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## The entangled state: How state-business relations shaped the German corporate tax regime

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Abstract:	<p>Contemporary tax research is split into two camps: comparative approaches emphasise continuity and cross-country differences, while the globalisation literature stresses similar changes across countries. Counter the continuity thesis, this paper finds that neoliberal dynamics were at play in a case considered largely resilient to such dynamics: German governments implemented a series of corporate tax reforms which radically curbed business taxes and added a short-term and cost-cutting component to investments and corporate finance. While these changes point towards neoliberal change, they were distinct from the trends we see in other economies: crucially the German reforms did not follow the common trend of reducing taxes for individuals and entailed a particular emphasis on enhancing multinational's access to international capital – but did not liberate financial incomes from tax in general. Based on archival documents from the Bundestagsarchiv, this paper traces the process of German tax reforms and finds that neoliberal dynamics were at play but received a local (export-oriented) colour through processes specific to the German polity. Because consensual institutions granted power to a specific business coalition, radical change was long blocked. Reforms could only be implemented once the state forged a new coalition. Making sense of the mediation of neoliberal dynamics through state institutions can contribute to a better understanding of the variegated nature of neoliberalism.</p>

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# The entangled state: How state-business relations shaped the German corporate tax regime

**Abstract:** Contemporary tax research is split into two camps: comparative approaches emphasise continuity and cross-country differences, while the globalisation literature stresses similar changes across countries. Counter the continuity thesis, this paper finds that neoliberal dynamics were at play in a case considered largely resilient to such dynamics: German governments implemented a series of corporate tax reforms which radically curbed business taxes and added a short-term and cost-cutting component to investments and corporate finance. While these changes point towards neoliberal change, they were distinct from the trends we see in other economies: crucially the German reforms did not follow the common trend of reducing taxes for individuals and entailed a particular emphasis on enhancing multinational's access to international capital – but did not liberate financial incomes from tax in general. Based on archival documents from the *Bundestagsarchiv*, this paper traces the process of German tax reforms and finds that neoliberal dynamics were at play but received a local (export-oriented) colour through processes specific to the German polity. Because consensual institutions granted power to a specific business coalition, radical change was long blocked. Reforms could only be implemented once the state forged a new coalition. Making sense of the mediation of neoliberal dynamics through state institutions can contribute to a better understanding of the variegated nature of neoliberalism.

## Introduction

Tax systems critically shape the resource allocation between different sectors of an economy and thereby determine the type of economic growth that evolves (Haffert and Mertens 2019; Prasad 2006; 2012). State actors have to decide whether they want to levy a higher tax burden on consumption or investment (Huo 2020), and whether they want to support certain business groups over others (Berry 2016). By making these decisions, policy makers determine the type of growth strategy they want to pursue. So far, the tax literature has either highlighted tax reforms driven by neoliberal dynamics and globalisation leading to a convergence of tax regimes towards the liberal model (Cerny 1997; Strange 1996), or stressed how institutions in coordinated regimes ensured resilience (Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2006), or incremental change within the larger framework of collective organisation (Thelen 2014; 2019). With this emphasis on globalisation and institutions, the state as an active 'economic player' (Zysman 1983, 75), has moved to the backburner of the analysis. This paper analyses neoliberal dynamics in the German case which, because of its collective organisation and export-

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3 orientation, was for a long time considered *the* case that was resilient against neoliberal  
4 trends.  
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8 Can an export-oriented tax regime be neoliberal? In broad terms, neoliberalism can be defined  
9 as ‘a set of economic ideas and associated policies that have a constant goal (to enlarge the  
10 realm of the market) and a variable one (to carry out upwards redistribution)’ (Ban 2016, 4). In  
11 the realm of taxation, scholars have shown that neoliberal reforms usually combine low tax  
12 rates and high levels of tax neutrality. More specifically, the goal of neoliberal tax reforms is to  
13 minimize the distortion of markets which comes about through taxes on corporate profits,  
14 individual incomes and capital incomes (dividends, interest and capital gains) (Hakelberg and  
15 Rixen 2020, 4). According to this definition, the German tax regime has gone through a  
16 neoliberal transition and yet the transformation critically differed from outcomes in liberal  
17 regimes. First, German neoliberal tax reforms came surprisingly late. In the 1980s, when  
18 governments in the Anglo-Saxon world implemented radical corporate tax reforms (Martin  
19 1989; 1991; Swank 2006), the German tax regime retained most of its post-war features  
20 including support for large exporting businesses (Prasad 2006; Zohlnhöfer 2003) and ‘patient  
21 capital’ – a system of long-term finance (Gourevitch and Shinn 2010, 162; Lütz 2000, 150).  
22 Reforms were implemented only in the late 1990s, and they differed in several respects from  
23 their Anglo-Saxon counterparts: Even though corporate tax rates were reduced and patient  
24 capital dismantled – adding short-term and cost cutting elements to investment and corporate  
25 finance - export businesses remained the main beneficiaries of the reforms: They benefited  
26 from significant (and uneven) rate reductions and a new dividend tax system which facilitated  
27 corporate finance in international capital markets.  
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51 This paper inquires how this unusual pattern of German neoliberal tax reforms came about. It  
52 draws on state-centred approaches to argue that neoliberal tax reforms originate from the  
53 state’s active involvement in the economy and are critically shaped by the state’s relations  
54 with businesses. I develop a heuristic of *state entanglement* which encapsulates both  
55 movements at the same time: When pursuing growth strategies, the state may find the support  
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3 of some economic actors – the winners of reform – but will also encounter considerable  
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5 backlash by entrenched interests which lose out from a new strategy (Zysman 1983).  
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7 Navigating through these structures of resistance of entrenched interests, the disentangling of  
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9 existing relations and building of new ones can be critical to facilitate and shape neoliberal  
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11 reform. By investigating the role of entanglements between state and economy, this paper  
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13 explores how state-business relations mediate the outcomes of globalisation pressures on  
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15 domestic institutions.  
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19 The paper shows that much of the entanglement of the German state with businesses was  
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21 shaped by electoral institutions. Federalism and consensual institutions – proportional  
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23 representation and multiparty governments (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004) – entangled the  
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25 interests of business groups and policy makers in three different ways. First, federalism aligns  
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27 the regional economic interests of state governments and economic interests. Second,  
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29 coalition governments represent several different business interests which become entangled  
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31 with parties' interests in federal government. Finally, state actors' dependence on certain  
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33 business groups can entangle their interests with these actors: In the German case federal  
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35 states depended on the services of the savings banks. These entanglements and the state's  
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37 attempt to break them up, critically shaped the outcome of neoliberal reform. The German  
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39 case helps explain why neoliberalism is not a 'one-size-fits-all' process of convergence, but  
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41 produces variegated outcomes depending on the institutional structure within the state.  
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45 The paper uses systematic process-tracing to examine the step-by-step falling apart of the old  
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47 tax regime and its replacement with a new regime. Process tracing allows for an in-depth  
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49 investigation of interests of several actors in the policy process, the relations of businesses  
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51 and the state and the strategies of the state which led to change. This method is applied to  
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53 documents from the archives of the German Bundestag (*Bundestagsarchiv*) which include  
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55 statements by officials, parties, and business associations on corporate tax reforms.  
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3 The paper proceeds as follows: The next section introduces general trends in neoliberal tax  
4 reforms across countries and the unusual pattern observed in the German case. Section three  
5 debates the existing scholarship on tax reforms and the benefits of reviving insights from the  
6 state-centred approach. Section four will outline the process-tracing technique and the  
7 archival research. Section five will engage with the empirical evidence starting with a historical  
8 background of the post-war German tax regime and mapping out actors, relations, and  
9 interests during the critical reforms of German corporate taxation. It then compares two  
10 periods of tax reform, one in which the tax system remained largely unchanged (1988-1998)  
11 and one in which radical change came about (1999-2000). The final section will draw the  
12 conclusion that state entanglements and attempts to supersede them can shape the outcomes  
13 of neoliberal reforms.  
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### 30 **Neoliberal tax cuts and the unusual pattern of reform in Germany**

