The Memories of the Pompeii from the 1st Century BC to the 3rd Century AD.

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Abstract[1]

Pompeius Magnus lived his life in one the most tumultuous periods in Roman history. From the outset, he was a participant in the upheaval caused by the civil war between those who supported Gaius Marius and Lucius Sulla, which overshadowed Roman politics for decades. Although Pompeius was a minor figure at the time, his rapid ascent to pre-eminence within the Roman establishment quickly made his role in these years gain a greater level of scrutiny than was perhaps warranted. Subsequently, he attained still further renown in the civil war fought between himself and Julius Caesar that set in motion the events that culminated in the imposition of an autocracy under Caesar's successor Octavian/Augustus and naturally formed the narrative for the foundation myth of the new ruling dynasty.

Similarly, Pompeius' sons were also a part of the monumental events of the civil war against Caesar, and later Sextus Pompeius became one of the key leaders in the civil war against the successors to Caesar that saw the ascendancy of Octavian. The memory of Sextus was influenced to an extent by his relationship to his father but also enhanced by his own role in the war. The version of Sextus that has survived in both the contemporary histories and those that followed later was largely formed by Octavian and his followers during the war and in the immediate aftermath when the conflict formed a part of the foundation myth of the 'rebranded' Augustus.

This thesis examines the memory of Pompeius and his sons in the historiography of the Roman world to the third century AD. Memory and its application in the development of cultural narratives is a fascinating area of study that is as relevant now as it is for the ancient world. History is full of examples where the narrative of events was changed or altered for various purposes. Then, as now, the narrative of momentous events was particularly

[1] Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.

susceptible to editing by those who wish to gain from a particular version of history. Sometimes these events are linked to such extreme changes to the established system within a country that they also become part of a founding narrative or myth for the new regime, as was the case in the first century BC.

The choice of the third century AD as a stopping point is due to the nature of the sources and the evolution of the narrative, the last largely intact accounts of Pompeius' life come from the Greek authors ending with Dio writing in the 200s AD. These accounts are long enough to allow the exploration their interaction with the existing narrative and the judgements of this era on the evolution of memories from the preceding centuries. Another reason is that these Greek authors also preserve the longest accounts of Sextus' memory too, which allow for a detailed comparison.

To examine the construction of these memories, this thesis is divided into four parts along thematic lines: the first discusses the images of Pompeius that were created in his own lifetime by the historians of the Sullan period and contemporary authors such as Cicero, Caesar, and Pompeius himself. This will examine how they influenced the memory that was perpetuated both during his lifetime and passed down in the collective memory to be picked up by later authors. The second part examines the death of Pompeius, which became a key aspect of his memory, and how this affected his contemporaries and how they reassessed his memory in the light of his demise. The third part explores how Pompeius' memory was understood and used by authors of the imperial period, particularly the Greek authors, when they looked back at the period and retrospectively applied their knowledge of what had subsequently occurred to the memories of that time. The fourth and final chapter will dissect the memory of Sextus, who, while tied to the memory of his father, also became the subject of a greater hostile historical tradition and was also affected by what almost amounted to a form of memory sanction. Unlike the chapters on his father, this chapter will examine the

whole range of Sextus' memory due to the relative disparity of lifetimes and imbalance in source quantity.

Chapter 1 Introduction: 'Memory and History'

Pompeius Magnus is one of the best known figures from the Roman period. In the modern world he is probably best known for his conflict against Caesar, but he was famous in his own times for far more before the civil war and its politics eclipsed these memories. His contemporaries remembered him for his early allegiance to Sulla in another civil war, the fears that engendered, and his extraordinary career, which at times threatened the normal operation of the *res publica*. His children Gnaeus and Sextus came to the fore in the dying embers of Caesar's civil war and Sextus in particular, continued to struggle against the heirs to Caesar's position. Both sons forced a re-evaluation of Pompeius as they advertised themselves as the sires to a great general, but to their enemies they became unworthy offspring. As their short-lived memories only existed in a time of war, they were quickly eclipsed in memory by the last battle of the civil war between Antonius and Octavian. This shift in focus to the pivotal battle of Actium meant that little was done to re-evaluate the memory of the two sons, which provides a good case study to contrast their memories with those of Pompeius and how they were treated by both contemporaries and later historians.[2]

The world inhabited by the Pompeii was a world of memory. Greece and Rome, for example, were littered with the physical reminders of the past from temples to statues. Liturgical events and oral history helped to spread the stories of people and events of the past among the populace as exempla to educate and explain how the present had come to be.[3] Many of the speeches of Cicero contained exemplum from the past, as Valerie Hope has noted 'for Cicero the essential role of an orator was to recall the past, to preserve collective

[2] The focus of Roman memory on Actium as the pivotal last battle can be seen in its representation in the narrative of the *Aeneid*. On the shift to Actium see Gurval 1998: 30; Stahl 2015: 253.
[3] Roller 2018: 1.

memories of great peoples and deeds. Orators made the best historians, and oratory and history both needed to promote what was deemed worthy of remembrance.'[4]

Later, with the advent of writing, these stories and myths could be further transmitted through the ages to even later generations, extending the range and capacity for memory – perhaps why Plato, in his analogy of memory, chose the wax writing tablet as his metaphor.[5] Since the forms of memory transmission are so broad it is understandable that in Greek mythology Μνημοσύνη (Mnemosyne, personified memory) was the mother of the muses, who were all personifications of the means of transmission such as poetry, music and Κλειώ (Clio) the muse of history.[6]

By using these memories, this study aims to examine the evolution of and reason behind their formation. Memory studies, the examination and understanding of human memory in its development and transmission, is not a new academic discipline – in its current form it is at least a century old – but it still lacks a solid conceptual framework.[7] This novelty has led to one of the major criticisms of this study being that it can be so broadly applied that it risks coming to encompass all aspects of culture itself.[8] As the anthropologist David Berliner has cautioned 'By a dangerous act of expansion, memory gradually becomes everything which is transmitted across generations, "almost indistinguishable" then from the concept of culture itself.'[9] Part of this problem may be because the study of memory and its function in society is itself a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing, for example, on sociology (which it developed from), psychology, anthropology, and history. Scholars from these disciplines have tried over the last century to narrow down the focus and define what exactly

[4] Cic. *De Or*. 2.36; Hope 2011: xiv.
[5] Radstone 2010: 327. Although Plato in the *Phaedo* was against the use of writing as a means of remembering as he perceived it as weaking the mind.
[6] Hom. *Ody*. 24.60; Hesi. *Theo*. 77-9; Dio. Sic. 4.7.
[7] Confino 1997: 1387; Berliner 2005: 197.
[8] Confino 1997: 1387.
[9] Berliner 2005: 203-205.

memory is in relation with general culture. However, as memory is so widespread in society almost all forms of expression can be affected by it. Most scholars of memory studies would readily admit that there is still a way to go to bring a uniform set of rules to a study born from a confederation of subjects.[10]

However, despite the widespread impact of memory, its study is relatively recent. In the discipline of history, many scholars consider the foundational work for memory studies to be that of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in the first half of the 20th century.[11] A student of the sociologist Emile Durkheim, Halbwachs first coined the term mémoire collective (collective memory) in his 1925 book *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Mémoire* (the social frameworks of memory).[12] Here Halbwachs argued that memory and recollection, particularly of events that were not witnessed, should not be understood solely as an individual action devoid of all external links, but that the society one inhabits and the collective memories of the group influence (provide the framework for) the individual just as the individual memories of the members of said group generate the collective memory.[13] As case studies, Halbwachs examined various levels of social groups from the family to the aristocracy and how they influenced the memories of their members.[14] The latter are of course a useful case study as the elites in Roman society were in the main a wealthy, literate group and tend to influence and preserve memories through their writings and monuments.[15] Both then and now his arguments about collective memory have been questioned. Contemporaries queried whether Halbwachs' theory of cultural memory failed to give due credit to the function of individual memory, which was considered the main aspect of

[10] Erll 2010: 1.
[11] Burke 1997: 44; Confino 2010: 77.
[12] Confino 2010: 77; Erll 2010: 8; Eckert 2016: 10-11.
[13] Halbwachs 1992: 53. (translated into English 1992)
[14] Halbwachs 1992: 54-166.
[15] On the elite focus of memory and subsequent history see Roller 2018: 9.

memory at that time.[16] In response to the criticism of his contemporaries, Halbwachs wrote the *La Mémoire Collective* (published posthumously in 1950), which argued that even the memories one experiences individually are still influenced by the external factors of one's social group or society, that one never truly remembers in a vacuum, and that recollection can focus on incidents that fit with what the prevailing social trend of the group or culture at that time.[17] Recently, his theories have been questioned again in regards to their originality with some scholars pointing to similar theories on memory in the prior centuries.[18] Although it is true that some scholars had discussed the function of memory, none seem to have had the impact that Halbwachs' work has had on modern studies.

