion are due my personal thanks for their assistance in facilitating the research: the support provided by the Regimental Headquarters of the Royal Irish is also greatly appreciated.

The opinions offered in this thesis are mine alone and do not reflect the views of my employer: mistakes, errors or omissions are my sole responsibility.

Glossary of Military Terms

'Ally'	British Army slang term for anything desirable or fashionable
Banner	Campaign name for operations in Northern Ireland
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BAR	British Army Review
BCS	Battlecraft Syllabus: training instruction for the British Army
Bde	Brigade: an army formation usually of 3 or more battalions or units
'CDRILS'	Mnemonic for British Army Values and Standards (V&S)
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff: the head of the British armed forces
CFA	Commander Field Army: responsible for the army's deployable forces
CGS	Chief of the General Staff: the head of the British Army
CGC	Conspicuous Gallantry Cross
'Chippie'	Slang term for anything undesirable or common: the opposite of 'ally'
CO	Commanding Officer: usually responsible for 600 or more soldiers
COIN	Counterinsurgency
Comds	Commanders
Coy	Company: the collective term for a body of c100 soldiers
Coy Comd	Company Commander aka 'OC'
DIPR	Defence Intellectual Property Rights
DSO	Distinguished Service Order
FG	Focus Group
GS	General Staff: describes British Army officers ranked Colonel and above
G1	Staff Branch designation: administration, personnel and discipline.
G2	Staff Branch designation: intelligence
G3	Staff Branch designation: operations
G4	Staff Branch designation: logistics
Herrick	Campaign name for operations in Afghanistan
IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
JNCO	Junior Non-Commissioned Officer: Lance Corporal or Corporal
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MODREC	MOD Research and Ethics Committee
MC	Military Cross
MCO	Major Combat Operations (aka 'warfighting')
OC	Officer Commanding: usually responsible for a company of soldiers
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
Op	Operation
Para	Paratrooper: soldier of the Parachute Regiment
PARA	Abbreviated regimental title for The Parachute Regiment
P Coy	'Pegasus Company': selects soldiers for service as paratroopers
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAC	Royal Armoured Corps
RHQ	Regimental Headquarters
RIRISH	Abbreviated regimental title for The Royal Irish Regiment
RMAS	Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
RN	Royal Navy
RRT	Regimental Recruiting Team
'Scoff'	British Army slang term for food
Sgt	Sergeant
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer: Sgts & Colour Sgts (or equivalent)
SO	Staff Officer
Telic	Campaign name for operations in Iraq
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
VC	Victoria Cross
V&S	Values and Standards
WOs	Warrant Officers

1. Introduction

Outline

In recent years, the British Army has begun to refer to its soldiers as 'warriors': it treats warriorship the same as soldiering and recommends warrior ethos as a guiding philosophy. This thesis asks if the terminology is appropriate, establishes soldiers' self-conception, their role as group members¹ and their relationship with society.² It asks if warrior is a welcome descriptor, and whether the employment of the term is 'accidental, coincidental or an intentional result of purposeful human decision-making.'³ The role of cognitive dissonance, where people try to make things that they know to be psychologically inconsistent, more consistent, is examined.⁴ Warriors that generate strange and timeless fascination,⁵ who are subject to 'a dazzling halo of poetry and of glory'⁶ but also echo 'the cult of the kill'⁷ present this challenge. My argument is that the term whilst superficially attractive, has a complex, multifaceted character that makes easy adoption problematic. Simultaneously meaningful and inspiring, it is also banal and misleading. To understand its contemporary relevance, I scrutinise the literature and identify several warrior types. I then analyse British Army culture, and the myths and stories told around 'guttering fires, to wring order and meaning out of the chaotic clash or arms.'⁸ The role of nature and nurture in the creation of martial identity is investigated and I give voice to soldiers on their perception of the word warrior⁹ uncovering through primary research and archival material 'the different criteria by which soldiers appraise themselves and their service.'¹⁰ The thesis concludes with some thoughts on the

¹ Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg (eds), *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances*, (Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, 1990), 2, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226768706>

² John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1983); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2008); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (NY: Free Press, 2017); Hew Strachan, *The British Army, Manpower, and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

³ Matthew Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons: Military Transformation in Crisis and the Future of Britain's Armed Forces," in *A Military Transformed?: Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945*, eds. Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (Solihull: Helion & Co. Ltd, 2016), 246.

⁴ Leon Festinger, "Cognitive Dissonance." *Scientific American*, 207:4 (Oct 1962): 93, www.jstor.org/stable/24936719.

⁵ John Keegan, Richard Holmes and John Gau, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle*, (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1997), foreword by Frederick Forsyth, 5.

⁶ E. T. Moneta, "What Is War?" *The Advocate of Peace*, 56:2 (Feb 1894): 29, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20665070>.

⁷ Robert L. Ivie & Oscar Giner, "Waging Peace: Transformations of the Warrior Myth by US Military Veterans." *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, 11:2 (2016): 199, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2016.1182174>

⁸ Philip Caputo, *Rumor Of War*, (London: Bodley Head, 2017), 355.

⁹ The view of serving military personnel is often absent in the literature due mostly to organisational constraint on public engagement. The number of anonymous contributors to *The Wavell Room* is remarkable. Registering the voice of British soldiers is important though it should not silence others. Aimee Fox & David Morgan-Owen, "Whose Voice Matters? The British Army in 2018," *The Wavell Room*, 21 Jun 2018, <https://wavellroom.com/2018/06/21/whose-voice-matters-the-british-army-in-2018/>.

¹⁰ Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers, Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit*, (NY:

implications of promoting 'warrior' as an identifying term for British soldiers.

Identity is 'the human capacity – rooted in language – to know 'who's who' (and hence 'what's what').'¹¹ Yet sociocultural categorisations can be 'utilized without much thought being given to how and when definitions of the term have changed,' or alternative meanings.¹² Where warrior is the premise of soldier identity it should be clear, conceptually and practically. Simple or contradictory definitions fail to 'live up to the realities of modern combat'¹³ and present instead 'philosophical quandary' and dilemma.¹⁴ Whilst some armies 'have a strong tradition of precision in their military language, the British Army does not'¹⁵ so new terms require explanation. Sophisticated understanding, borne of explanation, over superficial attraction is more useful. Words carry hidden baggage that can determine perception.¹⁶ Language 'shapes thought patterns on which actions are based'¹⁷ and action is taken to resolve social problems.¹⁸ Getting the language right is therefore critical for its implications.

Warriors, according to the 'accepted authority on the English language'¹⁹ make war: the warrior is 'a fighting man', and a soldier, sailor, or airman, and a valiant or experienced man of war. This, though contestable for gender specificity and its broad service application, is relatively comprehensible. Defining warriors as 'the fighting men of the ages celebrated in epic and romance and of pre-industrial peoples, for whom the designation soldier would be inappropriate' is where the term becomes more complicated and intriguing. This historic allusion suggests exclusivity and invokes memory, myth and symbols that 'represent a compact' between individuals who assert primacy over other groups.²⁰ Contemporary relevance is debatable not least for the aggressive suggestiveness of the term. Derived from the French word *guerre* meaning war, warrior (*guerrier*) in German is *Kämpfer*, meaning fighter and is a word that has a positive and not necessarily military connotation; more traditionally it is read as *Kreiger*

Berghahn Books, 1998), 18.

¹¹ Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 5.

¹² Kevin Linch & Matthew McCormack, "Defining Soldiers: Britain's Military, c.1740–1815," *War in History* 20:2 (Apr 2013): 146, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344512471004>.

¹³ Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare*, (UK: Basic Books, 2010), 52.

¹⁴ Gilbert Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning," in *The Importance of Language* ed. Max Black, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 168-9.

¹⁵ John Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare Since 1945," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19:4 (1996): 197, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399608437657>.

¹⁶ Adam Alter, "The Power of Names," *The New Yorker*, 29 May 2013, <https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-power-of-names>.

¹⁷ Albert Bandura, "Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency." *Journal of Moral Education*, 31:2 (2002): 104, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022014322>

¹⁸ Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 9.

¹⁹ The Oxford English Dictionary (OED).

²⁰ Edward Burke, *An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland*, (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2018), 27.

from the German word for war. To German soldiers, the anglicised version sounds 'fierce and gladiatorial'.²¹ The OED would allow this and permits the warrior as a 'persecutor'. Historically, culturally, linguistically and functionally constructed the word then has no singular meaning.

Thesis Origins

My interest came from a declaration from General Sir Peter Wall, then Chief of the UK General Staff, who said in 2014 that the British Army had an 'imbued warrior mentality':

I believe the warrior spirit and experience the British Army has acquired during its long decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan means it is ready for the challenges it is likely to face in the years ahead. We can be confident we have a 'warrior generation' who have the skill and fighting ability to play their role in the nation's defence and its security interests.²²

He authoritatively heralds those who 'made war' and encourages soldiers through 'a common social construction' similar to that which tells armies that some supreme being is on their side in times of war.²³ I initially thought the title attractive but on reflection decided the issue deserved deeper thought, not only for its defining martial utility on a narrow 'warfighting' front, but more so for the introduction of an unfamiliar term of identity for British soldiers. It is also unclear whether his message is linguistic or expressive: the former sees sender and subject with 'no necessary connection' but is intended; the latter allows the sender to 'deny he meant quite what others claim he meant'.²⁴

Anthony King tells us that Britain's armed forces 'have changed profoundly over the last two decades'.²⁵ With the UK contemplating its relations with Europe, security concerns over a resurgent Russia, an emergent China and a volatile Gulf region, further change is inevitable. These provide critical junctures, 'relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest.'²⁶ Such junctures challenge existing norms.²⁷ In 2017 the British infantry, produced seminal doctrine focussed on warrior ethos, that 'characteristic spirit':

...that that separates the Infantryman from other soldiers and the attitude

²¹ Sarah Katharina Kayß, "War, Combat and Peacekeeping," *The Wavell Room*, 20 Sep 2018, <https://wavellroom.com/2018/09/20/war-combat-peacekeeping/>

²² Christopher Hope & Con Coughlin, 'UK Troops: a New "Warrior Generation,"' *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 Aug 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/11009347/Afghanistan-has-left-Britain-with-a-warrior-generation-of-soldiers-says-top-general.html>.

²³ David L. Hull, "In Search of Epistemological Warrant," in *Selection Theory and Social Construction: The Evolutionary Epistemology of Donald T. Campbell*, eds., Cecilia Heyes & David L. Hull (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 162.

²⁴ Erving Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, (NY: Free Press, 1963), 13-14.

²⁵ Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics And Cohesion In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries*, (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 418.

²⁶ Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures," *World Politics* 59:3 (Apr 2007), 348, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060162>.

²⁷ Adrian Hyde-Price & Charlie Jeffery, "Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39:4 (Nov 2001): 693, <https://doi/pdf/10.1111/1468-5965.00327>.

that marks him out as extraordinary in the profession of arms. The Warrior Ethos is rooted in our Values and Standards but it is also more than this. It is the state of mind which inspires Infantrymen to go that bit further and work that bit harder than they believe is possible.²⁸

Operating beyond the Army's norms²⁹ distinguishes the infantry from other soldiers. Warriorship is its measure: 'If we want our soldiers to behave like Warriors then we must treat them like Warriors.³⁰ Soldier as an identity isn't 'thick enough':³¹ warrior is preferred.

Regiments have adopted the term:³² Army programmes use 'warrior' as a descriptor.³³




Fig. 1.1: Infantry Branding Flashcard

The Achilles Project³⁴ and the Warrior Programme promote well-being in soldiers;³⁵ the Warrior Games have been established.³⁶ The head of the Field Army has declared his desire for an organisation 'bold, innovative, with a warrior spirit and an unrelenting will to win'.³⁷ Recruitment strategy incorporates 'warriors', alongside the iconic bayonet³⁸ (opposite) as a device to attract trainees.³⁹ It was suggested during the research that the term originated 'bottom up' from regiments not 'top down' from the Army.⁴⁰ In fact it has sprung omni-directionally and is popular

even with veterans.⁴¹ The concept is increasingly discussed⁴² but the speed of its

²⁸ UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), "The Infantry Battle Craft Syllabus," (BCS), restricted circulation, (2017), 3. Permission to quote granted by MOD (DIPR) email to author 10 Jul 2018.

²⁹ UK MOD, "A Soldier's Values and Standards," <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/our-people/a-soldiers-values-and-standards/>.

³⁰ BCS, 5.

³¹ Cheyney Ryan, "The Dilemma of Cosmopolitan Soldiering," in *Heroism and the Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?* ed. Sybille Scheipers, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 135.

³² "Yorkshire's Warriors" were at Waterloo and D-Day; Royal Welsh Regiment soldiers are to "perfect the ways of the modern warrior" and '#RIRISHWARRIOR' identifies the Royal Irish Regiment. UK MOD "Who We Are: The Infantry," <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/>. Infantry soldiers are: 'Skilled warriors, naturally. Adaptable military professionals, definitely' (@ArmyInfantryHQ, 28 Mar 2019) and infantry regiments in the round are described on Twitter by '#CLOSECOMBATWARRIOR'.

³³ Exercises often have the 'warrior' suffix, for example Agile Warrior and Autonomous Warrior.

³⁴ To strengthen the mind, body and soul of soldiers in training (@CO_AFC, 22 Jan 2019).

³⁵ Marco Giannangeli, "British Soldiers Forego 'Warrior Fried Breakfast' For Avocado On Toast 'To Tackle Obesity'," *The Daily Express*, 7 Jul 2019, <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1150219/british-army-fitness-diet-health-regime>.

³⁶ To instil competitive spirit and teamwork (@ArmyInfantryHQ 24 Jul 2019).

³⁷ Commander Field Army tweet (@field_army) 10 Sep 2019

³⁸ For a history see Tim Ripley, *Bayonet Battle: Bayonet Warfare in the 20th Century*, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1999).

³⁹ General Staff Officer #2 (hereafter 'GS2') interview with the author, 14 Feb 2019. "Infantry Branding" design dated Jul 2018. Permission for use granted by UK MOD by email to the author on 03 Apr 2019.

⁴⁰ GS6, 15 Mar 19, timestamp 40:10.

⁴¹ 'Warrior RV' is for 'serving and ex serving warriors,' <https://warriorsrvopsroom.com>.

⁴² "Securing Competitive Advantage," RUSI Conference, 05 June 2019. A soldier presented: "I'm a Soldier,

appearance and opacity of origin gives concern: the 'faster a theory grows in terms of its effect and reach, the greater the capacity for confusion and misinterpretation.'⁴³

Warriorship is often associated with US forces where warrior ethos is promoted,⁴⁴ even chanted, as part of daily routine.⁴⁵ Incidents in the Iraq campaign in 2003 indicated that fighting skills had been relegated to secondary importance.⁴⁶ 'They'll tell you, 'I'm a mechanic,' not 'I'm a soldier,' and we've got to change that...'⁴⁷ The terms warrior and soldier so became synonymous and Warrior Ethos supplanted the Soldier's Creed.⁴⁸ American soldiers are now 'Warriors, Leaders, Professionals, Servants'.⁴⁹ The concept remains popular with the Army urged ten years later to 'renew Project Warrior'.⁵⁰ Recent wars ignited the concept in others as well. In 2006 the 'return of the Canadian warrior'⁵¹ was marked (though the term was not explained)⁵² and Australia has been deploying a 'special class of warrior' to combat zones.⁵³ This may be military isomorphism, where 'weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the world'⁵⁴ or the seizing

Not a Warrior - the Problem with 'Warrior Ethos'." At the RUSI launch of the UK Strategic Command a BBC journalist, tweeted: 'I've just heard a British RM [Royal Marine] General talk about the need for UK armed forces to employ "information warriors". He was being serious.' @bealejonathan, 18 Feb 2020

⁴³ Matthew J Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review." *Social & Personality Psychology Compass*, 2:1 (2008): 205, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x>

⁴⁴ US Army Values state: 'I am an American Soldier. I am a Warrior.' "US Department of Defense (DOD), "The Warrior Ethos," <https://www.army.mil/values/warrior.html>.

⁴⁵ Steven L. Gardiner, "The Warrior Ethos: Discourse and Gender in the United Army Since 9/11," *Journal of War & Culture Studies*, 5:3 (2012), 371, <https://doi.org/10.1386/jwcs.5.3.371.1>. Soldiers in training scream 'kill' hundreds of times each day. D. Dixon, "The LAWS Virtues: Rebuilding Our Scholarly Culture," *Marine Corps Gazette* 98:7 (Jul 2014): 74.

⁴⁶ Vernon Loeb, "Army Plans Steps to Heighten Warrior Ethos," *The Washington Post*, 08 Sept 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/09/08/army-plans-steps-to-heighten-warrior-ethos/aafb2625-a33d-48ca-8fcf-3ef2747f1243/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87357ce8520a. The unit was the 507th Maintenance Company. See Rick Bragg, *I Am A Soldier Too: The Jessica Lynch Story*, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

⁴⁷ Attributed to General Byrnes. Argiris Malapanis, "Each Soldier a Rifleman: Radical Shift in U.S. Army," *The Militant*, 67:32, (22 Sep 2003), <http://www.themilitant.com/2003/6732/673204.html>.

⁴⁸ US DOD, FM 3-21.75 "The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills," (Washington, DC: Dept of the Army, 2008), <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-21-75.pdf>. The original Creed introduced in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, had greater emphasis on ethical behaviour. "The old Soldier's Creed came down to 'doing the right thing'. I like that." Sarah Baxter, "US Army's Kill-Kill Ethos Under Fire," *The Sunday Times*, 24 Sep 2006, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/us-armys-kill-kill-ethos-under-fire-676x0q0w9zi>

⁴⁹ Don M. Snider & Gayle L. Watkins, *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 11.

⁵⁰ US DOD, "Chief of Staff of the Army's Leader Development Task Force Final Report," (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013): 34, 53, <https://docplayer.net/18885929-2013-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-leader-development-task-force-final-report.html> on 29 Jan 2020.

⁵¹ Tina Managhan, "Highways, Heroes, and Secular Martyrs: The Symbolics of Power and Sacrifice." *Review of International Studies* 38:1 (Jan 2012): 98, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000271>

⁵² Colin Magee, "The Way of the Warrior: A Warrior Ethos for the 21st Century," in *Dimensions of Military Leadership*, ed. Allister MacIntyre & Karen Davis, (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 21.

⁵³ Andrew Greene, "Defence Inquiry Into Alleged Unlawful Killings by Special Forces Demands Thorough Response," *ABC News*, 22 Jun 2018, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-23/analysis-australian-war-crime-allegations-demand-examination/9869738>. Armies not known for warfighting are also declaring as warriors. Peter Murtagh, "Targets, Bullets and Soldiers: Deep in the Wicklow Mountains," *The Irish Times*, 01 Jul 17, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/targets-bullets-and-soldiers-deep-in-the-wicklow-mountains-1.3139502>.

⁵⁴ Joeli Pretorius, "The Security Imaginary: Explaining Military Isomorphism," *Security Dialogue*, 39:1 (Feb 2008): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607086825>. The notion of mimicry is not immutable. Gat prefers military culture as circumstantial. Azar Gat, *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 328. Equipment standardisation has been examined to show national choice has bearing alongside the influence of 'evolving relational structures.'

of a 'common template'.⁵⁵ Armies model on 'organizations they perceive to be more professional and hence legitimate.'⁵⁶ Perhaps warrior distinguishes western forces from less soldierly adversaries, or creates shared identity with less constrained proxy forces.⁵⁷

For the British Army this may be an attempt to emulate allies, to capture and instil in the British soldier some of the essence of their military power and martial strength. The introduction of the term warrior may be to persuade an external audience or adversary that the army has a level of aggression beyond that of 'ordinary' soldiers; or by presenting the nation's soldiers as warriors it recommends to the British public that their security is guaranteed – who better to defend them than an army of warriors? There could be a political angle: an army in transition requires political attention, and investment. More cynically it is a symptom of the 'Militarisation Offensive', launched in 2006 'by a loose and diverse group of politicians, military chiefs, newspapers and pressure groups to generate support for the 'good war' in Afghanistan and repair the damage caused to the military's reputation by the 'bad war' in Iraq.'⁵⁸ It is certainly an adjustment and an example of change that is 'rapid in wartime'.⁵⁹

Manipulating identity impacts social and political history, and culture: the army cannot divorce⁶⁰ itself from this in pursuit of something more narrow or local. Identity, imagined⁶¹ or otherwise reverberates. Whether an army is known as a Defence Force or 'warfighters', where soldiers are 'stormtroopers,' the collective a horde not a battalion, the observer assumes behaviours and supposes association. 'Words and the meanings of words are not matters merely for the academic amusement of linguists and logisticians, or for the aesthetic delight of powers; they are matters of the profoundest ethical significance to every human being.'⁶² Declaring soldiers as warriors where it is unwarranted and unappreciated could impact the Clausewitzian Trinity of Government,

Matthew Ford & Alex Gould, "Military Identities, Conventional Capability and the Politics of NATO Standardisation at the Beginning of the Second Cold War, 1970–1980," *The International History Review*, 41:4 (2018): 788, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1452776>

⁵⁵ Theo Farrell, *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict*. Boulder, (CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 25.

⁵⁶ Theo Farrell, "Review Article. Culture and Military Power," *Review of International Studies*, 24:3, (Jul 1998): 412, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210598004070>.

⁵⁷ Charles Dunlap, 'Lawfare Today: A Perspective', *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (Winter 2008): 146-154, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3154/.

⁵⁸ Paul Dixon, *Warrior Nation: War, Militarisation and British Democracy*, (London: ForcesWatch, 2018), accessed at https://www.forceswatch.net/sites/default/files/Warrior_Nation_web.pdf on 07 Nov 18.

⁵⁹ Andrew J. Knight, "Retaining the Warrior Spirit," *Military Review* 94:5 (Sep/Oct 2014): 88-9. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141031_art015.pdf

⁶⁰ Kevin Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army: Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807-15*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3.

⁶¹ A phrase made popular by Benedict Anderson – it refers to communities that are socially constructed by its members. Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 2006).

⁶² Aldous Huxley, "Words and Their Meanings," in Black, *The Importance of Language*, 12.

People and Army⁶³ and damage the social contract⁶⁴ where citizens ‘tolerate sacrifices in return for popular sovereignty; and the first among these sacrifices was the death of their sons on the battlefield.’⁶⁵ Words have meaning and ‘ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts upon the unthinking’⁶⁶ but not so wild to be incomprehensible.

Kiszely warns that the ‘enormity’ of change in army culture should not be underestimated. ‘It strikes at the heart of its attitude to discipline and hierarchy, its perception of martial qualities, its recruiting and training policy, the expectations it has of its soldiers and their ability to think independently....’ The Army holds ‘strong and fixed views’ on such issues so change must be understood for its implications.⁶⁷ Jenkins says ‘we can’t live routine lives as humans without identification, without knowing – and sometimes puzzling about – who we are and who others are’. He suggests we require ‘repertoires of identification’ without which ‘we would not be able to relate to each other meaningfully and consistently’;⁶⁸ Burr focusses on language allowing the achievement of ‘particular social goals’⁶⁹ vice the purpose of description. Poorly formed, limited repertoires and incoherent language, inconsistent with reality, imposed and worse, misunderstood, is dangerous. Change that introduces new terms may alter the essential workings⁷⁰ of an organisation in unanticipated ways, and should be guarded against. Sir Peter’s presentation of the British soldier in a new light following a ‘long decade of combat’ acknowledges that the organisation is defining ‘its boundaries, identity, and role in a time of change’⁷¹ but the word warrior should be understood for its implications before it is quickly adopted.

Focus

The ‘infantry is at the heart of the army and everything else coalesces around it.’⁷² They self-declare as warriors, promote warrior ethos as their characteristic spirit and ‘make war’: infantry soldiers are ‘fighting men’⁷³ the infantry the bedrock of ‘warfighting’

⁶³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. & trans. by Michael Howard, Peter Paret & Bernard Brodie, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984).

⁶⁴ Where the people have influence and even sovereignty. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract: Or, Principles of Political Right*, trans. Henry J. Tozer, (Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions, 1998).

⁶⁵ Scheipers, *Heroism*, 1.

⁶⁶ John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency." *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 22:86 (Jun 1933): 191, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30094997>

⁶⁷ Kiszely, "Approaches," 186.

⁶⁸ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 27.

⁶⁹ Vivien Burr, *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 6.

⁷⁰ Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 8.

⁷¹ Pauline Shanks-Kaurin, "Questioning Military Professionalism," in *Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics*, eds. Nathan K Finney & Tyrell O. Mayfield, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 9

⁷² General Sir Nicholas Carter, UK Chief of the Defence Staff quoted in "Who We Are: The Infantry".

⁷³ The term is used generically and as offered by the OED. It is noted that the first female British Army infantry soldiers and officers were in training at the time of writing (2019), and prior to submission the first female officer passed paratrooper training. Jonathan Beale, "British Army Officer Becomes First Woman to

capability.⁷⁴ Their activity takes place in the ‘most demanding environment that you can possibly get’ according to one senior officer who further declared that this is ‘not science it’s fact’.⁷⁵ This makes the infantry separable from other soldiers, as it wishes, and the infantry the most likely part of the army to collectively associate with warriorship.

Other soldiers make war too but it is the infantry who close with and kill the enemy in the most intimate of circumstances, hand-to-hand where warranted, in a ‘direct struggle of sinew, muscle and spirit.’⁷⁶ The ‘primary function’ of soldiers of other branches ‘is to support the fighting’.⁷⁷ Fighting is the trade and primary purpose of the infantry and this distinguishes them from those whose first duty is as drivers, clerks and logisticians. Separating the infantry from soldiers designated ‘combat arms’ is more difficult.⁷⁸ They would assert that they too are ‘front-line’ troops but the qualification offered by a respondent to the research conducted for this thesis is preferred: front-line troops as a descriptor is reserved for those ‘engaging the enemy directly.’ He denied it to anyone ‘dropping bombs from many thousand feet, or drone pilots, or artillery...’.⁷⁹ The infantry have a mandate to take and hold ground, often in appalling environmental circumstances, in all weathers, round the clock, on foot, with what they can carry. Their focus is on dismounted close combat: a ‘terrifying and unnatural setting. Fighting for ground and killing people in the process’ is an intense and very human experience.⁸⁰ Here infantry soldiers are unique, the ‘maids of all work on the battlefield’⁸¹ who go ‘where vehicles cannot travel, shells and missiles cannot reach, and electronic sensors cannot sense.’⁸² The infantry bear the brunt of battle⁸³ and the ‘unit of account’ that matters in war is the infantry battalion.⁸⁴ It is with the infantry that we find the ‘undeniable certainty of responsibility on the part of the killer.’⁸⁵ The British infantry, a fitting object of analysis for the phenomenon of warriorship, is therefore focus of this thesis.

Pass Brutal Para Course,” *BBC News*, 18 Feb 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51553815>.

⁷⁴ “Who We Are: The Infantry”.

⁷⁵ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 13:15

⁷⁶ Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, (NY: Back Bay Books, 2009), 99.

⁷⁷ Patrick Mileham, “*Military Virtues 2: The British Army Ethos*,” *Defense Analysis*, 14:3, (1998): 234, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179808405767>

⁷⁸ ‘Some folks might have the view that an actual combat veteran is one that was directly involved in active combat while others might extend this definition a bit more.’ Kevin Landrigan, “Female Vets Running for Congress Find Service Records Under Attack,” *Military.Com*, 26 Aug 2018, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/08/26/female-vets-running-congress-find-service-records-under-attack.html>

⁷⁹ Focus Group 5 (hereafter FG5) JNCOs discussion with the author 29 Nov 18, 08:40.

⁸⁰ Dave, “The British Regimental System: Essential or Outdated?” *The Wavell Room*, 16 August 2018 <https://wavellroom.com/2018/08/16/the-british-regimental-system-essential-or-outdated/>.

⁸¹ George Forty, *Companion to the British Army, 1939-1945*, (Stroud: History Press, 2009), 95.

⁸² John A. English & Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *On Infantry*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 177.

⁸³ In 1944 the infantry was ‘less than 25 per cent of 21st Army Group’ but suffered 71% of its casualties. David French “‘Tommy Is No Soldier’: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19:4, (1996): 159, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399608437656>

⁸⁴ English & Gudmundsson, *On Infantry*, introduction.

⁸⁵ Grossman, *On Killing*, 114.

Some issues that I expected to draw comment didn't appear in the primary research and are therefore only lightly touched upon in the thesis. It is 'the rule, rather than the exception that genetic variation is between individuals'⁸⁶ so discredited 'martial race' theories are not considered in any depth.⁸⁷ The debate surrounding women in combat is relevant and expansive⁸⁸ but it was minimally commented upon during the research and is therefore not examined in detail. My focus was driven by the data I collected. Similarly, class, a supposed mainstay British society, did not figure in consultations. Rank was discussed in oblique terms with regard to expectation and disagreement on the meaning of warrior membership⁸⁹ 'is no longer race, ethnicity, or nationality or in some case, even gender':⁹⁰ it is more nuanced.

⁸⁶ Richard Lewontin, "The Apportionment of Human Diversity," in *Evolutionary Biology* eds. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Max K. Hecht & William C. Steere, (NY: Springer, 1972), 382, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9063-3_14

⁸⁷ Indian soldiers were historically designated warriors by 'tradition and descent'(or caste); others 'would be without physical courage and unfit for any military service'. John Walter Beresford Merewether, *The Indian Corps In France* (Location Unstated: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), location 6865-6870, Kindle (original published in 1917). The notion of martial races wasn't confined to the British. According to Theodore Roosevelt 'all the great masterful races were fighting races' (*Address of Hon. Theodore Roosevelt before the Naval War College*, Sagamore Hill National Historic Site, 02 Jun 1897). The issue of cause and effect is though worth consideration. Whilst race is no determinant, culture may influence martial preference and vice versa. 'Military service' for example shaped Sikhism as a martial culture through 'self-fulfilling prophecy', according to Tarak Barkawi "Subaltern Soldiers: Eurocentrism and the Nation-State in the Combat Motivation Debates," in *Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the 21st Century*, ed. Anthony King, (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 30. With regard to the British Army, Highlanders, Gurkhas and the Irish are considered 'martial races'. Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 35. The pugnacious Irish, the religious fervour and eagerness for battle of the Highlander, the 'calmness in anger' of the English is highlighted in R. Money Barnes, *The British Army of 1914*, (London: Seeley Service & Co. 1968) 14. Streets discusses Highlanders, Sikhs and Gurkhas and declares the martial race theory an issue of gender as much as genetics. Heather Streets, *Martial Races: the Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857-1914*, (Manchester, Manchester UP, 2004). The issue of race is explored with reference to the German Wehrmacht, the US Army and Marine Corps, the British and French Armies in King, *Combat Soldier*, 90-97. Race was commented on during the research but not as a major area of enquiry.

⁸⁸ Gardiner, "Warrior Ethos," 371–383, details the US Army's travails with the issue of gender and warrior ethos; Allsep deals with the gender divide in Michael L. Allsep, "The Myth of the Warrior: Martial Masculinity and the End of Don't Ask, Don't Tell," *Journal of Homosexuality*, 60:2-3, (2013), 381-400, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2013.744928>. Eve MacDonald provides an historical view of 'Warrior Women' at <https://theconversation.com/amp/warriors>, published 04 Oct 2018; Kate Germano and Franklin C Annis debate gender and warriorship in The Wavell Room: Germano published "Hyper-Masculinity and Ground Close Combat," <https://wavellroom.com/2018/10/09/hyper-masculinity-ground-close-combat/>; Annis' counter-argument that "Ground Close Combat is Masculine", is at <https://wavellroom.com/2018/10/30/ground-close-combat-is-masculine/> (published on-line 0 Oct 2018). Anthony King explains the 'concept of equivalency rather than equality as a way of understanding' the role of women in the armed forces. Anthony C King, "Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat," *Armed Forces & Society*, 41:2 (Apr 2015): 380, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14532913> and addresses the issue further in *Combat Soldier*, 376-418. The role of women serving in Special Forces is examined in Nicole Alexander & Lyla Kohistany, "Dispelling the Myth of Women in Special Operations," *Center for a New American Security (CNAS)*, 19 Mar 2019, at <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/dispelling-the-myth-of-women-in-special-operations>. Further analysis is available at Adrienne Mayor, *The Amazons: Lives and Legends of Warrior Women across the Ancient World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2016) and Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) but it is early days in cultural and policy terms to make firm declarations on how the issue of warriorship will evolve with regard to women in combat. It represents an opportunity for future research.

⁸⁹ Special Forces would be an interesting case study but access to the community is difficult and for this reason it is not probed in this thesis in detail; other service persons such as submariners or fighter pilots could also be usefully examined for their views on warriorship but these also fall outside of scope where the infantry is the declared focus.

⁹⁰ King, *Combat Soldier*, 421.

2. Study Design

Analytical Framework

This study considers the individual soldier, and the military unit or group. In my examination of individuals I am guided by Hofstede's model of human programming¹ (Fig. 2.1) that shows the relationship between human nature or that which is universal; the culture in which we exist; and our individual personalities.




Fig. 2.1: Hofstede's Three Levels of Mental Human Programming

Wright calls this 'new Darwinism' where behaviour evolves from three sources: our biological roots ('human nature'); culture or the influence of others; and the malleable human mind or personality that allows choice.² The models are grounded in evolutionary psychology, that 'long-forested scientific attempt to assemble out of the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory human disciplines a single, logically integrated research framework for the psychological, social, and behavioral sciences.'³ Where the group is concerned I draw too on social identity theory and 'those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives

¹ Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 6, accessed on-line at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5b53/90078b153ff9d9f805f09c570fb82f90c9a5.pdf>. Model from Sven Uebelacker, "Security-Aware Organisational Cultures as a Starting Point for Mitigating Socio-Technical Risks," Conference Paper (Sep 2013), <https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.1389.6000>.

² Robert Wright, *The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are. The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology* (London: Abacus, 1996), 5-7.

³ John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, "Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology," in *The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*, ed. David. M. Buss, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 3.

himself as belonging', and different from distinct 'out-groups.'⁴ Cultural evolution, the 'knowledge, values, and other factors' that influence behaviour through teaching and imitation,⁵ where meaning develops alongside others,⁶ and the individual's sense of self are reconciled and provide balance to contemplations on evolutionary psychology. Social constructionism, socially negotiated, collective and collegiate and social constructivism, the identity more actively given by others, have relevance. This interdisciplinary study⁷ examines warriorship as a 'biological adaptation' and cultural invention with more shallow roots.⁸ Nature and nurture⁹ 'fundamental to the way we are'¹⁰ are its foundations.

Thesis Structure

Chapter One outlined the rationale for the study. This chapter explains the structure and methodology of the thesis: it is followed by the literature review, where the meaning of war¹¹ is considered, and two schools of thought regarding the term warrior are identified. Chapter 4 considers myth and story, documented history, suspect metaphor and the dubious analogies¹² that preserve 'the underlying substance' of culture.¹³ Academic

⁴ Henri Tajfel & John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *Organizational Identity: A Reader*, eds. Mary Jo Hatch & Majken Schultz, (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 59.

⁵ Robert Boyd & Peter Richerson, *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 2.

⁶ Jonathan D. Raskin, "Constructivism in Psychology: Personal Construct Psychology, Radical Constructivism, and Social Constructionism," *American Communication Journal*, 5:3, (Spring 2002), <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e059/911cff568f4d4c05837252c787f052523fb5.pdf>.

⁷ 'One can draw on varied disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, and anthropology to define and interpret identity.' Kay Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity," *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19:1 (Feb 1993): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293191001>. This study also considers organisational theory, psychology and the impact of history on warriorship.

⁸ Luke Glowacki *et al.*, "The Evolutionary Anthropology of War," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, (2017): 3. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.014>.

⁹ Sir Francis Galton first established the nature/nurture distinction in "On Men of Science, Their Nature and Their Nurture," *Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, (Feb 1874): 227, <http://galton.org/essays/1870-1879/galton-1874-men-of-science.pdf>. Steven Pinker dates the phrase earlier to 1581. "Why Nature & Nurture Won't Go Away," *Daedalus* 133:4 (2004): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526042365591>

¹⁰ Kenneth Payne, *The Psychology of Modern Conflict: Evolutionary Theory, Human Nature and a Liberal Approach to War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 6.

¹¹ Maurice R. Davie, *The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies*, (NY: Dover Publications, 2003); Jared Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?* (London: Penguin, 2013), Kindle; Aaron Edwards, *War: A Beginner's Guide*, (London: Oneworld, 2017); Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: A History*, (London: Allen Lane, 2017); Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, (Oxford: OUP, 2001), *War in Human Civilization*, (Oxford, OUP, 2006); Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, (London: Routledge, 2001); Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (CA: University of California Press, 1989), *The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern*, (NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010); Michael Howard, *War in European History*, (London: OUP, 1976); Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, (NY, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1993); Lawrence H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, (Oxford: OUP, 1996), Kindle; Julian Lupley-French & Yves Boyer, *The Oxford Handbook of War*, (Oxford: OUP, 2012); Scheipers, *Heroism*; Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013); Hew Strachan & Sybille Scheipers. *The Changing Character of War*, (Oxford: OUP, 2014).

¹² Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, (London: Routledge, 2006): 22-3.

¹³ Christopher Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 39.

opinion on the British Army¹⁴ is deliberated in light of ‘socially established structures of meaning’¹⁵ and authoritative works on culture.¹⁶ Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprise the bulk of the primary research. Here, soldiers explain how they understand ‘warrior’ as a prescriptive, proscriptive and descriptive term. They consider how it applies, the complex dynamic of self and social identity, and how they relate to each other and internalise group membership.¹⁷

Amongst a raft of findings, the main conclusion is that the term warrior is poorly understood and soldiers are uncomfortable with it. They recognise tension between the archetype warrior and army norms; and it was suggested that the introduction of the term amounts to an imposition. It is not an organic reflection of army culture, nor regimental identity which is vigorously defended. The vast majority of those consulted (87%) disagreed that British soldiers were warriors. About half thought they personally qualified (though a third had no opinion of the matter) and over two thirds expressed the view that where warrior is a term of identity in the British Army then it is for infantry soldiers. They were ill-disposed to extending the title to all soldiers, and inclined to those whose primary duty is combat. The views expressed were as remarkable for their inconsistency and contradiction as they were for consensus.

¹⁴ Antony Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990); Burke, *Army of Tribes*; Patrick Bury, *Callsign Hades*, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011); David Chandler & Ian Frederick William Beckett (eds.) *The Oxford History of the British Army*, (Oxford: OUP, 2003); Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey*, (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2007), Kindle; Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, *Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green*, (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2002); J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army, Vol. 1* (London: MacMillan & Co, 1910); David French, *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c.1870-2000*, (Oxford: OUP, 2005), *The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Aimée Fox, *Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018); Dominick Graham, *Against Odds: Reflections on the Experiences of the British Army, 1914-45*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); A. C. Grayling, *War - an Enquiry*, (London: Yale University Press, 2017); Gerald Hanley, *Warriors: Life and Death among the Somalis*, (London: Eland, 2004); Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket* (London: HarperCollins, 2001), *Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (London: HarperCollins, 2004), *Sahib: The British Soldier in India, 1750-1914* (London: HarperCollins, 2005), *Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War* (London: HarperPress, 2006)a; Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton UP, 1999); Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1932); Linch, *Wellington's Army*; Alan Macmillan, "Strategic Culture and National Ways in Warfare: The British Case," *RUSI Journal*, 140:5, (1995): 33-38; Lewis Page, *Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs: Waste and Blundering in the Military*, (London: Arrow Books, 2007); Helen Parr, *Our Boys: The Story of a Paratrooper*, (UK: Allen Lane, 2018); Mark Urban, *Generals: Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the World* (London: Faber & Faber, 2006); Noel T Williams, *Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth of the British Army 1660-1690* (London: Brassey's, 1994).

¹⁵ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, (London: Fontana Press, 1993), 12.

¹⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method*, trans. W. D. Halls, ed. Steven Lukes, (NY: The Free Press, 1982), *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, London: Allen & Unwin (first edition 1912), trans. Joseph Ward Swain, (NY: Dover Publications, 2008); Geertz, *Interpretation*; Victor Davis Hanson, *Why the West Has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam*, (London: Faber, 2001); Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes*. (London: Hurst & Co., 2009); Edward W Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (London: Vintage, 1994); Martin van Creveld, *Pussycats: Why The Rest Keeps Beating The West, And What Can Be Done About It*, (Mevaseret Zion, Israel: DLVC Enterprises, 2016), Kindle.

¹⁷ Tajfel & Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." Also S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, & Michael J. Platow, *The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence, and Power*, (Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2011).

Approach

Following the literature review four key areas of inquiry were identified: the meaning of warrior, warriorship and warrior ethos; the reasons for the promotion of these terms; ‘soldier/society’ dynamics; and whether warriors are ‘born or made’. Communities of interest, or ‘cohorts’ were identified ‘to provide information on issues and decisions that I could not directly observe and where respondents could provide insight’.¹⁸ Means of research (questionnaire, focus group and semi structured interview) were selected for their potential to generate quantitative data and qualitative responses.¹⁹ This multi-sample approach allowed triangulation of findings and the exploration of the problem from different angles. Some of those consulted set ethos, others enforce it, cohort three promote it and live its consequences. The approach is exploratory: I employed both ethnomethodological (where the focus is on widely accepted and taken-for-granted practices) and deconstructionist frameworks, where the aim is to reveal the instability of the dominant ideology.²⁰ Fig. 2.2 illustrates my approach.




Fig. 2.2: Research Model

Interviews. Semi-structured interview was employed to obtain constructions of the phenomenon of warriorship and the events (historical and contextual) that have brought ‘warrior’ as a term of reference to the fore in recent decades; to provide projections for the future; and gain opinion on comment made by others.²¹ Individuals were selected on

¹⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods: Applied Social Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 85.

¹⁹ Ian Brace, *Questionnaire Design: How to Plan, Structure, and Write Survey Material for Effective Market Research*, (London: Kogan Page, 2006); M. Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1990).

²⁰ Martha S. Feldman, *Strategies for Interpreting Qualitative Data*, (London: Sage, 1994), 4-5.

²¹ Interviews took place after the return of questionnaires and completion of the focus groups.

the basis of their expertise and insight and the detailed information they possess regarding corporate culture, policy and direction. They could clarify issues that had arisen during the process and afforded insight into army level thinking. Interviews were conducted through open-ended questioning with inductive probing in response to prompts from the participant. All interviews followed a similar basic format:

- Do you agree that the term 'warrior' has become more prevalent in the British Army?
- What do you think of the term and why is it being used for British soldiers?
- Does the British Army need warriors?
- What are the implications in identifying British soldiers as warriors?
- Will 'warrior' endure as a term of reference?

Detailed questions were not provided in advance as I sought instinctive answers from those consulted and wanted to avoid pre-planned responses. Interviewees added to the conversation as they wished.

Questionnaires. Background reading, personal knowledge and experience allowed the creation of meaningful questions for an attitudinal questionnaire. A pilot resolved issues with an initial version and allowed confidence that the issue required examination.²² The dispersed nature of the primary audience, infantry COs, meant questionnaire suited the research aim and also respondents.²³ An added benefit is that answers 'to a question on a paper and pencil questionnaire – ranging from highly favorable to highly unfavorable responses – may contribute to greater freedom on the part of the subject to express asocial or antisocial feelings'.²⁴ Self-completion questionnaire²⁵ best allows opinion to be expressed that may not be in keeping with corporate narrative.

Quantitative data from collected answers to questions 1-6 (the questionnaire is reproduced below at Fig. 2.3), based on the Likert Scale was processed into bar charts; qualitative responses, to open-ended questions, delivered evidence of patterns of thought. These permitted narrative analysis: a 'common approach to interpreting textual responses to open questions is to work through question-by-question looking for key themes that recur across different respondents'.²⁶ Written responses to questions 7 to 12 were collated and key words extracted. Infrequent mentions were deleted: the remainder were grouped and processed for analysis through 'Word Cloud' software,²⁷ or

²² Paul N. Hague, *Questionnaire Design*, (London: Kogan Page, 1998), 95-6.

²³ Jenny Rowley, "Designing and Using Research Questionnaires," *Management Research Review*, 37:3 (2014), 5, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MRR-02-2013-0027/full/html>.

²⁴ Helen Metzner & Floyd Mann, "A Limited Comparison of Two Methods of Data Collection: The Fixed Alternative Questionnaire and the Open-Ended Interview," *American Sociological Review*, 17:4 (Aug 1952), 491. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2088007>

²⁵ Distributed with a Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form.

²⁶ Rowley, "Research Questionnaires," 29.

²⁷ <https://www.wordclouds.com>

quoted as evidence of pertinent opinion within the thesis.

This questionnaire is based on the Likert Scale. For the first 6 questions place an 'X' in the box that best reflects your view. For questions 7-12 please offer your thoughts in free text.

	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. The British Army has a warrior ethos					
2. The British Army trains warriors.					
3. I am a warrior.					
4. Infantry soldiers are warriors.					
5. All British soldiers are warriors					
6. All soldiers are warriors.					

7. How do you understand the term 'warrior'? What does it mean to you?

8. Please describe British Army culture. What are its constituent parts?

9. What do you consider to be the most iconic actions/events in British Army history? Please * or highlight those that are particular to your Regiment.

10. What is warrior ethos?

11. Do you have family ties (parent, aunt/uncle, cousin, sibling, grandparent) to the military?

12. Can anyone be a warrior? Please elaborate.

Please feel free to make any further comment below.

Would you agree to a follow up interview? If so please include contact details.

Fig. 2.3: Research Questionnaire

Focus Group. An 'adjunct to other research methods' focus groups allowed me to pursue findings²⁸ from background reading and returned questionnaires. Held in an informal setting in the participant's work place, soldiers were encouraged to discuss the issues anticipated as common to all participants.²⁹ Group sessions provided a spread of opinion and permitted observation of how views are advanced, elaborated and negotiated in a social context.³⁰ Comprising 3-9 participants (groups varied due to attendee availability) these 'performances in which the participants jointly produce accounts about proposed topics in a socially organized situation'³¹ advanced the analysis by providing 'grass-roots' opinion that could be compared to that expressed by COs.

Attendees were assembled by rank and so were amongst peers in a homogeneous grouping where prestige or status had less impact, making for a more open discussion.³² Prior to the focus group soldiers completed the questionnaire to allow focus on the issues

²⁸ Sue Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology: A Review," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 1:3, (1998): 184, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.1998.10846874>

²⁹ Andrew Parker & Jonathan Titter, "Focus Group Method and Methodology: Current Practice and Recent Debate," *International Journal of Research & Method in Education*, 29:1, (Apr 2006): 24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01406720500537304>.

³⁰ Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology" 187.

³¹ Janet Smithson, "Using and Analysing Focus Groups: Limitations and Possibilities," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 3:2, (2000): 105, <https://doi.org/10.1080/136455700405172>.

³² Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology," 182.

that I wished to discuss: this also allowed additional quantitative and qualitative data to complement the original questionnaires distributed to COs. Focus group discussion was recorded, then transcribed with an emphasis on the words and phrases most commonly used, and the most interesting comments in the context of the study; data from questionnaires was processed in the same manner and subject to similar content and thematic analysis. Direct quotations in keeping with the 'spirit' of the group were extracted.³³ Groups provided an 'interpretative account of the everyday social processes of communication, talk and action occurring within the focus group'.³⁴ They give a true representation of attendees' thoughts at that time. Conducted using a basic question set, conversations involved spontaneously worded questions in response to prompts. Discussion typically lasted one hour.

Communities of Interest

Senior Army Officers. This cohort (Colonels, Brigadiers and Generals) set army policy and procedure. Their status and authority is such that for them 'it may be possible simply



Fig. 2.4: Pegasus' – Formation Badge

to impose change without waiting for compliance.'³⁵ Where ethos, recruitment, training and leadership require attention for example (interviewees have expertise in all these areas) they issue orders and military discipline provides for their enactment. Officers of this cohort and their peers led the army in the programme announced in 2017 to switch from a counterinsurgency focus³⁶ toward soldiering in more austere conditions that initiated the infantry's focus on warriorship. One of those

interviewed championed the establishment of warrior ethos in the infantry that defined infantry soldiers as warriors; another launched the 'Pegasus Ethos' and (re)adopted Bellerophon (known as 'Pegasus' and shown at fig. 2.4), the mythical airborne Warrior, as a totem for the airborne brigade.³⁷ This was for historical reasons but also to give the brigade renewed impetus. 'I felt there was something missing in our collective ethos. Reintroducing Pegasus as a timeless symbol was to reset our airborne ethos, back to

³³ *Ibid.*, 196.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 196.

³⁵ Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons," 258.

³⁶ "Troops Get Back to Basics on Salisbury Plain," UK MOD, Press Release, 06 Dec 13, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/troops-get-back-to-basics-on-salisbury-plain> on 08 Oct 18.

³⁷ Bellerophon was the symbol of airborne forces of the 1st UK and 44th Indian Airborne Divisions in WW2. Accessed at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/16_Air_Assault_Brigade on 29 Jan 20 available under Creative Commons licence (SA).

our roots, and harness what was good in the Brigade.³⁸ This cohort, of General Staff Officers (referenced as 'GS' in the footnotes, contributors are unnamed) provided insight into the rationale for the increased use of the term 'warrior' in the army. They are advocates and agents who shape,³⁹ and are considered alongside those who they influence. Interviewees were selected for breadth of perspective and knowledge of topics which needed explanation and refinement:

Infantry Commanding Officers. Respondents were Regular Army and Reserve Unit COs,⁴⁰ who were commanding battalions in 2018 or had commanded in the preceding year. This cohort, the frontline stewards⁴¹ and 'gatekeepers' of organisational culture⁴² enforce ethos and set the character of the battalions. In total 77 COs were invited to take part: not everyone could. Some had only recently assumed command and had little time to know their units well enough to offer a view; others were on exercise or operations and couldn't participate. The response by 31 officers is nearly 50% of the available and judged qualified cohort. They know the soldiers referred to as warriors, and proved to have a view on 'warriorship': they are a vital cohort – 'the primary agents by which an organization's culture and role norms are modelled, transmitted, and maintained'.⁴³ Data collected through questionnaire corroborated the sense that the term 'warrior' is problematic. Contributors are anonymised (CO1, CO2 etc) and units are unidentified except where unavoidable for context or to maintain the integrity of comment.

Soldiers and Officers. Cohorts 1 and 2 are 'horizontal' slices of personnel of similar rank; the third cohort is a vertical sample across ranks. This cohort, ten times larger than cohort one and over double the size of cohort two, comprises 74 respondents from private soldier to major. Soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment provide the majority of the

³⁸ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 38:30.

³⁹ The role of agents is evident through the negative effects of experiments conducted in the 1960s and 1970s: Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*, (NY: Perennial Classic, 1974); Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil*, (London: Random House, 2007). I believe the conclusions of these studies are defensible though I recognise that Zimbardo's conclusions and in particular his methodology are not universally appreciated and are contested: see S. Alexander Haslam & Stephen D. Reicher, "Contesting the 'Nature' Of Conformity: What Milgram and Zimbardo's Studies Really Show." *PLoS Biology*, 10 (Nov 2012). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001426>; Haslam & Reicher, "50 Years of 'Obedience to Authority': From Blind Conformity to Engaged Followership," *Annual Review of Law & Social Science*, 13 (Oct 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113710>; See also the interaction between agents and subjects in Haslam et al, *New Psychology*, 64, and Stephen Reicher, Alex Haslam, & Jay Van Bavel. "How the Stanford Prison Experiment Gave us the Wrong Idea About Evil." *Prospect*, 06 Mar 2019. <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-the-stanford-prison-experiment-gave-us-the-wrong-ideal-about-evil>

⁴⁰ One Royal Marine and one cavalry officer took part. These were the only 'non-infantry' officers surveyed but both had service and experience comparable to their infantry peers.

⁴¹ Casey Landru, "Evolution of Defining the Army Profession," in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 49

⁴² Rod Thornton, "The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 15:1, (Spring 2004): 93. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310410001677005>.

⁴³ Donna Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: Military Culture and the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations," in *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*, eds. Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau, (NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 307.

sample for their specific ability to allow investigation of the reception of the marketing device '#WARRIOR' used for recruiting, and more generally due to the unit's strong regimental identity.⁴⁴ The historical, organisational and functional structure, and the societal, political and national influences on the Royal Irish are distinct and make the regiment a fascinating study. The regiment has comprised in serving soldier memory regular full-time soldiers, both home-based and abroad, part-time soldiers on operations overseas and in Northern Ireland, and Territorial Army (now Army Reserve). It recruits from both main communities in NI, from the Republic of Ireland, and in Great Britain, and also has a number of Commonwealth soldiers within its ranks. The CO of the 1st Battalion highlighted that even within his unit of regular soldiers he identified discrete identities: 'home birds' and 'wild geese'. The former feel the draw of Ireland and are socio-economic recruits; the latter had broken ties to Ireland and were motivated by duty, conviction, adventure and expeditionary zeal.⁴⁵ The impact of the introduction of another term of reference, #RIRISHWARRIOR, makes this regiment an engaging case study.

Research was conducted through questionnaire and focus group discussion with 1st Battalion soldiers in Great Britain; in NI, with the 2nd Battalion, at the Regimental Headquarters (where branding work was undertaken) and with the Regimental Recruiting Team (RRT). The research cannot be generalised across the British Army but insight into this unit that has adopted the title 'warrior' is likely transferable. Answers to the questionnaire are anonymised as RIRISH1, RIRISH2 etc. Cohort 3 also included instructors at the Infantry Training Centre where Royal Irish recruits are trained. Training staff there – modern day high priests to military orders⁴⁶ – are role models and have custody of basic training. I wanted to find out how the instructors (from corporal to captain) perceived the title warrior, its applicability to recruits and their views on whether they were producing warriors. Recruits were excluded due to sensitivity regarding their age and lack of experience. Respondents were from infantry regiments⁴⁷ other than the Royal Irish allowing a useful triangulation and comparison of views. Contributors are

⁴⁴ This dates to the raising of the regiment in Ireland by Zacharia Tiffin in 1689 and is a consequence of many regimental mergers since. In 1992, the Royal Irish Rangers and the Ulster Defence Regiment merged to form the Royal Irish Regiment. Gerry Murphy, *Where Did That Regiment Go?: A Lineage of British Infantry and Cavalry Regiments at a Glance*. (Stroud: Spellmount, 2009), 106-7, 112-3. Prior to that the Irish Rangers were formed in 1968 through the amalgamation of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Royal Ulster Rifles and the Royal Irish Fusiliers – a consequence of a decision taken by the War Office more than 10 years previously to 'maintain regimental esprit de corps' by a re-organisation of line infantry regiments 'into nineteen large regiments, each of three battalions and a depot.' French, *Military Identities*, 295. The time taken to effect mergers provides a cautionary note where organisational and cultural change is planned. New identity rarely resonates immediately. Riflemen and Fusiliers pride themselves on unique approaches to soldiering; so too bringing for example soldiers from cities together those from rural communities requires careful handling. The Royal Irish had to contend with functional and geographical identity alignment in the 20th Century.

⁴⁵ 'The Future Basing of 1 R IRISH: A Strawman,' Commanding Officer's paper, dated summer 2018. Limited 'Regimental Only' circulation. Permission to quote granted by CO 1 R IRISH (author), Nov. 2018.

⁴⁶ Caputo, *Rumor*, 8.

⁴⁷ Including the Parachute Regiment who provided insight and contrast with 'line infantry' personnel.

anonymised as Instr (Instructor) 1, Instr2 etc.

- Main Case Study: The Royal Irish Regiment. 9 Focus Groups: 52 participants;
 - FG1: Regimental Headquarters staff – 3 participants;
 - FG2: Regimental Recruiting Team all ranks – 9 participants;
 - FG3: Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs)⁴⁸ – 9 participants;
 - FG4: Officers – 3 participants;
 - FG5: Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCOs)⁴⁹ – 3 participants;
 - FG6: Corporals – 5 participants;
 - FG7: SNCOs – 7 participants;
 - FG8: Officers – 8 participants;
 - FG9: Majors – 5 participants.
- Secondary Case Study: Infantry Training Centre. 4 Focus Groups: 22 participants;
 - FG10: JNCOs – 4 participants;
 - FG11: SNCOs – 4 participants;
 - FG12: Officers – 9 participants;
 - FG13: Parachute Regiment ('P Company') instructors – 5 participants.

Archival Research. The army has an archive of interviews of soldiers who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁰ It exists to facilitate the lessons that inform the development of doctrine and has broad utility for the insight into the thoughts of those involved in recent conflicts. I examined 150 interviews from Operation Herrick⁵¹ between 2005 and 2010 and more than 300 interviews from operations in Iraq⁵² deployments from 2004-08 for a sense of how common the term warrior was in the British Army and how soldiers then identified. I also scrutinised the regimental journals of the Royal Irish Regiment. These highlighted the regiment's many recent functional purposes from service in Germany, to internal security duties in Northern Ireland, through to operations in the Balkans and Sierra Leone in the '90s. They document the regiment's role in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, later as an air assault unit in Afghanistan, on deployment to Mali, and most recently in 2019, duty in Kabul. The journals provided a flavour of the lived experience of soldiers and are representative of the practise of British infantry regiments. They were most useful for citations of awards made to soldiers in recent years and document the behaviours that are admired and honoured.

⁴⁸ FG3 and FG7 included Warrant Officers.

⁴⁹ FG5 included one private soldier.

⁵⁰ Mostly ranging in rank from Major to Major-General.

⁵¹ The UK codename for operations in Afghanistan.

⁵² Operation Telic

Methodology Limitations

All research has limitations. I couldn't always access the opinions I wanted, nor people who I thought could contribute. In a study involving service personnel, political, procedural and security sensitivities impact freedoms. The interviews involving senior army officers were recorded and on occasion caution was evident in responses: those consulted for example wouldn't draw a line between combat and non-combat soldiers as clearly as did more junior soldiers. At other times they were remarkably candid. By focussing on specific areas of expertise maximum benefit was had from the engagement.

With the questionnaires (aside from Likert scale limitation where there is no measure between categories),⁵³ random answer choices where respondents hadn't fully read or understood the question, and a failure to engage the qualitative questions were expected.⁵⁴ Limited opportunity was available to respondents to express additional thoughts beyond the offer to 'feel free to make any further comment below' (which some did exploit) but my focus was on making the survey simple to elicit as many responses as I could. There are more questions that could be asked but balance was necessary and compromise required to gain as rich response as possible.

Surveys were mostly distributed and returned electronically, and though I am acquainted with some of those who responded no personal contact was had; those completed by focus groups attendees were distributed 24 hours in advance and out of my sight. I am therefore satisfied that I brought no direct pressure to bear on respondents either to respond or to comply with a perceived requirement. Creating distance between questionnaire delivery and completion, and collation of results did result in some lack of clarity. For example, whether 'Palestine' was an iconic event related to Allenby's entry to Jerusalem in 1917 or the British campaign there in 1948 was unclear and limited opportunity existed for follow-up. More broadly, the risk in using a survey as a means of data collection is that what is omitted can be as important as that which is offered and respondents 'may miss what culture is all about: that which is taken for granted'.⁵⁵ No two respondents either have the same experience so perceptions differ and those who responded were volunteers and so demonstrate self-selection bias.

Focus groups bring different concerns. Attendees were selected by their parent organisation on the basis of availability so one can never be certain of levels of expertise

⁵³ Further limitations are detailed at Susan Jamieson, "Likert Scales: How To (Ab)Use Them," *Medical Education*, 38:12 (2004): 1217-1218. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x>

⁵⁴ A lack of comprehension was declared in one focus group, but obvious in few cases.

⁵⁵ Kier, *Imagining War*, 36.

or indeed, though the Participant Information Sheet and verbal briefing beforehand made it explicit, that soldiers were willing volunteers. There were some identifiable instances of non-participation due to a lack of confidence, inarticulate communication skills or the dominant influence of one or two individuals. I encouraged participation and invited quieter group members to speak but I recognise that there are often unknown 'social variables' that impacted upon levels of participation.⁵⁶ I cannot qualify if or how this manifested. I also cannot be certain that their perception of my position of seniority over them had no impact on shaping their answers. This said, focus groups were marked by 'vivid and compelling views'⁵⁷ and the opportunity to contribute was afforded to all. Incomplete or interrupted speech did occur and I both intervened to allow the contributor to finish and accepted the interruption.

Focus groups could morph into Group Interviews.

In group interviews the researcher adopts an 'investigative' role: asking questions, controlling the dynamics of group discussion, often engaging in dialogue with specific participants...the researcher asks questions, the respondents relay their 'answers' back to the researcher. In focus groups the dynamics are different. Here, the researcher plays the role of 'facilitator' or 'moderator'; that is, facilitator/moderator of group discussion between participants, not between her/himself and the participants.⁵⁸

I was 'driving' the conversation on occasion. This meant that non-verbal communication was difficult to ascertain, and management of the meeting took precedence over listening for cues: it was easy to become fixed by lively discussion. Recording the conversation mitigates against missing information though follow up after the focus group disbands is difficult. It is also true that participant's positions shift so the opinions expressed on the day may not endure. 'A quote from an individual may be typical of their initial view but radically different from the one they hold when they leave the focus group.'⁵⁹

A failure to over-recruit⁶⁰ meant some groups were lighter than I would have liked (3 people only in two groups): reliance on others to select personnel, the availability of soldiers not otherwise engaged and the stipulation that participation should be voluntary reduced my influence. Procedural problems are 'an integral part of focus group use, and even if mitigated by moderator techniques, will still exist.'⁶¹ Environmental factors (design of the room and temperature, time of the day, future activity, duties prior to the discussion) had uncertain impact and my status as a serving military officer was known to attendees: this may have influenced some interactions. Where I could I applied

⁵⁶ Parker & Tritter, "Focus Group Method," 32.

⁵⁷ Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology," 187.

⁵⁸ Parker & Tritter, "Focus Group Method," 25-6. Others though do merge the terms.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶⁰ Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology," 188.

⁶¹ Smithson, "Using and Analysing Focus Groups," 106.

mitigating measures to minimise any effect: I didn't conduct engagements in uniform for example. The disadvantages inherent in engaging with a hierarchical community, as a member of that community, are though offset by the benefit of 'familiarity with the language habitually used by research participants'⁶² and comfort in a military environment. 'Socio-cultural and interviewer-style differences are two important uncontrolled variables' that can account for observed differences⁶³ but my affinity minimised difference. Where the researcher can 'remain aware of how respondents see' him or her it can in fact create advantage.⁶⁴

Declaration

In preparing a research proposal, 'the candidate must reflect on who they are in the world and what their world-view is.'⁶⁵ The thesis involved a journey of self-examination and a change in my stance on the issue of warriorship and I recognise that some conflict of interest and unconscious bias is possible. The study reflects my perception of what is important in the opinions of those who contributed: thought 'bears the stamp of our age and our geography'⁶⁶ and my knowledge too is historically and culturally derived. Those consulted are also influenced by their experience but it is 'unlikely that members of the armed forces in different ranks, regiments and regimes have over a long period consistently held to a single strategy or view of themselves'⁶⁷ so snapshots are valuable as representative of the time. I incorporated multiple sampling techniques and several different audiences to create a broad research base but recognise limitations here too.

Questionnaires reflect the designer's view of the world, no matter how objective a researcher tries to be. This is true not only for the design of individual questions, but often about the very choice of research subject. Furthermore, what we choose not to ask about may just as easily reflect our world view as what we include in the questionnaire'.⁶⁸

The thesis bears the stamp of my experiences. On submitting it I had been in the Army for over 30 years as a soldier and officer; an infantryman for the first 16 of those (though never in any of the units that comprise the case studies). I have been a CO of a non-

⁶² Wilkinson, "Focus Group Methodology," 188

⁶³ Greg Guest *et al.*, "Comparing Focus Groups and Individual Interviews: Findings from a Randomized Study," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 20:6, (2017): 705, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2017.1281601>

⁶⁴ Parker & Tritter, "Focus Group Method," 32.

⁶⁵ Adele Baldwin, 'Putting the Philosophy Into PhD,' *Working Papers in the Health Sciences*, 1:10 (Winter 2014), <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273694286>

⁶⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, (NY: Vintage Books, 1994), xv, https://monoskop.org/images/a/a2/Foucault_Michel_The_Order_of_Things_1994.pdf

⁶⁷ Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, "The Concept of Military Professionalism," *Defense Analysis*, 6:2, (1990): 119, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405441>

⁶⁸ Rowley, "Research Questionnaires," 32, citing D. E. Gray, *Doing Research in the Real World*, 2nd ed., (London: Sage, 2009), 339.

infantry unit and understand the 'fundamental codes' of military culture; I have followed the empirical orders⁶⁹ and I consider myself a master of the vernacular. This gives me insight but also association and proximity to my subject. My military experience and training extends throughout the 'spectrum of operations'⁷⁰ from support to the civil authority through to operations on the staff of an armoured brigade on combat operations. I identify with many of those who contributed to the primary research, and with some of their opinions. None of those consulted, to my knowledge, have ever fallen under my command in the past and will unlikely do so in the future. I am therefore satisfied that I am distant enough from the soldiers who contributed that I cannot impact on any of their career prospects for the future though I cannot be certain that they recognised this. I am confident that I have not amplified my opinion or beliefs, nor indulged in advocacy, but recognise the value in reflexivity and in writing myself, as the researcher, into this work.⁷¹

Research Approval

The research conducted for this thesis was cleared to King's College, national and internationally accepted ethical standards through the UK Ministry of Defence. The MOD Research Ethics Committee (MODREC) process,⁷² for the assessment and approval of research protocols, provides authority to collect data on identifiable individuals directly (by focus groups or interviews) or indirectly (such as by questionnaire). Both methods were employed and though the individuals would be unidentified, approval was nevertheless sought. The process involved appraisal by the Army Scientific Assessment Committee, then review by MODREC. The research protocol was given favourable opinion on 3rd April 2018⁷³ and negated the requirement for renewal of other approvals.⁷⁴ Requests for interview with officers of Brigadier rank and above also required MOD approval⁷⁵ and the finished thesis was authorised for publication in the public domain.

⁶⁹ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xx.

⁷⁰ The army presents the different operations it expects to conduct as existing along a 'spectrum'. It shows each separate from another. On the left hand side of the model it shows Major Combat Operations (MCO) that morph into Stabilisation then Counter-insurgency (or 'COIN') through to Peace Support and Conflict Prevention to the right hand side where Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities (MACA) is situated. MCO is assumed the 'most demanding' of operations; MACA the least demanding. UK MOD, ADP Ops 8-9 (2010), Figure 8.1 'Summary of Military Activities,' accessed at <http://www.defencesynergia.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Army-Doctrine-Operations-Dec-2010.pdf>. The model is frequently updated but the phrase is well enough recognised to be employed here.

⁷¹ Paul Higate and Ailsa Cameron, "Reflexivity and Researching the Military," *Armed Forces & Society* 32:2 (Jan 2006): 220, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05278171>

⁷² UK MOD Research Ethics Committee, <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ministry-of-defence-research-ethics-committees> and Joint Service Publication 536, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553276/JSP536_Part1.pdf on 31 August 2017.

⁷³ Letter MODREC-Marks ref 840/MODREC/17 dated 03 April 2018.

⁷⁴ KCL ethical approval, was previously granted and was allowed to lapse once superseded by MODREC. Guidance available at <https://internal.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/ethics/do-i-require/external-approval>

⁷⁵ Approval granted 16 Jan 2019 by UK MOD Directorate of Defence Communications.

3. Literature Review

Heroes and Killers

The literature presents the warrior from one of two broad perspectives: as hero or killer. The first suggests culture, and often ethics as overriding factors in the warriors construct; the second emphasises the physical and neurological aspects of warriorship. Each is analysed in this chapter and, where useful, primary research is introduced to validate or contest the academic views, and expose the gaps in thinking. First, and before scrutinising the types of warrior determined through my analysis of the literature, the curious attraction of the word warrior is examined in overview. Suggestive of status, strength and valour; associated with images of chivalric contest and skilled champions, warriorship can 'expand beyond the literal interpretation of war and destruction to include every moment of our lives'.¹ It is a blend of 'personal morals, institutional culture, training and experience, personal biases, societal expectation, and legal obligation.'² But it involves less tangible, psychological aspects too. Warriors choose to fight: they are savages who operate in a 'coldly efficient' manner and revel in the reality of war that 'doesn't allow for polite company, private hygiene and weakness'.³ They arouse fear: their presence is disturbing and mention can suppose atrocity and dishonour. War is brutal yet 'intoxicating and exciting.'⁴ So are warriors. The warrior is hero and killer; warriorship a demonstration of nobility and animality.⁵ The concept involves depth and is both disturbing and appealing.⁶

The warrior represents 'only the small portion of the force that is called upon to do the actual fighting...we cheapen both words [the other word is soldier] when either one or the other or both are used out of context.'⁷ Gilchrist thinks it is the act of battle that bifurcates the two: 'By necessity, war will barbarise its participants'⁸ and even those with

¹ Richard Strozzi-Heckler, *In Search of the Warrior Spirit: Teaching Awareness Disciplines to the Military* (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake, 2007), 243.

² Jo Brick, "The Military Profession: Law, Ethics, and the Profession of Arms," in Finney & Mayfield *Redefining*, 29.

³ Annis, "Combat is Masculine."

⁴ George Kassimeris, "The Warrior's Dishonour," in *Warrior's Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare*, ed. G. Kassimeris, (Aldershot: Routledge, 2006), 11, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315547640>.

⁵ J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 15.

⁶ Margaret MacMillan, "War and Humanity," *Reith Lecture*, BBC R4, 30 Jun 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0b7f390>

⁷ Richard G. Trefry, "Soldiers and Warriors: Warriors and Soldiers," in *The American Warrior* eds. Chris Morris & Janet Morris (NY: Curtis Brown Ltd., 1992), 464, cited in Donald M. Sando, "Band of Brothers - Warrior Ethos, Unit Effectiveness and the Role of Initial Entry Training," (Masters diss., U.S. Army War College, 2004), 3.

⁸ Mark Gilchrist, "War Isn't Precise or Predictable — It's Barbaric, Chaotic, and Ugly," *The Strategy Bridge*, 24 Aug 2017, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/8/24/war-isnt-precise-of-predictable-its-barbaric-chaotic-and-ugly>

honourable intent can become 'other worldly' with accepted norms suspended and conflict creating a 'physical separation of the military from the population it represents.'⁹ Ankersen says warriors fight as 'a personal quest, often railing against legitimate authority' – an uneasy fit with soldiering and an issue wrapped up in ethics.¹⁰ Those 'who identify as warriors (and who may espouse a set of values contrary to those of the contemporary military) prior to formal socialization/training' may in fact be dangerous.¹¹ Warriorship as a functional, circumstantial or psychological phenomenon prompts its examination beyond limited descriptive terminology.

Loaded with 'philosophical and behavioural connotations',¹² warrior extends to 'bullies, terrorists, religious extremists, tribal warriors, narco-guerrillas, and the all-others category that interests adventurers and special operations soldiers',¹³ warlords,¹⁴ mercenaries and private security companies.¹⁵ It is thought 'citizen soldiers or insurgents can buy into it too';¹⁶ soldiers think warrior can apply outside the military to those with a disability,¹⁷ sportsmen, nurses and even politicians 'because of their tenacity, outlook or how they engage'.¹⁸ It is 'a familiar concept and catchphrase in the fields of psychology, philosophy, literature, business, and in the movies': amongst 13 variants (such as warrior athletes, earth warriors and executive warriors) Strozzi-Heckler highlights market value. It gets 'great press, precisely because it suggests kicking ass in a moral and socially conscious way, though most people don't have a sense of what it entails.'¹⁹ At a recent army conference it was less kindly regarded. A serving soldier ridiculed the broad

⁹ Kassimeris, "Warrior's Dishonour," 13. Paddy Ashdown says civilian norms 'hobble' soldiers in war and advises that in conflict there be a suspension of 'normal rules of behaviour'. "Defence: No Stomach For The Fight?", interview by Kenneth Payne, *Analysis*, BBC R4, 07 Nov 2010, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkwk8>. A soldier responding to allegations of war crimes in Afghanistan says troops 'cannot fight enemies like that [the Taliban] by adhering to normal Western moral standards. Michael Smith "Article Written By Former SASR Trooper In Response to Recent Allegations Against the Regiment." 14 Jun 2018, accessed at <http://www.michaelsmithnews.com/2018/06/article-written-by-former-sasr-trooper-in-response-to-recent-allegations-against-the-regiment.html> on 24 Feb 20.

¹⁰ Standards against which moral questions are judged, where actions are right or wrong, regardless of context. 'The Basics of Philosophy', http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_absolutism.html.

¹¹ @ProfAnkersen, 19 October 2018.