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32 Neoliberal ideas, policies and institutions have spread across advanced Western democracies  
33 since the 1980s placing tax cuts to the forefront of fiscal considerations (Ban 2016; Blyth and  
34 Matthijs 2017; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Neoliberal tax reforms often entail two  
35 critical features: radical rate reductions and enhanced tax neutrality, i.e. minimizing selective  
36 tax benefits for specific economic sectors. Tax rates often targeted to fall were corporate  
37 income tax rates (CIT), top personal income tax rates (PIT) on individual incomes and profits  
38 of unincorporated businesses, and capital income on dividends, interest, and capital gains.  
39 According to supply-side theorems these rates distort the efficient allocation of resources in  
40 the economy – as opposed to consumption tax which is generally viewed as least distorting  
41 (Hakelberg and Rixen 2020, 4). The overarching goal of this type of tax policy is to enhance  
42 investment conditions, reduce costs of production and improve the incentives to work and  
43 save (Musgrave 1959, 246).  
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3 Neoliberal tax structures first emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the liberal market  
4 economies under Thatcher and Reagan who dramatically changed the functions, instruments,  
5 and goals of taxation in the U.K. and the U.S. In the preceding Keynesian model, taxation  
6 contributed to the overall goal of state management of the economy: Tax rates were generally  
7 high, but investment credits, grants and exemptions incentivised investment in certain  
8 economic sectors (Howard 1997; Steinmo 2003). Progressive income tax rates contributed to  
9 demand stimulation and limited private investment when resources were needed for  
10 alternative societal goals (Martin 1991, 22). This model came into crisis after productivity  
11 growth had slowed in the 1960s, and supply-side notions, suggesting that coupling high tax  
12 rates with exemptions was unfair, complicated, and inefficient, increasingly influenced the  
13 thinking of economists and policy makers (Brownlee 2018; Prasad 2012). Under the additional  
14 pressure of businesses threatening to leave jurisdictions for cheaper production sites  
15 (Ganghof 2006; Streeck 2010), many finance ministers, and economic advisers in OECD  
16 countries came to view taxation as a critical hurdle for productive investment (Swank 2006).

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Many OECD countries followed the liberal model and implemented corporate, top marginal,  
and capital income tax rate cuts (Ganghof 2006; Hakelberg and Rixen 2020). Many  
governments radically reduced the top statutory corporate and income tax rates, and curbed  
investment tax credits for specific economic sectors (Swank 2006). After mobile (high-income)  
individuals and profits of multinational corporations contributed to a massive outflow of taxable  
profits in the 1990s, OECD countries also specifically reduced taxes on financial incomes  
(interest income, dividends, and capital gains) (Hakelberg and Rixen 2020, 11). For instance,  
several countries – which traditionally taxed interest within the general income tax schedule -  
introduced lower rates to curb cross-border tax evasion (Genschel and Schwarz 2011, 359).

While many OECD countries followed the liberal model, German reforms differed in several  
respects. Throughout the 1990s, German governments only achieved incremental reductions  
in corporate tax rates resulting in unusually high effective average corporate tax rates (AETR)  
compared to liberal and other coordinated market economies. Then, in 2000, a radical reform

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3 cut CIT rates to OECD levels within one year (the rates fell from 43.7 to 32.8 percent) (Figure  
4 1). Moreover, the composition of the German reform differed from the general trend. German  
5 policy makers cut CIT rates but retained high personal income tax rates. For instance, the cuts  
6 in statutory CIT – paid by corporations - were much more pronounced (fell to 25 percent in  
7 2000) than the reductions in the top marginal PIT rate for small businesses (fell to 42 percent  
8 in 2000) (Bach, Corneo, and Steiner 2014, 119). Moreover, top rates for individuals were  
9 almost fully retained. Compared to the US, where effective rates for the top 0.01 percent fell  
10 to 23 percent in 2002 (CBO 2008), German top income taxation almost did not change: the  
11 top 0.01 percent still paid 39.8 percent in Germany in 2002 (Corneo 2005). Finally, while many  
12 governments reduced taxes on financial incomes, German reforms focused on facilitating  
13 investments into corporations. The most significant reform elements in the area of financial  
14 incomes were a new dividend tax, the elimination of tax support for savings banks and the  
15 elimination of capital gains taxes on block-shares which dismantled traditional finance  
16 structures and facilitated corporate finance in international capital markets (Sørensen 2002).  
17 In short, German reforms contained some neoliberal elements by adding a cost-cutting  
18 component for corporations and enhancing access to foreign investments and yet they differed  
19 from the neoliberal model by selectively supporting corporations over individuals and SMEs.  
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40 Figure 1 about here