Regardless of these questions, Halbwachs is still viewed as one of the most important pioneering minds in the field of memory studies and certainly helped to bring the theory of a collective memory to the fore. This has obvious implications in the study of Pompeius, as such a major figure in his own lifetime, his memory, as recorded by his contemporaries, was one that was frequently influenced by the wider socio-political considerations of the time. This is particularly acute in the aftermath of the civil wars of the 80s and 40s BC, when the allegiance of the various authors to one party or another in the war clearly impacted on their view and, therefore, memory of Pompeius.

Halbwachs' work went through a period of obscurity due in part to his death during the Second World War, until the late 1960s and the early 1970s when scholars again became interested in the ideas he expounded and his books were republished.[19] The late 1970s and the 1980s (the so-called memory boom) also saw a revitalisation of cultural memory studies driven by events such as postcolonial perspectives and the need to gather the fading

[16] Burke 1997: 44; Erll 2010: 1.
[17] Halbwachs 1950: 33-35.
[18] Russell 2006: 792.
[19] Hirsch 2016: 51, 54. Perhaps as a sign of the continued interest in Halbwachs, his works were collected and published in English translation in the 1992 by the University of Chicago.

testimony of the remaining Holocaust survivors.[20] Halbwachs' work influenced several scholars around this time whose work is particularly relevant for this study: German scholar Jan Assmann (and later his wife, Aleida).[21] Assmann, a prolific author on memory studies, is interested in the role of memory in early cultures such as the Egyptians and Hebrews.[22] He added a new layer of detail to the various concepts of Halbwachs, along with a more historical leaning. His wife Aleida later added further to the concept with further subdivisions such as the notion of the canon and archive of memory.[23]

These recent scholars have expanded the study of memory in the historical sphere. Both Assmanns have examined the function of media – in this case, architectural, sculptural and written – in the transmission of memories on different levels. Jan Assmann is credited with the concept of cultural memory, which he first defined in his 1988 essay *Kollectives Gedächtnis und Kulturelle Identität*.[24] Later he expanded this as functioning 'in two ways: through the mode of "foundational memory" that relates to origins, and that of "biographical memory" that concerns personal experiences and their framework – that is, the recent past. The foundational mode always functions […] through fixed objectifications both linguistic and non-linguistic. The biographical mode, on the other hand, always depends on social interaction. Foundational memory is more a matter of construction than of natural growth […] whereas biographical memory works the opposite way.'[25]

On communitive memory, he explains this as 'memories related to the recent past. These are what the individual shares with his contemporaries. A typical instance would be generational memory that accrues within the group, originating and disappearing with time or, to be more precise, with its carriers. Once those who embodied it have died, it gives way

[20] Confino 1997: 1386.
[21] Eckert 2016: 9.
[22] Eckert 2016: 13.
[23] Assmann 2010: 97-106.
[24] Translated into English in 1995 as *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*.
[25] Assmann 2011: 37 (first published in German 1992).

to a new memory.' Assmann further argues these communitive memories have a life span of about three generations.[26]

Assmann also created the concept of the *Erinnerungsfiguren* – the use of certain individuals as totemic figures in which memories of historical events are anchored – such as Cato Uticensis' connection with opposition to Caesar after his suicide following the battle of Thapsus.[27] Meanwhile, Aleida Assmann has also explored the *Erinnerungsfiguren* of important events who rise to the top in cultural memories in contemporary histories.[28]Aleida developed the theory of active and passive memory, which can be broken down into the canon and archive of memory transmission. The active canon is composed of the memories that are designed to be communicated – like a display in a museum – whereas the passive archive consists of those that are simply retained but perhaps not meant for public consumption – like a storeroom or a physical archive – but which can provide further information if reviewed. This is coupled with active and passive forms of forgetting based, for example, around censorship and neglected memories respectively.[29] Such an understanding of the structuring of memory will be particularly pertinent to the examination of the strategies around memories of the Pompeii, in particular those of Sextus, whose memory was subject to active forms of forgetting.

The theories of all these scholars provide tools with which to understand the functions of memory. Memories have long been a battleground for various people and societies. This is particularly the case when memories become the tools of politics. Jeffrey Olick has summarized the thought process: 'How do we represent the past to ourselves and to others? Which of our many pasts do we represent, and when, where, and why do we change those representations? How do those representations shape our actions, identities, and

[26] Assmann 1995: 36-7.
[27] Winter 2007: 364.
[28] Ginsberg 2017: 11.
[29] Assmann 2010a: 97-104.

understandings? How do individual-level processes interact with collective ones, and vice versa? What does it mean to think about "memory" in these broad ways?'[30] This representation has become particularly prominent in recent years with racial tensions reigniting ideological battles over the memories of the civil war in the United States, especially The Lost Cause of the South.[31] The focus of much of clashes have been over the projection of these memories, such as in flags and sites of memory, such as statues and memorials.[32] This in turn has led to the revaluation of sites of memory in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, that relate to representation of the memories of slavery.[33]

Roman society provides a particularly valuable insight into this mnemonic process and forms a good case study for exploration with memory studies, as the political elite were very concerned with controlling their memory – both communicative and cultural, for example, Pompeius' concerns over the wording of his titles on his great theatre. The ancient world's preferred method of transmission on material that was less susceptible to the ravages of time such as stone or metal addresses this concern with preservation of the message to current and future audiences, as there was a concern to combat what they saw as the natural state of memory, which was oblivion.[34]

Aside from monuments, as Assmann states, written accounts of events were a major component for the elite of the Roman world. Since authors such as Polybius, individuals and families had had their selective version of deeds commemorated in writing to keep their chosen memories alive for both current and posthumous familial glory.[35] Jeffrey Tatum notes that written history that acts as a means of cementing the past in a way that retrospectively

[30] From 'About The Memory Studies Association' https://www.memorystudiesassociation.org/about_the_msa/ accessed 10/8/20.
[31] Wilson 2021.
[32] Many of these statues were actually the product of another period of political upheaval and a desire by certain groups to maintain their control of the narrative. See Wilson 2017.
[33] Slave trader Edward Colston being one example. See Siddique and Skopeliti 2020.
[34] Flower 2006: 2.
[35] Roller 2018: 1.

explains the present was more valuable to a patron.[36] It should be remembered, as Rawson has argued, that because the Romans were more focussed on the practical application of memory as a tool for learning or advertisement they, therefore, do not constitute historians in our sense of the word.[37]

Frequently, elite Romans would build upon the memories of ancestors or other illustrious figures, in order to provide a benchmark to their own claims, this would regularly lead to historical revisionism to make these memories better fit their new purpose. In turn, this refashioning would lead to the communication of curated older memories to new audiences, further narrowing the collective and cultural memory of these figures. Pompeius' cognomen 'Magnus' is one such case, where he selectively used the memory of Alexander the Great's qualities as a general, which could only be understood from a reference to that past memory, to inform his martial skills. Other figures did the same – Gnaeus and Sextus heavily built on the memory of their father as a great general as did Octavian with Caesar.

Many of these accounts were influential enough that their viewpoints became part of the collective memory that was drawn on by others for exemplar that would be understood or used later as the sources for historians looking back at those memories. Eventually, these were collected together and then formed the basis of a cultural history, as James Young has argued: 'collective memories are undeniably shaped by national interests and concerns, but they are also dependent on 'the conflation of private and public memory.[38] Assmann notes: 'cultural memory has passed a process of selection which secure it a lasting place in cultural working memory of a society.'[39] This could preserve certain memories that had been affected

[36] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 5.12.3; Hall 1998: 308; Dugan 2005: 51; Hope 2011: xiv; Tatum 2011: 161-2. Cicero's attempts in the mid-50s to persuade Lucius Lucceius to write a monograph about his consulship form the basis of Tatum's argument.
[37] Rawson 2014: 264.
[38] Young 1993: 15.
[39] Assmann 2010a: 100.

by the views of the time and if recorded uncritically maintain that bias, influencing the cultural memories of the period.