¹² Thomas St Denis, "The Dangerous Appeal of the Warrior," *Canadian Military Journal* (Summer 2001): 31, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo2/no2/doc/31-38-eng.pdf>

¹³ Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class Revisited," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 13:2 (2002): 16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310208559178>

¹⁴ John Mackinlay, "Warlords," *The RUSI Journal*, 143:2 (Apr 1998): 24-32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849808446246>

¹⁵ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007); Uwe Steinhoff, "Ethics and Mercenaries," in *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, eds. Paolo Tripodi & Jessica Wolfendale, (London: Routledge, 2016), 137-151; Erik Prince & Davin Coburn, *Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror*, (NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014); Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*, (London: Serpent's Tail, 2007); Neil Hauer, "Russia's Favorite Mercenaries," *The Atlantic*, 27 Aug 2018, <https://amp.theatlantic.com/amp/article/568435/>; for attitudes to security companies see Gary Schaub Jr., "Civilian Combatants, Military Professionals? American Officer Judgments." *Defence Studies*, 10:3, (2010): 369-386, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2010.503679>

¹⁶ Questionnaire: Commanding Officer #12 (hereafter CO12)

¹⁷ FG2: Regimental Recruiting Team (hereafter RRT) mixed ranks discussion, 14 Nov 18, 05:00

¹⁸ CO20

¹⁹ Strozzi-Heckler, *Warrior Spirit*, 288

application of the word: 'cross-fit Spartans and glam rock Vikings.'²⁰ A word that comes in and out of *vogue*, 'Ngram' software²¹ allows broad trend analysis²² and suggests the word was most popular prior to 1900.²³ It dipped away considerably from 1900 with a nadir around 1920 and again in the mid '40s, assumedly in the aftermaths of the World Wars. As a term of reference it has been on the rise through the critical junctures of the wars of the early 2000s.




Fig. 3.1: Warrior: Occurrence in Literature Since 1800

We can be confident that warrior mostly applies to a 'person who makes war upon', not least for the trends shown in Fig. 3.1. However this specificity makes it no less clumsy. It fits awkwardly to Luttwak's 'post-Napoleonic and post-Clausewitzian'²⁴ conflict and Kaldor's wars, more social than bloody.²⁵ How Fourth,²⁶ Fifth,²⁷ and 6th Generation²⁸

²⁰ "Securing Competitive Advantage: I'm a Soldier, Not a Warrior - the Problem with Warrior Ethos," RUSI Conference, 05 June 2019.

²¹ This presents the words and phrases that occur in a corpus of books (here 'predominantly in the English language published in any country'). Google Books Ngram Viewer, <http://books.google.com/ngrams>.

²² Over 5 million digitized books or c4% of all books ever published. The designers intent was to allow the observation of 'cultural trends and subject them to quantitative investigation'. Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., "Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books," *Science* 331: 6014, (Jan 2011), 176. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1199644>

²³ The trends are illustrative and the 'beguiling power' of the software is acknowledged. For criticism of this methodology see Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth & Peter Sheridan Dodds, "Characterizing the Google Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution," *PLoS ONE* 10:10 (Oct 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137041>

²⁴ Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74:3, (May-Jun 1995): 122.

²⁵ Kaldor, *New Wars*, 4.

²⁶ 'Decentralised war' reliant on technology; the successor to war conducted through mass, industry and manoeuvre. William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Military Review*, 84:5 (Sept/Oct 2004), 12-16, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p124201coll1/id/178>

²⁷ T. X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," *Military Review*, 87:3 (May/Jun. 2007), 14-23, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/162/rec/4>; Ryan Faith, "Fifth-Generation Warfare: Taste the Color Revolution Rainbow," 06 Jun 2014, accessed at https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ev7kap/fifth-generation-warfare-taste-the-color-revolution-rainbow on 10 Feb 2020.

²⁸ Attributed to Major-General Slipchenko. Jacob W. Kipp, "Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent Developments," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 9:7 (Jan 2012), https://jamestown.org/program/russian-sixth-generation-warfare-and-recent-developments/#.Vnr3jTY_VE4

warfare are serviced by warriors is uncertain. Ambiguous,²⁹ hybrid,³⁰ 'Non-Obvious',³¹ and Unrestricted Warfare³² have few templates against which the warrior can be considered. Employing 'military analogies to discuss things that aren't quite military'³³ like cyber-war a 'medium with its own rules'³⁴ is then imprudent. Warrior is as ill-fitting to individuals who indulge in war as a 'remote spectator sport'³⁵ as it is to the sportsmen, earth warriors or executives mentioned previously. The term requires an excursion into a definition of war to establish a baseline for understanding.

War, the 'central institution in human civilisation'³⁶ suffers from a lack of linguistic precision.³⁷ Coker advises that it is possible to 'experience war without understanding it'³⁸ so a singular representation is elusive. Defining it is not helped by what Turchin calls the 'war over war' in academia³⁹ and some complicated approaches to what might appear simple – like defining 'combat'.⁴⁰ War is also constantly evolving: Bobbitt provides a useful, though he admits an 'oversimplified' graphic of constitutional conventions (the princely, kingly, territorial, state-nation, nation-state and market states) compared to the significant events of the time (wars, treaties, innovation).⁴¹ Fascinating, repulsive, exhilarating, sad, tender and cruel,⁴² war stirs primordial emotion. It can be rational according to Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clausewitz: Gat says it is 'a continuation of human desires by violent means';⁴³ it provides the opportunity for status; for sex⁴⁴ (it is 'a strategy by which coalitions of males cooperate to acquire and defend resources for

²⁹ Mark Galeotti, "I'm Sorry For Creating The 'Gerasimov Doctrine'," *Foreign Policy*, 05 Mar 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/>

³⁰ Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges." Joint Forces Quarterly, 52, (Q1 2009), 34-39, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfghoffman.pdf>; "Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars." Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, published Dec 2007, accessed at http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf on 24 Sep 17.

³¹ Martin C. Libicki, "The Specter of Non-Obvious Warfare," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2012): 88-101, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-4/2012_4_03_libicki_s_eng.pdf

³² Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, (Beijing: PLA Literature & Arts Publishing House, 1999).

³³ Lawrence Freedman, "On the Future of War," interview by Mick Cook. *The Dead Prussian*, Nov 2017, <http://thedeadprussian.libsyn.com/episode-50-on-the-future-of-war-the-dead-prussian-podcast>

³⁴ Martin C. Libicki. "Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar." Report for the USAF. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009, iii. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf

³⁵ Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, (London: Pimlico, 2002), 185

³⁶ Gwynne Dyer, *War*, (London: Guild Publishing, 1986), xi.

³⁷ Jeremy Black, "What is War?" *Defence In Depth*, published 11 Jun 2018, accessed at <https://defenceindepth.co/2018/06/11/what-is-war/> on 26 Oct 2019.

³⁸ Coker, *Waging War*, 72.

³⁹ Peter Turchin, *Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth*. (Chaplin, Connecticut: Beresta Books, 2016) Kindle, location 2699.

⁴⁰ For example: "The deployment of mutually incompatible behavioral strategies designed to thwart organismic design can be succinctly called "combat." Aaron Sell, Liana S. E. Hone & Nicholas Pound, "The Importance of Physical Strength to Human Males," *Human Nature*, (March 2012), 31. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-012-9131-2>

⁴¹ Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: The Long War and the Market State*, (NY: Knopf, 2002), 344-47. For modern changes see Michael Evans, "The Twenty-First Century Security Environment: Challenges for Joint Forces." *The RUSI Journal*, 154:2, (2009), 64-72. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902965752>

⁴² Caputo, *Rumor*, xix.

⁴³ Azar Gat, "On the Decline of War," interview by Mick Cook, *The Dead Prussian*, Jul 2017, <http://thedeadprussian.libsyn.com/episode-40-on-the-decline-of-war>

⁴⁴ A synopsis of the Freudian association of sex with violence is offered by Grossman, *On Killing*, 134-37.

reproduction⁴⁵); and to commit murder, steal or trespass.⁴⁶ Definitions are contestable: as Strachan explains ‘we do not really know what is a war and what is not’.⁴⁷ The inability ‘to agree on the meaning of key terms’⁴⁸ does not though negate a working definition.

This study focuses on British Army soldiers and the act of war, not the reasons for it: the frame of reference is combat. ‘At its most basic level,’ says Edwards, ‘war is something that individuals engage in collectively’. It is both an individual and group endeavour.

War is a complex social process, if you will, which animates human beings into committing violent acts, ranging from killing and maiming, to inciting great fear, stress and hatred in their fellow man and woman...war has, of course, deeply human consequences that are often overlooked, including the degeneration of fighting into genocide and ethnic cleansing.⁴⁹

War is social, involving organised groups of humans, ‘each attempting to exercise tyranny over the other through violence, terror, and threat’.⁵⁰ Functions are exclusive: non-martial or sporting allusions are dismissed: ‘Warriors kill people, that’s it, it’s a laugh when people say war is like a boxing match – it’s not, someone’s going to die’.⁵¹ In war ‘placing second is to pay an unthinkable price’.⁵² The warrior engages in ‘direct fighting, face-to-face’ at personal risk⁵³ with a ‘willingness to put their body on the line’.⁵⁴ Combat, the ‘inherently lethal environment in which competing organizations seek to use their skill and strength of arms to impose their will’⁵⁵ involves the application of purposeful violence. War is that ‘quintessentially human institution of organized, leader-mandated, group-on-group killing’;⁵⁶ the warrior is ‘someone who takes part’⁵⁷ in applying lethal force and engages in the rare activity where ‘one can kill without crime’.⁵⁸

I determined that there are two schools of thought evident in the academic literature

⁴⁵ Glowacki *et al*, “*Evolutionary Anthropology*,” 1. William Buckner, “The Behavioural Ecology of Male Violence,” *Quillette*, 24 Feb 2018, <http://quillette.com/2018/02/24/behavioral-ecology-male-violence/>

⁴⁶ Gerald Wheeler, *The Tribe, And Intertribal Relations in Australia*, (London: John Murray, 1910), 139. <https://archive.org/details/tribeintertribal00wheeuoft/page/n5>

⁴⁷ Hew Strachan, “The Changing Character of War,” *A Europaeum Lecture Delivered At The Graduate Institute Of International Relations*, 09 Nov 2006, <https://europaeum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Changing-Character-of-War-Hew-Strachan-Europaeum-Lecture-2006.pdf>; Donald Stoker, ‘The Myth of Total War,’ *The Strategy Bridge*, 17 December 2016, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/12/17/the-myth-of-total-war>

⁴⁸ Christopher Daase, “Clausewitz and Small Wars,” *Clausewitz in the 21st Century*, Oxford University Conference, 21-23 March 2005, <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Daase/SmallWarsPaper.htm>

⁴⁹ Edwards, *War*, 4.

⁵⁰ Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. (NY: Scribner, 2003), 209.

⁵¹ FG7: SNCOs, 29 Nov 18, 00:54.

⁵² Toby Whitmarsh & David Arnel, “If You Are Not First You Are Last: Gaining An Adaptive Edge Through Prototype Warfare,” *US Army War College, War Room* (May 2019), <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/if-you-are-not-first-you-are-last-gaining-an-adaptive-edge-through-prototype-warfare/>

⁵³ FG9: Majors, 29 Nov 18, 02:50.

⁵⁴ FG8: Officers, 28 Nov 18, 19:50.

⁵⁵ Landru, “Evolution”, 47.

⁵⁶ Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death*, (London: Macmillan, 2010), 362.

⁵⁷ CO09.

⁵⁸ Grégoire, Chamayou. *Drone Theory*, trans. Janet Lloyd (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 160.

regarding the warrior or *homo furens*, meaning ‘fighting man’.⁵⁹ This Latin phrase is employed to permit analysis through a less declaratory, distracted approach whilst meaning is investigated. The first school thinks the phenomenon sociological, where individuals ‘have enormous flexibility in what they can become, in contrast to the inflexibility and determinism attributed to evolutionary approaches to human behaviour.’⁶⁰ Individuals respond to direction: fighting is controlled – ‘armed surgery to deliver us painlessly from evil’⁶¹ – but *homo furens* is also automaton-like, operating to institutional norms.⁶² Considered mostly through an ethical lens this *homo furens* fights in the service of others, within a collective, recognisable, institutional and hierarchical group.⁶³ Known here as ‘Type 1’ (T1) these are products of formal military training, and nurturing, who perform to qualified standards. They exist as easily in peace as they do in combat – and calibrate to either. The terms soldier and warrior may be synonymous, but ‘soldiering’, a social construct, is the dominant authority. T1 *homo furens* are soldiers, servants, occasionally automatons: ‘loyalty and obedience are the highest virtues.’⁶⁴

The second school looks to the deeper motivations behind fighting.⁶⁵ It considers the

⁵⁹ Gray, *Warriors*, 27.

⁶⁰ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 21.

⁶¹ Sten Rynning, “Zero Civilian Casualties: Why the Face of Western War Gives Us a False Idea of Conflict.” *The Conversation*, 20 March 2018. <http://theconversation.com/zero-civilian-casualties-why-the-face-of-western-war-gives-us-a-false-idea-of-conflict-93090>

⁶² David Sloan Wilson, “Evolutionary Social Constructivism,” in *The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative*, eds Jonathan Gottschall & David Sloan Wilson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 20.

⁶³ Christopher Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror*. London: Routledge, 2007; Shannon E. French, *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); Gray, *Warriors*; Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998); Kassimeris, “Warrior’s Dishonour,”; Keegan *et al.*, *Soldiers*; Shay, *Achilles*; Nancy Sherman, *Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind* (NY: OUP, 2007); Strozzi-Heckler, *Warrior Spirit*; Edward Tick, *Warrior’s Return: Restoring the Soul after War*. (Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2014); Tripodi & Wolfendale, *New Soldiers*; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (NY: Basic Books, 1977).

⁶⁴ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 73.

⁶⁵ Bourke, *Intimate History*; Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men*, (London: HarperCollins, 1998), Kindle; Michael Burleigh, *Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II*, (NY: Harper Perennial, 2012); Caputo, *Rumor*; Chamayou, *Drone Theory*; Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, (London: Penguin, 2007); Robert D Hare, “Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come,” *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 23:1, (Mar 1996): 25–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854896023001004>; “Psychopathy as a Risk Factor for Violence.” *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 70:3, (Fall 1999): 181–197, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1022094925150>; Frederick, *Black Hearts*; Daniel J. Goldhagen, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (NY: Vintage Books, 1997); *Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*, (London: Abacus, 2011); Grossman, *On Killing*; Richard Holmes, *Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (London: Cassell Military, 2004); Kent A Kiehl, *The Psychopath Whisperer: Inside the Minds of Those Without a Conscience* (London: Oneworld, 2015); Mark J. Larrimore, *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Karl Marlantes, *What It Is Like To Go to War* (London: Atlantic, 2012); Mike Martin, *Why We Fight*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2018); Frank McLynn, *Heroes & Villains: Inside the Minds of the Greatest Warriors in History* (NY: Pegasus Books, 2009); Milgram, *Obedience to Authority*; Leo Murray, *Brains and Bullets: How Psychology Wins Wars* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013); Sönke Neitzel & Harald Welzer. *Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying: The Secret World War II Tapes of German POWs* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2013); Tim O’Brien, *If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me up and Ship Me Home*, (NY: Broadway Books, 2014); Ralph Peters, *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World*. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), *Endless War: Middle-Eastern Islam vs. Western Civilization*. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2010); Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature*, (London: Penguin, 2003), Kindle, *The Better Angels of Our Nature the Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes*, (London: Allen Lane, 2011); Robert Plomin,

physiological, neurological and psychological influences and promotes evolutionary psychology. This is Hobbesian man⁶⁶ inclined, or born, to fight: warriors who 'go their own way',⁶⁷ who like Berserkers embody the spirit of reckless attack.⁶⁸ They are 'free riders without moral scruple' an idea that 'seems to have become controversial only in the postmodern era, when it has become fashionable to deny that any of us have a "nature" at all.'⁶⁹ This individual comprehends an 'internal reality and cannot know whether an outside world exists'.⁷⁰ They stand for themselves, against others.

There are no treaties of trust between lions and men: wolves and lambs share no unity of heart, but are fixed in hatred of each other for all time – so there can be no friendship for you and me, there will be no oaths between us, before one or the other falls...'⁷¹

Autonomy and emotion, not policy, law or institution⁷² dominate behaviour: warriors' actions are anathema where 'moral perfectionism'⁷³ is nirvana, incomprehensible to any 'tidy, rational western mind.'⁷⁴ Type 2 (T2) *homo furens* are fighters, maybe savages, with animalistic tendencies who go 'into battle naked, or at least without armour, in a godlike or god-possessed – but also beastlike – fury.'⁷⁵ They act according to impulse and desire, and fight 'depending on whether it might be profitable'.⁷⁶ A product of nature, it is individual character that dominates. A love of combat and a dedication, fixation or even obsession with fighting are motivations. This individual operates in an unconstrained, dissident manner, according to internally determined reference.

Warriorship permeates 'synapses to social networks'.⁷⁷ Darwin and Galton's⁷⁸ views on

Blueprint: How DNA Makes Us Who We Are, (London: Allen Lane, 2018); Matt Ridley, *Nature via Nurture, Genes, Experience and What Makes Us Human*, (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), Kindle; Adam Rutherford, *A Brief History of Everyone Who Ever Lived: The Stories in Our Genes* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016); Turchin, *Ultrasociety*; Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*.

⁶⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2014).

⁶⁷ The Yoruba of Nigeria call such an individual *aranakan*: 'a person who always goes his own way,' who is uncooperative, full of malice, and bullheaded. The Inuit *kunlangeta* is someone whose 'mind knows what to do but he does not do it.' As examples these provide insight into genetic disposition, the part played by free will and global humanity. Kent A Kiehl & Morris B Hoffman. "The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, And Economics." *Jurimetrics*, 51 (Summer 2011): 359, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4059069/pdf/nihms580794.pdf>

⁶⁸ Michael P Speidel, "Berserks: A History of Indo-European "Mad Warriors", " *Journal of World History* 13:2 (2002): 253, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078974>. Such individuals exist in a 'ruinous' state ignorant of ethics that leads to life-long psychological and physiological injury, according to Shay, *Achilles*, 98.

⁶⁹ Kiehl & Hoffman. "Criminal Psychopath," 357.

⁷⁰ Jonathan D. Raskin, "The Evolution of Constructivism," *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 21:1, (2008): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10720530701734331>

⁷¹ Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles, (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 550

⁷² Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 5.

⁷³ James Burk, "Strategic Assumptions and Moral Implications of the Constabulary Force". *Journal of Military Ethics*, 4:3, (2005): 159, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570500216535>.

⁷⁴ Alistair Horne, *Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century*, (NY: HarperCollins, 2015), 150.

⁷⁵ Shay, *Achilles*, 77

⁷⁶ Diamond, *World Until Yesterday*, 156.

⁷⁷ James Giordano, "Neuroscience and the Weapons of War" Interview by John Amble. *The Modern War Institute*, Aug 2017, <http://modernwarinstitute.libsyn.com/ep-31-neuroscience-and-the-weapons-of-war-with-dr-james-giordano>

⁷⁸ Charles Darwin, *On The Origin of Species*, (Oxford: OUP, 2008); Galton, "Men of Science." See too Lewis Goldberg, "An Alternative 'Description of Personality': The Big-Five Factor Structure," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 59:6, (1990), 1216-7, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1216>

the innateness of personality provides some explanation; inheritance and heritability is important. Freud and Lorenz's work on shaping the psyche has meaning; the thoughts of Pavlov and B. F. Skinner on the power of learning, and 'the autonomous power of culture'⁷⁹ that operates outside of our awareness, and 'makes some things possible, some things desirable, and some things unimaginable'⁸⁰ provide useful if partial explanation. Strachan summarises:

Achilles may have been in need of in-depth psychotherapy, but he and the other leading figures in the *Iliad*, Hector, Patroclus and even Odysseus, are indubitably the West's archetypal heroes. However, three problems arise if we relate the *Iliad* to modern conceptions of war...First, we don't know whether we are talking about historical figures or mythical ones. Second, these heroes, although certainly warriors, were not soldiers – in that they were not regularly paid, even though they did make war pay. Third, they became heroes through the medium of single combat rather than the collective use of force, through individual and intermittent courage rather than consistent campaigning.⁸¹

These problems are now explored. The types evolve from ancient, localised beginnings, and a trade 'as old as human society itself'.⁸² They are not exclusive and the truth of one idea 'is not proof of the falsehood of another.'⁸³ Understanding is enhanced where identity, a concept 'ubiquitous in contemporary social science, cutting across psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology, and history'⁸⁴ is fully considered. The observer mustn't be seduced by trends.⁸⁵ The connectionist adds 'a useful brick to the wall. They are wrong only when they try to pull somebody else's bricks out, or to claim that the wall is held up only by empiricist bricks.'⁸⁶ Gat warns against the historian and social scientist who disregard the biological element of human culture.⁸⁷ The construction of T1 *homo furens* is first examined with a close eye to culture and environment: T2 and the part played by choice, free will and genetics is then considered.

Soldier-Servants

Soldiers and warriors are compared to each other in the literature. Keeley says soldiers are the poorer and will lose 'to warriors in combat despite superior weaponry, unit

⁷⁹ Edgar H. Schein, *Organisational Culture and Leadership*, (NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016) 299.

⁸⁰ Kier, *Imagining War*, 165

⁸¹ Scheipers, *Heroism*, 48.

⁸² Keegan *et al*, *Soldiers*, 11.

⁸³ Ridley, *Nature via Nurture*, location 4390-4394

⁸⁴ Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke. "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63:4, (Dec 2000): 284, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695840>

⁸⁵ From nativism to empiricism various theories have over time been preferred: the nature view is based on biology; the nurture position adheres to behaviourism. Between the two are psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology and humanism. Saul McLeod, "Nature vs. Nurture in Psychology," *Simply Psychology*, (2018), <https://www.simplypsychology.org/naturevsnurture.html>. The reality is that all are related and connected. Michael Rutter, "Nature, Nurture, and Development: From Evangelism Through Science Toward Policy and Practice." *Child Development*, 73:1 (Jan/Feb 2002): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00388>

⁸⁶ Ridley, *Nature via Nurture*, location 3165-3168.

⁸⁷ Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 145.

discipline, and military science'.⁸⁸ Edwards highlights the effectiveness of insurgents: soldiers 'organized along conventional lines' struggle against their 'speed, aggression and intimate knowledge of the human and physical terrain'.⁸⁹

A giant, heavy and unresponsive machinery, that deliberately transforms its living members into unthinking robots performing standard operational procedures or SOPs cannot possibly compete, however much firepower it has, with fanatical or inspired, but at any rate extremely flexible, thinking, cause-oriented fighters who are the very embodiment of mission-command and *Auftragstaktik*.⁹⁰

Others think soldiers superior. Victor Davis Hanson takes an ethnocentric view: he highlights the ancient Greeks, disciplined and educated with technological advantage who generally defeated uncivilised warrior or barbarian armies (though his argument does involve 'a modest amount of straining').⁹¹ Harari echoes Hanson, lauding soldiers who 'easily routed disorganised hordes'.⁹² Their premise is that organisation beats fighting spirit: the importance of the debate is in acknowledging there are different types.

Porter distinguishes the soldier by purpose. For warriors conflict has a meaning of its own and they exercise freedom of action and thought; soldiers, disciplined and organised, are 'directed for instrumental purpose and expediency'.⁹³ Ralph Peters differentiates similarly.⁹⁴ Bury and King emphasise soldierly responses to ritualised words of command and the adherence to the choreography of battle.⁹⁵ In their study into military cohesion, training is preferred over the 'older sociology'⁹⁶ that privileges primary group association (though choreography, the 'mechanical, quasi-automatic aspects of Army operation' is recognised there too).⁹⁷ Porter reduces the soldier's independence of action; the others reduce independence of thought with soldiers responding instinctively to orders and 'drills'. The discipline that soldiers exhibit, that Hanson thought progressive and enabling also constrains, with *homo furens* denied opportunity to act from conviction, acting instead from compulsion,⁹⁸ in an automated manner.

⁸⁸ Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, location 1524-25.

⁸⁹ Edwards, *War*, 30

⁹⁰ Beatrice Heuser, "The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:1 (Feb 2007): 157, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701210863>.

⁹¹ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 111.

⁹² Yuval Noah Harari, *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow*, (London: Vintage, 2017), 155.

⁹³ Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 39.

⁹⁴ Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters* 24:2 (Summer 1994), <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1605856/posts>

⁹⁵ Patrick Bury & Anthony King, "A Profession of Love: Cohesion in a British Platoon in Afghanistan," in King, *Frontline*, 204.

⁹⁶ Eyal Ben-Ari, "From a Sociology of Units to a Sociology of Combat Formations: Militaries and Cohesion in Urban Combat," in King, *Frontline*, 78.

⁹⁷ Samuel A. Stouffer & Arthur A. Lumsdaine. *Volume II: The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 98.

⁹⁸ James J. Sheehan, *The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War*, (London: Faber & Faber, 2010), 16-7.

The first modern army, military servants of the monarch with ‘uniform composition’,⁹⁹ was raised in 1445 by decree of the French King Charles VII.¹⁰⁰ The ‘big men’¹⁰¹ in society, warriors of antiquity, ‘ignorant, miserable, brutal, and violent,’¹⁰² and ‘non-professionals’¹⁰³ agreed to fight for others, as stipendiary troops, or ‘*soldi*’, for pay.¹⁰⁴ They brought under control others ‘neglectful of the obligations they owed a Crown.’¹⁰⁵ By 1900, states had abolished all non-state military actors.¹⁰⁶ Soldiers as citizens in arms under *comitia centuriata* or the people’s assembly, not the tribal *comitia curiata*¹⁰⁷ controlled or forcibly disbanded ‘the mercenary bands pullulating about the country.’¹⁰⁸ Culture modified what evolution shaped, says Ken Payne.¹⁰⁹ Service grew in importance – ‘to fight but to advance its society’s political ends by doing so.’¹¹⁰ Soldiering ‘reduced the wolf pack’ to obedient gun dogs;¹¹¹ and established a ‘social construction defined by shared expectations and values’:

Some of these are embodied in formal regulations, defined authority, written orders, ranks, incentives, punishments, and formal task and occupational definitions. Others circulate as traditions, archetypal stories of things to be emulated or shunned, and accepted truth about what is praiseworthy and what is culpable. Altogether, these form a moral world that most of the participants most of the time regard as legitimate, “natural,” and personally binding.¹¹²

Under instruction and control, soldiers preserved the state, safeguarded its monopoly on violence¹¹³ and protected it from the military itself.¹¹⁴

Soldiering, a collective activity, for others, to a stipulated standard eclipsed warriorship and fighting for ‘base motives’.¹¹⁵ Greater discipline was found in the soldier and structure

⁹⁹ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Though 1494 when the ‘fully stipendiary’ army of Charles VIII was formed is also defensible. Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 96. His was the first ‘combined arms’ force. Howard, *European History*, 20.

¹⁰¹ Gat, *War in Human Civilisation* 34

¹⁰² Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, location 175

¹⁰³ Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday*, 144.

¹⁰⁴ Keegan, *A History of Men in Battle*, 11.

¹⁰⁵ Howard, *European History*, 8. Morris, with an eye to ancient times suggests standing armies existed in 2400 B.C. when ‘wild warriors were being turned into disciplined soldiers’ but the practice was not then as wide-spread nor without credible alternative, and these soldiers were rarely paid the same stipend as later armies. Morris, Ian. *War! What Is It Good For? Conflict and the Progress of Civilization from Primates to Robots*, (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), 90-1.

¹⁰⁶ Farrell, “Culture and Military Power,” 413.

¹⁰⁷ Gat, *Nations*, 62. Jim Gourley, “What’s a Soldier? What’s a Warrior? Well, Do You Want to Live in a State or in a Tribe?” *Foreign Policy*, 15 Sep 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/15/whats-a-soldier-whats-a-warrior-well-do-you-want-to-live-in-a-state-or-in-a-tribe/>.

¹⁰⁸ Howard, *European History*, 18

¹⁰⁹ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 27.

¹¹⁰ C. Toner, “Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the Sword and Shield Approaches to Military Ethics,” *Journal of Military Ethics* 5:3 (2006):185.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹¹² Shay, *Achilles*, 6

¹¹³ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” essay (1919) in *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification*, eds. & trans. Tony Waters & Dagmar Water, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 131.

¹¹⁴ Landru, “Evolution,” 43.

¹¹⁵ Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, Location 271-73

with third party control was imposed: soldiers specialised and evolved (swordsmen and archers then riflemen and gunners). Militaries became professions, with expertise, responsibility and corporateness¹¹⁶ 'commissioned by their parent societies to perform a function' that varies from society to society¹¹⁷ but generally the 'ordered application of force' in pursuit of the resolution of social problems.¹¹⁸ Uniforms, promotions and medals, visible representations of association and insignia demonstrated membership of the team: personal reputation was promoted through the regiment.¹¹⁹ Emotionally charged symbols, won or invented came to represent the 'memories of past events.'¹²⁰ The journey from pre-historic through classical times,¹²¹ and beyond culminated in the Great War and Europe's evolution into a soldier society.¹²² With the peace of 1945 a further shift occurred: 'Western Europe, in the aftermath of two world wars and the Holocaust, has been demoralized, guilt-ridden, and essentially debellicized, averse to raising even modest defences.'¹²³ With the rise of war as an industrial endeavour then its rejection as a means of conflict resolution came the death of warriorship as an artisan undertaking.¹²⁴

Martial activity became transactional, involving 'a relationship with a client.'¹²⁵ In common with other professionals the soldier offered: depth of knowledge in the field; monopoly of skill; and a service required by others.¹²⁶ These criteria are clear cut. Brick continues: the custody of knowledge 'creates a duty in the professional to act in the interest of the client.' This stipulation constrains *homo furens*: it is unclear if the client to whom a duty is owed is the government, the leader or society at large. Further where the professional is paid, self-interest must exist alongside loyalty: *soldi* act in the interest of the client where the client pays. Brick's final criterion is more questionable: self-regulation, she says, as much as institutional control establishes accountability. Where this is allowed it tempts a return to warrior like behaviour. Soldiers as servants don't self-regulate – they follow guidelines and operate according to 'subordinate sovereignty',¹²⁷ and 'objective civilian control'.¹²⁸

¹¹⁶ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 8-10.

¹¹⁷ Toner, "Military Service," 185.

¹¹⁸ Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 7.

¹¹⁹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. French, *Military Identities*, 337. Anthony King, "On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group Thesis," *Security Studies*, 25:4, (2016): 721, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1220205>.

¹²⁰ Paul O'Connor, "The Unanchored Past: Three Modes of Collective Memory," *Memory Studies* (Dec 2019), 10, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019894694>.

¹²¹ Howard, *European History*, 1.

¹²² John Keegan says 'warrior society' emphasising the commonplace conflation of terms. Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 21.

¹²³ R. Jordan Prescott, "Goodbye Conventional War. It's Been Fun," *Modern War Institute*, 21 Mar 2019, <https://mwi.usma.edu/goodbye-conventional-war-fun/>

¹²⁴ Hew Strachan, "Heroic Warfare and the Problem of Mass Armies: France 1871-1914," in Scheipers, *Heroism*, 47-64.

¹²⁵ Rebecca Johnson, "Ethical Requirements of the Profession," in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 86.

¹²⁶ Brick, "Military Profession," 22.

¹²⁷ James H. Toner, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 36.

¹²⁸ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 94.

Adherence to a stipulated code – ‘a stratified set of rules that serves as a model for actors in the society to follow’¹²⁹ – informs action. Rules are how society shapes the self which ‘shapes social behaviour.’¹³⁰ This is an important concept in Identity Theory:¹³¹ society attributes role and therefore regulates martial behaviour. There is a part played by both external and internal control.¹³² The rules set by the military themselves as professional code¹³³ ‘can seem very remote’ to others;¹³⁴ equally Harries-Jenkins’ internal ‘social action,’ can fail to have a moderating effect. To assume that either of these matter much is wrong and places responsibility inappropriately. Rules set by others and enforced by institutional control are those that are immutable.

The autonomous warrior became malleable and bent to society’s wishes. Domesticated and made agreeable *homo furens* was welcomed by instrumentalists as a tool of government: warrior self-agency reduced. For soldiers, fighting is to be a deliberate act not an emotional enterprise, war is political not personal and detachment from the act is fundamental to legitimacy. Organisational coherence takes precedence over personal drive, and loyalty is as important as fighting efficiency. The focus is on ‘the instrumental problem of defeating the enemy’ not the intrinsic value of violence for its own sake.¹³⁵ The mantra that strategy is the domain of the warrior ‘fully independent of policy’ and with ‘a free hand to pursue that elusive quarry, tactical victory, the attainment of which serves policy best’¹³⁶ was dismissed in the years after 1945 when militarism became intolerable.¹³⁷ The soldier is society’s servant; society’s purpose is no longer primarily or even significantly to support *homo furens*. The value of service, the myth of obligation,¹³⁸ and a code of responsibility¹³⁹ is instead given emphasis.

Soldiers fight due to peer relationships, friendships and primary social groups.¹⁴⁰ The ‘Big

¹²⁹ Joseph Curran, “*The Warrior Code: The Influence of Martial Ethics on Reenactors*” (Paper, University of Nevada), 3, <https://www.academia.edu/25036677>

¹³⁰ A ‘simplified form’ of George H Mead’s work (1934). Stryker & Burke. “Past, Present, and Future,” 285.

¹³¹ Sheldon Stryker claims he introduced Identity Theory to the American Sociological Society in 1966.

¹³² Harries-Jenkins, “Military Professionalism,” 123.

¹³³ Brick, “Military Profession,” 22.

¹³⁴ Niall Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat,” *War in History*, 11:2 (Apr 2004): 152, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26061867>

¹³⁵ Christopher Dandeker & James Gow “Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 10:2, (1999): 61, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592319908423241>

¹³⁶ Antulio J. Echevarria. “Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies,” *Parameters*, (Spring 1996), 91-99, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/96spring/echevarr.htm>.

¹³⁷ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003); Sheehan, *Why Europeans Hate Going to War*.

¹³⁸ Ignatieff, *Warriors Honor*, 4; Charles Dunlap, ‘Can We Talk? The Obligation of Military Service,’ *War on The Rocks*, 20 Jun 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/can-we-talk-the-obligation-of-military-service/>

¹³⁹ Ignatieff, *Warriors Honor*, 117.

¹⁴⁰ A prime study of small groups as a source of morale, and cohesion is Morris Janowitz & Edward Shils, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12: 2 (Summer 1948): 280–315.

Three¹⁴¹ thus promoted 'mateship' not self-motivation as the primary motivating factor – though this is increasingly queried.¹⁴² It is suggested now that the bonds that tie *homo furens* together are fundamentally different and different motivations apply:¹⁴³ 'it has become fashionable to emphasise how soldiers fight for their mates, we should not forget men also fight because somebody tells them to'.¹⁴⁴ The reviled SS, for example, is widely accepted as an ideologically motivated organisation¹⁴⁵ that fought on when others quit. However, to dismiss their heinous behaviour only as a consequence only of the highly politicised environment in which they served, or to attribute it to nationality or race would be wrong. How many did so from fear that otherwise they would be 'stripped of all rank, expelled from the SS' and committed to a concentration camp as an inmate¹⁴⁶ such was the disciplinary process where they demonstrated disobedience cannot be known. How many fought on because they wanted, or because their comrades were so behaving is similarly indeterminate. The number of Soviet citizens who went into battle to prevent their families being persecuted or their own assignment to a punishment battalion is equally impossible to determine.¹⁴⁷ Discipline and compulsion, through external or self-induced pressure, a fear of shame or disgrace;¹⁴⁸ military efficiency; closer control and more formal command all matter and motivate as well as 'mateship'; so too does better organisation, welfare provision and training, morale and the sense of professionalism.¹⁴⁹ The armies mentioned above are not directly comparable to a relatively small, modern professional armed force like the British Army but the point here is more particularly that the soldier acts on many different and separate motivations and is rarely an independent actor with self-agency acting only on personal initiative.

Marshall's famous 1947 work suggests 'automation' is actually necessary.¹⁵⁰ Where soldiers exercise choice, they fail to fight – and even die before they can overcome their reticence.¹⁵¹ Of any 100 soldiers perhaps only 15 would fire their weapons.

¹⁴¹ Shils & Janowitz; S.L.A. Marshall; and Stouffer & Lumsdaine are so grouped by Simon Wessely, "Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41:2 (Apr 2006), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009406062067>

¹⁴² Social explanations based on group psychology have largely disappeared. The preferred framework now is 'based almost entirely on individual responses to trauma...the military continue to insist on the importance of small group psychology in explaining motivation to fight, and are distrustful of either ideological or individual explanatory models.' Wessely, "Twentieth-Century Theories," abstract, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009406062067>

¹⁴³ Bury & King, "A Profession of Love," 200-215.

¹⁴⁴ Murray, *Brains and Bullets*, 133

¹⁴⁵ Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich*, (Oxford: OUP, 1991).

¹⁴⁶ Charles W. Snyder Jr., *Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division 1933-1945*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1977), 61.

¹⁴⁷ Roger R. Reese, "Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 20:2, (Jun 2007), 279. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040701378287>

¹⁴⁸ King, *Combat Soldier*, 66-67.

¹⁴⁹ Charles Moskos, "Why Men Fight: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam," *Trans-action*, 7:1, (Nov 1969): 13-23, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF02806280.pdf> and King, *Combat Soldier*.

¹⁵⁰ S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1947).

¹⁵¹ Grossman, *On Killing*, 4.

The heroic few are relatively unaffected, and indeed their willingness to expose themselves to danger in order to further the unit's mission can be an inspiration to their comrades-in-arms. However, for the remainder the range of behaviour can stretch from competence, but without initiative, right through to non-participation.¹⁵²

That some soldiers have little fighting spirit and abstinence is their preference is a sociological phenomenon.¹⁵³ All armies are endowed 'with a class of men in whom the primal urge for self-preservation is unusually well pronounced.'¹⁵⁴ The British Army is not exempt and has its quota too. Whilst 'drilling' soldiers to comply with orders is assumed a remedy and is unremarkable in army routine we could actually be concerned at those who act on compulsion and 'fearful of those who would kill simply out of a sense of duty without considering a deeper meaning'.¹⁵⁵ Soldiers, as devices with limited agency, utilitarians¹⁵⁶ who 'fight as avatars of a nation's sanctioned violence'¹⁵⁷ compare unfavourably to *homo furens* with individual existential, even noble purpose. The 'mindless brick in a moving wall of flesh, instantly responsive to the orders' of superiors¹⁵⁸ who never question or think, and simply 'follow and obey'¹⁵⁹ are automatons, parts of a machine,¹⁶⁰ who 'function like cells in a military organism,' and do what is expected of them 'because it has become automatic.'¹⁶¹ The rigid authority and agency of leaders in such circumstances obliterates that of followers.¹⁶² However, this *homo furens* might also hold the key to success in war. 'Success in hand-to-hand combat often depends on a rapid and accurate interpretation of environmental information and the production of highly automated movements.'¹⁶³

With belligerent urges assumed controlled in *homo furens*, war was no longer considered the destiny of mankind.¹⁶⁴ Increases in technology made the traditional fighter less of a commodity and battles were increasingly fought beyond the eyeline of the commander involving more than those physically present. Hand to hand combat where necessary was to finalise the victory and intimate engagement with the enemy was only to confirm

¹⁵² D. Rowland & L. R. Speight, "Surveying the Spectrum of Human Behaviour in Front Line Combat." *Military Operations Research* 12:4 (Dec 2007): abstract, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43941089>

¹⁵³ King, *Combat Soldier*, 201

¹⁵⁴ David Englander & James Osborne, "Jack, Tommy, and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class," *The Historical Journal*, 21:3 (Sept 1978): 597, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00019786>

¹⁵⁵ M. Shane Riza, "Two-Dimensional Warfare: Combatants, Warriors, and Our Post-Predator Collective Experience," *Journal Of Military Ethics* 13:3 (2014): 268. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2014.976475>.

¹⁵⁶ Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 65.

¹⁵⁷ Elstain, *Women and War*, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Corelli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey* (London: Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1970), 340.

¹⁵⁹ Parr, *Our Boys*, 20.

¹⁶⁰ Caputo, *Rumor*, 10.

¹⁶¹ Grossman, *On Killing*, 19.

¹⁶² Haslam et al, *New Psychology*, 218.

¹⁶³ Peter Richard Jensen, "It Was Fight or Flight...and Flight Was Not an Option: An Existential Phenomenological Investigation of Military Service Members' Experience of Hand-to-Hand Combat." (PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2012), 97, http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1310

¹⁶⁴ Howard, *European History*, 73

defeat. Combat in its historical, physical form was the last act over the decisive one. War, a 'full orchestra'¹⁶⁵ affair, involves all soldiers not just combat arms and civilian personnel too. The place of the soldier shifted: no longer 'a warrior class that stands apart from the people'¹⁶⁶ rather one tool amongst many¹⁶⁷ to be applied to wicked problems.¹⁶⁸

This demise prompts a 'lament for a dying class'.¹⁶⁹ The soldier emasculated the warrior, and *homo furens*, reduced, became an object not the subject of his or her destiny.¹⁷⁰ Coker warns that the warrior tradition is then just surviving. The attack is 'based on three melancholy currents: postmodern relativism, the self-esteem movement, and the cult of celebrity.'¹⁷¹ Those drawn to warriorship find themselves adrift and their desire increasingly alien to society. Narratives of illness,¹⁷² trauma as a 'pervasive idiom of distress in Western culture,¹⁷³ and soldiers expected to break down after combat¹⁷⁴ place warriorship in a precarious and isolated position. Helen McCartney¹⁷⁵ presents the soldier as victim, eulogised in this form since violence is no longer glorified.¹⁷⁶ Her representation is actively challenged by the military and the government¹⁷⁷ who wish alternative emphasis but the 'socially designated status and official medical classification of disabled veterans as 'Wounded Warriors' fuels her argument.¹⁷⁸ The positive effect of illuminated sacrifice is negated by the visible reality of injury and death – and associated requirement for charity and societal advocacy.¹⁷⁹ The depiction 'latches on to the most sacred military

¹⁶⁵ General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the UK General Staff, "RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2016, Opening Address," 28 Jun 2016, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_address.pdf

¹⁶⁶ The Angry Staff Officer. "Stop Calling Us Warriors," (Blog), 14 Dec 2016 at <https://angrystaffofficer.com/2016/12/14/stop-calling-us-warriors/> on 17 Jun 17.

¹⁶⁷ UK MOD "The Comprehensive Approach." Joint Discussion Note 4/05 (2005).

¹⁶⁸ C. West Churchman, "Wicked Problems," *Management Science*, 14:4 (Dec 1967), <https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.4.B141>; Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences*, 4:2, (Jun 1973): 155-169, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4531523>

¹⁶⁹ Coker, *Warrior Ethos*, 30.

¹⁷⁰ Frank Furedi, "New Britain – a Nation of Victims", *Society*, 35:3, (1998): 83. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686140>

¹⁷¹ Michael Evans, "Stoicism and the Profession of Arms," *Quadrant Online* (Apr 2018), <http://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2010/01-02/stoic-philosophy-and-the-profession-of-arms/>

¹⁷² Coker, *Warrior Ethos*, 101. More recently this opinion: Melissa Thomas, "I'm a Veteran Without PTSD. I Used to Think Something Was Wrong With Me," *The New York Times Magazine*, 30 May 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/magazine/ptsd-combat-veterans.html>

¹⁷³ Derek Summerfield, "The Invention of PTSD and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category," *British Medical Journal*, 322, (Jan 2001): 95-8, <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7278.95>

¹⁷⁴ Parr, *Our Boys*, 253. See also Edgar Jones & Hugh Milroy, "Stolen Trauma: Why Some Veterans Elaborate Their Psychological Experience of Military Service," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 32:1, (2016), 51-63, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2015.1130318>

¹⁷⁵ Helen McCartney, "Hero, Victim or Villain? The Public Image of the British Soldier and its Implications for Defense Policy," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 27:1, (2011): 43-54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2011.557213>. The notion of victimhood is expanded nationally in Furedi, "New Britain," 80-84.

¹⁷⁶ Christopher Coker, "The Unhappy Warrior," *The RUSI Journal*, 150:6, (2005): 10-16.

¹⁷⁷ David Willetts, "War Vets Aren't 'Broken': Defence Chief Sir Stuart Peach Calls On Brits To Stop Treating All War Heroes As 'Broken'," *The Sun*, 08 Jun 2018, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6477749/brits-should-stop-sympathising-with-broken-heroes/> 'We need to dispel the myth that veterans are all 'mad, bad or sad.' UK House of Commons Defence Committee, "Public Perception That Most Service Personnel are Damaged by Their Service is Wrong," at <https://social.shorthand.com/CommonsDefence/nyY8dcjQ6OR/public-perception-that-most-service-personnel-are-damaged-by-their-service-is-wrong> on 08 Dec 2018.

¹⁷⁸ Sidra Montgomery, "Invisible Inequality Among Wounded Warriors," Research Article, published 01 Aug 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504218792523>.

¹⁷⁹ Scheipers, *Heroism*, 12.

symbol, the warrior, and re-purposes it.¹⁸⁰ The soldier who wishes to be warrior, and hero – a term that is also weaponised¹⁸¹ – is instead ‘paid man...a glorious pauper, victim, and executioner, a scapegoat daily sacrificed to his people and for his people’.¹⁸² Commiserated as victims, presented as villains¹⁸³ these are imperfect *homo furens*. They earn pity; their conscience is subordinated to necessity¹⁸⁴ and the violence they deliver, the responsibility of the institution,¹⁸⁵ is enacted by the oppressed man.

The soldier who broke from the warrior mould was to be an improved *homo furens*. This characterisation as automaton suggests regression. Soldiers operating to a machinist’s instructions reintroduces that which is reviled: the abdication of personal responsibility and reliance on a ‘Nuremberg Defence’ to excuse wrongdoing. Disallowing that is essential. ‘Soldiers can never be transformed into mere instruments of war...Trained to obey without hesitation,’ says Walzer. ‘It is a mistake to treat soldiers as if they were automatons who make no judgments at all.’¹⁸⁶ Yet history suggests otherwise. Society satisfies itself that such behaviours are ‘an aberration that civilized societies do not tolerate’:¹⁸⁷ the individual must then be at fault when a breach occurs and self-regulation has failed since the rules are clear. Soldiers are to respond to instruction; they are to be ethically sound and socially aware, and responsible for their actions. Liberal society, increasingly sceptical about the glory of war,¹⁸⁸ and rejecting it as alien to human nature¹⁸⁹ prefers the world as it should be, and not necessarily as it is.¹⁹⁰ It validates *homo furens* only in a singular form. That soldiers as servants are unempowered or have within them the remnants of more primitive warrior behaviours is ignored.

Soldier-Warriors

Opposition to the idea of the soldier as automaton is not the sole reserve of society’s

¹⁸⁰ Montgomery, “Invisible Inequality”.

¹⁸¹ Myke Cole, “The Poisonous Cult of the Military Hero”, (Blog), 23 March 2019 accessed at <https://mykecole.com/40652-2/> on 30 Mar 19.

¹⁸² Alfred de Vigny, *Lights and Shades of Military Life*, (London: Henry Colburn, 1850), 28, <https://archive.org/details/lightsshadesofmi00napi/page/n7>.

¹⁸³ For an intriguing examination of circumstance and the British soldier as victim and villain see Ross McGarry, “War, Crime and Military Victimhood,” *Critical Criminology*, 23:3 (Sept 2015): 255-275, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-015-9268-5>.

¹⁸⁴ Burk, “Strategic Assumptions,” 160.

¹⁸⁵ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 104.

¹⁸⁶ Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 311.

¹⁸⁷ Grossman, *On Killing*, 104.

¹⁸⁸ Glowacki *et al.*, “*Evolutionary Anthropology*,” 3.

¹⁸⁹ “There is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently...biology does not condemn humanity to war.” UN Seville Statement, at <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/vita/2011/seville2011.pdf> on 03 Mar 2020. Seville ‘rejected the view that violence and war were in any way rooted in human nature and proclaimed that they were merely a cultural artefact.’ Azar Gat, “Is War in Our Nature? What Is Right and What Is Wrong about the Seville Statement on Violence,” *Human Nature*, 30, (2019), 151.

¹⁹⁰ Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War,” *International Organisation* 56:1 (Winter 2002): 41, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3078669>

guardians. Soldiers also reject the notion of unthinking, mechanical military manoeuvre. 'We are not just the Poor Bloody Infantry. We are not the cannon fodder. We are more than that'.¹⁹¹ The thinking soldier who self-regulates is a more favoured prospect.¹⁹²

Soldiers are disciplined masters of warfare, acting out of a sense of duty and devotion to their homeland, families, or an ideal, who do not love violence but understand that there are cases where violence is necessary. They are self-sacrificial, putting the needs of others over their own. They do not seek glory, they seek victory. They are thinkers who understand that passions must be controlled in the heat of battle, that sometimes the answer is not always to attack in a frenzy.¹⁹³

Comparison to 'Viking raiders or Genghis Khan's marauders' is rejected.¹⁹⁴ The undisciplined and chaotic warrior, tribal and lawless, governed by a 'rampant'¹⁹⁵ code and dedicated to violence who fights only for themselves holds little attraction. This *homo furens* is not just 'concerned primarily' with a relationship to combat¹⁹⁶ or alternatively, adherence to orders through some 'contractual obligation and exchange'.¹⁹⁷ This individual aspires to modern-day chivalry¹⁹⁸ typified by competition, the application of cold steel, participation in aerial combat or man-stalking¹⁹⁹ and veers from industrial practice or the 'passivity of the mass'.²⁰⁰ Measured autonomy and admiration for the virtues,²⁰¹ that 'give 'dignity to a man's fighting instincts',²⁰² is strong and with that comes recognition of the need to act with restraint. These *homo furens* are 'value-based or they are nothing'.²⁰³ The opportunity to satisfy one's 'darker', more aggressive nature, detailed in philosophy and history as the 'hominid behavioural repertoire' of cruelty in war, in sacrificial rites, and as entertainment²⁰⁴ is resisted. This second variant of T1, that I term the soldier-warrior, is a 'biopolitical military professional', a Janus-faced figure who engages in violence but also partakes of 'forms of military participation that are life-enriching'.²⁰⁵

¹⁹¹ GS6, 15 Mar 19, 06:55

¹⁹² Andrew Milburn, "When Not To Obey Orders," *War on the Rocks*, 08 Jul 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/when-not-to-obey-orders/>

¹⁹³ 'Angry Staff Officer, "Stop Calling Us Warriors," (Blog).

¹⁹⁴ Chris Masters & Nick McKenzie, "Standing Up, Not Shooting: the 'Compassionate Psychopaths' of the SAS," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 04 Aug 2018, <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/standing-up-not-shooting-the-compassionate-psychopaths-of-the-sas-20180801-p4zux2.html>.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Joseph O. Chapa & David.J. Blair, "The Just Warrior Ethos: A Response to Colonel Riza," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 15:3 (2016): 171. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2016.1251232>.

¹⁹⁷ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 39.

¹⁹⁸ From the French name for horse-mastery and so in fact primarily a cavalry over infantry term. A.V. B. Norman & Don Pottinger, *Warrior to Soldier: 449 to 1660*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), 36.

¹⁹⁹ Bourke, *Intimate History*, 39.

²⁰⁰ King, *Combat Soldier*, 127.

²⁰¹ Hospitality, generosity, mercy, religion, courtesy, fidelity and courage are the virtues of chivalry painted on the walls of the Robing Room at the Palace of Westminster.

²⁰² Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, 23

²⁰³ Holmes, *Acts of War*, x.

²⁰⁴ Victor Nell, "Cruelty's Rewards: The Gratifications of Perpetrators and Spectators." *Behavioral And Brain Sciences*, 29:3 (Jun 2006): 211, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009058>.

²⁰⁵ R. William Palmer, "Twenty-First Century Celebrations of the British Armed Forces: The Rise of the Biopolitical Military Professional," (PhD Diss., University of Manchester, 2017), 182. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/64901040/FULL_TEXT.PDF

Patrick Bury explains: 'I was attracted to the glory of war. The fantasy. The heroes with their citations and medals were almost other-worldly, untouchable.'²⁰⁶ Caputo thought war seductive;²⁰⁷ Karl Marlantes emphasised the lack of introspection as explanation for its attractiveness.²⁰⁸

Armies are traditionally the preserve of young males, based on their propensity to be risk-takers, tending to overconfidence, lacking experience and imagination as to the consequences of the activities, together with their physical strength in energetic and, if necessary, violent activity over the short to medium period.²⁰⁹

Whether warriorlike behaviour is a consequence of pent up energy, a lack of considered analysis due to limited experience (young men know nothing about war)²¹⁰ or rejection of mortality is unclear, the suggestion that warriorship might be age, time or maturity bounded has value. More certain, it attracts and is embraced as a standard by individuals as part of their identity.²¹¹ The soldier-warrior variant demands a voice in martial activity and won't stand in the ranks either metaphorically or literally. This Type closes 'the chasm between the senior officer's view of chivalry, the junior officer's view of combat, the warrior concept, and the twenty-first-century idea that all combatants must be warriors'.²¹² They comprehend warriorship as self-realisation but interpret its demands in line with the Just Warrior tradition. Responsibility rests roundly on their shoulders. 'Far from the self-aggrandizing and honor-loving conceptions' associated with the warriors of antiquity, behaviour is 'marked by reluctance and humility; a subjugation of the self and personal honor to justice as the highest good'.²¹³ Their standard is not 'individual morality but rather ethical norms in the context of military professionalism'.²¹⁴

Cicero rejected the idea that individuals are motivated only by fear, honour, status and self-interest,²¹⁵ preferring instead duty and service as impetus. Good men endure pain and danger for others, 'not only not seeking pleasure, but actually renouncing pleasures altogether, and preferring to undergo every sort of pain rather than be false to any portion of their duty'.²¹⁶ A sense of 'pragmatism and cynicism'²¹⁷ sets them 'a class-apart', a

²⁰⁶ Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 20.

²⁰⁷ Caputo, *Rumor*, xvi.

²⁰⁸ Marlantes, *What It Is Like*, preface. Grossman highlights the desire to actively and vicariously pursue physical danger. Grossman, *On Killing*, 75.

²⁰⁹ Mileham, "Ethos," 235

²¹⁰ Caputo, *Rumor*, xvi.

²¹¹ Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 22.

²¹² Riza, "Two-Dimensional Warfare," 267.

²¹³ Chapa & Blair, "Just Warrior Ethos," 180.

²¹⁴ Pauline Shanks Kaurin, "Professional Disobedience: Loyalty and the Military," *The Strategy Bridge*, 08 Aug 2017, accessed at <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/8/8/professional-disobedience-loyalty-and-the-military> on 04 Aug 2018

²¹⁵ Thucydides. *History Of The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner & M. I Finley, (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1972).

²¹⁶ James Garvey & Jeremy Stangroom, *The Story of Philosophy: A History of Western Thought*, (London: Quercus, 2013), 140.

²¹⁷ Ryan Leach & David Danford, "Curb Your Enthusiasm: The Case For The Cynical Military Leader," *Modern War Institute*, 07 Sep 2018 at <https://mwi.usma.edu/curb-enthusiasm-case-cynical-military-leader/>.

model for others.²¹⁸ Huntington recognised the tension in the military ethic that emphasises evil over good. The military view is ‘decidedly pessimistic. Man has elements of goodness, strength, and reason, but he is also evil, weak, and irrational.’²¹⁹ The soldier-warrior internalises these aspects and resists nefarious urges in favour of honourable intent.

Nancy Sherman²²⁰ introduces the modern-day stoic as a multiphrenic²²¹ figure impacted by many influences; an individual who is ‘socially constituted within the boundaries of culture, context, and language.’²²² Her warrior is a self-sufficient, tough individual, ‘detached from sticky emotions’ in pursuit of completing the tasks they have accepted; soldiers who can apply cognitive control to emotional responses, according to McMaster.²²³ Adherents are given to ‘the rigorous cultivation of self-command, self-reliance and autonomy in which one seeks to develop inner character based on the four cardinal virtues of courage, justice, temperance and wisdom.’²²⁴ The soldier-warrior does not exist with just single purpose but compartmentalises: they ‘switch from one moral world to another’,²²⁵ and moderate ‘runaway passion – the most rabid and unbridled of all emotions’, according to the ancient Seneca.²²⁶ The defining quality is self-control over self-reference. This soldier ‘swims in ever-shifting, concatenating, and contentious currents of being.’²²⁷

An internet search of soldiers’ public personae demonstrates the point: one declares himself rifleman (a regimental identity) and soldier; another father, husband, soldier; a third is a ‘Commandant, Director, Fusilier’ (this first two are appointments and will shift, the last again is a regimental identification that is more enduring).²²⁸ Others are: advisor, mental health and well-being champion;²²⁹ ‘CO, voice of the soldier, and conscience of the army’;²³⁰ and ‘family, soldier and mental health advocate.’²³¹ These soldiers recognise ‘multiple components of self as identities.’²³² The core of their identities is their self-

²¹⁸ General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the UK Defence Staff, “RUSI Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture,” 18 Dec 2013, <https://rusi.org/event/annual-chief-defence-staff-lecture-2013>.

²¹⁹ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 63

²²⁰ Nancy Sherman, “Educating the Stoic Warrior,” *Whitehall Papers*, 61:1 (2004): 105-126.

²²¹ A condition in which ‘one begins to experience the vertigo of unlimited multiplicity’. Kenneth Gergen, *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life*, (NY: Basic Books, 2000), 49.

²²² Raskin, “Constructivism in Psychology.”

²²³ H.R. McMaster, “Review Essay – Ancient Lessons for Today’s Soldiers.” *Survival*, 50:4 (2008): 181, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802329071>.

²²⁴ Evans, “Stoicism”.

²²⁵ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 119.

²²⁶ Sherman, “Stoic Warrior,” 119 citing Seneca, “On Anger III”, 16, in *Seneca, Moral and Political Essays*, ed. J. M. Cooper & J.F. Procope, (Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 1995).

²²⁷ Gergen, *Saturated Self*, 80.

²²⁸ @PYNMSanders; @Rifles_Comd_SM; @ArmyComdtRMAS.

²²⁹ @SEAC_Defence.

²³⁰ @thepagey.

²³¹ @Average_Soldier.

²³² Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry & Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical

categorisation as occupants of their preferred roles.²³³ They minimise the number of competing identities with three the optimal number of roles through which they wish to present and be seen. This illustrates that the 'greater the number of related identities, the greater the difficulty in dealing simultaneously with relationships between them.'²³⁴ Critically for this thesis, none of those found on social media declare as warriors.

The soldier-warrior is swayed by an inherent 'peace ego', and Sherman emphasises humanity, but allows too for a 'war ego':²³⁵ a 'stony faced Marine colonel' whose most wrenching experience was to leave his family as he deployed, not the prospect of killing his fellow man; Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson,²³⁶ the 'Hero of My Lai' who refused to allow American soldiers to commit genocide and viewed 'enemy communities' as more than that.²³⁷ Alternately, Milgram discovered 'ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part' who become agents in a terrible destructive process²³⁸ capable of bureaucratised killing²³⁹ like this drone operator: 'I feel no emotional attachment to the enemy, I have a duty, and I execute that duty.'²⁴⁰ Gray presents an officer who executes a collaborator at the end of World War Two whose different identities could 'succeed each other with lightning rapidity.'²⁴¹ Treating the victim as an object allowed the officer a temporary suspension of humanity.²⁴² The concept of multiple identities allows 'domains' where varying influence is evident.²⁴³

The first of these, the Marine Colonel, puts duty before family; the second the values he has sworn to uphold; the third and fourth separate their action against the enemy from other references. Each adheres to a commitment and satisfies the expectation they feel is upon them. They differentiate through personal interpretation and are capable of the 'disciplined disobedience'²⁴⁴ the servant or automaton cannot comprehend: soldier-

Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58:4 (Dec 1995): 256, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2787127>.

²³³ Jan E Stets & Peter J. Burke, "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63:3 (September 2000): 225, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695870>.

²³⁴ Stryker & Burke, "Past, Present, and Future," 292.

²³⁵ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 120

²³⁶ Conor Friedersdorf, "The Unlearned Lesson of My Lai," *The Atlantic*, 16 Mar 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/my-lai-50/555671/>

²³⁷ Sherman, "Stoic Warrior," 122

²³⁸ Stanley Milgram, "The Perils of Obedience," *Harper's Magazine*, 247:1483 (Dec 1973): 62, <https://harpers.org/archive/1973/12/the-perils-of-obedience/>

²³⁹ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (NY: Penguin, 1963).

²⁴⁰ Elisabeth Bumiller, "A Day Job Waiting For a Kill Shot a World Away," *The New York Times*, 29 Jul 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/us/drone-pilots-waiting-for-a-kill-shot-7000-miles-away.html>

²⁴¹ Gray, *Warriors*, 8.

²⁴² Jensen, "Fight of Flight," vi.

²⁴³ Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity," 9.

²⁴⁴ Where a subordinate has freedoms and is empowered to disobey an order or task to accomplish a purpose. To do so takes judgment: it 'can't just be willy-nilly disobedience', must be done with trust and integrity, in a morally and ethically correct context. General Milley, "Commanders Series Event with Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley," Atlantic Council, 4 May 2017, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/commanders-series-event-with-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-general-mark-milley>. An established blogger calls this 'Rebel Leadership'. The Angry Staff Officer. "Being a Rebel Leader:

warriors are 'virtuosic individuals in a mass of unmotivated and unskilled non-participants.'²⁴⁵ This evolution shouldn't surprise: in 'premodern and modern times people interacted in precious few contexts...in the postmodern psychological world people mix and match realities and identities in an increasingly complex array of circumstances.'²⁴⁶ The soldier-warrior accepts war as 'both senseless and necessary, squalid and fulfilling, terrifying and sometimes jolly. This is like life. Humans are at home in war (though they seldom admit this).'²⁴⁷ The requirement to adjust behaviour and identity to the ever-changing and multifarious circumstances of war is understood by the soldier-warrior.

Soldier-warriors are chameleon-like and surrounded by layers. Few soldiers take their identity only from the Army or they 'would be the only people existing in human society who had a single identity'.²⁴⁸ Multiple identities are not just possible: they are inevitable.

The Stoic Hierocles, writing in the first century AD, refers to the notion of cosmopolitanism in the following way: 'each one of us' he describes as 'entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger'. 'The first circle contains parents, siblings, wife, and children'. As we move outward, we move through grandparents, to neighbors, to fellow tribesmen and citizens, and ultimately to the whole human race.²⁴⁹

Stoicism – a remarkable philosophy uniquely suited to the battlefield and the predecessor of modern Cognitive Behavioural Therapy²⁵⁰ – provides contemporary soldiers with traces of the ancient warrior. The soldier-warrior has adapted to the paymaster but retains personal motivation. This is a thinking not reactive, considered not reflexive, individual who rehearses. 'One ought to question, argue, discuss and reflect well in advance of the shooting, so that when it comes time to act, one is ready and comfortable in carrying out the moral obligations of the Profession of Arms.'²⁵¹

The critical obligation is ethical, and value theory or 'questions about how one ought to live.'²⁵² This is fundamental to cultural construct and guidance for 'living well and dying well'.²⁵³ Culture though 'is like natural selection. Both are colour blind when it comes to morality'²⁵⁴ and so morality must be imposed: it's not necessarily intuitive or apparent. Ethical behaviours are human artefacts, 'cultural, contingent & contextual', and on

Disciplined Disobedience in the Army." 27 Aug 2018. Accessed at <https://angrystaffofficer.com/2018/08/27/being-a-rebel-leader-disciplined-disobedience-in-the-army/> on 30 Nov 19.

²⁴⁵ King, *Combat Soldier*, 433.

²⁴⁶ Raskin, "Constructivism in Psychology."

²⁴⁷ Nicholas Mosley, *Time at War*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2006), ix.

²⁴⁸ French, *Military Identities*, 338.

²⁴⁹ Sherman, "Stoic Warrior," 111.

²⁵⁰ Annis, "Combat is Masculine."

²⁵¹ Pauline Shanks-Kaurin, "Ethics: Starting at the Beginning," *The Wavell Room*, 23 Aug 2018, <https://wavellroom.com/2018/08/23/ethics-starting-beginning/>

²⁵² Garvey & Stangroom, *Philosophy*, 4.

²⁵³ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 146.

²⁵⁴ Christopher Coker, *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 32.

occasion contested,²⁵⁵ they are transcendental and a mix of conscience, assumption and organisational preference. Ethics is not law or policy but allows ‘the study or reflection upon moral belief, moral systems and moral practices’²⁵⁶ to prevent ‘moral injury’. It is how the armed forces are kept in check²⁵⁷ and how the state arbitrates between desire and direction: ‘the former emphasises difference and the latter similarity’.²⁵⁸

Behaviour is governed by rules or ‘situational proprieties’²⁵⁹ that keep brutish nature under control,²⁶⁰ and the code of necroethics that ‘holds forth on the procedures of homicide and turns them into the objects of complacent moral evaluation’.²⁶¹

The conversion of socialised people into dedicated fighters is achieved not by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or moral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively redefining the morality of killing so that it can be done free from self-censure.²⁶²

Advocates promote ethics as pre-requisite for *homo furens*: these are non-negotiable rules, constraints that ensure adherence to domestic societal norms, where the premium is placed on ‘cooperative, non-violent behaviours’.²⁶³ Actions are sanctioned by statutes believed ‘congruent with the warrior ethos that frames military identity’.²⁶⁴ They privilege a particular martial character. The edicts are to ‘limit, contain, and to establish criteria that sanction the use of violence’ to differentiate killing from murder.²⁶⁵ To reduce or negate ‘dastardly’ actions²⁶⁶ a hard framework of law situates the military: the softer layer of ethics fills the gaps.²⁶⁷ The rules allow killing and punishment where breaches occur but also facilitate the quenching of passion through procedure. This *homo furens* accepts the rules: the servant had them imposed. In becoming a soldier:

one enters into a new moral community of practice, taking up new roles and obligations that one did not have prior to taking that oath. With this comes a new moral identity and obligations related to that role and membership in this community.²⁶⁸

Oaths counter self-interest:²⁶⁹ they are a ‘moral shield that can safeguard soldiers’

²⁵⁵ Anthropologist and technologist Genevieve Bell, “Can Frankenstein Develop Manners?” Advertisement, *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/paidpost/intel/can-frankenstein-develop-manners.html>

²⁵⁶ Shanks-Kaurin, “Ethics.”

²⁵⁷ Jo Brick, “On Laws, Ethics and Professionals,” Interview by Mick Cook. *The Dead Prussian*, Nov 2018, <http://thedeadprussian.libsyn.com/episode-68-on-laws-ethics-and-professionals-the-dead-prussian-podcast>

²⁵⁸ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 38.

²⁵⁹ Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, 243.

²⁶⁰ Judith M. Burkart *et al*, “Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates,” *Frontiers in Sociology*, 3:17 (Jul 2018), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017>

²⁶¹ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 147.

²⁶² Bandura, “Moral Disengagement,” 103.

²⁶³ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 2.

²⁶⁴ Shanks-Kaurin, “Questioning,” 12.

²⁶⁵ M. L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 21.

²⁶⁶ Riza, “Two-Dimensional Warfare,” 258.

²⁶⁷ Brick, “On Laws, Ethics and Professionals.”

²⁶⁸ Shanks-Kaurin, “Ethics.”

²⁶⁹ Shannon E. French, “On the Code of the Warrior,” interview by Mick Cook, *The Dead Prussian*, Dec 2017, <http://thedeadprussian.libsyn.com/episode-52-on-the-code-of-the-warrior-the-dead-prussian-podcast>

humanity' in war,²⁷⁰ and provide spiritual protection against the moral harms of war.²⁷¹ In *The Code of the Warrior* it is declared that the 'absolutely fundamental battlefield ethics lessons' are restraint, discrimination, and proportionality. However, that these are 'timeless principles' that informed warrior codes for millennia²⁷² is overstating the case. Fighting is brutal and often wont adhere to these constraints that Caputo terms, 'the mincing distinctions of civilized warfare – that code of battlefield ethics that attempted to humanize.'²⁷³

Gray emphasises the importance of a code but warns against compliance with ethical standards promulgated by others. He declares *homo furens* a professional who regards 'himself as an instrument of the state'²⁷⁴ but adds a note of caution: 'You must act as a man and not as an instrument of another's will'.²⁷⁵ That *homo furens* must censor 'illegal orders' would be recognised through well-known historical instances where this was not the case; it may even be necessary to disobey legal orders.

...the military officer is not an automaton. He has an obligation to the nation, derived from his oath to defend the constitution, and to his subordinates, implicit in the extraordinary position of authority he has over them, to exercise some degree of moral autonomy in the gap between receipt of order and execution.²⁷⁶

Such caution prompts deep consideration. It allows freedom in how *homo furens* answers the call, free will, choice and the opportunity to refuse orders; but re-introduces an issue of split loyalties. Whether the 'loyalty enshrined in a particular warrior code is primarily to the parent society and its constitution, or to the institutional military' is a quandary: the potential exists 'for sharp conflict between the two approaches'.²⁷⁷ This conflict is sharper for introducing a third division still where *homo furens* adheres to a self-generated code.

French separates warriors (I suggest soldiers), from murderers²⁷⁸ through recognition of honourable intent.²⁷⁹ She emphasises moral and social responsibility – *homo furens* within the 'communities that spawned them'²⁸⁰ – and legal constraint. What happens in battle can be criticised in its aftermath: ethics aims to reduce the opportunity and necessity of this. Such criticism involves complex consideration but can also be arbitrary,

²⁷⁰ Toner, "Military Service," 183.

²⁷¹ Shanks-Kaurin, "Ethics."

²⁷² Lt Col Joseph J. Thomas USMC (Retd.), foreword to French, *Code*, xi.

²⁷³ Caputo, *Rumor*, 229.

²⁷⁴ Gray, *Warriors*, 143.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 185.

²⁷⁶ Milburn, "When Not To Obey Orders."

²⁷⁷ Toner, "Military Service," 187.

²⁷⁸ French, *Code*, 3.

²⁷⁹ Chapa & Blair, "Just Warrior Ethos," 170.

²⁸⁰ French, *Code*, 12.

highly subjective and culturally bound: accusations of ‘moral relativism’²⁸¹ are easily laid. Morality is relative to time and place, and can even be superficial or cosmetic: ‘the varnish of two thousand years’ of learning so thin as to be transparent.²⁸² In advocating warriorship in line with societal norms, away from martial norms (the ‘technical scripts and moral codes’²⁸³ specific to the warrior), ethos is manipulated and commentators preside over a ‘vast redefinition of warrior virtues.’²⁸⁴ The clash is between justification and impulse: the dilemma of cosmopolitan soldiering.²⁸⁵ It is the critical difference between T1 and T2 *homo furens*.

Both variants of this first Type, the soldier-servant and soldier-warrior, operate within the bounds of humanity – and personal values are mostly if not fully synonymous with those of the institution. They are the people’s sword but they also shield themselves from the horrors of war by care and attention to a stipulated code.²⁸⁶ The soldier-servant exists under Janowitz’s socially inclusive doctrine with Huntington’s martial caste under supervision more applicable to the soldier-warrior.²⁸⁷ Their shared mantra is service, a choice that can evolve into a compulsion. To perform their duty *homo furens* is malleable and accepts personal agency is limited in pursuit of organisational cohesion and success. The actions taken can be simplified as Doing, adherence to a virtual contract, over Being²⁸⁸ and reacting more intuitively. Doing and Being is the watershed between T1 and T2, though the boundary is not absolute: ‘being and doing are both central features of one’s identity.’²⁸⁹ The individuals measured by Doing are judged by how they perform against externally derived culturally constructed criteria. Identity is taken from the relationship with and to others. ‘It is a process – identification – not a ‘thing’. It is not something one can have, or not; it is something one does.’²⁹⁰

²⁸¹ Shanks-Kaurin, “Ethics,”

²⁸² Hanley, *Warriors*, 8.

²⁸³ Farrell, *Norms*, 4.

²⁸⁴ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 101. In Afghanistan in recent years soldiers were to exercise ‘courageous restraint’ which demanded they prioritise ‘self-sacrifice and courage’ over self-preservation and take personal risk to protect non-combatants (bystanders): harm to civilians is balanced against military value. Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro, “Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The Case of Courageous Restraint,” *Daedalus*, 146:1, (Winter 2017), 44-58. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00421 cf. Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin “Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective,” *Journal of Military Ethics*, 4:1, (2005), 20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570510014642>. The former privileges the bystander in the soldier’s calculus; the latter article places responsibility for bystander deaths on the terrorist.

²⁸⁵ Ryan, “Dilemma,” 126.

²⁸⁶ Toner, “Military Service,” 184.

²⁸⁷ Burk, “Strategic Assumptions,” 156-7. There are alternatives that might better solve the conundrum for creating ‘an institution strong enough to protect civilians yet not so strong as to ignore civilian direction’: Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces & Society* 23:2 (Jan 1996): 170, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9602300203>

²⁸⁸ Philip J. McCormack, “The Nature of the British Soldier: Warrior or Weapons Platform a Philosophical Framework,” (PhD diss., Cranfield University, 2014), <https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/10988>. The distinction here is philosophical: it is not to be confused with the ‘perennial speech’ made by Colonel John Boyd who asked younger officers if they wished to ‘do something’ or ‘be somebody’. His point was to be true to oneself by doing and not compromise by being what others wanted. Chapa & Blair, “Just Warrior Ethos,” 175. ‘Being’ in the sense it is used here is to be true to oneself by living authentically.

²⁸⁹ Stets & Burke, “Identity Theory,” 234.

²⁹⁰ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 5.

Warrior-Soldiers

The theorist John Locke thought the mind a 'white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas',²⁹¹ or *tabula rasa* meaning Blank Slate. He suggested that differences 'among races, ethnic groups, sexes, and individuals come not from differences in their innate constitution but from differences in their experiences.'²⁹² Such belief underpins contemporary liberal, social constructivist thought, and military training. Judith Harris and John Watson provide further foundation through their work on the socialisation of children (and whether the influence of peers or 'parental determinism' is critical).²⁹³ This seems relatively straightforward but the question of what motivates *homo furens* is a more vexing one.²⁹⁴ Soldiers don't enlist only on the basis of tempting recruitment campaigns and fight as a consequence of training alone. Motivation involves more personal and individual processes.