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43 The consequence of this one-sided approach of tax reform was a divergence in investment  
44 and finance opportunities of different types of German businesses. Figure 2) shows that large  
45 corporations invested more in securities and long-term equity and less in tangible assets –  
46 German corporations also reportedly accumulated rising levels of profit since the late 1990s  
47 (Braun and Deeg 2020), while equity investment for small and medium-sized businesses  
48 (SMEs) remained at a low level. At the same time, as figure 3) shows, loans – one of the  
49 traditional elements of German organised capitalism – declined as a source of corporate  
50 finance for both SMEs and large corporations while finance through retained earnings and  
51 capital markets increased. Unfortunately, there is no data which distinguishes equity into  
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3 internal and equity finance, but data on all firm types shows that there has been a general  
4 trend of deleveraging and profit retention in the German economy between 2000 and 2015  
5 (Bundesbank 2018), internal finance made up a roughly stable share of 70 percent of new  
6 finance while equity finance made up about 10 percent between 1997 and 2012 (Braun and  
7 Deeg 2019, 8). At least for large corporations it is likely that this indicates a stronger short-  
8 term orientation of corporate finance.  
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22 If this tax reform triggered some neoliberal elements but remained distinct from the Anglo-  
23 Saxon type of liberalism, could it be characterised as ordoliberal? Blyth (2013, 133) calls  
24 ordoliberalism a 'peculiar form of liberalism' which differs from neoliberalism in that it stresses  
25 the role of a more interventionist state which sets framework conditions to enhance the  
26 effectiveness of markets. Ordoliberalism developed in 1920s and 1930s Germany but was  
27 based in the experience with an interventionist state during late industrialisation in the 19<sup>th</sup>  
28 century and the loss of credibility of liberalism after the stock market crash in the Great  
29 Depression (Allen 1989). Ordoliberalism promoted a strong state, one that curbed the  
30 uninhibited power of economic agents and instituted collective forms of economic organisation  
31 (Bonefeld 2012, 643). Since the German tax reforms stripped away important elements of the  
32 collective organisation of the German post-war system - including patient capital, the case at  
33 hand rather represents a reorganisation of the German economy along laissez-faireism than  
34 ordoliberalism.  
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## **Explaining neoliberal tax reforms: Tax competition, coordination, and the role of the state**

Much has been written about the convergence of tax systems after the radical reforms in the U.S. and the U.K. put pressures on Western economies to follow their example and radically reduce CIT and PIT rates. Many studies have argued that rising capital mobility and trade integration instigated tax competition and critically limited the room to move for revenue collection and redistribution in European welfare states (Genschel 2002; Genschel and Schwarz 2011; Radaelli 1999). More specifically, some studies pointed out that tax optimisation and tax arbitrage of multinational corporations forced governments to radically reduce statutory tax rates because transfer pricing activities rendered capital movements uncontrollable by governments (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano 2008; Slemrod 2004). While many economies radically reduced taxes on corporate, individual and financial incomes (Béland 2006; Swank 2006), the general tax competition argument cannot explain why German reforms emerged much later and differed in their composition from the reforms in liberal economies.

While comparative accounts - loosely connected with the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach – have since developed a comprehensive theoretical framework which explains different outcomes of tax policy across countries, these approaches expect that coordinated market economies (CMEs) like Germany are either ‘resilient’ (there is no change) or subject to ‘drift’ (incremental change) under globalisation pressures. Initial ‘resilience’ accounts argued that the coordinated nature of the German economy prevented liberal-market reforms because these did not suit the long-term orientation of patient capital, industrial relations and skill formation which support high-quality production (Hall 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2006; Martin 2014; Reisenbichler and Morgan 2012). While a second strand of the literature focused less on the complementarity of institutions and stressed the historical origins of contemporary tax structures (Gould and Baker 2002; Prasad 2006; 2012; Prasad and Deng

2009; Steinmo 2002), both approaches share a static view of institutional development which leave the radical changes in the German tax system unexplained.

Following the critique of scholars who found a significant erosion of the German coordinated market economy (Höpner and Beyer 2004; Streeck 2009), and a dualization of insiders and outsiders which left some protected and others unprotected (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), comparative scholarship increasingly incorporated the changing conditions of the German economy. Thelen (2014) develops a new 'political coalition model' which argues that with the pressures of economic liberalisation different trajectories of liberalisation evolved. While liberal market economies entered 'deregulatory liberalism' resulting in the displacement of institutions of collective organisation, the conservative Christian Democratic countries – like Germany – entered 'dualising liberalisation'. They maintained strong levels of coordination, but the changing economic context (a rising service sector) eroded coverage and insider-outsider cleavages emerged. Change in the latter type of liberalisation follows a pattern of 'drift' because there is no direct attack on the old institutions (see also Thelen 2019). While going beyond the dual nature of the original VoC approach and recognising liberalisation dynamics, the literature largely stuck to known country groups – Thelen (2014; 2019) splits CMEs into conservative European and Scandinavian countries, but these groups are expected to develop coherent responses towards liberalisation along existing institutional frameworks (for a critical response see Cliff and McDaniel 2019). Moreover, 'drift' is a rather incremental form of institutional change which does not match the radical nature of German corporate tax reform.

To make sense of the varieties of neoliberal tax reforms, this paper turns to the literature which stresses the role of the state in economic reforms (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Mann 1984; Skocpol 1985). Instead of viewing the state as a mere regulator or provider of institutional frames, these approaches see the state as 'an economic player' which actively shapes economic outcomes (Zysman 1983, 75). States pursue what Martin (1991, 17) calls 'growth strategies': strategies of economic development that are loosely organized around a