In this way, the history of Rome started as a collection of personal familial histories written by and for a family's own personal needs, as they were the only ones able to afford the education or personal historian this required.[40] Later, when Rome was ruled by members of the same family, these personal/familial memories became part of the history of the state as Young has noted, and the memory of their accession or personalities could become quasi-sacred and unsuitable for revision. 'Deciding who or what would be remembered was an aspect of power, authority and prestige. Memory was about controlling the past, defining the present and planning for the future. Rome's rulers entwined its present and its past through media such as literature, buildings, sculpture and coinage.'[41] This is largely what occurred with Sextus, who had his memory set during the Octavianic/Augustan period to justify the war of the contemporary ruling dynasty. Due to the regime's process of dominating the sphere of memory at that time, Sextus' image was overshadowed in the collective memory as a smaller player in the civil wars compared to Brutus, Cassius, and Marcus Antonius, and was never subject to any serious re-evaluation by later historians who tended to uncritically repeat the memories created by his enemies.[42]

These memories therefore transitioned from the personal to the collective. The Julio-Claudians in particular are a good example, where the personal memories of the civil war that brought Augustus to the purple became mythologised to explain and justify the regime and, therefore, a difficult topic to explore during that dynasty, especially for later members who need to strengthen their claims to rule. In an example of Assmann's active forgetting, Augustus burned the records of the Triumvirate, and the future emperor Claudius as a child

[40] Roller 2018: 9.
[41] Hope 2011: xiv.
[42] For a well-documented example of such media domination in an age before the television and the internet, see Cook 2017: 40-68 on the domination of memories by the Southern States after the U.S. Civil War.

was supposedly warned off writing a history of the civil war period.[43] That is not to say that the Romans at this point had a uniform or strict strategy for controlling memory – Caligula, as emperor, allowed the publication of some works that still existed but had been barred by Tiberius (what Assmann described as an archive).[44]

Despite attempts at historical revisionism by the early emperors, the last century BC, which encompasses the lives of both Pompeius and his sons, is one of the most well documented as much of the textual record for the period has survived. Written by a wide range of figures, with a greater range of views than some later eras, the memory of the Pompeii are a particularly good example for exploring how collective memories of a non-imperial family on the losing side of civil war evolve over time into cultural memories. The treatment of Pompeius is markedly divergent from that of his sons, which highlights the differences in both forms of memory, the strategies of the different eras, and which groups or individuals had the greatest impact. The death of the three in varying ways against different opponents during the civil wars was to have major consequences, which meant that their memories were subject to the wider battle over the memory of the civil war. However, since all three had been on the losing side, their memories and their place in the cultural memories of Roman history were manipulated by the victors' own needs and the shifting remembrance of events as a whole. This enables a better understanding of the memories that were formed at this time and how external factors influenced them, which in turn allows the evolution of these memories over the course of Roman history to be traced with greater precision.

The study of the memory of the Pompeii will fit into the recent number of investigations that have been undertaken on the topic of historical memory and remembrance in the Roman world, as currently no such examination of this length exists in publication.

[43] Suet. *Claud*. 41.2; Westall 2019: 75.
[44] Sen. *Contr*. 10 *Praef*. 4-8; Suet. *Calig*. 16.1; Barrett 1993: 66-67; Fantham 1999: 127-128. Even though Augustus had heard the offending lines 12 years before with no ill effect; *FRHist* i. 2013: 472; Strunk 2017: 148; Gerhardt 2018: 206.

One of the earliest to compare the memory of Pompeius across different eras was Vivian Holliday's 1969 '*Pompey in Cicero's Correspondence and Lucan's Civil War*', which is a short analysis of a contemporary and later authors' memories of Pompeius and how they contrast or corroborate.[45] Later, Robert Goar focussed on a particularly pertinent example of an *Erinnerungsfigur* and the development of their memory over the centuries that followed in 1987 with '*The Legend of Cato Uticensis from the First Century B.C. to the Fifth Century AD'*, which was a brief study of the memory of Cato in the writings of those centuries. However, none of these went into depth on the subject of memory and its function.

Aside from these studies, Pompeius and his sons have largely been treated in the usual biographic fashion with a series of works starting with the thorough scholarship of Mathias Gelzer in 1949, to the more recent study of Robin Seager in 1979 (reissued in 2002). Both do, however, remark on what they perceive to be the hand of an editor on certain events during Pompeius' life, which provides a starting point to examine some of the attempts by authors to alter memories.

On his sons, Sextus has biographies by Hadas in 1939 and Welch in 2012, with Welch taking a more updated and forensic approach and noting the inconsistences in his memories. In modern scholarship, however, Sextus tends to suffer more from speculative attempts to understand his memory, or even complete disinterest in seeing beyond the memory left to posterity, due to the lack of evidence on certain aspects of his life owing to Octavian's apparently active attempts to forget his rival, the lack of surviving material from the era, and the sometimes poor understanding of his memories by later authors.[46]

Apart from these excursions, only aspects of the lives of the Pompeii have been the subject of studies – commonly wars, leadership, appearances in literature, or in conjunction

[45] Although Bartsch 1997: 87-88 disagrees with the central premise of the work.
[46] As famously in Syme 1939. Welch 2012 is now considered one of the best remedies to the perpetuation of this view in modern scholars. See also Gerrish 2016: 196.

with other famous figures being some of the myriad topics covered. However, the reason why the Pompeii were remembered as they are by contemporaries or later authors is rarely explored. In the study of literature, there is perhaps more of an interest in analysing the characters who are sketched out in the accounts of historians or judgments on their veracity, rather than asking contextual questions as to why they were remembered in this way regardless of the truth of such memories, however, since the 1980s there has been a more scientific approach.[47]

Building on the work of Halbwachs and the Assmanns among others, Flower has published on the various aspects of memory in Roman culture. Starting with a study on ancestor masks and in 2006 examining the concept of *damnatio memoriae* memory sanctions.[48] Karl Galinsky is also a major proponent of the study of Roman memories. Since 2009 his project 'Memoria Romana', based at the University of Texas in Austin, has researched, '…what people, and especially groups of people, remember, how these memories evolve, and how they shape identities.'[49] From this project, Galinsky has edited a trilogy of books and several other scholars involved with the project have also contributed books and articles.[50] Andrew Gallia has been another influential writer with his 2012 book *Remembering the Roman Republic*. His study aims to explore the ways the Principate remembered the 'Republican' period.[51] While in 2015, Ayelet Peers published an updated examination of Caesar's *Bellum Civile* and added a new argument to the scholarship.[52] Recently, Kathryn Tempest has written a book length study on the portrayal of Brutus both by contemporaries and later historians after his death at Philippi.[53] A study of a possible play

[47] Assmann 2008: 60-2; Ginsberg 2017: 12.
[48] Flower 2000, 2006 and 2009.
[49] Galinsky 2014 *Home*. Memoria Romana Project accessed 03/04/18 http://www.laits.utexas.edu/memoria/.
[50] Galinsky 2014; Galinsky and Lapatin 2015; Galinsky 2016; Nelis and Farrell 2013; Seider 2013; Ginsberg 2017; Popkin 2016.
[51] Covering from Nero to Trajan. Gallia 2012: 8.
[52] Titled *Julius Caesar's Bellum Civile and the Composition of a New Reality*.
[53] Titled *Brutus: the noble conspirator*.

of 69 AD the '*Octavia'* by Ginsberg has also made good use of the tools of memory studies and yielded some interesting intertextuality with earlier works going back to the memories of the civil wars of Caesar and Octavian, especially the image of Pompeius versus Caesar in light of the fall of the latter's dynasty.[54] Ginsberg's work made direct use of the theories of Aleida Assmann, particularly the *Erinnerungsfigur*, and her work is a good example of the applications of memory studies in the exploration of the recollection of historical figures and the influence of contemporary needs on that memory.[55]

Although the framework of memory studies has not been welcomed as much as other topics, the work that has been done by numerous scholars over the last few decades have created a comprehensive tool kit to use with the study of the Pompeii. As Alon Confino has stated, 'only when linked to historical questions and problems, via methods and theories, can memory be illuminating.'[56] These techniques can contribute to our knowledge regarding Pompeius and his family as a case study of Roman memories. As stated, historians have tended to see events in isolation or only through the context of the moment and discounted those that seem incompatible with the accepted 'truth'. However, it can be argued in the realm of memory studies that even false or misremembered memories can provide an insight into the factors that shaped them and provide a deeper context to events. This thesis hopes to elucidate the evolution of the memories of the Pompeii, how their preservation in history could become a way of maintaining the views of certain parties during different periods in ways that were to their benefit, and to explain the reasons and contexts that brought this about.

This can be seen in a brief view of the evolution of the memories of the Pompeii. In Pompeius' case this began early, his memory had already been subject to similar influences

[54] Titled *Staging Memory, Staging Strife: Empire and Civil War in the Octavia.*
[55] Ginsberg 2017: 11-12.
[56] Confino 1997: 1388.

when he was young and was merely seen by his contemporaries as a lesser player in the events of the day. His memory at that point was tied to the memories of his father, who was a controversial figure during the Cinnan civil war, while later it was affected by Pompeius' role in the Sullan civil war and its aftermath with the proscriptions. These memories would continue to influence the image of Pompeius for the rest of his life, as different groups wrote their accounts of the events and looked back to explain the Pompeius of their own times. Pompeius and his circle seem to have tried to retroactively edit these memories at a later date to counteract the collective memory of his political opponents. Even after his death, his memory continued to be shaped by his family, friends, enemies, and, importantly, by the changing directions of society.