War is not just a matter of politics, or something societal, war is a matter of human nature. It is undertaken for particular and definable gain. The rather smug disdain for war and warriors reflects a mistaken view that modernity and the Enlightenment have not only changed international politics, but human nature at large.²⁹⁵

To fight involves choice: 'under enemy fire, there are some that seek cover and there are others that stand-up and charge. The latter are warriors.'²⁹⁶ That this 'response can be trained in and out'²⁹⁷ is possible but it is also owned by the individual. Presented as fight or flight²⁹⁸ it is an 'expressive' instinct.²⁹⁹

The Blank Slate as a sole measure for behaviour analysis isn't wholly convincing. Evolutionary psychologists, against the 'strongest opposition'³⁰⁰ oppose such 'standard' social science models of open-ended, non-genetic evolutionary processes where individuals and groups adapt to their environments.³⁰¹ They reject the 'naïve nature/nurture dichotomy,' that overlooks heavy and complex biological machinery that

²⁹¹ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, first published 1690, (Online Ebook: Global Grey, 2019), 78, <https://www.globalgreyebooks.com/content/books/ebooks/essay-concerning-human-understanding.pdf>

²⁹² Pinker, *The Blank Slate*, 6.

²⁹³ Judith Rich Harris, *The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do*, (NY: Free Press, 2009); J. B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). See also Ridley, *Nature via Nurture*, location 4011.

²⁹⁴ Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, location 2327-29.

²⁹⁵ Peter van Ham, "The Power of War: Why Europe Needs It," *International Politics* 47:6 (Nov 2010): 574.

²⁹⁶ CO14.

²⁹⁷ GS1, 23 Jan 19, 12:07.

²⁹⁸ Grossman includes 'posture and submit.' Grossman *On Killing*, 5-18. Murray suggests 2 further options: to freeze and to 'fuss'. Murray, *Brains and Bullets*, 85-117.

²⁹⁹ Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 36.

³⁰⁰ Tristan Flock, "What Good Is Evolutionary Psychology?" *Quillette*, dated 17 Oct 2018 accessed at <https://quillette.com/2018/10/17/what-good-is-evolutionary-psychology/> on 21 Oct 2018

³⁰¹ Wilson, "Social Constructivism," 36.

is necessary for the working of each of them and the interplay between them³⁰² and prefer the work of socio-biologists who reveal ‘the enormously complicated circuitry’ required to perform ‘such “simple” acts as seeing, hearing, and remembering’.³⁰³ Social science alone can’t explain why individuals are personally drawn to warriorship and war – the joining of personal desire and the opportunity for social flourishing.³⁰⁴ The ‘sense of the tragic’ where ‘a personal test of will and skill often at great individual risk’ provides meaning³⁰⁵ is not elucidated. The Blank Slate theory is dismissed as ‘a total failure as a mechanistic conception of the mind.’³⁰⁶

Type 1 is pensive, passive and malleable. Where one can find a singularly focussed and constructed individual, they comply with the Blank Slate theory: Type 2, more active, responsive and intuitive, is inclined to internal reference and personal desire: they neglect ‘the social contractarian trinity’.³⁰⁷ For ‘true warriors, war-making is not so much about what they do but what they are.’³⁰⁸ The focus switches from Doing to Being, and:

...her *own* philosophy, her *own* personal growth, her *personal* understanding of the martial dance, her *own personal* will and skill and, in the end, the personal risk *she alone* faces. Unimpeded by the nature of the war around her, the death of her friends, and the killing of her enemies, this warrior ethos is defined entirely in terms of self.³⁰⁹

Warrior-soldiers stand in opposition to the idea that killing is unnatural and ‘makes most healthy people uneasy.’³¹⁰ They are the ‘hard core’ of 10-15% of *homo furens*.³¹¹ General Adrian Carton de Wiart is an example: ‘war was in my blood. I was determined to fight and I didn’t mind who or what.’³¹² A Happy Warrior,³¹³ essentially apolitical,³¹⁴ (welcome to society) but not putty in the hands of society nor a victim.³¹⁵ Unmotivated by the idea of service, uninterested in bureaucratized standards, he was enthused by war pursuing what ‘must be tasted’ before one has enjoyed the full flavour of life.³¹⁶

The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the

³⁰² Azar Gat, “Is War in Our Nature?” *Human Nature*, 30: 2 (Jun 2019): 151, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12110-019-09342-8>

³⁰³ Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 27.

³⁰⁴ B. C. S. Watson, “The Western Ethical Tradition and the Morality of the Warrior,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 26:1 (Fall 1999): 57.

³⁰⁵ Riza, “Two-Dimensional Warfare,” 257.

³⁰⁶ Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 28.

³⁰⁷ Andreas Krieg, “Beyond the Trinitarian Institutionalization of the Warrior Ethos – A Normative Conceptualization of Soldier and Contractor Commitment in Post-Modern Conflict,” *Defence Studies*, 14:1 (2014): 60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2014.890335>.

³⁰⁸ Coker, *Waging War*, 6.

³⁰⁹ Chapa & Blair, “Just Warrior Ethos,” 177.

³¹⁰ Grossman, *On Killing*, xxxv.

³¹¹ Shils & Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration,” 286.

³¹² de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey*, location 151.

³¹³ Francis Anderson, “The Happy Warrior,” *Australasian Journal of Psychology & Philosophy*, 9:4 (1931).

³¹⁴ Holmes. *Acts of War*, 286.

³¹⁵ Ridley *Nature via Nurture*, location 1193-1195.

³¹⁶ War is one of three things: the others are poverty and love. Anderson, “Happy Warrior,” 264.

shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent...war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble.³¹⁷

And de Wiart is not anomalous: Grossman highlights the WW2 fighter pilot who declares 'the love of the sport rather than the sense of duty that makes you go on.' Another veteran: 'The fact is, it was fun'; the 'benchmark of all my experiences' according to a third. A helicopter pilot explains that he and his colleagues 'became very efficient executioners'.³¹⁸ Even Great War veterans have claimed that war is not as traumatic as the narrative would suggest.

I saw far more fighting than Siegfried Sassoon, or Edward Blunden, or Robert Graves, far more than Liddell Hart, four or five times as much as much (sic) as Wilfred Owen, and I didn't go home with a nervous breakdown.³¹⁹

Presenting the soldier as victim not warrior is incomprehensible to T2 but the narrative of tragedy is 'hard to dislodge'.³²⁰ T2 finds 'in war a master text by which they came to know themselves better'.³²¹

The human condition³²² and Tragic Vision where war is a 'rational and tempting strategy' for personal and national gain³²³ remains valid. There are still:

hardy, adventurous men who embrace the sweat, heat, cold, bruises, vomit, cordite smell, blasts, rifle cracks, screams, and camaraderie, knowing that some of them will lose limbs or bleed out. They don't need a patriotic war or sacrifices by the public. We cannot explain why they choose the rough life. They march to a different drummer. They like to fight and are highly skilled at it.³²⁴

Fighting is intuitive and emotional, 'an entirely human enterprise';³²⁵ illogical to some, it belongs more properly alongside chaos than order but it is enduring. Consider the tribal chief who instinctively realised the advantage new technology would afford him:

Despite never having seen an airplane before, the tribal leader immediately asked for a ride, a request that was granted. When finally seated, he said that he wanted to bring a few heavy stones with him on the flight. Asked what the rocks were for, he replied that if he were flown over the village of his enemies, he would drop these rocks on them.³²⁶

The chief grasped the utility of air power quicker than those at the turn of the 20th Century who initially employed aircraft for observation. He is no Blank Slate. That idea is 'addictively attractive to people because we want to believe that anyone can achieve

³¹⁷ Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (Oxford, UK: PublicAffairs, 2002), 3.

³¹⁸ Grossman, *On Killing*, 236-40.

³¹⁹ Robert Kershaw, *24hrs At The Somme*, (London: Penguin Random House, 2016), 379, quoting Charles Carrington MC, scholar and Professor of History at Cambridge University.

³²⁰ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 2.

³²¹ Coker, *Waging War*, 58. Bury explains that he had an epiphany after one combat action having 'proved myself to myself.' Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 178-9.

³²² Hanson, *Father of Us All*, xii.

³²³ Pinker, *The Blank Slate*, 292.

³²⁴ Bing West, "The Way Out of Afghanistan", *Military Review*, (Mar/Apri2011): 94.

³²⁵ Hanson, *The Father of Us All*, xi.

³²⁶ Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, location 1704-8.

anything. It's a lovely story, and it's one our culture tells us repeatedly. But it's not true.³²⁷ Dick Winters' infantry company, the subject of the TV series 'Band of Brothers', comprised a core of killers 'who instinctively understood the intricacies of battle.'

In both training and combat, a leader senses who his killers are. I merely put them in a position where I could utilize their talents most effectively. Many other soldiers thought they were killers and wanted to prove it. In reality, however, your killers are few and far between. Nor is it always possible to determine who your killers are by the results of a single engagement. In combat, a commander hopes that nonkillers will learn by their association with those soldiers who instinctively wage war without restraint and without regard to their personal safety. The problem, of course, lies in the fact that casualties are highest among your killers, hence the need to return them to the front as soon as possible in the hope that other "killers" emerge. This core of warriors survived, at least until the fates finally abandoned them, because they developed animal-like instincts of self-preservation. Around this group of battle-hardened veterans the remainder of Easy Company coalesced.³²⁸

Winters acknowledges his killers separately from his other soldiers; he observes that they developed with experience but that their approach was innate. He could identify them in training, not after training. A respondent major had a similar view: 'You need a 'splattering' of warriors throughout the force', he said, 'it's that 'splattering' that gives the confidence to the soldiers, and drives the formation forward'.³²⁹

These lay bare the 'illusory and inconsequential glorification'³³⁰ of the warrior who acts for others. They present the warrior who performs according to instinct with 'a strong undercurrent of independence from society and even at times deviation from its moral structures.' Scheipers continues: 'This should make us wary of postulating too strong a connection between the moral foundations of heroism and the subjective sources of combat motivation.'³³¹ This is 'Mad Jack', charging up beaches 'dressed only in a kilt and brandishing a dirk, killing with a bow and arrow, playing the bagpipes at moments of extreme peril';³³² and 'Mad Mark' not berserker-like but rather 'insanely calm. He never showed fear. He was a professional soldier, an ideal leader of men in the field. It was that kind of madness, the perfect guardian for the Platonic Republic....'³³³ Such figures are 'problematic': separate from society they 'strip conflict of its political context.'³³⁴ War

³²⁷ Will Storr, "How the Self-Esteem Myth Has Damaged Society and Us", interview with Clay Routledge, dated 5 Jan 2019, accessed at https://quillette.com/?s=Self-Esteem+Myth+Has+Damaged+Society+and+submit=Search&orderby=relevance&order=DESC&post_type=post on 29 May 2019.

³²⁸ Dick Winters, *Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters*, (Reading: Ebury Press, 2011), Kindle, 94 (location 1513).

³²⁹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 29:30.

³³⁰ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 100.

³³¹ Scheipers, *Heroism*, 6.

³³² "Obituary: Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Churchill," *The Daily Telegraph* dated 13 Mar 1996, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/7733516/Lieutenant-Colonel-Jack-Churchill.html> on 10 Jun 17.

³³³ O'Brien, *If I Die*, 81.

³³⁴ Palmer, "The Rise of the Biopolitical Military Professional," 183-4.

is a destructive but also generative force like no other, say Barakwi and Brighton.³³⁵ This type relishes it. Descendants of warrior societies³³⁶ they succeed those who existed as a consequence of societal expectation, as a rite of passage, and systems of obligatory militarism.³³⁷ Warriorship here is a calling, not just an avenue for social mobility.³³⁸

Membership of the historical community³³⁹ may be influenced by heritability. 'Nearly every reliably measured psychological phenotype (normal and abnormal) is significantly influenced by genetic factors'³⁴⁰ and over time, just as society 'weeded out those individuals with a tendency toward greater aggression,'³⁴¹ so too those incapable or squeamish in battle who couldn't kill were extinguished or retreated from the caste.

Given the frequency and selective importance of aggression and combat during human evolutionary history, it would be surprising if humans had not been tailored by selection to assess the fighting ability of conspecific males.³⁴²

The 'systematic long-lasting environmental effects' and radical, enduring culture, led to genetic changes: experience complements genetic propensity.³⁴³ 'Cultural changes in political and social organization – phenomena that are unique to human beings – may extend their reach into patterns of genetic variation in ways yet to be discovered.'³⁴⁴

An officer, returned from Iraq, asked if a drone pilot was at war, said: 'No. He doesn't meet my definition'.³⁴⁵ Rear-based personnel neither meet the warrior standard: 'no one with the warrior calling joined the Army to be a logistician, administrator or educator'.³⁴⁶

³³⁵ Tarak Barakwi & Shane Brighton, "Conclusion: Absent War Studies? War, Knowledge, and Critique," in *The Changing Character of War*, eds Strachan & Scheipers, 524.

³³⁶ Greeks, Romans, Vikings and English Knights according to Magee, "The Way of the Warrior," 24. Indigenous Americans, Chinese Monks, the Samurai, and Saladin's Saracens says French in *Code*.

³³⁷ Yagil *et al.*, "From 'Obligatory Militarism' to 'Contractual Militarism' – Competing Models of Citizenship," *Israeli Studies*, 12:1 (Spring 2007).

³³⁸ Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 211, location 3972.

³³⁹ H. R. McMaster, "Remaining True to Our Values – Reflections on Military Ethics in Trying Times," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9:3 (2010): 193, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.510850>.

³⁴⁰ Thomas J Bouchard Jr., "Genetic Influence on Human Psychological Traits," *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 13:4 (Aug 2004): 151, http://www.psy.miami.edu/faculty/dmessenger/c_c/rsrscs/rdgs/temperament/bouchard.04.curdir.pdf.

³⁴¹ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 33.

³⁴² Sell, Hone & Pound, "Physical Strength," 34.

³⁴³ Plomin, *Blueprint*, ix.

³⁴⁴ Tian Chen Zeng, Alan J. Aw & Marcus W. Feldman, "Cultural Hitchhiking and Competition Between Patrilineal Kin Groups Explain the Post-Neolithic Y-Chromosome Bottleneck," *Nature Communications*, 9:2077 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-04375-6>

³⁴⁵ Interview with special forces officer, Washington DC, 7 Sep 2006, in Peter W Singer, *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Penguin, 2009), 331.

³⁴⁶ Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 33. Not so argues Kayß. 'In the German Army you can either be a trainer, a facilitator, leader or educator. But in contrast to other nations, no one will motivate you to be a Kämpfer [warrior]... a term which is too martial and warlike for such an anti-military society like in Germany.' Kayß and Bury underline the argument made here for different Types of *homo furens*. Sarah Katharina Kayß, "Regimental Traditions and Army Reputation," The Wavell Room, 14 Aug 2018, <https://wavellroom.com/2018/08/14/traditions-and-army-reputation/>. Less the difference between the British and German armies is assumed pronounced, she also deduces from her study that comprises a hundred interviews and survey of almost 900 British and German Army Officer Cadets between 2014– 2015, that the military systems in Britain and Germany do not actually not create a certain type of officer, but strengthen particular types of soldiers depending on their regiment by training their strengths. So she agrees too that Types exist. Kayß,

T2 think themselves a warrior caste³⁴⁷ and thesis respondents tended to reserve the term. 'It's a choice to be a frontline soldier and maybe die' and that earns the title warrior since the descriptor is inextricably linked to danger: those 'cooking burgers'³⁴⁸ don't qualify. 'Some fella...who cooks sausages 2 weekends a month'³⁴⁹ set against infantrymen 'on courses in Brecon³⁵⁰ for weeks on end, doesn't really compare, two completely opposite ends of the scale'.³⁵¹ Those who qualify are 'boys who are like us, boys who fight on the frontline...who are attached to us,³⁵² [they can] take the title warrior, but boys in Bastion³⁵³ cooking scoff³⁵⁴ or whatever I wouldn't really say they'd be warriors...'³⁵⁵

Self-categorisation and 'accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and the other in-group members'³⁵⁶ was evident in my research: aggrandisement the result of training but also choice. 'With good training and good leadership anyone can get into warriorship':

...but the benefit and advantage of a volunteer army like ours is that you end up with people who are pre-disposed toward infantry and they mentally accept that's the space they are going to be in...[thankfully there are also] some people who want to drive trucks...³⁵⁷

Operating in close proximity to the enemy differentiates. Soldiers who kill in less traditional ways or from distance don't qualify: 'anyone can pull a trigger at 600 metres but can everyone go into a knife fight?'³⁵⁸

Progress has purged actual warfare of much of the emotional anger which accompanied the struggles of olden times. Except among the infantry, killing has become so impersonal that the killer resembles a boy with a toy gun, or a man in a bathroom stepping on cockroaches.³⁵⁹

'Making war' or involvement in the endeavour doesn't alone qualify warriors. Warriors who engage in intimate combat are separate from their soldier peers: the warrior-soldier may have more in common with non-institutional *homo furens* than with fellow soldiers.³⁶⁰

"War, Combat and Peacekeeping."

³⁴⁷ David Priestland, *Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A History of the World in Three Castes*, (NY: Penguin Press, 2013).

³⁴⁸ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 17:30.

³⁴⁹ He is referring to reservist soldiers whose trade is chef.

³⁵⁰ Brecon, where advanced infantry training takes place, is venerated by infantry soldiers.

³⁵¹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 43:40

³⁵² This is 'battlegrouping' where non-infantry join infantry soldiers in modified 'mixed function' formations. It prevents functional excellence but promotes a more powerful 'array of modular assemblages'. Ben-Ari, "Sociology", 76. The concept of organic solidarity 'a dense feeling of mutual allegiance because they rely on each other's specialisms' has bearing here. King, *Combat Soldier*, 357.

³⁵³ The main logistics base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan where mostly support troops were based.

³⁵⁴ Army slang for food.

³⁵⁵ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 08:10

³⁵⁶ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225.

³⁵⁷ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 18:47.

³⁵⁸ FG2: RRT, 14 Nov 18, 15:16.

³⁵⁹ John U Nef, "The Economic Road to War," *Review of Politics* 11:3 (July 1949): 329-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404845?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

³⁶⁰ Dandeker & Gow, "Military Culture," 61.

In a study, before the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the top three reasons for joining the Army were: for adventure; 'to be a soldier'; and to get a trade. Soldiers were not asked if they wanted to fight.³⁶¹ During my research the opportunity arose to conduct a similar exercise.³⁶² The cohort's reasons for joining are grouped as follows:

Theme	Mentions(%)
To Serve: For the Country, Pride and 'Status'.	20 (17%)
The 'Offer': Challenge, Opportunity, Limited Alternatives, Family, Housing, Job Security	62 (52%)
To Fight: War, Infantry pull, Belonging and Camaraderie.	37(31%)

Fig. 3.2: Reasons For Joining

What the infantry provides – the opportunity to fight – attracted one third of those consulted: it allows them to express their identity.³⁶³ Respondents pointed to TV programmes³⁶⁴ and news footage of the campaign in Afghanistan 'as instrumental'³⁶⁵ in awakening their interest. 'Service' was prioritised by less than one fifth of those consulted; roughly half were attracted by the 'Army Offer' and might have joined any branch. Respondents demonstrate the split allegiances of institution and occupation.³⁶⁶

The draw to the infantry is better explained by the 'Ghost in the Machine'³⁶⁷ than the Blank Slate. This requires the same faith as that found in religious doctrine, or belief in a soul. Adherents ascribe behaviour to a celestial or Supreme Being and believe mankind is born with pre-existing ideas and principles. Differences are explained by inherent behaviours, not learned or imitated, but rather revealed.³⁶⁸ Wright explains human nature as consisting of knobs and mechanisms for turning the knobs:³⁶⁹ both are invisible. Culture and environment determine the design of the knobs; free will, or the Ghost, turns them.³⁷⁰ 'Moral standards do not function as fixed internal regulators of conduct. Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated.'³⁷¹ Free will, a tenet of existentialist thought, is 'the re-assertion of the free man against the totality or the collectivity or any tendency to depersonalization': it is akin to personalism and

³⁶¹ Unpublished Attitude Surveys by David Tickner in 1994 cited in Mileham, "Ethos", 230.

³⁶² Forty soldiers took part in the exercise conducted in 7 of 13 focus groups. Respondents were infantry; the 1994 study was conducted at an Army Training Regiment where non-infantry soldiers were trained.

³⁶³ Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel & Alan S. Waterman, "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32:6 (2009): 539, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100902888453>.

³⁶⁴ Ross Kemp, a UK television celebrity, hosted of a very successful series that aired in the UK in 2008, showing him with British infantry in Afghanistan. The show inspired several soldier respondents to enlist.

³⁶⁵ RIRISH16.

³⁶⁶ Charles C Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces & Society*, 4:1 (Nov 1977): 41–50, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103>.

³⁶⁷ Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1967).

³⁶⁸ Rune Henriksen, "Warriors in Combat - What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:2 (2007): 187–223, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701248707>.

³⁶⁹ Wright, *The Moral Animal*, 9.

³⁷⁰ The combination of 'soul' and 'free will' is commented upon in Andrew J. Vonasch, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Meled, "Ordinary People Think Free Will is a Lack of Constraint, not the Presence of a Soul," *Consciousness and Cognition*, 60 (Apr 2018): 133-151, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.03.002>

³⁷¹ Bandura, "Moral Disengagement," 102.

pragmatism.³⁷² To exist constitutes identity:³⁷³ T1 inclines to the collective and is a cog in a political machine; T2 to individual identity over group, and are systems in themselves.³⁷⁴

The Ghost explains good and evil. The idea that humans may be inherently cruel, the mind innately organised, is rejected only because it suggests something ‘immoral to think’³⁷⁵ and an unmentionable taboo;³⁷⁶ to discuss it might normalise behaviour or absolve the perpetrators.³⁷⁷ The concept is a battleground to be avoided entirely rather than a battle to be fought. To acknowledge it might demand action that would trap the unwary: so it is ignored. That good and evil might be awakened by circumstances, and so nature and nurture have bearing, is also worth consideration. ‘The evil was not inherent in the men – except in the sense that a devil dwells in us all – but in the circumstances on which they had to live and fight.’³⁷⁸ There is something fundamentally human about this and ‘dispassionate reading of the evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that genetic factors play a substantial role in the origins of individual differences with respect to all psychological traits, both normal and abnormal.’³⁷⁹

The Ghost, suggesting fate, and free will allowing choice (albeit some ‘have more free will than others’)³⁸⁰ come together in genetic disposition. This is the nexus of existence, or how we live, and the ‘essence’³⁸¹ of being, or how we will live. Internal and external influences endure³⁸² but the actualisation of essence, the ‘desire to assert one’s essential “self” in the act of killing’³⁸³ is more intangible. Where an individual assumes or pursues warrior identity they have consciously chosen certain behaviours. Gray understands the warrior in this existential form and explains the warrior philosophically. ‘Man as a warrior’ he says ‘is only partly a man. Yet, fatefully enough, this aspect of him is capable of transforming the whole.’³⁸⁴ He highlights those who in war have no desire to fight and ‘die in battle, miserable, alone, and embittered, without any conviction of self-sacrifice and without any other satisfactions’ but counters with the warrior for whom war presents no fear: ‘those who in every battle are seized by the passion for self-sacrifice, dying has

³⁷² F. C. Coplestone, “Existentialism,” *Philosophy*, 23:84 (Jan 1948), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100065955>

³⁷³ Steven Crowell, “Existentialism”, *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2016), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/existentialism/>.

³⁷⁴ Bourke, *Intimate History*, 37.

³⁷⁵ Pinker *The Blank Slate*, preface.

³⁷⁶ Pinker, “Why Nature and Nurture Won’t Go Away,” 5.

³⁷⁷ Nell, “Cruelty’s Rewards,” 212.

³⁷⁸ Caputo, *Rumor*, xx.

³⁷⁹ Rutter. “Nature, Nurture, and Development,” 1.

³⁸⁰ Kevin J. Mitchell, *Innate: How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 2018), 266.

³⁸¹ Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, (London: Methuen & Co., 1958).

³⁸² Vonasch *et al*, “Free Will is a Lack of Constraint.”

³⁸³ Bourke, *Intimate History*, 26. Parr. *Our Boys*, 182.

³⁸⁴ Gray, *Warriors*, 27.

lost its terrors because reality has vanished'.³⁸⁵ Their reality differs: for those seized by the experience the terrors of war have disappeared and they are their authentic self.

The existentialist concept of 'authenticity' explains the individual who decides who to be and lives the consequences. Being authentic is being autonomous and self-reference is key so norms such as duty, ethics, and even humanity are less compelling. Humanity 'classically has two meanings: on one hand, what human beings are, their essence; on the other, a norm of conduct' or acting humanely.³⁸⁶ Where the warrior acts according to 'essence' the former definition applies: action defined as inhumanity relies on the latter meaning and the assumptions of others. Warrior identity then cannot be denied due to the imposed criteria of others³⁸⁷ and the individual who chooses it may stand against the desire for a marginalisation of violence:³⁸⁸ the warrior-soldier would be acting in an inauthentic manner where 'acceptable' behaviour is determined by others.

With regard to what I want to do, I need only consult myself: all that I feel to be good is good; all that I feel to be bad is bad. Conscience is the best casuist, and it is only when one haggles with conscience that one has recourse to the subtleties of reasoning.³⁸⁹

The issue of group identity and association, and practically, the training of soldiers is pertinent. The individual as well as the collective must be understood and consciously manipulated. Aligning individual authenticity with group norms is as challenging as matching the 'social solidarity'³⁹⁰ of the small group to organisational culture.

That *homo furens* can enjoy war is easily grasped where we accept the 'type' who seeks it. Offered 'values and standards' might be inapplicable, a tyranny of the majority, or even of the minority, 'formed by those who really have an opinion.'³⁹¹ Any presumption that the stated norms of others are immutable or universally applicable is incorrect.³⁹² Where values are not meaningful they can also be rejected.

I asked how to incorporate the Marine Corps values — Honor. Courage. Commitment — into my training. The millennials provided the expected answer: explicitly and frequently. But the responses from those under 20 stunned me. All of them echoed one corporal's statement: "Don't even say those words to us. We hear that phrase, and we know what's coming next is just more Marine Corps propaganda." The motto was an immediate tune-out trigger. The marines had no problem with the values themselves, but believed they should be taught as part of being a good person — not a

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁸⁶ Chamayou, *Drone Theory* 209.

³⁸⁷ Kassimeris, "Warrior's Dishonour," 18.

³⁸⁸ van Ham, "The Power of War," 585.

³⁸⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Essential Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans by Peter Constantine, ed Leo Damrosch, (London Vintage Books, 2013), 276.

³⁹⁰ King, "Beyond the Primary Group," 701.

³⁹¹ Soren Kierkegaard, *Diary of Soren Kierkegaard*, ed Peter Rohde, (NY: Philosophical Library, 1988), 106

³⁹² Dan Lamothe "Trump Issues Pardons in War Crimes Cases, Despite Pentagon Opposition to the Move," *The Washington Post*, 16 Nov 2019 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/11/15/trump-issues-pardons-war-crimes-cases-despite-pentagon-opposition-move/>

good marine. One junior marine added, “I take off this uniform when I go home. I’m a person first, not a marine.”³⁹³

A recent survey by the US Department of Defense revealed that only ‘47 percent of soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect’. More than one-third thought torture should be allowed, less than half would report a team member for unethical behaviour. Mistreating non-combatants or damaging property ‘when it was not necessary’ was admitted by one in ten.³⁹⁴

There is a tendency to assume norms (for the British Army its Values and Standards, or V&S), because they are taught, are then accepted and agreed. That V&S are ingrained and universal across the ranks with all adhering to them as part of their identity is questionable as evidenced above but also in observations made of the British Army. A survey conducted at one of the British Army’s ‘fighting brigades’ in 2018 found that just 44% of young soldiers (under 26) had ‘affinity’ for the V&S. It is accepted that there could be a sampling issue here – young soldiers such as these, and the marines above, may not have seen combat but their views, their personal values and beliefs as detailed make their opinions worth recording, particularly given the fact that over 80% of officers expressed affinity. This figure was stated to be ‘world class’ and unseen in 6 years of similar surveys across non-military organisations. V&S therefore may be as much of an imposition as the term warrior is, and maybe even particular to officers or the attitudes of gatekeepers.³⁹⁵ Hockey in his study of British soldiers highlights the finding that soldiers more often have a value system which is ‘*oppositional* to those in command’ rather than acquiescent.³⁹⁶ Where ‘norms’ sits at odds with alternative belief, a Code is contestable. It is of questionable value where it isn’t believed or adhered to.

Warrior-Berserkers

Where warriorship is an individual endeavour then it is to the physiological and psychological construct of *homo furens* that we should look for insight. ‘Even those who are sceptical about direct inferences from primate studies and evolutionary theory agree that biology has something to offer the study of war and conflict in general.’³⁹⁷ The science of genetics reveals ‘the essence of our individuality’³⁹⁸ and even sceptical writers

³⁹³ K. C. Reid, “How The Network Generation Is Changing The Millennial Military,” *War on the Rocks*, dated 20 Mar 2018 at <https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/how-the-network-generation-is-changing-the-millennial-military/> 05 Apr 18.

³⁹⁴ Douglas A. Pryer, “Controlling the Beast Within: the Key to Success on 21st Century Battlefields,” *Military Review* (Jan-Feb 2011), 4.

³⁹⁵ The results of the survey, conducted by a civilian health care provider, were advertised at the UK’s Field Army Conference, 10 Jan 2019, which the author attended.

³⁹⁶ John Hockey, *Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture*, (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1986), 158.

³⁹⁷ Grayling, *War*, 127.

³⁹⁸ Plomin, *Blueprint*, 12

who wish to ‘confront and dispel’ the idea that genes are fate³⁹⁹ concede that DNA⁴⁰⁰ reveals behaviour. Genomics⁴⁰¹ makes the Ghost less supernatural phenomenon, and more discoverable human trait:

...the search for ‘genes for war’ is bound to fail, but the contrary dogmatic insistence that war is a pure product of culture written on the blank slate of impressionable minds is equally foolish. There could well be psychological mechanisms in the mind, placed there by natural selection acting in the past upon sets of genes, that predispose most people to react to some circumstances in warlike ways.⁴⁰²

Genetic analysis that allows understanding of the influence of ancestors and heritability⁴⁰³ won’t necessarily uncover programming but can highlight ‘probabilistic propensities’.⁴⁰⁴ Free will is important, environment too, but ‘what look like systematic environmental effects are often due to us choosing environments’ that match our genetic bent.⁴⁰⁵

The human blueprint is not obvious and only ‘thorny maths’ impenetrable to all but a handful of geneticists⁴⁰⁶ will expose it. The ‘link between gene action at a molecular level and expression of traits at a behavioral level’ is too indirect, nonspecific, and combinatorial⁴⁰⁷ to trace relationships – but genomics allows a partial map.

Understanding how social and cultural processes affect the genetic patterns of human populations over time has brought together anthropologists, geneticists and evolutionary biologists, and the availability of genomic data and powerful statistical methods widens the scope of questions that analyses of genetic information can answer.⁴⁰⁸

We are beginning to open ‘new windows’⁴⁰⁹ that may eventually allow us to ‘know enough to localize “cruelty” in one brain area or to explain individual differences.’⁴¹⁰ The amygdala, a specific area of the brain provides one such window. Repeatedly associated with aggressive behaviour⁴¹¹ Kiehl’s research involving prisoners established ‘deficits in

³⁹⁹ Rutherford, *Brief History*, 46.

⁴⁰⁰ The double-helix structure was discovered in 1953 with preliminary work in the 1860s. Leslie A. Pray, “Discovery Of DNA Structure And Function: Watson And Crick,” *Nature Education* 1:100 (2008), <https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/discovery-of-dna-structure-and-function-watson-397>

⁴⁰¹ A word derived from eugenics (now much less used due to its ‘toxic meaning’). Rutherford, *Brief History*, 10.

⁴⁰² Ridley, *Nature via Nurture*, location 3904-3908.

⁴⁰³ A measure of differences accounted for by genetics, another by the environment. Rutherford, *Brief History*, 305-6. Genetics may be the predominant influence: intelligence for example, ‘is one of the most heritable behavioural traits.’ R. Plomin & IJ Deary, “Expert Review: Genetics And Intelligence Differences: Five Special Findings,” *Molecular Psychiatry* 20 (2015): 98, <https://www.nature.com/articles/mp2014105>

⁴⁰⁴ Plomin, *Blueprint*, 43.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 186

⁴⁰⁶ Rutherford, *Brief History*, 153.

⁴⁰⁷ Mitchell, *Innate*, 269.

⁴⁰⁸ Zeng *et al*, “Cultural Hitchhiking.”

⁴⁰⁹ Anna Nowogrodzki, ‘The World’s Strongest MRI Machines are Pushing Human Imaging to New Limits,’ *Nature*, 563 (Oct 2018): 24-26, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07182-7> on 14 Dec 2019.

⁴¹⁰ Donald Dutton, “*The Psychology of Genocide, Massacres and Extreme Violence: Why “Normal” People Commit Atrocities*,” (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 146, <http://www.al-edu.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Dutton-The-Psychology-of-Genocide-Massacres-and-Extreme-Violence.pdf>.

⁴¹¹ Adrian J. Raine *et al*, “Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective Murderers,” *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, 16:3 (Dec 1998): 328, [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(SICI\)1099-0798\(199822\)16:3%3C319::AID-BSL311%3E3.0.CO;2-G](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199822)16:3%3C319::AID-BSL311%3E3.0.CO;2-G). Giordano, “Neuroscience and the Weapons of War.” David S. Chester *et al*, “Physical

emotional processing’⁴¹² separating affective murderers from predatory.⁴¹³ Other windows are provided through studies of conditioned emotional responses;⁴¹⁴ how anger is regulated;⁴¹⁵ management of stress;⁴¹⁶ the impact of high testosterone on aggression’;⁴¹⁷ and the effects of cortisol.⁴¹⁸ These afford insight to how individuals might behave in stressful situations like war. Much ‘new thinking’⁴¹⁹ is required but ‘the converging results from behavioral, physiological and neural measures point to a multi-level mechanism related to an implicit and spontaneous process’⁴²⁰ regarding anger, cooperation and chances of conflict. These discoveries are beginning to explain how ‘our modern skulls house a stone age mind.’⁴²¹

It is defensible that 10-15% of soldiers are T2 *homo furens*, the fighter most influenced by nature. The identification of the warrior gene,⁴²² whose carriers are predisposed ‘to aggressive, impulsive, and even violent behavior’⁴²³ the ‘ruthless’ and ‘psycho’ genes,⁴²⁴ and ‘pseudogenes’ that alter ‘fear and memory symptoms’ and reduce anxiety⁴²⁵ allows a more reduced group comprising the ‘occasional soldier’ who has proven capable of with-standing combat ‘for an inordinate length of time.’

Perhaps less than 2 per cent (as judged by numerous conversations with veteran soldiers) fall into this class. No personality type dominates this small, "abnormal," group, but it is interesting that aggressive psychopathic

Aggressiveness and Gray Matter Deficits in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex,” *Cortex*, 97 (Dec 2017): 17–22, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2017.09.024>.

⁴¹² Kiehl, *Psychopath Whisperer*, 115.

⁴¹³ Raine *et al*, “Predatory and Affective Murderers.”

⁴¹⁴ Raine *et al*, “Brain Functioning,” 329.

⁴¹⁵ Gadi Gilam *et al*, “Attenuating Anger and Aggression with Euromodulation of the vmPFC: A Simultaneous tDCS-fMRI Study,” *Cortex*, 109 (Dec 2018): 156–170, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.09.010>

⁴¹⁶ G. Gilam *et al*, “Neural Indicators of Interpersonal Anger as Cause and Consequence of Combat Training Stress Symptoms,” *Psychological Medicine*, 47:9 (Jul 2017): 1561-1572, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716003354>.

⁴¹⁷ Nell, “Cruelty’s Rewards,” 215.

⁴¹⁸ Charles Morgan, “The Brain and the Battlefield,” interview by Jake Miraldi, *The Modern War Institute*, Sep 2018, <http://modernwarinstitute.libsyn.com/ep-60-the-brain-and-the-battlefield>.

⁴¹⁹ “Brain Waves. Module 3: Neuroscience, Conflict and Security,” *The Royal Society*, published Feb 2012 at https://royalsociety.org/~media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-waves/2012-02-06-BW3.pdf on 23 Oct 2018.

⁴²⁰ Gadi Gilam *et al*, “Neural Substrates Underlying the Tendency to Accept Anger-infused Ultimatum Offers During Dynamic Social Interactions,” *NeuroImage*, 120 (Oct 2015): 410, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.003>

⁴²¹ Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, “*Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer*” University of California Santa Barbara 1997 at <http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html> on 22 Jul 16.

⁴²² Monoamine oxidase A or MAOA. Anne Gibbons, “Tracking the Evolutionary History of a ‘Warrior’ Gene,” *Science* 304: 5672 (May 2004): 818, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.304.5672.818a>. The gene CDH13 is similarly associated with violent behaviour. Jari Tiihonen *et al*, “Genetic Background of Extreme Violent Behavior,” *Molecular Psychiatry*, 20:6 (2015): 791, <https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2014.130>. Such ‘medicalized concepts’ of warrior are not universally appreciated (see Grant Gillett & Armon J. Tamatea, “The Warrior Gene: Epigenetic Considerations,” *New Genetics & Society*, 31:1, (Mar 2012), 42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14636778.2011.597982>) but they are a key consideration in this thesis.

⁴²³ ‘If there is a warrior gene is there also a compassion gene? Those two together could be powerful’. GS1, 23 Jan 19, 27:20. Such a ‘balanced warrior’ would be in keeping with the discussion of Stoics earlier.

⁴²⁴ Rutherford, *Brief History*, 326.

⁴²⁵ Abdella M. Habib *et al*, “Microdeletion in a FAAH Pseudogene Identified in a Patient With High Anandamide Concentrations and Pain Insensitivity,” *British Journal of Anaesthesia*, available online at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0007091219301382>.

personalities, who were poorly disciplined before combat, stand out.⁴²⁶

This aligns with that '1% of the general population'⁴²⁷ (to include CEOs, spies, surgeons, politicians and the military as well as serial killers, assassins and bank robbers)⁴²⁸ who demonstrate 'dark traits'.⁴²⁹ Psychopathy 'a term grounded in biology and genetics', truly agnostic to causes or etiology,⁴³⁰ and sociopathy⁴³¹ are therefore relevant to warriorship.

Sociopathy, or antisocial personality disorder, is a consequence of environmental influence: 'those already demonstrating antisocial behaviour prior to joining the military are more likely to continue on this trajectory'.⁴³² Such recruits also seem to settle easier into military life: the social learning of violence is 'magnified when you are from a broken home and are searching for a role model'.⁴³³ The army promotes role models and leaders set and promote the localised standards:⁴³⁴ the organisation expects them to reflect corporate norms. However, small groups can determine their own benchmarks, institutionalising 'deviant cohesion'⁴³⁵ where local standards are preferred. MacKenzie explains the concept in her article on sexual violence in the Australian Army where she highlights elite masculinity and toxic military culture (and demands intervention).⁴³⁶ Soldiers 'will do almost anything to conform'⁴³⁷ to subculture ('groups of people that are in some way represented as non-normative and/or marginal through their particular interests and practices')⁴³⁸ as they perceive it, and not necessarily as taught. Where this

⁴²⁶ Roy L. Swank & Walter E. Marchand, "Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion," *Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry*, 55:3 (Mar 1946): 243-4, <https://doi.org/10.1001/archneurpsyc.1946.02300140067004>.

⁴²⁷ Hare, "Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct," 26. Hare says prisons comprise 15-25% psychopaths. Kiehl and Hoffman estimate that where 1% of the population are psychopaths then 93% of psychopaths in the US are in prison, parole, or on probation. Kiehl & Hoffman, "The Criminal Psychopath," 356.

⁴²⁸ Kevin Dutton, *The Wisdom of Psychopaths: What Saints, Spies, and Serial Killers Can Teach Us About Success*, (London: Arrow Books, 2013), 22. Personality disorders in 'mainstream society' is covered in Belinda Jane Board & Katarina Fritzon, "Disordered Personalities at Work," *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 11:1 (Mar 2005): 17-32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10683160310001634304>. There are also interesting comments in a later though retracted article. Nathan Brooks & Katarina Fritzon, RETRACTED: "Psychopathic Personality Characteristics Amongst High Functioning Populations," *Crime Psychology Review*, 2:1 (2016): 22-44, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23744006.2016.1232537>

⁴²⁹ David Whetham. "Dark Traits and Military Ethics," *Defence In Depth*, accessed at <https://defenceindepth.co/2019/11/15/dark-traits-and-military-ethics/> on 23 Nov 2019.

⁴³⁰ Kiehl, *Psychopath Whisperer*, 40-1

⁴³¹ Dr Scott Bonn, "How to Tell a Sociopath From a Psychopath." 22 January 2014. <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wicked-deeds/201401/how-tell-sociopath-psychopath>

⁴³² D. MacManus et al. "Violent Behaviour in UK Military Personnel Returning Home After Deployment," *Psychological Medicine* 42:8 (2012), 1668. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291711002327>

⁴³³ Grossman, *On Killing*, xxii.

⁴³⁴ "27 Questions to Identify Culture and Define Vision," *The Military Leader*, at <https://www.themilitaryleader.com/questions-culture-vision/> on 08 Dec 2019.

⁴³⁵ Situations in which 'subgroup solidarities overturn organizational goals.' Pascal Vennesson, "Cohesion and Misconduct: The French Army and the Mahé Affair," in *Frontline*, ed. King, 237.

⁴³⁶ Megan MacKenzie "Sexual Assault Still Plagues Australia's Defence Forces and 'Boys Will Be Boys' Doesn't Help," ABC News, 17 Jul 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-17/sexual-assault-military-adf/11310814>

⁴³⁷ Dick Couch, *A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 17

⁴³⁸ Kenneth Gelder, *The Subcultures Reader*, (London, Routledge, 2005), 1. Gelder continues: 'They may represent themselves in this way, since subcultures are usually well aware of their differences, bemoaning them, relishing them, exploiting them, and so on.'

takes hold 'group absolution'⁴³⁹ wins out over hierarchical approval to the point where excesses are even celebrated.⁴⁴⁰ The challenge is setting the group reference: the army expects soldiers to look to army norms for guidance; it must take care they don't look elsewhere else and are otherwise influenced.

One of the respondents recognised the power of army sub-culture: 'the culture of [a certain unit] is such that they then form a story and that story is stuck to rigidly'.⁴⁴¹ The 'private world' of the regiment, a small group, 'is a silent, often secretive one' and members are 'expert at concealing their business from outside authority'.⁴⁴² These are 'micro-ethics' where the 'call' or judgement,⁴⁴³ the influence of peers and the exercise of instinct is the guide. In a study of deserters in WW2, sociopathic tendency, (actions that contravene stipulated norms) was evident:

only 43 per cent of them had 'normal stable personalities', 21 per cent were classified as being immature, 5.5 per cent were 'dullards', the same proportion were psychopaths who exhibited anti-social tendencies, and a quarter of them had, according to the psychiatrists who examined them, inadequate personalities.⁴⁴⁴

Sociopathy and psychopathy are separable; they are conflated above though sociopathy is more closely related to culture whilst psychopathy 'is driven by a biosocial jigsaw'.⁴⁴⁵

A recent study by Arcelia Ruíz Vásquez, a research psychologist at the University of Guanajuato, provides insight to the behaviour of those who demonstrate 'dark traits.' She neatly separates the sociopath from the psychopath in her report, "X-Ray of a Mexican Sicario", derived from interviews of dozens of inmates in a Mexican penitentiary, through her identification of four main personality types among cartel foot soldiers.⁴⁴⁶ The first two are sociopathic: they are the 'Marginals' on the periphery of society who see crime as way to escape a life of poverty; and the 'Antisocials' for whom 'impulsivity, hedonism, recklessness, and the search for immediate satisfaction' are motivations. These types are known to demonstrate remorse for their actions. Vasquez's second two types are more clinically defined and less common. The Psychopath and the Sadist comprise around 15% of *sicarios* and are characterized by 'emotional coldness, total

⁴³⁹ Grossman, *On Killing*, 227.

⁴⁴⁰ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 326.

⁴⁴¹ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 26:39. This is a literal example of 'closing ranks.'

⁴⁴² Keegan, "Regimental Ideology," 17.

⁴⁴³ Michael Ignatieff, "Handcuffing the Military: Military Judgement, Rules of Engagement and Public Scrutiny," in *Military Ethics for the Expeditionary Era*, eds. P. Mileham & L. Willett, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 30.

⁴⁴⁴ French "Tommy Is No Soldier," 159.

⁴⁴⁵ Adrian Raine, *The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime*, (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 242-273.

⁴⁴⁶ Cited in Jeremy Kyrt, "Inside the Minds of Cartel Hitmen: Hannibal Lecters for Hire," 15 Sept 2018, updated 09 Jan 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-minds-of-cartel-hitmen-hannibal-lecters-for-hire>

absence of remorse, cruelty and lack of empathy.’ Their difference is that the former kills primarily for profit, the latter does it for pleasure. Though no causal link is suggested between *sicario* and warrior the types are all relevant in some measure to *homo furens*.

Behaviourists argue that ‘the human brain was a blank slate at birth and all processes, even psychopathic traits, were formed through social forces.’⁴⁴⁷ However, psychopathy seems more involved.⁴⁴⁸ It is ‘a constellation of affective, interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics, including egocentricity; impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse; pathological lying; manipulateness and the persistent violation of social norms and expectations.’⁴⁴⁹ It is a ‘lay synonym for incorrigible’.⁴⁵⁰ Hare declares it a clinical, genetic construct and physiological system that requires attention. Condemned as a malfunction, psychopathy provides Winters’ killers, members of the Greatest Generation.⁴⁵¹ So there are ‘good psychopaths and bad psychopaths.’⁴⁵² The condition isn’t borne of a ‘blank slate’ but it can be influenced:

a phenotype is a contextually elaborated lived human identity that manifests in certain ways the genotype it is based on but is not fully determined by that genotype. Other aspects that might be particularly important in the psychological characteristics that form an important part of a person’s identity are the social, cultural (or subcultural) and political forces that a person is surrounded by.⁴⁵³

As a pliable trait there may be utility in actively promoting ‘uniformed’⁴⁵⁴ or ‘functioning psychopaths’.⁴⁵⁵ Performance enhancement⁴⁵⁶ (‘improving the efficiency of one’s own forces’) using the ‘forces of modern pharmacology’⁴⁵⁷ seems a less efficient (and ethically dubious) approach to harnessing the latent propensity toward violence where an ‘instrumental, dispassionate, and predatory’ manner is discoverable.⁴⁵⁸ Psychopaths are surely in the minority but in ‘times of danger a nation needs them desperately.’⁴⁵⁹ We might ‘factor in this inevitable component of necessary ruthlessness’⁴⁶⁰ when we consider

⁴⁴⁷ Kiehl, *Psychopath Whisperer*, 40.

⁴⁴⁸ Psychopathy emerged as a clinical construct only in the last century: references exist since biblical times. Hare, “Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct,” 27. Kiehl & Hoffman. “The Criminal Psychopath,” 356.

⁴⁴⁹ Hare, “Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct,” 30.

⁴⁵⁰ Kiehl & Hoffman, “The Criminal Psychopath,” 355.

⁴⁵¹ A term based on dubious foundations though national pride ‘bristles’ where those who fought WW2 are presented outside of the ‘cherished belief’ as anything other than noble. King, *Combat Soldier*, 164-5.

⁴⁵² FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 23:00. Subject to positioning on the neuropsychological continuum. Dutton, *The Wisdom of Psychopaths*, 22.

⁴⁵³ Gillett & Tamatea, “Warrior Gene,” 48.

⁴⁵⁴ Michael Asher, *Shoot to Kill: A Soldier’s Journey through Violence*, (London: Viking, 1990), 274. Caputo also refers to this perception of soldiers in combat as psychopaths in uniform. Caputo, *Rumor*, 350.

⁴⁵⁵ Kiehl & Hoffman, “The Criminal Psychopath,” 357.

⁴⁵⁶ Patrick Lin, “More Than Human? The Ethics of Biologically Enhancing Soldiers,” *The Atlantic*, dated 16 February 2012, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/02/more-than-human-the-ethics-of-biologically-enhancing-soldiers/253217/>.

⁴⁵⁷ Grossman, *On Killing*, 272.

⁴⁵⁸ Robert D Hare, “Psychopathy as a Risk Factor for Violence,” *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 70:3 (Fall 1999): 187, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1022094925150>.

⁴⁵⁹ Grossman, *On Killing*, 185.

⁴⁶⁰ Dutton, *Psychology of Genocide*, 156

the type of *homo furens* who qualifies as a warrior.

King provides insight into the mental states of soldiers engaged in close combat through the speculative 'Cooper Colour Code'. White is for disengaged soldiers; yellow for those in the early stages of arousal; orange when soldiers concentrate; red suggests total focus; and black, a state of panic, or rage,⁴⁶¹ with 'adrenaline-induced physical responses.'⁴⁶² These colour states may be circumstantial (and aperiodic) but they read well into my analysis: white, yellow and orange for T1; red and black for T2. Physiological, neurological and pharmacological studies are not performed on *homo furens* to confirm 'colours' but they would allow better understanding of the 'interactions of hundreds of different cell types, organized into highly specific circuits', the microcircuits and brain connectivity⁴⁶³ that impact individual biochemistry. Research tools and checklists 'for operationalizing the construct of psychopathy'⁴⁶⁴ can make this less 'hidden'⁴⁶⁵ where militaries wish to be better informed.

We 'know very little about the neuroscience of individuals who commit homicide'⁴⁶⁶ but there are many examples of it in war. There are those who kill 'methodically and without apparent feeling';⁴⁶⁷ there are the 'ideologically motivated warriors'⁴⁶⁸ whose miasmatic ethos and conscious dehumanisation of their adversary are well documented. But we should be careful before we declare such behaviour the sole preserve of soldiers of totalitarian regimes or ideological indoctrination. Browning also speaks of American units in the Pacific who had a 'take no prisoners' policy and collected body parts of Japanese soldiers as souvenirs; Dower of the racially motivated hatred that drove this behaviour.⁴⁶⁹ The massacre at My Lai highlights those who perpetrate such crimes as rarely extraordinary.⁴⁷⁰ Kenneth Hodges, a 73 year old farmer from southern Georgia, accused of rape and murder there explains: "It's easy to sit back and analyse things and maybe

⁴⁶¹ 'The "rage system" circuit runs from the amygdala through the hypothalamus.' Dutton, *Psychology of Genocide*, 144-5.

⁴⁶² King, *Combat Soldier*, 326. The code appears to have originated with Colonel John Dean "Jeff" Cooper.

⁴⁶³ Mitchell, *Innate*, 249.

⁴⁶⁴ Hare, "Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct," 30. Robert D. Hare *et al*, "The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and Factor Structure," *Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology*, 2:3 (1990): 338-341, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.2.3.338>. On the list of the 20 items that indicate psychopathy are: a grandiose sense of self-worth, superficial charm, the need for stimulation, lack of remorse or guilt, lack of empathy, irresponsibility and impulsivity.

⁴⁶⁵ Psychiatrists served during WW2 on officer selection boards. After the war the practice was 'swept aside in favor of nominations by commanders', and more traditional methodology. Geoffrey Field, "Civilians in Uniform: Class and Politics in the British Armed Forces, 1939-1945," *International Labor & Working-Class History*, 80:1 (Fall 2011): 128-29, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S014754791100010X>

⁴⁶⁶ Ashly Sajous-Turner *et al*, "Aberrant Brain Gray Matter in Murderers," *Brain Imaging & Behavior* (Jul 2019): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11682-019-00155-y>

⁴⁶⁷ Kassimeris, "Warrior's Dishonour," 14.

⁴⁶⁸ Browning, *Ordinary Men*, location 2879; Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*.

⁴⁶⁹ John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, (NY: Pantheon Books, 1986), 11. Ferguson, "Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing," 148-92.

⁴⁷⁰ Christopher Elliott, "The Centurion: Conversations with a Mý Lai Massacrist," *Medium*, 02 Dec 19, at <https://medium.com/@cgaelliott/the-centurion-conversations-with-a-mý-lai-massacrist-24df9f511a23>.

even pass judgement if you were not there...If you have not been to Vietnam, out in the field, if you have never been in a war it's easy for you to say 'oh my God, how could you do this?'... [But] you really have to have been there". In more modern times and recent wars Pryer highlights American soldiers who committed assault, manslaughter and homicide in the course of 'brutal' interrogations and descended into thuggery 'just for the perverse pleasure of it'.⁴⁷¹ The activities of the French in Algeria,⁴⁷² where torture was routinely conducted are well documented. The British too answer for activity in Malaya,⁴⁷³ Kenya,⁴⁷⁴ murder in Aden and 'mass assault' upon hundreds of Cypriot civilians in 1958⁴⁷⁵ as it retreated from Empire. Burke reminds us of soldiers who committed murder in Northern Ireland in *Army of Tribes*; Huw Bennett explains command level complicity in illegal acts there.⁴⁷⁶ The Falklands War provides examples of alleged 'excess' in recent conflicts⁴⁷⁷ and the actions of Sergeant Blackman, brings the list up to date.⁴⁷⁸ Atrocity 'a seemingly ineradicable by-product' is committed in every war.⁴⁷⁹ Studies 'show men and women "like us" are capable of grotesque acts of violence against fellow human beings': it is unnecessary to seek extraordinary people or circumstances⁴⁸⁰ and naïve to think all soldiers 'who conceive of their service as a calling or a vocation do so with honorable intent'.⁴⁸¹ Whether those who perpetrate such action are Berserkers or automatons is debatable: what is less so is that *homo furens* is capable of committing such acts. 'War makes murderers out of otherwise decent people. All wars, and all decent people.'⁴⁸²

The warrior makes war and is also 'a persecutor'.⁴⁸³ Here is T2, the 'bad apples',⁴⁸⁴ and

⁴⁷¹ Pryer "Controlling the Beast," 12.

⁴⁷² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, (NY: New York Review Books, 2006).

⁴⁷³ Karl Hack, "Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British Way of Counter-insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 23:4-5 (2012): 671-699, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709764>.

⁴⁷⁴ Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005).

⁴⁷⁵ David French, "Nasty Not Nice: British Counter-insurgency Doctrine and Practice, 1945-1967," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 23:4-5, (2012), 744-761, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709763>

⁴⁷⁶ Huw Bennett, "Smoke Without Fire"? Allegations Against the British Army in Northern Ireland, 1972-5," *Twentieth Century British History*, 24:2, (Jun 2013): 275-304, <https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hws006>.

⁴⁷⁷ Vincent Bramley, *Excursion to Hell: Mount Longdon: A Universal Story of Battle*. (London: Bloomsbury, 1991), 177; Fitz-Gibbon, *Not Mentioned in Despatches*, 113, 160 (footnote 13). 'UK Government and Military Accused of War Crimes Cover-up,' *BBC News*, dated 17 Nov 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50419297> on 10 Dec 2019.

⁴⁷⁸ Steven Morris & Richard Norton-Taylor, "Royal Marine Must Serve At Least 10 Years In Jail For Taliban Murder," *The Guardian*, 06 December 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/06/royal-marine-blackman-10-years-jail-taliban-murder>

⁴⁷⁹ Frederick, *Black Hearts*, 362.

⁴⁸⁰ Bourke, *Intimate History*, xvii.

⁴⁸¹ Holly Hughson, "The Military is Not the Sole Profession on the Battlefield," in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 189

⁴⁸² Ben Ferencz, Nuremberg Trials Prosecutor. Ashley Collman, 'Last Living Nuremberg Prosecutor Speaks Out Against War,' *Mail Online*, 10 May 2017. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4492630/Last-living-Nuremberg-prosecutor-speaks-against-war.html>

⁴⁸³ OED.

⁴⁸⁴ Jackie Wellen & Matthew Neale, "Deviance, Self-Typicality, and Group Cohesion: The Corrosive Effects of the Bad Apples on the Barrel," *Queensland University of Technology*, 37:2 (Apr 2006): 165-186, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/04c5/cc203a85b9a8b13c5c38f9508592ec2fdd63.pdf> on 27 May 2019. Errella Grassiani, *Soldiering Under Occupation: Processes of Numbing Among Israeli Soldiers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, (Oxford, Berghahn, 2013), 17.

most extreme version, or the 'top' 1-2% of the force that seem to persevere in all modern armies⁴⁸⁵ and might exist in larger numbers or more commonly than is acknowledged. The soldier emerged to counter this figure and the 'terror inspired by the devouring beast'.⁴⁸⁶ Their confrontation renders the conflation of the terms warrior and soldier invalid: the former attacks, the latter defends. These are not just tactical or functional terms. Cors *et al* dismisses interchangeability and purposive or cultural distinctions. She refuses 'soldier' as an evolved, modern warrior and declares the two incompatible:

In comparison to the synonymous word 'soldier,' a 'warrior' is frenzied and kinetic. The word's adoption into military usage through such phrases as 'warrior culture' and 'wounded warrior' underscores the value of the aggressive male. However, the warrior Achilles is set apart from his fellow soldiers. He refuses their company and food – and hungers instead for the "slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men".⁴⁸⁷

Militaries like the term – they embrace aggression as positive – but employ it in limited fashion ignoring those 'whose personal gospel' is savagery⁴⁸⁸ and who lack the facility to choose when to behave aggressively or otherwise. The currency of the warrior is slaughter and blood; the individual is 'beastlike, godlike, socially disconnected, crazy, mad, insane, enraged, cruel, without restraint or discrimination, insatiable, devoid of fear, inattentive to own safety, distractible, indiscriminate, reckless, feeling invulnerable, exalted, intoxicated, frenzied, cold, indifferent, insensible to pain, suspicious of friends'.⁴⁸⁹ Yet the term remains attractive, and archetypal.⁴⁹⁰ The volatile, anguished, predatory state and 'emotional "hot rush" – involving rage, frenzy, and elation'⁴⁹¹ should concern those who declare soldiers as warriors.

⁴⁸⁵ Winslow blames an 'exaggerated warfighting culture' in Canadian forces for war crime in Somalia borne of an acceptance of stereotyping in "Misplaced Loyalties"; King thinks it a failure of professionalism, the triumph of hyper-masculinity and a contravention of the externally stipulated code. King, *Combat Soldier*, 209. Special Forces have occasionally in the course of the recent wars been accused of having a 'rogue culture'. Matthew Cole, "The Crimes Of Seal Team 6," 10 Jan 2017, at <https://theintercept.com/2017/01/10/the-crimes-of-seal-team-6/?fbclid=IwAR3ie3TjCzdL0Dsz3tauziSnHPONIIgpy-zZHHYfpOzaZ3iWaEN2Grix3k>; and Rachel E. VanLandingham, Geoffrey S. Corn & Robert Bracknell, "Is There A Values Crisis In Special Operations Forces? National Security Could Be At Risk," *USA Today*, 26 July 2019, at <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/07/26/special-forces-values-crisis-congress-must-investigate-fix-column/1790315001/> highlight problems with US Special Forces. UK Special Forces are neither exempt from accusation. Greg Wilford, "SAS Soldiers 'Suspected' of Executing Unarmed Afghans and Covering Up Potential War Crimes," *The Independent*, 02 Jul 2017 at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sas-special-air-service-war-crimes-civilians-cover-up-ministry-of-defence-operation-northmoor-royal-a7819006.html> on 23 Nov 2018. Australian SAS Regiment soldiers have been identified as 'psychopaths' and 'killer angels' who apply lethal force without hesitation. Masters & McKenzie, "Compassionate Psychopaths". Jim Frederick details criminality in a US infantry regiment in Iraq in *Black Hearts* and Caputo discusses the 'sudden disintegration' of his platoon from disciplined soldiers into an incendiary mob (Caputo, *Rumor*, 304) - 'atrocious by situation' according to Paolo Tripodi, "Deconstructing the Evil Zone: How Ordinary Individuals Can Commit Atrocities," in Tripodi & Wolfendale *New Soldiers*, 201.

⁴⁸⁶ Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*, (NY: Henry Holt & Company, 1997), 47.

⁴⁸⁷ Cynthia Cors, Stephanie Lau & David John Farmer, "Fragmented Warrior," *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 35:3 (2013), 428, <https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806350305>.

⁴⁸⁸ Snyder, *Soldiers of Destruction*, 321.

⁴⁸⁹ Shay, *Achilles*, 82.

⁴⁹⁰ Rick Fields, *The Code of the Warrior in History, Myth, and Everyday Life*, (NY: Harper Perennial, 1991), 62.

⁴⁹¹ Bury & King, "Profession of Love," 207

Homer's Achilles is the exemplar: he personifies the sense of abstractness.⁴⁹² A frenzied and kinetic Berserker,⁴⁹³ who hurls souls into Hades,⁴⁹⁴ he revels in war, seeks separateness and abhors union with his fellow man.⁴⁹⁵ His 'ethic of combat' is that of putting to death⁴⁹⁶ beyond the doctrine of necroethics. Any fair fight degenerates quickly into dishonourable act – dragging Hector's body behind a chariot, now posing with an enemy corpse⁴⁹⁷ or collecting body parts as 'trophies'.⁴⁹⁸ Warriors like Achilles kill, instinctively, easily and brutally and reject the strict and closely defined criteria imposed on the soldier. Authority and circumstance that the ethicist champions are unimportant to this type; killing is not carried out in a proscribed manner and there is no 'good killing or bad killing – there is just killing.'⁴⁹⁹ Warriorship involves selection from strategies of barbarism⁵⁰⁰ depending on which pays the greater dividend.⁵⁰¹ The 'utilitarianism of extremity'⁵⁰² is the basis of the code. There is no 'cognitive restructuring' through moral justification, no 'sanitising language and exonerating comparisons' and no attempt at self-exemption 'from gross inhumanities by displacement of responsibility.'⁵⁰³ Such individuals are 'hand-hired killers, each of which possesses all the aptitudes of murder and all the extraordinary instruments to kill'⁵⁰⁴ fulfilling a function not just a duty.

The triggers of 'moral indignation are quite mysterious sometimes'.⁵⁰⁵ Judgment is influenced by difference and distinction, and grounded in relativism. Bowden observes that we admire bravery and courage in our own but dismiss the enemy's as fanaticism.⁵⁰⁶

⁴⁹² Hannah Arendt, "Introduction," (dated 1966) to Gray, *Warriors*, viii.

⁴⁹³ Shay, Achilles, 77-99.

⁴⁹⁴ Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Martin Hammond, (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 3.

⁴⁹⁵ Gray, *Warriors*, 53.

⁴⁹⁶ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 163

⁴⁹⁷ Jared Keller, "Reenlisting Next To An Enemy Corpse Isn't A War Crime, Navy Judge Rules" *Task & Purpose*, 02 Feb 2019, at <https://taskandpurpose.com/reenlisting-enemy-corpse-war-crime> on 5 March 2019.

⁴⁹⁸ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 192. Parr, *Our Boys*, 178. Bourke, *Intimate History*, 25-31. Walker S. Schneider, "Skull Questions: The Public Discussion of American Human Trophy Collection During World War II," *Penn History Review* 25:2 (2018), 125-151.

⁴⁹⁹ Adam Linehan, "Just Kills: How The Marine Corps Blew The Biggest War Crimes Case Since Vietnam," *Task & Purpose*, published 23 May 2018 at <https://taskandpurpose.com/true-story-marine-corps-blew-biggest-war-crimes-case> on 5 Mar 2018

⁵⁰⁰ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, 26:1 (Summer 2001), 101.

⁵⁰¹ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 47.

⁵⁰² Thomas McDermott, "Burning the Village to Save it: Moral Absolutism, Strategy, and the Challenge of the 21st Century," 18 Oct 2016, at <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/10/18/burning-the-village-to-save-it-moral-absolutism-strategy-and-the-challenge-of-the-21st-century> on 05 Jan 17. Moral absolutism and moral relativism are explained in 'The Basics of Philosophy', at http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_absolutism.html on 07 Dec 17.

⁵⁰³ Bandura, "Moral Disengagement," 106.

⁵⁰⁴ This comment in response to a proposal for the creation of a French warrior elite. 'When will this Army then march on Paris?' Lefranc & Moulin, *Dialogue Sur L'armee*, 13, cited in Kier, *Imagining War*, 81-2. Kier also highlights the French fear, in contravention of the traditional *levee en masse*, of retaining a conscript army for longer than necessary. '[The army] would be able to elicit passive obedience and to use this force for domestic repression.' Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security*, 19:4, (Spring 1995): 72. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539120>

⁵⁰⁵ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 31

⁵⁰⁶ Mark Bowden, *Hué 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam*, (London: Grove Press, 2018), 325.

The 'good' institutional soldiers, 'our boys' are favourably compared to 'evil' dissident warriors, the 'bad apples' and those who 'drift' from the established values,⁵⁰⁷ but all are killers and perform often in very similar fashion. Moral qualifiers (like improper, wrong and bad) are simple but complicated. All act according to rules, but some to 'local' rules, internally derived, specifically defined and unsanctioned by society over the rules laid down by external agents. Jean Lartéguy's paratroopers are exemplars: 'They're dangerous because they go to any lengths...beyond the conventional notion of good and evil'.⁵⁰⁸ As warriors they have their own self-determined ethical standards which they apply to the circumstances. A cautionary, if subjective, note is added: they should not be 'too inhuman'.⁵⁰⁹ Aristotelian freedom is granted.

Morally right conduct, for Aristotle, is an expression of a virtuous character, and doing the right thing depends on the context you're in. Being virtuous is a matter of doing the right thing at the right time, with the right feelings, in the right way and for the right reason. There's no set of moral rules to follow.⁵¹⁰

For *homo furens* choice exists over the code to be followed: personal or institutional; small group or organisational; civilised or barbaric. What is 'personal or social depends on the particular fit of individual to context'.⁵¹¹

Some archetypes are no longer appropriate for the times or for a people⁵¹² but contemplation of law alone 'as a natural social phenomenon quickly reveals that it cannot be reduced to purely rational processes and explicit reasoning'.⁵¹³ Burkart says morality and some sense of right and wrong are fundamental but the perceived context and one's social construct is also central. 'If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being'.⁵¹⁴ Normative or deontological ethics, the moral algorithm, is assumed infectious, and ever progressive: its champions express strong feelings that others ought to conform and that it be enforced.⁵¹⁵ Meta-ethics 'the presuppositions behind our ethical concerns' allows an alternative frame.⁵¹⁶ Here, virtue ethics, a self-referential framework and teleological or consequential ethics where the ends might justify the means have purchase. These are militant ethics and 'criminality' is assumed inevitable in the climate

⁵⁰⁷ James Clark "Top SEAL Says The Service's Special Operations Community Has 'Drifted From Our Navy Core Values'," *Task and Purpose*, 24 Aug 2019 <https://taskandpurpose.com/navy-seal-commander-discipline-problem>

⁵⁰⁸ Jean Lartéguy, Xan Fielding & Robert D. Kaplan, *The Centurions*, (NY: Penguin Books, 2015), xii.

⁵⁰⁹ Lartéguy et al, *Centurions*, 46.

⁵¹⁰ Garvey & Stangroom, *Philosophy*, 99.

⁵¹¹ Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity," 5.

⁵¹² Carol S. Pearson, "Are You A Warrior?" 23 Apr 18, accessed at <https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-hero-within/201804/are-you-warrior-and-if-so-what-kind?eml> on 20 Oct 18.

⁵¹³ Burkart et al, "Evolutionary Origins."

⁵¹⁴ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 168.

⁵¹⁵ Burkart et al, "Evolutionary Origins,"

⁵¹⁶ Garvey & Stangroom, *Philosophy*, 5.

of battle.⁵¹⁷ One may derive ‘humanity from war’⁵¹⁸ but war also provides for self-actualisation in darker ways that explain the persistence of ‘plain old killers’, the fundamentalists of human behaviour.⁵¹⁹ To ‘meat eaters’⁵²⁰ like Achilles, war is a game of winner takes all, a competition between predator and prey and ‘it is inappropriate to show outrage or surprise that people are killed and maimed when there is war. If there is war, that’s the way it is’.⁵²¹ Warriors act in the moment on the basis of emotional, intuitive and subconscious⁵²² drives. Dangerous, unconstrained, operating through self-expression and likely for self-satisfaction the warrior exhibits still the traits of his primitive ancestor and lays bare the reality that ‘war is a polite name for sanctioned homicide’.⁵²³

Summary

Warriorship is presented in the literature from two distinct perspectives. The first advises how to fight and suggests culture, and ethics as overriding factors (Shannon E. French, Coker, Jonathan Shay, King, Victor Davis Hanson, Gat and Strozzi-Heckler are the authorities cited most here): the second examines why *homo furens* fights, and emphasises the physical, neurological and psychological aspects of warriorship. Grossman, Bourke, Kiehl, Neitzel and Welzer, Browning and Hare provide a solid foundation. There is also a bank of literature that explains more extensively the draw of humankind to war as a consequence of nature, nurture or both that includes the work of Payne, Pinker, Wright, Turchin, Diamond and Lawrence Keeley, and the biographies and autobiographies by and of *homo furens* (Marlantes, Caputo, de Wiat, Bury, O’Brien and Parr). The history and meaning of war is provided by Edwards, Michael Howard, Keegan and Hew Strachan who mostly recommend in Platonic fashion that we have not yet seen the end of war, so we have not then seen the last of the warrior. There is consensus⁵²⁴ or near-consensus that warrior is a valid contemporary term, mostly restricted to those who go to war; that these individuals are motivated by some mix of nature and nurture; and that warrior is a term reserved for those who fight.

There is also disagreement and a fissure exists between those who think *homo furens* possesses self-control, and those who are recognised as seeking ‘thrill’.⁵²⁵ The soldier

⁵¹⁷ Parr, *Our Boys*, 181.

⁵¹⁸ Coker, *The Warrior Ethos*, 24.

⁵¹⁹ Peters, “New Warrior Class Revisited,” 17.

⁵²⁰ Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*.

⁵²¹ Neitzel & Welzer, *Soldaten*, 342.

⁵²² Martin, “On Why We Fight.”

⁵²³ O’Brien, *If I Die*, 219.

⁵²⁴ The literature review highlights areas of consensus, disagreement and gaps. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Doing a Literature Review,” *Political Science & Politics*, 39:1 (2006): 129-30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096506060264>

⁵²⁵ Orna Sasson-Levy, “Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers,” *Men & Masculinities*, 10:3 (2008): 298, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X06287760>

school recognises martial skill and expertise but expects *homo furens* to respond to external authority: warrior and soldier are then synonyms and *homo furens* is the automaton who complies to direction and the stoic who does as they think they should. They serve for a stipend to rules with which they either passively or actively agree. Service is their overriding motivation and ‘Doing’ trumps ‘Being’ in the philosophical sense. For the soldier, or ‘anti-warrior’⁵²⁶ the collective is king and culture through teaching, imitation and the influence of environment dominates. The Blank Slate brings soldiers to battle and the major difference within this type is between those with little choice who serve in civilian, often conscripted, mass armies and those who are ‘professional’, members of volunteer forces – institutionally or occupationally driven,⁵²⁷ the mechanical and the organic.⁵²⁸ The alternative, the warrior school, is where ‘natural’, not nurtured, fighters and killers who do as they wish and berserkers and psychopaths who do as they must, are found. They fight because it allows personal realisation, and they live according to ‘essence’: they exercise their Being and perform according to free will. The Ghost in the Machine, or genetic propensity, motivates.

The literature review allows a model of *homo furens* by type and variant, with the Cooper Colour Code as background. It illustrates, proportionally, the 4 descriptors I have used.




Fig. 3.3: Warrior Types Model

Kaurin suggests 3 categories (Guardian, Citizen-Soldier, Warrior) as sufficient: more significantly however she emphasises the importance of getting this right.

The discussion about the warrior *ethos* in the military goes to the heart of

⁵²⁶ Morris, *War!* 90-1.

⁵²⁷ Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation,” 41–50.

⁵²⁸ King, *Combat Soldier*, 339-340.

how military and veteran think of themselves, how society looks at them and how we are to honor service in an authentic way in an age when many civilians have no idea what they are honoring, a fact which angers and frustrates many in the military community.’⁵²⁹

The model disguises a ‘puzzle for geneticists and evolutionists, as well as psychologists’⁵³⁰ but it delivers clarity regarding the various employments and reading of the term warrior. The enclosed area bounds a professional, volunteer army (the dashed lines allow extension of the model for a conscripted or compelled fighting force).

There is a gap in the literature. Whilst there is a lot of information and opinion on what it means to be a warrior there is very little regarding its application to British soldiers. Yet the word is now prevalent. It is not clear which of the four variants the British Army is promoting: the militarised, institutionalised, and responsive servant; the professional Stoic soldier who operates with personal agency; the natural born, self-motivated fighter; or that most dangerous of *homo furens*, the Berserker. We might assume it is neither the psychopathic ‘warrior’ nor the automaton ‘soldier’ shown at the extremes but that is not certain, and there is a requirement for the term to be both clarified and justified. Depending on one’s view *homo furens* might be placed anywhere on the model and warrior is allowed throughout it. It seems impossible to define exactly what is meant by the term and so further research is merited. The question of what British soldiers think warrior means and whether it is appropriate for them is valid. Examination of culture – ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes to life’⁵³¹ – provides access to how the term warrior is understood in the British Army. The next chapter concerns organisational expectation and the sources of learning and imitation in the British Army.