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3 dominant growth model which shapes economic relations between the state and businesses.  
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5 Once relations of the state and businesses have developed, economic policy change becomes  
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7 difficult to enact because of the considerable distributional consequences of new growth  
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9 strategies: they will likely strip resources from entrenched interests which will resist reform  
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11 (Hall 1986; Zysman 1983). Change most likely comes about during an economic crisis which  
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13 drives a wedge between existing coalitions, generates conflict within the institutional structure  
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15 and incites state actors to forge new coalitions (Gourevitch 1986; Gourevitch and Shinn 2010).  
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19 A useful heuristic which allows us to examine the specific mechanisms underlying economic  
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21 relations is 'state entanglement'. Entanglement can be defined as the intertwining of interests  
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23 of the state and businesses in institutions and social networks which are difficult to reverse  
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25 (Grabowski 1998, 110). The concept was first introduced by the developmental-state literature  
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27 which viewed it as a source of state power: business support for state strategies mobilises  
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29 resources for economic development (Grabowski 1998).<sup>1</sup> A similar concept has been  
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31 developed by the literature which investigates the role of central banking for financialisation.  
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33 Braun (2018) defines infrastructural entanglement as the increasing mutual control of state  
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35 and market actors through market-based central banking. By providing an infrastructure for  
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37 markets, the state enhances its steering capacity of the economy, but this will in turn also  
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39 generate power for the financial market as the state increasingly depends on functioning  
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41 markets (see also Walter and Wansleben 2019; Konings 2007). This mutual expansion of  
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43 power of state and economy is also important in this study, but electoral institutions play the  
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45 critical role for state entanglement.  
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49 Electoral institutions can contribute to entanglement in three distinct ways: First, the dispersion  
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51 of interests across smaller regional political entities in federalism might lead to the  
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53 entanglement of interests of regional political actors with regional economic actors. Federalism  
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55 contributes to the fragmentation of interests across regions while more centrally organised  
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57 polities will face more homogenous interest representation (Martin and Swank 2012, 20). If  
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59 interest formation is dispersed across geographic areas, there is a high chance that regional  
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3 political actors will share the interests of regional economic interests (Lütz 2000; Verdier  
4 2003). The German case presents a good example because of the type of federalism which  
5 is present in Germany: *cooperative federalism*. Contrary to systems of *dual federalism* where  
6 legislation in the federal and local sphere are relatively separated from one another,  
7 cooperative federalism requires that the federal and state level work together closely in many  
8 areas of legislation (Börzel 2001). Because representatives in the second chamber (the  
9 *Bundesrat*) not only represent central partisan positions but also regional economic interests,  
10 voting may diverge from the first chamber and present effective veto points protecting regional  
11 interests in federal policy making.  
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23 Second, the system of proportional representation (PR) can contribute to the entangling of  
24 interests of business groups and parties. While majoritarian electoral systems often generate  
25 single-party governments (which represent a selected group of business interests), PR  
26 systems favour multiparty governments (Prasad 2006). These multiparty settings enforce  
27 consensus not only among multiple parties but also the economic actors each party  
28 represents. This consensual nature of PR contributes to continuity in legislation because  
29 several actors have to agree on a new initiative (Gourevitch and Shinn 2010) and change will  
30 be rare (Verdier 2003). We can see this dynamic in the German case. Each party represents  
31 some business interests more than others – the Free Democrats (FDP) represent small  
32 businesses, the Christian Social Union (CSU) represents farmers, and the Christian  
33 Democratic Union (CDU) represents small and medium enterprises (SMEs). When these  
34 parties entered into government – as they did in 1981, they needed to find agreement among  
35 all those business interests (Gourevitch and Shinn 2010; Schmidt 2002; 2009). The fact that  
36 the coalition lasted for sixteen years, but implemented few radical reforms, demonstrates the  
37 obstacles that consensual political organisation poses for change.  
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55 Finally, the economic relevance of some market actors may contribute to an entangling with  
56 state interests. For instance, if the state depends on a specific public good provided by a  
57 market actor, this might lead to entangling. The German semi-public savings banks represent  
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3 such an economic actor. Partly owned by the federal states (*Länder*) and critical for state-level  
4 economic and structural development for most of Germany's post-war development, these  
5 institutions held a particularly powerful position in the German polity. Savings banks provided  
6 cheap loans for housing and local economic development (Seabrooke 2006; Johnson 1998,  
7 11). They received special tax treatment in corporate income tax, local trade and wealth tax  
8 to facilitate the provision loans to small savers, small and medium enterprises (*Mittelstand*)  
9 and structural support for financially weak regions (Gärtner 2008; Koschorreck 1969).  
10 Additionally, partial ownership by the states ensured an indirect representation in the second  
11 chamber of the German parliament (*Bundesrat*). As a consequence, these semi-public  
12 institutions found considerable support in the German parliament once the conservative  
13 government proposed to curb some of their benefits to finance tax cuts for corporations.  
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### 30 **Methodology**

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32 To capture the role of local institutions and state entanglement for radical tax reforms, this  
33 paper uses a systematic process-tracing approach after Hall (2006). Processes reveal how  
34 strategic interactions of actors and specific events shape institutional change. With a focus on  
35 chain of events, researchers can unveil the micro-level mechanisms of historically complex  
36 macro-causal relations (Hall 2006, 30). In the German case of tax regime change, process  
37 tracing can uncover the concrete historical dynamics of interest formation and how the state  
38 used these to forge coalitions for change.  
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48 Two reform periods were selected to trace change over time. The first spans from 1990-1994  
49 and contains the two largest tax cuts implemented under Helmut Kohl; The Tax Reform Act  
50 1990 and the Location Preservation Act 1994. In the reform period under Gerhard Schröder  
51 (1998-2001) the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002 and the Tax Reduction Act of 2000 were  
52 passed. In both periods, government strategies to revive economic growth and forge business  
53 coalitions are analyzed from statements of officials in hearings and parliamentary debates.  
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3 Business interests are extracted from letters to the parliament and statements in hearings.  
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5 The archival material stems from the Bundestagsarchiv in Berlin and contains all protocols of  
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7 hearings in the Finance, Economic, and the Mediation Committee, all written statements of  
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9 businesses, civil society groups and trade unions on the four relevant tax reforms. The total  
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11 population of documents analyzed encompasses about 3,400 pages.  
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### 17 **The evolution of a new growth strategy in German tax reforms**

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20 This section lays out the empirical findings in three parts. It will first introduce the historical  
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22 background of the German growth strategy and map out the key actors, their relations, and  
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24 interests. This will help to introduce the context within which long-term blockage and eventual  
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26 overhaul took place. Section two and three will introduce the empirical process of resilience in  
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28 the 1990s and the process of change between 1999 and 2000, respectively.  
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#### 31 *Historical background, actors, relations, and interests*