One group of these successors to the memory of Pompeius were his sons, who made use of aspects of that memory to construct an image for their own political and military ambitions. They emphasised the memory of Pompeius as a great Roman general and advertised their own descent from him on their coinage, which was the one form of media that could be disseminated quickly, in much the same way the *tresviri montales* had for centuries to boost they own prospects for office.[57] Due to the death of their father, they also advertised their war as a pious act of revenge for a father, countryman and, eventually, a divinity.[58]

On the other side, Octavian began to treat the dead Caesar in much the same way. He also turned his various wars against his fellow Romans into a crusade to avenge Caesar's assassination. Perhaps realising that he was opposing someone who had just as good a claim to similar memories, Octavian set about diminishing Sextus to make him unworthy to be the avenger. Part of the process of creating this image of Sextus led to a re-evaluation of the

[57] Alföldi 1956: 66; Hamilton 1969: 192-194; Flower 1996: 79-90; Pobjoy 2010: 72; Woytek 2012: 327; Győri 2015: 231-2; Woytek 2018: 362-5.
[58] See pp. 207-10.

memory of Pompeius in the light of current events. Despite Pompeius' prominent role in the fight against Caesar, his heir Octavian sought in part to restore the positive memories of Pompeius as a general, empire builder and protector of Rome, whose extraordinary commands paved the way for his own.[59] Octavian's motive was also to diminish Sextus' image and later memory as one who instead attacked Rome, broke up its empire and relied on freedmen to win his battles in opposition to the memory of his father's deeds. What differed with Sextus was his standing in the collective memory of society – he was only remembered for his role in the civil war – which meant that there were very few memories to counter those created by Octavian and his circle. This led to his memory becoming almost formulaic and in line with what Octavian had created in the cultural memory of Rome by the time of the Second century AD, if not earlier.

[59] Seager 2002: 172; van der Blom 2016: 141; Morrell 2019: 20.

Chapter 2: 'The living memory of Pompeius'

The memory of Pompeius was heavily influenced by war. He first appeared in the social war, made his name in the civil war of Sulla and died in the midst of another civil war. Civil wars in particular have a particularly strong and lasting memory because of the national trauma they inflict; this is not some distant foreign war but one that has both occurred and left its mark at home.[60] Added to these events, was the development of written history at Rome. This was a relatively new venture among the Romans, although there had been some written accounts before this with figures such as Polybius and Cato the Elder, most of the writing of this period had looked to the last recent major event of collective memory – the Punic wars.[61] The civil war between the supporters of Marius and Sulla changed this focus, and a range of writings on this dramatic event appeared. Although many accounts have not survived to the current time, they provided much information to Pompeius' contemporaries and later authors.[62]

As Carsten Lange and Frederik Vervaet have noted, in a statement as true under Sulla as Caesar: 'the Roman elite's strong sense of legality and legitimacy meant that fighting a civil war invariably necessitated developing numerous levels and strategies of justification, including the topical branding of the opposing side as responsible for the collapse of order and outbreak of hostilities, and representing the victory of one's own faction as socio-political salvation. Unsurprisingly in a society dominated by a highly cultured and historically conscious aristocracy, one key level of justification was writing. Sulla decided on autobiography (*De Rebus Suis Gestis*), […] this genre became inevitably concerned with civil strife and civil war, defining features of the late republican period.'[63]

[60] Walde 2011: 284; Rosenblitt 2019: 4.
[61] For Cato's *Origines,* see *FRHist* i. 2013: 201.
[62] van der Blom 2019: 117 notes the long negative memories that many contemporaries of the Sullan period had.
[63] Lange and Vervaet 2019: 17.

As the dictatorship of Sulla was so unusual and shocking, it is unsurprising that there were many accounts written on this era.[64] Many of the accounts were written by active participants in the conflict as a means to control their memories and justify themselves. Beginning with an account, arguably, of utmost importance, that of Sulla's memoir, which was published posthumously after his death in 78 BC by his freedman.[65] It was unfinished and had probably only reached 81 BC before his passing.[66] Despite this, the autobiography was 22 books in length, charting the history of Sulla's family and his own career up to his final victory in the civil war of the 80s. The impetus for Sulla to write a memoir of his life was likely because of his awareness that his life would be remembered less favourably in light of his recent actions by some quarters and thus, as Lange and Vervaet argue, an attempt to justify his actions and control his memory with a definitive account. From the fragments of his autobiography, as well as its incomplete nature, some have argued that Sulla did not cover the later years of his life, although uncertainty exists over whether this was by fate or design.[67] As the autobiography covers events up to at least his seizure of Rome on his return from the East in the 80s, it is reasonable to assume that Pompeius' early career in his service may have been included.

Sulla's friend Lucullus also seems to have written on the Social war but nothing that may have included Strabo or Pompeius' has survived.[68] Instead the main impact on the memory of Pompeius were the comments and reports that he left from the campaign in the

[64] Eckert 2016: 5-8.
[65] Suet. *Gramm*. 12; *FRHist* i. 2013: 284.
[66] Plut. *Sull.* 37.1 Sulla only reached 22 books before he stopped writing. Tatum 2011: 168 argues this was probably a shallow narration of these years due to the difficult nature of some of Sulla's decisions, e.g. the proscriptions.
[67] *FRHist* i. 2013 : 284.
[68] *FRHist* i. 2013: 287.

East, which were used by later authors to illustrate the enmity that developed between the two and the temperament of Pompeius.[69]

Outside of the main military leadership of the time were other authors of varying political views, but whose work has not survived in enough detail to allow much to be inferred. One of these was Sisenna, who wrote a history of the social wars, with a terminus ante quem of 67 BC when he died during the campaign against the pirates while Pompeius' legate for the Greek coast.[70] The most that is known of its contents comes from the later author Sallust, who wrote his own account as a continuation, accusing Sisenna for not being sufficiently critical of Sulla in his work.[71]

A few other authors wrote a history of the times that inevitably covered the period of Pompeius' early career. These included Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, whose work was very fragmentary, although it is known that it narrated events down until at least the civil war between Sulla and Marius.[72] Another contemporary was Valerius Antias, but little is known on his views on Pompeius.[73] Lastly there was L. Lucceius, a friend of Pompeius in 59 BC and one of his advisors during the civil war.[74] His history went from the Social war down to at least the 70s.[75] Although most of these authors were known to later historians, they were mainly used as sources for earlier Roman history.[76]

All of these early contemporary authors writing about their memories of this time were ignorant of the future of Pompeius and, therefore, these accounts only tangentially

[69] Hillman 1991: 315-318. The poet Archias also wrote an epic account of the campaign for Lucullus, who was his patron (Cic. *Arch*. 21), which probably help to transmit the memory of Lucullus' exploits.
[70] Dio 36. 18.1-19.1; App. *Mith*. 95.435; Rawson 1979: 330; *FRHist* i. 2013 306. On his output see Rawson 1979: 327; *FRHist* i. 2013: 315.
[71] Rawson 1979: 308.
[72] *FRHist* i. 2013: 291. On the possibility that his account was favourable to Sulla and his forces see von Albrecht 1997: 385.
[73] Rich 2005: 145.
[74] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.1 and 11; Gold 1987: 317.
[75] On the length see Cic. *Ad Fam*. 5.12; *FRHist* i. 2013 336. On possible discussion of Pompeius, see Gold: 1987 317. *FRHist* i. 2013: 335.
[76] *FRHist* i. 2013: 291; *FRHist* iii. 2013: 299- 304.

remember the young peripheral figure if at all. When Pompeius does appear, his memory is heavily shaped by these authors' views on his prominent father Strabo, Sulla, and the wider civil war. It would not be until later when Pompeius had become a major figure in Roman society that authors reached back for earlier memories and, as Halbwachs and Young have noted, gave greater prominence to those that suited their current world-view.

The memories of these years, however vague and limited, were to have a long-lasting impact on Pompeius for the rest of his life, with friends and enemies both utilising them to support the version of Pompeius they needed for political reasons. These partisan uses of the memories of Pompeius coupled with his own achievements and self-promotion meant that certain events and actions were remembered as the key aspects of his life and character. After his death, these memories of Pompeius' early life and career were retrospectively interpreted by authors with knowledge of his full life and evolved again due to their perceived importance to suit the views or needs of the time.[77] This altered or further reinforced certain memories of Pompeius until key aspects became, by gradual reduction, far more concrete.[78] For this reason this first chapter will breakdown the main thematic elements of Pompeius' memory and examine the parts that were most utilised by the writers in their memories of this time.

[77] Westall 2019: 57 has argued, '…historiography was lost largely because it was too detailed. Not deemed worth the investment of resources needed for copying, this historical literature disappeared because of the fact that the quality that appealed to contemporaries (viz. details given at length) was not as highly prized by later generations.' See also Westall 2019: 67-69 for more examples.