⁵²⁹ Pauline M. Kaurin, “Warrior, Citizen Solider or Guardian: Thoughts After a Kerfuffle,” Blog Post published 20 Dec 2016, at <https://shankskaurin.wordpress.com/2016/12/20/warrior-citizen-solider-or-guardian-thoughts-after-a-kerfuffle/> on 16 Dec 2019.

⁵³⁰ Bouchard, “Genetic Influence,” 151.

⁵³¹ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 89.

4. British Army Organisational Culture

Culture and Myth

As part of the research process what must be considered 'and is often ignored in the literature concerns contextualization.'¹ Warriorship appears routinely in academia agnostic of national culture and set instead against some broader international standard. The discussion to follow, that complements the consideration of the 'types' of warrior in Chapter Three, will focus on British culture. In this chapter I explore British strategic culture, British military culture and the ways in which these have developed. These are the funnels down which warriorship is poured and the lenses through which it is viewed. The discussion comprises further academic reference but more significantly introduces a swathe of the primary research data. First: what is culture?

Culture is the full range of learned behaviours.² It is not the determinant of human nature³ but it is a significant component in the development of human behaviour: our 'rationality is culturally conditioned'.⁴ The customs, ideas and behaviour of a particular people or group,⁵ culture is 'the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns'.⁶ It provides 'a definition of the world for a group or organization and guides for action'; it comprises formal and informal elements, specific rules or prohibitions.⁷ Geertz advises that it is 'best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters' but as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call "programs") – for governing behaviour'.⁸ Once absorbed culture provides a 'set of assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the world'.⁹ What is understood is unquestioned.

Culture is given by or taken from others. It is instrumental¹⁰ and plays 'the role of genes in non-genetic evolutionary processes'.¹¹ Identifiable and observable, it can be promoted,

¹ Julia Brannen, "Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the Research Process," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8:3, (Jul 2005): 173, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570500154642>

² Culture was first defined in 1871 as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." Edward Burnett Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art & Custom, Vol. 1*, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2017), 1.

³ Ridley, *Nature via Nurture*, location 3299.

⁴ Kier, *Imagining War*, 38.

⁵ OED.

⁶ Pinker, *The Blank Slate*, 21.

⁷ Dandeker & Gow, "Military Culture," 59.

⁸ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 44.

⁹ Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review*, 51:2 (Apr 1986): 279, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>.

¹⁰ Kier, *Imagining War*, 33.

¹¹ Wilson, "Social Constructivism," 35.

denigrated, 'created,' imagined or invented¹² and is slow to change (though quicker to adjust than genetic evolution).¹³ Definitions suffer from 'crippling imprecision'¹⁴ and the study of culture is 'as dangerous as an unmarked minefield on a dark night',¹⁵ but it is critical to understanding *homo furens*: 'erroneous simplifications that merely allow our limited mental apparatus to cope with the vast complexity of the world'¹⁶ though must be resisted. Boundaries are opaque and specificity difficult but two elements are identifiable:

One is the narratives that people are nurtured on – the stories and myths they and their religious and national leaders tell themselves – and how these narratives feed their imaginations one way or another. The other is the context in which people grow up, which has a huge impact on shaping how they see the world and others.¹⁷

Value-laden stories that encourage emulation are key: they inspire through 'actors and actions that confound the conventions of routine experience'¹⁸

Culture is not a 'power' but provides for context.¹⁹ It allows understanding of the world and our place in it. It 'is not only about what is written and taught. It is also about what one lives and what one hears and sees in myths and visual images.'²⁰ These remind people 'they are part of something bigger and older than they are, in which those going before have set standards of conduct and behaviour that today's people are expected to keep up'.²¹ Myths, images, legends, symbols and stories, in particular of heroes 'more for copying than adapting'²² are how army culture is transmitted and social action articulated.²³ They attain a kind of immortality: their 'inherent archetypal beauty, profundity, and power have inspired rewarding renewal and transformation by successive generations.'²⁴ Social facts,²⁵ 'manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which

¹² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983).

¹³ Wilson, "Social Constructivism," 26.

¹⁴ Andrew M Johnston, "Does America Have a Strategic Culture," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, 18:2 (Fall 1998), <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11700/12457>.

¹⁵ Rashed Uz Zaman, "Strategic Culture: A 'Cultural' Understanding of War," *Comparative Strategy*, 28:1 (2009): 69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930802679785>.

¹⁶ Haslam et al, *New Psychology*, 64.

¹⁷ Thomas L Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), 452-3.

¹⁸ John McDowell, "Perspectives: What is Myth?" *Folklore Forum*, 29:2 (1998): 80, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/2275/29%282%29%2075-89%20alt.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> on 06 May 2019.

¹⁹ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 14.

²⁰ Kier, *Imagining War*, 162. Terraine differentiates myth that 'is mischievous' from legend that is 'relatively innocent'. John Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War, 1861–1945*, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), 13,17. The two terms are similar enough to be treated synonymously here.

²¹ Simon Anglim, "An Educated Military: Professional Education and the Profession of Arms," in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 143.

²² Raymond Kimball, "Mentoring for a Military Professional Identity," in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 153.

²³ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 17.

²⁴ Mark Morford et al, "Classical Mythology," at <https://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780199997329/student/materials/chapter1/summary/> on 29 Dec 17.

²⁵ Durkheim, *Rules*, 90. Social facts and subject are related unlike the 'scientist and chemical compound': interpretation matters. Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons," 250. How the fact is received is critical.

they exercise control'²⁶ are established through story. *Mythos* as a misrepresentation of the truth²⁷ can be of little consequence. 'If you are known as fighters' one focus group attendee explained, 'like the Irish, then you feel like you have to live up to it...there's pressure both physical and mental if you are known to be a warrior...there's an expectation...how many VCs²⁸ were pressured and how many wanted to do it...?'²⁹

'Colours' (revered artefacts)³⁰ embroidered with battle honours,³¹ associated stories and tales of *derring-do*, provide the altar at which the deeds of previous generations in foreign



Fig. 4.1: Regimental Colour

and vaguely imaginable places and times are made real. They simplify meaning and provide a rally point. Items recovered from battlefields, 'sacred things'³² that are also 'knowledge-laden frames'³³ are held in awe and promoted as near holy relics: they serve similar functions to the Colours. These are totems and soldiers 'fix themselves to the idea of the totem rather than that of the clan:

for the clan is too complex a reality to be represented clearly in all its complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences.'³⁴ The deeds immortalised in paintings, invested in the regimental badge, and shown off by parading the Colours persuades that success was won, whether that is true or not.

The stories create a matrix ('a composite of our stories')³⁵ and *homo furens* becomes 'suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.'³⁶ 'Regimental Days', celebrating significant battles (the pattern of activities is very similar regardless of unit)³⁷ demonstrate the power of myth. These usually involve parades, a church service and formal dinners, tables adorned with regimental silver and an atmosphere as 'dim and

²⁶ Durkheim, *Rules*, 21.

²⁷ OED.

²⁸ Victoria Cross winners. Constituted in 1857, the VC is Britain's highest award for valour.

²⁹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 30:00.

³⁰ Greenberg *et al.*, "Evidence of a Terror Management Function of Cultural Icons: The Effects of Mortality Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished Cultural Symbols." *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin* 21:11 (Nov 1995): 1221, <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672952111010>.

³¹ Fig. 4.1 is the Regimental Colour of 1st Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment at <https://www.royal-irish.com/stories/queens-and-regimental-colours-royal-irish-regiment> on 10 Dec 19 © Copyright 2019, The Royal Irish, All Rights Reserved.

³² Collective ideals fixed on material objects: 'moral forces, they are made up of the ideas and sentiments awakened in us by the spectacle of society, and not of sensations coming from the physical world.' Sacred things are distinguished by Durkheim from the 'profane' that relate to 'men's ordinary life', Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, a Historical and Critical Study*, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1985), 25-6.

³³ Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons," 247.

³⁴ Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms*, 220.

³⁵ Wilson, "Social Constructivism," 30.

³⁶ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 5.

³⁷ Richard Holmes, *Soldiers*, (London: HarperPress, 2011), 453.

secretive as the dining hall in a monastery.³⁸ The 'group's symbolic life' reflects its war behavior, and vice versa.³⁹ Ritual⁴⁰ 'reminds those dining of the sanctity placed on combat by the unit and the ability of their ancestors to master it'.⁴¹

People say you fight for your buddies. That's true, but that's a floor not a ceiling. People say you fight because you're well trained and well led. That is also true. But truly great military organizations have fought well because they hold themselves accountable for their own history and traditions.⁴²

Charters for warriorship define martial consciousness, and the extremity of existence.⁴³ Humans have 'sacralized the act of killing' and surrounded it with ritual and awe to overcome its reality.⁴⁴ Models for human behaviour, 'the world of myth provides guidance for crucial elements in human existence – war and peace, life and death, truth and falsehood, good and evil.'⁴⁵

Myth will make *homo furens* 'go that bit further and work that bit harder than they believe is possible.'⁴⁶ It heralds action which soldiers wish to emulate and demonstrates how to earn renown. Stories about close combat inspire most of all: the tale of the soldier who eschewing technology kills with the bayonet or knife, for example. 'There is always hushed awe for any citation describing that sort of fighting'⁴⁷ and the resultant medals are most valued.⁴⁸ These play a huge part in mythology: that 'soldiers will fight long and hard for a piece of ribbon'⁴⁹ is a military maxim and efforts toward earning trade badges is testament to its truth. Symbols, 'associated with primary gratification,'⁵⁰ also assist in creating cohesion. They promote martial endeavour as 'cool'⁵¹ not just tough.

Myth can be dismissed as imaginary or fantastic, like dragons or fairies though it's very unattainability makes it inspirational. Coker appreciates it as a phenomenon 'powered

³⁸ Caputo, *Rumor*, 22.

³⁹ Jack Snyder, "Anarchy and Culture," 26.

⁴⁰ Harrison M. Trice & Janice M. Beyer, "Studying Organisational Cultures through Rites and Ceremonials," *Academy of Management Review* 9:4 (Oct 1984), 653-69, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/258488>

⁴¹ Bury, "Barossa Night," 319.

⁴² James A Warren, *American Spartans: The U.S. Marines: A Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq*, (NY: Free Press, 2005), interview with James Webb, 24.

⁴³ Highlighted through examination of Neanderthal grave ritual. Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 3-4.

⁴⁴ Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites*, 37.

⁴⁵ Buxton *et al*, "Myth".

⁴⁶ BCS, 3.

⁴⁷ Conversation between the author and colleague 20 Dec 2018. Bourke agrees such forms of combat are idolized. Bourke, *Intimate History*, 40. 'Offensive actions were assumed the most heroic' with bayonet charges described as 'splendid', 'gallant', 'noble' and 'magnificent'. Adam I. P. Smith, "'On the Altar of the Nation': Narratives of Heroic Sacrifice in the American Civil War," in Scheipers, *Heroism*, 35. 'Primal warrior actions like single-handedly charging enemy position or smashing a man's face in with a rock are highly respected.' Ben Connable, "Warrior-Maverick Culture: The Evolution of Adaptability in the U.S. Marine Corps," (PhD diss., King's College London, 2016), 65.

⁴⁸ Patrick Bury, "Barossa Night: Cohesion in the British Army Officer Corps," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 68:2 (2017): 319.

⁴⁹ Attribute to Napoleon Bonaparte.

⁵⁰ Shils & Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration," 281.

⁵¹ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 22:50.

by nostalgia',⁵² its purpose is to sustain authority, validate practice and provide a framework for action. It promotes values to be adhered to, and defended, less they disappear or are assumed outdated. Myth counters the decomposition of ideological residue⁵³ that militaries wish to retain and provides reference to the past. It delivers comfort and reassurance from historical authority that the martial undertaking is noble.

Kate Germano⁵⁴ thinks myth constraining. She challenges the historic approach that equates 'hyper-masculinity' with warriorship and limits the utility of the term. Though warrior is not a gender specific term the myth of the warrior of antiquity who was predominantly if not exclusively⁵⁵ male persists and warriorship can be 'highly gendered, often to the point of misogyny'.⁵⁶ It can emphasise separateness and allows the presentation of adherents as special, even elite. Anthropologist and folklorist Paul Radin says: 'A myth is always explanatory. The explanatory theme often is so completely dominant that everything else becomes subordinated to it.'⁵⁷ So the approach of the narrator (who explains) and those listening is critical. Imprecision and even ambiguity due to the deliberate abuse of language⁵⁸ can create advantage or problems. What happened may be unimportant: it is how it is remembered that matters. We take from the story what we wish: detail that contradicts and the integrity of the tale is neglected in favour of a preferred understanding. Myths are believed stories: their telling brings responsibility for the creation of collective consciousness, 'a determinate system that has its own life.'⁵⁹ Standard-bearers, guardians and followers must believe the offered framework more than they do temporal opinion or fleeting direction. Identity comes from 'myths about our forefathers that are not historical but help to explain current attitudes about our environment, neighbours and customs.'⁶⁰ Culture, contemporary and importantly, 'functional,' can then be better understood.⁶¹ The mythic 'is everything that preserves the underlying substance of a living culture.'⁶²

Myth 'sticks' where it reinforces existing belief or perception: prior commitment is difficult

⁵² Coker, *Warrior Ethos*, 34.

⁵³ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 98.

⁵⁴ Germano, "Hyper-masculinity".

⁵⁵ Eve MacDonald, "Warrior Women: Despite What Gamers Might Believe, The Ancient World Was Full of Female Fighters," *The Conversation*, dated 04 Oct 2018, at <http://theconversation.com/warrior-women-despite-what-gamers-might-believe-the-ancient-world-was-full-of-female-fighters-104343> on 12 Oct 2018.

⁵⁶ @ProfAnkersen, 19 Oct 2018. This is the 'combat masculine-warrior' paradigm. Karen. O. Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces & Society* 20:4 (Summer 1994): 531-47, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X9402000403>.

⁵⁷ Radin, "The Basic Myth of the North American Indians" (1950) in Mary Magoulick, "What is Myth?" at <https://faculty.qcsu.edu/custom-website/mary-magoulick/defmyth.htm> on 29 Dec 17.

⁵⁸ Paddy Griffith, "Small Wars and How They Grow in the Telling," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 2:2 (1991): 216-229, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592319108422979>.

⁵⁹ Lukes, *Durkheim: His Life and Work*, 151.

⁶⁰ Armstrong, *A Short History of Myth*, (Edinburgh, Canongate Books, 2006), 6.

⁶¹ Kier, *Imagining War*, 163.

⁶² Coker, *Warrior Ethos*, 39.

to undo.⁶³ Bias facilitates resistance to disconfirmation, and demythologising, but this requires social support. Myth and 'invented tradition' is 'reinforced and institutionalized over centuries⁶⁴ 'almost by accident'⁶⁵ through networks that exacerbate, and do not contest, myth. Where everyone believes something there is no question at all to its validity⁶⁶ particularly where it assists in coping with a 'problematic human predicament'⁶⁷ – like killing or being killed. 'A warrior is somebody who embraces the possibility of death and subordinates it to the unit and the mission. This preparedness to die is what confers the moral authority to take life.'⁶⁸ This, the myth of reciprocity, justifies the taking of life. Stories that offer immortality, fame, even notoriety, dock with terror management theory.⁶⁹ Myth is the antidote to slipping from human consciousness. 'Someday soon, perhaps in forty years, there will be no one alive who has ever known me. That's when I will be *truly* dead – when I exist in no one's memory.'⁷⁰ Death is less frightening where one is remembered. The military facilitates this in statue form, written history or mess painting. 'The cure for the horror is story'.⁷¹

There is never a single, orthodox version of a myth. As our circumstances change, we need to tell our stories differently in order to bring out their timeless truth...every time men and women took a major step forward, they reviewed their mythology and made it speak to the new conditions.⁷²

Myth provides 'a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action".'⁷³

Myth fictionalises but mobilises coherent structure of meaning.⁷⁴ An integral part of the 'meaning-making'⁷⁵ process it allows 'the creation of an image of the past, through careful selection and interpretation, in order to create or sustain certain emotions or beliefs.'⁷⁶ Where soldiers require motivating this is essential. Myth allows action through 'ideas and experiences that we cannot explain rationally'⁷⁷ and makes sense of extraordinary

⁶³ Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken & Stanley Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World*, (NY: Start Publishing, 2012), 4

⁶⁴ Linch, *Wellington's Army*, 147.

⁶⁵ Jim Storr, "The Regimental System in the British Army 1685-2010," *BAR* 149, (Summer 2010): 75.

⁶⁶ Festinger *et al.*, *Prophecy*, 30.

⁶⁷ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 6.

⁶⁸ CO12.

⁶⁹ The instinctive drive for continued existence where individuals seek concepts for understanding the world and their place in it. Greenberg *et al.*, "Evidence of a Terror Management Function of Cultural Icons: The Effects of Mortality Salience on the Inappropriate Use of Cherished Cultural Symbols." *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin* 21:11 (Nov 1995): 1222, <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672952111010>.

⁷⁰ Irvin D Yalom, *Love's Executioner and Other Tales of Psychotherapy*, (London: Penguin, 2013), 190-1.

⁷¹ William Storr, *The Science of Storytelling*, (London: William Collins, 2019), 1.

⁷² Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 8.

⁷³ Swidler, "Culture in Action," 273.

⁷⁴ David Martin Jones & M.L.R. Smith, "Myth and the Small War Tradition: Reassessing the Discourse of British Counter-insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 24:3 (2013): 437, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802604>

⁷⁵ O'Connor, "Three Modes of Collective Memory," 1.

⁷⁶ Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *The RUSI Journal*, 107:625 (1962): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071846209423478>.

⁷⁷ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 5.

circumstances. It seizes our interest, creating memory and imagination – ‘the essential ingredients of war’⁷⁸ – and focusses aspiration.⁷⁹

My Regimental Duty (RD) was mostly spent in 2 PARA and undoubtedly the most celebrated events are the fight to hold Arnhem Bridge (centre piece painting in the Officers’ Mess) and the two battles fought in the Falklands Campaign but in particular The Battle of Goose Green.⁸⁰

This officer doesn’t say these battles were the best or most fierce rather they are retold and remembered. ‘We were telling ourselves stories about ourselves’,⁸¹ indulging in that ‘natural human process’ of constructing stories to help individuals understand their experiences and themselves.⁸² This is ‘viable mythology’⁸³ that reduces the necessity of mathematical calculation in war. A more artistic, human endeavour becomes apparent promoting a tendency to believe in possibilities arithmetic suggests are improbable.

By emphasising a chosen or offered myth such as chivalry in combat or the importance of valour ‘we silence’ through mutually assured deception the nastier, less attractive side of war.⁸⁴ Hannah Arendt cautions that lies or mistruths, ‘secrecy and deliberate deception have always played a significant role’ in human interaction. But ‘self-deception is a danger *par excellence*; the self-deceived deceiver loses all contact, not only with his audience but with the real world which will catch up with him, as he can remove only his mind from it and not his body.’⁸⁵ Where we seize the myths we prefer, we become disorientated by believing them incontrovertible. Stories then excuse responsibility. French highlights British wars of decolonisation where ‘liberal notions of right and wrong’ were made compatible with successful counter-insurgency operations.⁸⁶ The myth says the UK excelled, ‘winning hearts and minds’ and succeeding in war amongst the people.⁸⁷ The truth is that the army exercised ‘wholesale and indiscriminate coercion’⁸⁸ sometimes beyond the laws of war.⁸⁹ Yet the image of the benevolent colonial custodian persists. Officials ‘intent on sanitising the experience of fighting wars of decolonisation’⁹⁰

⁷⁸ Farrell, *Norms*, 65.

⁷⁹ Buxton *et al* “Myth” at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/myth> on 28 Dec 17.

⁸⁰ CO17.

⁸¹ “Spinning a Dit: Leadership and Storytelling,” *The Army Leader*, dated 13 Dec 2018 at <https://thearmyleader.co.uk/spinning-dit-leadership-story/> on 08 Jan 2018. ‘Dit’ is military slang for story.

⁸² Wilson, “Social Constructivism,” 30.

⁸³ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 50-1.

⁸⁴ David Barno & Nora Bensahel, “Lying to Ourselves: The Demise of Military Integrity,” *War on the Rocks*, 10 March 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/lying-to-ourselves-the-demise-of-military-integrity/>.

⁸⁵ Hannah Arendt, “Lying In Politics: Reflections On The Pentagon Papers,” *The New York Review of Books*, 18 Nov 1971, <http://www.tramuntalegria.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Lying-in-Politics-Reflections-on-The-Pentagon-Papers-by-Hannah-Arendt-The-New-York-Review-of-Books.pdf>

⁸⁶ French, “Nasty Not Nice,” 745.

⁸⁷ Smith, *The Utility of Force*.

⁸⁸ French, “Nasty Not Nice,” 747.

⁸⁹ Keith Surridge, “An Example to be Followed or a Warning to be Avoided? The British, Boers, and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900– 1902,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23:4-5 (2012): 608– 26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709768>

⁹⁰ French, “Nasty Not Nice,” 758. Today officials are less able to present the story, the myth, as they prefer in the face of more intrusive media and perhaps greater confidence in presenting war as it is. Mark Hookham, “Critics of Civilian Deaths Must Face the Reality of War”, *The Times*, 24 September 2017, at

presented activity as revolutionary whilst denying the reality of the use of force. This exposes a clash and contradiction. Soldiers like the myths of warriors who fight; the army prefers to emphasise soldiers who don't, yet promotes the term.

In mythology, 'we entertain a hypothesis, bring it to life by means of ritual, act upon it, contemplate its effect upon our lives, and discover that we have achieved new insight into the disturbing puzzle of our world.'⁹¹ That soldiers are warriors entertains a hypothesis, maybe a 'distorted vestige of a wishful phantasy'.⁹² Without comprehensive understanding of what is involved, risk is taken. If myth 'does not give us new insight into the deeper meaning of life, it has failed.'

If it *works*, that is, if it forces us to change our minds and hearts, gives us new hope, and compels us to live more fully, it is a valid myth. Mythology will only transform us if we follow its directives. A myth is essentially a guide; it tells us what we must do in order to live more richly. If we do not apply it to our own situation and make the myth a reality in our own lives, it will remain as incomprehensible and remote as the rules of a board game, which often seem confusing and boring until we start to play.⁹³

Where the British Army is an army of warriors it must understand the 'directives' of the myth, or it will be the victim of cognitive dissonance with consequence apparent much later. The nature of the 'lived' myth must register. Storytelling is afforded the freedom to reveal meaning without committing the error of defining it⁹⁴ but some stories are frameworks for action, not entertainment. The danger is that myth can be meaningless, or worse, promotes the prejudice of chauvinism⁹⁵ and meaning that only a small number comprehend or 'own'. It requires embedding in strategic and military culture.⁹⁶

British Strategic Culture

Strategic culture – 'a system of shared meaning held by members that distinguishes that organisation for others'⁹⁷ – involves the 'moral codes and technical scripts' that guide and

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/major-general-rupert-jones-lays-bare-grim-cost-of-beating-isis-7dlns7zr7>; see also Colonel Gian Gentile, "War Is About Killing and Destruction, It Is Not Armed Social Science: A Short Response to Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham", *Small Wars Journal*, (Dec 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/334-gentile.pdf>.

⁹¹ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 8.

⁹² Sigmund Freud, "Creative Writers and Daydreaming," accessed at <http://users.uoa.gr/~cdokou/FreudCreativeWriters.pdf> on 08 Dec 2019.

⁹³ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 8.

⁹⁴ Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970), 105.

⁹⁵ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 227.

⁹⁶ Important due its 'pervasive impact on the preferences and actions of both armies and states.' Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," *International Security*, 18:4 (Spring 1994): 109, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539179>. R. A. D. Applegate & J. R. Moore, "The Nature of Military Culture." *Defense Analysis*, 6.3 (1990): 302-05, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07430179008405460>.

⁹⁷ Stephen P Robbins, *Organisational Behaviour: Concepts Controversies Applications*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 595.

regulate the use of force.⁹⁸ Jack L. Snyder first coined the term⁹⁹ as he searched to uncover the ‘dominant behavioural propensities’¹⁰⁰ of Soviet decision-making. His analysis of doctrine, military bias¹⁰¹ and other influences¹⁰² aimed to reduce emphasis on the ‘ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist’¹⁰³ perspective that neglected human factors in decision-making. He defined strategic culture as the ‘sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other.’¹⁰⁴ He popularised the term promoting discussion on national ways of war. ‘Each country or nation’s strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making.’¹⁰⁵

A ‘powerful analytical device for understanding variation’¹⁰⁶ the concept ‘has blossomed as a field of study, with scholars seeking evidence of national or strategic behaviours that reflect underlying cultural norms.’¹⁰⁷ Colin S. Gray defined strategic culture as ‘thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience.’¹⁰⁸ He suggested a difference between ‘declaratory’ and operational strategy where decision makers in ‘security communities’¹⁰⁹ can ‘rise above strategic cultural constraints which they manipulate’.¹¹⁰ Kier highlights the interaction of domestic politics and durable military culture as important.¹¹¹ For Johnston about the use of force and may not be unique to any state.¹¹² Longhurst sees practice arising gradually over time that ‘can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures’¹¹³ and under

⁹⁸ Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 25:2 (Summer–Fall 2005): 12, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/190594>.

⁹⁹ Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations,” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977), <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ Snyder, “Soviet Strategic Culture,” preface.

¹⁰¹ Kier, *Imagining War*, 11.

¹⁰² ‘Technology, geography, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even international system structure.’ Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security*, 19:4, (Spring 1995): 37.

¹⁰³ Johnston, “Strategic Culture,” 35.

¹⁰⁴ Snyder, “Soviet Strategic Culture,” 8.

¹⁰⁵ Li Jijun, “On Strategic Culture”, *China Military Science*, (1997), 8, cited in Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*. (Darby: DIANE Publishing, 2002), 1, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a402402.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Farrell, “American Empire,” 3.

¹⁰⁷ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 112, outlines his concerns. Explanation of ‘waves’ in scholarly thought is provided in Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies.” *International Security*, 23:1, (Summer 1998): 141–170, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539266>. For the currents of strategic culture since ‘9/11’ see Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” *Strategic Insights*, 6:10, (Nov 2005), <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/11212>.

¹⁰⁸ Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” *International Security*, 6:2 (Fall 1981): 22, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446680/pdf>. See also his comparison of the US and the Soviet Union and their ‘distinct national perspectives,’ Gray, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” *Parameters*, 14:4 (Winter 1984): 26, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1306227150?accountid=11862>.

¹⁰⁹ Colin S. Gray, “Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar Period,” *Comparative Strategy*, 13:4 (1994): 361, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939408402994>.

¹¹⁰ Johnston, “Strategic Culture,” 40.

¹¹¹ Kier, *Imagining War*, 21.

¹¹² Johnston, “Strategic Culture,” 33.

¹¹³ Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004), 17.

transformative pressure.¹¹⁴ Change can be deliberate or accidental.¹¹⁵ Strategic culture comprises 'discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants'¹¹⁶ and each commentator allows interpretive freedom: none of their views are definitive.

A framework will help to understand the interaction of policymakers, political elites, and the military.¹¹⁷ Fox says strategic culture is influenced by a 'number of factors, including, *inter alia*, perceptions of national character, geostrategic politics, military initiatives, and the social make-up of the officer corps'.¹¹⁸ Lord stratifies it into geopolitics, international relationships, political ideology, civil-military bureaucracy, technology, military history and culture.¹¹⁹ This provides for fuller analysis and allows caution against overemphasising 'cultural variables'¹²⁰ or the actions of gatekeepers. Organisations must guard against becoming ethnocentric or 'culture-bound'¹²¹ so a broader view is useful. Lord cautions against the 'tendency to overlook 'big picture' constructs like language, history, and culture in favour of intrapsychic and interpersonal processes';¹²² he reminds that strategic culture is realised through a wide base.

An island nation, Britain's geostrategic position affects force size, structure and 'strategic orientation'.¹²³ But naval power, preferred for centuries as the critical means of national security, bred complacency says Tony Corn and Britain then built an 'unimaginative army' capable only against an equally unimaginative opponent: no match for 'German "blitzkrieg" yesterday or Chinese "unrestricted warfare" tomorrow.'¹²⁴ MacMillan asked if 'a history of success in war, and fighting largely on the territory of others' made Britain unconcerned and sanguine about the use of force, and therefore less warriorlike, than

¹¹⁴ Darryl Howlett, "The Future of Strategic Culture," *Report for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office*, dated 31 Oct 2006, 17, <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-future.pdf>

¹¹⁵ Patrick Porter, "America's Accidental Militarism," *The American Conservative*, 24 Feb 2020, online at <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/americas-accidental-militarism/>

¹¹⁶ Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Styles*, (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986): 35.

¹¹⁷ Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," *International Studies Review*, 4:1 (Spring 2002): 53, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186274>.

¹¹⁸ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 22.

¹¹⁹ Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, 5:3 (1985): 272, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938508402693>

¹²⁰ Michael C Desch, "Culture Versus Structure in Post-9-11 Security Studies," *Strategic Insights*, 10, (Oct 2005), 10. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36718307.pdf>

¹²¹ Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (London: Croom Helm, 1979): 15.

¹²² Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory," 204.

¹²³ Lord, "American Strategic Culture," 273. Ian Morris, *Why the West Rules - for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal about the Future*. (London: Profile, 2011), 557. The British are 'by a natural conjunction of temperament and geography, a maritime people' according to David Ascoli, *A Companion to the British Army: 1660-1983*, (London: Harrap Ltd, 1983), 13. Beckett declares the British Way of War as one based on 'economic pressure exercised through seapower' and urges that 'small wars' be considered equally valid. Ian F. W. Beckett, "Another British Way In Warfare: Charles Callwell and Small Wars," in *Victorians At War: New Perspectives*, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett, (Warminster: Society for Army Historical Research, 2007), 89.

¹²⁴ Tony Corn, 'Clausewitz in Wonderland' *Policy Review* (Sept 2006), <http://www.hoover.org/research/clausewitz-wonderland> on 22 Mar 16.

continental states 'which experienced defeat and far greater destruction.'¹²⁵ The tradition of the exercise of naval power and relative isolation shaped commercial attitudes, but also 'national objectives and approaches to war'.¹²⁶

A belief in multilateralism¹²⁷ and astute alliance making¹²⁸ provides 'a medium-ranking economic and military power...a disproportionately high level of ambition in, and a sense of responsibility for international security policy.'¹²⁹ Politically attractive this can though be militarily constraining. Alliances require investment and often constraint: where reliance on partner capabilities, or 'burden-sharing' is part of the agreement, nations reduce sovereign capability; and alliances can lead to mimicry and a reduction in one's own military ethos and structure. The UK government has recently admitted that it 'needed to rethink military assumptions, in place since 2010, that the UK would always be fighting alongside the Americans...'¹³⁰ Maintaining balance is also challenging. Strategy doyen Michael Howard claimed the maintenance of UK security and independence relied on military action in Europe.¹³¹ Liddell-Hart saw the continent as a dead end and anticipated deployment there to result in reduced mobility, a lack of surprise, and damage to alternate alliances,¹³² contrary to his recommended British Way of Warfare.¹³³ Maintaining colonial (now Commonwealth) relationships; the UK as a bridge between the US and Europe;¹³⁴ and the defence of continental Europe, each merits differently shaped armed forces beyond the primary function of national defence: the multiple foci demand a multiphrenic force with manifold identities. Whether critical allies are European, American or 'old empire', or the best force mix is heavy or light armour, the British Army is caught in 'an enduring investment dilemma with historical roots.'¹³⁵

Britain has a long martial history based on opposition to Roman Rule, the religious edicts of early Christianity, the relationship between serf and landowner, the Magna Carta, and

¹²⁵ MacMillan, "Strategic Culture and National Ways," 37.

¹²⁶ Lord, "American Strategic Culture," 273.

¹²⁷ Alister Miskimmon, "Continuity in the Face of Upheaval – British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government," *European Security* eds. Kerry Longhurst & Marcin Zaborowski, 5, https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/1382821/miskimmonukstrategicculture2004web_1_.pdf.

¹²⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "Alliance and the British Way in Warfare," *Review of International Studies*, 21:2 (Apr 1995): 145-158, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500117590>.

¹²⁹ Cornish, "Strategic Culture in the UK," 361.

¹³⁰ Tim Shipman, "Ben Wallace Interview: We Can't Rely on US," *The Sunday Times*, 12 Jan 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ben-wallace-interview-we-cant-rely-on-us-pmwcgv398>.

¹³¹ Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars*, (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd. 1972), 9-10.

¹³² MacMillan, "Strategic Culture and National Ways," 34.

¹³³ Liddell-Hart promoted mechanised warfare as a 'more promising alternative' for the conduct of war by British forces over the 'abortive and self-exhausting battles of 1914-18'. B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Memoirs Vol. 1*, (London: Cassell, 1965), 222-3.

¹³⁴ Tony Blair, Speech to the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 23 Nov 2001.

¹³⁵ G. C. Peden, "The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered," *The Historical Journal*, 27:2 (Jun 1984): 405-23, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00017854>.

establishment of parliamentary government.¹³⁶ Over the centuries though the perception of war as the natural order has shifted to the belief that war is avoidable: democracies like the UK 'are deeply disinclined to prepare adequately for war, or to foster the institutions and types of men capable of waging it.'¹³⁷ It is not that they are incapable of war: when war comes they are 'peculiarly inclined toward' it¹³⁸ but the state does not exist in a state of permanent readiness for war. The consequence is that the British Army is often unprepared and rarely victorious in 'early battles, losing men, equipment, confidence and respect.'¹³⁹ It takes time to align political intent and military capability; and the army's functional competencies often require adjustment.

The English Civil War¹⁴⁰ brought the army to a pivotal but not central national position.¹⁴¹ It has since then been politically neutral (a proud boast) and doesn't present as a 'political actor.'¹⁴² Harries-Jenkins describes the professional military officer as 'above all, obedient and loyal to the authority of the state, competent in military expertise, dedicated to using his skill to provide for the security of the state whilst politically and morally neutral'.¹⁴³ He provides substantial foundation to the idea of the British soldier as a servant or automaton who works to direction. The 'dominant factor is not the existence of armed forces, but the prevalence of political sentiments.'¹⁴⁴ Control of the military is through constitutional means (though 'there are surprisingly few authoritative statements as to what purposes the army exists to fulfil')¹⁴⁵ and legal constraint. The Lieber Code, Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the findings of War Crimes Tribunals, International Criminal and European Courts are incorporated into the Law of Armed Conflict, and taught to every soldier. 'Civilised life requires, in addition to humane personal codes, social systems that uphold compassionate behaviour and renounce cruelty.'¹⁴⁶ The 'trinity' of people, state and armed forces is balanced with 'the people' *primus inter pares*. The people – of whom soldiers are a part – increasingly perceive the state as something that serves them and not vice versa¹⁴⁷ and this has implications for the army. It challenges

¹³⁶ Lawrence James, *Warrior Race: The British Experience of War from Roman Times to the Present* (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2001).

¹³⁷ Lord, "American Strategic Culture," 273.

¹³⁸ Robert Cooper, "The New Liberal Imperialism," *The Guardian*, 7 Apr 2002, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1> on 15 Oct 16.

¹³⁹ A. G. Denaro, "Warrior Or Worrier: Is The British Army Producing The Right Man To Command Its Troops On Operations?" *RUSI Journal*, 140:3 (1995): 37.

¹⁴⁰ John Miller, *The English Civil Wars: Roundheads, Cavaliers and the Execution of the King* (London: Robinson, 2009).

¹⁴¹ Parr, *Our Boys*, 290.

¹⁴² Landru, "Evolution," 37.

¹⁴³ Harries-Jenkins, "Military Professionalism," 121.

¹⁴⁴ William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 177. 'Cameron Irritated Over Military Chiefs' Libya Comments,' *BBC News* dated 21 Jun 2011, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13857733>.

¹⁴⁵ Chandler & Beckett (eds.) *Oxford History of the British Army*, xvii.

¹⁴⁶ Bandura, "Moral Disengagement," 116.

¹⁴⁷ Harari, *Homo Deus*, 37.

the notion of 'service over self' – an army mantra. The organisation is to provide for the happiness and well-being of soldiers in line with societal expectation and the army too is to behave within the law as 'a normal, all-inclusive employer.' This presents problems for the institution where it is argued that the demands of military service requires the restriction and even denial of some of the rights and individual dues as citizens.¹⁴⁸

Lord's fifth *strata*, technology, is the means by which the UK pursues "Tier One' status and an 'international reputation for excellence'.¹⁴⁹

The most advanced armies of the twenty-first century rely far more on cutting-edge technology. Instead of limitless cannon fodder, countries now need only small numbers of highly trained soldiers, even smaller numbers of special forces super-warriors and a handful of experts who know how to produce and use sophisticated technology.¹⁵⁰

Exquisite technology is protected as 'the key to operational superiority, manpower has been seen more as an overhead.'¹⁵¹ Machines 'substitute for infantrymen',¹⁵² and fighting ability can be compromised as a result. The 'question of harmonising conventional and nuclear capabilities' is understood but colonial operations,¹⁵³ now expeditionary warfare, requires servicing too. Technological deficiency contrarily is a point of pride. The British emphasise 'low-key' (and inexpensive) soldiering with reduced armoured potential compared to other armies,¹⁵⁴ and less reliance on high-technology and mass firepower.¹⁵⁵ Troops are thought more agile when 'not weighed down with technology' relying instead on 'their diplomatic skills'.¹⁵⁶

Technology facilitates civilian control of the military: 'when they can see what's going on they control what's going on.'¹⁵⁷ Battlefield activity is then more socially acceptable¹⁵⁸ as war is sanitised.¹⁵⁹

The essence of social liberalism is to avoid harm wherever possible, and technology affords a way of doing so, while happily also conferring a war-

¹⁴⁸ Frank Furedi, "The British Army's Latest Ads Spell the End of the Warrior Ethos," 15 Jan 18, accessed at <http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/turning-the-army-into-a-safe-space/20770#.WoX0lWacZxg> on 19 Jan 18; Ewen Southby-Tailyour, "The Armed Forces Can Never Represent Society," *Daily Telegraph*, 04 Nov 17, <https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-daily-telegraph/20171104/282024737529419>

¹⁴⁹ Hew Strachan, "Introduction," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, xiii.

¹⁵⁰ Harari, *Homo Deus*, 348-9.

¹⁵¹ Houghton, "RUSI Annual CDS Lecture," 2013.

¹⁵² John Buckley & Gary Sheffield, "The British Army in the Era of Haig and Montgomery," *The RUSI Journal*, 159:4 (Aug/Sept 2014): 26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2014.946690>.

¹⁵³ Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 203.

¹⁵⁴ Thornton, "Minimum Force Philosophy," 83, 97.

¹⁵⁵ Brian M. Linn & Russell F. Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," *The Journal of Military History*, 66:2 (Apr 2002), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i355607>; Antulio J. Echevarria, "An American Way Of War Or Way Of Battle?" http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/ssi_op_ed_jan04.pdf.

¹⁵⁶ Bruce George MP, statement to the Strategic Defence Review; Defence Committee Report, Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence and Memoranda (London: HMSO 1998), 71, cited in Thornton, "Minimum Force Philosophy," 84, footnote 10.

¹⁵⁷ Stanley A. McChrystal, *Team of Teams New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*, (NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 208.

¹⁵⁸ Pryer, "Controlling the Beast," 10.

¹⁵⁹ French, "Nasty Not Nice," 758.

fighting advantage. Combat deaths risk undermining public support for ongoing operations. For the leadership of the armed forces themselves, there is an acute dilemma here.¹⁶⁰

This dilemma is ethical and functional; it belongs to the political leader as well as the uniformed officer and is much debated.¹⁶¹ Technology incapacitates and kills people, degrades, damages and destroys objects;¹⁶² lasers dazzle, beams damage molecular structure;¹⁶³ chemical enhancement of soldiers is real;¹⁶⁴ and cyber-attack makes an 'enemy' population combatants. Technology sterilises war but makes it more horrendous too: that the UK doesn't embrace it for its potential to guarantee victory, albeit at significant cost, provides insight to strategic culture. Technology is desired but can be unaffordable; it is welcome but gives concern;¹⁶⁵ a useful replacement for manpower, it is uncertain how much, and it cannot replace personal interactive skills. Contrarily technology is 'counter-cultural' but it is an element of strategic culture. The UK likes its army to be 'low-tech and high-tech simultaneously'.¹⁶⁶

Examination of 'core military culture'¹⁶⁷ elsewhere provides comparators. Russia has relied on its geo-political position, to absorb the energy of an attacker, and nuclear technology (or artillery in 1944):¹⁶⁸ the Chinese depend on upon 'several million surplus single males ready to die for their country'.¹⁶⁹ Weigley says US military culture is based on industrial and technological capability;¹⁷⁰ Eliot Cohen points to a 'predilection for direct and violent assault'¹⁷¹ as its determining characteristic; Ignatieff declares it 'the West's last military nation-state: Europeans, he posits, are 'post national and post military'¹⁷² as evidenced by the German doctrine of *Innere Fuehrung*.¹⁷³ Martial culture is adaptable,

¹⁶⁰ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 116.

¹⁶¹ Special Report: The Ethics of Future Warfare. 2017 Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium, 24-25 Apr 2017, published 01 May 2018, US Army Command and General Staff College, ed. Elizabeth Ditsch at <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Ethics-Symp-2017.pdf>

¹⁶² R.A. Poisel, *Information Warfare and Electronic Warfare Systems* (2013), 7, cited in Matthew Brooks, "The Ethics of Directed Energy Weapons," *Chesterfield Strategy*, dated 22 Nov 2018, <https://chesterfieldstrategy.wordpress.com/about/>

¹⁶³ Brooks, "Directed Energy Weapons."

¹⁶⁴ Lin, "More Than Human?"

¹⁶⁵ The British Adjutant-General opposed a faster firing weapon on the grounds that it would 'waste ammunition and undermine discipline.' Andrew Wheatcroft, "Technology and the Military Mind: Austria 1866-1914," in *War, Economy and the Military Mind*, eds. Best & Wheatcroft, 45.

¹⁶⁶ Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, eds., *The Sources of Military Change. Culture, Politics, Technology*, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 3.

¹⁶⁷ Dandeker & Gow, "Military Culture," 72.

¹⁶⁸ 'At the end of the war, almost half the Red Army was artillery.' Strachan, *European Armies*, 185.

¹⁶⁹ Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 162.

¹⁷⁰ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (NY: Macmillan, 1973).

¹⁷¹ Eliot A. Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945," cited in John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 44.

¹⁷² Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire: The Burden," *New York Times Magazine*, 05 Jan 2003, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/magazine/the-american-empire-the-burden.html>.

¹⁷³ Translated as inner guidance this 'sets out the values and responsibilities for citizen soldiers whilst protecting their constitutional rights': it focusses on 'enhancing morality.' Ian, "Learning from Germany's Inner Guidance: the Ethical Citizen Soldier," *The Wavell Room*, at <https://wavellroom.com/2017/12/12/>

though often slow moving, and 'Ways of War' or military strategy as cultural practice¹⁷⁴ are rarely static: the German example shows it can though change quickly where critical junctures (like defeat) are met. Treated as shorthand for military culture¹⁷⁵ 'ways of war' require cautious handling. It is from sweeping assumption that the reductive martial tribes theories of the 19th Century originated. Observers must resist templating: understanding strategic culture requires 'more than a few salty quotes from Sun Tzu' to count as expertise.¹⁷⁶ There are instead ways that nations fight wars at critical junctures and so behaviours are transient.

Support for the military is akin to 'civic religion' in the US:¹⁷⁷ UK civil-military relations are not comparable. The British Way of War¹⁷⁸ 'is compatible with notions of limited rationality (where strategic culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (defining ranked preferences or narrowing options) and adaptive rationality (historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice)'.¹⁷⁹ Historic victories, stories and myths, including those built on 'wobbly historical foundations',¹⁸⁰ support an approach where previous success will assumedly allow future victory. This attitude provide freedom for inattention to martial matters in peacetime. Cornish thinks UK strategic culture is mostly descriptive (as Snyder says) and contextual (Kier) with Gray's instrumentality though the intervening or dependent variable is unclear.¹⁸¹ He explains

[learning-from-germanys-inner-guidance-the-ethical-citizen-soldier/](#) There is also value in considering 'non-national' ways of war grounded in religious doctrine, coalitions or centred on ethnicity. See Andrew J Bacevich, "The Islamic Way of War," *The American Conservative*, 11 Sep 2006, at <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-islamic-way-of-war/>; Christopher Coker, "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Co-operation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture," *The RUSI Journal*, 151:5 (Oct 2006): 14–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840608522868>; Paul Cornish & Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," *International Affairs*, 77:3 (Jul 2001): 587-603, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3095439>; Paul Cornish & Geoffrey Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report," *International Affairs* 81:4 (Jul 2005), 801-20, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00485.x>; Sten Rynning, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?" *Security Dialogue*, 34:3 (2003): 479–496, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010603344007> and Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security*, 17:4 (Spring 1993): 119-50, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539024>.
¹⁷⁴ Bradley S Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics," *Review of International Studies*, 14:2 (Apr 1988): 135, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050011335X>

¹⁷⁵ Many more examples exist. Ireland, Turkey and Japan, and Russia are discussed in Farrell & Terriff, eds., *The Sources of Military Change*; Robert Johnson examines *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight*, (NY: OUP, 2011); Peter J. Katzenstein & Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies." *International Security*, 17:4 (Spring 1993): 84–118, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539023>; Ray Murphy, "Ireland, the United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations." *International Peacekeeping*, 5:1 (1998): 22-45, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319808413706>.

¹⁷⁶ Peter Mattis, "So You Want to Be a PLA Expert?" *War on the Rocks*, 19 Nov 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/so-you-want-to-be-a-pla-expert-2/>

¹⁷⁷ Peter D. Feaver 'Public Confidence in the Military', lunchtime seminar 22 Nov 2019, IISS, London.

¹⁷⁸ The 'British Way' is associated most with Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Brian Holden Reid, "The British Way in Warfare," *The RUSI Journal*, 156:6 (Dec 2011): 70-76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.642691>. See B. H. Liddell Hart, "Economic Pressure or Continental Victories," *Royal United Services Institution Journal*, 76:503 (Jan 1931): 486-510, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109426155>.

¹⁷⁹ Johnston, "Strategic Culture," 34.

¹⁸⁰ Douglas Porch, "The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 22:02 (2011): 249, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.574490>.

¹⁸¹ Kier, *Imagining War*, 148.

that for the UK 'the most decisive cultural influence upon strategy is *not to have a strategic culture*', or framework 'which is authoritative.'¹⁸² To get a more detailed picture of what warriorship means to British soldiers army culture must now be examined.

British Army Culture

History matters for its influence on culture that 'changes slowly. Scholars who prefer to look only to recent history as the determining influence upon contemporary strategic culture, would be well advised to change concepts.'¹⁸³ British military culture has evolved over centuries with the army in recognisable form established in 1661¹⁸⁴ 'from a small force of foot and horse guards, which Charles II raised and paid out of his own pocket to protect his person and safeguard his throne'.¹⁸⁵ His Royal Warrant created regiments¹⁸⁶ and the 'first peacetime standing army since the Roman occupation of Britain.'¹⁸⁷ Martial references were won at the Boyne, Culloden and Minden. America was conquered, the Raj established and swathes of Africa colonised. An empire containing 'a fifth of the world's surface' and a quarter of its population¹⁸⁸ was built on the UK and overseas.

In 1755 Parliament recognised 'the Army': previously it was 'a small, marginal institution' whose authority was 'sullenly granted' on an annual basis¹⁸⁹ and known only as 'guards and garrisons'.¹⁹⁰ The civil war cautioned against large standing armies and established anti-military attitudes.¹⁹¹ The godly¹⁹² 'Rule of the Major-Generals' from 1655-7 gave Britain a taste, and further aversion to militarism where 'specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.'¹⁹³ Opposition to a 'strong centralized institution' or

¹⁸² Paul Cornish, "Strategic Culture in the United Kingdom," in *Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, eds. Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich & Alexandra Jonas, 361, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01168-0_29

¹⁸³ Colin S. Gray "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Strikes Back." *Review of International Studies*, 25:1 (Jan 1999): 52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599000492>.

¹⁸⁴ In 1661 the last two units of the new Model Army ground arms and took them up again loyal to King Charles II. J. M. Brereton, *The British Soldier: A Social History for 1661 to the Present Day*, (London: Bodley Head, 1986), 1. The year 1661 is accepted by 'purists' as the birth day of the British Army. Michael Carver, *The Seven Ages of the British Army*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), xi. Alternative arguments are made for 1645, the start of the Thirty Years War and even the 1300s and wars against the French remembered for battles such as Poitiers, Crecy and Agincourt. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, 3-4. Others suggest 1707 when Scots and English forces formally merged.

¹⁸⁵ Williams, *Redcoats and Courtesans*, ix.

¹⁸⁶ Some of which endure: the Household Cavalry, Grenadier and Coldstream Guards are identifiable.

¹⁸⁷ John Childs, "The Restoration Army," in Chandler & Beckett, *Oxford History of the British Army*, 66

¹⁸⁸ Krishan Kumar, "Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective," *Theory & Society*, 29:5 (Oct 2000): 588-9, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026550830748>

¹⁸⁹ Howard, *European History*, 88.

¹⁹⁰ Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, 166. For 29 years the army was 'held to be constitutionally illegal'. Ascoli, *A Companion to the British Army*, 9.

¹⁹¹ Linch, *Wellington's Army*, 3.

¹⁹² Derek Hirst, "The Failure of Godly Rule in the English Republic," *Past & Present*, 132 (Aug 1991), 33-66, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/650820>. David Watson Rennie, "Cromwell's Major-Generals," *The English Historical Review*, 10:39 (Jul 1895): 471-506, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/547830>.

¹⁹³ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46:4 (Jan 1941): 455, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2769918>

military caste with interests potentially at odds with government's took time to reconcile.¹⁹⁴ A perceived threat to liberalism, the army was feared for its potential as the tool of an autocrat 'for political repression at home' as well as wars abroad.¹⁹⁵ By preventing a 'strong organisational identity'¹⁹⁶ the army would support government and never to substitute for it. Cost was also a concern.

The King, Parliament, and their Colonel (like Zachariah Tiffin who raised a Regiment) gave soldiers direction. The Army was national, and local. The Acts of Union of 1707 and 1800, supreme acts of human imagination,¹⁹⁷ created a British identity over a Regimental System¹⁹⁸ – 'the principal vehicle of the nation's military culture.'¹⁹⁹ The Regiment, known first by its Colonel's name was later identified numerically (Tiffin's became the 27th of Foot),²⁰⁰ then geographically and functionally (the 27th renamed as the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers). Process linked regular army to militia units (and 'amateur military tradition').²⁰¹ Heritage and identity – the pursuit of which 'most human beings indulge in all their lives'²⁰² – was protected and the regiment became 'a living Leviathan'.²⁰³ Soldiers joined a total institution, 'a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life'.²⁰⁴

The army, unlike a gang, strengthened social institutions:²⁰⁵ Whitehall recognised instrumental utility²⁰⁶ and *homo furens* as 'a creative, cooperative political agent'.²⁰⁷ No

¹⁹⁴ Kier, *Imagining War*, 110.

¹⁹⁵ Hew Strachan, "Liberalism and Conscription 1789-1919," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 7.

¹⁹⁶ Theo Farrell, "Figuring Out Fighting Organizations: The New Organizational Analysis in Strategic Studies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19:1 (Mar 1996): 128, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399608437629>.

¹⁹⁷ Farrell, "American Empire," 3.

¹⁹⁸ This system is known from the Cardwell Reforms and later Childers' legislation of 1881 but is grounded in the raising of units under local Colonels from much earlier and the distribution of 'County titles' from the 1790s. Barnes, *The British Army of 1914*, 15. Reforms added to an existing regimental system. David French, "The Regimental System: One Historian's Perspective," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 84:340 (Winter 2006): 363.

¹⁹⁹ Keegan, "Regimental Ideology," 16.

²⁰⁰ A system introduced in 1751.

²⁰¹ Jonathan E. Cookson, "Service without Politics? Army, Militia and Volunteers in Britain During the American and French Revolutionary Wars," *War in History*, 10:4 (Oct 2003): 383, <https://doi.org/10.1191/0968344503wh288oa>. Ian Frederick William Beckett, *The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945*, (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1991).

²⁰² John Christopher Malcolm Baynes, *No Reward but Honour? The British Soldier in the 1990s*, (London: Brassey's, 1991), 119.

²⁰³ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 40.

²⁰⁴ E. Goffman, *Asylums*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 11 cited in Christie Davies, "Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions," *Human Studies*, 12:1/2, Erving Goffman's Sociology (Jun 1989): 77, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009046> on 24 April 2019

²⁰⁵ Scott H. Decker & Barrik Van Winkle, *Life in the Gang: Family, Friends and Violence*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 184.

²⁰⁶ For conquest and in pursuit of the three 'C's of 'Christianity, commerce and civilisation. A.F. Walls, 'The Legacy of David Livingstone' *International Bulletin Of Missionary Research*, 11:3 (Jul 1987): 126.

²⁰⁷ Celestino Perez, "The Soldier as Lethal Warrior and Cooperative Political Agent: On the Soldier's Ethical and Political Obligations Toward the Indigenous Other," *Armed Forces & Society* 38:2 (Apr 2012): 200, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X11418322>.

longer ‘tools of the propertied classes’²⁰⁸ warriors facilitated government responsibility for law and order and kept ‘in check the anarchy that individualism might spawn’.²⁰⁹ It provided a constabulary, through militia and yeomanry units,²¹⁰ and *posse comitatus*,²¹¹ to suppress domestic unrest, as well as warfighting forces. Martial activity was nested within a bounded framework. ‘Undirected by culture patterns – organized systems of significant symbols – man’s behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and, exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless.’²¹²

The army’s development ‘from a collection of independent and heterogeneous regiments to a centralized and unified force’ was complete by 1700 in its ‘essential outlines’:

a state machine responsible for, and capable of, maintaining a full-time force on foot in war and peace – paying, feeding, arming, and clothing it; and a coherent hierarchy of men with a distinct subculture of their own, set apart not only by their function but by the habits, the dress, the outlook, the interpersonal relations, the privileges, and the responsibilities which that function demanded.²¹³

The machine was employed in continental tussles; suppression of risings; imperial expansion and ‘markedly different’²¹⁴ war in America that culminated in a rare British military defeat at Yorktown.²¹⁵ The responsibility of the coloniser (during and after colonisation) became apparent;²¹⁶ strategies for containing insurrection; the ethics of the use of mercenaries²¹⁷ and ‘British-officered levies’;²¹⁸ and the evolution of martial technique – skirmishing for example – became evident in the British Army’s *repertoire*.

The Nineteenth Century influenced thoughts of Republic versus Monarchy and the nation in arms. The Napoleonic Wars taught logistics, discipline and tactics lessons and ‘the soldier’s lot was much improved, officers had a greater sense of what was professional conduct, and regimental identities and loyalties were stronger.’²¹⁹ The wars brought self-belief: the British were the only military force not to suffer a major defeat by Napoleon.

²⁰⁸ Kier, *Imagining War*, 69.

²⁰⁹ Thornton, “Minimum Force Philosophy,” 86.

²¹⁰ Barnes, *The British Army of 1914*, 26-32.

²¹¹ A force that the authorities can call upon. Thomas R. Lujan, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997): 82-97, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=571>. The United States Posse Comitatus Act prohibits its Army from enforcing civil criminal law.

²¹² Geertz, *Interpretation*, 46

²¹³ Howard, *European History*, 54-5.

²¹⁴ Stephen Conway, “To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 43:3 (Jul 1986): 381, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1922482>.

²¹⁵ In over 300 years the British Army has won over a thousand battle honours and ‘suffered fewer than 50 defeats’. Ascoli, *A Companion to the British Army*, 11.

²¹⁶ An enduring challenge. Ché Singh Kochhar-George, “Nepalese Gurkhas and Their Battle for Equal Rights.” *Race & Class* 52:2 (Oct 2010): 43–61, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396810379073>.

²¹⁷ David French estimates approximately 45% of British forces in North America were mercenaries. French, *The British Way*, 87.

²¹⁸ Forty, *Companion*, 1.

²¹⁹ John E. Cookson, “Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars,” 24, in Alan Forrest, Karen Hageman & Jane Rendall (eds) *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

With routine duties in the interim²²⁰ the Crimean War was then joined. Focus on the humanitarian foundation of the army²²¹ and soldiering's social dimension brought change with 'increasing speed':²²² even the army's formal disciplinary code was 'liberalised and humanised.'²²³ Front-line journalism, most famously through William Howard Russell, established societal debt to soldiers through greater public awareness of the reality of the battlefield and returned veterans. The British soldier became humanly recognisable and applauded for sacrifice, less known as a tool for internal control: 'the agents of Christian militarism abroad, not the enemy of Chartism or nascent socialism at home.'²²⁴

The army of the 1900s is traceable to the nineteenth century,²²⁵ and 'a moment in history which had already disappeared.'²²⁶ Tasked to police the empire²²⁷ the critical juncture in Sarajevo demanded required rapid evolution 'from a small colonial *gendarmerie* in 1914 to a mass citizen army capable of sophisticated operations in industrial warfare in 1918'.²²⁸ Tommy²²⁹ replaced the Redcoat but the fragmented nature²³⁰ of the British Army endured, with additional strata. The regular army ('Old Contemptibles') provided for the Western Front; Haldane's Territorial Force and Kitchener's New Army or 'Pals' Battalions delivered reinforcements. Dominion recruited units, then conscripts were added to the mix. Each brought its own character²³¹ and impact on culture. The Great War increased the number of Britons with access to regimental identity and by extension ethos²³² – though their absorption of either is questionable. The norms that comprise culture take time to embed where they are not in evidence through previous socialisation.²³³ A Home Counties unit reorganised into a Highland regiment will 'take to the kilt rather kindly'²³⁴ because ethos in a mass army is Doing not Being. But this is functional not emotional; commitment not calling; and those enlisted were co-opted. 'Wartime volunteers and

²²⁰ Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society, 1815-1914*, (London: Longman, 1980); *The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902*, (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1992); Hew Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54*, (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984); *From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology, and the British Army 1815-1854*, (Cambridge: CUP Archive, 1985).

²²¹ Linch, *Wellington's Army*, 144.

²²² Barnes, *The British Army of 1914*, 17-8. Lord Carver declares 'parsimony, neglect, indifference and conservatism' as obstacles in the mid-nineteenth century. Carver, *Seven Ages*, xii.

²²³ French, "The Regimental System," 370-1.

²²⁴ Strachan, "The Problem of Mass Armies," 48.

²²⁵ Thornton, "Minimum Force Philosophy," 99

²²⁶ Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, *The Army in Victorian Society*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 275. Harries-Jenkins declares the Boer War as the 'last chapter in the history of the Victorian army.'

²²⁷ French, *Military Identities*, 292.

²²⁸ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 8; also Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 26.

²²⁹ Holmes, *Tommy*, 75. The British soldier as 'Tommy' was made famous in the poem by Rudyard Kipling. Accessed at <http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/tommy.html> on 16 Oct 16

²³⁰ Regimental and socio-economic. For the social make-up of the time – and some enduring socio-economic themes – see Barnes, *The British Army of 1914*, 37-41, and Beevor, *Inside the British Army*.

²³¹ Ian F. W. Beckett, *Territorials: A Century of Service*, (Plymouth: DRA Pub., 2008); Peter Simkins, "The Four Armies: 1914-1918," in Chandler & Beckett, *Oxford History of the British Army*, 235; Ray Westlake, *Kitchener's Army*, (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount, 2003).

²³² Mileham, "Ethos," 229.

²³³ Thornton, "Minimum Force Philosophy," 93.

²³⁴ J M Moulton, "Regimental Tradition, Morale and Organization," *BAR* 35 (Aug 1970): 31.

conscripts perhaps identified less powerfully with the regiment as an institution, and much more strongly with the people they had served alongside.²³⁵ Their 'preference for amateurism, a distaste for prescription, and an emphasis on the character of the individual'²³⁶ overwhelmed pre-war reference: army ethos was challenged by 'changing needs and demography'.²³⁷ Citizen-soldiers, 'non-martial, non-ideological and less deferential men' required the army to adapt to them as much as vice versa.²³⁸ Warriorship was a dying or at best a temporal endeavour.

The machine gun eradicated chivalry and had a 'fundamental impact on the warrior elite,' reducing status and the possibilities of the solo fighter pitching for honours and reward.²³⁹ Soldiers were 'employed at least as much for their skills as machine manipulators as they were for their skills as warriors.'²⁴⁰ Balancing the role of technologist with hero²⁴¹ and embracing technology proved difficult.

Britain had a tough time dealing with the tank because of its old regimental system, which is the idea that officers took their identity from this particular kind of unit that had a history going back centuries. That culture was more important to them than a new, more effective approach.²⁴²

It 'meant the destruction of an entire way of life'²⁴³ for some, the eclipse of a country lifestyle for others.²⁴⁴ The character of war changed but the army resisted: the decline of horse cavalry explained apologetically still in the 1930s.²⁴⁵ The Tank Corps expanded,²⁴⁶ communications, medical and logistics branches grew and combat forces reduced. In 1881, 77% of the army was infantry or cavalry; in 1939 it was 60 per cent; and 34% by 1991.²⁴⁷ Armies no longer comprised champions. 'They were instruments through which the belligerents could bleed one another dry of resources and of men.'²⁴⁸ Industrial War

²³⁵ French, "The Regimental System," 373.

²³⁶ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 21.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

²³⁸ Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 33

²³⁹ Magee, "The Way of the Warrior," 30.

²⁴⁰ French, "The Regimental System," 367.

²⁴¹ Officers must balance endeavour as heroic leader, military manager and technologist. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 424. Scott Efflandt, "Developing the Warrior-Scholar," *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 2001): 82-89, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524797.pdf>.

²⁴² Peter, W. Singer, "The Next War: What The Military Doesn't Know It Doesn't Know About Future Threats," interview by Isaac Chotiner, 06 Sept 2017, at <https://slate.com/technology/2017/09/how-the-military-prepares-for-unpredictable-future-threats.html> on 02 Apr 2019. Others factors too prevented progress: 'Treasury parsimony, rather than dim-witted generals, played the major role in the retarding of British tank development' say Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 30.

²⁴³ Michael Howard, "The Liddell-Hart Memoirs." *The RUSI Journal*, 111:641 (1966), 61, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071846609427036>.

²⁴⁴ Kier, *Imagining War*, 133. These are simplistic and cliched but valid views. There were other factors. Stone says institutional conservatism, doctrinal constraint and political strategy all played a part. John Stone, "The British Army and the Tank," in Farrell & Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change*, 200-1.

²⁴⁵ The 'unpalatable' decision to mechanize cavalry regiments in 1936 was compared by the Secretary of State for War to asking a great violinist to 'devote himself to the gramophone'. Forty, *Companion*, 3.

²⁴⁶ Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War in 1937, is credited with giving the army 'a capacity for mechanized war'. Forty, *Companion*, 63.

²⁴⁷ French, *Military Identities*, 291.

²⁴⁸ Howard, *European History*, 114.

made *homo furens* machine cogs: skill, bearing, breeding, and other warrior hallmarks became less significant.

The Minimal Force Tradition ('the degree to which maximal force was impracticable')²⁴⁹ required maintaining for duties not involving 'the annihilation of an enemy but the suppression of a temporary disorder'.²⁵⁰ This introduced a 'schizoid character'²⁵¹ splitting martial focus across high-intensity conflict and gendarmerie type duties, though this latter emphasis was rarely benign. Declining and limited resource²⁵² required ex-soldiers to work as auxiliary policemen in Ireland in 1920. These 'ordinary men'²⁵³ demonstrated why making combat hardened soldiers, maybe warriors, into policemen²⁵⁴ is optimal only where the desire is toward the exercise of 'the brutal tactics of forcible resettlement, promotion of faction against faction and political concessions.'²⁵⁵ They prove, by example, that separating policing, soldiering and warriorship is more difficult than maybe first assumed and a schizoid approach can be untenable.

The line between society and the military 'blurred.'²⁵⁶ WW1 set the conditions for a 'decision to 'civilianize' everyday life in the Army'.²⁵⁷ Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War (1937-40) thought the Army should acknowledge the national mood²⁵⁸ and initiatives²⁵⁹ launched then and throughout the 20th Century nudged the Army toward a new place in society. A contracted career was established, and with that attendant schemes of increasing professionalism (officers would work 'not only in the morning but in the afternoon as well').²⁶⁰ Regiments became 'family friendly' and catered not only for young single male recruits: family housing was created; pay was aligned to civilian norms; and recruitment practice was expanded to allow greater access not least 'the admission of bourgeois officers into the closed circle of the officer class'.²⁶¹ The

²⁴⁹ Jones & Smith "Myth," 450.

²⁵⁰ Thornton, "Minimum Force Philosophy," 87.

²⁵¹ Jones & Smith, "Myth," 450.

²⁵² Cuts (the 'Geddes Axe') were applied in 1919 on the assumption the UK would not fight another 'great war' for a decade. John Ferris, "Treasury Control, the Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919–1924," *The Historical Journal*, 30:4 (Dec 1987): 859–83, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00022354>

²⁵³ A phrase used by Browning for Police Battalion 101 as well. Leeson says the individuals recruited for service in Ireland were products of 'circumstance rather than character'; others would agree his alternate portrayal of them as psychopaths. D. M. Leeson, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921*. (Oxford: OUP, 2011), preface, ix.

²⁵⁴ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 272.

²⁵⁵ Porch, "Dangerous Myths," 249.

²⁵⁶ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 14.

²⁵⁷ French, *Military Identities*, 310; Kier, *Imagining War*, 157.

²⁵⁸ French, *Military Identities*, 309. Englander and Osborne explore this in some depth in "Jack, Tommy, and Henry Dubb," 593-621.

²⁵⁹ Like recruitment and selection processes, welfare and education. Jeremy A Crang, "The British Army as a Social Institution 1939-45," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 16.

²⁶⁰ Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 161. Officer amateurism in the years before 1939 is well examined in Edward Smalley, "Qualified, But Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s," *British Journal for Military History*, 2:1 (2015), <http://journals.gold.ac.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/view/638>

²⁶¹ Wheatcroft, "Technology and the Military Mind," 45.

'stranglehold that birth and social status, rather than brains' had over the officer ranks was broken.²⁶² The approach created a 'spirit of social cohesion' with profound results.²⁶³ Service became less 'a burden of masculine duty to be accepted without complaint, and more a set of special skills that can be taught to all people, not just to men'.²⁶⁴

The British Expeditionary Force constituted on 2nd September 1939 (Britain declared war on the 3rd) is an example of the national tendency toward 'limited liability until the last possible moment'.²⁶⁵ The evacuation from Dunkirk in May 1940 'encapsulates features of British history that are enduringly popular: British isolationism, patriotic sacrifice and the success of the few against impossible odds due to intrinsically noble qualities plus a capacity for improvisation'.²⁶⁶ The 'Armed Services intruded into daily life' again.²⁶⁷

For the second time in a quarter century, the British army, a small, conservative, professional force, mostly designed for imperial duties, had to be rapidly transformed into a conscript force more than ten times its peacetime size, capable of fighting a modern, mechanized war in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and the European continent.²⁶⁸

The 'disagreeable necessity'²⁶⁹ of wartime service, lack of preparation and defeat at Dunkirk meant the army 'was far from being an efficient and fearsome instrument'.²⁷⁰ The war of 1939-45 followed the pattern of 1914-18: a shaky start; alliance exploitation then 'building up materiel superiority and fighting in an attritionalist style'.²⁷¹ It left in its wake the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) that dominated British doctrine²⁷² after 1945 and resonates still²⁷³ but also the enduring requirement for multi-functionality. The army provided defensive forces²⁷⁴ for Europe; a 'continental campaign-winning machine'²⁷⁵ to

²⁶² French, "The Regimental System," 376.

²⁶³ Jonathan Fennell, *Fighting the People's War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019), 677.

²⁶⁴ Parr, *Our Boys*, 290.

²⁶⁵ Kier, *Imagining War*, 92. 'Not until April 1939 was political sanction given to a continental strategy.' Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 30. Neither had preparation been made for defence of Empire. 'General Alan Brooke, assuming the duties of chief of the imperial general staff in December 1941, noted that his predecessor had done "practically nothing" to prepare for war with Japan, while General Archibald Wavell, appointed commander of imperial forces in India in October 1941, found the atmosphere in Singapore "completely unwarlike." Slim, posted to organize the defense of Burma, was similarly shocked to find that there were no defensive plans or preparations whatsoever.' Andrew N. Buchanan, "The War Crisis and the Decolonization of India, December 1941 – September 1942: A Political and Military Dilemma," *Global War Studies*, 8:2 (Dec 2011): 9, <https://doi.org/10.5893/19498489.08.02.01>.

²⁶⁶ Penny Summerfield, "Dunkirk and the Popular Memory of Britain at War, 1940–58," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 45:4 (Nov 2010): 789, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009410375260>.

²⁶⁷ Parr, *Our Boys*, 13.

²⁶⁸ Field, "Civilians in Uniform," 122.

²⁶⁹ Shils & Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration," 292.

²⁷⁰ Mark Connelly & Walter Miller, "The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western Front in 1940," *War in History*, 11:4 (Oct 2004): 427, <https://doi.org/10.1191/0968344504wh308oa>.

²⁷¹ Kiszely, "Approaches," 183.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 193.

²⁷³ Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar, *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe: Towards the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Brassey's, 1991).

²⁷⁴ Francis Howard Heller, *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO after Forty Years*, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990).

²⁷⁵ Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 33.

fight in Korea; patrolled Cypriot villages and conducted arrest operations in Malaya and Kenya; policed India and garrisoned Hong Kong. Throughout, it stood ready to assist UK civil authorities at home. Mixing counter-insurgency, a politico-military endeavour, with anti-terrorism, a policing and security consideration,²⁷⁶ with high intensity warfighting where failure means state defeat whilst providing domestic support became routine, and with it the multiple foci of the British Army.

The 1957 'Sandys' White Paper halved the army and cancelled National Service²⁷⁷ creating a 'chasm' between the army and society.²⁷⁸ The cuts – 'a watershed moment'²⁷⁹ – forced the army back to a peripheral societal position yet it conducted 'no fewer than thirty-five overseas military operations in more than twenty countries'²⁸⁰ between 1949 and 1970. Its longest ever enduring campaign,²⁸¹ Operation Banner then commenced in Northern Ireland (NI) and the army assumed responsibility for security, and militarised a part of the UK. It involved army effort in the raising of a local militia,²⁸² the establishment of relationships with government departments, intelligence agencies, political parties and civilian organisations: paramilitary groups who challenged the state's monopoly on violence were tolerated, even partnered.²⁸³ The army, an essential, critical lever of domestic policy also presented as an anachronism, an instrument of oppression²⁸⁴ 'singularly untouched'²⁸⁵ by national progress. NI operations exposed soldiers with certain 'habits and traditions' as unsuited for duties of this nature.²⁸⁶

A fracturing, and partial anonymisation of the regimental system occurred in 1971 with the introduction of a policy of centralised recruitment,²⁸⁷ the closure of regimental depots

²⁷⁶ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 68.

²⁷⁷ French, *Military Identities*, 295.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 304.

²⁷⁹ David French, "Duncan Sandys and the Projection of British Power after Suez," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24:1 (2013): 41, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2013.762882>.

²⁸⁰ French, *Military Identities*, 294.

²⁸¹ Nicholas Van Der Bijl, *Operation Banner: The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969 to 2007*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009).

²⁸² The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). For a personal view of this regiment see: Wallace Clark, *Brave Men and True: Pages from a Company Commander's Diary*, (Upperlands, Co. Derry: Wallace Clark Booksales, 2003). For opinions on the soldiers who comprised the regiment: John Potter, *A Testimony to Courage: The Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment*, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001) cf. Chris Ryder, *The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace?* (London: Mandarin, 1992). Militia as a term disappeared mostly as a consequence of the Haldane Reforms of 1907. Today the term is one of derision which professional soldiers use to dismiss those they judge fall short of their perceived standards.

²⁸³ Mark McGovern, "State Violence and the Colonial Roots of Collusion in Northern Ireland," *Race & Class* 57:2 (Oct 2015): 3–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396815595200>.

²⁸⁴ Parr, *Our Boys*, 26. Army efforts 'resulted in a gradual but nonetheless serious erosion of British civil liberties.' Counterinsurgency 'in an open, democratic country can only be conducted with the application of measures so illiberal that the society will not tolerate them unless its very existence is threatened.' Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, (Manchester, Manchester UP, 1995), 128

²⁸⁵ Anthony. Beevor, "The Implications of Social Change on the British Army." *BAR* 194 (Aug 1993), 14.

²⁸⁶ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 110. Graham Dawson, "Trauma, Place and the Politics of Memory: Bloody Sunday, Derry, 1972–2004," *History Workshop Journal*, 59:1 (Spring 2005): 151–178, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbi013>

²⁸⁷ John Baynes, "Recruiting the Professional Army 1960-90," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*,

and greater cross posting of personnel between regiments. Soldiers were no longer expected 'or in many cases willing, to regard their regiment as their real, as opposed to their metaphorical, family'.²⁸⁸ The work-based culture shifted to one 'focused on home life'.²⁸⁹ The invasion of the Falklands altered the trajectory and reminded of the necessity for a 'warfighting' army: for the first time in a generation 'British soldiers engaged a static enemy on open fields and ridges'.²⁹⁰ Pronouncements that the 'post-imperial maritime intervention' in the Falklands, then 'continental armoured warfare' in Kuwait in 1991 were 'the last operations of their type for generations'²⁹¹ proved premature when the UK went to war again in 2003. The fighting function refused relegation to 'secondary importance'²⁹² regardless of optimistic desire to the contrary and army attention to alternative duties.