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33 The German post-war corporate tax regime was characterised by the institutional structures  
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35 of federalism and the dispersion of power of the central German state initiated by the Allied  
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37 forces. One consequence of this structure was that states held independent rights to spend  
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39 which rendered control of the federal state over fiscal resources insecure. In order to ensure  
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41 sufficient revenue sources, post-war governments implemented very high corporate and  
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43 income tax rates (Katzenstein 1987; Shonfield 1965; Zysman 1983, 255). Since high tax rates  
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45 impaired the potential recovery of the German economy, tax concessions became an integral  
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47 part of the German fiscal structure and supported the reinvestment of profits in machinery,  
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49 fixed assets, and inventories. Critical in this respect was the accelerated depreciation  
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51 schedule, the *degressive Afa* which shifted resources from declining to growing sectors of the  
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53 economy (Zysman 1983, 257).<sup>2</sup> The state's support for reinvestment contributed to the  
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55 orientation of the economy to long-term investment and long-term employment enabling high-  
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57 quality production (Streeck 1991; Zysman 1983, 256). While selective subsidies and tax  
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3 concessions in manufacturing were rather minor, West Germany had unusually high levels of  
4 general tax concessions reaching an average of 27 percent of total tax revenue of the  
5 corporate income tax revenue (figure 4).  
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10 Figure 4) about here  
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13 The state also supported a long-term loan structure, so called 'patient capital', through tax  
14 instruments. The German post-war finance regime was characterised by a pattern of relational  
15 banking in which bankers held seats on corporate boards and block shares of their clients to  
16 exchange of information and build trust (Lütz 2000, 150; Gourevitch and Shinn 2010, 162).  
17 Tax concessions were critical for cross-shareholding as the 'major shareholding privilege'  
18 (*Schachtelprivileg*) exempted all dividend income from shareholdings of more than 25 percent  
19 of a firm's shares (Höpner and Krempel 2004, 346). Moreover, tax concessions protected the  
20 house bank relationship of the credit institutions of the public right (savings and state banks)  
21 and German SMEs. The savings bank privilege (*Sparkassenprivileg*) was a special tax  
22 concession for the public savings- and state banks (*Sparkassen und Landesbanken*) which  
23 ensured the availability of cheap loans for SMEs, local consumers and structural regional  
24 development (Koschorreck 1969). In short, the German tax regime supported credit-based  
25 and long-term oriented corporate finance.  
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41 We can identify three larger groups of actors relevant in the debates over German tax reforms:  
42 businesses (interested in tax cuts), state governments (interested in balanced budget and  
43 support for savings banks) and federal governments (with new growth strategies). While all  
44 important business groups requested tax cuts, there were significant differences in the specific  
45 cuts each group proposed. Large manufacturers - often multinational corporations (MNCs) -  
46 represented by the Federation of German Industry (*Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*  
47 BDI) requested a radical CIT cut and the liberalisation of German corporate finance.<sup>3</sup> Medium-  
48 sized businesses represented mostly by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and  
49 Commerce (*Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag* DIHT) supported radical CIT and  
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3 PIT tax cuts because many SMEs pay PIT. Moreover, since SMEs often depended on loan  
4 finance from savings banks - which they found increasingly expensive - they requested tax  
5 cuts on retained earnings to self-finance. Because self-finance is not an option for small firms  
6 and farmers, the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (*Zentralverband des Deutschen*  
7 *Handwerks* ZDH) and the German Farmers Federation (*Deutscher Bauernverband* DBV)  
8 defended loan-finance through savings banks. The financial sector and commercial banks, on  
9 the other hand, requested its dismantling and more support for shareholders and the German  
10 stock market.  
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21 Because every German party represents some business interests more than others, the  
22 conservative-liberal coalition government (CDU/CSU and FDP; 1981-1998) developed  
23 complex tax plans. The CDU tended to represent the Mittelstand (SMEs), but the CSU and  
24 FDP represented farmers and small businesses. The tax plan tried to integrate all requests at  
25 once: CIT and PIT reductions coupled with cuts in tax concessions for all business groups to  
26 finance the reform. Together with the initiative to liberalise corporate finance and strengthen  
27 the German stock markets, the overall goal of the program was to support investment and  
28 offer capital-market finance to MNCs.  
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39 But these tax initiatives were frequently blocked in the second chamber: state governments  
40 including those governed by the FDP and CDU/CSU feared reforms would negatively affect  
41 state finance. Moreover, state governments wanted to secure the position of the savings banks  
42 and rejected proposals to raise revenue through new taxes which burdened these entities.  
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48 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party  
49 blocked reforms in order to protect the old system of long-term finance and investment, but  
50 this changed in the late 1990s when continued decline in growth rates and rising levels of  
51 unemployment put pressures on the German economy. Growth rates had been unusually low  
52 especially since unification and businesses, politicians and the public increasingly attributed  
53 this to the outdated tax system (Lieberman 2000; Streeck 2009). Once in office, in 1998, the  
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3 so-called 'modernisers' won increasing support in the red-green government and pushed for  
4 a tax plan in support of MNCs and finance (Author 2017: chapter 7). The new strategy was to  
5 liberalise corporate finance for large MNCs to allow for self-finance in SMEs and to dismantle  
6 patient capital which limited growth prospects in venture capital markets.  
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### 11 12 13 14 15 *Savings banks as guardians of patient capital (1990-1999)* 16

17 Much of the existing literature explains the continuity in the German corporate tax system as  
18 a result of the complementarity of the German institutional mix of long-term loans, industrial  
19 relations institutions, and corporate taxation (Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2006). This  
20 section will demonstrate that continuity in the tax system was less a function of  
21 complementarity, but of the entanglement of interests of economic and political actors in  
22 German electoral institutions.  
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31 Since the 1970s, businesses in the export sectors - metal, automobile, and chemical sectors  
32 – had publicly debated the role of high German corporate tax rates for increasingly diminished  
33 productive investments and product innovation (Lieberman 2000). In response, the Kohl  
34 administration proposed two larger tax cuts which planned to support investment. The Tax  
35 Reform Act 1990 proposed a moderate reduction of CIT for retained earnings - from 50 to 45  
36 percent - and a top PIT rate reduction on business income - from 56 to 53 percent. The  
37 Location Preservation Act 1994 planned another 5-percentage point CIT reduction on retained  
38 earnings and a 4-percentage point reduction in the top PIT for business income (Prasad 2006;  
39 Zohlnhöfer 2001). Additionally, the government planned to eliminate the financial transaction  
40 tax (*Börsenumsatzsteuer*) to strengthen the German stock market (DIP/11/2157). Since state  
41 governments worried about their budgets, the government proposed to raise DM 4-5 billion  
42 extra revenue through a new 10 percent withholding tax on interest income (Findling 1995,  
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3 This proposed tax rate on interest income was the first measure which encountered  
4 considerable resistance by economic actors entangled with the state. While the government  
5 presented this tax as one that was predominantly closing loopholes of tax minimising practices  
6 of German commercial banks (PA/XI71/doc No 39; PA/XI71/A2/18, 570. Finance Committee,  
7 14.04.1988, pp. 24), the 10 percent withholding tax on interest income was also to be levied  
8 on operations of savings banks. In the early stages of the deliberation process (in February  
9 1988), the entire banking sector - private and public banks – lobbied against it arguing that the  
10 tax would hurt the German loan market, raise the cost of finance and curb available resources  
11 in the capital market (PA/XI71/B2/39; PA/XI71/B2/40).