[78] Westall 2019: 70-71 has warned 'not all witnesses are equally worthy of attention and trust, but virtually all authors dealing with the period and protagonists of the civil wars will have offered accounts that included descriptions of military operations. It only remains to observe that – as a general rule – the amount of detail furnished will have been greater the closer in time that the author and original readership were to the events being related.

The architect of Pompeius' memory: The Bellum Civile

Caesar's account is one of the main narratives of Pompeius' memories and his portrayal set the framework within which the post-war opponents of Pompeius would form their memories. Since this work is a pivotal part of the memory of Pompeius and draws together many of the earlier strands of Pompeius memory into a comprehensive attack, it is worth digressing to briefly discuss the scholarly debate that has swirled around the complicated evolution of the *Bellum Civile*, its composition and publication.[79]

The recollections contained within Caesar's work were not wholly new; the first book in particular makes use of the negative memories that were already in existence, what differed with Caesar's memories were his ability to attack the last bastion of Pompeius' self-created image as a great general. Although senators had criticised Pompeius' abilities throughout his life, they had never been able to demonstrate that their view was correct. By defeating Pompeius, Caesar could claim the veracity of his viewpoint. Although the books were not published within Caesar's lifetime, like those of Sulla, they likely preserve the contemporary opinion of Caesar and the propaganda that was emanating from his side of the war.

Modern scholarship that follows the argument that the book was unpublished in Caesar's lifetime is divided on the reason behind Caesar's decision not to complete his account of the war. Most hypotheses on this question posit that Caesar ceased writing due to the changing nature of his power and that current events had invalidated his previously stated objectives.[80] However, the event that is commonly proposed as the cause of this, the battle of Thapsus, occurred many months after Caesar stopped writing.[81] The third book of the *Bellum Civile,* as we have received it, ends abruptly with Caesar besieged in Alexandria by the forces

[79] See Ginsberg 2017: 12 on the notion that some works become 'programmatic to remembrance.'
[80] Collins 1959: 117; Carter 1991: 21.
[81] Collins 1959: 117-8; Billows 2009: 198.

of the teenage Ptolemy XIII. Thus, it would seem probable that Caesar had another reason to put aside his *Bellum Civile*. Perhaps it was because Caesar viewed his involvement in the dynastic conflict in Egypt as beyond the original intentions he envisaged for the *Bellum Civile* (which would appear to be to defend his actions against fellow Romans).[82] Another possibility was that when the death of Pompeius in Egypt in 48 BC failed to bring an end to the war any closer, Caesar's *Bellum Civile* lost some of its purpose and a great deal of its logic now that the main antagonist was dead.[83] Instead Caesar's opponents elected other commanders, including Cato, Scipio, Labienus and Gnaeus Pompeius, to continue the war. They became the new figureheads and showed that the opposition ran deeper than a faction arranged around Pompeius alone. Caesar would also have been aware of the popularity of Pompeius with the plebs and might have decided to tone down his attacks on the memory of Pompeius now that he had died at the hands of a foreign king – allowing Caesar a modicum of absolution – to focus instead on Cato who was probably less widely popular with the lower orders. The shift of the elite to the memory of Cato in the aftermath of Thapsus seems to have distracted Caesar and caused him to refocus his literary efforts on combatting this rash of criticism, perhaps dropping the *Bellum Civile* indefinitely.[84]

The problems faced by a study of the *Bellum Civile* are of course the twin issues of the nature and date of composition. The significance of the date of the creation of the *Bellum Civile* lies in the need to determine when Caesar's version of Pompeius was in the public sphere, and when it would, therefore, influence the posthumous reputation of Pompeius. It also goes some

[82] Henderson 1998: 53. Much as Sulla likely had undertaken his own work for a similar purpose, see above p. 22.
[83] Cluett 2009: 199, notes that the resistance to Caesar even after the death of Pompeius was 'substantial and well organised'. Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 18 notes that a publication after Thapsus would have conflicted with the current nature of Caesar's position. In agreement with Cluett 2009: 32, Marin 2009: 159 argues that Pharsalus was meant to be the ultimate battle. Cluett 2009: 115 agrees.
[84] Cluett 2009: 170-71. Especially after what may have seemed like the last major conflict in the civil war, the campaign in Hispania that culminated with the battle of Munda in 45 B.C. in the aftermath of which Caesar is supposed to have written his reply to the Cato of Cicero. See Abel: 1961 230; Jones 1970: 189; Kierdorf 1978: 169-170.

way to answering the question of when Caesar stopped and if he ever published what was written or kept it back because the circumstances had changed too dramatically. The *Bellum Civile* itself gives no clear time frame for its composition or when it was published. Two pieces of evidence are available: that of Caesar's contemporary, Hirtius, and the latter's preface to book VIII of the *Bello Gallico*, and the second is a short passage in Suetonius' *Divus Julius* regarding comments made by Asinius Pollio, an associate of Caesar and member of his staff, on Caesar's writings.[85] In the first passage of book VIII, Hirtius addressed another trusted lieutenant of Caesar, Balbus, declaring that he (Hirtius) had worked on Caesar's writings, which were left 'unfinished from events carried out in Alexandria.' (*Imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae*.)[86] Meanwhile Asinius thought Caesar had intended to rewrite and correct his writings. This passage, while far from definitive on the *Bellum Civile* itself, does seem to suggest the possibility that Caesar had not intended to publish his commentaries at that point and he had ceased working on them.

According to Suetonius, Pollio had also criticised the *Bellum Civile* saying that he 'thought they were composed with insufficient diligence and from insufficient integrity to the truth, because Caesar frequently trusted random accounts that were others', and his own, which, either by choice or lapses in memory, he recorded incorrectly. [Pollio] thought [Caesar] would have rewritten and corrected them.' (*Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse*.)[87]

Luca Grillo has cautioned about Pollio's own honesty on this matter though, noting that Pollio likely had an ulterior motive in his comments on Caesar's work, as Pollio had himself

[85] Caes. *BG*. 8.2; Suet. *DJ*. 56.4.
[86]Caes. *BG*.8.2.
[87] Suet. *DJ*. 56.4; Grillo 2012: 4-5 with note 12.

written an account of the war and 'writers of historiography typically critiqued their predecessors as a means of constructing their own authority.' [88] If this was the case, then Pollio's self-professed desire for accuracy largely seems to have worked on some modern scholars who are convinced that his *Histories*, had they survived, would have been a much more objective account of the war.[89] Pollio did indeed like to engage in critiquing others with Livy and Sallust both receiving Pollio's judgement; however, in Caesar's case it was probably a fair criticism for Pollio to make.[90] For example, the opening lines of the *Bellum Civile* distort the chronology of the opening weeks of the war making Caesar appear, where possible, to be more - and his opponents less – reasonable.[91] The casualties at Pharsalus was another area that Caesar was deemed to write inflated figures of his dead opponents.[92] Pollio does not however, accuse Caesar of being deliberately dishonest only that he was forgetful and had meant to rewrite the problematic parts, thereby preserving his friend's honour from accusations of out-right manipulation.

Grillo has recently stated that the general consensus among scholars is that there is a gap between the composition and the publication.[93] Grillo, therefore, adds his voice to the growing camp that was begun by Alfred Klotz and now includes John Collins, Kurt Raaflaub, Mary Boatwright, Jerzy Linderski, Jan Gaertner and Bianca Hausberg. [94] These scholars propound the argument that the *Bellum Civile* was composed during the conflict itself but left unfinished at Caesar's death and was later likely edited and published posthumously by an unspecified figure or figures - possibly Hirtius.[95] The evidence for this view is compelling

[88] Grillo 2012: 4.
[89] Bosworth 1972: 441.
[90] Suet. *Gramm*. 10; Quint. *Inst*. 1.5.56, 8.1.3.
[91] Carter 1991: 163.
[92] Plut. *Pomp*. 72.3, *Caes*. 46.2-3; Stevenson 2015b: 270.
[93] Grillo 2012: 178.
[94] Klotz 1950: ix-xiv; Collins 1959; Boatwright 1988: 36-7; Linderski 1996: 167; Raaflaub 2009: 180-182; Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 17-21.
[95] Collins 1959: 113; Batstone and Damon 2006: 3; Raaflaub 2009: 180; contra Cluett 2009: 194. Suetonius *DJ*. 56 also suggests Oppius in his comments on the authorship of the books on the Alexandrian, African, and

when compared with the assumption that it was published during the war. Klotz noted, in the preface to his editions of the *Bellum Civile*, several incomplete passages and the awkward placement of the events at Massilia in chapters 56-59 of the first book. These would, presumably, indicate that Caesar had not finished the work.[96] It should be noted that Klotz's primary purpose was to argue against the theories of Barwick, who posited that the mistakes in the *Bellum Civile* were the result of losses and the errors of copyists.[97] The most plausible evidence for this is the ending to Book 3 of the *Bellum Civile*. The last chapter informs us that Caesar was in the midst of the battle for Alexandria, when suddenly the lines '*Haec initia belli Alexandrini fuerunt*' (this was the start of the Alexandrian war) appear.[98] Grillo notes that there have been arguments for the end of Book 3 being lost, rather than unfinished. However, he goes on to argue that both the third book of the *Bellum Civile* and fifth book of the *Bellum Gallicum* end in a similar manner, and that, therefore, the ending of the third book was deliberate.[99] This argument has been criticised by Gaertner and Hausberg, who note that Caesar's soldiers are in a better position at the end of book five, whereas Caesar in Alexandria is still at a disadvantage.[100] Their implication is that Caesar preferred to end his accounts on a high note and that this is lacking in the case of the third book. Furthermore, the words seem like a sentence to dovetail the following accounts of the civil war, which are almost certainly not written by Caesar – much as Hirtius added Book VIII to the *Bellum Gallicum* to connect the narrative to the *Bellum Civile*. In view of the evidence, it would seem more probable that Caesar abandoned his work and did not intend it to end where it currently does.[101]

Spanish wars. It seems unlikely, therefore, that modern scholarship would be able to solve a problem that even the ancients could not resolve.