The fall of the Berlin Wall brought wars, against 'troublemakers, criminals and pests':²⁹³ the army was assumed to have 'unique insight'.²⁹⁴ However the contradiction 'between the 'warrior' self-image of soldiers and the extreme frustrations of soldiering in a low intensity conflict'²⁹⁵ gave rise to disquiet. Operations like those in the Balkans²⁹⁶ a 'curious legal hybrid, somewhere between warfare and policing',²⁹⁷ were thought detrimental to the army's health: the lack of an identifiable enemy and inability to apply traditional military principles frustrated.²⁹⁸ Kiszely suggests such activity be more favourably regarded but recognises the inherently conservative and anti-intellectual stance of militaries prevents it.²⁹⁹ The preference for 'conventional' soldiering limits the expansion of the martial base beyond a focus on high intensity warfighting: 'proper' soldiering is preferred to the 'wet philosophy' of peacekeeping.³⁰⁰ Humanitarian strategy is less attractive than warrior ethos.³⁰¹

ed. Strachan, 55.

²⁸⁸ French, *Military Identities*, 290.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 310.

²⁹⁰ Parr, *Our Boys*, xiii.

²⁹¹ Mileham, "Ethos," 229.

²⁹² Dandeker & Gow, "Military Culture," 62.

²⁹³ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 165. Mark Galeotti, "Transnational Organized Crime: Law Enforcement as a Global Battlespace," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 13:2 (2002): 29-39, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310208559179>

²⁹⁴ UK MOD, Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations, Issue 1.0, dated Jul 2001, Ch. 2, B-2-1, accessed at <http://www.freeinfosociety.com/media/pdf/4868.pdf> on 19 Feb 20.

²⁹⁵ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 101.

²⁹⁶ Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia*, (London: Warner, 1999).

²⁹⁷ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 172.

²⁹⁸ Charles Dobbie, 'A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping', *Survival*, 36:3 (Autumn 1994): 141.

²⁹⁹ John Kiszely, "Learning about Counter-Insurgency," *The RUSI Journal*, 151:6 (Dec 2006): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840608522852>.

³⁰⁰ John Mackinlay, 'Why the British Army Should Take Peacekeeping More Seriously', *BAR* 98 (Aug 1991): 11, cited in Thornton, "Peace Support Operations," 46.

³⁰¹ Laura Miler & Charles Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope," *Armed Forces & Society*, 21.4 (Summer 1995): 625-31. Wendy A. Broesder *et al.*, "Can Soldiers Combine Swords and Ploughshares? The Construction of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Role Identity Survey", *Armed Forces & Society*, 41:3 (2015): 519-540, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14539326>. Others maintain soldiers can be 'both warriors and humanitarians.' McMaster, "Remaining True to Our Values," 184.

Iraq presented an awkward unrecognisable conflict environment. With the regime defeated in open warfare it was assumed the army's constabulary skills would be useful as the campaign transitioned.³⁰² Such thinking quickly evaporated in the light of violence:

...altogether more complicated and multifaceted, being motivated by a mixture of power-seeking, religion, and criminality rather than nationalism or sectarianism. The tacit constraints common in Northern Ireland were also absent. Militia fighters were often suicidally brave and utterly indifferent to humanitarian considerations, being prepared to employ human shields in combat, and torture and execute prisoners.³⁰³

Berets adopted after warfighting³⁰⁴ were replaced with helmets; reconstruction activity was suspended, and troops resumed combat operations. The Army's 'venerated reputation for waging small wars' and multi-functionality should have allowed adaptability and quick adjustment. The failure to do so is judged a consequence of 'complacency, ineptitude, cost-cutting and laurel gazing'.³⁰⁵ It may equally be grounded in the refusal to acknowledge the difference between soldiers and warriors.³⁰⁶

Military forces can be bifurcated into those for 'high-tech big violence war' and others for 'security generation and routine crisis response'.³⁰⁷ Lovelace advised separate armies for a 'three tier' model of threats³⁰⁸ that today would be recognised as sub-threshold activity, conventional war and constant competition. Nagl recognises that organisations optimised to succeed in one activity 'have great difficulty' in others and struggle to adapt.³⁰⁹ The British have only one army and its soldiers historically are nation-builders, policemen, soldiers and warriors simultaneously – 'jacks of all trades', not masters of one. Warfighting is not privileged so functional brilliance is difficult to achieve. By promoting split, not hierarchical nor necessarily related identities, and assuming soldiers can perform multifariously, the British Army has 'no single experience of anything'.³¹⁰ The options the army offers are impressive but a lack of singular focus means no tangible or discernible military culture exists – 'there has never been'³¹¹ a British way of war says

³⁰² Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," *Military Review*, (May-Jun 2005), 11-20, at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art006.pdf

³⁰³ James K. Wither, "Basra's not Belfast: the British Army, 'Small Wars' and Iraq," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 20:3-4 (2009): 619, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310903251898>

³⁰⁴ Claus-Christian Malzahn, "Her Majesty's Construction Troops," *Der Spiegel*, 16 Feb 2004, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/iraq-her-majesty-s-construction-troops-a-286605.html>.

³⁰⁵ Jones & Smith, "Myth," 439. Storr declares complacency the greatest risk to the army of a developed western nation. Jim Storr, *The Human Face of War*, (London: Continuum, 2009), 205.

³⁰⁶ Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations." *Military Review*, (Nov-Dec 2005): 14, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/aylwin_jan06.pdf

³⁰⁷ The Leviathan Force and the Administrator Force. T. P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Putnam's Sons, 2004), 302.

³⁰⁸ Douglas C. Lovelace, "The Evolution of Military Affairs: Shaping the Future US Armed Forces", *Strategic Studies Institute*, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1997), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/ssi_lovelace.pdf

³⁰⁹ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*, 219.

³¹⁰ Jones & Smith, "Myth," 450.

³¹¹ Hew Strachan, "The British Way in Warfare," in Chandler & Beckett, *Oxford History of the British Army*, 399.

Strachan: nor any singular soldier identity. 'The much-cited differentiation of roles is in fact a practical effect of the multi-functionality of modern armies, but precisely because of this differentiation, modern armies can offer soldiers no consistent social role.'³¹² The requirement for diverse political options means the army is in perpetual organisational survival mode. This is a distraction from the pursuit of warfighting excellence, or warriorship, and something that makes defining British Army culture and therefore identity, near impossible.

British Army Myth

Analysis thus far has been at the levels of State, Society and Organisation. Connable *et al* suggest 'willingness to fight' as a critical component of warriorship be analysed at Unit and Individual level too.³¹³ Events that 'happened once and which also happen all the time'³¹⁴ to soldiers, that provide stories and that matter are now considered. These are 'symbolic narrative, that ostensibly relates actual or extraordinary events, or circumstances apart from ordinary human experience'.³¹⁵ My questionnaire asked: *What do you consider to be the most iconic actions/events in British Army history?* John Kiszely thinks 'Agincourt, Hougoumont Farm and the Squares at Waterloo, the Thin Red Line in the Crimea, Rorke's Drift, Dunkirk. Kohima and Imphal' resonate in British Army mythology:³¹⁶ Keegan too chose Agincourt and Waterloo and added the Somme for his chronicle.³¹⁷ Respondents demonstrated historical depth from Agincourt in 1415 to events of this century³¹⁸ but presented much more diverse examples of cultural memory from folk, commemorative and mediated frameworks.³¹⁹ They also recognised personal prejudice and that their regiments, 'sites of ceremonies, commemorations, and entertainments'³²⁰ promoted events and traditions to provide focus and causes 'with which they identified so closely that they would be willing to fight and die for it.'³²¹ Stories 'play an extremely important role in communication, including the ways that organisations talk about themselves':³²² they impact self-perception and how soldiers

³¹² Andreas Herbert-Rothe, "The Democratic Warrior and the Emergence of World-Order Conflicts," in Scheipers, *Heroism*, 286.

³¹³ Ben Connable *et al.*, *Will to Fight: Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 41.

³¹⁴ Armstrong, *History of Myth*, 7.

³¹⁵ Buxton *et al.*, "Myth."

³¹⁶ Kiszely, "Approaches," 194.

³¹⁷ John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, (London, Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1988).

³¹⁸ For earlier recorded views over this same timeframe see John Lewis-Stempel, *The Autobiography of the British Soldier: From Agincourt to Basra, in His Own Words*, (London: Headline Review, 2008).

³¹⁹ Folk memory has the past as a pervasive dimension of everyday life; 'commemorative' invokes it at set times and places for specific social purpose; mediated memory is the past 'consumed as entertainment or as part of the identity projects of individuals.' O'Connor, "Three Modes of Collective Memory," 3.

³²⁰ French, *Military Identities*, 335.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 336.

³²² Freedman, "Transformation," 22-23.

view the army and their peers and the past is important 'not for its own sake, but because it might help to motivate soldiers in the future'³²³ Responses from 105 soldiers were collated into themes (shown in Fig. 4.2) that encompass the canonical episodes, impressive³²⁴ and 'favourite'³²⁵ stories.



Fig. 4.2: Word Cloud - Iconic Events

Agincourt invokes images of chivalric warriorship (though one CO did mention that we neglect of mention of 'knifing knights through the visor')³²⁶ It offers knights, coloured banners, kings taking the field, that rousing Shakespearian 'Band of Brothers' eve of battle speech and it was thought it would be inspiring at least for its historical prominence. In fact only 6 respondents mentioned it, 5 of them officers. Maybe it is regarded as an English battle, fought by another force, not the British Army. None of the Royal Irish soldiers suggested it as iconic, suggesting the knightly figure may be relatable only to English officers. The Battle of the Somme and the 'blood sacrifice'³²⁷ of Ulstermen was emphasised by Irish soldiers. Myth resonates tribally with 'significant cultural meaning, imbued with traditions, memories and reflecting' imagined and real communities.³²⁸ It can overwhelm military training and take precedence over army culture. Agincourt also stood

³²³ French, "The Regimental System," 369-70.

³²⁴ CO16.

³²⁵ Instr14.

³²⁶ CO12.

³²⁷ RIRISH32. As Irishmen were fighting on the Somme others rebelled against the Crown at home. The two events presents fascinating 'mythistory'. Guy Beiner, "Between Trauma and Triumphalism: The Easter Rising, the Somme, and the Crux of Deep Memory in Modern Ireland," *Journal of British Studies*, 46:2 (Apr 2007): 384, 389, <https://doi.org/10.1086/510892>.

³²⁸ Linch, *Wellington's Army*, 147.

out as an historical anomaly: no other battle of the Hundred Years War (Crecy and Poitiers for example) gained mention. Bannockburn or Culloden were not iconic; the Battle of the Boyne in Ireland, was mentioned just twice. The Wars of the Roses were neglected and English Civil War actions were disregarded. The 'birthing pains' of the UK were ignored, possibly again as a consequence of the research sample which was weighted toward an Irish cohort. Few mentions were made of battles in America – Quebec once, Yorktown not at all: India earned mostly singleton references for all the political implications of battles there. More than a sampling issue, these battles are clearly thought less significant. They occurred mostly before the British Army was established: the stories belong to others and are not relatable.

Some respondents specified individuals as iconic. Nelson, Montgomery and Slim were mentioned though no leaders since 1945 figured (Templer or Kitson for example); nor were British soldier-scholars (like Liddell-Hart, Fuller or Bagnall) discussed. Two soldiers offered the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980 as iconic. Below the threshold of 'battle' this is well known from television – the modern-day camp fire round which stories are told though this can be a source of 'absurdity' and inventiveness too.³²⁹ 'The more heavily mediated memory becomes, the more it is disembedded from frameworks of particular places and social groups, and the more individualised and mutable our relationship to the past.'³³⁰ Memory though is no less vivid and the narrative is more accessible. Several contributors focussed on commemorative memory, and non-battle events like parades. Focus groups were held two months after the Royal Irish were presented with new Colours; the 200th anniversary of Waterloo was in 2015; and the centenary of the ending of the First World War was in 2018. The events were prominent in responses due to this. The 'most iconic events have to be those that are most commemorated.'³³¹ Events involving 'boys who are like us'³³² create 'a special communication license' between past and present: such licence can exclude those who were actually present in the situation.³³³

Proximity plays a major role. The 'history of an army is, above all, that of its deeds'³³⁴ and local deeds resonate most. The siege of *Musa Qala* in 2006 involved soldiers who contributed to the study; several highlighted operations in Afghanistan in 2008, '09 and 2010 'when proper fighting was done by my generation'.³³⁵ Strategic culture is partly a

³²⁹ Lucy, Fisher, "We're Just Normal People, Not Supermen, Says Ex-SAS Leader Sir Cedric Delves," *The Times*, 20 Oct 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/6a2c1afa-d3e1-11e8-b8d4-d6fb90acb7b1>.

³³⁰ O'Connor, "Three Modes of Collective Memory," 14.

³³¹ CO17.

³³² FG5: JNCOs, 29 Nov 18, 08:10. Patrick Bury mentions his narration of events at Waterloo to motivate a platoon of Irish soldiers in Helmand: 'Lads, these guys were like youse, from all over Ireland, North and South.' Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 148-50.

³³³ Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, 83.

³³⁴ Carver, *Seven Ages*, xi.

³³⁵ RIRISH41. There are several other accounts alongside Bury's, *Callsign Hades* that document these

product of military experience, and 'combat is its great educator.'³³⁶ Many of the soldiers consulted consider their schooling to have been on these operations. The point was made that events that qualified as iconic were those 'within my lifetime that I have had experience with'.³³⁷ Soldiers interpret reality according to local logic and bear consequences that others 'find wildly unreasonable'³³⁸ for the meaning it provides them.

Official historians 'consciously or unconsciously sustain the view that his regiment has usually been flawlessly brave and efficient, especially during its recent past.'

Without any sense of ill-doing he will emphasize the glorious episodes in its history and pass with a light hand over its murkier passages; knowing full well that his work is to serve a practical purpose in sustaining regimental morale in future.³³⁹

Contrarily, reprehensible behaviours, failure and defeat in my research were offered by soldiers as 'iconic'. The collapse of discipline at Badajoz³⁴⁰, the retreat from Kabul,³⁴¹ massacre at Amritsar,³⁴² the Dunkirk evacuation,³⁴³ loss of Singapore³⁴⁴ and the events of Bloody Sunday³⁴⁵ were all highlighted. The death of a detainee in Basra whilst in army custody,³⁴⁶ and the killing of a wounded Taliban in 2011 were so recognised as well. Events mentioned most often are now examined in more detail.

Waterloo. The Napoleonic Wars were mentioned 65 times (Waterloo on 43 specific

tours. Doug Beattie & Philip Gomm. *An Ordinary Soldier: Afghanistan: A Ferocious Enemy a Bloody Conflict One Man's Impossible Mission*, (London: Pocket Books, 2009), Richard Doherty, *Helmand Mission: With 1st Royal Irish Battlegroup in Afghanistan, 2008*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009). Toby Harnden, *Dead Men Risen: The Welsh Guards in Afghanistan and the Real Story of Britain's War in Afghanistan*, (London: Quercus, 2011).

³³⁶ Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, 10:1 (Jan–Mar 1991): 13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495939108402827>.

³³⁷ Instr02.

³³⁸ Colin S. Gray, "In Praise of Strategy," *Review of International Studies*, 29:2 (Apr 2003): 292, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503002857>.

³³⁹ Howard, "Use and Abuse," 4.

³⁴⁰ The sack of Badajoz is 'considered 'shameful' and helped establish the reputation of Wellington's redcoats as 'scum of the earth'. Gavin Daly, 'The Sacking of a Town is an Abomination': Siege, Sack and Violence to Civilians in British Officers' Writings on the Peninsular War – the Case of Badajoz," *Historical Research*, 92:255 (Feb 2019): 160, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2281.12252>.

³⁴¹ The British remember it for the 'inexcusable mistakes' of commanders, British gallantry, the unreliability of Indian sepoy, and the treachery and barbarity of the Afghans. The Afghans for Pashtun bravery; British perfidy; and 'glorious victory' over the British. Louis Dupree, "The Retreat of the British Army from Kabul to Jalalabad in 1842: History and Folklore," *Journal of the Folklore Institute*, 4:1 (Jun 1967): 51, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3813912>.

³⁴² A 'far more complex and confusing event than is often assumed' the events there are nevertheless remembered as 'the most infamous single incident within the history of the British Empire in India.' Nick Lloyd, "The Amritsar Massacre and the Minimum Force Debate," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 21:2 (Jun 2010): 397, 382, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2010.481436>.

³⁴³ The lesson from Dunkirk should have been that "the British Way in Warfare" was 'no longer a realistic option. Historically this strategy took the form of late and small contributions of troops to continental allies, early disasters and lucky escapes, the rallying of public opinion under inspirational leaders for a long, all-out war in which our own heroic efforts, aided by colossal enemy blunders and immense support from allies, have eventually brought victory.' Brian Bond & General Sir Harry Tuzo, "Dunkirk: Myths and Lessons," *The RUSI Journal*, 127:3 (1982): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848208523434>.

³⁴⁴ The 'abject surrender of Singapore' was characterized by Churchill as the "worst disaster" in British military history. Buchanan, "The War Crisis and the Decolonization of India," 9.

³⁴⁵ For an 'alternative interpretation of the political and military decision-making process' of the events in Derry on 30 January 1972 see Niall Ó Dochartaigh, "Bloody Sunday: Error or Design?" *Contemporary British History*, 24:1 (Mar 2010): 89-108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13619460903565531>

³⁴⁶ Andrew Williams, *A Very British Killing: The Death of Baha Mousa*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012).

occasions and by 24 of 31 Commanding Officers). Of the few COs who failed to mention it, one was a Royal Marine and one a paratrooper; neither have regimental tradition



Fig. 4.3: Inniskillings at Waterloo

there. One respondent, with broader historical appreciation, reflected on the negatives: 'John Moore's retreat to Corunna (not glorious), Albuhera (bloody and close-run), and Badajoz (not glorious – a city sacked after a violent siege)'.³⁴⁷

Mostly though this period was lauded. Waterloo 'changed the course of European history' and 'saved a continent';

it 'set the British Army as the world's reference', proved the ability to operate overseas, and tenacity in battle – 'outnumbered men barging against the doors of Hougoumont Farm etc'.³⁴⁸ That it was more than a British victory was ignored.³⁴⁹ The Inniskillings defending against French cavalry (Fig. 4.3)³⁵⁰ make it doubly celebrated by Royal Irish.³⁵¹

Myth establishes the army as a Tier One force and model for others;³⁵² Waterloo as the 'cultural bedrock of our regimental system'.³⁵³ The story drives belief, and behaviour. '[F]or better and for worse it still influences how we think about soldiering: bravery; restraint; gentlemanly soldiering'.³⁵⁴ This is a significant declaration by a guardian of regimental narrative and gatekeeper of tradition. He promotes a Victorian stereotype that contemporary British society may find difficult and a narrative that would fit awkwardly

³⁴⁷ CO10.

³⁴⁸ CO01; CO24; CO16; CO25; CO12.

³⁴⁹ Arguments continue about what or who won Waterloo: 'the earth was too wet for the French artillery, the French marshals were faint-hearted, the Prussians arrived in the nick of time...' Alan Mallinson, *The Making of the British Army*, (London: Transworld Publishers, 2009), 183; cf. Jasper Heinzen, "A Negotiated Truce: The Battle of Waterloo in European Memory since the Second World War," *History and Memory*, 26:1 (Spring/Summer 2014): 39-74, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/histmemo.26.1.39>

³⁵⁰ Image from <https://www.royal-irish.com/events/battle-honour-waterloo> © Copyright 2019. The Royal Irish. All Rights Reserved. Original Painting by Peter Archer, © Peter Archer.

³⁵¹ The Inniskilling Fusiliers were allegedly complemented by Wellington. Their action 'saved the centre of my line at Waterloo' and by Napoleon who observed: "That regiment with the castles on their caps is composed of the most obstinate mules I ever saw; they don't know when they are beaten." The compliments are worn by all Royal Irish soldiers now. The Royal Irish Virtual Gallery, at <https://www.royal-irish.com/events/the-27th-inniskilling-regiment-of-foot-on-02-Sept-2019>. The Irish made the bulk of the British Army at the time of Waterloo hence its resonance: 100,000 joined between 1800-14 according to Terence Denman, "The Red Livery of Shame: The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899–1914," *Irish Historical Studies* 29:114 (Nov 1994): 209, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30006743>. See also Jane Ohlmeyer, "Ireland, India and the British Empire," *Studies in People's History*, 2.2 (2015): 179, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2348448915600920>; Keith Jeffery, 'The Irish Military Tradition in the British Empire', in *'An Irish Empire'? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire*, ed., K. Jeffery (Manchester, Manchester UP, 1996), 94-122; Peter Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or Subordinate?" *Journal of Social History*, 17:1 (Autumn 1983): 31-64, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3787238>

³⁵² The 'full spectrum of military capabilities, including an independent nuclear deterrent and a navy, army and air force capable of being deployed anywhere in the world.' David Bond, "Defence Secretary Pledges to Maintain UK Status as Tier One Power," *The Financial Times*, 17 Dec 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/120dd274-022a-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1>.

³⁵³ CO02.

³⁵⁴ CO09.

with army recruiting campaigns.³⁵⁵ Myth allows army culture to self-sustain.

Rorke's Drift. Mentioned by 11 respondents,³⁵⁶ desperate and hopeless but brave actions like that at Rorke's Drift, 'examples of courage against the odds'³⁵⁷ figured prominently in responses. A calamitous yet renowned day 'in the august history of Britain's standing army',³⁵⁸ British soldiers celebrate such 'pluck, futility and/or dignity':

Agincourt – outnumbered bowmen... Waterloo – outnumbered... Balaclava (Charge of the Light Brigade) – manic and futile courage (God forbid we'd question orders); Rorke's Drift – outnumbered. We wowed the natives into clemency; Ypres – outnumbered again. Somme – see above... 3rd Ypres – see above (the pattern forms) Dunkirk – salvaged our dignity with the help of RN and RAF; Arnhem – outnumbered, futile, went into the bag with dignity again. Etc³⁵⁹

Rorke's Drift was 'tenacious defence against overwhelming odds':³⁶⁰ it is a reference action and soldiers talked of 'dozens of Rorke's Drifts' every day in scattered platoon



Fig. 4.4: 24th of Foot at Rorke's Drift

posts in Helmand, says Mallinson.³⁶¹

'British culture is drawn to the narrative of the plucky underdog overcoming a superior opponent or sometimes even valiantly losing...'.³⁶² That Rorke's Drift was 'a skirmish'³⁶³ is unimportant: it is the desperate 'last stand' spirit (Fig. 4.4)³⁶⁴ of this battle, its defensive nature, and others like it that appeals. Had the story been less of a box office hit³⁶⁵ perhaps fewer British soldiers would offer the event as iconic, despite the 11 VCs won.³⁶⁶ The screen presentation nonetheless shows too the standard for soldiering that the British soldier thinks illustrative of British army endeavour and martial identity.

³⁵⁵ 'This Is Belonging' at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1vCe3BANws>. The army seeks recruits of all persuasions (not just 'gentlemen'). See also 'Army Campaign Targets 'Snowflake' Millennials,' *BBC News* dated 03 Jan 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46747862> on 03 Jan 2019.

³⁵⁶ 15 times where Isandlwana (3) and 'Zulu Wars' are included.

³⁵⁷ CO10.

³⁵⁸ Mike Snook, *Like Wolves on the Fold: The Defence of Rorke's Drift*, (London: Greenhill, 2006), xi.

³⁵⁹ CO12.

³⁶⁰ CO11.

³⁶¹ Mallinson, *British Army*, 235.

³⁶² CO18.

³⁶³ CO10.

³⁶⁴ Image available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Défense_de_Rorke%27s_Drift.jpg accessed 02 Jan 20 under Creative Commons SA. Painting by Alphonse de Neuville (1836-1885).

³⁶⁵ *Zulu* (1964), Cy Enfield, starring Michael Caine is a 'memory artefact' produced by a secondary agent (Enfield), championed by primary agents (soldiers). Farrell, *Norms*, 89-90. The action at Isandlwana was less mentioned though the two battles are intimately connected. See Mike Snook, *How Can Man Die Better: The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed*, (London: Greenhill Books, 2005).

³⁶⁶ 24 were won on 16 Nov 1856 during the Indian Mutiny; 7 were awarded 21 Aug 1860 in the Third China War; 5 on the Andaman Islands Expedition of 1867. None of these were appeared as 'iconic'.

The battle at Arnhem,³⁶⁷ another defeat (and ‘military cock-up’)³⁶⁸ based on small teams is also mediatised.³⁶⁹ It figured in 12 CO responses and at focus groups: 19 times in total. The Korean War was remembered and mentioned 9 times (Imjin on another 6 occasions): the ‘actions of the Glosters in the face of dire circumstances’ according to one respondent ‘embodies warrior spirit and the drive and determination of infantry to win’.³⁷⁰ That they lost is irrelevant: it is ‘the British soldier in defence...a stubborn and formidable foe’³⁷¹ fighting against overwhelming odds that is celebrated.³⁷² ‘Actions such as Rorke’s’ Drift, Arnhem or the Old Contemptibles on the Marne exemplify this spirit. Each one was physical, combative and relied heavily on the soldiers’ warrior spirit.’³⁷³ Myth makes loss more agreeable and suppresses war’s ‘bitter and repugnant reality’.³⁷⁴

WW1 and WW2. The British Army, in both world wars, ‘has been subject to a degree of myth-making.’ Buckley and Sheffield highlight the underplayed role of the RAF and Royal Navy; the neglect of the importance of the Grand Alliance (US material and Russian



Fig. 4.5: The Royal Irish Rifles at the Somme

manpower) and the promotion of the seemingly invincible German soldier. In the Great War the enduring memory, myth and perception is of the incompetency of British Generals and accepted cultural history that is ‘largely based on the experience of a handful of officer-poets...wholly unrepresentative of the mass of British soldiers.’³⁷⁵ For this

thesis too significant mythical underpinning was evident and the frequent mentions of these wars demonstrate they resonate still amongst contemporary British soldiers. WW1 and associated events were discussed 89 times; WW2 gained 127 mentions. Though mass citizen armies are anomalies in British strategic culture, ‘Pals’ Battalions and those who stood in the ‘good wars’ of public consciousness³⁷⁶ against Nazism are the archetype British Soldier. This

³⁶⁷ Antony Beevor, *Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944*, (London: Viking, 2018).

³⁶⁸ Julian Thompson, *Ready For Anything: The Parachute Regiment At War*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989), 147, quoting Major Dover, 2 PARA.

³⁶⁹ *A Bridge Too Far* (1977), Richard Attenborough.

³⁷⁰ Instr15.

³⁷¹ Battle of the Imjin River, *The National Army Museum*. <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-imjin>.

³⁷² Outnumbered ten to one according to Tim Carew, *The Glorious Glosters*, (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 83. See also ‘The Day 650 Glosters Faced 10,000 Chinese’ *The Telegraph*, dated 20 Apr 2001 at <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1316777/The-day-650-Glosters-faced-10000-Chinese.html>.

³⁷³ CO18.

³⁷⁴ Wilhelm Deist & E.J. Feuchtwanger, “The Military Collapse of the German Empire: The Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth,” *War in History* 3:2 (Apr 1996): 207, <https://doi.org/10.1177/096834459600300203>.

³⁷⁵ Buckley & Sheffield, “Haig and Montgomery,” 26.

³⁷⁶ Fennell, *Fighting the People’s War*, 52.

figure, honoured on Armistice Day,³⁷⁷ situates the army in society, democratises soldiering and allows war as national endeavour.³⁷⁸ The summer of 1916 'imprinted itself on British culture more than any others'³⁷⁹ through the folly of the loss, the 'cost of total war' and national commitment not warriorship.³⁸⁰ One officer thought commemoration ironic.

We honour the dead, we don't honour the killers, events like the Somme are commemorated on the basis of the casualties we sustained, not the number we inflicted; our honours and awards are based on self-sacrifice, duty not the extent to which you had an effect on the enemy.³⁸¹

The global spread of WW2 was easily recalled (WW1 actions beyond the Western Front less so). Normandy³⁸² gained 15 mentions and 'D-Day' a further 22. Montgomery's Eighth Army 'whose exploits are remembered'³⁸³ though not understood³⁸⁴ gained comment; Slim's Fourteenth Army was not forgotten. Both these commanders were declared iconic but none from the Great War registered, a consequence likely of the good versus evil dynamic: the army was 'on the side of good'³⁸⁵ in WW2, a war 'widely seen as purposeful, necessary and crucial to the re-establishment of a sustainable international order'.³⁸⁶ That it was not a UK only action (like Waterloo) is again inconsequential and actions were understood once more through the 'saving Europe' narrative.

Northern Ireland. The campaign in NI was assessed as iconic 16 times – more often than Rorke's Drift and nearly as frequently as 'Iraq'. It is remembered as successful 'counter-insurgency on home soil'.³⁸⁷ This is interesting as the campaign is more regularly advanced as having simply created space for a political settlement: it 'is seldom included in chronicles of Britain's military triumphs'.³⁸⁸ It might even be termed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, maybe peace support, or Stabilisation, according to the

³⁷⁷ The appropriation of the war dead and commemoration in rituals of national mourning 'has the effect of establishing social unity.' Scheipers, *Heroism*, 5.

³⁷⁸ David Englander, "Soldiering and Identity: Reflections on the Great War," *War in History*, 1:3 (1994): 300-318, <https://doi.org/10.1177/096834459400100304>.

³⁷⁹ CO10. The image at Fig. 4.5 shows troops on the opening day of the Battle of the Somme. Mentioned 37 times it was the second most quoted singular term alongside the Falklands. Accessed at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205193964>. © IWM (Q 1),

³⁸⁰ CO09.

³⁸¹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 36:20.

³⁸² Antony Beevor, *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*, (London: Viking, 2009). The image shows infantry on 6 June 1944, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205205810> on 02 Feb 20, © IWM (B 5039)

³⁸³ Robin Neillands, *Eighth Army: From the Western Desert to the Alps, 1939-1945*, (London: John Murray, 2004), xxv.

³⁸⁴ It was 'averagely led, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, uncertain of the cause it was fighting for, and deprived of the effective support...'. Jonathan Fennell, "Courage and Cowardice in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and Defeat in the Summer of 1942," *War in History*, 20:1 (Jan 2013): 122. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344512454251>. This is scarcely the stuff of legend.

³⁸⁵ CO09

³⁸⁶ Buckley & Sheffield, "Haig and Montgomery," 30.

³⁸⁷ CO01.

³⁸⁸ Bennett, "Allegations Against the British Army in Northern Ireland," 276.

doctrinal 'spectrum of operations.' Counter-insurgency confers alternative status. Applying terminology loosely like this undermined credibility in Iraq where the NI campaign was advanced as a reference and template³⁸⁹ regardless of the difference in



Fig. 4.6: Ulster Defence Regiment Soldiers

intensity of combat actions in Iraq. One CO was less ambitious about what the army gained from NI. 'I might add Northern Ireland' but only, he explained, for experience in patrolling and riot control.³⁹⁰ The image at Fig. 4.6 shows soldiers typically employed, searching a vehicle to interdict munitions and the movement of terrorist suspects.³⁹¹ This requires the skills of a militia or a para-military force over an army of warriors. Regarded as 'less challenging' than war-fighting it is still equal employment for British soldiers. The 'degree

to which the warrior ethos',³⁹² combat focus and fighting spirit should be privileged however is questionable. 'I find it difficult to think of any instance in my career soldiering in Northern Ireland that feels like warriorship...single gunmen, petrol bombs doesn't seem to allow it'.³⁹³

We need to be careful. The danger is that we can't appeal solely to warriors...what we have to do is make sure the lived experience matches the adverts, and they have to show what we are doing today. And what we are doing today is not fighting in Afghanistan. We are doing other things – still exciting, still high-end stuff but not actually fighting.³⁹⁴

Falklands. The 'reconquest'³⁹⁵ of the Falklands in 1982 was judged iconic by more than half of CO respondents (17) and twenty focus group participants with the battles of Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Goose Green specifically mentioned. It was the second most quoted singular event after 'Waterloo' and equal to the Somme with 37 mentions. The COs thought it 'flavoured the 1980s'³⁹⁶ and images from it such as the one shown at Fig. 4.7³⁹⁷ remain live in their memories, not least one imagines as most of the COs at the

³⁸⁹ Oliver Poole, "Why the US blundered in Iraq, by a British Brigadier," *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 Jan 2006, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1507653/Why-the-US-blundered-in-Iraq-by-a-British-brigadier.html>.

³⁹⁰ CO20.

³⁹¹ Soldiers from the UDR at a checkpoint in County Down in 1972. Accessed at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205189636> on 12 Jan 20, © Crown copyright. IWM (MH 30540).

³⁹² Shanks-Kaurin, "Questioning," 12.

³⁹³ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 11:50.

³⁹⁴ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 30:30.

³⁹⁵ CO30.

³⁹⁶ Parr, *Our Boys*, 196.

³⁹⁷ Image at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205194942> accessed 15 Dec 19, © Crown

time would have been in their formative childhood years. Fought at company and battalion level and not through Corps or Army manoeuvre this sort of war is attractive to



Fig. 4.7: Troops in the Falklands 1982

COs. It is war they can personally influence and where individual soldiers are most empowered. It is remembered too as a 'soldier's war: clean; restrained; with acts of bravery and demonstrative of the utility of a well-trained and motivated soldier over one who is poorly trained with low moral'.³⁹⁸ It created a standard that continues to influence training 'at the Infantry Training Centre, RMA, Infantry Battle School' and resonates 'more than anything else.'³⁹⁹ Until the Falklands, 'referential status' (Tier One standing) was waning;⁴⁰⁰ the war 'reaffirmed our ability to fight'.⁴⁰¹ It validated inherent warfighting aptitude and the 'expeditionary demonstration of national will/resolve'.⁴⁰² It showed 'the ability of the

Army (and other Services) to deliver a decisive outcome in extreme circumstances'⁴⁰³ and 'saw the British soldier overcome significant odds'.⁴⁰⁴

The Falklands had been a very near-run thing indeed. Nevertheless it had been the finest thing, too; and in June 1982 the standing of the British Army in the eyes of the nation and of the world had probably never stood higher.⁴⁰⁵

The soldiers surveyed agreed and remembered it, Britain's first televised war, for the use of bayonets, the taking of prisoners and evocative footage of field burials of soldiers killed in action as well as the VCs won by Lieutenant Colonel 'H' Jones and Sergeant McKay. Neither accusations of mistreatment of prisoners nor the dogmatic doctrinal approach mentioned by those who fought there were commented upon by the current generation of soldiers.⁴⁰⁶

copyright. IWM (FKD 2028).

³⁹⁸ CO09.

³⁹⁹ CO19.

⁴⁰⁰ The Soviets thought BAOR, the premier British Army formation of the time, 'a joke' and 'embarrassment for NATO.' US CIA Report: "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses" dated 19 Aug 1982. Accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1982-08-19.pdf> on 02 Feb 20.

⁴⁰¹ CO24.

⁴⁰² CO11

⁴⁰³ CO16

⁴⁰⁴ CO23

⁴⁰⁵ Mallinson, *British Army*, 438

⁴⁰⁶ Bramley, *Excursion to Hell*, 144; Fitz-Gibbon, *Not Mentioned in Despatches*, 94-96, 182-4.

Iraq. Activity in Kuwait, Gulf War 1 (Operation Granby), and Gulf War 2 (Operation Telic)



Fig. 4.8: Soldier in the Middle East c2003

tended to be discussed collectively as 'Iraq'.⁴⁰⁷ The merging of distinctly separate deployments, albeit the 2003 war was most prominent, suggests that operations from 1991 until 2009 are recognised as one single campaign – betraying in itself some lack of understanding of events and growing myth. Activity was recognised as war, in traditional form and a departure from what had gone before, where troops were waiting for war in Germany or conducting non-war-fighting constabulary-like duties in NI. The uniforms were different from the woodland camouflage worn previously (the image at Fig 4.8 shows a soldier in desert uniform but with European pattern equipment)⁴⁰⁸ and it was the first time since 1945 that the army deployed with

full warfighting capability: tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and helicopters. The army was doing the job which its supposes to be its existential purpose.

Iraq 'stifled the British Army's true ability because the politics interfered with the tactics.'⁴⁰⁹ This is not a 'stab in the back' accusation⁴¹⁰ but the campaign was disruptive.

It redefined warfighting and the idea of security. It challenged the relationships between war-fighting (and the war-fighters), politics and the nation. The legal ramifications are still being felt today. The invasion re-opened the debate on what an Army is for and shattered the Army's image of being a 'Force for Good'. We are only now starting to re-define what the Army is for.⁴¹¹

That the army needed to redefine itself emphasises a lack of recognisable martial or strategic culture: it gives a glimpse for why 'warrior,' years later, has become an attractive

⁴⁰⁷ Iraq as a theme was mentioned 32 times, 20 of those specifically though it was never certain 'which Iraq' was being referred to.

⁴⁰⁸ Image accessed at <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205219065> on 15 Jan 20, © Crown copyright. IWM (OP-TELIC 03-010-09-026).

⁴⁰⁹ CO25. Afghanistan was as 'political' as Iraq (see Theo Farrell, *Unwinnable*, (London: Bodley Head, 2017) but it isn't similarly remembered.

⁴¹⁰ The German army after 1918 is best known for this accusation. Deist & Feuchtwanger, "The Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth." The French defeat in Algeria and the US experiences in Vietnam are further examples of this well-rehearsed military refrain. Horne highlights an earlier accusation of betrayal from Marcus Flavinus of the Augusta Legion of the Roman Army. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 81.

⁴¹¹ CO21.

proposition. It might equally be some other term. The ‘unglamorous and uncomfortable’ irregular warfare⁴¹² involving insurgents, guerrillas and partisan types⁴¹³ left raw organisational wounds. One CO dismissed the venture: ‘incredible displays of our ability but don’t hit iconic.’⁴¹⁴ Another reminded that ‘iconic does not necessarily equal glorious. Nor...does it necessarily equate to strategic importance.’⁴¹⁵ That these are the some of the conclusions drawn from that war is astonishing. Activity was remembered as the most significant ‘for a generation’ but not for the reasons expected. Tactical actions and the invasion are sources of pride; events at Camp Bread Basket, Abu Moussa’s death in detention and the withdrawal from Basra⁴¹⁶ are not. ‘Very few of our iconic events were successes in COIN or stabilisation.’⁴¹⁷ These wars, personally familiar to many respondents are recalled without demonstrable pride.⁴¹⁸ The Falklands known only through story was more fondly remembered.

Afghanistan. Operations in Afghanistan that ran from 2001 through an intensive period of combat and continue in less intense form at the time of writing were dismissed much



Fig. 4.9: British Soldiers in Afghanistan 2012

less quickly than those in Iraq, and mentioned twice as often (65 times against 32). ‘Helmand casts a very long shadow. It was the greatest and defining event of my career and for my Coy Comds, WOs and SNCOs. It is the frame of reference for everything we do.’⁴¹⁹ Experiences ‘changed the entire way we do business in every department’;⁴²⁰ they drive behaviours, perceptions of role and purpose for those who served there, and expectations of those that weren’t or

since enlisted.⁴²¹ These are meaningful statements. Afghanistan is how contemporary

⁴¹² Ian F.W. Beckett, “British Counter-insurgency: a Historiographical Reflection,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 23:4-5, (2012): 787, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709770> 781-798.

⁴¹³ The historiography of such types, both progressive and reactionary, is well covered by Beatrice Heuser, “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33:1 (2010): 139-162 <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402391003603623>

⁴¹⁴ CO20

⁴¹⁵ CO10

⁴¹⁶ CO04

⁴¹⁷ CO18

⁴¹⁸ Frank Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan*, (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2011).

⁴¹⁹ CO19.

⁴²⁰ Instr 08. ‘Recent changes are radical and there is no going back’ states Charles Kirke though he also highlights that the significant continuity in British Army organisational culture. Charles Kirke, *Red Coat, Green Machine: Continuity in Change in the British Army 1700 to 2000* (London: Continuum, 2011), 208-9.

⁴²¹ CO02.

soldiers understand their purpose. The application of 'iconic' to Afghanistan and its denial for Iraq shows the two campaigns are very differently remembered and discussed. Soldiers (Fig. 4.9)⁴²² in Afghanistan were differently oriented to those who deployed to Iraq: there are evident differences in the quality of clothing, equipment and weaponry but also in the activities undertaken and the relative freedoms enjoyed. The recognition of the efforts of those who served there, accessible through YouTube videos where soldiers could be seen, by fellow soldiers not deployed and the national at large, in battle, engaged in activity that qualified as 'real soldiering' allows Afghanistan a place alongside the Falklands War.

While historic actions and campaigns (i.e. Waterloo etc) are a cultural bedrock of our Regtl [regimental] system, they are in many ways an unconscious and irrelevant part of the lived experience in the Army. Therefore, I am not certain they are the most iconic. Rather, the most iconic are the more recent actions, namely Afghanistan.⁴²³

A consequence perhaps of the 'tyranny of the present',⁴²⁴ declarations of iconic were recognised as 'based on a short memory and some diverse and news attracting actions'.⁴²⁵ One CO acknowledged the fact that he was naming events relevant 'to me', others have meaning 'to the older public,' and young people might prefer something different again.⁴²⁶ The Falklands is iconic 'for a certain generation of public' and 'Iraq/Afghanistan (again for a certain generation)'.⁴²⁷

Journals. Kevin Linch says that British military history develops from narrative accounts of campaigns like those shared during my research, from biographies (of generals mostly) and from regimental histories.⁴²⁸ A search of the journals of the Royal Irish Regiment ('Blackthorn') revealed actions celebrated and stories told at regimental level. The citations published there are also judged as valorous by the army and so give insight into wider organisational culture. Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan soldiers of the Royal Irish have been publicly recognised for their endeavours on 11 separate occasions. These comprise one Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and 3 Conspicuous Gallantry Crosses (CGC) – defined as level two awards – and 7 Military Crosses (MC) which are level three awards.⁴²⁹

⁴²² Image taken in 2012 (attributed to Cpl Mike O'Neill RLC LBIPP/MOD and licensed under the Open Government Licence, image cropped by this author, accessed at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Soldiers_Patrolling_in_Afghanistan_MOD_45154539.jpg, on 02 Feb 20.

⁴²³ CO02.

⁴²⁴ Paul Barnes, "Neophilia, Presentism, and their Deleterious Consequences for Western Military Strategy," *Modern War Institute*, published online 06 Mar 2019, at <https://mwi.usma.edu/neophilia-presentism-deleterious-consequences-western-military-strategy/>.

⁴²⁵ CO16.

⁴²⁶ CO22.

⁴²⁷ CO28.

⁴²⁸ Linch, *Wellington's Army* 4.

⁴²⁹ The Victoria Cross, the highest state honour for bravery, is a level one award.

The award citations detail acts of *derring-do*, demonstrations of courage and bravery in keeping with traditional perceptions. One JNCO 'charged the enemy firing from the hip';⁴³⁰ another 'rallied his force, directing and leading a series of frontal and flanking assaults over a period of 6 hours';⁴³¹ a sergeant 'with bayonet fixed, then stormed across the open field towards the main enemy positions';⁴³² and a captain 'led the manoeuvre through constant small arms fire out of the exposed ground to the relative safety of a nearby compound.'⁴³³ There is equal recognition of acts of selflessness where soldiers put others, and in particular the civilian population first. A soldier is honoured for 'gallant and inspirational leadership'; his efforts to recover four casualties from the battlefield are highlighted.⁴³⁴ Another for hitching a bogged vehicle at great personal risk to rescue colleagues from an ambush.⁴³⁵

The captain was recognised for 'distinguished command, leadership and tactical skill' in his efforts to ensure that only the enemy were killed in clashes and for his compassion.

The [ANA]⁴³⁶ were beating and kicking a Taliban prisoner...Only Rainey's arrival and intervention defused the situation...Rainey ignoring an enemy bullet an inch from his face, extracted the pinned down cover group whilst instructing [his soldiers] to apply splints and dressings to the brutalised prisoner...once safely back at the Patrol Base, Rainey's first concern was for the welfare of the prisoner.⁴³⁷

The bayonet charging sergeant is recommended for aggression and warrior example but also for his choice of weapon: 'McConnell's decision to assault quickly rather than apply indirect fire had prevented collateral damage and saved many civilian lives.'⁴³⁸ His use of the bayonet over an alternative like artillery or mortar fire is applauded for its more clinical effect. Lance Corporal Coult was recognised for placing his vehicle alongside another during an ambush, for bringing 'proportional, justified and accurate fire' and for his judgement, bravery and restraint.⁴³⁹ A private soldier demonstrated leadership beyond his rank and a 'clear grasp of the key principle of counterinsurgency. By checking for civilian casualties he engendered a level of empathy with the local population that no amount of fighting could establish.'⁴⁴⁰

The citations illustrate the nature of heroism that is recognised in the British Army. The hero is not only killing – though that is documented and admired – but is also helping

⁴³⁰ Corporal Stevens CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 87.

⁴³¹ Corporal McClurg CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 86.

⁴³² Sergeant McConnell MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 89.

⁴³³ Captain Rainey MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 88.

⁴³⁴ Lance Corporal Toge CGC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 88.

⁴³⁵ Captain Beattie MC citation, Blackthorn 2005-2007, 22

⁴³⁶ Afghan National Army.

⁴³⁷ Rainey citation, 88.

⁴³⁸ McConnell citation, 89.

⁴³⁹ Lance Corporal Coult MC citation, Blackthorn 2005-2007, 22.

⁴⁴⁰ Ranger Owens MC citation, Blackthorn 2009, 90.

friends, allies and even the enemy. It is what the soldier does within the collective and in relation to his or her fellow human beings that matters as much as any individual action in despatching the enemy. This widens the concept of bravery. Soldiers are awarded for risk to themselves when providing protection as well as when they take action to defeat an adversary. This creates a fundamental question regarding the purpose of *homo furens* and promotes defensive posturing to equal status as offensive action – ‘we do a lot of things that aren’t warriorlike’.⁴⁴¹ There are no mentions of warriorship in these citations, nor are any of the soldiers termed warriors. In war British soldiers are not presented as warriors.

Summary

Culture is validated by myth, narrative and legend; it comprises the stories grounded in events and the actions of people both actual and reported. These give meaning. It is explanatory and provides a guide (exaggeration and idealisation are permitted) with functional value, that inspires and transforms: it defines one’s immediate world and the afterlife. Myth matters for providing insight and explanation. For soldiers it can be a ‘cure for horror.’ Through learning, experience and imitation, cultural reference is built; social action, reputation and inspiration are had; and a foundation to collective consciousness both positive and negative is established, promoting emulation but also allowing deception, silencing and masking the truth.

British strategic culture is an eclectic mix of influences: dependent on personalities, critical junctures, investment dilemmas and political judgements, subject to electoral cycles and public opinion. It is less non-existent and more oft changing and necessarily dynamic. Some themes can be identified. It is the consequence of a whole of government dynamic with political leaders the critical element (not history, tradition or stereotype). The army plays a part as a political tool for national interest and protection: it has no natural predators and is under minimal enduring threat less that which emanates from its own political masters. A vital part of the national fabric, the tendency toward ‘post-martialism’ means the army must continually defend its position and prove utility beyond warfighting. Neither the concept of warriorship nor the term warrior appear in the myths advanced, stories told or ‘shared meaning’ that comprises Britain’s strategic culture.

There is no singular British Army culture. The ‘sheer number of scenarios’ that the army might face precludes ‘any simple, narrow definition of purpose and aim’.⁴⁴² The

⁴⁴¹ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 05:50.

⁴⁴² Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 31.

organisation is a 'flexible, stimulating' (and stimulated) social system,⁴⁴³ a collection of regiments⁴⁴⁴ rather than a true collective, and a tribal patchwork where tartan is at least as strong as regulations.⁴⁴⁵ The regimental system, a source of both strength and weakness,⁴⁴⁶ is hugely important but the organisational wrap that the army provides cannot be dismissed as administrative only. It is more than this: it gives 'structures of meaning'⁴⁴⁷ to the 'named and classified world'⁴⁴⁸ of regiments.

For an institution which has existed for nearly 340 years, there have been many different armies in fact and self-conception. In defining or describing the present-day characteristic spirit of the regular Army, it is necessary to draw out those characteristics that still persist from previous ages, even if only as trace elements.⁴⁴⁹

The trace elements are of an army of regular forces and reserves; militia and professionals; 'heavy' armoured formations and light role units; line infantry and Special Forces. It is an army that is required to serve overseas and at home; in Europe in defensive positions and in Northern Ireland suppressing terrorism – manning machine guns or wielding batons. Comprising 'enablers' and 'bayonets'⁴⁵⁰ it is charged with nation-building and state defeat; it can be brutal and sensitive; it kills and protects. The British Army exists in multiple dimensions; it has layers and its many guises and component parts co-exist and are complementary but they can also be in opposition to each other. Of concern it lacks a philosophical basis and possibly even on occasion, purpose.

The British Army's most dearly-held qualities:

tend to be those exhibited in its mythology (often represented as pictures hanging in regimental messes) and in its most dearly held triumphs, notably those against overwhelming odds, where the day was saved by a combination of physical courage, unquestioning discipline, sang-froid and firepower.⁴⁵¹

The army revels in 'tough soldiering' against an enemy that plays by similar rules. Fair competition is the yardstick but victory can be incidental, and a 'draw' even defeat is agreeable. The most popularly quoted events or actions by respondents reveal an army that fights against the odds with pluck, grit and tenacity. Performing a constabulary function is satisfactory and demonstrates the inherent flexibility of the British soldier and broad utility of the army. Chivalric pageantry is unfamiliar; wars of British unification and the milestones in the 'establishment and running of the Empire'⁴⁵² gain little mention.

⁴⁴³ Kirke, *Red Coat, Green Machine*, 209.

⁴⁴⁴ Mileham, "Ethos," 228.

⁴⁴⁵ Holmes, *Tommy*, 91.

⁴⁴⁶ Carver, *Seven Ages*, xi. Holmes, *Tommy*, 91

⁴⁴⁷ Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 12.

⁴⁴⁸ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225.

⁴⁴⁹ Mileham, "Ethos," 228.

⁴⁵⁰ This distinction was made by the senior non-commissioned rank in the Army. 'Whether they are bayonet or an enabler, soldiers are trained to fight and win,' @ArmySgtMajor, 05 Jul 2018.

⁴⁵¹ Kiszely, "Approaches," 194.

⁴⁵² CO05.

The regimental system, a 'quasi-religious'⁴⁵³ construct is vitally important and the attraction of small scale Company level activity (though it constrains thinking to the tactical level)⁴⁵⁴ was evident in responses where soldiers detailed what matters. Stories 'help convey meaning to groups larger than 150'⁴⁵⁵ but it is stories about groups of less than 150⁴⁵⁶ (the size of a company) that stick. The contemporary British soldier is prepared to tell stories about failure, poor behaviour and instances of excess as iconic, as well as the events that resulted in victory. Bravery is understood beyond the traditional definition and protecting others is as compelling a recommendation as killing the enemy.

⁴⁵³ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 39.

⁴⁵⁴ Kiszely, "Approaches," 191.

⁴⁵⁵ "Spinning a Dit."

⁴⁵⁶ This is 'Dunbar's Number' that determines the number of relationships various species can maintain. Robin Dunbar, "Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates," *Journal of Human Evolution*, 22: 6 (1992): 469–493, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004724849290081J>

5. The British Warrior

Are Soldiers Warriors?

In this chapter army statements about warriorship are tested against the primary research that uncovers soldiers' perceptions of the meaning of the term. The role of nature and nurture is considered, and respondents are asked if they think the British Army trains warriors or if there is something inherent in the individual. First, the words that soldiers associated most with warrior are examined. Question 7 asked: *How do you understand the term 'warrior'? What does it mean to you?* Responses were grouped by theme and weighted: the top 10 are highlighted below and expanded at Appendix B.




Fig. 5.1: Word Cloud - 'Warrior' Themes

A difference in understanding of the words warrior and soldier was apparent. 10 respondents defined warrior against soldier: 'not a soldier'. Others thought 'soldier', offered on 25 occasions, explained warrior and when collated with similar words¹ warrior as a synonym of soldier gained 64 thematic mentions. More diverse terminology was offered where warrior was not thought synonymous with soldier: alternatives, offered 61 times, ranged from Berserker to 'primitive creature'. These are captured and shown in Fig. 5.1 under the thematic heading of 'Other'.

¹ By way of example: Professional (12); Trained/Training (12); Discipline (7); Soldiering (5); Schooled (1).

Soldier was a more desirable even essential term of reference. One soldier explained that he needed the identity of 'soldier' – a term he associated with professional. By omission he did not consider warrior similarly. 'Soldier' gave comfort:

We need, as infantry, or anyone in close combat, you need your identity to help you morally with the absolute brutality of some of the things you end up doing. When you just red-misted [killed] ten guys in a corn field and you say I did that because I was a professional soldier – that's how you deal with that.²

Soldier as a term of reference, not warrior, counteracts the spectre of moral injury such is its association. Soldier was attractive because soldiers 'protect and secure and help out civilians. We don't provoke people.'³ This resonates with the army's reading of bravery and courage evidenced in the citations mentioned in Chapter 4, and stories where the soldier is defending.

Soldier inferred a broader skills base and utility than warrior. It was recognised that the Army 'isn't always looking to fight' – whereas warriors were presumed ready and focussed on combat. One soldier went so far as to explain that 'the job [of soldiering] doesn't actually require you to fight'.⁴ Warrior doesn't resonate with those who believe soldiering involves a much wider skillset than fighting. Where the terms are synonymous it is thought so only to satisfy 'the politics of inclusion' that describes every soldier as a warrior without understanding the depth it entails⁵ so they feel they are part of the team. This is ill-considered: 'If there were true synonyms, one word would vanish as being unnecessary. Each word that is retained represents a unique coordination of actions.'⁶

Where warriorship was different to soldiering in the qualitative responses to question 7, respondents emphasised the dichotomy highlighted by Matthew Kosuta: the warrior is individual and personal; the soldier is based on the team, duty, discipline and the profession of arms.⁷ Recent campaigns recommended examples of warrior culture vested in individuals honoured for bravery – not organisationally.

The warrior culture is epitomised by the Falklands, actions in Helmand and Iraq (Budd VC and Beharry VC for example). In other words, the warrior icon needs a strong character to reference rather than large-scale actions such as Waterloo or Minden which are often a bit more 'faceless'.⁸

Warriorship though is not just a consequence of 'going to war'. The 'difference between

² FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 42:31.

³ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 43:10.

⁴ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 14:00.

⁵ Riza, "Two-Dimensional Warfare," 266.

⁶ Jay Efran in conversation. Jay S. Efran, Sheila McNamee, Bill Warren & Jonathan D. Raskin, "Personal Construct Psychology, Radical Constructivism, and Social Constructionism: A Dialogue," *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 27:1 (2014): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2014.850367>.

⁷ M. Kosuta, "Warrior and Soldier, What's the Difference?" Discussion, 19 Jul 2018, at <https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/discussions/2075887/warrior-and-soldier-what-s-difference> on 08 Dec 2019.

⁸ CO26.

being a warrior and being a professional soldier⁹ is that warriorship is a lifestyle and a whole of life endeavour;¹⁰ 'warrior is hand to hand fighting, knives, riding in on horseback, we are just soldiers,' according to one respondent.¹¹

Any definition of warrior centred solely on endeavour or hardship (Strozzi-Heckler's 'marketable' variants) that excluded killing and in particular the most intimate of killing, was unconvincing to the majority of those surveyed. The reality of war is more than this; it 'is not just hand to hand combat like it was for the Vikings, we train for distance.'¹² Here the soldier differs from the warrior: 'someone who is firing from a long distance away who never sees the enemy, I wouldn't say he's a warrior...there's a difference between a killer, someone who prepared to kill, and a warrior.'¹³ Respondents recognised the difference between the 'emotional logic' required for close combat and the 'deliberative, rational cognition' that allows killing at range.¹⁴ This view is interesting for the suggestion that the warrior has more noble standing and the soldier is more simply 'a killer.' The Special Forces officer cited in Chapter 3 had this opinion of his drone pilot colleague. It counters the view that the soldier is the more virtuous character. A more earthy, colloquial definition of what warrior meant came from a focus group: 'it's about having the stones [sic] to go out and pull that trigger, fix that bayonet and get into the enemy's face and kill him'.¹⁵ The warrior though was not always considered external to the army and soldiers could still be warriors. Infantry soldiers reserved access: 'just killing' and 'just' suffering hardship did not qualify; not all soldiers qualify but some may be warriors.

One of the COs offered a deliberate, short definition making the terms synonymous. A warrior is a soldier 'who is trained and ready for his or her combat role and serves an ideal greater than him or herself'.¹⁶ The warrior within a community and as the servant of society was therefore thought feasible: the notion that there could be a code was agreed, albeit neither point was universally acknowledged, nor was any identifiable code evident. Comments on this theme were collated as 'Service' and respondents recognised sacrifice as an important tenet of warriorship.¹⁷

A warrior is somebody who embraces the possibility of death and subordinates it to the unit and the mission. This preparedness to die is what confers the moral authority to take life. The sense of equality (and respect) with the opponent is a necessary, though not sufficient, pre-requisite to be

⁹ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 01:44.

¹⁰ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 02:00.

¹¹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 14:00.

¹² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 27:58.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 29:40.

¹⁴ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 128-9.

¹⁵ FG5: JNCOs, 29 Nov 18, 09:45.

¹⁶ CO23.

¹⁷ Sacrifice was mentioned 3 times; self-sacrifice (4) and self-sacrifice (1) also figured. 'Service' includes 28 variations on the theme.

a warrior.¹⁸

The definition of a warrior was most apparent with war as a competition,¹⁹ with the right to engage 'granted mutually' and involving reciprocity.²⁰ A singular focus on overcoming an adversary;²¹ willingness to fight;²² a determination to win, ruthlessness and the relentless pursuit of professional excellence were all mentioned. Warriors have an appetite to be tested and put their skills to use²³ and so the notion of service performed stoically, or perfunctorily, on behalf of others fades. 'A warrior is unrelenting in his (or her) pursuit of excellence. He strives to be the best fighter to ensure he never enters a battle that he cannot win';²⁴ she is 'professional, dedicated, utterly committed, with a relentless pursuit of the goal to win...never give up, never surrender, work hard and do your best, in order to win in war.'²⁵ Warriorship then is the pinnacle and exemplar of martial prowess: 'a warrior should be excellent at everything – ceaseless pursuit of excellence'.²⁶ Service, associated with warriorship, was a side benefit or afterthought.

For all the mention of competition respondents didn't actually relish the possibility for defeat and maybe even death that equal combat offered – nobility and honour is important, but negotiable, and certainly subordinate to winning. One officer thought 'warriorship as a net positive term' and 'aspirational'²⁷ but didn't place adherence to any warrior code above military success. 'I'm not a believer in a fair fight' he said, 'I'm about being devious – within the rules of the game'.²⁸ This is an alternative view to the recalled myth and the stories found iconic where valiant defeat was more inspirational than victory. The idea of 'kicking a man when he's down' runs counter to the British Army's ethos²⁹ but there is also a point where stories and aspiration or how one would wish to see oneself, and reality meet. Stories are absorbed and enjoyed away from combat: fighting is more personal and in the combat arena instinct is pervasive. Where contemporary British soldiers appreciate the title warrior it is toward success: as fighters they wear it easily but don't admire it for chivalric notions or as willing losers who see as much value in the contest as in winning.

¹⁸ CO12.

¹⁹ This is defensible but is at odds with a reading of stipulated British doctrine: 'there is little if anything in British military practice which suggests that combat is adversarial' with preference given to low-level skills and drills (the very thing the professional soldier must master but that tends to miss the point; the drills are to improve performance when fighting). Storr, *The Human Face of War*, 37.

²⁰ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 161.

²¹ CO22.

²² CO25.

²³ CO26.

²⁴ CO14.

²⁵ CO24.

²⁶ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 13:15.

²⁷ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 10:48.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 29:41.

²⁹ Kiszely, "Approaches," 196.

Soldiering was also defined in direct opposition to warriorship: the warrior not the soldier is the automaton and it is the warrior who is defined as T1:

...the Zulu who marches unthinkingly onto British guns at Rorke's Drift...British soldiers at the Somme who were not allowed to be soldiers because their commanders didn't think they could be soldiers...soldier to me is the man in the Falklands who in the dark of the night even without a commander cracks on and does what's necessary but can also differentiate when to fight and when not'³⁰

The soldier is that individual who performs in war according to initiative, guile and with agility of thought. Knowing when to fight allowed another to privilege soldiering over warriorship: 'I think switching on and off is outside the definition of warrior – that's sounds more like soldier,'³¹ or the stoic soldier-warrior in my model in Chapter 3. Warriorship was queried for relevance by one respondent: 'if I die it is an honour is the warrior's mantra...warriors believe that organised violent combat makes us better people.'³² He was not in agreement with this guiding principle. Another emphasised the emotional and responsive, maybe unthinking and uneducated aspect of warriorship: 'soldier has the professional element to it that warrior doesn't necessarily have; the warrior doesn't have to buy into the conceptual side of it'.³³ One respondent was bemused at the thrust of the discussion: 'I think people in the Corps will be looking at this'³⁴ he said in solidarity with fellow soldiers. He inferred their uncompromised standing as soldiers provided them greater confidence and comfort in that identity. Later the same group of infantry discussed their affording themselves unnecessary and even unwarranted distinction:

I spoke to guys in the RLC³⁵ and in the Corps' and they don't get caught up in this like we do about being called Spartans,³⁶ or warriors, or an operator or being ally,³⁷ and the tie that goes with it...they just say they are drivers and don't seem to need to stand on the pedestal. In the infantry we always want to be better than others.³⁸

That the Army had to be a broad church was highlighted. Recruiting only those of a warrior disposition compromised the ability of the Army to think and act more broadly. 'If you emphasise the warrior ethos too much you limit the recruits you attract'³⁹ and

³⁰ FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 20:50.

³¹ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 22:07.

³² FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 04:00.

³³ *Ibid.*, 20:40.

³⁴ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 05:00.

³⁵ Royal Logistics Corps.

³⁶ The attraction of being known as Spartans is prevalent in the US as well but there too in keeping with the sentiments expressed here it is neither universally appreciated. Gabriel Russell, "The Spartans Were Morons." 18 Jan 2018, accessed at <https://www.lawenforcementtoday.com/spartans-morons/>. The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the UK Chief of Defence Staff, quoting Euripides, invoked the image of the Spartans for inspiration after the first female officer passed 'P Company' in 2020. "The daughters of Sparta are never at home. They mingle with the young men in wrestling matches," @SEAC_Defence, 19 Feb 2020.

³⁷ 'Ally' is a colloquialism for the wearing of non-issue clothing but more widely refers to anything desirable or stylish in appearance or behaviour. Dominic Adler, "A Punk History Of Military Cool, or the Pursuit of Ally-ness," at <http://www.craigrobertdouglas.co.uk/punk-history-military-ally-ness/> on 17 Nov 2018.

³⁸ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 40:55.

³⁹ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 30:17.

therefore the broader skills needed for utility across the spectrum of operations. Inattention to warriorship was even considered acceptable: ‘good soldiers’ didn’t need to be warriors. ‘Some of my soldiers are utterly professional and they hold that in high regard but they are not necessarily warriors.’⁴⁰ Soldiering involves its own a code of conduct – ‘our values and standards’ and this provides ethical foundation, core purpose and *esprit de corps*.⁴¹ The danger of emulating warriors, in particular those of antiquity was highlighted: warriorship was ‘associated with aggression, fighting, killing and losing and pillaging and raping your way through your vanquished enemy...we don’t do that latter part anymore...’⁴² That the warrior could bound conduct and prevent animalistic behaviour was questioned.⁴³

Magee collates the traits of warriors (reproduced below) through history and suggests that ‘warrior codes’ are similar to the values and standards of modern day soldiers.⁴⁴

	Primitive	Greek	Roman	Viking	Knights	US Army
Service		X	X	X	X	X
Skill at Arms	X	X	X	X	X	X
Physically Fit	X	X	X	X	X	X
Honesty			X	X	X	X
Moral Courage			X	X	X	X
Disciplined	X	X	X	X	X	X
Loyalty	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kill	X	X	X	X	X	X
Physical Courage	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protect the weak	X			X	X	

Fig. 5.2: Magee’s Warrior Traits

Aligning Knights with Vikings would surprise the majority of those surveyed for this thesis. The knight would be familiar for chivalry and may resonate: they wouldn’t associate with the Viking. What Magee exposes is how difficult it is to ascertain what is actually meant by warrior where the title is applied to all *homo furens*: his examples actually have little in common beyond the basic endeavour of fighting.

Soldiers Are Not Warriors

Question 6 asked if all soldiers are warriors. Clear lines were drawn: ‘not all soldiers, foreign nations for example.’⁴⁵ Only 4% of respondents thought that all soldiers qualified

⁴⁰ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 09:20.

⁴¹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 13:12.

⁴² FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 14:40.

⁴³ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 02:00. A veteran of the Falklands War used the same phrase but explained it as a predatory instinct: ‘if he did not kill, he would die.’ Parr, *Our Boys*, 168. FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 16:40.

⁴⁴ Magee, “The Way of the Warrior,” 36.

⁴⁵ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 04:48.

(see Fig. 5.3 below).




Fig. 5.3: 'All Soldiers Are Warriors'

It was suggested that UK stated martial values were important: 'I use words like self-sacrifice, courageous...its more than just that rough fighting, deal with the enemy, type person, its more subtle, it goes back to the standards and values of the British Army – that has to be at the centre of it.'⁴⁶ Explaining warrior as a term that can be taken only by those that adhere to British values dismisses 'others', peripheral out-groups. That this benchmark would deny it to the Berserker for example wasn't thought odd. That warrior is accepted against UK cultural and organisational criteria is an attempt to make the term exclusive and maybe seize it rather than better define it. In this first glimpse of British infantry soldiers defining the term warrior, they covet it less it is allocated to others.

British soldiers as a community fared little better. When asked specifically if they were warriors, agreement that soldier and warrior were interchangeable if V&S were adhered to, tended to dissipate: the importance of the British code as a qualifier reduced in importance. A considerable majority of COs (c87%), shown in Fig. 5.4, disagreed or strongly disagreed that all British soldiers are warriors; soldiers consulted at focus groups had a similar opinion with 86% against extending the title nationally. A senior officer interviewee stated his reservation.

Warrior in my view has been a term that has been expanded in terms of its use, more broadly than the term requires; people comfortably substitute

⁴⁶ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 05:10.

soldier and warrior but I don't think the two terms are necessarily substitutable one for the other.⁴⁷




Fig. 5.4: 'All British Soldiers Are Warriors'

The minority who agreed the terms were synonymous applied caveats: achieving the mission qualified those who did so as warriors;⁴⁸ training for war but 'maybe not fighting' allowed the accolade.⁴⁹ Meeting 'standards'⁵⁰ (though these were not determined) would qualify according to one soldier. That basic training, undertaken by all soldiers regardless of trade, was adequate for entry was defended on one occasion. 'Our Army basic training, infantry training, makes us warriors – even the professionally technical.'⁵¹ For most respondents though the terms were not synonymous and warriorship was reserved. Almost everyone expressed an opinion demonstrating certainty of belief in answering this question but not consistency when the answers were cross checked against qualitative statements. Those disqualified as warriors were easily identified; determining those who should be called warrior was much more difficult.

Warriorship was open to soldiers but qualifiers apply.

Warrior and soldier are not synonymous. I think that warrior is an expression of a specific and discrete output within the Army – I think its narrowly defined by those that engage in close combat. Not exclusively, but I don't think [soldiers of a named Corps] would define themselves as being

⁴⁷ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 03:52.
⁴⁸ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 05:50.
⁴⁹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 12:27.
⁵⁰ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 04:07.
⁵¹ GS2, 14 Feb 19, 02:56.

warriors, they would call themselves soldier, they enable. There's something about the fact we call them Enablers. I don't think the two terms are interchangeable. I think by dint of their output some soldiers demonstrate warrior characteristics and draw some strength from the idea of warrior.⁵²

Another thought that the term warrior could be read in a number different ways and he recommended a 'sliding scale' of warriorship be applied. 'There are different types of warrior; you don't have to be a warrior to be a soldier, but it helps'.⁵³ In terming warriorship a 'discrete output' warriors are then a discrete element of the army

For some soldiers, 'it's difficult to be a warrior; they have other jobs'.⁵⁴ Furthermore, warriorship is not essential for victory: 'not all armies were bred as warriors'.⁵⁵ Good armies comprising good soldiers could be successful but warriorship offered the soldier an advantage, and 'a vision of what one can be':⁵⁶ it should be 'part of the soldiers toolbox and soldiers must have to capacity to know whether or not to use it'.⁵⁷ Warriorship is an 'aspiration, the standard to achieve' though 'not every soldier can get on that journey'.⁵⁸ To do so the soldier needs a different philosophy.⁵⁹ 'There's no gulf between soldier and warrior, one encapsulates the other'⁶⁰ but the soldier must choose to 'be warrior' according to a major – the qualifier is a sense of choice, and state of mind is important: 'Not all soldiers are ready to go at the drop of a hat regardless of training'.⁶¹

Warriorship involves 'spiritual intellectual engagement with soldiering; and that is what affords substance to any definition of warrior'.⁶² This officer elaborated: 'some people emotionally connect with soldiering – maybe that's what it is.' The idea that a combination of 'physical, mental and spiritual work' that together 'make the warrior different from the professional soldier where physical and mental are the focus' convinced others too. Which of these aspects of differentiates the warrior is unclear but the idea of separation resonates and may help in understanding different types:

The warrior ethos for the 21st Century warrior comprises of two separate but related parts the physical and mental aspects. Physically, the warrior must possess the skill at arms to carry out his duties to protect society. He must be physically fit to operate for extended periods and overcome the stress and strain of the modern battle space. Mentally, the warrior must possess the ability to kill.⁶³

⁵² GS5, 19 Mar 19, 07:55.

⁵³ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 07:20.

⁵⁴ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 05:15.

⁵⁵ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 01:45.

⁵⁶ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 34:30.

⁵⁷ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 15:40.

⁵⁸ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 34:05.

⁵⁹ GS5, 19 Mar 19, 22:09.

⁶⁰ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 10:48.

⁶¹ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 07:00.

⁶² GS5: 19 Mar 19, 21:30.

⁶³ Magee, "The Way of the Warrior," 40.

Magee suggests by omission that the spiritual aspect is not necessary: those surveyed would argue that by ignoring that aspect he is debating soldier types and not discussing the warrior. That the British Army 'doesn't embrace the spiritual side'⁶⁴ of soldiering is thought an impediment. The mentality of the application of 'mind, body and soul into the application of violence', that goes beyond soldiering is the victory of nature over nurture.⁶⁵

A sergeant said soldiers are warriors only if employed on infantry duties 'You are either infantry, or you are infantry support, once trained if they are fit and ready then they [soldiers] are classed as warriors'.⁶⁶ An officer admitted all airborne forces to the caste. 'There you require everybody to drive a bayonet and do the business'⁶⁷ so warrior isn't reserved only for airborne infantry and is available for all qualified for airborne duties.⁶⁸ Other soldiers were disregarded. Warrior was therefore reserved for a more reduced and 'discrete' cohort. The 'valuation of the in-group generally means being anti-social to relevant out-groups'.⁶⁹ That the infantry (or those who are infantry like) are the standard bearer for, or inheritors of warriorship in the British Army would be divisive – regardless of the infantry's self-perception or Battlecraft Syllabus declaration. General Staff officers with non-infantry backgrounds made a claim on warriorship for the wider martial community. 'I would broaden it out to include others like the Army Air Corps who for most of their history and certainly since the arrival of Apache,⁷⁰ have considered themselves combat aviators with very much a warrior ethos'.⁷¹ 'I'd look at the RAC'⁷² suggested another who served his regimental duty there. He pointed to their recruiting adverts that were 'all about blokes going on log runs, wearing cam cream, helmets, physical endeavour, Band of Brothers, alpha males, machine guns'⁷³ as evidence that soldiers who crew tanks are warriors too. But the word was considered by infantry soldiers against a model of concentric circles with the infantry at its heart, fully deserving of the title, with other soldiers less so the further one moves away from the centre.

The term could be made less exclusive for more pragmatic reasons: 'we can't exclude

⁶⁴ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 02:50.

⁶⁵ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 00:40.

⁶⁶ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 03:43.

⁶⁷ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 03:24.

⁶⁸ That the infantry are tested to a more strenuous standard, and airborne soldiers more strenuous again, makes them distinct, and 'better'. An army fitness test for infantry soldiers for example demands they march 4km carrying 40kg in 50 mins then 2km with 25kg in 15mins; airborne forces are to march 4km with 40kg in 35mins then 2km with 25kg in 12mins 30 secs. New 'Non-Ground Close Combat' standards for non-infantry that will be less challenging will be implemented in 2021/22, <https://www.army.mod.uk/physical-employment-standards/>. Whether physical fitness this is a valid test of warriorship was disputed. The regime for selection for airborne duties ('P Company') 'is a fitness test not a warrior test...' FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 06:40.

⁶⁹ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 131.

⁷⁰ The name of the British Army's attack helicopter.

⁷¹ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 02:28.

⁷² Royal Armoured Corps.