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Once the debate moved to the Bundesrat, the arguments of the public banks were adopted  
by state governments. Representatives argued that placing taxes on banks of the public right  
was not an effective approach of revenue recovery because it indirectly raised costs for federal  
states and municipalities. A majority in the Bundesrat suggested to exempt these banks from  
the tax entirely. The institutes of the public right had after paragraph 5 section 2 income tax  
law 'special responsibilities' which included support of the housing market, improving the  
regional economic structure, and strengthening local competitiveness (PA/XI71/A2/17, 570.  
Finance Committee, 14.04.1988, pp.82, 83). Since these institutes did not compete with the  
private credit institutions – but were responsible for areas often not covered by commercial  
banks – tax exemption had to be retained (PA/XI71/A2/17, 570. Finance Committee,  
14.04.1988, pp. 85; PA/XI71/A2/18, 570. Finance Committee, 14.04.1988, pp. 85). Moreover,  
municipalities held silent partnerships in the public mortgage banks (*Hypothekenbanken*)  
which would get more costly if these entities had to pay higher tax (PA/XI71/A2/17). The fact  
the Bundesrat argued that these institutions should be excluded from the tax (PA/XI71/A2/18,  
570. Finance Committee, 14.04.1988, pp. 52), indicates how difficult it is to disentangle  
institutions which generate shared interests of the state and economic sectors.

Commercial banks and the financial sector did not hold comparable ties in the Bundesrat. The  
Federal Association of German Banks (*Bundesverband deutscher Banken*) wrote several

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3 letters to the Bundesrat arguing that commercial banks required protection from the  
4 competition of the advantaged savings banks and could not bear further preferential treatment  
5 for those banks. While the overall rate reduction for businesses - the top PIT rate reduction  
6 from 56 to 53 percent and the corporate income tax from 56 to 50 percent - evened out the  
7 traditional favouritism of the savings banks because private banks mostly grant credit to  
8 corporations and savings banks cover SMEs, the planned additional unfair tax treatment of  
9 interest income would reinstate unfair competition between the two sectors (PA/XI71/B2/42).  
10 But the savings bank privilege remained untouched.  
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21 Similarly, although the government planned to abolish a financial transaction tax to enhance  
22 wealth building in the German economy, this element of the tax plan did not pass the  
23 Bundesrat. The government argued that the tax hindered the mobility of financial capital which  
24 generated economic disadvantages for finance in Frankfurt. The Bundesrat almost  
25 unanimously (10 of 11 votes) rejected the proposal arguing that the costs of losing revenue of  
26 DM 600 million – a rather minor figure - outweighed the benefits of enhancing the German  
27 financial market (PA/XI71/A2/17, 570. Finance Committee, 14.04.1988, pp.112). Baden-  
28 Württemberg, Berlin and Bavaria argued 'it is desirable but currently not affordable'  
29 (PA/XI71/A2/18, 570. Finance Committee, 14.04.1988, pp. 70).  
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41 The second source of gridlock were the entangled relations of the governing parties with  
42 business interests. The individual representation of SMEs, small firms and farmers in the  
43 coalition required an inclusive approach to reform. The small firms and farmers were  
44 disappointed that corporations received a larger tax reduction than smaller firms which filed  
45 taxes as individuals - the top PIT was only reduced from 56 to 53 percent. Thus, to get the  
46 support of the FDP and the CSU in the Bundesrat the Finance Minister Stoltenberg had to  
47 offer a compromise in the finance committee. He added special depreciation allowances for  
48 SMEs, a cut in the wealth tax of small firms and improvements in the treatment of pension  
49 schemes for freelancers and small firms. These amendments won support of sufficient votes  
50 in the Bundesrat but reduced the revenue recovery from DM 19 to 9 billion (PAXI/5A).  
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3 While much smaller, the Location Preservation Act of 1994 also planned to raise revenue  
4 through reductions in tax concessions. DM 8 billion were supposed to get recovered through  
5 a reduction in the degressive depreciation schedule (*degressive Afa*) (DIP/12/4487, pp. 31).  
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7 This reform provided greater benefits for SMEs through a significant top PIT rate reduction  
8 (from 53 to 44 percent), but big businesses were losing out from the Afa reduction. Small  
9 businesses, for instance the crafts-business association ZDH, 'fully backed' the tax reform  
10 (PAXI/242/A2/53, pp. 1), but the BDI and the DIHT (large and medium-sized firms) viewed  
11 reductions in the degressive AfA as 'a serious problem' (PAXI/242/A2/53, pp. 1). Again,  
12 entangled interests made it difficult for the government to implement reductions in tax  
13 concessions. The opposition and a number of CDU-led governments voted against the  
14 reductions in the degressive AfA (XII/242/A1/6, pp.20-22) since the bill only raised 3 billion  
15 instead of DM 8 billion in extra revenue, the scope for further rate reductions was significantly  
16 curbed (BMF 2014, 74–76).  
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#### 34 *Finance and the export sector as promoters of a liberalised system (1999-2005)*