[96] Klotz 1950: ix-xiv. Also note the surrender of Antonius at Curicta at *BC*.3.10, which was never explained.

[97] Barwick 1938: 133-5.

[98] Caes. *BC*. 3.112.

[99] Grillo 2012: 167-174 others who agree that the ending as we have it was unintended include Batstone and Damon 2006: 29-32, and Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 20.

[100] Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 201 with note 61.

[101] Grillo 2012: 174 suggests plausibly that the last line is a later addition by another hand.

In a similar vein, Gaertner and Hausberg, in a recent analysis of the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, have added to the debate with a set of logical arguments against several advocates for the *Bellum Civile* being published during Caesar's lifetime. To begin with, Kalinka proposes that the work had been published without Caesar's consent and MacFarlane supports Kalinka with the argument that Caesar could have sent the drafts to friends for their opinion and that from there the *Bellum Civile* entered the public domain.[102] Gaertner and Hausberg counter that it was highly unlikely that someone would publish the rough drafts given the doubtful desire to run afoul of someone of Caesar's position and capabilities; they also note that Caesar, most likely, would have been careful with the drafts just in case.[103] Jehne's case for the *Bellum Civile* being a series of hastily-written pamphlets is refuted on the basis that the *Bellum Civile* was influenced by Greek historiography.[104] Barwick's counter-argument to Klotz's initial criticisms was that Caesar's campaigning in Alexandria was to avenge Pompeius and that he wrote Book 3 to explain his long absence.[105] Gaertner and Hausberg rightly note the complete lack of connection between the last act of Book 3 (the execution of Pothinus) and the death of Pompeius (although Pothinus made the decision personally if Plutarch is to be believed).[106] In fact Caesar makes no mention of Pothinus in regards to the death of Pompeius, only later claiming that Pothinus rules on behalf of Ptolemy XIII.[107] The exact years of composition, whether annual or composed in a single moment is a question that will, as noted by Grillo, probably never be conclusively proven.[108] Recently, Ayelet Peer has tried to return to the argument for the *Bellum Civile's* publication in stages as the war progressed with the first book written to persuade the citizenry of Caesar's claims

[102] MacFarlane 1996: 109.
[103] Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 19.
[104] Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 20.
[105] Barwick 1951: 86-93.
[106] Gaertner and Hausberg 2013: 20.
[107] Caes. *BC*. 3.108.
[108] Grillo 2012: 178.

after he had occupied Italia and forced Pompeius and the other senators to retreat to Greece.[109] This argument has been plausibly refuted by Damon, who points to a lack of evidence to reinforce Peer's conclusions.[110]

The Memory of Strabo and Sulla

Much as Caesar's *Bellum Civile* would help to set the tone for Pompeius' memories in the civil war and the years proceeding it, the early memory of Strabo would form the foundation of Pompeius' early memories and partly influence their direction. As Robin Seager noted, we know little of Pompeius' early years.[111] Pompeius was born in 106 BC in Picenum, where his family had estates and strong links with the community.[112] Although a possible remote relative Q. Pompeius served in Hispania Citerior and was later made consul in 141 BC, the relationship to Pompeius' own branch is unclear.[113] Strabo was therefore, the first direct relation to be raised to the office of consul during the Social War in 89 BC. He was also the first to hold a triumph for his victory over the capture of the city of Asculum, itself in Picenum, during that war.[114] It was in those turbulent years that the teenage Pompeius entered the historical record, appearing as a member of his father's *consilium* during the granting of citizenship to a troop of Iberian cavalry.[115]

Strabo was a controversial figure during the troubled years of the 80s, where he gained a reputation for greed and corruption starting with accusations that he kept the

[109] Peer 2015: 5.
[110] Damon 2017: 362.
[111] This was a common phenomenon in the Roman world where interest in public figures typically began when they had reached adulthood.
[112] Cic. *Q. Fr*. 2.3.4; Plut. *Pomp*. 6.1; van Ooteghem 1953: 41; Leach 1979: 14; Seager 2002: 21, 23, 26; Gelzer 2005: 34.
[113] Vell. Pat. 2.25.5; van Ooteghem 1953: 31; Leach 1979: 14; Seager 2002: 20; Gelzer 2005: 34.
[114] Vell. Pat. 2.65.3; Val. Max. 6.9.9; Ascon. 14.b; Plin. *NH*. 7.135; Gell 15.4.3; Dio 43.51.4-5, 49.21.3; Seager 2002: 21; Gelzer 2005: 36.
[115] *ILLRP* 515; van Ooteghem 1953: 39; Leach 1978: 13; Keaveney 1982: 111; Seager 2002: 21, 23; Gelzer 2005: 36. The beginning of an important relationship with the peninsula as per Nicols 2014: 41; contra Pina Polo 2008: 40, 47.

proceeds of the siege of Asculum.[116] After the death of his father, he was prosecuted for the retention of some of the looted goods, which had ended up in his possession.[117] There seems to have been little interest in seeing Pompeius convicted in the circles of the new regime and he was able to escape the charges through the intercession of some prominent allies of Cinna – including the three-times consul Gnaeus Papirius Carbo.[118] The theft from Asculum was not the only issue that was left to him by his father; Strabo's poor reputation was further strengthened when he sat on the side-lines during the siege of Rome by Cinna in an apparent attempt to try to extort a second consulship for his aid, with rumours that he was negotiating with Cinna and Carbo despite being allied to the consul Octavius.[119] The evidence for this seems even stronger when Pompeius later appeared in the enemy camp and was supported by Carbo at his trial over the loot from Asculum.[120] Strabo's vacillation only served to enhance the hatred felt toward him and helped to cement his negative memory, as can be seen in the accounts of his death.

According to the later historians Plutarch, Appian, and Orosius, Strabo was killed by a lightning strike, while Velleius suggests that it was a plague in Strabo's camp, and Granius opts to use both stories – that Strabo was dying with the plague and struck by lightning.[121] Which is the correct version of events has been the subject of much debate amongst scholars for years.[122] However, what is important here is the reason for these two versions of Strabo's death. A particularly virulent plague broke out in Strabo's camp during the siege of the city,

[116] Katz 1976: 333 notes that Strabo was probably not helped by the *invidia* caused by his non-*nobiles* status.
[117] Seager 2002: 25.
[118] Cic. *Brut*. 230; Val. Max. 5.3.5, 6.2.8. Antistius was also a Cinnan ally, see Hillman 1998: 176. Seager 2002: 23 has stated that Pompeius was left with no supporters in the senate after his father's death, but the support of several prominent figures seems to suggest otherwise.
[119] Seager 2002: 23.
[120] Seager 2002: 25.
[121] Plut. *Pomp*. 1.2; App. *B.C.* 1.68, Vell. Pat. 2.21.4; Gran. Lic. 21-23; Obseq. 56a; Oros. 5.19.18; Seger 2002: 23.
[122] Katz 1976: 333 does not even include the event in his account and justifies his reasoning in note 20 with regard to the scholarship. Contra Watkins 1988: 143-50. Also see Hillman 1996: 81 note 3 for another summary of the positions taken by scholars.

this much seems true, and that this may have been the cause of his death seems to be a reasonable assumption. But, as an unpopular figure, the death by lightning would be the more fitting, showing the disfavour of the gods.[123] The memory of Strabo being killed by lightning may have come about at the time of his death as a rumour in the city against an unpopular figure – at his funeral procession his body was dragged from the bier by the crowd and abused – and since it occurred during a tumultuous period, was colourful, and was attached to the memory of his famous son, it was subsequently remembered by many contemporary historians, eventually becoming a lasting memory of his demise.[124]

Pompeius moves out of his father's shadow

As Pompeius became famous in his own right through his military achievements, he began to break away from the memories of his father. His political enemies, who maintained a working negative memory of Strabo moved onto the memories of Pompeius' own actions, which proved bountiful enough. Despite this, Strabo was an inauspicious start for the young Pompeius and it appears that he later tried to influence these memories. It is likely, since almost all that has survived of Strabo's memory relates to the negative memories of Pompeius, that the catalyst for this re-evaluation was Pompeius' own desire to combat his enemies' narrative that he was the scion of a controversial father.