⁷³ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 41:00.

anyone from the term because nobody knows what it really means – who are we [the infantry] to decide if you can use it or not?’⁷⁴ This is insightful not least for its wider implications. Where armies wish to generate ‘novel combinations’ and instant formations of individuals previously unknown to each other⁷⁵ (the process of ‘battlegrouping’ explained on page 61) and ‘swift trust’⁷⁶ is afforded a premium, then inclusion is the prize. Armies that introduce exclusivity run the risk that they will have ‘automatically killed cohesion.’⁷⁷ This is worse where the exclusivity is introduced through uncertain qualification. Enablers, what Huntington called ‘auxiliary vocations,’⁷⁸ were denied access to warriorship, and sometimes even fellow ‘bayonets’ were judged unqualified for the epithet of warrior by respondents. The notion that all ‘capbadges are soldiers, however not all are warriors’⁷⁹ was oft-stated; ‘to be a warrior you should excel beyond ‘normal’ soldiering standards’;⁸⁰ and variations on the view that ‘not all soldiers are warriors or need to be warriors’ was frequently offered.⁸¹ The club is made more special by one officer: ‘I feel the term belongs to a more physical and less technology driven profession...I believe a warrior is someone who can use honed skills together with raw, controlled aggression to physically overcome their adversary’.⁸² Pushing buttons to facilitate killing⁸³ is not demonstrative of the skills of the warrior: those skills are ‘fighting spirit, fitness, unarmed combat, SAA [skill at arms], etc. etc’;⁸⁴ the willingness to fight for ‘self-preservation, protection of the young, and resource competition’⁸⁵ is warriorship’s primordial basis. Warriorship should then depend on more than regimental enlistment.

It is possible to ‘put any man in a uniform and give him an ID card and he’s a soldier, pay him as a soldier and he can do the bare minimum, dodge tours, if he wants and still be a soldier, won’t be a warrior.’⁸⁶ Another differentiated warriors from what he termed ‘salary soldiers’,⁸⁷ modern day stipendiary troops who replaced the warrior. It was agreed that some soldiers, when their duties came close to warriorship, balk at the prospect: ‘a lot of people like the idea of putting on a uniform’ and acting the part but when they are

⁷⁴ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 39:00.

⁷⁵ King, “Beyond the Primary Group Thesis,” 719.

⁷⁶ Debra Meyerson, K. E. Weick & R. M. Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” in *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research*, eds., R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996) 166-195, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452243610.n9>.

⁷⁷ Anna Simons, “Here’s Why Women in Combat Units Is a Bad Idea,” *War on the Rocks*, 28 Aug 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/heres-why-women-in-combat-units-is-a-bad-idea/>.

⁷⁸ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 12. Huntington says these have the same relationship as the nurse has to the doctor and are prohibited from claiming they are capable of the ‘management of violence’.

⁷⁹ CO13.

⁸⁰ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 09:49.

⁸¹ CO14.

⁸² CO18.

⁸³ Chamayou, *Drone Theory* .31.

⁸⁴ CO30.

⁸⁵ John Archer, *The Behavioural Biology of Aggression*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988), ix.

⁸⁶ ‘Tours’ normally refers to duty overseas – often for 6 months at a time; FG7:SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 02:00.

⁸⁷ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 03:54. David French also mentions the establishment of the ‘military salary’ as a significant tension between ‘soldiering’ and family life. French, *Military Identities*, 348.

called upon to perform 'they transfer out of the infantry because they don't expect the actual job role to be what it is'.⁸⁸ The wearing of a uniform alone doesn't permit entry to warriorhood. Some soldiers 'want to be warriors until it's time to do warrior things and then they aren't interested anymore.'⁸⁹ A colleague agreed: some 'join the army to do the job, go overseas...some join to put it up on social media.' Instagram soldiers⁹⁰ he called them invoking an image of soldiers with motivation similar to civilians who are drawn to martial life and 'adopt a persona and don the garb (costume) of the period, in all of its minute detail.' They wish to 'reconnect to a lost heritage or to find acceptance'.⁹¹ Participants engage with martial life for a period of time on the basis of 'how they wish it to be, not necessarily as it actually is.'⁹²

Once SNCO explained his position anecdotally. He recalled a time when his infantry company was protecting resident soldiers, sailors and airmen in the Falkland Islands.

They have this exercise where the infantry go away and then they turn out the garrison and they actually get a go outside; they are out for two days and they get withdrawal symptoms from Costa Coffee – two thousand of them...they are not warriors, that jumps right out at me.⁹³

The OED definition extended the title warrior to soldier, sailor or airman: this respondent thinks that over generous. Misunderstanding and misrepresenting relationships in the way the OED allows between services and trades, between those who experience combat and those who don't 'causes friction' and confuses identity.⁹⁴ Focus group attendees agreed. Even those who might be thought deserving of the title warrior given their proximity to the fight 'on the frontline like medics don't necessarily deserve to be called warriors...they don't actually push into the positions [forward positions like enemy trenches]...the term shouldn't be diluted just because you are in the Army.'⁹⁵

The singular focus of the warrior was commented upon: warriors get 'in there', they fight, where 'anything gets in the way' they charge through it in pursuit of their mission. However, their ability to fight a 'more subtle battle' under greater constraint' and offer broader utility was questioned.⁹⁶ 'We've got guys who are warriors, great in combat but useless at everything else we need to do, including the preparation for combat'.⁹⁷ Those who admired warriors thought them distinct in their mentality⁹⁸ compared to soldiers. The

⁸⁸ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 04:00.

⁸⁹ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 15:55.

⁹⁰ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 04:37. Instagram© is a free photo and video sharing social media application intended primarily for use on mobile devices.

⁹¹ Curran, "Reenactors," 4.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹³ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 45:37.

⁹⁴ Riza, "Two-Dimensional Warfare," 266.

⁹⁵ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 06:41.

⁹⁶ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 09:20.

⁹⁷ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 09:16.

⁹⁸ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 03:45.

argument that 'not all with combatant status [soldiers] could be fairly judged as warriors,'⁹⁹ and in fact only the very few qualify, was extended one degree further when the term warrior was made inapplicable to British soldiers. Warriors, according to some of the COs who offered comment are different from soldiers. The warrior is a Berserker: he 'lives for the fight. In peacetime a warrior has no role.'¹⁰⁰

Nature

Can anyone can be a warrior? This question was asked to draw opinion on the relevance of mind-set and free will in creating warriors. If the answer was yes then a conclusion might be that culture, training and environment dominates and provides for warriorship; if no, then individualistic tendency is paramount. Sir John Kiszely expressed his opinion:

Certainly, training has a major role to play, but like the more technical attributes which qualified them in the first place for selection for their trade or speciality, so, I would argue, there must be in our recruits a sufficient, basic level of the other necessary attributes which allows them to be trainable in the time available.¹⁰¹

The response was almost 50/50: 47% said anyone could be a warrior; the remainder declared not, some stridently.¹⁰² The lack of consensus is unsurprising. When we ask questions about will and decision, or reason or choice, says Noam Chomsky, human science is at a loss and the questions remain in obscurity.¹⁰³

Some people were thought natural warriors¹⁰⁴ and warriorhood a closed community since not everyone has the same mind-set; others said the mind-set can be adopted and therefore anyone can attain warrior status, 'if they make the decision'.¹⁰⁵ There is a complex argument here summed up by CO20. 'It's a state of mind, as well as who you are and how you act.'¹⁰⁶ To one degree the Blank Slate argument applies – the individual can be shaped toward warriorship – with environment influencing decision-making and action. Alternatively the decision is made sub-consciously beyond the individuals awareness or even in opposition to more obvious environmental factors, driven by the Ghost in the Machine. More likely this is a consequence of a complex algorithm; a mix

⁹⁹ Riza, "Two-Dimensional Warfare," 265.

¹⁰⁰ CO21.

¹⁰¹ John Kiszely, "What Should We Be Looking For? And For What? A Commander's Perspective on Recruits and Recruiting," *RUSI Journal*, 148:2 (Jun 2004): 72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840308446874>.

¹⁰² 'Absolutely not,' CO17.

¹⁰³ Noam Chomsky, "The Ideas of Chomsky," interview by Bryan Magee, *Men of Ideas*, 1975, <https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-great-philosophers-by-bryan-magee/id1399334405?i=1000413819832>

¹⁰⁴ CO18.

¹⁰⁵ CO23. Mindset was the fourth most mentioned term. It was offered specifically 10 times and thematically on 43 occasions where I included mental/mentality (11), willing/willingness (7) and 'commitment' 3 times.

¹⁰⁶ CO20.

of biological and cultural factors, none of these though are barriers that cannot be overcome.¹⁰⁷ All require attention. The human is equivalent to 'an organ genetically determined then growing to a mature state' through all interactions and not just learning or teaching.¹⁰⁸

'Everyone is born innately different and raised differently.'¹⁰⁹ Each of us is a combination of many variables: evolutionary roots, mind-set, environmental influence and culture and so the origin of warriorship 'is not binary'.¹¹⁰ Recruiting from civil society and assuming as the only truth that those who choose to enlist can be trained as warriors was thought risky. 'A conscript army can never be an army of warriors'¹¹¹ and so the opportunity for anyone and certainly those inclined to be the servant *homo furens* to claim the title is dismissed. That 'you can coach the instinct but it has to be innate'¹¹² allows T2 greater purchase on the title warrior: 'there is a personality aspect to being a warrior' but those with the personality are the rarity.¹¹³ It is thought 'plausible that a correlation between personality traits and military service could be caused by genetic predispositions.'¹¹⁴ Those with the disposition exist within the tier designated as warrior-soldiers in the model.

'If you are combat arms you have made the warrior choice'¹¹⁵ Free will or some Ghost in the Machine, maybe genetic propensity, brought this CO to his regiment, and unit culture then took hold, developing further his warrior instinct and desire:

It takes a particular type of person to want to become a member of the 'teeth arms'...However, joining such a unit is not enough to become 'a warrior'...The ethos I felt in the Unit, at that time, was incredibly strong - like a religion, everyone worshiped The Regiment and celebrated past actions and actors from within its relative [sic] short but proud history. We were desperate to emulate our forefathers by having the chance to serve with distinction in the face of the enemy....it was regimental ethos and our intense comradeship (or 'love' in the soldiering sense) for each other and the desire to kill the enemy that underpinned our actions. Such a culture had to be controlled and took strong leadership.¹¹⁶

Culture is a driving force here but so too is personality or the character of the individual: 'our very identity and sense of self is always defined relative to the norms of some group to which we belong or that we aspire to join.'¹¹⁷ The officer quoted above grasped the

¹⁰⁷ Harari, *Homo Deus*, 382-3.

¹⁰⁸ Chomsky. "The Ideas of Chomsky."

¹⁰⁹ CO16.

¹¹⁰ CO18.

¹¹¹ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 24:30.

¹¹² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 03:28.

¹¹³ FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 18:00.

¹¹⁴ Matthew R. Miles & Donald P. Haider-Markel, "Personality and Genetic Associations With Military Service," *Armed Forces & Society*, 45:4 (Apr 2018): 644, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X18765449>

¹¹⁵ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 13:00.

¹¹⁶ CO17.

¹¹⁷ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 45.

opportunity to serve with a unit he felt comfortable with. He was drawn to it through subconscious desire or genetic tendency, and serendipitously he met his goal for he had no way of actually knowing if the regiment he chose would meet his desires and offer him what he expected. This is the 'nature of nurture' or where nurturing satisfies one's nature. It is what some¹¹⁸ 'psychologists call *sociality*, which requires people to construe the constructs of others with whom they wish to interact.'¹¹⁹ This officer hunted an environment where he could realise his self. Where he found it 'unsatisfying,' Raskin advises that he might then develop new dimensions of meaning, or look elsewhere for satisfaction. Such behaviours are evident when soldiers join a regiments then transfer to another, or seek challenge elsewhere for example with Special Forces, private security companies or as mercenaries – and then not just for financial gain but for self-actualisation.

Most frequently mentioned when describing the warrior was fighting spirit, warriors as fighters and the act of fighting.¹²⁰ This fits with 'ontologies of war that emphasise fighting as its central feature.'¹²¹ Fighting spirit is the 'body chemistry of military units' and where it changes for the worse it leads to defeat, and so it is critical for *homo furens*.¹²² The will to fight – 'the disposition and decision to fight, to act, or to persevere when needed'¹²³ and fighting spirit, that 'ringing term that broadly refers to a soldier's readiness to move in on an enemy rather than flee or freeze; and essential for survival in combat'¹²⁴ is vital where one claims to be a warrior. 'How would I apply warrior? I'd say it's about fighting spirit, it's what makes men and women fight.'¹²⁵ It could be argued that fighting and combat are the same and should be themed together but separating them better reflects the opinions expressed during research. Combat or some variation on that theme¹²⁶ was mentioned 32 times. It was suggested as disciplined activity, 'purposeful' violence one respondent said. It read as a professional and inclusive pursuit where a cohort of soldiers would be involved. Fighting is more physical, and aggressive, a hand-to-hand endeavour and visceral activity: this is what respondents associated with warrior.

¹¹⁸ Advocates of personal construct psychology where people organize their experiences by developing bipolar dimensions of meaning, or personal constructs. George. A. Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs: Vol. 1. A Theory of Personality*, (London: Routledge, 1991) cited in Raskin, "Constructivism in Psychology." It is a highly personal endeavour where at the 'very least, individual psychology remains the clear focus.' Constructionists by contrast make relationships not individuals 'the locus' of study. Raskin, "The Evolution of Constructivism," 2.

¹¹⁹ Raskin, "Constructivism in Psychology."

¹²⁰ Grouped thematically as 'fighting' and mentioned over 60 times.

¹²¹ Matthew Ford, "The Epistemology of Lethality: Bullets, Knowledge Trajectories, Kinetic Effects," *European Journal of International Security*, 5:1, (Feb 2020): 78, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.12>

¹²² Charles Kirke, "A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit on the British Army," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 239-40.

¹²³ Connable et al., *Will to Fight*, xi.

¹²⁴ Shay, *Achilles*, 200.

¹²⁵ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 01:35.

¹²⁶ 16 times specifically and on 35 occasions within the broader theme.

The warrior engages in physical combat or 'hand-to-hand fighting'. Where this is denied, the definition of warfare is altered:

Warfare by distancing itself totally from the model of hand-to-hand combat, becomes something quite different, a "state of violence" of a different kind. It degenerates into slaughter or hunting. One no longer fights the enemy; one eliminates him, as one shoots rabbits.¹²⁷

Here again is the idea that the warrior is the superior of the soldier who is less personally committed and more detached from the consequences of martial action. This challenges preconceptions and presents warriors in a more favourable light than that of Berserker. Looking the enemy in the eye and engaging in equal contest where either participant could win was admired by respondents – 'the two key elements that characterize the warrior are his location on the battlefield and his tasks in combat'.¹²⁸ This negates the application of the title to those who kill from distance or whose duties don't involve warfighting.¹²⁹ This sense appeared in around 50% of questionnaire responses: it was equally prevalent in the focus groups.

Homo furens has to be ready and must possess the right attitude for immersion in combat: 'it's not just ability in hand to hand [fighting] but more so willingness'.¹³⁰ Mindset differentiated those who had fighting spirit from those don't.

It's just something you can tell. A guy has a bit of substance about him or he doesn't; you can tell straight away. His demeanour, the way he walks, how he responds when you ask him a question, a self-confidence, pride, looking ally.¹³¹

How the prototype is defined 'is not simply a matter of what one says, it is a matter of what one does, how one looks, and even...what one wears.'¹³² The warrior has 'something more than everyone else';¹³³ the 'instinct that is initiated in difficult circumstances such as when losing'.¹³⁴ Contrasted with soldier: warriorship demands 'a stubborn, ruthless mindset. A soldier is a title, but that title doesn't make you a warrior.'¹³⁵ This is about mentality, fighting mindset, and mindset more generally.¹³⁶ A warrior may be 'a soldier or someone engaged in warfare' but some do not rise to the challenge.¹³⁷ As a recent Royal Marines recruiting advert had it: 'It's a state of mind. You may already

¹²⁷ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 91.

¹²⁸ David Buckingham, "The Warrior Ethos," (Paper, US Naval War College, 1999), 3, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a366676.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Fighting spirit might be redefined for contemporary soldiering. "From being a personal and very subjective experience, fighting has developed additionally into a vast range of highly objective physical and intellectual activities." Patrick Mileham, "Fighting Spirit: Has it a Future?" in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 255.

¹³⁰ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 17:20.

¹³¹ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 28:56.

¹³² Haslam et al, *New Psychology*, 141.

¹³³ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 07:33.

¹³⁴ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 18:39.

¹³⁵ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 08:50.

¹³⁶ COs 12, 15, 14, 17, 19, 28.

¹³⁷ CO11.

have it.’¹³⁸ The way ‘in which you approach your mission’¹³⁹ is pertinent. The weight here is on the word ‘may’, and the focus is on ‘you’ the individual not the Marines as an organisation. ‘What a Royal Marine does is change what he thinks is possible’. The US Army placed similar individual emphasis in 2018: ‘There are those who are compelled to act when others don’t. Are you one of them?’¹⁴⁰ Respondents agreed the personal emphasis and extended the notion. ‘It [warriorship] requires someone who has natural confidence, has natural leadership skills and has confidence.’¹⁴¹

Biochemistry, ‘drugs, bugs, toxins and tools’,¹⁴² can influence the fight or flight tendency. Without such intervention, warriors ‘if given the option of fight or flight – (s)he will fight’;¹⁴³ ‘warriors fight, non-warriors take flight’.¹⁴⁴ The conundrum is well recognised historically: ‘between the physical fear of going forward and the moral fear of turning back there is a predicament of exceptional awkwardness’.¹⁴⁵ Few soldiers have this particular ‘mindset and disposition’; few live for the chaos of war and actively look for a fight.¹⁴⁶

All those in the British Army by definition have the will to serve. Most, but certainly not all, of those serving are likely to also have the will to confront actively a violent opponent – although this does change depending on a variety of internal and external factors. Only a small percentage of this last group will actively relish this confrontation. To me, a warrior is someone who stands on this last motivational rung: they are someone who relishes combat. This type of person is probably very rare, and in many societies (e.g. British) this is not something a warrior might admit to so they are hard to find.¹⁴⁷

The soldiers who devote themselves to war and fight for a cause¹⁴⁸ are beyond the Stoic who fights under constraint. These are T2 *homo furens* ‘for whom fight is an instinct, and for whom killing is very very straightforward, and easy and clinical, “dogs of war”...’¹⁴⁹ though they will only reluctantly admit it. ‘We’d all sound nuts [if we said we wanted to fight, go to war, to kill people]’¹⁵⁰ but the type is recognisable and tentatively embraced. One officer preferred to focus on accelerant over ignition: ‘a warrior must fight for a cause not just for the passion for the fight – someone fighting just for the love of the fight is just

¹³⁸ Royal Marines advert Sep 18, <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/royalmarines>.

¹³⁹ CO15.

¹⁴⁰ US Army on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/usarmy?s=11> on 21 Oct 2018. The US Army uses #WarriorsWanted and #Ready2Fight.

¹⁴¹ CO25.

¹⁴² Giordano, “Neuroscience and the Weapons of War.”

¹⁴³ CO15.

¹⁴⁴ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 02:09.

¹⁴⁵ David L. Thompson, “With Burnside at Antietam,” in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Struggle Intensifies*, ed., Robert Underwood Johnson, (NY: Castle Books, 2010), 662.

¹⁴⁶ CO15.

¹⁴⁷ CO22.

¹⁴⁸ CO21.

¹⁴⁹ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 09:00.

¹⁵⁰ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 18:50. Kay argues similarly for many German soldiers who ‘would shy away’ from announcing themselves to do so in public, because of negative connotations as a result of Germany’s militarist past. Kayß, “Regimental Traditions and Army Reputation.”

a barbarian.’¹⁵¹ Defining oneself in more favourable terms and especially against others is a recognised technique. ‘One of the universals of intergroup savagery is that it is attributed to the enemy group and denied in the host group.’¹⁵² Where the barbarian appears and the archetypal warrior disappears is impossible to determine objectively so cause is invoked as justification and separation: the Other then can only call upon illegitimate explanation.

Major Winters’ differentiation of warriors as killers, a minority community compared to the average soldier was echoed in discussion: ‘I’ve probably met fewer than five.’¹⁵³ This CO promotes the thoughts of the ancient Heraclitus¹⁵⁴ where one in a hundred men is a warrior, and the views of Wigram,¹⁵⁵ that influenced the famous Marshall study, that in any platoon only 6 ‘gutful’ men (one quarter) exist alongside twelve ‘sheep’ who follow and four to six others ‘who have not got what it takes’ to be effective.¹⁵⁶ Grossman classifies the population as sheep and fighters as dogs, sheep dogs, wolves and wild dogs.¹⁵⁷ These correspond roughly to the four variants outlined earlier in the model at Fig. 3.3. That warriors are ‘not as common as you might think’¹⁵⁸ and stand separate from soldiers is a reasonable judgement. Swank and Marchand’s assessment of 2%¹⁵⁹ is defensible as a measure for this rare breed, most noticeable where the highest standard of fighting effectiveness is required.¹⁶⁰ What is uncertain from the research is whether these are the most noble of *homo furens* or the most dangerous. My sense is that respondents when discussing the most noble were considering the soldier-warrior or warrior-soldier; the most deadly is the warrior-berserker.

Nurture

Homo furens as a naturally occurring phenomenon is more often rejected than agreed. ‘Soldiers, like most professionals, are made more than born. To assume otherwise leads, at best, to wasted effort and unnecessary discrimination, and, at worst retarded combat performance and increased illegal violence.’¹⁶¹ Respondents would agree where

¹⁵¹ CO21.

¹⁵² Dutton, *The Psychology of Genocide*, 3.

¹⁵³ CO22.

¹⁵⁴ The quote (from a letter attributed to Heraclitus in ‘The Cynic Epistles’) is: ‘Out of every one hundred men, ten shouldn’t even be there, eighty are just targets, nine are the real fighters, and we are lucky to have them, for they make the battle. Ah, but the one, one is a warrior, and he will bring the others back.’

¹⁵⁵ Wigram to Directorate Military Training, “Infantry Tactics in Sicily,” 16 Aug 1943. David French, *Raising Churchill’s Army: the British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-45*, (Oxford, OUP, 2002), 71-2

¹⁵⁶ Rowland & Speight. “Surveying the Spectrum,” 48.

¹⁵⁷ Grossman, *On Killing*, 183.

¹⁵⁸ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 01:49.

¹⁵⁹ Swank & Marchand, “Combat Neuroses,” 244.

¹⁶⁰ Shils & Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration,” 287.

¹⁶¹ Bruce Newsome, *Made Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 156.

soldiering is concerned yet only a slim majority of COs (51%) thought the British Army trained or nurtured warriors. Those who attended the focus groups were more sceptical: just 42% agreed or strongly agreed.




Fig. 5.5: 'The British Army Trains Warriors'

What is striking is less the comparison across cohorts and more that those surveyed were so evenly split (see Fig. 5.5). About half think the British Army trains Warriors; about half think not. This matched almost exactly the proportions who either agreed or didn't that anyone can be a warrior (asked at question 12). Where soldiers are so uncertain on both counts doubt must be cast on any claim that the Army produces warriors. It suggests, at least as far as this sample is concerned that the onus is then on those joining to 'be' warriors already where they are to achieve the warrior standard. The nurturing process begun in basic training that teaches soldiering relies on innate ability in the recruit to reach a 'higher' standard of warriorship.

Eleven COs thought experience important where one is to wear the mantle of warrior. Soldiers who had been to war and partaken of the unifying experience that is combat were afforded qualification that couldn't be had through training alone. 'Anyone who actively takes part in conflict or war is a warrior by definition'.¹⁶² Others expressed similar sentiments. 'A warrior to me is an experienced soldier, someone who has done his tours'.¹⁶³ From that comes entitlement to call oneself a warrior – and be seen as such by

¹⁶² CO27.

¹⁶³ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 06:20.

others. 'Battlefield experience conveys a certain weight to the voices of those who have fought there.'¹⁶⁴ Experience of war,¹⁶⁵ experience of fighting,¹⁶⁶ and volunteering for the worst task¹⁶⁷ in combat are ways the soldier can earn his warrior spurs – and build reputation.¹⁶⁸ To be a warrior is to be combat-hardened and 'tested'. When laid bare warriorship is 'beating someone else through violence'¹⁶⁹ and the award of the title then is a consequence of involvement in that act – not just 'going to war' or involvement in war as the OED would have it but 'an issue of physical contact'.¹⁷⁰ Through personal participation in close combat the soldier lays claim – 'otherwise you dilute the term'.¹⁷¹ Anyone can be trained as a soldier but 'to be a warrior you need to be in a fixed bayonet situation, combat environment'.¹⁷² Operations are 'disturbances' to routine soldiering: 'when disturbances change the situation such that individuals perceive situated self-meanings and expectations of themselves as different from their identity standard, they act to counteract the disturbance.'¹⁷³ The soldiers surveyed instead suggest *homo furens* acts to embrace the opportunity to seize the new identity of warrior.

An officer asked rhetorically 'whether or not simply being trained makes you count as a warrior or having been tested in combat makes you a warrior'?¹⁷⁴ Another stated that to be a warrior the individual must be operationally proven. The qualifying environment as well as skills is what counts: 'the warrior needs an arena in which to be vulnerable.'¹⁷⁵ Those who haven't had the experience of war are thought for this fact to have limited entitlement. No matter how they wish it or even if the title is conferred upon them 'there's going to be people sitting in the infantry not feeling like warriors because they haven't been anywhere; no medals on your chest makes it difficult to feel like a warrior.'¹⁷⁶

Those who join hoping for 'baptism by fire' but who never experience war feel side-lined in their hero's journey. Left to bear witness to glory but denied the opportunity to partake, is a population of veterans who served during a period of conflict but never in conflict...they are left with the fantasy, but not the reality, of war.¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁴ Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons," 259.

¹⁶⁵ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 06:36.

¹⁶⁶ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 01:26.

¹⁶⁷ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 01:40.

¹⁶⁸ The number of badges, medals and the possession of a combat patch 'signifying deployment to a combat zone' is significant in terms of the judgement of others. Monica Biernat *et al*, "All That You Can Be: Stereotyping of Self and Others in a Military Context," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75: 2 (1998): 305-6, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.2.301>

¹⁶⁹ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 45:05.

¹⁷⁰ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 10:26.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 05:01.

¹⁷² FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 13:00.

¹⁷³ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 233.

¹⁷⁴ CO20.

¹⁷⁵ CO12.

¹⁷⁶ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 07:40.

¹⁷⁷ Meaghan Mobbs, "Why Soldiers Crave a 'Hero's Journey': Understanding the Desire for 'Baptism By Fire'," posted 04 Oct 2018 accessed at <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-debrief/201810/why-soldiers-crave-heros-journey> on 24 Oct 2018.

The inexperienced are not warriors ‘because they haven’t done a tour’¹⁷⁸ and they won’t be warriors until they are ‘tested, blooded’.¹⁷⁹ Any allusion otherwise is an empty award and even those who deployed on operations suffer self-doubt. One soldier explained that he wouldn’t class himself as a warrior as his recent deployment to Afghanistan wouldn’t qualify as ‘warfighting’.¹⁸⁰ The nature of time and place are important and the warrior must have been situated appropriately to fully deserve the epithet. Warfare is a ‘geographically defined object’ and it is only there that ‘the special laws of war apply’ so ‘beyond that place one has no right to behave as a warrior.’¹⁸¹ Warriorship in this context then is something that is turned on and off as the warrior enters and exits the arena.

The “hero’s journey” as a ‘departure, initiation, and return sequence is made manifest as an individual undertakes a journey or a rite of passage, experiences a defining moment rooted in crisis, emerges victorious, and then returns home positively transformed by the adventure.’¹⁸²

That a warrior may claim to be so only where he has faced combat in that arena explains the ethicists concern regarding the return of *homo furens* from that place.

Training has a role in warriorship. It doesn’t turn out finished ‘blooded’ warriors (‘it’s one thing doing a course, another executing the job’)¹⁸³ and exposure to conflict retained its importance with close combat as the critical qualifier¹⁸⁴ but ‘combatives’¹⁸⁵ training or sport like boxing for example that involved laying hands upon another person were thought proxy activities. There was frustration that the avenues for exposing soldiers to close combat situations in training were not more readily available. ‘I was shocked by the lack of martial arts in the army – this is essential for fighting spirit’¹⁸⁶ said one officer. ‘The reason we don’t do hand-to-hand, boxing, fighting’ – the main activities offered as warrior pursuits – said one sergeant, is that ‘as an Army we are too nice, you want someone who can handle themselves in a bar fight and as an Army we have lost that’.¹⁸⁷ It was felt that policy constraint privileged risk over reward: organisationally the army was ‘not willing to take the G1¹⁸⁸ on the chin’.¹⁸⁹ A corporal appreciated and recommended

¹⁷⁸ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 02:02.

¹⁷⁹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 06:48.

¹⁸⁰ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 09:11.

¹⁸¹ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 58.

¹⁸² Mobbs, “Why Soldiers Crave a ‘Hero’s Journey’.”

¹⁸³ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 43:58.

¹⁸⁴ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 01:50.

¹⁸⁵ Matt Larsen, “Turning Soldiers into Warriors,” interview, *The Modern War Institute*, Sep 2018, <http://modernwarinstitute.libsyn.com/ep-59-turning-soldiers-into-warriors-with-matt-larsen>; ‘Chris’, “Why the British Army Needs a Combatives System,” *The Wavell Room*, 09 Feb 2018, at <https://wavellroom.com/2018/02/09/why-the-british-army-needs-a-combatives-system/>.

¹⁸⁶ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 10:40.

¹⁸⁷ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 15:50.

¹⁸⁸ Code for administrative and personnel issues – G1 is used colloquially for disciplinary procedure which this contributor suggested might better be embraced as something of an occupational hazard. Soldiers will fight (and might be expected to do so): disciplinary procedure is then the consequence of that was his view but the army would prefer that this was unnecessary since soldiers shouldn’t fight outside of combat conditions.

¹⁸⁹ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 18:10.

'milling', a test that paratroopers undergo in basic training¹⁹⁰ that brings out 'the sort of aggression that one sees in animals fighting':¹⁹¹ 'milling is about going forward and that's key to being a paratrooper, you can see the warrior.'¹⁹² This opinion, from a paratrooper is unsurprising but others similarly recommended Parachute Regiment training as a useful test for warriorship.¹⁹³

There's a lot that's wrong with the Parachute Regiment but one thing they do have is a really strong ethos; they know who they are and if you were to label them warriors due to their ethos and the individuals they have you wouldn't be far wrong.¹⁹⁴

That comment, an uncommon admission of admiration from a soldier of another regiment, was made grudgingly: it is no less illuminating for that.

'Today's generation of soldiers is different from that in the past but then there's never been two generations that are the same' is a truism:¹⁹⁵ it is however also common for every generation to think they had it 'harder' than those who follow. So it is for serving soldiers – and in particular the more experienced – with regard to those now enlisting. In the view of some respondents a tougher syllabus of training required introduction and defending, where recruits were to be warriors. The 'changed times' narrative suggests less capable recruits;¹⁹⁶ altered societal behaviour and demands, and less challenging training has led to reduced army potency and a sense that warriorship has been pushed beyond the reach of British soldiers. The view is heard in allied armies as well:

What leaders have observed in general is they believe that there is too much of a sense of entitlement, questioning of lawful orders, not listening to instruction, too much of a buddy mentality with NCOs and officers and a lot of tardiness being late to formation and duties.¹⁹⁷

Combat operations is a gateway but 'hard' training and imposed discipline allows the development of 'raw aggression'¹⁹⁸ important for fighting spirit. Notwithstanding the fact

¹⁹⁰ See Parr, *Our Boys*, 69-70.

¹⁹¹ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 124.

¹⁹² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 15:50. A recent twitter exchange about army boxing prompted a retired Parachute Regiment officer to express an alternative view. 'Repeated blows to the head cause brain damage. Fact. Care for soldiers' welfare is our greatest duty of care. In light of all recent medical studies on CTE [Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy – a neurodegenerative disease caused by repeated head injuries], etc, why do we continue to expose them to this risk?' @majfox 12 Dec 2019.

¹⁹³ For a sense of what is involved in paratrooper training see You Tube video at youtu.be/P89X8tqtFNI.

¹⁹⁴ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 13:20. The Warrior Ethos and Warrior Culture 'at its purest' Sharman argues is in the Parachute Regiment. Ant Sharman "Does Diversity Dilute the Warrior Ethos?" The Wavell Room, 19 July 2018 <https://wavellroom.com/2018/07/19/does-diversity-dilute-the-warrior-ethos/>

¹⁹⁵ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 01:40.

¹⁹⁶ The attitude of those already in a unit to those joining as newly trained recruits or as reinforcements is explored by Andrew Brown. His analysis – that new soldiers are never as poor as those receiving them would have it and in particular that 'no commanding officer ever admits that the reinforcements his unit receives have been properly trained' – appears broadly applicable to both circumstances. Andrew Brown, "New Men in the Line An Assessment of Reinforcements to the 48th Highlanders in Italy, January-October 1944," *Canadian Military History*, 21:3 (Summer 2012): 35-47, <https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/4/>.

¹⁹⁷ Maj. Gen. Malcolm Frost, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Center of Initial Military Training quoted in Matthew Cox, "Low Recruit Discipline Prompts Army to Redesign Basic Training," *Military.Com*, at <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/09/low-discipline-new-soldiers-prompts-army-redesign-basic-training.html>

¹⁹⁸ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 14:30.

that those who went before will charge that basic training is less challenging than 'in their day' there was a sense that the training undertaken now is less warriorlike or demanding than it might be: 'Phase One [basic training] is not a test anymore, recruits aren't back termed¹⁹⁹ anymore...the idea is you are continuously training so there's no fails...[it] is a standardless regime...only paras and marines fail people now.'²⁰⁰

Those who attended the focus groups have intimate and immediate interaction with newly trained soldiers: they were unsatisfied that warriors were being produced. However, COs thought training adequate for warriorship. 'Modern training methods':

will deliver the skills and enough of an attitude, an approach, to make anyone a warrior. It can be trained rather than born. Some are inherently better at being a warrior, but I believe everybody can get some of it with training, and approach, to a level that historically, would place them among 'elite' warrior units.²⁰¹

The process undertaken by the British Army as far as this CO is concerned enables recruits to achieve the status of warrior – and even elite warrior status so convinced is he by the training regime. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure what he means when he thinks of the warrior or the standard he is thinking of. A more junior officer recently published his thoughts that the establishment of good 'combat behaviours' (that allow combatants to control themselves and excel in combat) relied on instructor competence, realistic training and a robust program.²⁰² This seems applicable to most *homo furens* and all soldiers but not necessarily specific to those positioning against a warrior scale.

According to one officer, edging toward the 'twelve healthy infants' theory and conditioning,²⁰³ it is possible to calibrate and even recondition toward warriorship:

It all depends on whether you believe in nature or nurture! I believe in the latter hence, so long as an individual is born physically and mentally able, the [sic] theoretically could be nurtured into being a warrior...some can be trained/ re-nurtured accordingly.²⁰⁴

Mixing nature and nurture respondents even came close to promoting martial race theory. Britons can all be warriors: 'as a nation I would argue it is part of our DNA but it needs to be uncovered rather than installed'.²⁰⁵ Others thought it a word particular to

¹⁹⁹ A process where recruits who are failing some aspect of training recommence the course with the recruit course behind theirs and therefore qualify later.

²⁰⁰ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 20:57.

²⁰¹ CO24.

²⁰² His suggested formula is $CB = (r + p)^c$ where: 'CB' is Combat Behaviours, 'r' is realistic training, 'p' is a robust program and 'c' is instructor competence. Tom Bourke, 'Combat Behaviours,' Cove, 16 Apr 2018, <https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/article-combat-behaviours/>.

²⁰³ Watson, *Behaviourism*. John B. Watson & Rosalie Rayner, "Conditioned Emotional Reactions," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 3:1 (1920): 1–14, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/emotion.htm>. B. F. Skinner, "The Experimental Analysis of Operant Behaviour: A History," in eds. R. W. Rieber & Kurt Salzinger, *Psychology: Theoretical-Historical Perspectives*, (NY: Academic Press, 1980), 191-202.

²⁰⁴ CO28.

²⁰⁵ CO08.

certain cultures, even within the British Army.²⁰⁶ Warrior ‘means something to me as an Irishman – it means fighting person and we’ve always been good fighters’.²⁰⁷ Later, at the same focus group: ‘I’d look at the Fijians if you are looking for warriors...if I were to pick out warriors in our battalion the top two or three would likely be Fijians’.²⁰⁸ Others dismissed cultural and ethnic qualifiers²⁰⁹ and argued that ‘there are no biological or cultural barriers that cannot be overcome if the need arises’²¹⁰ preferring instead to make the soldier ‘highly schooled’²¹¹ through Blank Slate manipulation or ‘re-nurturing’.

Military culture is the determining factor in the quest toward warriorship but societal influence is an equally powerful component and may hold the key. Culture was associated with warriorship by 11 respondents; 8 of those consulted thought that where society wishes to build a cohort of warriors then there is responsibility beyond the army.

Not ‘anyone’ but the majority [can be warriors] if the socialisation process is favourable. This process can’t be owned only by the military – there must be an element of conscious or subconscious self-selection before the formal military socialisation process is started. If this self-selection is universal enough because of general socio-cultural norms (Sparta might be an example), then most people could probably be a warrior.²¹²

According to ex-US general and Defense Secretary James Mattis ‘most’ is an overestimate: only 30 percent of young Americans in his opinion would meet the physical, intellectual, and moral standards to even qualify for military service today.²¹³ The view that society matters most, possibly the most profound in some ways for its recognition that the army is not the definitive influence on martial identity, was agreed at a focus group of junior officers: ‘it’s a whole of culture thing, the whole society is aimed at the betterment of the warrior culture, support of the warrior’.²¹⁴

‘Warriors are born, soldiers are made – that’s a nice way to put it’²¹⁵ thought one focus

²⁰⁶ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 19:45.

²⁰⁷ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 00:51. Inferences toward martial race theory are readily dismissed now as ‘racist tropes’. Joe Humphreys, “Is Fighting In Our Genes? A Biological Theory of Warfare,” *The Irish Times*, 29 May 2018, <https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/is-fighting-in-our-genes-a-biological-theory-of-warfare-1.3505451>. Certain cultures though may be inclined to fighting (learned behaviour) and ‘race’ might otherwise be ‘a social’ not biological category. David Reich, “How to Talk About ‘Race’ and Genetics,” *The New York Times*, 30 Mar 2018, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/opinion/race-genetics.html>.

²⁰⁸ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 29:00.

²⁰⁹ It is not ‘ethnic quality’ that distinguishes but rather the fact that some units and formations are ‘efficient, well-organised, well-led and able to implement modern tactical techniques effectively.’ This is an important observation in an article that examines in depth the fighting spirit, identity and ethos of Irish regiments in the First World War. Nicholas Perry, “Maintaining Regimental Identity in the Great War: the Case of the Irish Infantry Regiments.” *Stand to! The Journal of the Western Front Association*, 52 (Apr 1998), 11.

²¹⁰ CO29.

²¹¹ CO18.

²¹² CO22.

²¹³ Kathy Roth-Douquet, “America’s Elite Needs to Get Back in Uniform: Military Service is a Unifying Force in a Time of Deep Division,” *Foreign Policy*, 25 Sept 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/military-service-warrior-caste-united-states/>.

²¹⁴ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 02:00.

²¹⁵ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 16:00.

group attendee. Warriors and soldiers are thus differentiated: T1 and T2, the stoic and the fighter. The warrior who 'does what they think they should do or what they want to do, a soldier though is rules and regulations'²¹⁶ acting under direction, not from free will. Warriors are 'twice volunteers' – once to enlist then to fight, doing and being.

There is something here about volunteering: it's the difference between doing something because you've been told to do it and doing something because you want to do it, a desire to put yourself in difficult situations, to have a combat experience as opposed to a reluctance to do it; the word soldier can sometimes evoke those feelings of reluctance, pressed men, conscription, all those kind of slightly negative terms...'²¹⁷

Where this is accepted it is obvious why the army is promoting warrior over soldier: it is less the superficial attraction or carnival suggestion of the word warrior and more rejection of the inferences associated with the word soldier toward something motivational or dynamic. Warrior is otherwise the personification of the fighting spirit thought necessary on future battlefields.

Whilst lots of other things, technology, cyber, quantum computing...even the geo-political context in which we sit is changing, the nature of warfare will always take us back at some stage to the infantryman having to do the warrior thing. What they did in the Peloponnesian war was similar to what they did in the Falklands, its similar to what the bloke in the First World War and the Second World War did.²¹⁸

'Technology and doctrine are just two elements of a set of interdependent factors composing a system whose sole purpose is to deploy and sustain a single weapon—the most effective infantryman possible.'²¹⁹ With similar sentiments: 'when all the cyber is done and the expensive bombs have been dropped and the smart weapons used you will still have a bloke with a bayonet who is at the sharp end and who is probably slightly out of control and he's the guy you can rely on in the final analysis'.²²⁰ This 'bloke with a bayonet', a near berserker in this analysis – the infantry soldier who engages 'at the level of immediate close combat' and as such is relatively timeless²²¹ – is the most familiar and agreed warrior figure: a simplistic but powerful image²²² it gained mention most often.

Summary

How British soldiers understand 'warrior' is indeterminate. They have no benchmark with individuals privileging different elements. Contradiction between colleagues was evident and no agreement was had on warriorship as a consequence of nature or nurture. A

²¹⁶ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 14:41.

²¹⁷ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 14:39.

²¹⁸ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 23:30.

²¹⁹ Edward G. Miller, 'To Build Infantry for the Future, Look First to the Past,' *Modern War Institute*, 15 Oct 2018, <https://mwi.usma.edu/build-infantry-future-look-first-past/>

²²⁰ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 59:43.

²²¹ King, "Beyond the Primary Group," 709.

²²² Bourke mentions the 'fury and dismay' at threats to strip bayonets, 'the emblem of combatancy' from non-infantry prior to WW2. Bourke, *Intimate History*, 43.

sense of elitism was apparent in how soldiers thought the term should be applied whether through self-selection, training or experience but it was clear that warrior is not a universally recognised or acknowledged term for British soldiers. Attractive to some, others took more comfort from being known more simply as soldiers. Several soldiers made an attempt to simplify the difference: 'soldier is transactional, warriors are transformational';²²³ the soldier provides a basic service; the warrior sees and fills the cracks;²²⁴ 'we want warriors in times of conflict but soldiers in other times'.²²⁵ The view that soldiers are automatons resonated: one officer used 'neutral' and 'grey' to describe soldiers.²²⁶ A separate phenomenon, warriors were 'exclusive' but also 'excluded'.²²⁷

The infantry soldiers surveyed didn't think warrior a title that extends to all British soldiers. Only 1 in 10 applied soldier and warrior synonymously. The terms were separated by centring the latter on 'fighting', a specific act and 'binary indicator':²²⁸ soldiering was a much broader term involving duty beyond fighting. More generously but still divisively: 'I don't think soldier and warrior is synonymous – glory is a word I associate with warrior, honour and duty with soldier, some of us are warriors but you have to be a soldier'.²²⁹ And so discrete elements are identified. Concerning in light of the view that the warrior is a fighter (a frequently quoted descriptor) is the statement that 'not every soldier is a fighter'.²³⁰ Soldiers are then actively excluded from donning the mantle of the warrior.

The desire to be a warrior though was palpable – if only to deny it to others. The first draw was thought internal; but performance as a warrior may then be refined through nurturing. Mindset and mentality were important but so too standards imposed in training. The individual must want to be a warrior then the organisation must train them. Research revealed that warriorship was considered primarily to be a personal endeavour, and not an organisational construct. Warriorship is about individual desire and drive. 'Whilst you can be trained to be more resilient, more aggressive, the sort of passion and self-determination/discipline cannot be manufactured'.²³¹ Warriorship 'is more of a personal issue' and in the opinion of this officer 'the Army as a corporation does little to foster this'.²³² Having examined how soldiers understand, or rather didn't fully comprehend the word warrior, next I discover how comfortable they are being known as warriors.

²²³ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 34:30.

²²⁴ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 06:55.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, 11:43.

²²⁶ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 22:12.

²²⁷ GS3:12 Feb 19, 1:07:50.

²²⁸ Scott Nestler, 'The Combat Patch: Binary Indicator or Something More?' *Small Wars Journal*, (2013). <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-combat-patch-binary-indicator-or-something-more>

²²⁹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 08:20.

²³⁰ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 10:46.

²³¹ CO26.

²³² CO30.

6. British Warriors?

'A Person Who Makes War'

In 2003 the British Army fought in the US-led invasion of Iraq: since 2001 British soldiers have been deploying to Afghanistan. At the height of each campaign there were 45,000 troops in Iraq and over 10,000 in Afghanistan. They deployed with the full range of equipment and weapons for 'warfighting' or Major Combat Operations. It was a time of intense activity, and arguably, given the national resource expended and the numbers involved, the most significant overseas commitment of national combat power since 1945. Formations deployed and applied themselves to a range of scenarios for which they had been trained, prepared and anticipated, and some for which they had not. Battles were fought, casualties were incurred, and soldiers died: enemy forces too were killed. British soldiers were 'making war' and the army was operating at high tempo in the most demanding of circumstances. If warriorship was ever a thing, and warrior a term of reference for British soldiers it would be observable during this time.

I examined over 450 interviews of soldiers who served in these wars. The lack of reference to the words 'warrior', warriorship or warrior ethos is startling. Of 150 interviews²³³ from Operation Herrick, the UK military codename for operations in Afghanistan, 'warrior' was mentioned just 64 times: 53 of those with reference to the



Fig. 6.1: Warrior IFV

British Army's Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) known as a 'Warrior' and shown in Fig. 6.1²³⁴ and once when referring to a US helicopter, the Kiowa-Warrior;²³⁵ it was mentioned five times in relation to Afghan soldiers, occasionally known by rank as 'warrior' instead of private.²³⁶ An officer spoke about the Afghan warrior culture²³⁷ but did not elaborate; another said British

soldiers must present as 'Honourable Warriors'²³⁸ by adhering to the Pashtunwali Code²³⁹

²³³ Conducted from October 2005 to January 2010.

²³⁴ This image is in the public domain. Accessed at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Warrior_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle.jpg on 29 Feb 20 under Creative Commons SA.

²³⁵ Commanding Officer (CO), Operation Herrick (Op Herrick) 2009, Post Operations Interview (POI), Land Warfare Centre (LWC), 22 Jan 2010.

²³⁶ CO, Op Herrick 2008/09, POI, LWC, 22 May 2009; CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 20 Nov 2009 (3 times); CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 22 Jan 2010.

²³⁷ CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 25 Feb 2010.

²³⁸ CO, Op Herrick 2008/09, POI, LWC, 03 Sep 2009.

²³⁹ Pashtunwali is a code and a non-written law for the Pashtun people which dates to pre-Islamic times.

and thus demonstrating cultural sensitivity. Warrior ethos was mentioned just once in relation to British soldiers;²⁴⁰ 'warrior mentality' once referring to the attitude of Afghan troops.²⁴¹ On only a single occasion did a (non-infantry) commander talk about a need to 'engender more of a warrior spirit' in his unit.²⁴² The references are all from one 12 month period in a 5 year timeframe. The term was not prevalent and appears more likely inculcated by local gatekeepers than. There is no evidence of warrior as an enduring organisational cultural reference point in the British Army in the Afghanistan archive.

In over 300 interviews recorded between 2004 and 2008 from operations in Iraq (known as 'Operation Telic') with personnel ranked from Major to Major-General, the word warrior is mentioned 230 times: again (on 226 occasions) mostly with reference to the IFV.²⁴³ Of the remaining few instances a logistics officer refers to 'G2/G3 warriors'²⁴⁴ (a disparaging comment on the lack of logistics expertise in combat officers); the remaining three comments relate to American soldiers.

I was very envious of their ability to remain a purely military, rather than a political organisation: a true warrior class, with the full backing of their country, and with the resources they need to do whatever they see fit.²⁴⁵

The implication is that the British Army is politically tainted, and not a warrior class. Then, building on this issue of military-political affiliation, the British 'Comprehensive Approach'²⁴⁶ is compared to what is perceived as a more pure military approach by the Americans: "their attitude was very much "I'm a warrior and I don't do sewage".²⁴⁷ Finally 'warrior' was used to differentiate experiences and competencies, purpose and geographical deployments: 'the Americans tend to have their "Iraq Warriors" in the same way that we had "Northern Ireland Warriors" in the past'.²⁴⁸ The interviews show that warrior was no more a common term of reference for British soldiers at war in Iraq than it was in Afghanistan.

Discipline, cohesion, sacrifice, strength and authority according to Major Buckingham of the US Army²⁴⁹ are warrior traits: these are situated according to national preference and organisational cultural norm. Research respondents thought the word limited by such

²⁴⁰ CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 24 Feb 2010.

²⁴¹ CO, Op Herrick 2009, POI, LWC, 16 Feb 2010.

²⁴² CO, Op Telic 2009, POI, LWC, 04 May 2010.

²⁴³ The Warrior IFV was more widely utilised in Iraq than in Afghanistan.

²⁴⁴ Logisticians under this code are G4 officers, G2 is intelligence, G3 identifies operations staff. Staff Officer (SO), Operation Telic 2006, POI, LWC, 14 Dec 2006.

²⁴⁵ SO, Op Telic 2006, POI, LWC, 07 Jul 2006.

²⁴⁶ UK MOD Document (2005), *The Comprehensive Approach*. Joint Discussion Note 4/05. This approach sees all levers of government working together in a collegiate manner.

²⁴⁷ SO, Op Telic 2006/07, POI, LWC, 16 May 2007. Warrior fits with this American service persons warfighting self-image. The requirement to 'do sewage' is the responsibility of troops involved in stabilisation (not warfighting) activity. In Iraq sewage was part of the 'SWET' effort where troops focussed on providing Sewage, Water, Electricity, and Trash services to the population.

²⁴⁸ SO, Op Telic 2007, POI, LWC, 04 Feb 2008.

²⁴⁹ Buckingham, "Warrior Ethos," 5.

frames and frequently declared the concept as ‘an Americanism’²⁵⁰ (‘the Americans are big into this stuff’).²⁵¹ British officer cadets who contributed to Kayß research had a similar view. They explained that they did not like the word warrior: they perceived it as ‘too bragging, too antiquated or too American’²⁵² – and not a ‘British’ term of reference. America and its military is the key reference point when discussing the phenomenon: ‘warrior sounds really American’ was a common refrain.²⁵³ It was less well recognised and much less often embraced as a British term.

One officer thought ancient reference points more useful. ‘There’s a Roman model of an army and a Greek model’:

The Greek model of army is a citizen soldier army that fights for the idea of nation and tends to fight wars of national determination; the Americans have a Greek model of Army; they created the idea of nation by fighting for it...they have a view of warrior culture much like the Greeks had. The Roman idea of an army is a small professional army, distinct from the nation, used for wars of national interest and expansion as opposed to determination. The British is an army like that – a small professional army that has been abroad, with a very closed sense of its own identity...²⁵⁴

Service, he continued, allows soldiers from outside the UK to become members of the nation – in the Roman style,²⁵⁵ whereas Americans are citizens ‘who defended liberty in time of emergency and returned home after the threat had passed’.²⁵⁶ There is much that could be debated here: two issues are selected. First, the American soldier is presented as the traditional warrior of the UK feudal system, *homo furens* who fights for the local community (the *comitia curiata*): the British soldier is expeditionary, a tool of government, within the *comitia centuriata*,²⁵⁷ an ‘instrument of limited war, designed to achieve limited goals at limited cost’.²⁵⁸ In reality the British Army is historically characterised as having the ‘quality of impermanence’²⁵⁹ and serves at home or abroad: it cannot be aligned with or disassociated from either model.

Secondly, this respondent reinforces consideration of the warrior as a non-professional whereas the soldier, that Roman figure, is the professional. Alex Danchev made the same distinction but in reverse. For him the US are the Romans – an expeditionary

²⁵⁰ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 20:29.

²⁵¹ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 35:20.

²⁵² Kayß, “Combat and Peacekeeping.”

²⁵³ FG13: Parachute Regiment (‘P Company’) Instructors 02 Nov 18, 14:50.

²⁵⁴ GS5, 19 Mar 19, 05:30.

²⁵⁵ Porch suggests this would include members of private security companies and proxy forces as well. It is not without its implications. Douglas Porch, “Expendable Soldiers.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25:3 (2014): 696-716, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.893974>.

²⁵⁶ William M Beasley, “The Rise, Fall, and Early Reawakening of US Naval Professionalism” in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 108.

²⁵⁷ Gat, *Nations*, 62.

²⁵⁸ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*, 43.

²⁵⁹ Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, xix.

warrior force deployed globally in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – whilst the British possess ‘the wisdom of latter day Greeks.’²⁶⁰ Such debate may seem moot but failure to investigate ‘the cultural context in which decisions are made’ whether in a Greek or Roman style for example, traditionalist or modernist,²⁶¹ means ‘we are left with narrow and meaningless insights into strategic behaviour.’²⁶² The point here is less which relates best and more that these commentators offer four armies different and distinct from each other, but also the same in some instances. A complicated matrix appears with many variations: the British, the British-Greek, the British-Roman army etc. We cannot assume that standards, behaviours or culture are consistent across armies – nor adopt terms of reference or models without extensive elaboration and explanation of what is meant.

The manner in which organisations present themselves (and are perceived) is considered important.

The American army is very public, demonstrative, overt: “we are warriors”. In the British Army it’s a much more reflective, pragmatic, sense of what we do. There is a visceral reality to the idea of warrior in the British Army – it’s not a public statement.²⁶³

Warrior then is a more obvious and deliberate term and not one to be adopted where a force wishes to present more subtly or less superficially. Another officer was more concerned about the British Army’s inability to match the US standard of warriorship, which to his mind is technologically and financially enabled, as well as culturally distinct. It relates also to numbers of soldiers and the freedom for greater specialisation.

I don’t know if I like the warrior thing or not; I like the idea of it but my nervousness is about the fact that it is so inculcated in the American army, the American infantry, and I’m nervous about following in this culturally because we are different. We’re smaller, we’re poorer.²⁶⁴

The research shows warrior is mostly understood in a US context²⁶⁵ and the recognisable contemporary example is the American combatant not the British soldier regardless that both have been to war in recent decades, and mostly the same wars. We can then separate war as an activity from the warrior as *homo furens*. ‘For one truly to be a warrior, it would seem, requires that there be a war’²⁶⁶ but going to war does not in itself make the soldier a warrior.

²⁶⁰ Alex Danchev, “Greeks and Romans: Anglo-American Relations After 9/11,” *The RUSI Journal*, 148:2 (Apr 2003): 16.

²⁶¹ Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” 6.

²⁶² Stuart Poore, “Review: What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture,” *Review of International Studies*, 29:2 (April 2003): 284, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097850>

²⁶³ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 06:24.

²⁶⁴ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 01:00.

²⁶⁵ The US Army has produced a 308 page document that explains their perspective. ‘The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills’ dated 13 Aug 13 at <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/tc3-21-75.pdf> on 10 Oct 18.

²⁶⁶ Michael Robillard, “Risk, War, and the Dangers of Soldier Identity.” *Journal of Military Ethics* 16:3-4 (2017): 207, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2017.1412131>

'Not a Word For Us'

There was evidence of significant contemplation of the meaning of warrior and demonstrable caution in electing support amongst those surveyed. Respondents didn't assume meaning in place of personal understanding.

We live in language. We can never step outside of language. Language by its very nature is a differentiating device. Once I say good, it's not bad. Once I say right, it can't be wrong. We are carving up and categorizing the world in every moment...We don't have shared meaning, we don't have shared discourses, but we act as if we share them. They're what we take for granted.²⁶⁷

I expected the word and title warrior to be overwhelmingly popular. I thought soldiers would instinctively find it attractive. Responses, borne out in the disparate responses to the statement 'I am a Warrior', suggested otherwise. Less than 50% of those surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed that they were warriors, and significant numbers (26% of COs and 40% of soldiers, an average of 36%) had no opinion of how or if the term applied personally.




Fig. 6.2: 'I am a Warrior'

The OED definition has the warrior as 'a person famous or skilled in war.'

By this definition, very few British officers and soldiers can legitimately describe themselves as warriors. Some – those who have proved themselves in combat – can, but the vast majority cannot. I have answered

²⁶⁷ Sheila McNamee in discussion. Efran *et al.* "Dialogue." 7.

'no opinion' against question 3 [I Am A Warrior] because, although I have taken part in combat, I'm not sure I can honestly describe myself as 'famous or skilled in war'.²⁶⁸

Others were similarly uncertain – some based on their perception of the meaning of the word, others because they felt they neither met the dictionary definition.

COs have careers that take them from command and regimental employment where they expect to be deployed on exercise or operations to staff or office-based duties more frequently than lower ranked soldiers. 'Officers direct the killing but very seldom participate in it.'²⁶⁹ They find themselves managing the business of Defence as often as they see the opportunity as 'warrior or heroic leader.'²⁷⁰ It is understandable then that they may feel unentitled to the legend of warrior that, according to this research, is bound to fighting. Huntington would explain that COs are managers not deliverers of violence: soldiers are 'specialists in the application of violence'²⁷¹ so they might be more positively disposed to the title. In fact they were even less sure than the COs of the personal applicability of the word (only 43% of soldiers as opposed to 61% of COs agreed or strongly agreed that they were warriors).

The responses of the COs raised concern in focus groups. 'I don't see how an infantry CO can say he is not a warrior...our COs lead by example...maybe they think more clinically'²⁷² opined a JNCO, contemplating the emotional inferences of the term. Junior officers' were less prepared to allow their seniors to distance themselves from being warriors: 'as officers the guiding principle is leading by example so how can we not be warriors but our soldiers are?'²⁷³ Where this was false humility, or a demonstration of British reserve and 'stiff upper lip' on the part of the COs, the junior officers suggested the author should 'ask their men instead'²⁷⁴ for a more honest representation. Where this measurement is accepted, warriorship and the entitlement to the title is then awarded by external agents and not personally assumed. The research showed that officers think infantry soldiers are warriors, but they considered themselves and other soldiers less so: soldiers contrarily think officers are as warriorlike if not more so than they are. Neither group seems to feel particularly warriorlike in themselves but expect others, like them or perhaps thought better, to adopt the title – and can be indignant where the second party refuses it.

²⁶⁸ CO10.

²⁶⁹ Grossman, *On Killing*, 63.

²⁷⁰ Kier, *Imagining War*, 4.

²⁷¹ Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 11. H. M. 'Mike' Denny, "Professionals Know When to Break the Rules" in Finney & Mayfield, *Redefining*, 58.

²⁷² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 48:00.

²⁷³ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 37:35.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 38:20.

Warrior is an embryonic and relatively new term in British Army lexicon: it would be bold and illustrative of 'early adopter' or entrepreneurial attitudes rare in bureaucratic and conservative organisations to see the term seized upon quickly. This may explain some of the reluctance regarding its adoption. From the answers given though it seem to be a more profound problem: respondents simply do not recognise themselves as warriors. They don't understand the word and are unclear on its meaning. The 36% of respondents who had no opinion on whether or not they were warriors, coupled with the 15% who rejected it suggests warriorship is an uneasy fit for over half of those consulted. It's not a natural term for the British Army thought one officer;²⁷⁵ its 'not a word for us' was the opinion of a company commander.²⁷⁶ The deployment of a special class of warrior by Australia at the height of the Afghanistan campaign was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. By 2019 Australia had decided that warrior is not a word for them either and was distancing itself from the concept promoting instead 'soldiering' as their rallying call.²⁷⁷ Their recently published Creed begins: 'I am an Australian soldier who is an expert in close combat...' There is no mention of warriors.

'I am not a massive fan of the word warrior'.²⁷⁸ Like the company commander who thought the word inapplicable, this CO wouldn't champion it as a term for the soldiers under his command. As a gatekeeper he has that authority. If he chose otherwise and promoted the term he might find his audience unreceptive. Warrior was declared by soldiers to be the opposite of 'ally' – British Army slang for anything desirable and covetable, or fashionable. Warriorhood was considered 'chippie'²⁷⁹ meaning undesirable or common, and the opposite of 'ally'. Soldiers were blunt in their dismissal. It was thought cringey, cringeworthy and 'cheesy'.²⁸⁰ As a term of reference it was even treated with derision. The potential for the voluntary adoption of a term thought so unattractive by image conscious soldiers is low. Another admitted an initial attraction to the term warrior but then having considered its meaning thought it less so. 'My initial thoughts were that I can relate to that [warrior as a term] but then when I began to really think about it I found it difficult to answer the questions – I relate to soldier more easily'.²⁸¹ When asked about the naming of a Company of soldiers as 'Spartan Company' – a

²⁷⁵ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 22:50.

²⁷⁶ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 04:00.

²⁷⁷ "Good Soldiering: Army's Cultural Optimisation Program," Australian DoD, updated 04 Mar 2019, <https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/good-soldiering>. This programme is a result of an ongoing enquiry into the warrior ethos of the 'special class'. Andrew Greene, "Former Spy Boss Begins Wide-ranging Review of Australia's Special Forces," *ABC News*, 11 Jun 2018, <https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-10/former-spy-boss-begins-review-of-australias-special-forces/9855430>. Criticism of the UK for failing to recognise similar issues is made by Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen, "The UK Should Learn from the Transgressions of Australian Special Forces," *Small Wars Journal*, at <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/uk-should-learn-transgressions-australian-special-forces-on-14-Sep-2018>.

²⁷⁸ CO24.

²⁷⁹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 39:00.

²⁸⁰ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 29:50; FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 11:55; FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 02:13.

²⁸¹ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 00:30.

seemingly obvious reference to warriorship – it was explained it wasn't what it seems. It was discovered that soldiers in training had similar regimental (or identifying serial) numbers. 'The Company comprised new recruits whose regimental numbers started 300- and 301- so they were called 'The 300s'²⁸² which then morphed into 'the Spartans' after the movie '300'.²⁸³ An instructor explained that few people realised the origins of the name. In so explaining, he emphasises through minor anecdote how myth can grow, and how a word with meaning can be misappropriated. Those unaware of the provenance thought it a complimentary term for recruits who had or were expected to perform well, in warriorlike fashion. The reference was created by NCOs whose regimental numbers began 291- and 292- for amusement and neither for purposes of morale nor to instil a sense of identity. It certainly wasn't adopted for its original value.

The attraction of the term was completely lost on some respondents: its 'old-fashioned'²⁸⁴; it meant something once²⁸⁵ – not now. The term is 'time-expired.'

Some years ago I would have seen 'warrior' as referring to a soldier with high levels of professionalism and commitment to soldiering. Unfortunately, I now think that the term has become quite hackneyed and I tend to avoid using it personally, despite respecting its original meaning.²⁸⁶

The word is 'over-used'.²⁸⁷ Others thought it unrelatable: 'when I hear of warriors I think of Romans, I think of Vikings, I think of blood thirsty savages';²⁸⁸ a second respondent said it conjured similar images for him and he associated it with words like 'mythical, Norse, Viking, rape and pillage'.²⁸⁹ Another: 'spears...Amazons; that's not me, different circumstances'.²⁹⁰ It might be made relevant but only where the word is reconstructed. 'The norms and what was acceptable for the warrior in history were very different from what is acceptable now; I'm saying the warrior ethos now is altered due to training and control'.²⁹¹ This view was validated in a focus group: 'warrior now means something different because we have rules of war, the standards now are different and culture is also a thing, definition is changing over time, constantly changing'.²⁹² It might then 'be a word for us' but only after some considerable redefinition. A repackaging of 'warrior' is therefore necessary or a word already in use, like soldier, could be reinforced.

'Policy Gets In The Way'

²⁸² FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 19:00.

²⁸³ 300 (2006), Zack Snyder.

²⁸⁴ CO27.

²⁸⁵ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 02:45.

²⁸⁶ CO29.

²⁸⁷ CO15.

²⁸⁸ FG2: RRT, 14 Nov 18, 14:41.

²⁸⁹ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 08:00.

²⁹⁰ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 04:30.

²⁹¹ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 10:00.

²⁹² FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 03:04.

What is normatively right can be privileged over what is instrumentally right.²⁹³ Comments made suggested a separation between what soldiers think they should be doing, particularly where they agree with the pursuit of warriorship, what society wants and expects from them, and how the Army reads society's signal. The warrior is the embodiment of the 'tension between soldierly actions and the self-image' of civilian society.²⁹⁴ Perceived constraints as well as practical obstacles laid in the path of the aspiring warrior through strategic culture, societal preference, the law, morals and military ethics were considered impediments to warriorship.

The British Army is not simply being forced to mirror contemporary society. It increasingly runs the danger of being bogged down by attitudes which are utterly inimical to conventional military values. One might well argue that the day the British soldier becomes a model of caring citizenship is the day that he can no longer be counted upon to hold the pass against the thug and tyrant.²⁹⁵

The separation is functional as well as cultural. 'Society wants us to kill but they don't want to know about it.'²⁹⁶ This causes concern and nervousness: the sponsor 'wants us to be warriors when it suits them'²⁹⁷ leaving the soldier in a position of uncertainty over whether or not he or she will be supported in the aftermath. The recruiting adverts it is believed 'are directed at the mums and dads to reassure them that 'their children will be OK' and not to inspire:²⁹⁸ it was thought where 'the British Army released adverts showing warriors kicking in doors there would be a lot of upset people out there.'²⁹⁹

The relationship between warriorship and society's perception of soldiering is the crux of the issue here and these comments underline concern regarding the army's place in society but also a 'creeping aversion to risk'³⁰⁰ regarding the employment of the armed forces. Soldiers understand that they serve in an environment of 'postmodern militarism' where society admires the military but can reject 'the discipline and sacrifice necessary to achieve it'.³⁰¹ Societal values can be 'inimical to the culture of the armed forces'³⁰² and the 'more libertarian values of modern Britain with their emphasis on the freedom of the individual rather than obligation or collective identity are sometimes at odds with the values and behaviour needed to create the spirit and cohesiveness required in battle'.³⁰³

²⁹³ Farrell, "Review Article. Culture and Military Power," 414.

²⁹⁴ Herbert-Rothe, "The Democratic Warrior," 286.

²⁹⁵ Antony Beevor, "The Army and Modern Society," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 73-4.

²⁹⁶ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 45:00.

²⁹⁷ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 17:43.

²⁹⁸ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 10:45.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 53:40.

³⁰⁰ Houghton, "RUSI Annual CDS Lecture," 2013.

³⁰¹ Charles J. Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: the Erosion of Civilian Control of the US Military," *Wake Forest Law Review*, 29:2 (Summer 1994): 387, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2538/

³⁰² French, *Military Identities*, 350.

³⁰³ General Sir Roger Wheeler, "Peacemakers Know That Britain Will Deliver," *RUSI Journal*, 144:2

The UK public are confused too about what they think of their soldiers and how they should be termed. A recent YouGov survey asked ‘which members of the armed forces, if any, should be considered heroes.’³⁰⁴ Of the Britons surveyed 32% (see Fig. 6.2) thought all armed forces personnel were heroes; 31% believed that only armed forces personnel who performed bravely should be described as heroes.³⁰⁵ Roughly one fifth thought serving in a combat role or having seen combat qualified the armed forces³⁰⁶ as heroes. These compare favourably to the sentiments of soldier respondents to the title warrior. Some personnel are more worthy of recognition as heroes just as some are thought more deserving of the term warrior. Neither is a universal identifier.




Fig. 6.3: Civilian Attitudes to Martial Identity

The YouGov survey shows the responses to the same question from samples in the USA and in Germany.³⁰⁷ ‘In Germany, the most common response was that no members of

(Apr/May 1999): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849908446367>.

³⁰⁴ Matthew Smith, “Are The Troops Heroes?” YouGov Survey, 26 Sep 2018 at <https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/09/25/are-troops-heroes-americans-britons-and-germans-fe> accessed on 30 Nov 2018. © 2018 YouGov plc. All Rights Reserved.

³⁰⁵ You Gov Survey (GB adults) accessed at https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/ja6noaoxnu/InternalResults_180725_TroopHeroes.pdf on 30 Nov 2018. © 2018 YouGov plc. All Rights Reserved.

³⁰⁶ Acknowledged as a larger cohort that includes all three services but for purposes of comparison here taken as soldiers.

³⁰⁷ The US and Germany are useful comparators given the different perspectives on the military. US

the armed forces should be described as heroes. By contrast, only 5% of Americans and 6% of Britons said the same.³⁰⁸ Americans were most comfortable with their armed forces in the broadest sense being known as heroes, as with their naming as warriors, regardless of function or experience. The US and German examples mark British military identity boundaries – and emphasise that strategic as well as military culture is relevant.

From a strategic consideration to one more tactical: the lack of an approved British Army fighting knife. This was thought illustrative of the absent appetite for warriorship and what was termed the neglect of ‘precision combat’:

We are in the infantry and we don’t have a knife, it’s on the badge but we don’t have one...at one stage [we] trialled 50 different knives but that faded away as they were advised against it, there’s just no hunger for it, I was told there was no need for it.³⁰⁹

Knives are considered symbolic of warriorship: the bayonet, iconic image of the infantry, and centrepiece of corporate identity was cited for special attention. That the bayonet in recent times has been responsible for comparatively few deaths is irrelevant: it continues to be revered as the tool that instils aggression, unites individuals and is ‘the decisive element’ of the infantry attack.³¹⁰ It occupies ‘a central position in the acculturation of the foot soldier’.³¹¹ ‘The infantry has just gone through a rebranding process’ advised the senior officer with responsibility for infantry ethos and the appropriateness of ‘the knife’ was discussed, not in terms of its symbolic power or its utility in combat but in the light of an increase in crime involving the use of knives in UK society:

Our symbol is a big knife. How does that play?...That bayonet is historical, legacy, it’s part of who we are and what we do – close combat may require our soldiers to stick a bayonet in someone but in some ways we are going against the societal narrative. Promotion of the warrior ethos then can be a double-edged weapon.³¹²

Around the time of this interview it was even suggested that the army could be the antidote for societal knife crime, an awkward conflation of elements of this discussion.³¹³

Where society’s nervousness over the place of the bayonet is privileged, and policy clashes with military practice, behaviours and expectations become confused.

The warrior is characterized by a strong attachment to professional values, a clearly defined distance from civilian society and a high measure of

soldiers are lauded and thanked for their service; German soldiers feel ‘forgotten and unappreciated’ by their country. Noah Barkin, “Where Veterans Aren’t Thanked for Their Service,” *The Atlantic*, 06 Aug 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/what-makes-german-military-veteran/595381/>

³⁰⁸ Smith, “Are The Troops Heroes?”

³⁰⁹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 46:20.

³¹⁰ King, *Combat Soldier*, 98-115.

³¹¹ Hew Strachan, “Training, Morale and Modern War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41:2 (Apr 2006): 217, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009406062054>.

³¹² GS6: 15 Mar 19, 14:00.

³¹³ Deborah Haynes, “Penny Mordaunt Says Army Can Help Tackle ‘Blight’ of Knife Crime,” *Sky News*, 4 Jun 2019, <http://news.sky.com/story/penny-mordaunt-says-army-can-help-tackle-blight-of-knife-crime-11735041>

professionalism. The virtues that the warrior represents do not reflect the values of his or her particular society or community.³¹⁴

The warrior can be anachronistic and separate yet is embraced as a cure for society's ills. It is why the term warrior must be cautiously engaged with. The idea that the military must fully match the broader societal narrative can also be overplayed, and the British Army should also exercise caution before compromising its values. It may have a strong case for occasional exemption.³¹⁵ Equally care is needed in not overemphasising something that may actually be irrelevant. One soldier suggested the knife is less iconic, or representative of warriorhood than corporately or academically presented: 'the knife I carry on my belt is for cutting string.'³¹⁶

The perceived need of the army for a fighting knife and society's rejection of the same could be viewed as metaphorical. The retention of the bayonet for its intended purpose may be an anachronism, but it remains 'a useful all-purpose knife.'³¹⁷ The army too is for killing, like a combat knife or bayonet with a single blade, but it is often also called upon to deliver more diverse, utilitarian functions, like a Swiss Army Knife. Some tasks might compromise combat purity but army culture expressed through the stories relayed previously promote broader force utility. The iconography of warriorship might then require 'downplaying a bit'³¹⁸ both to satisfy societal concern, or service a critical juncture and also so the army can present more honestly, and responsively. The extent to which the 'profession of arms is an exclusive culture' and requires recognition as 'one that is much more separated from civilian society than postmodern militarism supposes'³¹⁹ is the crux of the issue here but the tyranny of the issue of the day might also render the army helpless in any debate. One officer mulled 'warrior' as a term that would be permitted in the face of pressure regardless of army preference: 'whether it sticks or not will be partly political and partly societal'³²⁰ and so he recognises that the army's identity, the knife it wishes to be, is determined externally. The free hand von Moltke desired³²¹ for the military is restrained, a sense of identity bewilderment is introduced and fighting ethos can be undermined.

The Army uses the phrase [warriorship] then they actively dilute it. The amount of procedure and things like that which we have to chin off [ignore]...we need to expose the men to violence regularly and they just

³¹⁴ Herbert-Rothe, "The Democratic Warrior," 290.

³¹⁵ Amongst Americans 'critical of our military's conduct, the majority believes the military may need different and less egalitarian standards than civilian society.' Kori Schake & Jim Mattis, "Ensuring a Civil-Military Connection," in Kori N Schake & James N. Mattis (eds.), *Warriors And Citizens: American Views of Our Military*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2016), 306.