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36 The literature on German corporate finance has shown that increasing capital market finance  
37 of MNCs instigated an erosion of the German system of patient capital (Beyer 2003; Höpner  
38 and Beyer 2004; Höpner and Krempel 2004). However, this trend not only change the  
39 economic sphere, but also opened political opportunities. When the Red-Green government  
40 proposed radical corporate tax reforms in the late 1990s, it forged a new coalition of the  
41 financial sector and large internationally operating corporations. Thus, instead of bringing all  
42 business groups into their tax coalition, the new government selected specific interests which  
43 received benefits, while broadening the base among the outsiders of the coalition.  
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54 The new growth strategy under the red-green government aimed at radically reduced tax rates  
55 and a new system of corporate finance to attract investors and generate capital for young  
56 high-tech firms and start-ups in the software and biotechnology sectors (Spiegel 2000). Two  
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3 reforms radically reduced the CIT on retained and distributed profits from 45 and 30 percent  
4 to 25 percent (Bach, Corneo, and Steiner 2014, 119). Moreover, the Tax Reduction Law 2000  
5 entailed a very focused programme to support MNC finance which simultaneously dismantled  
6 patient capital. Revenue recovery was composed of the cutting of several tax concessions for  
7 SMEs - the co-entrepreneur waiver, and the swap assessment – and the elimination of the  
8 savings bank privilege (von Rosen 1999, 654; PA/XIV/16/B3/96, p.6).  
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16 One of the key instruments of the Tax Reduction Law 2000, which generated strong business  
17 support for the project, was the plan to implement a new system of dividend taxation which  
18 provided systematic shareholder relief – especially for foreign investors. The former imputation  
19 system deducted the corporate income tax from the income tax of the shareholder which  
20 benefitted domestic investors who paid German income tax but rendered foreign investors  
21 subject to double taxation (PA/XIV/154/A4/111, pp. 11). The government considered the  
22 imputation system an obstacle for the attraction of foreign investment and the growth of  
23 German export businesses because it repelled foreign investors and complicated joint-  
24 ventures (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 54). The new half-income system was supposed to attract  
25 investments from abroad and open international capital markets to German corporations  
26 (Brühler Kommission 1999). The systems change was complemented by changes in capital  
27 gains taxation: Capital gains from the selling of corporate shares became tax free when shares  
28 held in a firm were below the threshold for significant participation – effectively abolishing the  
29 block-shareholding in the Deutschland A.G. (PA/XIV154/A6/111, pp. 9-11).  
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47 Resistance formed in the parliamentary discussions among the traditional coalitions of the  
48 SMEs, the savings banks and the federal states. Business associations representing SMEs -  
49 the ZDH, the German Crafts Association, and the DIHT – argued that the capital gains tax cut  
50 unevenly benefitted corporations (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133; PAXIV/154/A4/88, pp. 50).  
51 Smaller businesses also worried that by eliminating the savings bank privilege, loans would  
52 get more expensive (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 51). Since the CDU supported SMEs and the  
53 CSU and the FDP were close allies of smaller businesses, conservative state governments  
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3 blocked the proposal in the Bundesrat (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 139; PA/XIV/154/A2/40;  
4 XIV/154/A6/111; PA/XIV154/A6/103, pp. 44). The Bavarian government complained that  
5 farmers and forestry received the smallest benefits but suffered significant losses from the  
6 reductions in special tax concession for SMEs (PA/XIV/A1/3).  
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12 To work against gridlock, the government engaged in a divide and conquer strategy and 'split  
13 existing coalitions'. While strengthening the coalition of SMEs and federal state governments,  
14 it excluded the savings banks from the arena of deliberation. Most relevant in this respect was  
15 the setting up and staffing of the 'tax reform commission', which brought representatives of  
16 BDI (MNCs), DIHT (SMEs) and the federal states together and made the DIHT tax expert  
17 Alfons Kühn the chairman of the commission (PA/XIV154/A6/111, pp. 9; XIV/154/A4/88, pp.  
18 57). The effect of this setup was that the DIHT (SMEs) increasingly felt responsible for the  
19 interests of other important business interests represented in the commission, most notably  
20 MNCs, while letting go of the alignment with the savings banks (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 79).  
21 Statements like 'various mergers with German firms could not take place in Germany because  
22 we have the full-income system' (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 79) and the system change could  
23 double the number of shareholders which 'enhanced the risk and shareholder culture in  
24 Germany' (DIHT 2000) are a testimony to a shift in interest towards capital market  
25 liberalisation.  
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43 The outcome of this strategy was a tax plan which incorporated the interests of the MNCs and  
44 SMEs. The commission developed a plan which supported capital-market finance (requested  
45 by MNCs) and self-finance (requested by larger SMEs) while further curbing tax support for  
46 loan finance (PA/XIV154/A6/111, pp. 9; XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 57). The DIHT summarised its  
47 mission as making corporations and SMEs independent from the German hausbank  
48 relationship and 'turn firms [themselves] into savings banks' (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133).  
49 Capital gains tax on the selling of block shares would be eliminated to 'break up the encrusted  
50 German shareholder structure' (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133), and a system change in dividend  
51 taxation would increase investments of foreign investors into German corporations  
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3 (PA/XIV154/A6/111, pp. 9; XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 57). Lower tax rates on retained *and* distributed  
4 earnings allowed for 'let[ting] profits sit in the corporation, cumulate and through the realisation  
5 of earnings through the selling of shares make a good cut' (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133).  
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10 The second strategy to limit the power of the existing coalitions was to introduce outsider  
11 interests and to 'forge new business coalitions'. The German Shareholder Institute (*Deutsches*  
12 *Aktieninstitut*), an association which had not played a role in previous tax reforms, was  
13 introduced as one of the main players in the debate. It was highly supportive of those elements  
14 of the reform which promised a restructuring of German firms. For instance, by reducing the  
15 co-entrepreneur waiver and the swap assessment – tax concessions which helped larger  
16 SMEs to expand and produce abroad - the Mittelstand had strong incentives to restructure  
17 which opened up new capital sources to capital markets (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 134;  
18 PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 131). Moreover, the association argued that the capital gains tax  
19 reform liberated capital locked-in in the Deutschland A.G. with positive effects on international  
20 financial markets (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133). This sentiment was shared by BDI which  
21 confirmed that the tax reform proposal had created 'phantasies' among investors abroad which  
22 led to a soaring of share prices (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133).  
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39 The third state strategy was to 'disentangle' the interests of the federal states and the savings  
40 banks. Initially, the states opposed the radical CIT cuts because with the existing imputation  
41 system, which credited the CIT against the PIT, the states which collected 50 percent of the  
42 latter would have suffered significant revenue losses (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 79). For  
43 instance, the minister president of North-Rhine Westphalia argued in a hearing that: 'If you  
44 want to keep the imputation system, but at the same time support the definitive taxation of the  
45 CIT with 25%, this is unaffordable' (PA/XIV/154/A4/111, pp. 12). To gain the support of the  
46 federal states, the government presented the half-income system as one that recovered much  
47 of the revenue loss of the federal states. There were estimates that the half-income system  
48 would limit the revenue loss from the CIT cut by 2.5 billion for the federal treasury and 2.3  
49 billion for the federal states (PA/XIV/154/A4/111, pp. 7; DIP/14/026, pp. 103).  
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3 Another powerful budgetary argument was that the former imputation system was particularly  
4 prone to tax evasion. Under the imputation system, foreigners could engage in so-called  
5 dividend stripping, a practice in which foreign investors sold their shares to German residents  
6 at a predetermined buyback price. Both financial actors benefitted, but the treasury incurred  
7 significant losses. The government tied the argument in favour of the system change to the  
8 goal to reduce such practices (von Rosen 1999, 658; PA/XIV154/A6/111, pp. 9-11). It argued  
9 that it included a reduction of the significant participation from 10 to 1 percent into the tax plan,  
10 for the very reason that the simultaneous reduction in tax rates on distributed and retained  
11 earnings allowed for tax saving models (PA/XIV/154/A4/88, pp. 133).