Although any attempts to improve the memory of Strabo himself seems to have been near impossible, Pompeius appears to have partly succeeded in improving his own memory by separation. Plutarch, in his biography of Pompeius, seems to preserve the attempts to alter

[123] Sen. *Clem.* 1.7.2. No doubt to emphasize his negative legacy, as Gelzer 1964: 2125 argues when he says it would be Mars' 'divine judgement for his sneaky (hinterhältiges) and greedy (habgieriges) behaviour.' The hostile source may be Rutilius in his history as recounted by Plutarch in *Pomp*. 37.4, although Hillard 1996: 135-6, has noted that both Orosius and Granius are assumed to have drawn their accounts from the Livian tradition.

[124] Plut. *Pomp*. 1.2; Plut. *Mor*. 553; Val. Max. 9.14.2; Plin. *NH.* 7.54; Gran. Lic. 23-24; Obseq. 56a; Seager 2002: 23. Katz 1976: 334 argues that the story is plausible and that the plebs urbana were probably looking to vent their anger after the devastating siege on a divisive figure such as Strabo.

the memory of his early life – likely by using a source written from the Pompeian perspective.[125] In his version of this period, Strabo is still remembered as deeply unpopular, but Plutarch goes to great lengths to show that Pompeius is not like his father at all. Instead Pompeius is beloved and, when Cinna – now portrayed as a staunch enemy – sends assassins to kill both Pompeii, like a pious son he rescues his father and stops a mutiny in the camp.[126]

Gelzer has argued that Plutarch's account is eulogistic and Hillman agrees, stating that the aim of the early chapter on Pompeius may be to 'contrast Pompeius with his wicked father Strabo […] Plutarch does not even mention Strabo by name, but refers to him only as 'the general', which further disassociates Pompeius from him and emphasizes the centrality of Pompeius to the narrative'.[127] Other authors, Hillman also notes, do not seem to preserve the assassination story in their accounts, which he explains as the result of Pompeius and his supporters 'since rehabilitating Strabo's memory would have proved difficult, and the truth about Strabo would have been an uncomfortable reminder of Pompeius' origins, Pompeius and his early biographers might have shunned him, just as Caesar's heir shunned the memory of Caesar the dictator.'[128]

A few authors have been put forward as the sources of these pro-Pompeian works. Chief among these is Theophanes of Mytilene, arguably most famous as Pompeius' own historian, who kept writing about his friend and patron even after his untimely death in Egypt.[129] As has been shown, Theophanes seems to have taken an interest in the early life of Pompeius and even the memory of Strabo, possibly at the behest of Pompeius. Alternatively, M. Otacilius Pitholaus, a freedman of Pompeius who was known for his literary attacks on Caesar, was supposed to have written a history, which included accounts of the achievements

[125] Katz 1976: 332.
[126] Plut. *Pomp*. 3.3.
[127] Hillman 1996: 82.
[128] Hillman 1996: 83 note 9; contra Katz 1976: 332 note 19. See also Ramage 1985: 223-4.
[129] Gold 1985: 323.

of the Pompeii. [130] Hillman suggests that other likely candidates could have been Varro or L. Voltacilius Plotus, while Barry Katz follows the suggestion of Gelzer who also postulates that the positive memory of Pompeius may come from Voltacilius, and that Plutarch may have combined the accounts with Rutilius' version to form the hybrid.[131] As part of the transformation of Pompeius into a loyal Sullan, he supposedly expelled Cinna's recruiters from Picenum so that he could gather an army for Sulla, although this too has been argued by Hillman to be an alteration of the facts.[132] This new attempt to alter the memory of Pompeius' youth may have been prompted by a need to create a memory of loyalty rather than one of an opportunist – a label that was attached to Pompeius early on via memories of his father and his own decision to drop his support for Cinna and sided with Sulla instead.[133]

Although the accounts of Pompeius and members of his circle only exist in fragments preserved by other authors, it seems probable that there was a biographical account of Pompeius' life that included such a positive memory of his youth, much as other ancient figures improved their early lives – as in the above example of Hillman.[134] One of the accounts that are known to have been an early source of Strabo's hostile memory came from Publius Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 BC. As a contemporary, he wrote on the broader history of the events covering at least the 80s.[135] Rutilius, it should also be remembered, was absent from Rome when he wrote his accounts, having gone into exile in 92 to escape prosecution by Marius.[136] He never returned, having also rejected an offer to do so from Sulla.[137] The reason for Rutilius' hostility to Strabo is not known but it might have stemmed

[130] Suet. Jul. 75.5; *FRHist* i. 2013: 333.
[131] Hillman 1998: 192. Katz 1976: 332 note 19 includes an exhaustive review of the scholarly discussion.
[132] Hillman 1996: 85 note 20.
[133] Hillman 1998: 190-2 argues that the focus on the trouble Cinna caused for Pompeius, such as the looting of his house, and little detail of the Cinnan allies in court was part of a campaign to detract from Pompeius' support for the regime.
[134] See also the discussion above p. 22 on the desire to leave a positive account.
[135] Rutilius was still alive to be visited by Cicero in 78 B.C. Cic. *De Rep*. 1.13, *Brut*. 85.
[136] Cic. *Font*. 38; *Pis*. 95; Liv. *Per*. 70; Vell. Pat. 2.13; Val. Max. 2.10.5; 6.4.4. Cic. *Brut*. 85. On Rutilius' hostility see Plut. *Mar*. 28.8; Sanford 1950: 33.
[137] Sen. *Dial*. 1.3.7; *Ep*. 24.2; Quint. 11.1.13.

from his rumoured support of Cinna.[138] Despite not being an eyewitness to events, the news must have reached him, as Plutarch records Theophanes posthumously slandering Rutilius as having been a part of the massacre of Romans under Mithridates.[139] The reason for Theophanes' enmity toward Rutilius stems, according to Plutarch, from his hostility towards Strabo in his *Historiae* – a history of his times written in Greek.[140] Jeffrey Tatum has questioned how widely these accounts were read, and while they may not have been widely read they must have been known enough for Theophanes to have tried to discredit their author.[141] Despite this, Rutilius' account may still have become the main vector of the collective memory of Strabo's enemies and was transmitted via later authors until it effectively became a cultural memory of Strabo.[142]

As these earlier memories demonstrate, whenever Pompeius tried to distance himself from the memory of his father, he was never able to get completely free, especially when his own behaviour seemed to confirm the worst to his own enemies, who probably maintained these selective working memories as a means of tarnishing Pompeius when he became more politically active. Katz has argued, however, that Pompeius' difficulties with the other members of the aristocracy and senate were likely not just due to his past with Sulla alone, but due to his father and his own social position noting that 'Strabo, outside the inner circle of the oligarchy and, though desirous of admission, was, again like his son, a victim of its *invidia*.'[143]

[138] See Katz 1976: 332 note 19 for the discussion of this.
[139] Plut. *Pomp*. 37.2-3.
[140] Plut. *Pomp*. 37.3; Athen. 168D, 274C.
[141] Tatum 2011: 163 quoting Cicero's remarks that most of these earlier historians were not read in his own day, except by scholars. He does not even include Rutilius, which Tatum sees as indicative of his low readership numbers (i.e. he is forgettable). However, Rich has suggested that Cicero might have been omitting those authors who did not add to his argument. see *FRHist* i. 2013: 295.
[142] Sallust may also have helped to maintain the negative memory of Strabo as a means to attack Pompeius, see Katz 1976: 332 note 19.
[143] Katz 1976: 333.