³¹⁶ FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 11:50.

³¹⁷ A. L. Thompson, "The Bayonet," *BAR* 26, (Aug 1967), 76.

³¹⁸ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 03:44.

³¹⁹ Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta," 389.

³²⁰ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 41:20.

³²¹ See page 43.

are not...Bayonet lesson – why is that so wrapped up in procedure?³²²

The clash here is between civilian control of the military whilst recognising the civilians don't always understand the nuances of marital activity, and the demands that the military self-polices but to acceptable societal standards.

Warriorship demands 'bursts of really strong physical activity: punching, kicking, stabbing, wrestling, the sense you can't keep going any more – that's not built in to our physical training'. This officer continues: 'we train for other particular functions but none of those functions are proper close combat'³²³ and so there is a gap in competence. The skills associated with close combat requires courage – 'a muscle that needs to be developed' but policy prevents this for fear of 'breaking' people'.³²⁴ That the army had adjusted training too keenly to fit with societal constraint was a prominent opinion. 'We have adjusted the terminology to the extant process of training, rather than adjusting the training to match what we think is the requirement for the warrior capability'.³²⁵ This tension between policy constraint and what is viewed as military necessity was tangible. 'Policy gets in the way';³²⁶ 'it's no longer acceptable to do the more challenging things [in training]'³²⁷ and standards are compromised as a result.

Men need to be hardened in peace if they are to be tough enough for war. But the very processes designed to achieve this cut across the integration of armed forces with civilian society. Training soldiers to kill, and getting them to realize that it is certainly proper and legitimate to do so, creates a division more complete in peace than is likely to be the case in war — when the perceived need for the soldier's skills endorses his actions.³²⁸

Caputo warns that shadowboxing won't prepare soldiers for street-fighting.³²⁹ British soldiers had similar concerns. 'The problem now is that it has become acceptable not to be at a standard, there is no basic standard anymore'.³³⁰

Few soldiers defended the policy, legal or societal constraints that the Army operates under as enhancing warriorship. This is not new.

The content of a military ethic (beyond such things as courage or loyalty which are obviously required for fighting well) can sometimes strike soldiers as a sort of window dressing or public relations undertaking at best, or as

³²² FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 43:30.

³²³ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 24:43. David Hackworth reflected on similar failures to provide 'realistic combat training' well before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. David Hackworth, "Defending America: Warrior Ethic Down, But Not Out" dated 20 Feb 2000, at https://products.kitsapsun.com/archive/2000/02-20/0047_david_hackworth_warrior_ethic_do.html on 15 Oct 16

³²⁴ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 14:20.

³²⁵ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 23:39.

³²⁶ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 11:30.

³²⁷ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 08:00.

³²⁸ Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," 227.

³²⁹ Caputo, *Rumor*, 16.

³³⁰ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 20:26.

an obstacle to mission accomplishment and force protection at worst.³³¹ 'War is supposed to serve policy, but it is not an easy or natural servant thereof'³³² particularly where the policy is perceived to be at odds with creating an efficient fighting machine. The Army (read society) was not thought ready for the 'fall out' from testing people³³³ to their limits, though constraints were contrarily recognised as integral to and a prerequisite of service: 'we are there to protect and operate within the letter of the law'.³³⁴ The 'key issue' says Dandeker is 'the extent to which the military way of life needs to be different from that of civilian society'³³⁵ and especially where it espouses standards akin to the warrior or T2 over the soldier and T1.

The reason the Army is not doing more hand-to-hand combat training according to one soldier is that 'it doesn't want the training it is providing its people to spill out onto the streets on a Saturday night'.³³⁶ This is a fair comment and an even more fair reservation. The ethical and legal responsibility of improving or enhancing T2's abilities to kill or injure without bounding the activity to a certain time and place (essentially allowing the Type to act without control) is an extremely complex consideration. A final comment is reserved for the soldier who thought the true warrior would be a fighting individual regardless of the training the Army provides, the law it operates under or the policy that it follows. Linking reduced inhibitions associated with the consumption of alcohol to an inclination for violence he suggested that any study into warriorship 'look at the discipline records...that'll show you the warriors...Pay Day Weekend produces warriors.'³³⁷ The constraints that soldiers think reduce warriorhood can be meaningless where the individual's innate character leans toward warrior behaviour.

'In Ten Years It'll Be A Different Word...'

For all the careful consideration, warrior was still thought meaningless by many of those consulted. 'I only knew what it was from googling it.'³³⁸ Its widespread application flew in the face of what they thought should be an exclusive and earned term. In 9 of the 14 focus groups soldiers expressed uncertainty regarding the purpose behind its introduction. It was a 'struggle to link the British Army with warrior status.'³³⁹ The word was thought similar to other terms considered similarly hollow. 'Warrior: it's a made-up

³³¹ Toner, "Military Service," 198.

³³² Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," 5.

³³³ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 19:55.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 08:50.

³³⁵ Christopher Dandeker, "On 'The Need To Be Different': Recent Trends in Military Culture," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 173.

³³⁶ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 47:20.

³³⁷ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 46:40.

³³⁸ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 28:35.

³³⁹ CO16.

thing; it sounds funny; you get called it by putting a uniform on; it's like being called a legend.'³⁴⁰ Alternatives thought equally vacuous were suggested as equivalents: it is like saying that 'he's a ninja – but he's not actually a ninja.'³⁴¹ References of this sort – warrior, legend, ninja – were recognised as 'tools to get people on side to do things you want them to do but really it doesn't mean anything'.³⁴² Such imposition of identity may lead to compliance but won't result in conversion.³⁴³ One of the soldiers wasn't impressed with any of these labels: 'I couldn't give two hoots what society calls me – I'll just crack on with what I need to do'³⁴⁴ he stated, demonstrating self-belief, personal motivation and awareness and explaining that without his acquiescence it is unlikely to stick. 'Just because someone says it doesn't make it true. Someone articulates a comprehensive theory; it still doesn't make it true. It has to be subjected to critical scrutiny, *a la* Socrates.'³⁴⁵ But such comment also betrays a sense of powerlessness: the identity of warrior is being forced upon soldiers.

One SNCO said focus group attendees 'had a conversation about it before we came in and it's how you define it that is difficult – we all have a different definition'.³⁴⁶ These soldiers were from the same regiment: they work together on a daily basis and have a shared regimental identity but couldn't agree what warrior meant. Soldiers analysed the Army's motives: 'The Army is trying to define the warrior through CDRILS'³⁴⁷ thought one, explaining warrior as the vehicle to give substance to standards and values – an argument that wins favour with ethicists. Whether warrior affords a rallying point for the code or the code defines the warrior, these two sides of a coin allow definition and importantly exclude other possibilities. Narrower bounding would introduce greater consistency – 'across regiments they use the term warrior in a different way... we need to be a bit more straight on what warrior means'.³⁴⁸ This places responsibility on the army to be specific. One respondent accepted its 'antiquated or historical connotations' but was curious, indeed cynical, at the reasons it was being 'deliberately invoked' now.³⁴⁹ In another group similar suspicion was expressed that the term warrior is for organisational efficiency reasons and not much else: 'I think because this is being used as an infantry

³⁴⁰ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 04:40.

³⁴¹ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 06:19. 'Ninja' used colloquially to imply a soldier is good at something from shooting to polishing boots to providing impressive briefings – the 'PowerPoint Ninja'.

³⁴² FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 18:40.

³⁴³ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 61.

³⁴⁴ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 12:40.

³⁴⁵ Bill Warren in conversation. Efran *et al*. "Dialogue." 9.

³⁴⁶ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 00:50.

³⁴⁷ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 06:52. 'CDRILS' is the mnemonic for the Army's Values and stands for courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty and selfless commitment. The Army has also established what it expects in terms of standards. These are that soldiers must be lawful in their endeavours; act with appropriate behaviour and demonstrate total professionalism.

³⁴⁸ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 13:57.

³⁴⁹ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 01:48.

term I think it's coming in line with the future which is going to be an Infantry Corps'.³⁵⁰ Applying the term to the broadest collective brought soldiers to a conclusion that it is a device to undermine small group identity.

What is meant by warrior is hard to specify³⁵¹ according to the Regimental Recruiting Team focus group; its 'one of those words that's very hard to pinpoint exactly' thought another group.³⁵² Senior officers agreed that the word hadn't been well defined though one urged caution against 'metricising'.³⁵³ others contrarily felt there was a need 'to measure 'warrior' somehow'.³⁵⁴ The values and standards of the British Army were assumed to be at the heart of what was meant and these might be the measure. That the term hadn't been adequately defined was 'a fair point; we should perhaps make more of the term as the epitome of a professional combat soldier who works to a code of conduct in the battlespace.'³⁵⁵ The case against metrics was that local interpretation is more useful and viable: 'the term is ill-defined, but has strong historical resonance for certain communities'³⁵⁶ and accordingly should be left to those communities to determine meaning. Why 'soldier' or some regimental title won't suffice is then unclear.

When philosophers talk about words and things there comes talk about meanings. If the various meanings are incommensurate with one another and we hold to our respective positions, then we move into relativism.³⁵⁷

That warrior might apply 'relatively' and subject to local interpretation allows exclusivity: 'warrior says dismounted close combat: it's a bloke with a spear and now a bloke with a bayonet'.³⁵⁸ In this form, with the bayonet again as the critical element, the warrior is the individual with 'the savage fury necessary to ram cold steel into another man's guts'³⁵⁹ and the responsibility to do so. As a term, 'warrior' won't then apply across the British Army but might create identity within a global, martial cadre. Where it is metricised according to Values and Standards the word becomes relative and understood only in the context of the British Army. The need to 'adapt the term to the culture'³⁶⁰ was well recognised but so too was the fact that it is 'hard to define British Army culture...it can be contradictory'.³⁶¹ So it is difficult to establish a foundation or even entry point.

Soldiers thought warrior a useful term beyond the regiment: 'Works best at Army – if it is

³⁵⁰ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 34:30.

³⁵¹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 03:51.

³⁵² FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 04:32.

³⁵³ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 04:18.

³⁵⁴ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 15:55.

³⁵⁵ GS2, 14 Feb 19, 07:37.

³⁵⁶ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 05:52. 'I'd be careful not to codify it too much – that would be my advice'. GS1, 23 Jan 19, 23:50.

³⁵⁷ Bill Warren in conversation. Efran et al. "Dialogue." 7-8.

³⁵⁸ GS3, 12 Feb 19, 16:11.

³⁵⁹ Caputo, *Rumor*, 12.

³⁶⁰ FG11: SNCOS, 01 Nov 18, 19:45.

³⁶¹ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 41:10.

to apply it has to apply to the whole Army. Not at regimental [level]³⁶². The preference to push it elsewhere allows local groupings to remain salient. Promoting it thus infers that the term is unwelcome or at least is made inapplicable locally. The lack of embrace makes it a fad, some new trend or temporal device. The sense in focus groups was of 'a marketing image or label to promote the Army...it's a buzzword'.³⁶³ It was acknowledged that 'warrior has broader appeal'³⁶⁴ than some of the 'niche' terminology used at Regimental level yet regimental identity was aggressively protected: 'does it work for us in terms of building an ethos within the Regiment, I don't think so...'³⁶⁵ The 'word now being bandied about, wasn't even common during Herrick [operations in Afghanistan], it appeared afterwards, someone came up with it as a 'good' word'³⁶⁶; 'it feels like a word that has appeared as a result of our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan'³⁶⁷; 'during Herrick everything was 'ally', we were all 'operators', and now warriors, it's the latest thing.'³⁶⁸ Most damning was the dismissal that 'in ten years it'll be a different word...'³⁶⁹

'There's two sides to it: there's those that are in the Army that maybe have a belief in it or maybe don't, and there are those who are looking at it being advertised in the careers offices and recruiting centres'.³⁷⁰ Calling soldiers warriors was recognised as a recruiting strategy³⁷¹ but 'otherwise it doesn't mean anything to me.'³⁷² Recruiting is the fertile ground for its employment. This is the opposite of how Army intent is explained. With regard to sanctioned branding 'the warrior word can be seen as pejorative in society' but it is assumed 'really useful as a brand for our soldiers':

In putting the Army across to the public we are better using words like protection and defence even though they don't actually describe the nature of [the soldiers who] are going to have to attack and fight the wars, and are therefore *de facto* warriors'³⁷³

This is more than semantics: words matter because 'definitions are the foundations of action, knowledge, reality and Truth. If we think the military is made up of warriors, that is one set of ethical choices' if we think otherwise, then a different set of choices apply.³⁷⁴ Warrior is used by the Army in the expectation that it appeals to its soldiers; as far as soldiers are concerned it's an appeal to civilian recruits. One soldier fully rejected it. 'There's no credibility in the word, because of the way the British Army has branded it, it

³⁶² FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 41:10.

³⁶³ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 01:17.

³⁶⁴ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 01:55.

³⁶⁵ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 01:10.

³⁶⁶ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 02:08.

³⁶⁷ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 31:30.

³⁶⁸ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 02:30

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 53:50

³⁷⁰ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 01:30

³⁷¹ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 01:20

³⁷² FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 32:10

³⁷³ GS2, 14 Feb 19, 06:20 and 10:17

³⁷⁴ Kaurin, "Warrior, Citizen Soldier or Guardian."

has lost all meaning - I have no respect for it as a word at the minute, it's a brand that people jump on'.³⁷⁵

'The role of language is critical in social constructionism'³⁷⁶ and soldiers didn't appreciate the word warrior being applied to them without their agreement. 'I would never have thought of myself as a warrior'; another in the same focus group thought the word 'completely stupid; it's annoying that it's been imposed upon us.'³⁷⁷ It was being done to soldiers by an unappreciated third party: 'I don't think you ever call yourself warrior, someone calls you a warrior...this hasn't come from grass roots.'³⁷⁸ In another group they complained that 'we are not getting let be what we want to be' – and that was to be identified regimentally. There is recognition here that the soldier 'unlike the civilian, possesses little to no legal or institutional recourse when it comes to psychologically insulating herself' from strong character-shaping forces.³⁷⁹ This is not to say that acceptable subculture did not loom large in soldiers' consciousness, and was appreciated, when they considered identity. 'If you want to call us warriors then fair dos, but we know we are Rangers and part of something bigger than that...'³⁸⁰ This is explored further when I consider ethos in Chapter 7. The smaller regimental group is 'bigger' than the Army to soldiers. Few who attended the focus groups self-referenced as warriors: they railed against imposed identity but rallied around their stronger regimental identities.

'This Leaves Us At Risk Of Great Damage'

Fighting was the descriptor most often used in relation to the meaning of warrior with 'Other' warrior archetypes presented as points of reference: Maoris, Samurai, the Zulus, Crusaders, and Vikings gained mention as typical but were rarely relatable. Seldom was the term used in relation to the contemporary British soldier though the attraction of being referred to as warriors wasn't lost on those consulted: 'Give each Company a name; you're Spartan Company, you're the Immortals, and everyone's buzzing off it' said one young soldier.³⁸¹ Another read the word historically but was unimpressed with the concomitant 'edge of the primitive': it's pejorative, he explained, 'we ask our infantry soldiers to do...a damn sight more than warfighting; warrior suggests you do not much else. Warrior skills will only get you round the first corner' presumably and to extend the metaphor, of any future three-bloc war.³⁸² Contemporary soldiers, evidenced by the

³⁷⁵ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 04:43

³⁷⁶ Raskin, "Constructivism in Psychology."

³⁷⁷ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 35:16-36:00

³⁷⁸ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 27:16

³⁷⁹ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 212.

³⁸⁰ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 33:51-37:19.

³⁸¹ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 01:00.

³⁸² FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 03:40; Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three

iconic events that soldiers recalled, 'are not employed solely to fight.'³⁸³ Used in a certain way, one officer mused, the term is 'almost fanatical'.³⁸⁴ These are powerful points: used 'in a certain way' the word is much more and perhaps 'refers to all embodied activity'.

It is not just words or text. This focus for me is very important as a communication scholar; recognizing that we create our world in what we do together is very powerful. It takes us out of pathologizing individuals. If I locate problems in someone's conflicted processes or psyche, then that person has a problem. If I can look at patterns of relationship and the ways that people coordinate their activities, I am looking more at social and cultural discourses.'³⁸⁵

Association with the full discourse implied by warrior is not within every soldier's appetite.

'I strongly disagree with all of this – "warrior" leaves us at risk of great damage'³⁸⁶ was the forcefully expressed opinion of one officer. The risk is that 'we glorify shocking acts by dressing it up as warriorship³⁸⁷ and excuse 'those who just want to scrap' by offering channels for 'pathological behaviour'.³⁸⁸ Warrior here is understood in terms of the Killer, Psychopath and Berserker. The risk is in building a fascination with 'mythic violence'³⁸⁹ and the serviceperson becomes less interested in professional standards or any proffered code and more in the persona of the warrior and preferred code. The chance of 'deviant cohesion', the counter to the 'reciprocal interplay of personal and social influences' that creates moral action,³⁹⁰ increases where *homo furens* pursues the short-term task, or performs according to some locally determined and alternative standard, detached from broader organisational goals. Donna Winslow terms it hyper-investment³⁹¹ where unit pride becomes so over-powering that out-groups are resented and rejected – with attendant undermining of wider discipline and institutional unity. Warrior units, where they self-define assume their own reference points and operate according to their own rules: this is a form of self-policing of course but not that which commentators welcome. 'Putting a high-end combat warrior battalion into a certain situation is not without risk'³⁹² admitted one British officer; another thought that he had 'great soldiers who were right at the front on operations, who couldn't control their warrior spirit when they weren't fighting in the field.'³⁹³ This soldier type brings benefit and shows example but also concern. Positively this is *homo furens* 'who stands out brilliantly on the battlefield' but

Block War." *Marines Magazine*, (Jan 1999), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm.

³⁸³ Mileham, "Fighting Spirit", 248.

³⁸⁴ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 13:37.

³⁸⁵ Sheila McNamee in Efran *et al.* "Dialogue." 2.

³⁸⁶ FG1: RHQ 14 Nov 18, 03:50.

³⁸⁷ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 20:12.

³⁸⁸ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 11:20.

³⁸⁹ Decker & Van Winkle, *Life in the Gang*, 69, Burke, 336.

³⁹⁰ Bandura, "Moral Disengagement," 115.

³⁹¹ D.M. Winslow, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Enquiry." (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), 263.

³⁹² GS6: 15 Mar 19, 11:00.

³⁹³ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 19:50.

goes unnoticed in garrison life'.³⁹⁴ More negatively, the army should 'take care not to create Alpha males'.³⁹⁵ Battlefield brilliance can have both effects.

Leadership might be assumed the remedy for aberrant behaviour.

There's a fine line. What you don't want to do though is stifle potential. When you do over command you feel the machine straining against you, trying to break the shackles. The organisation needs shackles but if you pull them too tight, if they feel restricted then they will push back – and turn round and bite you.³⁹⁶

This puts clear responsibility on the leader. 'Once an army is involved in war, there is a beast in every fighting man which begins tugging at its chains, and a good officer must learn early on how to keep the beast under control, both in his men and himself.'³⁹⁷ The expectation is evident but there is no guarantee the officer will be able for it.³⁹⁸ Where momentum is created amongst a collective that sees themselves as a certain breed of warrior, separate as 'men and lions, wolves and lambs', as the Iliad had it, predatory instinct can overwhelm, particularly where it is encouraged, deliberately or not. The group preferred identity 'begins to outweigh or silence competing moral, epistemic, or prudential reasons'³⁹⁹ that recommend compliance with organisational culture. The leader must then abdicate responsibility and conform to the will of the collective, or take control to rebalance and realign the guiding principles of his or her charges. That challenge is more difficult where a term like warrior has been promoted but left open to local interpretation. Delegating the responsibility for understanding without setting parameters is an incomplete approach. 'We want warriors. But we need them to be controlled. They need to be able to turn it on and off. Is that too much to ask...? Don't know, don't think it is.'⁴⁰⁰ Others think soldiers deserve greater support: it is 'unreasonable and impractical to expect front-line soldiers, given their training and pre-eminent warfighting role, to develop the levels of subtlety or master the wider range of skills'⁴⁰¹ demanded by operations other than war, and maybe even peacetime routine. Warriorship where trained for, apparent and accepted, even lauded, has implications.

Experience and history supports the view that high-end combat units struggle with the demands of low intensity operations: 'at the day-to-day level the employment of self-conscious elite units such as paratroops in urban policing has had disastrous results.'⁴⁰²

³⁹⁴ Kiszely, "What Should We Be Looking For?" 73.

³⁹⁵ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 21:10.

³⁹⁶ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 14:50.

³⁹⁷ General George C. Marshall quoted in Pryer, "Controlling the Beast," 2

³⁹⁸ Andrew Milburn, "When You're in Command, Your Job Is to Know Better", *The Atlantic*, 25 May 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/trumps-war-crime-pardons-sully-memorial-day/590302/>.

³⁹⁹ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 215.

⁴⁰⁰ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 22:10.

⁴⁰¹ Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army," quoting an unnamed US General, 5.

⁴⁰² Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), 71.

The British soldier may not be as 'ambidextrous' as it is assumed.⁴⁰³ But the risk of the edgy, unpredictable warrior may be worth taking. Some officers appreciated the opportunity that warriors offer and embraced the type.

You need killers and you need people who are absolutely ruthless. There are times when nothing else matters but succeeding; sometimes the task is paramount. To have a cohort that will follow in pursuit of the mission regardless of the damage it does to the team, regardless of leaving individuals behind is a necessity.⁴⁰⁴

This task-oriented view suggests that even soldiers with demonstrable psychopathic tendencies might be useful war. At first sight the idea repels but soldiers see merit. 'Psychopath? Depends if you can stick to the rules of engagement',⁴⁰⁵ and 'you don't want a battalion full of psychopaths but...'⁴⁰⁶ a small number, Winters' killers maybe, Janowitz and Shils' 1-2%, have appeal. 'Officers promote the CDRILS but sometimes you might need to break them'⁴⁰⁷ was one expressed view and warriors possess that freedom. The most useful fighter is 'stealthy, aggressive, and ruthless, a combination burglar, bank robber, and Mafia assassin.'⁴⁰⁸ That this is excusing deviant behaviour is a fair challenge but equally these are behaviours that are valuable when soldiers are thrown into battle: it is 'difficult to turn warriorship off. Difficult to tell soldiers I want you to do this but sometimes you are not to do it particularly where victory is essential.'⁴⁰⁹

Some soldiers worried about having warrior expectation placed upon them. The warrior:

...sacrifices emotion, familial relationships, relationships in any sense for the complete drive for self-betterment, or professional development and to fight – so the term isn't particularly helpful. Those people are sad, quite sheltered and have sacrificed so much of a normal life that they put themselves in a position where they are less good at their job because they don't have understanding of people...⁴¹⁰

An officer in the same group thought 'you can't be a warrior if you have any distractions – like family. Those are weaknesses that impact performance. A warrior is like a warrior monk.'⁴¹¹ A third made clear that warriorship was not his aspiration. 'I have seen people who I would describe as leading a warrior lifestyle. [They] can bring standards up but they can also be quite harmful as they tend to be very self-motivated, self-centred, sometimes quite arrogant and ignorant of the group they are in.'⁴¹² Promoting warrior elites invites the rebirth of an historic figure for 'an environment in which violence was

⁴⁰³ Joseph L. Soeters, "Ambidextrous Military: Coping with Contradictions of New Security Polices," in *The Viability of Human Security*, eds. Monica den Boer & Jaap de Wilde, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mxt.8>.

⁴⁰⁴ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 34:46.

⁴⁰⁵ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 09:21.

⁴⁰⁶ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 28:50

⁴⁰⁷ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 08:20

⁴⁰⁸ Caputo, *Rumor*, 36

⁴⁰⁹ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 13:09

⁴¹⁰ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 23:30

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 39:13

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, 05:40

much more common than today.⁴¹³ Military leaders might 'protect against the dangers of soldier identity by making a more active effort to change what sorts of identities and behavior military culture regards as "high status".⁴¹⁴ Where they decide to support the 'warrior' as the archetype, leaders recommend elite status. This should give caution.

...physically stronger men have been shown to feel more entitled to better outcomes, to set a lower threshold for the triggering of anger and physical aggression, to have more self-favoring attitudes about income redistribution, and to believe more in the utility of warfare.⁴¹⁵

There is a reluctance, for the reasons above and the many others discussed here, even where the term is thought attractive, to use it openly. The modern Army might actually prove intolerant of warriorship: it becomes a tenet of 'the predicament of the modern western male.'⁴¹⁶ 'Saying to someone in training that they are a warrior is like telling them to 'man up'. Its intrinsically linked to masculinity and that's a golden taboo'.⁴¹⁷ Where the mantle is adopted too quickly it may invite more leisurely circumspection when the reality of its interpretation is glimpsed – and then some necessary and hasty redefinition or clarification. One officer told a story where his battalion was deployed on operations and to introduce a stronger ethos, centred on warriorship, the company leadership looked for a more martial identity.

'A' Company was the 'Happy Apples' – the least masculine punchy thing you can have and the Sergeant Major tried to change it to something more Nordic in keeping with the idea of the Vikings so he had the 'Norse Knot' even though that can be seen as a neo-Nazi symbol. It was soon outlawed. They tried to make a Viking Ethos, but that has connotations of rape and pillage and doing whatever you want, but not being an efficient fighting force; now we just have t-shirts we can't wear.⁴¹⁸

Other instances of similar appropriation were offered. The term implies 'a Viking Berserker' said one officer. He wasn't supportive of warrior as an identifying terms but admitted that he used it as a device: 'my JNCOs [Junior Non-Commissioned Officers] and Young Officers like it' he thought; 'it aids in getting a message across'.⁴¹⁹

The British Army, like its peers,⁴²⁰ is alert to anything that appears to go against its perceived or recognised culture. It tends, reasonably, given that it is an organisation based on mass, uniformity and stated standards, to look unfavourably on any obvious

⁴¹³ Sell, Hone & Pound, "Physical Strength," 36.

⁴¹⁴ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 217.

⁴¹⁵ Sell, Hone & Pound, "Physical Strength," 41.

⁴¹⁶ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 214.

⁴¹⁷ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 04:00

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 17:00

⁴¹⁹ CO24. Note though that more soldiers than COs had 'no opinion' on whether they were warriors.

⁴²⁰ David Chen, "Chief of Army Bans Soldiers From Wearing 'Arrogant' Death Symbols," *ABC News*, <https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-19/army-bans-troops-from-wearing-skulls-death-symbols/9673242>. The US Navy also recently banned unofficial unit insignia' in the wake of a damaging series of allegations. <https://taskandpurpose.com/navy-seal-commander-discipline-problem>

development of unsanctioned 'sub-services'.⁴²¹ The allure of the term warrior must then be balanced against the possibility of unofficial secession by any part of the British Army and unwarranted 'warrior-type' behaviour, and 'unsoldierly acts', where the term is understood locally and differently than intended.

Does soldier maybe imply more discipline, imply more professionalism, warrior maybe sounds a bit more 'cowboy-esque'? Maybe that's a good point... Soldier spirit? It's a difficult one. My gut feel is I'm not a fan of warrior. I get where they are coming from, I get that its marketable but I just don't think we need it. We've got enough.⁴²²

Warriors have, in equal measure, the potential and 'capacity to do bad' as well as 'to do great things'.⁴²³ Care must be taken where 'overly aggressive groups of soldiers' are mistaken for high-functioning units.⁴²⁴ It is not only great things that may be delivered. The language associated with warriorship and the definitions that are offered or preferred are all important. What is meant in the British context is critical.

I think there is inherent danger in using the term warrior for the British Army. We want to develop a culture that is more unique – for us, not emulate US. There is a British Army culture, there's an infantry culture, there's a paratrooper culture, there's a Parachute Regiment culture. There's an NCO culture, corporals and sergeants mess culture...⁴²⁵

The danger in the term warrior comes from its loose and imprecise definition. The word warrior 'has layers'⁴²⁶ and the principles associated with it, maybe the ethical structure said one officer, 'might be different for different warriors'.⁴²⁷ Another expressed a worry that the use of the word warrior 'takes you to a place where its less about the ethical thing and more about defining you against your enemy'⁴²⁸ – the metric is how you perform against an adversary and not adherence to institutional norms. It was recognised that warriorship would not play well with the British public for this reason. 'I think there is a risk that if you sell the British Army to the public as warriors then we might be assumed to have all the warrior attributes. That seems risky. We need to very carefully bound the definition.'⁴²⁹ By 'all the warrior attributes' we include the ferocity, the violence and the ruthlessness⁴³⁰ offered as fine line behaviours which can be admired but when exercised in an undisciplined manner make the warrior abhorred. Recognised as controversial and a word to be used 'cautiously in society'⁴³¹ not 'thrown around loosely',⁴³² it is

⁴²¹ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 10:50

⁴²² GS7: 29 Mar 19, 22:41

⁴²³ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 20:12

⁴²⁴ Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 6

⁴²⁵ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 21:09

⁴²⁶ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 09:25

⁴²⁷ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 13:30

⁴²⁸ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 26:35

⁴²⁹ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 41:20

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, 21:10

⁴³¹ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 07:07

⁴³² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 05:57

acknowledged as value-laden. 'Warrior unnerves'⁴³³ people.

We are using warfighting quite specifically and we changed our lexicon recently to use the term infanteer. We need to be a bit careful about the word warrior in our 'Attract' phase; evidence shows that young people today outside the army would like to consider themselves part of an organisation that is doing the right thing, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, aggressively at times protecting the innocent and the combat end of the spectrum, the warrior end is attractive only to a minority in this country, and we therefore need not to put people off.'⁴³⁴

The Army knows the word warrior could 'put people off'; it recognises it should 'be used quite carefully in the public domain' though it is assumed 'absolutely brilliant in the internal domain'.⁴³⁵ The analysis was not agreed by many of those surveyed who were much more wary.

Summary

The British Army speaks about warriors but has not formally characterised what it means – nor explained it to soldiers. The point was made by one of the COs that a definition of terms by this author 'would have been helpful'.⁴³⁶ One interviewee mulled the issue: 'I don't know if we are formally adopting the title 'warrior' – not sure its army approved' though he conceded that it did appear at least 'semi-official'.⁴³⁷ He is correct in that warrior is not an official term of reference like some trade descriptors or ranks. Another senior officer also pointed this out: 'I'm not sure we are using warrior as much as you suggest'⁴³⁸ though then self-contemplated the statement. 'Do I agree with your thesis? Probably – recently it [the terminology] has re-merged. He continued: 'if I go back to Op Granby,⁴³⁹ I think it was in common usage, there was an ethos of warriorship, not least as we had just taken delivery of the new armoured fighting vehicle. Did we lose it might be the question?'⁴⁴⁰ Mention of the IFV again and not *homo furens* is consistent with the archival research and the conclusion that warrior is recognised in the first instance as equipment not identity. Warrior is being employed as a term of reference but as an object of analysis is insufficiently attended to by the British Army.

Where warrior is understood it is mostly in relation to American military doctrine and US soldiers. That it is a term not used when the British Army goes to war makes the point most forcefully that it is divorced from British military culture: the number who had 'no

⁴³³ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 04:43

⁴³⁴ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 05:16

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 05:58 and 11:15

⁴³⁶ CO04

⁴³⁷ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 30:10

⁴³⁸ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 05:16

⁴³⁹ Gulf War 1

⁴⁴⁰ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 01:23

opinion' on warriorship reinforces this deduction. It is seen as antiquated, from another time and not for today's soldier. It is unattractive, 'chippie' and 'not ally'. It was suggested though that warriors could be useful where the term is properly vested, explained and promoted, and this might be in a specific 'British style'. As a term of reference for a select grouping of *homo furens* it might be acceptable.

Where the introduction of the word is for branding purposes the exercise was thought tolerable by soldiers (it didn't then impact them and could be ignored). Senior officers advanced the idea that warrior was most useful for its internal resonance: they expressed greater caution where it is used externally. The dissonance exhibited here adds to the ambiguity and abstract nature of the term. 'Unless he is a fanatic, a man facing death in battle needs more than an abstract cause to defend.'⁴⁴¹

A social identity based on membership in an abstract category may not yield the support acceptance provided by a social identity based on membership on an actual group of interacting persons.⁴⁴²

Warrior was considered to sit in this category by respondents; it leaves British soldiers at great risk; it separates the soldier from society, and could create toxic, caustic small team behaviours. Simply: 'it's not us.' Where it might be, obstacles were anticipated. Warriorship is unachievable for 'policy reasons' such as the lack of appetite for warrior activity (like hand to hand fighting and bayonet practice for example). There was a sense that warriors at the 'high end' wouldn't be authorised for action such is their potential for unacceptable, unfamiliar and unsanctioned behaviours. It was a term thought temporal – and therefore less worth investing in than any alternative identity, and certainly much less valuable than regimental and subculture identity. A 'made-up' term won't quickly replace one of 400 years of standing and so warrior as a term of reference and descriptive noun, sat uneasily with infantry soldiers, officers and gatekeepers. It was deemed even more inappropriate for other soldiers. The concept of warrior ethos and the approach that British soldiers take to their duties is now examined.

⁴⁴¹ Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, 255.

⁴⁴² Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 233.

7. Ethos

Warrior Ethos

One officer said that they were 'good with warrior ethos, but not with Warrior; I've never heard anyone call themselves a Warrior.'⁴⁴³ Another agreed that 'warrior ethos' had greater resonance:

This seems to be about whether we label individuals as warriors or if this is about warrior ethos, will to win, will to fight, that sort of thing. I think that's where we should focus. You can have a warrior ethos, a unit can have a warrior spirit. If we label individuals as warriors it may prove a more tarnished title.⁴⁴⁴

Ethos was considered a collective endeavour and warrior an individual title. 'I'm very happy talking about warrior spirit and ethos. I'm less happy talking about individually calling somebody a warrior. I think that's really difficult to define.'⁴⁴⁵ Brigadier-General McMaster of the US Army explains the greater attraction: 'warrior ethos is important because it makes military units effective and because it makes war 'less inhumane'.⁴⁴⁶ Ethos then is connected with norms of acceptable behaviour, the noble code and 'good' soldiers; warrior is less so. Magee too advances the spirit of the warrior over the persona: 'by focusing on the term "warrior ethos" rather than on the term "warrior" itself, the real value to present day militaries is seen'.⁴⁴⁷ Others took an opposite view. Declaring that he was 'nervous' about conflating warrior and warrior ethos, an officer explained that 'it's not that we shouldn't have a warrior ethos, it's not that we are not warriors, it's the warrior ethos that makes me more nervous. Being a warrior is something we should aspire to.⁴⁴⁸ His concern was that warrior ethos means a culture that is 'martial and aggressive' and this is not appropriate for all soldierly activity. He saw 'less of a distinction between warrior and soldier' than between warrior ethos and the culture of soldiering, that allows 'meaningful identity and sense of purpose by participating in actions short of war such as humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations'.⁴⁴⁹

Used in everyday speech, ethos appears when someone wants to say something serious about an organisation, says Patrick Mileham. 'Special-sounding words, however, particularly those borrowed from the languages of classical times, are often used indiscriminately.'⁴⁵⁰ Ethos is 'jargon' lacking philosophical and empirical depth⁴⁵¹ but as

⁴⁴³ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 29:50.

⁴⁴⁴ GS7, 29 Mar 19, 19:10.

⁴⁴⁵ GS7, 29 Mar 19, 24:40.

⁴⁴⁶ McMaster, "Remaining True to Our Values," 193.

⁴⁴⁷ Magee, "The Way of the Warrior," 33.

⁴⁴⁸ GS4, 18 Mar 19, 01:24.

⁴⁴⁹ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 207.

⁴⁵⁰ Mileham, "Ethos" 227.

⁴⁵¹ David M. Jones & Mike L. Smith, "Review Article: Noise but No Signal: Strategy, Culture and the

Fig. 7.1 shows, it has become increasingly popular over the last century.⁴⁵²




Fig. 7.1: 'Ethos': Occurrence in Literature Since 1800

In simple form, ethos is 'a generally accepted way of approaching matters';⁴⁵³ it is a collective endeavour that determines 'the tone, character, and quality of life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood'; it is the underlying attitude that people have toward themselves and their world, according to Geertz. He distinguishes ethos through a world view: a 'picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order.'⁴⁵⁴ Ethos is therefore both collective and individual. It allows for society and self.⁴⁵⁵ This notion of ethos providing a picture is important in linguistic philosophy and fits Wittgenstein's idea of a proposition as a picture of the facts.⁴⁵⁶ Warrior ethos presents a proposition and conjures a picture in our heads: so we should reflect on what is meant by that too.

According to one think tank warrior ethos is the 'code that expects individuals to aggressively engage and defeat an armed enemy in battle, promoting and valuing traits of moral and physical courage, tactical skills, emotional and physical stamina, loyalty to comrades and determination to accomplish the tactical mission regardless of personal

Poverty of Constructivism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24:6 (2001): 492, <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761001753210515>.

⁴⁵² This illustration uses a moving average ('smoothing') to remove an inexplicable dip in the use of the word ethos in the literature in 2007.

⁴⁵³ Kiszely, "Approaches," 185.

⁴⁵⁴ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 127.

⁴⁵⁵ The basic concepts of mythology exist between the 'world' and the 'human.' Vasyl Shynkaruk *et al.*, "Myth As A Phenomenon Of Culture," *National Academy of Managerial Staff of Culture and Arts Herald*, (2018): 20, <https://doi.org/10.32461/2226-3209.4.2018.152938>.

⁴⁵⁶ 'Propositions are capable of saying something about the world because they are pictures, or models, of these facts and of other possible facts, or states of affairs.' David Shier, "How Can Pictures Be Propositions?" *Ratio* 10:1 (Apr 1997): 65-75, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00027>.

risk.⁴⁵⁷ However it is also the 'indifference to hardship, contempt for death, and genuine hatred' of the enemy, as well as a demonstrable lust for killing.⁴⁵⁸ This second view of ethos, or fighting spirit, would be unattractive to most people, and more alarming: but both views are equally valid. A broad term, ethos is the 'spirit of a culture, era, or community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations'⁴⁵⁹ – maybe the consequence of a critical juncture but often intangible and unlikely definitive. These different versions emphasise how warrior ethos, like warrior, can both attract and repel.

Whether spirit or code, of community or the individual, broad or narrow, determining ethos, culture patterns and tracing relationships is a 'staggering analytical task.'⁴⁶⁰ An approach to warfare and a taught phenomenon⁴⁶¹ ethos is what the armed human group does and how it does it.⁴⁶² It 'provides a framework within which 'the army can interpret, develop, and modify its method of waging war'.⁴⁶³ Less prescriptive than doctrine or policy, ethos allows for 'common character'⁴⁶⁴ and is related and subordinate to national and strategic cultures from which it is derived. The 'distinctive experience of particular security communities finds social expression in more or less distinctive patterns of enduring assumptions about strategic matters, and those patterns warrant description as cultural.'⁴⁶⁵ Ethos exists organisationally, but also within smaller groups and even individuals. It is most potent – exciting and possibly disturbing – where these converge. Grant says "that the founding ethos of the German Army, stressing above all else the dominant role of the individual on the battlefield, was fundamentally well suited to producing tactically effective formations."⁴⁶⁶

Synonyms for ethos include character, tendency, motivating force, disposition, moral code, attitudes, beliefs, principles, and standards. Warrior ethos, through a classical lens, is the embodiment of virtue where qualities such as 'honor, duty, courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice',⁴⁶⁷ integrity, and selflessness are evident, inherent and inculcated by training or from birth.⁴⁶⁸ It originates in:

...the Greek *ethike arete*, "ethical excellence", translated by the Romans as *virtus morales*, "moral virtue" or mores, which held society together. Although ethics tends towards "ideals" and morals towards actual

⁴⁵⁷ Proposed working definition for warrior ethos in "Working Paper on the Warrior Ethos Issue" Center for Strategic and International Studies dated 20 October 1998 cited in Buckingham, "Warrior Ethos," 4-5.

⁴⁵⁸ Snyder, *Soldiers of Destruction*, 316.

⁴⁵⁹ OED.

⁴⁶⁰ Geertz, *Interpretation*, 363.

⁴⁶¹ Steven Pressfield, *The Warrior Ethos*, (NY: Black Irish Entertainment LLC, 2011), 14, Kindle.

⁴⁶² King "RM Ethos," 2.

⁴⁶³ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 49.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁶⁵ Gray "Strategic Culture as Context," 68.

⁴⁶⁶ M P Grant, "Fighting Power: The German Army of WWII and the British Army of Today," *BAR* 114 (Dec 1996), 60.

⁴⁶⁷ Brick, "Military Profession." 31.

⁴⁶⁸ Pressfield, *The Warrior Ethos*, 2.

"behavior" in the real world, even philosophers routinely and unhelpfully use the two terms interchangeably.⁴⁶⁹

In desecrating the body of Hector, Achilles was no less warrior for refusing normative constraint: rather he exercised a particular warrior ethos, his view of self in war. Ethos is not a measure of good or bad but rather a demonstration of approach. 'There are plenty of instances of armies and units with magnificent morale and superb effectiveness which were based on a depraved ethos: the *Waffen* SS is an obvious example.'⁴⁷⁰ Where ethos is used in the British Army it is often in conjunction with ethical direction and constraint.

Ethos and the relationships between society, the social person, and social behaviour,⁴⁷¹ like warrior, is examined through Identity Theory⁴⁷² and Social Identity Theory (SIT).⁴⁷³ The frameworks are similar enough to be treated as one⁴⁷⁴ – and so they are here, albeit Identity Theory centres on 'roles' and is personal and 'microsociological'⁴⁷⁵ whereas SIT (a 'social psychological theory' according to Hogg *et al*) is focussed on the group. The theories allow hierarchies, and categorisation of identity. These match Hofstede's model at Fig. 2.1 and my analytical framework:

the superordinate category of the self as a human being (or *human identity*), the intermediate level of the self as a member of a social ingroup as defined against other groups of humans (*social identity*), and the subordinate level of personal self-categorization based on interpersonal comparisons (*personal identity*).⁴⁷⁶

Human identity involves the norms of humanity which to some extent all people share. It is heavily influenced by sociological consideration, or culture but it should not be assumed that this translates directly into ethical consideration. Shoemaker reminds us that 'the relation between personal identity and ethics is complex and by no means established.' He offers five different versions of identity related, but not determined by ethics: psychological, biological, narrative, "anthropological" and a view that identity doesn't matter for ethics.⁴⁷⁷ Group identity is more local and particular; personal identity is psychological but can be role-based. The boundaries are not clear: personal identity 'is defined, at least in part, by group membership and social categories are infused with

⁴⁶⁹ Mileham, "Ethos," 222.

⁴⁷⁰ Sebastian Roberts, "Fit To Fight: The Conceptual Component – An Approach to Military Doctrine for the Twenty-first Century," in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 200.

⁴⁷¹ Sheldon Stryker & Richard T. Serpe, "Commitment, Identity Saliency, and Role Behavior: Theory and Research Example," in *Personality, Roles, & Social Behavior: Springer Series in Social Psychology*, eds. W. Ickes & E.S Knowles, (NY,: Springer, 1982), 199.

⁴⁷² George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); George J. McCall, & J.L. Simmons, *Identities and Interactions*, (NY: Free Press, 1966); Sheldon Stryker, "Identity Saliency and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for Family Research," *Journal of Marriage & the Family*, 30:4 (Nov 1968): 558-64, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/349494>.

⁴⁷³ This concept is attributed mostly to work done by Tajfel and Turner in the 1970s and has been widely developed and commented upon since then.

⁴⁷⁴ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 224.

⁴⁷⁵ Hogg *et al.*, "A Tale of Two Theories," 255.

⁴⁷⁶ Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory," 208.

⁴⁷⁷ David Shoemaker, "Personal Identity and Ethics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-ethics/>

personal meaning.⁴⁷⁸

Warrior ethos is the spirit of the military collective: it 'binds teams together';⁴⁷⁹ it makes people 'feel part of something'⁴⁸⁰ and affords resilience 'to withstand shock and bounce back stronger.'⁴⁸¹ It was agreed that whilst the warrior is an individual, warrior ethos was a group endeavour and the two required aligning. 'It's no good being a warrior if you are an individual – collective culture is critical.'⁴⁸² Another soldier was more precise and mindful either consciously or otherwise of the possibility of subculture deviance as discussed: 'this is about collective warrior ethos – and the leader sets that.'⁴⁸³ As such, individualism dissipates. That 'warrior ethos can be distinct from being a warrior...the two are tangibly different'⁴⁸⁴ was mentioned on several occasions with warrior ethos mostly privileged over warrior when a choice between the two was required.

Ethos allows the formation of a 'Band of Brothers'⁴⁸⁵ and provides 'shared culture'⁴⁸⁶ but it is not contractual: it is 'inherently vocational' and a 'way of life'.⁴⁸⁷ It is therefore something vibrant and alive: 'it is tempting to equate ethos with tradition. However, to do this implies that ethos is inflexible and intolerant of change.'⁴⁸⁸ 'It's a code of conduct that is embedded in your culture and character that drives and supports how you behave in training, on the battlefield and in life. It will differ within cultures.'⁴⁸⁹ Fundamentally, ethos enables and guides action; it is cause to the warrior's effect, or input and process to martial output. Unfortunately not everyone found the concept comprehensible: one CO had 'no idea' what it meant and dismissed it, in keeping with the sentiment expressed in the epigraph to this thesis as 'a made-up concept'.⁴⁹⁰ Another stated that he didn't like it but didn't explain why.⁴⁹¹ Several found the term difficult to determine.

The British Army does not have a universal warrior culture. It is not like the US Marines, for example, with 'every man a rifleman' mantra (or the Royal Marines as an equivalent). Basic training is more about discipline, conformity, cooperation etc. It does not encourage an ethos rooted in issue and receipt of violence.⁴⁹²

This CO thought to rely on the nature of the recruit to actualise ethos: 'British Infantrymen

⁴⁷⁸ Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity," 5.

⁴⁷⁹ CO15.

⁴⁸⁰ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 16:00.

⁴⁸¹ CO15.

⁴⁸² GS1, 23 Jan 19, 12:24.

⁴⁸³ GS1, 23 Jan 19, 12:45.

⁴⁸⁴ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 31:32.

⁴⁸⁵ CO07.

⁴⁸⁶ CO18.

⁴⁸⁷ CO10; CO17.

⁴⁸⁸ Fox, *Learning to Fight*, 21.

⁴⁸⁹ CO20.

⁴⁹⁰ CO27.

⁴⁹¹ CO24.

⁴⁹² CO12.

have always arrived with the propensity for violence hard-wired'. So warrior ethos, like warrior, can be inherent and doesn't need taught: it is a personal code and something that could be reinforced. Just as warrior is a title for the few so too warrior ethos was not considered universally applicable. It was also thought a waning concept and something that the British Army wasn't taking seriously enough. Associated with warrior, this 'spirit of the culture' was becoming 'increasingly marginalised...[as other] intangibles are cut as we seek efficiencies. This has ramifications on developing a truly warrior spirit.'⁴⁹³

British Army Ethos

Instilling 'combat ethos' is 'the British Army's highest priority.'⁴⁹⁴ Various presented this includes fighting spirit,⁴⁹⁵ warrior ethos and combinations thereof (see Fig. 7.2



Fig. 7.2: Commander Field Army 2019

recommending in this instance 'warrior spirit').⁴⁹⁶ The terms are supposed to be roughly synonymous: 'warrior ethos and combat ethos are probably the same thing. I don't know but my gut tells me they are broadly the same thing'.⁴⁹⁷ Fighting power, another variant, comprises three components:

conceptual (or doctrinal); moral; and physical.⁴⁹⁸ Ethics fits mostly within the moral component,⁴⁹⁹ a critical and equal part but not the dominant paradigm.

An army, we find, is still a crowd, though a highly organized one. It is governed by the same laws which govern crowds, and under the stress of war is ever tending to revert to its crowd form. Our object in peace is so to train it that their reversion will become extremely slow; in other words, we add to each individual a quality known as 'moral', so that, when intellect and reason fail man is not ruled by his instincts and sentiments alone, but by the moral which has become part of his nature.⁵⁰⁰

Ethical or moral focus comes from the 'Values and Standards' that are the foundations⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹³ CO08.

⁴⁹⁴ General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the General Staff, 10 Jan 18, at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-army-chief.html> on 08 Oct 18.

⁴⁹⁵ Fighting spirit is 'roughly the equivalent of the US term 'warrior spirit.' Mileham, "Fighting Spirit: Has it a Future?" in *The British Army, Manpower, and Society*, ed. Strachan, 242.

⁴⁹⁶ General Jones at the Defence and Security Equipment International Conference in London in 2019. His vision for the army, incorporating 'warrior spirit', is in the background. Picture from Twitter (@field_army) 10 Sep 2019 https://twitter.com/field_army/status/1171558424942972928.

⁴⁹⁷ GS6, 15 Mar 19, 07:40.

⁴⁹⁸ Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/605298/Army_Field_Manual_AFM_A5_Master_ADP_Inter_active_Gov_Web.pdf on 06 Oct 18.

⁴⁹⁹ 'The term 'moral component' means more than either morale (*le Moral*), morals (*la Morale*) or morality (*la Moralité*).' Roberts, "Fit To Fight," 194.

⁵⁰⁰ JFC Fuller, *Training Soldiers for War* (London, 1914), 19, cited in Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," 218.

⁵⁰¹ RUSI seminar, 12 Apr 18, synopsis of discussion on combat ethos across multiple contributors.

of the British Army and explain 'what the British soldier is'.⁵⁰² Most efforts by respondents to form a definition of British Army ethos made comment on behaviour, organisational ethics and specifically the Values and Standards of the Army.

It's not just about aggression...It's about protecting the innocent; doing the right thing; it's about controlled aggression and understanding what is right and wrong and applying the law – and you may not necessarily agree with those laws but its knowing what you can and can't do – or its anarchy.⁵⁰³

The 6 Values and 3 Standards define the Army's attitude, and aspiration for its personnel: they were used as a guiding framework where soldiers hunted for meaning. Acceptable as the basis of the British soldier's ethos, to assume they translate seamlessly to a more universal warrior ethos though would be careless.

Of the Values, courage is an obvious warrior trait. Indeed, Keegan suggests courage is the only 'currency of unchallengeable value' in fighting regiments; other frameworks 'do not flourish.'⁵⁰⁴ The other components might actually constrain warriorship. Integrity might limit subterfuge; selfless commitment (service before self) privileges self-sacrifice, and undermines self-satisfaction. There is no room for Berserker behaviour where discipline is critical. The dehumanisation of the enemy and what Aylwin-Foster called 'institutional racism' in his survey of US Army 'warfighting ethos'⁵⁰⁵ has no place where respect for others is directed. The realisation of this value brings 'protection' into focus more sharply than winning. The Standards also bound behaviour. Soldiers' actions are to be lawful (within UK statutes, regardless of station) and they must exercise appropriate behaviour. Total professionalism is the mantra. These benchmarks are questionable for their general applicability: lawful is measurable but mostly nationally specific, appropriate behaviour is a subjective standard and professionalism an uncertain term.

Military organisations are predominantly situated in considerations of group identity whether large or small, and create in-groups and out-groups, those like us and Others. Tensions then evolve dependent on the theory, doctrine or hierarchy that is being applied. For example the individual can move between categories and across hierarchies. There exists a 'functional antagonism' between categories of identity – where one becomes more salient the others become less so.⁵⁰⁶ The V&S, and Leadership Code⁵⁰⁷ are guides for soldiers in the British Army. The BCS was to

⁵⁰² A Soldier's Values and Standards, at <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/our-people/a-soldiers-values-and-standards/> on 07 Oct 18.

⁵⁰³ GS1, 23 Jan 19, 08:27.

⁵⁰⁴ John Keegan, "Regimental Ideology," in *War, Economy and the Military Mind*, eds., Geoffrey Best & Andrew Wheatcroft, (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1976), 16.

⁵⁰⁵ Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army," 3, 14.

⁵⁰⁶ Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory," 208.

⁵⁰⁷ The Army Leadership Code: An Introductory Guide, First Edition, 2015. https://www.army.mod.uk/media/2698/ac72021_the_army_leadership_code_an_introduutory_guide.pdf on 21 May 2019.

consolidate the experiences gained on operations that produced soldiers who were ‘combat hardened’. It sought to ‘assure the combat ethos that we learned the hard way during fifteen years of counterinsurgency’⁵⁰⁸ and seized the opportunity to build on the experiences toward improved high-intensity warfighting capability (the acceptance of more austere conditions, tolerance of casualties and field burials over the repatriation of the dead,⁵⁰⁹ the taking of Prisoners of War, and isolation on the battlefield for instance). Each Army branch designed its own BCS to prepare for warfighting and to suit its own functional needs. Most branches emphasised the skills they thought critical in terms of trade contribution to the Army. The various sources that inform identity give as sense of what the British Army wants from its soldiers but collating them does not allow a clear picture of a warrior organisation, nor any single picture of ethos, or identity. Opinion was split accordingly on whether the British Army had a warrior ethos just as it was when soldiers were asked if the army trained warriors. As warrior was thought a meaningless term so too soldiers were unsure of the relevance of ethos.




Fig. 7.3: ‘The British Army Has a Warrior Ethos’

One soldier stated that ‘ethos statements are written by officers’, then highlighted the futility of that: ‘you can’t write an ethos...’⁵¹⁰ Of those who had an opinion 47% thought

⁵⁰⁸ General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff’s Keynote Address, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 28 Jun 2017, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20170628-rusi_lwc17-cgs_keynote.pdf.

⁵⁰⁹ Medical reports from the Falklands War stated that British infantrymen were not prepared to deal with the dead on the scale produced by that ‘intense war’. Parr, *Our Boys*, 144.

⁵¹⁰ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 40:39.

the army had a warrior ethos; 45% disagreed. Those who disagreed did not always reject 'ethos' but expressed a negative reaction to the prefix and descriptor warrior.

For most respondents combat, fighting spirit and fighting figured as prominently in describing warrior ethos as they did in defining warrior.⁵¹¹ COs thought the ability to endure austere and arduous conditions, a 'hardness of character, mental and physical conditioning and a willingness to meet extreme challenges important.⁵¹² Camaraderie also gained mention more often when considering warrior ethos than warrior – it was suggested that commitment 'to protecting comrades' and service to one's soldiers mattered in its realisation.⁵¹³ Fellow soldiers weren't mentioned as often when defining warrior reinforcing the sense the warrior is more individually based. Many referred to the association of warrior ethos with a higher or 'proud calling.' That calling was usually to the infantry. Its 'not that you join the infantry because you can't get to other parts of the army [because you are not clever enough] but rather because you have the calling'.⁵¹⁴

The pursuit of mission success that 'trumps personal needs'⁵¹⁵ is integral to warrior ethos. Whether these needs are personal comforts or personal realisation is unclear: they extend to different conclusions. The former suggests service comes first and adherence to a warrior ethos is the 'sense of being prepared to sacrifice oneself for the greater good,⁵¹⁶ for the sake of the cause.⁵¹⁷ Here *homo furens* performs stoically and the emphasis is on the transaction between the soldier and sponsor where soldiers are prepared to give their lives for others and the perceived greater good. 'The preservation of the lives of the subjects of the nation-state is the supreme duty'⁵¹⁸ of the government and its devices, of which the Army is one. This is T1 *homo furens*. The denial of personal realisation on the other hand may be the prohibition of one's existential self and a constraint on T2. This leads to 'psychological death, or ego death' the complete loss of subjective self-identity that in the mythological framework of the hero's journey 'is a phase of total self-surrender and transition.'⁵¹⁹

Morality was a factor in defining ethos – more so than when warrior was discussed. 'It is

⁵¹¹ The importance of 'fighting' is beginning to be reflected in changing US doctrine.. The Close Combat Lethality Task Force 'to improve the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency and readiness of U.S. infantry squads' and arrest the erosion in close combat capability. US DOD, "Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) – 18-001" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018). Accessed at <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dtm/DTM-18-001.pdf> on 14 Dec 2019. A degree of privilege is afforded to the US infantry: this is being built into the supposedly universal but now more constrained US Warrior Ethos.

⁵¹² COs 29, 10, 30, 28.

⁵¹³ CO07; CO10.

⁵¹⁴ GS2, 14 Feb 19, 13:12.

⁵¹⁵ CO15.

⁵¹⁶ CO10.

⁵¹⁷ CO21.

⁵¹⁸ Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 131.

⁵¹⁹ Mobbs, "Why Soldiers Crave a 'Hero's Journey'."

about respect and restraint recognising that those that we are called to fight are equally valuable human beings...It is about doing only what is necessary to bring about peace.⁵²⁰ Warrior ethos demands 'high skill guided by strong morality'⁵²¹ and is 'an approximation to the martial codes of chivalry employed by the Knightly Classes during the middle-ages in Europe, namely a competitive interest in fighting underpinned by sound ethics.'⁵²² One respondent offered Richard The Lionheart as the personification and to claim to have this ethos the fighter must be willing to die for his beliefs and those he fights along-side. Virtuous and of impeccable judgement *homo furens* knows when to fight and does not abuse the power that he has.⁵²³ These opinions align with the army's values and standards, and leadership code but not necessarily to how warrior was perceived.

There were differences of opinion in what aspects might be included where ethos is considered, but it was widely agreed what should not be included. Breaking the law and breaching organisational guidelines were 'red lines' where the army's perceived ethos was to be followed. 'Wrong doers aren't warriors – they don't show the responsibility associated with being a warrior; those aren't warriors in my sense of the word. You don't have to break CDRILS or LOAC'.⁵²⁴ The critical phrase here is 'in my sense of the word' and that this sense aligns with the army's organisational sense of the word: warrior ethos is conflated more easily with army ethos, and soldier ethos as evidenced through the V&S in a way that warrior was not with soldier. The point of convergence seems based on the shared suffix 'ethos' though than anything more considered.

The emphasis on morality was complemented by a focus on ruthlessness, the 'pursuit of excellence' in every endeavour, and well executed warfighting skills. The concepts are not mutually exclusive⁵²⁵ but where this harder edged consideration becomes dominant, we might recognise signs of what Snyder calls 'institutional solidity':

the presence of shared assumptions and beliefs, commonly accepted norms, and the unquestioned general values that enable large numbers of people, despite individual ambitions, dislikes, and disagreements, to work together in common purpose toward definite goals.⁵²⁶

The subjugation of personal interest might suit martial requirements but how it relates to 'moral injury' is then a challenge. Determining the veracity of national requirements is a further tension. That 'warfighting ethos underlines all that we do, coupled with a ruthless

⁵²⁰ CO10.

⁵²¹ CO16.

⁵²² CO30.

⁵²³ CO14.

⁵²⁴ The mnemonic for Values and Standards and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 26:39.

⁵²⁵ Stephen W. Richey "Military Professionalism and the Warrior Ethos: Both Are Needed to Win" 6 July 2018, accessed online at <https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/discussions/2013508/military-professionalism-and-warrior-ethos%C2%A0both-are-needed-win> on 01 Mar 2020

⁵²⁶ Snyder, *Soldiers of Destruction*, 346.

determination to succeed'⁵²⁷ was broadly agreed but the practicality of the approach and its reach was uncertain. Challenging the term early, with a view to clarifying meaning, before local interpretation becomes ingrained, is important. Otherwise the dissonance that follows is 'very strong – and painful to tolerate.'⁵²⁸ Attitudes become ossified and dogmatic, tied to a concept that is narrowly defined.⁵²⁹ 'Changing doctrines takes time; it disorients a military organization.'⁵³⁰ Calling soldiers warriors creates an altered reference point and respondents found it perplexing, the lack of solid foundation an issue.

Infantry Ethos

'My understanding is that the term came from soldiers, from market research...there seems to be an appetite for it, I suspect the infantry will like it, it's different, its special.'⁵³¹ The infantry, or some infantry at least, did like it (though I uncovered little to suggest it came from them): their attraction was though as heavily caveated as is organisational sanction. The ethos the British Army agrees to is not that of the Berserker – neither is the British soldier expected to be an automaton. This helps in bracketing what might be meant where the army uses warrior but doesn't provided a honed definition. The head of the team that most recently introduced the term to the Army⁵³² makes the admission that 'one of the things we didn't do in BCS was define what the warrior ethos actually is – though maybe we didn't need to...You could call it an infantry ethos maybe...' He explained the expectation:

self-reliance, moral compass, turning on but also turning off extreme violence; understanding of what is appropriate and what is not; the teamwork; never leaving a colleague behind; all of those things contribute to the warrior ethos.⁵³³

By calling it an infantry ethos it is possible or at least easier to focus better on what is meant. It provides for the omission of what it is not and helps to better understand the sort of warrior the British Army desires. Where warrior ethos is infantry-centric it is restricted to those who indulge routinely or primarily in the application of violence.

Warrior ethos is for soldiers involved in ugly, visceral, unpleasant work: only they, 'those involved in hand-to-hand fighting,' are warriors.⁵³⁴ Artillerymen, tank crews and attack helicopter pilots for example, though fellow combat arms, are denied the accolade. 'I

⁵²⁷ CO13.

⁵²⁸ Festinger *et al.*, *Prophecy*, 29.

⁵²⁹ Kiszely, "Approaches," 202.

⁵³⁰ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984), 30.

⁵³¹ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 30:10.

⁵³² It's a new term? 'Probably – recently it has re-emerged...Did we lose it might be the question?' GS2, 14 Feb 19, 01:23.

⁵³³ GS1, 23 Jan 19, 18:25.

⁵³⁴ CO14.

think sticking a 105 shell⁵³⁵ in the chamber is a technical act, it's a process, whereas a panzer⁵³⁶ coming at you in the direct role is a totally different interface'.⁵³⁷ To qualify, according to the infantrymen surveyed, one must be 'a trained combatant who is physically and mentally conditioned'⁵³⁸ the soldier in question's 'primary role is to fight and to kill the enemy'.⁵³⁹ Warriors possess 'the will to fight' and are ready and willing to fight when called.⁵⁴⁰ Respondents conferred the title on the infantry through patronage, for distinction and as a recommendation of fighting prowess. 'All soldiers are not warriors but infantry soldiers must be! I do not believe the British Army has a 'corporate' warrior ethos but the Infantry manages to keep the concept alive locally'.⁵⁴¹ Logisticians for example, it was stated, don't need a warrior ethos.⁵⁴² Others placed it against 'rank' and reserved it further: 'I suspect the closest any part of the British Army comes to generating a warrior ethos is the Infantry, but then only in its NCOs (and young officers to a lesser degree)'.⁵⁴³ This Company Commander agreed: 'I'm thinking our warriors are our Section Commanders who are leading men, who are committing to the decisive act, the Corporals...so, its 18 men across the battalion...'⁵⁴⁴ (and so he also excludes revered platoon sergeants and non-infantry corporals who don't command sections). Where this is true then the corporals and young officers divest themselves of the ethos as they promote and we establish yet another circle within the broader grouping. Warrior ethos according to this analysis is a generated capability that is time and place dependent. It requires initiation and realisation in groups that previously hadn't exhibited it.

When asked where the term originated, the officer who authorised the infantry battlecraft syllabus (BCS) gave an honest representation of his thought process.

There's some personal stuff in it; there's some we learnt from the Americans; in many ways it came from thoughts on how you build a team, a band of brothers if you like, that was a driving force; my view which the team shared; otherwise I can't tell you exactly where it came from.⁵⁴⁵

He suggests it is intuitive and a shared infantry perspective. The infantry declared in the BCS that it had a unique and characteristic spirit, that marks the infantry as extraordinary in the profession of arms. It fits with army norms but 'it is also more than this'. The infantryman will go that bit further, work that bit harder, and has a competitive nature such that losing is never an option. Infantrymen are urged to take risks, to do whatever

⁵³⁵ The projectile the artillery load into their guns is a 105mm shell.

⁵³⁶ British soldiers use 'panzer' as a slang term for tank regardless of its type or national affiliation. It is related to the long residence of UK forces in Germany after WW2.

⁵³⁷ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 16:00.

⁵³⁸ CO17.

⁵³⁹ CO19.

⁵⁴⁰ CO25.

⁵⁴¹ CO30.

⁵⁴² GS1, 23 Jan 19, 23:30.

⁵⁴³ CO10.

⁵⁴⁴ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 38:19.

⁵⁴⁵ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 02:42.

it takes to kill the enemy and to accomplish the mission.⁵⁴⁶ They focus on the enemy and their ethos declares the infantry separate from other soldiers. 'Do we have a Warrior Ethos in the Infantry? Put simply: Yes. It is the reason why people join the Infantry'.⁵⁴⁷ It demands from its members that they create and foster a fighting spirit.⁵⁴⁸

Other branches of the armed forces declare themselves similarly distinct with their own ethos.⁵⁴⁹ British soldiers of 16 Air Assault Brigade have the 'Pegasus Ethos', the hallmarks of which are: bravery founded upon determination, endurance and selflessness; discipline, that is primarily self-imposed; humility; and compassionate'. The airborne soldiers of that brigade are 'a ferocious enemy' who, in battle, in barracks, and at home, always do the right thing.⁵⁵⁰ The Royal Marines ethos is defined as the 'precise application of will' and focuses on the individual commando over the organisation.⁵⁵¹ The Rifles declare themselves 'distinctive, forward looking, modern and professional'⁵⁵² and offer that 'Rifleman' as an identity is a source of pride. The infantry, in seizing such recommendations, clearly wishes to be separate from non-infantry but there is also clear differentiation across infantry subcultures and distinct regimental approaches exist.

'A warrior must be selfless because he must subsume the purpose for which he is fighting to a higher purpose or else he is just someone who likes killing.'⁵⁵³ Where the title was confined to those who fight in close combat, ('edgy, bloody activity') then anything that afforded recognition of that 'most unpleasant work' was thought a good thing: 'ethos must be there to support the person who is being asked to do that. Training will only take the soldier so far.'⁵⁵⁴ It was suggested the infantry are also 'crying out for something a little less politically correct, a little more edgy, something more visceral that makes them stand out as different.'⁵⁵⁵ It allows focus on core purpose and was considered useful in clarifying why the infantry exists: 'let's separate out the notion of attaching warrior as a hashtag which is about mobilising identity and providing a sense of belonging, from the sense of purpose that makes you go that last hundred yards.'⁵⁵⁶ Identifying the infantry as warriors

⁵⁴⁶ BCS, 3.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁸ BCS, 1-2

⁵⁴⁹ The Royal Armoured Corps stated at their Forum, 12 May 2017 that their ethos would be centred on three descriptors: Robust-Agile-Capable (or R-A-C).

⁵⁵⁰ Pegasus Ethos accessed at http://abnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/16X_Pegasus_Ethos.pdf on 09 Oct 18.

⁵⁵¹ Anthony King, "The Ethos Of The Royal Marines: The Precise Application Of Will," (Paper, University of Exeter, 2004), <https://www.ex.ac.uk/~acking/Papers/RMethos4.doc>.

⁵⁵² The Rifles website at <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/rifles/> on 20 May 2019.

⁵⁵³ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 09:57.

⁵⁵⁴ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 17:40.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33:45.

⁵⁵⁶ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 20:19.

is more than branding: it's a catalyst to facilitate warrior spirit.⁵⁵⁷ Question 4 asked if 'Infantry Soldiers Are Warriors': 68% of COs agreed they were; a further one in five strongly agreed (87% overall).




Fig. 7.4: 'Infantry Soldiers Are Warriors'

These results are almost exactly the reverse of those where 'all soldiers' and all British soldiers were denied the title. Not a single CO strongly disagreed that infantry soldiers were warriors. This is an overwhelming vote from the gatekeepers of regimental culture: warriorship is relevant to British infantry soldiers in a way that it was refused to others. A smaller percentage (61%) of COs thought themselves warriors so we can deduce that COs think of their soldiers as warriors but are themselves unsure of their right to the title. In focus groups the sense of warriorship, or warrior ethos was slightly less vibrant though nearly two thirds (61%) thought infantry soldiers are warriors. That cohort were similarly reluctant to claim the title personally. When they considered the statement 'I am a Warrior' only 43% agreed or strongly agreed that they individually were warriors but in opposition to others, and as a collective they are comfortable that they deserve the title. It will be remembered that soldiers thought the term warrior was something that had been imposed upon them rather than something they themselves had sought; they considered it 'cheesy' and 'cringeworthy', a source of derision and 'not a word for us' yet they are

⁵⁵⁷ GS4: 18 Mar 19, 30:40.

reluctant to relinquish it, or strip their in-group of the title. It is a label then that is reserved (it's not for all soldiers); it sits uncomfortably on the individual ('not for me'); but is appropriate for those the respondent associates with (fellow infantrymen), regardless that is an indeterminate grouping since 'infantry' takes several forms.⁵⁵⁸ Soldiers may not believe they personally belong to the warrior caste but 'ingroup bias is motivated by a desire to see ones group' as well as oneself positively.⁵⁵⁹ The results demonstrate a preference for the group over the self, and a degree of group worship or what the group is thought to be. Soldiers compare themselves to others thought 'better' and strive for warriorship but don't necessarily feel they personally own the title. They are prepared to afford it to their infantry colleagues who they think 'more warrior' than themselves.⁵⁶⁰

The BCS team sought formal recognition, through symbology, for infantry soldiers: 'the infantry should consider an equivalent of the US Army's Combat Infantryman Badge to recognise both active duty and/or proficiency in basic skills'.⁵⁶¹ They sought the establishment of an exclusive Club firstly to recognise infantry skills beyond the basic training that all soldiers undertake, and secondly from service on operations.

We must reward those who embody the Warrior Ethos, and not be afraid to sanction those who fall below the standard. If we want our soldiers to behave like Warriors then we must treat them like Warriors.⁵⁶²

A badge would qualify admission to the caste and highlight infantry distinction: 'We might consider a ceremony to emphasise the fact that passing the Combat Infantryman's Course is something special...we have forged your fighting spirit, your warrior ethos...'⁵⁶³ The belief that warriorship is 'forged' is worth registering; the mention of a ceremony or a badge to mark the infantryman as a warrior implies more visible and public recognition of the infantry as a collective. The BCS recommended a badge; a company commander told me he had taken it upon himself to institute exactly this sort of recognition. In his Company 'we have a Best Ranger award and the prize is a fighting axe, to try and instil fighting ethos'.⁵⁶⁴ Outward demonstrations of qualification set against a corporate standard could assist in explaining what is meant when the word warrior is used to describe British soldiers but would also make the term more exclusive and illustrative of some of the more concerning aspects of historical and obligatory militarism.

⁵⁵⁸ Paratroopers, Armoured, Mechanised and Light Infantry. The British Army even boasts Special Infantry.

⁵⁵⁹ Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30:6 (Nov 2000): 755, [https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992\(200011/12\)30:6%3C745::AID-EJSP24%3E3.0.CO;2-O](https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)30:6%3C745::AID-EJSP24%3E3.0.CO;2-O)

⁵⁶⁰ Danish soldiers were asked their opinion on *esprit de corps*. One in 5 believed their answers would differ from fellow officers: 'they showed neither *Esprit de Corps* nor corporateness.' Henning Sørensen, "New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and *Esprit de Corps* Reevaluated," *Armed Forces & Society*, 20:4 (1994): 606, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9402000407>

⁵⁶¹ BCS, 4.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁶³ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 15:49.

⁵⁶⁴ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 49:00.

It was suggested that 'the infantry need these terms to make themselves feel better, and to give confidence'.⁵⁶⁵ This lack of confidence with the infantry presenting as neglected or adrift from the wider army and yearning for promotion and recognition was noted during the research. That the infantry is the bedrock of the army seemed a distant notion: respondents instead preferred the infantry was moving toward the margins of the army.

Units on a flank, that see themselves as different to the rest of the Army, by training, or geography, or culture: there's a bit about those organisations being different, working harder than others that are less different because they think they have something to prove...the concept of outsiders fuels the warrior approach⁵⁶⁶

Claiming ownership of warriorhood allows enhanced or re-energised identity. Warrior and warrior ethos permits the infantry to 'define themselves separately from the rest of the army...it has a resonance because the British like a shorthand for something'⁵⁶⁷ and warrior is shorthand for hard soldiering. Others highlighted the specific nature of the infantry: 'We are different. The infantry is different to the other Arms and Services. We are the tip of the spear. We are the bit that the rest support. We are combat.'⁵⁶⁸ That 'the shaft of the spear deserves equal esteem as that of the tip of the spear'⁵⁶⁹ was lost on many of those consulted. Warrior as an identity 'encapsulates that sense of identity and sense of belonging to a bunch of chosen men'.⁵⁷⁰ The recommendation and comments they made promote self, self-esteem, self-efficacy and self-interest.⁵⁷¹

Warrior is 'not just a military term but the military needs it'⁵⁷² and the infantry needs a more 'developed sense' of warriorship than others.⁵⁷³ It was pitched as an aspirational standard: 'we do need to tell soldiers that they are warriors as it will make them better soldiers – self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts' and a rallying point for the infantry – 'a good thing...to coalesce around.'⁵⁷⁴ These sentiments are weakened by uncertainty regarding meaning: 'we do need to control the definition' said a focus group of officers. It was accepted that warrior is not the only term that could be used 'We could have called it something else I suppose', said the officer who led the writing of the BCS. The fact is that the infantry is struggling to define its identity: 'warrior' is seized in the absence of stronger or preferable distinction to afford a clear sense of purpose and improve morale. The identifier 'warrior' is a consequence of a lack of credible or suitable alternative.

⁵⁶⁵ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 41:30.

⁵⁶⁶ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 29:57.

⁵⁶⁷ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 03:30.

⁵⁶⁸ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 04:19.

⁵⁶⁹ Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 217.

⁵⁷⁰ GS5: 19 Mar 19, 02:18.

⁵⁷¹ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 54.

⁵⁷² FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 02:45.