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14 These strategies generated very high levels of support for the bill in the Bundesrat. The vote  
15 margin in favour of the reform was 41:28 and thus included a significant share of votes from  
16 opposition governments (Ganghof 2004, 101). It resulted in a large tax cut – volume of DM 31  
17 billion - which entailed a significant reduction in the CIT (BMF 2014, pp. 113-117).

## 31 32 **Conclusion**

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34 This paper started from the puzzle that after a long period of resilience in the German  
35 corporate tax regime, a radical reform was implemented which shifted tax support from  
36 savings banks and SMEs to MNCs and finance. Aside from the general reduction in corporate  
37 tax rates, the reforms facilitated capital-market finance of large export businesses. This  
38 distinguishes German reforms from the general trend in OECD countries, in which tax  
39 reductions for MNCs were accompanied by significant tax cuts for individuals and financial  
40 incomes.

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42 This unique process and structure of German corporate tax reform provides us with a useful  
43 case to test this special issue's question of contested neoliberalism. The special issue argues  
44 that neoliberalism is contested not just because of the many interpretations that developed in  
45 forty years of academic debates, but also because of neoliberalism's nature, its contextual  
46 occurrence and local variegation. The special issue finds that neoliberalism is a consequence  
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3 of common economic pressures of globalisation but becomes localised within the state. The  
4 state responds to and embodies neoliberal transformations. This dual nature of neoliberalism  
5 has contributed to its theoretical and conceptual elusiveness. On the one hand, the classical  
6 thesis that neoliberalism instigates a convergence of Western capitalism to one liberal model  
7 did not materialise. Today, scholars largely agree that local differences between domestic  
8 regimes prevailed. However, the comparative literature's conclusion that coordinated market  
9 economies were resilient (Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2006), or that the process of  
10 neoliberalisation would be confined to incremental processes of 'drift' and 'erosion' (Thelen  
11 2014; 2019; Streeck 2009), make it difficult to understand radical but variegated changes in  
12 domestic economies. This special issue intends to highlight radical change but acknowledge  
13 local implementation.

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27 Applying this approach to the German case of corporate tax reform, this paper finds that  
28 radical reforms originate from state actors' active involvement in economic development and  
29 are shaped an array of 'economic relations' between the state and businesses. In the German  
30 case, economic relations consisted of an entanglement between businesses and parties in  
31 consensual institutions of federalism and proportional representation. This structure is  
32 particularly hostile to change because governing parties represent certain business groups in  
33 parliament. The process of breaking up entanglement shaped not only the pace of reform but  
34 also its outlook. Successful tax cuts could only be implemented once the red-green  
35 government 'split' existing coalitions, 'forged new coalitions', and 'disentangled interests'. The  
36 resulting new coalition of MNCs and finance supported the new structure which granted large  
37 exporters greater freedom to finance in international capital-markets.

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51 This finding has implications for our understanding of the role of neoliberalism in contemporary  
52 capitalism. The fact that German neoliberal tax reforms came late and differed from the liberal  
53 model does indicate that neoliberal dynamics vary. The case invites us to rethink the  
54 interaction of globalisation with institutional context and sheds light on the constraints imposed  
55 on officials and their strategies to supervene these to implement new growth strategies.

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
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
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Figure 1) Average effective corporate tax rates; country groups and Germany




Source: Own calculations from CBT Tax Dataset. AETR applies typical taxes and deductions of each country to a typical investment. The tax rate is a combined measure of top corporate tax rate at federal level, plus surcharges, and local corporate tax rate minus deductions (tax concessions and depreciations on inventory, plant and machinery and intangibles). The typical investment is calculated as a weighted average of 64% investments in plant and machinery and 36% buildings (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). Mixed European economies are Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, LMEs are Britain, Ireland, USA, New Zealand and Canada and CMEs are Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, Austria, Belgium, and France.




Source: own calculations from Bundesbank (2018a) and Bendel et al. (2016). Large enterprises are defined as firms with sales of 50 million or more and SMEs as firms with less than 50 million sales. Securities and other long-term equity investments contain stocks, bonds and other securities held by the firm as well as shares in affiliated companies and real estate investments.

Figure 3) Liabilities of NFCs as a percentage of the balance sheet total



Source: own calculations from Bundesbank (2018a) and Bendel et al. (2016). Large enterprises are defined as firms with sales of 50 million or more and SMEs are firms with less than 50 million sales. Equity is defined as subscribed capital and capital shares as well as retained profits and revenue reserves. Liabilities towards credit institutions are short- and long-term credit taken up from credit institutions.



Source: Own calculations. Subsidies plus tax concessions to manufacturing businesses in percent of value added from EC (1999). Tax concessions to CIT denote the volume of tax concessions (tax concessions and deferrals) paid to the entire economy as a share of total tax revenue of the corporate income tax, data from the EC State aid scoreboard (2018). The two indicators overlap to some extent (the tax concessions to manufacturing are also included in the tax concessions as a share of CIT tax revenue) but this does not diminish the validity of the graph main point that Germany spent more on general tax concessions compared to other countries and slightly more than most countries for selective measures.