⁵⁷³ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 26:45.

⁵⁷⁴ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 42:22; GS1: 23 Jan 19, 15:00.

The warrior ethos is at the heart of what we do in the infantry whereas arguably you can be a very good sapper, a good signaller, logistician and maybe not to the same degree have the same warrior ethos that you need in the infantry. It's not irrelevant to others but its pertinent for the infantry.⁵⁷⁵

It was welcomed as a vehicle through which the infantry could re-claim prominence, and argued that it would assist in filling a void that the infantry 'owned' and into which it should regenerate.⁵⁷⁶ This officer stated frankly: 'in the absence of a war or a campaign which is often the greatest recruitment tool, we, in the infantry, seem to have ceded the centre ground on combat or warrior status.'⁵⁷⁷ Allowing all soldiers the term diminishes the infantry's special place. The declaration of the infantry as warriors, the desired inculcation of warrior ethos and the warrior spirit was offered as 'the anti-thesis to the Belonging⁵⁷⁸ generation'; 'the infantry is more warrior' and needs to make this clear to itself, internally across the army and externally to society at large.⁵⁷⁹ Care is essential though in how a concept is presented: 'as soon as you label a concept, you change how people perceive it.'⁵⁸⁰ As soon as you label soldiers you could change how they are perceived.

By allocating the title warrior to their colleagues, those of the same trade, soldiers retained the title for the infantry ('for us') even where they think it's not one that they personally deserve. Uneasy as they were with the label they wouldn't give it up due to the 'us and them' considerations evident in the classic 'in-groups' and out-groups' of Social Identity Theory.⁵⁸¹ This phenomenon has been commented on in experiments where participants empathise with those they think support the same football team, or have similar coloured eyes. People tend to 'give more points to members of their own group than to members of the outgroup.'⁵⁸² Respondents were uncomfortable with the imposition of the title upon them as individuals but indulged in secondary imposition where they placed it on others rather than dismiss it completely. Soldiers seek the title warrior for those 'like them' and who they admired, in the infantry.

Prepared to exclude fellow soldiers, several of those consulted went so far as to exclude infantry colleagues. 'Some have it in spades from day one, others can become warriors through the right training and immersion and some will never get it. The Army, and to a

⁵⁷⁵ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 06:30.

⁵⁷⁶ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 33:45.

⁵⁷⁷ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 01:20.

⁵⁷⁸ 'Belonging' is the British Army's national recruitment campaign from 2017; videos are accessible at <https://www.thedrum.com/creative-works/project/karmarama-british-army-belonging>. The campaign generated considerable debate on its release. 'Army adverts have traditionally concentrated on the physical aspects, and benefits, to soldiering. This new focus on the emotional side of service is different and an attempt to showcase a modern military accepting of all.' Alistair Bunkall, "Do New Adverts Misrepresent the British Army?" *Sky News*, 10 Jan 2018, <https://news.sky.com/story/do-new-adverts-misrepresent-the-british-army-11202241>.

⁵⁷⁹ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 03:20; FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 07:30.

⁵⁸⁰ Alter, "The Power of Names."

⁵⁸¹ Tajfel & Turner. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *Organizational Identity*, eds Hatch & Schultz, 56-65.

⁵⁸² Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory," 206.

lesser extent the infantry, contain all three.⁵⁸³ That ‘some will never get it’, even in the infantry, albeit to a ‘lesser extent’ reinforces that warriorship cannot be imparted to anyone – the raw material must qualify first by ‘type’. The idea of ‘different’ types within the infantry made sense to others too. ‘I think though that there are scales within scales. On the right real potential but also possible catastrophe. Other end, possible success there too and less chance of something going wrong’.⁵⁸⁴ It is better to tolerate the non-warriors who might win success, but might lose, than to expose them as less than warriorlike. This is a risky strategy not least in light of the seriousness with which respondents regarded their trade. It compromises the concept of warriorship as an infantry standard where admission is based on a ‘tax’ on the toughest of soldiers.

Confusion about meaning, frustration at apparent constraint and concerns that warrior is an historic construct, or meaningless term were mostly set aside where it came to the issue of who might claim the title. It was more often considered synonymous with infantryman than it was soldier: ‘It does define infantry as a whole; the Army maybe not, the infantry definitely, tag it to the infantry’.⁵⁸⁵ The infantry needed to more actively seize it: it might even be reserved completely for the infantry.

I personally think it is more appropriate to the infantry because the nature of the warrior ethos is fighting spirit, its independence, its determination, controlled aggression, teamwork; all those things are important in our day job where we are contracted to close with the enemy. Everyone else in the army has to be able to do that but it’s not their day job.⁵⁸⁶

This seizing of the title offers opportunity. ‘One of the reasons the infantry is suffering at the minute’ in recruiting opined one officer ‘is because of how the Army is being branded and advertised; the neutralisation of tone, the acceptance of all people; “Belonging”; the infantry alternately needs to be chasing a higher-level vision’.⁵⁸⁷

‘Belonging’ went too far down the non-traditional route. It had to because the generation today are not as enthused by murder-death-kill as generations before. The core intenders who are enthused by that, that market is getting smaller all the time, and it gets smaller the farther away we get from Afghanistan and Iraq. If we went after just those we would have an Army of relatively few. But we went too far the other way. We turned off too much the core intenders and the internal market. The new adverts have dialled ‘Belonging’ back and we’re back to blokes bursting into rooms with rifles and lasers.⁵⁸⁸

The infantry is now being squeezed on two fronts. Historically ‘any officer in the technical branches was ‘the bloke’ – implying that he was not a proper soldier...unbefitting to the conduct expected...In the other ranks, those who had a technical qualification were

⁵⁸³ CO07.

⁵⁸⁴ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 18:38.

⁵⁸⁵ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 02:10.

⁵⁸⁶ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 05:21.

⁵⁸⁷ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 44:50.

⁵⁸⁸ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 28:40.

officially designated 'tradesmen'.⁵⁸⁹ Today the technical arms are considered more favourably and the infantry cannot assume 'horsey' superiority as Liddell-Hart termed it. They hope instead to recover their standing through recognition as warriors. Secondly, there appear to be less T2 warriors, 'core intenders' and Coker's dying class to recruit.

An opinion has been offered that an indifferent approach to 'rewarding effective conduct in combat' may be a symptom of a lack of 'true' fighting culture, or warriorship, in the British Army.⁵⁹⁰ In his article, Grant contrasts the British Army of the 1990s unfavourably with the German Army of WWII, and explains that in the Wehrmacht: 'Promotions,



Fig. 7.5: OSM & Clasp

rewards and kudos were reserved for those at the point of most danger.'⁵⁹¹ Respondents agreed that the British Army didn't have this culture and rewards were relatively meaningless. it doesn't matter 'who gets called warrior and who doesn't: it's like who gets rosettes and who doesn't'.⁵⁹² Rosettes on medals (or clasps as shown in Fig. 7.5)⁵⁹³ are awarded to distinguish those who are in the area of conflict and are judged to have been in danger, or involved in the 'warfighting phase' from those who were not. The criteria is disputed just as the entitlement to identify as warrior was disputed. Interestingly those who might

lay the easiest claim to the mantle were least concerned about it. The opinion above regarding medals and rosettes where it 'doesn't matter' was offered by an infantry corporal whose job it is to lead troops against the enemy: he has an undisputed right to the medal with rosette and clasp. Those whose right to it might be disputed are often more keen to gain recognition.

'Warrior' as a title, like rosettes, badges and ciphers allows the infantry to stand apart: 'I would be completely happy if warrior became a term that was associated with the infantry'⁵⁹⁴ not least because infantry as a word was thought unattractive. Infantry, infantryman or 'infanteer' were judged inelegant terms, associated with inglorious endeavours: 'infantry has negative connotations with the Great War, when I hear the word infantry, when the general public hear the word they think of masses walking forward in straight lines – that has to be broken away from'.⁵⁹⁵ Examination of this issue

⁵⁸⁹ Liddell-Hart, *Memoirs*, 79-80.

⁵⁹⁰ Grant, "The German Army of WWII," 70.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁵⁹² FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 29:29.

⁵⁹³ The "Afghanistan" Clasp to the Operational Service Medal (OSM) is awarded for service in Afghanistan. A silver rosette is worn on the medal ribbon to denotes entitlement to the clasp when no medal is worn.

Image accessed at UK MOD, Guidance: Medals: Campaigns, Descriptions and Eligibility, updated 23 Dec 2019, at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/medals-campaigns-descriptions-and-eligibility> on 01 Mar 2020.

⁵⁹⁴ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 39:50.

⁵⁹⁵ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 45:03.

gives substance to the deduction that the attraction of 'warrior' is a response and defence mechanism against a perceived demotion of infantry standing.

Partly due to societal changes, partly due to generational changes and due for example to things out there about what the combat element does like Op Reflect, the remembrance campaign for the 100th anniversary of WW1 that presents infantrymen being slaughtered in their thousands, and a mental health crisis in the nation which is reflected in the post-Falklands analogy that more people committed suicide after the Falklands than died in the War – this narrative has conspired against people wanting to do what we [the infantry] do.⁵⁹⁶

The term warrior allows 'social redress' for a grievance where the infantry is a minority group in the army – and where they question their own social and even personal identity and standing. By 'developing clearly visible identity markers and less permeable category boundaries'⁵⁹⁷ the infantry through its employment of the term warrior creates a secure system of reference. But it is acceptable only 'as a secondary term'⁵⁹⁸ – the primary term is a functional or regimental identifier.

Regimental Ethos

'Warriors should be looked at through a regimental lens' suggested an infantry instructor 'some regiments are, some are not.'⁵⁹⁹ Where a unit exists on a 'warrior scale' and the sources of its culture won through 'particular missions or geographical environments'⁶⁰⁰ assist in determining identity. Units might then be employed according to their nature as an assault force, or a defensive force, or even outside of combat operations:

...we should not fall into the trap of believing that the peacekeeping arena has much, if anything, in common with the battlefield, or that the attributes of the peacekeeper are, by themselves, of much relevance as qualifications to be a war-fighter.⁶⁰¹

The group most important to the soldiers consulted for this thesis was not the army or even the infantry: it was their regiment, a 'metaphysical concept'⁶⁰² maybe but a tangible social group⁶⁰³ as far as they were concerned and an organisation with real meaning. It is where 'one's idiosyncratic individualizing qualities are overwhelmed by the salience of one's group memberships'.⁶⁰⁴ Subculture also matters: 'it's when you get to your Company⁶⁰⁵ – that's when you get your ethos, that's when you get your calling'.⁶⁰⁶ It is

⁵⁹⁶ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 06:55.

⁵⁹⁷ Brown, "Social Identity Theory," 768.

⁵⁹⁸ FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 14:50.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 44:15. Regiments in this context is used to differentiate infantry units.

⁶⁰⁰ Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," 51-2.

⁶⁰¹ Kiszely, "What Should We Be Looking For?" 73.

⁶⁰² French, *Military Identities*, 339.

⁶⁰³ A 'set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category.' Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225.

⁶⁰⁴ Hornsey, "Social Identity Theory," 206.

⁶⁰⁵ Within each battalion there are usually 4-6 companies of c100 soldiers each.

⁶⁰⁶ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 13:53.

where both T1 and T2 are subsumed by the collective. Aligning team and Company ethos to regimental organisation and beyond to the infantry and the army is the trick to giving meaning to identity that is coherent.

Regimental identity is lucid.⁶⁰⁷ Uniformity provided by the named world of the regiment, the 'non-rational methods of persuasion'⁶⁰⁸ and the symbols that designate a soldier's position qualify role.⁶⁰⁹ These are comprehensible under Identity Theory. Like the chicken and egg dilemma, the recruit is drawn in, and the regiment offers opportunity for self-realisation or vice versa. Personality, and identity, is 'as much a product of a person's world as it is a determinant of it.'⁶¹⁰ A role is given or the group is joined and the soldier can exist either side of the Doing-Being division but the sense of belonging to that regiment circumvents all other considerations. One respondent couldn't connect with British Army ethos or culture and even isolated his regiment from the wider infantry: 'I'm not sure about British Army culture as I am a part of the Parachute Regiment'.⁶¹¹

It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of this statement: regimental identity is deliberately privileged over all others forms of identity. At one of the first focus groups a coarse show of hands survey was conducted to ascertain how soldiers wished to be known. The choices I offered were: soldier, infantryman, or warrior. It quickly became apparent that these three options were insufficient – the 'options aren't relatable'.⁶¹² Asking why revealed more specific terminology was preferred: 'I'd go paratrooper' said the soldier who raised the objection. Including this more functional and regimental term in the offer resulted in no hands shown for soldier, infantryman or warrior and 5 out of 5 hands raised for paratrooper: they said an acceptable alternative would be 'airborne'. This exercise was repeated at subsequent groups and results were consistent with soldiers overwhelmingly preferring to be known by their regimental identity.

It is critical 'to examine how a person categorizes herself or himself as a member of a group.'⁶¹³ The soldiers of the Royal Irish were clear on how they categorised themselves: 'We should be promoting the rank of Ranger over Royal Irish Warrior' was the opinion of the Royal Irish recruiting team where 10 out of 10 soldiers preferred Ranger over soldier, infantryman or warrior.⁶¹⁴ Ranger is the rank that the Royal Irish Regiment gives to its

⁶⁰⁷ Hogg *et al.*, "A Tale of Two Theories," 260.

⁶⁰⁸ The 'use of rhetorical language, symbols, uniforms, chanting, control of bodily appearance, movement, and posture, ribbons, ceremonies, music, marching, etc.' Robillard, "Dangers of Soldier Identity," 211.

⁶⁰⁹ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 225.

⁶¹⁰ Haslam *et al.*, *New Psychology*, 14.

⁶¹¹ Instr 21.

⁶¹² FG13: P Company Instructors 02 Nov 18, 13:51.

⁶¹³ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 228.

⁶¹⁴ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 03:00.

private soldiers. Dating to an antecedent regiment, the Connaught Rangers (1793-1922), it matters to the regiment for its exclusivity and heritage as much anything else. A focus group of officers agreed: 'I prefer Ranger over Warrior – it's how we refer to our soldiers, and it's what our soldiers are passionate about, its unique.'⁶¹⁵ At a SNCO focus group only one preferred infantryman, 5 out of 6 opted for Ranger; 3 out of 5 corporals accepted warrior but when offered 'Ranger' 5 out of 5 self-nominated; and in a group of junior non-commissioned officers the choice of 'Ranger' as identity was also unanimous.⁶¹⁶

In one discussion, small group affiliation came through even more strongly. Half the group were ex 1st Battalion soldiers, deployed and deployable globally, whose antecedent regiment was the Royal Irish Rangers: there soldiers were always referred to as Rangers. The other half comprised Home Service Royal Irish soldiers, who were deployed only in NI and who termed their soldiers Privates, a rank taken from their antecedent, the Ulster Defence Regiment. Here the body was split. Three opted for 'infantryman' as a designation; four of the group preferred Ranger.⁶¹⁷ The opinions expressed were directly related to antecedent regimental affiliations. This is remarkable for the fact that those regimental references were at the time of the discussion 28 years expired, with the merger of both regiments occurring in 1992. Subculture and regimental affiliation, and even informal or historic cultures unsanctioned by the formal extant culture⁶¹⁸ is a highly significant and determining factor for soldiers.

The officer in charge of infantry ethos, keen on the title warrior for the infantry, was convinced that a broader term of reference was necessary, especially for recruiting: 'People only think about joining the Army, people understand 'infantry' – the regiments are less well understood now. Where's Mercia? Who was the Princess of Wales to today's youngsters? Only 7% of the population know someone in the Army'.⁶¹⁹ His deduction is that regimental identity is less tenable since affiliation and regimental association is strong only once the soldier is enlisted and begun the journey of induction – when he or she is hearing and digesting the stories. 'To many outside the Army, the infantry (with its bewildering range of regiments) is more confusing than it is appealing.'⁶²⁰ Prior to joining then, the assumption is that the recruit cannot have a sense of

⁶¹⁵ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 27:40.

⁶¹⁶ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 32:40; FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 30:10; FG5: JNCOs 29 Nov 18, 06:40.

⁶¹⁷ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 29:00.

⁶¹⁸ Dandeker & Gow "Military Culture," 59.

⁶¹⁹ He is referring to The Mercian Regiment and The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment: GS6: 15 Mar 19, 36:30. A reduced military-civilian interface exists elsewhere too. 'There is a widening gulf in the United States today between the public and those who serve in the military and fight the nation's wars. Though the populace expresses a great deal of trust in the military, the number of citizens with a direct connection to the military is shrinking, suggesting that respect for the military is inversely proportional to participation in it.' Amy Schafer, 'Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,' CNAS, 08 May 2017, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations-of-war>

⁶²⁰ Dave, "The British Regimental System."

association. More should therefore be made of 'infantry' and warrior, as collective references to draw people into the army. That this could prove a short-term arrangement since identity is not a fleeting phenomenon was not considered. Two further points of caution apply: first, groups perceived to have high status contribute to positive identity⁶²¹ and are attractive so the assumption that regiments are not recognised due to a lack of contact should be tested before it is accepted. Reputations attract even where the units are themselves unfamiliar. Second, whether 'warrior' builds on existing self-identity that is then reinforced or if it affords an identity in the absence of self-esteem (aligned to the uncertainty-identity model)⁶²² is unclear. Induction and training for either must be carefully tailored to suit all or it may fail in building collective identity.

Collectivisation can also destroy local identity and affiliation. 'Infantry branding – it's very bland. It almost deletes the power of infantry recruiting through infantry regiments which is very powerful'.⁶²³ Insightfully: 'the thing that makes the Infantry unique [regimental ethos and identity] is the thing that makes us harder to collectivise'.⁶²⁴ This officer argues that contrary to accepted philosophy, the sum of the parts is actually greater where they are kept apart. Concern that the term warrior, useful for recruiting purposes, would become corporate identity and diminish regimental identity, leading to the merging of regiments under a 'warrior' banner was articulated and opposition thought predictable. 'If you apply it to the Infantry, the [infantry] regiments will object, if you make it the Army, the infantry will object'.⁶²⁵ It was anticipated to fail too when placed upon the wider British Army. 'If you define the British Warrior – the Scottish Warrior may not be happy, the Irish Warrior won't be happy, they will both have alternative preferences for identity'.⁶²⁶ Culture eats strategy for breakfast⁶²⁷ and so local culture trumps organisational identity. The fear is that: 'Once broken, the System will not readily recover, and the British Army will sever a key thread with history that has served the nation well for nearly four centuries'.⁶²⁸

One of the corporals consulted was able to bridge the gap. He thought the various terms did not need to be exclusive. Like the Stoic he could exist in a multiphrenic condition, confident in who and what he was. He supported his regimental identify over any other but explained self-categorisation, firm in his primary affiliation and satisfied that harmony

⁶²¹ Naomi Ellemers *et al.*, "Status Protection In High Status Minority Groups," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22:2 (1992): 123-140, <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420220203>

⁶²² Michael A. Hogg *et al.*, "Why Do People Join Groups? Three Motivational Accounts From Social Psychology," *Social & Personality Psychology Compass* 2:3 (2008): 1274, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00099.x>.

⁶²³ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 1:03:20.

⁶²⁴ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 43:58.

⁶²⁵ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 39:52.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 38:38..

⁶²⁷ Attributed to Management Consultant Peter Drucker.

⁶²⁸ Dave, "The British Regimental System."

could be had: 'Ranger is the Royal Irish word for Warrior'.⁶²⁹ A senior officer agreed multiple identities were possible (and like the corporal reduces warrior to something more specific): 'I think you can have many identities. This is not a watering down of the regimental system. You can be an infantryman first, then a Fusilier. Infantry is our trade'. However where warrior fits with these appreciated identities is uncertain and is more likely to conflict with one or all of them given its inexact connotation.

The regimental system where units, and in particular infantry regiments are recruited on a regional and county basis, is the foundation of British martial identity: national and provincial associations are encouraged and the regiment is a supra-national entity.⁶³⁰ The regiment also explains itself as it wishes. 'In the Lancs [The Duke of Lancaster's regiment] the soldiers will say they are Lions of England quicker than warrior; in the Anglians [The Royal Anglian Regiment] they will declare themselves Vikings'.⁶³¹ This first example allows identity as preferred through Lancaster, the persona of the Duke and indeed the county of Lancashire: in the second the 'land of the Angles' (Anglia) is assumed an entity akin to the regimental county home base regardless of its lack of recognisable boundary. Both gatekeeper influence and myth are working hard here. The Royal Regiment of Scotland emphasises Scots heritage, both lowland and highland. A card provided to each Scots soldier has this as regimental direction.⁶³²

I am a Scottish Infantryman
I am responsible for the reputation of my Regiment and upholding its history
I am PROUD to be part of this team
I am FEARLESS in battle and compassionate in peacetime
I am the living example of a PROFESSIONAL soldier

The term warrior is absent. In other regiments it is equally so: in some where it is mentioned it is downplayed, or interpreted toward individual regimental preference. The strongest sense of identity comes from knowing which regiment is yours, and which small group you belong to – 'the experience of the checkpoint [in Afghanistan] – doesn't matter where you are from, all mucking in together...it was brilliant...we were like a family'.⁶³³

⁶²⁹ FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 32:10.

⁶³⁰ Denman observes that: 'The regiment acted as a supra-national basis for the Irish soldier's loyalty; and perhaps service in Irish units focused rather than diffused a sense of Irishness. Denman, "The Red Livery of Shame," 233. Provincial identity and influences external to the army can also create negative effect. Draper highlights the Connaught Rangers who were stationed in India at the height of the Anglo-Irish War where nationalist sentiment played some part in the 'mutiny' there. He points to institutional failings in the Army at that time as being equally important but it is the nationalist element that is mediated and celebrated - and so mythologised. Mario Draper, "Mutiny Under the Sun: The Connaught Rangers, India, 1920," *War In History*, (2019): 1-22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344518791208>. Roy highlights that 'caste consciousness' can be replaced by racial pride. Kaushik Roy, "The Construction of Regiments in the Indian Army: 1859-1913," *War in History*, 8:2 (2001): 147. So, identity and ethos can come from many sources and cannot be assumed.

⁶³¹ FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18, 52:20.

⁶³² Provided to the author by a SNCO of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. FG11: SNCOs 01 Nov 18.

⁶³³ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 31:50.

The marketing company that advised the Royal Irish on the #RIRISHWARRIOR campaign agreed to discuss the rationale behind their advertising strategy.⁶³⁴ National pride ('Irishness') was important to their approach and they thought it important to



Fig. 7.6: The Caubeen

promote symbols like the distinctive Royal Irish headdress known as a *caubeen* (Fig. 7.6),⁶³⁵ the unique green hackle, or plume, and Royal Irish cap badge – the harp and crown. They were correct in picking these things according to focus groups: 'history spurs you on, the power of the *caubeen*, being an Irishman...'⁶³⁶ That the regiment had collectively been awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross (shown in top right hand

corner of the Regimental Colour at Fig. 4.1) in recognition of bravery, sacrifice and service on operations in Northern Ireland was also thought powerful for creating a brand: the Royal Irish is unique in that it is the only regiment to have been organisationally honoured in this manner. Symbols such as these are convincing in the creation and maintenance of myth, heritage and history, and provide the stories soldiers tell. Less tangibly perhaps, though equally authoritatively, fighting spirit was something thought inextricably associated with the regiment that required highlighting. The convergence of symbology, national sentiment and regimental fighting spirit provided the idea that the regiment should be marketed with the *caubeen*, the shamrock, the regiment's 'Drop Zone' flash from its days as an air assault unit (and associated with stories from World War Two and Arnhem) and even the regimental mascot, an Irish Wolfhound highlighted as icons. 'Irish' was the immutable part of the identity campaign; warrior was not.

Three descriptors were shortlisted – Hero, Warrior and Ranger – to identify soldiers and 'build a positive reputation'⁶³⁷ for the Royal Irish. The desire was to create a memorable and engaging social media strapline and Twitter 'hashtag'. Ranger failed as an identifier for several reasons. It was thought too close to one of the antecedent regiments from the most recent merger in 1992 and might alienate those otherwise affiliated. Of more concern, it can have sectarian overtones for its association with Glasgow Rangers Football Club – a team thought 'Protestant' in character. This could be inflammatory and

⁶³⁴ Discussion: author, Regimental Secretary of the Royal Irish Regiment and marketing company employees, 14 Nov 2018.

⁶³⁵ The regimental head-dress of the Royal Irish is called a *caubeen*. Image accessed at <https://www.royal-irish.com/stories/the-caubeen> on 31 Dec 2019. © Copyright 2019. The Royal Irish. All Rights Reserved. The history of the caubeen can too be found at this link.

⁶³⁶ FG2: RRT 14 Nov 18, 34:30.

⁶³⁷ Marketing Company Regimental Communications Proposal 06 Apr 2016.

would alienate communities in NI from which recruits are sought. ‘Hero’ was dropped early in discussions. The Regimental Headquarters made clear its opposition: ‘With respect to #RIRISHWARRIOR, the first proposal was #RIRISHHERO which certainly turned me off, even #RIRISHWARRIOR...we went with it with some discomfort’.⁶³⁸

Warrior, chosen ‘with some discomfort’, from the outset provides an unstable and unconvincing foundation for identity. The marketing company wanted to highlight heroism but the regiment didn’t favour the title. The soldiers would prefer Ranger but the political context was not conducive. Warrior was the least worse option. A subtlety in the marketing company’s campaign was also missed. ‘RIRISH’, the shortened militarised version of the regimental title, was to be charged as a device. The marketing company intended it to be read phonetically as ‘Our Irish’, promoting the regiment as belonging to the people of Ireland and therefore heightening association – and increasing recruits. The suffix Warrior was a less important element of the ‘hashtag’ to the marketing experts. This was totally missed by soldiers who contributed to the research: ‘warrior’ was the sole focus demonstrating how easy it is to attribute incorrect emphasis and become confused by a new term of identity.

The ethos of ‘the last Irish infantry Regiment of the line in the British Army’ is explained on the regiment’s official website.

It is defined by its Irish character and the Irish traditions it observes. The Regiment recruits predominantly from the island of Ireland but also welcomes men of the right quality and character from all parts of the United Kingdom and further afield. The Regimental identity is Irish, reflected in the ethos, values and cultural orientation of all who have served or continue to serve the Regiment. Those who identify as Royal Irish or seek to be identified as Royal Irish will, above all, be professional in attitude and action, determined to lean in to any task, fiercely loyal to their Regiment and positively apolitical.⁶³⁹

This is detailed and provides a sense of the attitude and aspiration that the regiment has for itself: soldiers also thought it familiar and felt they could then measure unit ethos. Ranger ethos⁶⁴⁰ is the spirit of the Royal Irish and this goes beyond functional or formation influence: ‘we offer Ranger ethos in this Battalion, and what it is to be a

⁶³⁸ FG1: RHQ, 14 Nov 18, 01:49. The RHQ sense of being ‘turned off’ by Hero reflects the mood at the regiment. Soldiers were not attracted to the plan. ‘#RIRISH HERO – now that’s American, what about being humble, showing humility, ain’t nobody going to turn around and can call themselves a hero’. FG6: Corporals, 29 Nov 18, 40:50. Interestingly in comment on the constructs one American soldier says that hero is used as a sarcastic sobriquet in the US forces. ‘If you’ve been in the Army longer than five minutes, you’ve probably been called “warrior” already. Or maybe “hero,” usually used sarcastically when referring to basic trainees. But “warrior” is not used sarcastically.’ Angry Staff Officer. “Stop Calling Us Warriors,” 14 Dec 2016, at <https://angrystaffofficer.com/2016/12/14/stop-calling-us-warriors/> on 17 Jun 2017.

⁶³⁹ Accessed at <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/infantry/royal-irish-regiment/> on 30 Dec 18.

⁶⁴⁰ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 14:50.

Ranger.’⁶⁴¹ Succinctly: ‘The soldiers all see themselves as Rangers. Different from all the rest.’⁶⁴² The Irishness of the unit and the ability to ‘be Irish’ in the British Army through adherence to traditions established by soldiers from Ireland and the unique history of the regiment – with emphasis on unit loyalty and the apolitical nature of the regiment – is how the Regiment self-presents. Any alternative identity would require careful handling to complement and not displace what is already authoritative. As one soldier said: ‘I can explain Ranger in a pub; I can’t explain Warrior’.⁶⁴³ Where it can be explained it is more than a ‘shallow act’; it has ‘appreciable effect’ and is viable.⁶⁴⁴

Ethos, locally enforced, is difficult to resist.

Once people are in the Army though around the 6-8 week point of basic training we have inculcated, indoctrinated, whatever word you use, more of a combat ethos and they see the Army’s purpose as to protect the nation and to fight to protect the nation’⁶⁴⁵

Certain regiments are thought to have an unassailable ethos – and with this comes a degree of envy and admiration. ‘The Paras ‘have it’ much as we might not like it. They have an ethos drummed into them that they are the best. [It] starts in basic training – they only train their own. Half of it is brainwashing but that’s OK’.⁶⁴⁶ The two strongest brands were thought to be Para and Rifles⁶⁴⁷ – ‘paras brand as ‘hard men’ with uncompromising standards and present as ‘vaguely cultish’;⁶⁴⁸ the Rifles offer the Rifleman Ethos, ‘lots of locations, lots of [infantry] trades, variation’ according to the senior officer in charge of infantry ethos. So strong are these brands in fact that ‘the first two females to commence infantry training have elected for Rifles’.⁶⁴⁹ The strength of the offer of this regiment is such that new recruits, including those previously prohibited from joining the infantry, have the Rifles as their first choice. They didn’t join the Army, nor the infantry or some band of warriors; they joined ‘The Rifles’.

The introduction of ‘warrior ethos’ is an attempt to reduce division and strengthen the higher-level collective.

⁶⁴¹ FG9: Majors 29 Nov 18, 43:11.

⁶⁴² CO01.

⁶⁴³ FG3: SNCOs 15 Nov 18, 32:40.

⁶⁴⁴ Riza, “Two-Dimensional Warfare,” 266.

⁶⁴⁵ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 05:40.

⁶⁴⁶ FG7: SNCOs 29 Nov 18, 14:08.

⁶⁴⁷ I am confident that others might equally have been mentioned: Gurkhas, Scots, the SAS come immediately to mind as strong army brands.

⁶⁴⁸ Nick Betts, ‘Inside the Parachute Regiment, “The Last Outpost for Hard Men Willing to do Bad Things to Bad People”’, *The Telegraph*, 9 Jan 2019, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/the-filter/inside-parachute-regiment-last-outpost-hard-men-willing-do-bad/>.

⁶⁴⁹ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 32:00. Since conducting this interview both are now qualified infantry soldiers. One joined the Rifles, the other reportedly enlisted in the Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment. Mark Nicol “Two Women Pass the Army’s Gruelling Six Month Infantry Training Course Making Them the First British Female Soldiers Whose Main Purpose is to Kill the Enemy at Close Quarters,” *The Mail On Sunday*, 1 Dec 2019 <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7742777/Two-women-pass-Armys-gruelling-six-month-infantry-training-course.html>.

My job is to please the infantry. We have 17 regiments that never speak as one – they are starting to now but only as a necessity because manning is not good. We need to regain and find the glue that binds us together; that's essential. If warrior is a term that can be used well, brilliant. We don't have a trade mark on it but we will use it.⁶⁵⁰

The necessity to maximise recruitment compels the seizure of the term warrior but it may be a short term expedient: promising warriorship could prove an empty offer. Such strategies can fail when the 'transferability of theory to the world of action' is tested.⁶⁵¹ The moment of truth will be in the appearance of the trained product. 'As a commander, I am concerned not so much with how to persuade people to join the Armed Services, as with what I am looking for in those who come under my command.'⁶⁵² The label is one thing; the training regime another; the leadership effort required to realise warriorship and establish identity within the ranks a further consideration.

The officer with responsibility for the BCS where warrior ethos was first articulated expects regimental and infantry ethos to co-exist. 'I don't think it should prevent units from referring to themselves on a more individual basis but warrior ethos allows us to bring the Corps of Infantry together.'⁶⁵³ A second officer with responsibility for branding and marketing, and more broadly the organisation's corporate communications said that 'the need was to find a binding factor for the infantry as a whole – this was that.'⁶⁵⁴ The offer of an additional layer of identity it was anticipated would be welcome. 'I'd like to think if you speak to most infantryman that they would agree and believe that the warrior ethos is a critical part of what we are about'.⁶⁵⁵ Discussed in the focus groups held for this thesis, and more recently still on social media,⁶⁵⁶ the constitution of a Corps of Infantry is an old and recurring idea.⁶⁵⁷ It generally fails to persuade. Even though 'the autonomy and distinctiveness of individual regiments was appreciably eroded after 1945'⁶⁵⁸ the British Army continues to resist the establishment of a single Corps of Infantry. The 'need to unpick 350 years of structural and cultural evolution is not,

⁶⁵⁰ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 42:50.

⁶⁵¹ Colin S Gray, "What Rand Hath Wrought," *Foreign Policy*, 4 (Autumn 1971): 111, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147739>

⁶⁵² Kiszely, "What Should We Be Looking For?" 70.

⁶⁵³ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 17:20.

⁶⁵⁴ GS2: 14 Feb 19, 11:23.

⁶⁵⁵ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 03:50.

⁶⁵⁶ @Average_SOLDier, 14 Feb 2020, ran on on-line poll on Twitter asking 'whether the Infantry could/ should move into a division based system. This system would have only 1 Infantry capbadge. We would be seperated [sic] by divisional flashes dependant on where we work.' Of 563 votes, 37% supported the 1 capbadge option; 59% desired to 'stay as we are'. The results cannot be verified; the sample is uncertain but the sentiment is illustrative and in line with my research. do not Accessed at https://twitter.com/Average_SOLDier/status/1228247450407854080 on 01 Mar 2020.

⁶⁵⁷ The idea is often dismissed for its perceived negative impact on morale. Those who argue for a Corps of Infantry 'mistake the gold of the infantry regimental system for brass, and want to replace it with cheap white metal.' Major General H. E. N Bredin, "An Interpretation of the Infantry," *BAR* 28 (Apr 1968): 39. Others suggest it is only 'passionate, sentimental loyalties' that prevent its formation. Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, 489. For a pragmatic serving soldier's opinion see B. M. Shaw. "The Demise of the Regimental System and the Reorganisation of the Infantry." *BAR* 116 (Aug 1997): 39-43.

⁶⁵⁸ French, *Military Identities*, 292.

currently, pressing.⁶⁵⁹

The results of this survey, focus groups and interviews, suggest for each of the three identities considered: warrior is thought least relevant, and largely incomprehensible; infantry is disliked; it is in regimental identity where a true sense of belonging and identity is felt. The inculcation of ethos, and indoctrination, persuades soldiers they are part of something bigger but this requires very careful management.⁶⁶⁰ Once accepted and absorbed it becomes a part of one's identity and a dominant and powerful force. The collective effort of one unit considered a warrior battalion was likened to 'a great stallion not quite always under control' by an officer; you've got to harness it; it won't always do what you want it to do but its powerful, and dangerous' and as such a potent force.⁶⁶¹ Not every ethos is well articulated, evident or 'lived': neither does ethos always appear in obvious form. 'If that's broadly what a warrior ethos, a warrior organisation is,' this officer continued, 'then you have to also consider others who aren't like that.' They have a different ethos, and the army as a broad church comprising soldiers who are not warriors was recognised. Where unit ethos isn't powerful though it can be irrelevant or becomes subordinate to another, for example the 'strong pull' of a civilian primary group⁶⁶² for soldiers based in the community. This may overwhelm and create divergence⁶⁶³ from the parent organisation: challenges to loyalty or split allegiances are then possible.

Summary

Ethos is the spirit or a sense of society. It is built across several levels of reference from the shared sense of that which unites humankind through nation to organisation and critically in the martial sense, regimentally. It is how one lives in each environment and importantly with reference to that environment that matters. Participation 'may be highest' when individuals are linked at three levels of abstraction (the group, the role, and the person).⁶⁶⁴ Ethos can cement these three levels through consistent and coherent narrative. Neither warrior nor warrior ethos though is accepted as part of British Army narrative except where it can be read to existing articulated standards and values and then because these are the only reference. In the absence of clarity soldiers seize upon the framework they recognise. This retro-fits the term warrior to existing structure and allows warrior ethos at best to be simply synonymous with existing models or dismissed

⁶⁵⁹ Dave, "The British Regimental System."

⁶⁶⁰ Kier applauds the honesty of the military for terming the assimilation of its members into its ethos in as indoctrination and not 'orientation' or 'mentoring'. Kier, *Imaging War*, 28.

⁶⁶¹ GS3: 12 Feb 19, 11:23.

⁶⁶² Shils & Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration," 290.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, 296.

⁶⁶⁴ Stets & Burke, "Identity Theory," 234.

as a 'a made up concept.' The spirit of the British Army is soldiering, and warriorship is an awkward addition to established ethos.

If warrior ethos is 'a thing', something specific and new, not fabricated or an exercise in rebranding it was supported for its applicability to the infantry. But there were hints of unattainability about it: hero worship of those thought more deserving of the accolade;⁶⁶⁵ and imposter syndrome where subjects were not prepared to self-award.⁶⁶⁶ Soldiers wanted the title but were uncertain over who qualified or how it is earned. An obvious and demonstrable lack of organisational esteem was evident as the infantry self-contemplated. It was stated that 'warriorship should be the infantry's trade'⁶⁶⁷ and just as 'other cap badges promote their trade as the differentiator'⁶⁶⁸ so too the infantry should seize upon and promote warriorship. More than this – 'we [the infantry] need it.'⁶⁶⁹ Warrior and warrior ethos is a means to regain lost status:

We've tried to make an all-encompassing 'Belonging' campaign over the last 3 or 4 years which has been useful to certain elements of the Army but not been good for the combat arms. I'm trying to get us to regain that centre ground, that combat ethos – for example 'soldier first, tradesmen second' for other arms and services, they use that as a selling point because they can show that in Afghanistan etc they too must be able to fight, to 'do combat', but it means we have lost the ownership of 'combat'.⁶⁷⁰

Where the infantry attempts to monopolise the term warrior it will face a struggle: others think they too 'do combat' and doing 'unpleasant stuff'⁶⁷¹ isn't restricted to the infantry. Trends suggest that ownership is likely to be further eroded before it is recaptured.⁶⁷²

In their considerations of ethos regimental identity was privileged by soldiers over all else and it was this that soldiers could most easily and readily define. 'The pride is in local identities – Fusilier, Ranger, Highlander..., that's the 'grippy' piece, that's where the

⁶⁶⁵ Allison and Scott say the original phrase originates in Thomas Carlyle's work of 1841, *On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History*. Their 'Hero Leadership Dynamic' is a useful frame of understanding here. It fulfils an 'epistemic function' relating to the 'knowledge and wisdom that hero stories impart to us' and an 'energizing function' by inspiring and promoting development. Scott T Allison & George R. Goethals, "Hero Worship: The Elevation of the Human Spirit," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 46:2 (2016): 190, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12094>.

⁶⁶⁶ 'Imposter Phenomenon' is where the individual internally experiences a sense of intellectual phoniness – but it is more widely understood now. Pauline Rose Clance & Suzanne Ament Imes, "The Imposter Phenomenon in High Achieving Women: Dynamics and Therapeutic Intervention," *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice*, 15:3 (1978): 241-7, <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0086006>.

⁶⁶⁷ FG12: Officers 02 Nov 18, 42:10.

⁶⁶⁸ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 08:00.

⁶⁶⁹ FG8: Officers 28 Nov 18, 28:10.

⁶⁷⁰ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 02:50. This idea that the infantry has lost ground is an historic refrain and recognised problem. 'In 1943 a Director of Infantry was appointed at the War Office to give the infantry a voice on a par with other teeth arms.' French, *Raising Churchill's Army*, 71.

⁶⁷¹ GS1: 23 Jan 19, 21:29.

⁶⁷² Cyber is now 'considered a combat arms branch along with infantry, armor, engineer, air defense, field artillery and aviation' and accounted for almost the entirety of the increase in combat arms spots at a recent US officer graduation. Brandon O'Connor, "West Point Grads Get Assignments Through New Branching System," *US Army Website*, 14 Nov 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/229826/west_point_class_of_2020_receives_branches_through_new_marker_model_branching_system

meaning is.⁶⁷³ These are not just titles retained due to some reverence or as ‘memorial to the obsolete weapons and techniques of the 18th and 19th centuries.’⁶⁷⁴ Rather they afford ‘combat value’ from a sense of solidarity.⁶⁷⁵ From that shared stories originate, familiarity grows and identity is strengthened. Regional, regimental and historical myth has meaning to serving soldiers and the regiment affords ‘a solid identity: that’s where the institutionalisation takes place.’⁶⁷⁶ Uniqueness is important and specific identity is powerful, in a way that warrior, soldier, or infantryman, is not and without some significant effort will never be. Anand Giridharadas says we need to dig our ‘fingers into the soil’ of our human identity predicament.⁶⁷⁷ The army must do similarly before it elects to impose the warrior ethos as a sense of society on the soldiers of the British Army.

⁶⁷³ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 32:40.

⁶⁷⁴ French, *Military Identities*, 341.

⁶⁷⁵ Kier, *Imagining War*, 29.

⁶⁷⁶ FG4: Officers 15 Nov 18, 42:50.

⁶⁷⁷ Anand Giridharadas, “Book Review: What Is Identity?” *New York Times*, 27 Aug 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/books/review/francis-fukuyama-identity-kwame-anthony-appiah-the-lies-that-bind.html>

8. Conclusions

Overview

The British Army, contemplating recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and considering war in the future, has latched onto the term warrior as a reference for its soldiers. It promotes warriorship as an endeavour and warrior ethos or spirit as a guiding totem. Examined in this thesis for clarity – conceptually and in practice – these notions have been found wanting. The British Army has no history of warriorship; in current national or strategic culture, warrior ethos is largely alien; and British soldiers do not identify as warriors. Worse they regard the term as an imposition: ‘I can see why *they* use it.’¹ Where it is attractive it is only as a superficial recommendation. Its insufficiency throughout the hierarchy (vertically) and between soldierly trades (horizontally) was apparent from my research; and the inherent confusion and contradictions in the terms were uncovered in discussion at focus groups, through questionnaire, and interview, and from my study of the academic literature. The importance of being deliberate in the language used has been demonstrated and the requirement for justification and amplification of what is meant by the army when it uses the term warrior has been established. Identity theorists and scholars of linguistic philosophy would have us know that there is much greater depth to how humans categorise themselves than the articulation and promotion of a relatively simple identifying term.

In this concluding chapter, three empirical themes are highlighted. First, I suggest there are societal implications where the British Army recommends itself as an army of warriors: this must be accounted for. Second, I recommend four types of identifiable *homo furens*: each has specific relevance to soldiering and will influence any drive for warriorship. Some are more warrior like than others and the British Army should consider where its soldiers currently fit and where it might wish them to fit on the warrior scale. Lastly, and maybe most importantly for an institution of long-standing and one with considerable responsibilities, there are military implications where warriorship is promoted as an underpinning philosophy.

The Army in Society

The traumatic experience of the 1914-18 war brought the death of chivalry and with that the romance of warriorship. In its wake it left only residue, the brutality of war, as a

¹ FG10: JNCOs 01 Nov 18, 00:44

recognisable tenet. The Second World War through its impact on home communities reinforced the sense that war is hell and there is little to be admired about it, or the warrior. Action taken by Hore-Belisha in the 1930s brought British soldiers closer to society and by extension made them more compliant with and subject to societal pressure and opinion. Warriorship in extreme forms faded further; service was proletarianized;² and society embraced soldiers as fellow citizens. Yet the contemporary British Army remains a small and curious separate institution, a 'boutique' enterprise when compared to mass or conscripted armies: its functions are delivered by select, discrete elements of society unknown and unseen by many there. Only 27% of the UK population declare themselves willing to fight a war for their country: that task is carried out by others.³ This sentiment also makes it difficult to recruit soldiers. The Army is then in a difficult position – it is necessarily because of its tasks, size and volunteer base a community within but separate from society yet society wishes it integrated and expects it to adhere to societal norms and behaviours.

Where the army is 'un-military' in its behaviours civilian society queries it;⁴ where it presents in identifiably martial form, it is criticised and risks losing support. The army suggests itself as an organisation that is reflective of its domestic base but also demands that it be allowed to behave differently. It wishes to be exempt from 'political correctness, incoherent relativism, and empty theorizing',⁵ due to the demands it puts upon soldiers but it recognises that it must also comply with civilian direction. The civil-military balance therefore requires careful management. Warriorship represents a dangerous form of the soldiering totem that would unlikely be welcome by society at large and would push the army away from society: where it is promoted it would create a gap that would require remedial action. In this the army cannot be complacent: 'public expressions of confidence in the military, however laudable and reassuring, should not be taken as conclusive evidence that the military is not alienated from civil society.'⁶ There is a fine

² Harries-Jenkins, "Military Professionalism," 119.

³ "Europe: Poll of People Willing to fight for country," *The Spectator Index*, accessed at <https://brilliantmaps.com/europe-fight-war/> on 02 Dec 19. The poll involved 60,000 persons and a sample of around 1000 men and women from each country. Accessible at <https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/33483/win-gallup-internationals-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country/>.

Morocco and Fiji topped the pool at 94%. The country with the fewest people willing to go to war was Japan (just 11%). The least belligerent nation in Europe was the Netherlands on 15%.

⁴ Robert Crampton, "The Squaddies Who Study Blank Verse," *The Times*, 2 Apr 2018,

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-squaddies-who-study-blank-verse-85wzh6ffv>. Mark Hookham & Tim Ripley, "Focus Groups Make Troops Feel More Valued, says Army's Senior Sergeant-Major," *The Times*, 27 May 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/80622aa6-611a-11e8-859e-536709dc09ad>.

⁵ David M. Jones & Mike L. Smith, "Review Article—Noise but No Signal: Strategy, Culture and the Poverty of Constructivism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24:6 (2001): 492-3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761001753210515>.

⁶ P. Gronke, & P. D. Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence: Civil Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations," In P. D Feaver & R. H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), at <http://people.reed.edu/~gronkep/docs/uncertain.pdf> on 24 Nov 2019. A summary of evolving societal attitudes is at Bobby Duffy, "How British Moral Attitudes Have Changed in the Last 30 Years," The Policy Institute, KCL, 24 Oct 2019 <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/British-moral-attitudes.pdf>

line here and sudden pronouncements declaring soldiers as warriors where meaning is debatable and interpreted according to personal taste, outside of organisational or societal expectation could bring the army to an unanticipated position. It is important we 'take care not to violate what we know of ourselves'⁷ but the army must also ensure it neither breaches the societal foundations upon which it is built nor blindly adheres to external direction. 'With its emphasis on ritual, tradition, and hierarchy' the military:

...is a culture already far removed from the society that it protects. Perhaps that is a necessity given the grim nature of its mission. Remove a belief in moral autonomy from that culture, replace it with simple obedience and that divide becomes unhealthy.⁸

Maintaining harmony between the nation and its armed forces is a tricky balancing act that won't be made easier for the election of the term warrior to describe British soldiers.

Warrior Types

Determining what is meant by 'warrior' is not as simple as defining war then extrapolating from there: the warrior is not simply one who makes war. War is a collective endeavour with the state or a political grouping at its heart as primary agent: warriors can be peripheral; soldiers predominant. Conversely the warrior can be central to fighting and war. 'Aggression is a *feeling* in an individual, but it is a *choice* in a state.'⁹ The state conducts its wars through its soldiers; the warrior fights – in state-centric war or otherwise as the opportunity presents itself. The two concepts – war and the warrior – may align but equally they may not: the two terms are neither mutually dependent nor inclusive.

Where the individual is concerned two main schools exist on the origins of warriorship: they are based on nature or nurture, or as I recommend, Being and Doing. The schools have *homo furens* at the extremes as automaton and protector, killer and psychopath. Dichotomies such as this prevail whenever warriorship is examined: the institutional over the occupational soldier; the fighter who acts in the interest of service against those who act for themselves; those who choose to fight and those who are compelled; the selfless and the selfish for instance. Clarity over what is meant is elusive. To create greater precision, I split the term *homo furens* and into 4 distinct variants:

- The Servant-Warrior;
- The Stoic-Warrior;
- The Warrior-Soldier;
- The Warrior-Berserker.

⁷ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 149.

⁸ Milburn, "When Not To Obey Orders."

⁹ Grayling, *War*, 231.

It is critical where warrior is used as an identifying term that the variant under discussion is declared. From that behaviours can be anticipated. The classifications are not absolute but the first two according to my analysis qualify as 'Soldiers': the second two are Warriors. The variants allow the observer to better categorise *homo furens*.

Implications for the Army

Where the army continues to pursue 'warrior' as a descriptor for its soldiers, and determines the variant it prefers, it might apply the title to all soldiers, some soldiers, a lesser few or to none. Of these options adopting it as the universal descriptor for every soldier in the army is the most ill-considered. Few of the infantry soldiers consulted, who I expected to identify as warriors did so, and many actively challenged the term. To apply it more widely outside of the infantry and across all branches would be even more questionable and ineffective. It competes poorly with trade identities, regimental association, functional affiliation, unit mythology and historical attachment and even some specified ranks and designations that are deemed more important.

What binds the soldiers of the British Army together is their shared identity as soldiers: warrior competes with this association and could supplant it – but then likely only for some soldiers. It implies an approach separate, and not necessarily complementary, more likely overwhelming, to aspects of soldiering and reduces the scope of that endeavour. Where warrior becomes a universal identifier, synonymous with soldiering, there could be no differentiation in fitness standards for example, more 'appropriate health mitigation strategies'¹⁰ would be required, there could be no separation of 'bayonets' from 'enablers' with all treated as warriors. Its employment as a general descriptor would then inevitably lead to erosion or compromise of the skills for which the army employs its non-infantry and non-combat soldiers. Enhanced combat training to a credible warrior standard would require additional time, resourcing and energy – and likely demand a fundamental review of recruitment strategy for instance. Defining the term against its existing stipulated standards and values is a hollow offer: soldiering doesn't translate seamlessly into warriorship.

The army might confine the title to just some soldiers, an idea being discussed in the US where until recently the 'warrior mindset' was ingrained as an aspirational universal term across the army. There, consideration is now being given to 'a grand reorganization of the military, whereby a small component of fighters is complemented by a larger corps

¹⁰ Dominic Nicholls, "Shock and Awe: We've Been on Front Line For Years, Say Women, As Royal Marines Open Up Commando Course To All," *The Telegraph*, 26 Aug 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/26/shock-awe-front-line-years-say-women-royal-marines-open-commando/>.

of military professionals.¹¹ The UK might separate similarly obvious communities like the infantry or those with stoic-warrior tendencies from others. Formally recognising the community that pursues excellence in combat as their profession just as law is the focus for the legal advisor and logistics for the supply expert would impress those in the combat arms. However, soldiers also demanded support where they are expected to flourish and succeed as warriors. They feel constrained and believe that policy doesn't allow them to pursue warriorship; that society isn't supportive; and the army won't accept what they perceive as the risks involved in adopting a warrior posture and behaviour or the possibility of their breaching of assumed boundaries. The army 'as a corporation does little to foster'¹² the yearning for warriorship, and societal norms are not conducive. Where some soldiers are to be known as warriors there is a requirement to afford the earning of the status some greater substance and investment beyond basic training or doctrinal statement, or the title is an empty offer.

Warriorship as an endeavour was often mentioned as something that goes beyond training: it is more personal, an issue of essence and 'calling', or nature over nurture and could be applied on a more limited basis to a much lesser few. The most obvious contemporary candidates are those in 'high-end' or elite infantry units – soldiers in the Parachute Regiment according to those who offered an opinion for this thesis or perhaps those of the nascent Specialist Infantry Battalions.¹³ Outside the army, the Royal Marines and Special Forces could be eligible for this more select and elite club.

Whereas in previous eras an entire army could cast a compelling warrior archetype (e.g. the Spartans or the Apaches) now it seems the bar has been raised and that "warrior" is defined primarily by groups that consist of those hand-picked from larger formations.¹⁴

This community already exists separate from the larger formation of 'line infantry' or county regiments that comprise the bulk of the infantry, and are trained to higher, and specialist, standards. By selecting these units, and declaring them warriors, the army maximises its chances of capturing those who likely already have a higher risk appetite, a desire to indulge in the act of combat and who have been tested previously to a standard beyond that of the soldier-servant or soldier-warrior: these are 'twice volunteer' soldiers, and the warrior-soldiers of the offered model at Fig. 3.3. They sit within the higher echelons of the martial community, the top 20% or less.

Where a more select cohort is to be known as warriors there is a requirement to better

¹¹ Steven Metz, "Does Every U.S. Soldier Really Need to Know How to Fight the Enemy?" *World Politics Review*, dated 07 Oct 2016, at <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20130/does-every-u-s-soldier-really-need-to-know-how-to-fight-the-enemy>.

¹² CO30.

¹³ A 'game-changing new capability for the army' comprising expert soldiers and expert instructors' that will be fully operational according to the British Army website by October 2019, at <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/6th-united-kingdom-division/specialised-infantry-group/>

¹⁴ Connable, "Warrior-Maverick Culture," 52.

understand the nature of *homo furens*. The research conducted for this thesis is necessarily curtailed in terms of psychological insight but there are swathes of secondary research, much detailed here, that point to the relevance of nature as well as nurture in the cultivation of warriorship. The possibility of unacceptable, unfamiliar and unsanctioned behaviours borne of individual motivation is recognised in clinical circles. Using this understanding, warriors can then be understood beyond their volunteer status and more so as a defined and definable Type. This is the top 1-2%,¹⁵ the soldiers that one CO said numbered 'fewer than five'¹⁶ in his experience, who would be recruited and trained with conscious recognition of their potential and likely following the benefit and support of neurological and psychometric testing.¹⁷ We test for academic ability but not mental robustness or suitability of temperament. Yet they too are pertinent to warriorship. In the US, scores in a test for perseverance and passion 'bore absolutely no relationship' to the academic exam results, appraisals of leadership potential and assessment of physical fitness so painstakingly calculated during the admissions process.¹⁸

This would be controversial but greater danger exists where *homo furens* brimming with passion and 'dark traits' enlists but is unacknowledged. Their actuality could lead to the unrecognised 'creation of a new combat arm.'¹⁹ Elite infantry units have high standards and are 'tasked with the most dangerous and difficult missions'; they have a highly developed *esprit de corps* (that can encourage arrogance and even 'contempt for others').²⁰ A 'them and us' paradigm can play out internal to the elite unit too.²¹ Other troops, both infantry or otherwise neither claim the same history of soldiering nor do they have 'fixed preconceptions about their own 'toughness': they are 'less sneering'²² about activities outside of warfighting: more elite soldiers, here warriors, would incline to all of this. The danger in failing to recognise an existential elite is that a 'microscopic condensation' or concentration of only specific parts of the larger force they represent can grow within.²³ Creating a framework within which the Type could be recognised and utilised to best effect would allow control but, critically, this would run contrary to the

¹⁵ The current 'Full Time Trade Trained Strength' (having completed training is 73,470. This 1-2% is then less than 750 *homo furens*, or a single battalion of soldiers. UK MOD. UK Armed Forces Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics, dated 1 Oct 2019, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/847640/1_October_2019_SPS.pdf on 24 Nov 2019.

¹⁶ CO22.

¹⁷ This is gaining traction as an idea. Haley Britzky, "Army Officers Wanting to Become Battalion Commanders Will Now Undergo a Psychological Exam," *Task and Purpose*, 13 Nov 2019, <https://taskandpurpose.com/army-battalion-commander-assessment>

¹⁸ Angela Duckworth, *Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance*, (London: Vermilion, 2016), 9

¹⁹ Rosen *Winning the Next War*, 7.

²⁰ King, *Combat Soldier*, 393.

²¹ Dan Lamothe, "Troops Charged in Green Beret's Death in Mali Planned to Record Him Being Sexually Assaulted, Marine says" *The Washington Post*, 5 Jun 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/06/05/troops-charged-green-berets-death-mali-planned-record-him-being-sexually-assaulted-marine-says/>

²² Burke, *Army of Tribes*, 73.

²³ Snyder, *Soldiers of Destruction*, 342, 345.

stated belief that 'the British Army is the ultimate team'²⁴ and so a clash of narratives occurs. Where obvious exception and privilege is afforded, the claim of a one team approach lacks credibility.

The final option is to cease using the term warrior altogether when describing British soldiers. This is in line with Moskos' basic hypothesis that western militaries are moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. The term warrior then has less relevance and soldiers match their standards and behaviours against a professional not historical, emotional or mythical charter. This option aligns with the observable shift in some western militaries away from the term warrior, popular again only in the last two decades or so, and back to the more familiar title of soldier. Soldier is a more inclusive term, it implies regimented, responsive and controlled activity. It encompasses all trades and functions, reserves and regulars, ethnicities and genders and is recognisable as applicable to and at every rank. It is less contestable than warrior, that at its extremes can mean psychopath or Berserker. These are not standards to which British soldiers aspire – but the type is inextricably linked to warriorship and warrior cannot be applied to their exclusion without considerable explanation of that fact.

Alongside policy considerations, a number of areas for further research fell from my study. The implications of the formal enlistment and integration of women into British combat units will be exciting for its impact on warrior ethos; so too it will be interesting in years to come to examine how the recruits that were attracted to the army by the promise of warriorship as a recruiting strategy read the army's ethos once trained and with experience serving with their units. The study concentrated on the infantry: it would be intriguing to carry out similar research with Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel who contemplate warriorship in those services. The Special Forces community both in UK and elsewhere, where access and ethical clearance can be gained, would present a fascinating case study particularly where clinical study can be made of motivations inherent in their choice to offer themselves for selection in what must be the most warriorlike undertaking. The suggestion that any study of warriorship should first consult a unit's discipline record is also something I wish I had the time and opportunity to do.

Mythology and Martial Identity in the British Army

The critical junctures presented by the recent wars were significant but scarcely of the same momentous impact as, for example, the World Wars of the 20th Century. The rationale for the relaunch, unofficial or otherwise, of British soldier identity on the back of

²⁴ UK MOD, 'A Soldier's Values and Standards.'

these wars is therefore questionable. Other influences have bearing. The promotion of warrior ethos at a time of lowered military operations reminds soldiers of their purpose; it has the potential to boost morale and will guard against the army becoming 'soft' from anticipated, prolonged periods of time in barracks. The stipulation of a warrior code recalibrates soldiers' thinking away from 'the years of campaigning in Afghanistan and Iraq – back to warfighting'.²⁵ Presenting soldiers as warriors when the touchpoint of combat operations is unavailable also allows the organisation and the veteran generation of the 2000s – a critical body of opinion formers – to embrace newly enlisted officers and soldiers through shared warrior identity. However, the use of the title warrior to describe British soldiers should not be underestimated for its potential impact. It provides a new model and repositions the army. 'Models derived from developmental analysis bridge the empirical world of today with the social forms of the future. Put plainly, what is the likely shape of the military in the foreseeable future?'²⁶

Where deftly handled creating a bridge to a new identity would be effective. It will appeal to would-be soldiers, increase recruitment as well as retention, and importantly allow the infantry, the cornerstone of combat operations, where the term is so confined, improved and enhanced status. Building that bridge and persuading soldiers to cross it, to extend the metaphor, is no easy feat. The British Army's most dearly-held memories can be viewed in its regimental messes. These memories hail from recent though still historical times (around 1800) though Britain's martial history extends well before. Activity across the spectrum of operations is remembered from manning entrenched positions on the bridge at Arnhem, patrolling in Northern Ireland and more recently fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan. Those consulted for this thesis understood 'post-martialism' as a real consideration and recognised that as an institution the army must also defend its position as a warfighting organisation – but they are not exclusively focussed on warfighting. They appreciated the stories that give meaning, for their explanatory value and as a 'cure for horror' whether real or anticipated and recognised warrior spirit, mostly through demonstrations of defence over attack and always in actions considered 'tough soldiering' but the pageantry associated with warriorship was unfamiliar, or irrelevant. What was relevant was the wide and varied employments and deployments that British soldiers expect – 'warrior' duties are only one consideration among many.

Senior officers think infantry soldiers associate primarily with the infantry and that this is their key identity: they then associate regimentally.

There is an internal market that requires servicing to make obvious the elite club we are in as infantrymen. We have our regimental clubs but we are

²⁵ GS6: 15 Mar 19, 05:10.

²⁶ Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation," 41.

trying to get back to the idea that you are first and foremost an infantryman then you have your regimental affiliation.²⁷

Many of the soldiers consulted reordered this hierarchy. Membership of the infantry or any other collective identity came a distant second to local small group identity: soldiers would even identify in opposition to those who shared their functional purpose, their fellow infantry soldiers. That the infantry is more important than the army is a fair conclusion; but regimental identity is more keenly felt than anything else. The army as a collection of regiments is preferred over some organisational collective. Within the hierarchy, however ordered, 'warrior' as a term of identification was absent. Soldiers don't use it and they were confused by what it meant. Those consulted had no agreed definition and the term was simultaneously meaningful and inspiring but also banal or misleading. It lacks authenticity and was regarded as an imposition. Soldiers are drawn to the idea of being warriors but cautious about seizing the term: they are also acutely aware of likely societal objection to their being permitted to be warriors. Some expressed a personal aversion to the term, and it is highlighted again that almost half of soldiers consulted had 'no opinion' (40% overall) on whether they were warriors.

The word warrior is not an organic reflection of British Army culture. It is not fully understood: there is no agreed definition and the term is imprecise to the point that it can be meaningless. Poorly prescribed, it lacks resonance and will therefore gain limited purchase in British society, British Army organisational culture and with British soldiers. This is concerning but represents the least bothersome outcome – its impact may be an irritation or irrelevance, an issue worthy only of debate and discussion. A more worrying and deleterious consequence is where its casual unattended introduction results in behaviour contrary to army intent and stated culture. It is 'one thing to create a social force. It is another to wield it to maximum effect.'²⁸ Warrior is a device seized upon to promote the Army and show it in a positive light but its potential instead to cause damage should be recognised.²⁹ To define, train and present the army as one of warriors, or privilege one element as such ('even the most minimal interventions' can cause in-group favouritism),³⁰ would create an organisation quite different to today's British Army with implications for 21st Century soldiering. Where this is mishandled and promoted in an uncontrolled manner without conscious effort, and greater and more explicit qualification beyond the base level of the Army's 'Values and Standards' it could lead, by extension, to a formal or acknowledged informal separation of part of the army from the rest, or the

²⁷ GS7: 29 Mar 19, 10:54.

²⁸ Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, 213.

²⁹ Commander 12 AI Brigade tweet: @Comd12AIBde 17 Aug 2019. The challenge is 'to avoid narrow ideas of what a 21st C professional soldier does. "Warrior" is only an (important) first step...care is also required; warrior ethos can distance us from the nuances of our role and the people we serve.'

³⁰ George A. Akerlof, foreword to Haslam *et al*, *New Psychology*, xiii.

British Army from allies, or home society. It would therefore be prudent to counter any tendency toward wholesale adoption of the term warrior and consider it instead as an ongoing 'developmental construct'³¹ that is not yet ready to be embraced and is neither ready as a bridge. It may apply in certain instances and to some individuals, but it is not convincing as currently employed; nor is it a fitting sobriquet for British soldiers

Where the title is to gain meaning the most significant challenge will be in how society chooses to embrace and define the warrior.

War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the warrior world adapts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.³²

The warrior exists; these are not mythical figures, though they are inspired by myth, and the warrior identity can be assumed to be real but it demands deep consideration and careful application. British army culture is also existential: it too is based on myth but not necessarily the mythology that promotes warriorship, and certainly not on that which recommends the warrior at the extremes of the model I have constructed.

British soldiers serve a liberal society and operate within liberal norms. The research I conducted brings me to the conclusion that 'the liberal warrior' is an oxymoron³³ and warrior is not a term appropriate for the contemporary British soldier. The terms soldier and warrior are distinct and should not be treated as synonyms. Soldier is a refined term with contemporary benchmark examples for comparison, and recognisable historical evolution to draw on. It is comprehensible. Open to much wider interpretation, warrior is less familiar to the martial landscape on which western forces like the British Army now find themselves. It is a curious and irrelevant term when applied to the many and varied circumstances that soldiers today find themselves in. Warriorship, individually found, is grounded in evolutionary psychology where our brains and therefore behaviour remain similar to our ancestors: for this reason alone it can be taboo and is therefore only selectively engaged with. Soldier, a collective endeavour, is a term centred on social psychology and learned behaviours.

The dilemma for the army lies in its desire for greater recognition for its soldiers. It wants them, at least in part, to be known warriors but must be careful this does not lead to their

³¹ Involving scrutiny of the past and identification of current trends this is 'a statement of expectations concerning the future expressed in certain core concepts.' Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11:2 (Jun 1958): 231, <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591295801100205>

³² Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, xvi.

³³ Payne, *Psychology of Modern Conflict*, 172.

alienation. It needs to maintain a whole force focus to its endeavours and cannot promote elitism. It is also obliged and acknowledges the necessity of recruiting on a wide basis: to afford access to as many prospective recruits as possible necessitates compromise against warrior standards. Lastly society will unlikely let the army be warriors to the extent that some of its soldiers might wish and certainly will not accept soldiers at the extremes of the warrior scale explained in this thesis. Constraints on warriorship are real, opposition to warrior behaviours is predictable, and the army, representative of the nation and a lever of government, must recognise this. The quick adoption of the term warrior to describe British Army soldiers might now be challenged less it leads 'to annihilation of identity rather than its actualization.'³⁴ We are warned against leaving crucial considerations that affect understanding and assumptions unchallenged.³⁵ 'What's surprising, perhaps, is how profoundly a single word can shape material outcomes over time.'³⁶ Considering how better to reinforce existing identity, through words recognisable to British soldiers and that they point to as providing them with meaning, before imposing something confusing, confounding and restrictive, would be prudent. The British Army must protect its heritage and the mythology that is embraced, and not some false promise or a word alien and unappreciated by those who fill its ranks.

³⁴ John T Kuehn, "The Cult of the Warrior - Helpful or...Silly, or...Dangerous?" Blog Post published 29 May 2018, at <https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/blog/hand-grenade-week/1875375/cult-warrior-helpful-orsilly-ordangerous> on 08 Dec 2019.

³⁵ Ford, "Learning the Right Lessons," 259.

³⁶ Alter, "The Power of Names."

Appendix A: Data Collation and Themes – Q9 ‘Iconic Events’

<p>Waterloo (43) 65 inc. Peninsular (9) Trafalgar (3) Albuhera (2) Corunna (2) Badajoz (2) Salamanca (1) Barossa (1) Hougomont Farm (1) Nelson (1)</p> <p>Rorke’s Drift (11) 15 inc. Isandlwana (3) Zulu Wars (1)</p> <p>WW1 (26) 89 inc. Somme (37) Gallipoli (5) Ypres (5) Helles (3) 100 days 1918 (2) Marne (2) Cambrai (2) Arras (1) Mons (1) Verdun (1) Amiens (1) Bellenglise-Riqueval (2) Gheluvelt (1)</p> <p>WW2 (25) 127 inc. D-Day (22) Arnhem (19) Normandy (15) El Alamein (7) Kohima (7) North Africa (6) Burma (5) Pegasus Bridge (3) Dunkirk (3) Chindits (2) BEF (2) Cockleshell Heroes (1) Sicily (1) Imphal (1) Italy (1) Slim (1) Arakan (1) Singapore (1) St Nazaire (1) Montgomery (1) Monte Cassino (1) Mandalay (1)</p>	<p>Korea (9) 15 inc. Imjin (6)</p> <p>Northern Ireland (16) 18 inc. Bloody Sunday (2)</p> <p>Falklands (37) 40 inc. Mount Harriet (1) Two Sisters (1) Goose Green (1)</p> <p>Iraq (20) 32 inc. Telic (4) Basra (3) Gulf War1 (2) Camp Bread Basket (1) Gulf War 2 (1) Kuwait (1)</p> <p>Afghanistan (33) 65 inc. Herrick (8) Musa Qala (7) Helmand (5) Sangin (3) Anglo Afghan Wars (1) Retreat from Kabul (1) Panther’s Claw (1) <i>Panchai Palang</i> (1) Al Amarrah (1) Abu Ghraib (1) Abu Moussa (1) <i>Moshtarak</i> (1) Sgt Blackman (1)</p> <p>5 or more mentions Waterloo (43) Falklands (37) Somme (37) Afghanistan (33) WW1 (26) WW2 (25) D-Day (22) Iraq (20) Arnhem (19) Northern Ireland (16) Normandy (15) Rorke’s Drift (11) Korea (9) Peninsular (9) Herrick (8) El Alamein (7) Kohima (7) Musa Qala (7) Agincourt (6) Imjin (6) North Africa (6) Burma (5) Gallipoli (5) Helmand (5) Ypres (5)</p>	<p>Outlier mentions (Non-Thematic)</p> <p>Wars of Spanish Succession 8 Blenheim 1704 (3) John Churchill (1) Malplaquet 1709 (1) Marlborough (1) Outenarde 1708 (1) Ramillies 1706 (1)</p> <p>Crimea (3) 9 inc. Alma 1854 (3) Balaclava 1854 (3)</p> <p>India 6 Ferozeshah 1854 (1) Indian Mutiny 1857 (1) Plassey 1757 (2) Sobraon 1846 (2)</p> <p>Others Cromwell (1) Boyne 1690 (2) Dettingen 1743 (1) Minden 1759 (3) Quebec 1759 (1) First of June 1794 (1) Amritsar 1919 (1) Anglo-China Wars 1839-60 (1) Boer War 1899 (3) Palestine 1917 or 1948? (2) Malaya 1948-60 (1) Borneo 1964-66 (1) Mirbat 1972 (1) Iranian Embassy 1982 (2) Bosnia 1992 (1) Sierra Leone 2000 (1) Empire (1) Ceremonial/Presentation of Colours (2) Remembrance Day/Remembrance (2)</p>
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Appendix B: Data Collation and Thematic Codes – Q7 ‘Describe Warrior’

<p>Soldier (25) 64 inc. Professional (12) Trained/Training (12) Discipline (7) Modern Soldier (3) Soldiering (2) Highly-schooled (1) Not gang member (1) Not executioner (1)</p> <p>Fighting (22) 64 inc. Fighter (15) Physical (12) Hand to Hand (3) Fighting Spirit (2) Relishes Combat (2) Combat Focussed (1) Combat ready (1) Close Armed Combat (1) Close Quarter (1) Unarmed Combat (1) Warrior spirit (1) Aggressive (2)</p> <p>Other 59 inc. Not Soldier (10) Enemy/Adversary (10) Infantry (7) Individual (3) Welsh/Irish/Viking (3) Feudal/Tribal (2) Opponent (2) Connotations (2) Maoris (2) Regiment (2) Distinctly different (1) Personal gain (1) SAS (1) Operator (1) Celtic (1) Ranger (1) Spartan (1) Samurai (1) Braveheart (1) Berserker (1) Roman Centurion (1) Primitive Creature (1) Historic origin (1) Old-fashioned term (1) Outdated view (1) Criminality (1)</p> <p>Mindset (10) 43 inc. Mental/Mentality (11) Willing (4) Willingness (3) Commitment (3) Ready (2) Mind (2) Not 9-5 mentality (1) Way of thinking (1) Ready and willing (1) Will to fight (1) Skin-in-the-game (1)</p>	<p>Combat (16) 32 inc. Close Combat (4) Front-line (4) Violence (4) Purposeful violence (2) Violent (2)</p> <p>Service 28 inc. Self-sacrifice (4) Cause (4) Sacrifice (3) Greater Good (2) Values (2) Honour (2) Serve (2) Greater than oneself (1) Greater ideal (1) Responsibilities (1) Comrades above self (1) Preparedness to die (1) Self-sacrificing (1) Selflessness (1) Morally guided (1) Honourable (1)</p> <p>Culture (11) 25 inc. Society (8) British (6)</p> <p>Experienced (9) 21 inc. Skills (3) Skilled (2) Experience (2) Arena (2) Combat Hardened (1) Tested In Combat (1) Operationally proven (1)</p> <p>War (11) 20 inc. Warfighting (3) Warfare (3) Conflict (2) Peacetime-no-role (1)</p> <p>Brave (11) 18 inc. Courage (5) Courageous (2)</p> <p>Top Mentions: Base Themes ‘Soldier’ (25) ‘Fighting’ (22) Not a Soldier (10): ‘Other’ ‘Mindset’ (10) ‘Combat’ (16) ‘Culture’ (11) ‘Experienced’ (9) ‘War’ (11) ‘Brave’ (11) Sacrifice (8): ‘Service’</p>	<p>Outlier significant mentions</p> <p>Different things to different people Extend beyond the military Extraordinary activity Army branding/Marketing Controlled aggression Serving own interest Uncomfortable things Does what most won't Common core purpose Physically overcome Relentless pursuit Averse conditions Prospect of death All encompassing Tunnelled vision Layered approach Defeat the enemy Original meaning Citizen soldiers Ready to deploy Supporting arms Never surrender Moral authority Necessary evil Ready to fight Built to fight Self-confident Group identity Not just a job Most demanding Not technology Fighting force Basic training Quick reaction Arrogant term Lethal action Differentiate Will to fight Mission first Never give up Irish culture Basic fighter Bayonet fixed Confrontation Violent acts Ruthlessness Internalised Primary role Hard to find/Rare Steely eyed Brotherhood Not a thing Not defined Self-belief Disposition Inculcation Conditioned Vocational Principles No meaning Ferocious</p>
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