These negative memories of Strabo were to have a profound effect on the early life of Pompeius, as frequently the personality of one's ancestors was used as though it were a hereditary condition to explain the attitude of descendants.[144] This was given some veracity by the means that Pompeius used or felt forced to use to gain the recognition he thought he deserved from a reluctant senate. For instance, in the years after the demise of his father, Pompeius' use of his armies, like his father had, to try and strong-arm the senate into granting him further commands, triumphs and other honours brought comparison to the memories of Strabo.[145]

After the capture of Rome by Sulla and the flight of the opposition in 82 BC, Pompeius and his army continued to campaign in Italia against the remaining forces opposed to Sulla. However, Pompeius soon began to use his army as a political tool. His first move came when he refused to disband after his successful campaign in Africa on behalf of Sulla. He claimed that his soldiers were in revolt at the suggestion that he was to relinquish command to a new general and return to Italia.[146] This immediately resembles the similar incident with his father's army when another distant relative Q. Pompeius, Strabo's replacement, had been ostensibly murdered by mutinous troops and, although Pompeius did not go this far, the similarity was clear.[147]

Soon after this incident, Pompeius again refused to disband his army after putting down the revolt of Lepidus to add weight to his demand for a new command in Hispania

[144] Although Plutarch's life starts by noting how different the father and the son were, as would be the case with Sextus. On the ancient view of personality see the discussion of Gill 1983: 469-87.
[145] Sherwin-White 1956: 8-9; Seager 1969: 158-9 and Gruen 1969: 72, 100 and 108.
[146] Leach 1979: 31 agreed to this view; Seager 2002: 28 suggests that although Sulla could have defeated a rebellion, he chose to acquiesce to maintain the peace that he had built. Contra Hillman 1997: 99-106 who questions this view also noting that Sulla could have crushed Pompeius and that Pompeius' army had a been hard to control both before and after this event. However, if Sulla believed him to be at risk of rebelling, why would he have praised Pompeius by naming him Magnus, and granted both a triumph and marriage connection?
[147] Liv. *Per*. 77; Vell. Pat. 2.20; Val. Max. 9.7m. 2; App. *B.C.* 1.63.

against the forces of Sertorius. [148] This resembled the leverage that his father had used to gain his consulship from Octavius during the siege of Rome. However, the fear of a renegade army more loyal to their general than the *res publica* had become heightened by the civil war, and Pompeius' use of his army as a tool of political persuasion like his father, combined with his adherence to Sulla was to prove fateful. His use of force to achieve his aims so soon after the civil war left an indelible negative memory of Pompeius in the collective memory of his political opponents.

The campaign against Sertorius also provided the next occasion for Pompeius to be painted as a threat to the safety of the *res publica*. During the campaign, in response to the lack of provisions and funding being supplied to Pompeius' forces, which he assumed was the work of his political rivals in Rome, he supposedly wrote a letter – apparently preserved in an archive – that threatened to return to Italia with his army and without defeating Sertorius, regardless of the consequences. [149] It should be noted, however, that the only source of the wording to survive for this event was written many decades later by Sallust, an opponent of Pompeius in the civil war, although he claimed to have seen the letter that Pompeius had sent to the senate.[150]

Sallust's later account was not the only one to deal with the campaign in Hispania though, there were other, contemporary authors at work too. It is likely that Metellus, the other government commander who was already in Hispania as a general, would have reported his actions in the war and would have probably wrote or had written an account that was more favourable to himself. His reports might be the source for the accounts of the war that

[148] Cic. *Leg. Man*. 62; Cic. *Phil*. 11.18; Liv. *Per*. 91; Val. Max. 8.15.8; Plut. *Pomp*. 13.9, 17.1.4; App. *B.C.* 1.80; Dio 36.25.3, 36.27.4; Leach 1978: 44; Seager 2002: 32; Gelzer 2005: 51.
[149] Plut. *Pomp*. 17.2, 19.4, 20.4; Leach 1979: 37; Gelzer 2005: 51-56.
[150] Seager 2002: 33-34, has a discussion on the validity of this event. Sallust famously included a letter that Pompeius supposedly wrote at this time in his *Historia*. This in turn was a source for Plutarch. Most modern scholarship views the wording of the letter as recorded by Sallust as a fabrication, although probably based vaguely on using the original. See Gerrish 2019: 85.

show how close Pompeius came to destruction and the loss of one of the allied towns to the enemy.[151]

As with the earlier battle over the memory of Strabo, Pompeius and his allies likely wrote accounts that burnished his role in the war. A couple of possible friendly contemporary authors exist: Terentius Varro, who was known as a prolific writer and scholar. He was closely associated with Pompeius, serving with him in Hispania during the campaign against Sertorius.[152] Years later, Varro wrote a trilogy on his own life, which likely included a large portion of his career in Pompeius' service.[153] Another was Caius Sulpicius Galba, he wrote a history of Rome from its mythical founding to the contemporary period. The one remaining fragment that explicitly deals with Pompeius only contains the disposition of troops at the battle of Lauro.[154] Since the account is explicit on the troop numbers at the battle, it probably drew its source material from one of the commander's reports.

Either way, the defeat of the holdouts in Hispania and the return to a relative peace must have been well received in the city, although it is clear that there were divided loyalties within the senate, as after Pompeius' clash he went some way to appease them by burning Sertorius and Perperna's papers to prevent any blackmail - a popular act, which supposedly helped to calm the situation at Rome.[155] This was probably part of his attempts to gain inclusion into the senatorial fold, as he was likely aiming at high office off the back of his victories and military reputation, but the destruction also meant that Pompeius had greater control of the narrative.

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[151] Plut. *Pomp.* 18.3, 19.2-3 Although Plutarch tries to put a positive spin on the memories.
[152] *FRHist* i. 2013: 413 casts doubt on this, although Varro was probably in Hispania before 50 B.C. at least. See Gold 1987: 318.
[153] *FRHist* i. 2013: 423. And the *De Vita Populi Romani* that probably covered the civil war down to 32 B. C. See Pittá 2018: 251.
[154] Oros. 5.23.9.
[155] Plut. *Pomp*. 20.4, *Sert*. 27.2-7; Flor. 2.10.9; App. *B.C.* 1.115; Liv. *Per*. 96; Vell. Pat. 2.30.1; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Sall. *Hist*. 3.80-81; Seager 2002: 32-35; Gelzer 2005: 57, 62.

Pompeius tries to distance himself from the long Shadow of Sulla

Despite Pompeius' successes and the failure of the feared coup attempts to materialise, he still faced opposition. Years later when a law was being promulgated by Gabinius for a command against the pirates, which was likely to go to Pompeius, there was opposition from the senate under the guise of memories of his abuse of military power. These led to some heated debates where Pompeius' senatorial opponents tried to prevent the command being assigned to him by playing on these fears before the crowds.[156]

Despite the continuous recalling of his youth in clashes with other senators, Pompeius never resorted to the threat of arms in peacetime to solve his problems again. However, at the end of the pirate campaign, Pompeius was not able to allay this concern as he transferred to a new command and did not have to discharge his army. The greatest effort to dispel the fear of his remaining armed instead came with his return to Italia at the end of the campaign in the East against Mithridates. As contemporaries make clear, the senate at the time were concerned by Pompeius' return, remembering the use of his army in previous times and all too familiar with the recent methods of the warlords of the civil war – particularly the similarity with the return from campaign in the East by Sulla.[157]

Rome was hard pressed at the time, the supposed conspiracy of Catiline had just been hurriedly crushed by Cicero and he could hardly expect to deal with a veteran army. Even Cicero, who considered himself a friend, was concerned that Pompeius' return from the East might be an invasion instead, especially with the possibility of Catiline providing a pretext for Pompeius and his army to return under arms.[158] Pompeius seems to have been aware of

[156] Seager 2002: 44-45.
[157] Especially after the flight of Nepos to Pompeius. Mitchell 1973: 4-6; Parrish 1973: 363.
[158] This seems to be a later interjection into the memories of the time based on Cicero's later rejection of Crassus as a supporter of Clodius. On this see Marshall 1974: 804- 813; Odahl 2010: 71; On the speculation on Catiline's supporters including Crassus and Caesar see Marin 2009: 105.

the apprehension that was permeating the upper echelons of society and wrote a letter pledging to return peacefully from campaigning in the East. When he did return, he made a point of disbanding his army as soon as they reached Italia to dispel the rumours circulating because of the memories of Sulla's return from the East and Pompeius' earlier obstinacy.[159]

Despite the swift disbandment and the popular acclaim it generated, the use of the memories of Pompeius' early life combined with the fear of him enacting a seizure of Rome as Sulla had remained among the senators and lasted throughout Pompeius' whole life. Such was the strength of the legacy of Pompeius as a supporter of Sulla who used his army for his own purposes, as well as the repetition of this memory by his enemies, that the following years were still clouded with the subsequent mistrust.

Despite the defeat of the pirates and the ending of the war with Mithridates, Rome then faced a grain shortage. A command for the *cura annonae* was proposed and Pompeius was suggested as a candidate, with support from many including Cicero.[160] Pompeius was duly granted the office and allowed to command forces for the procurement of grain for the city. Once more, the initial demand was for far greater powers, forces and funding, which were slashed over fears about the power being vested in his hands – although how much Pompeius had expected this to be accepted is questionable.[161] Instead he was granted more limited resources, although his legal remit is harder to fathom. Pompeius lived up to his reputation as a superior organiser, which he had gained during the pirate campaign, by sailing across the Mediterranean to secure Rome's access to supplies of grain from around the empire. However, despite this, the consul Piso deliberately went about discharging Pompeius'

[159] Cic *Fam* 5.7.1; Vell. Pat. 2.40.3; Plut. *Pomp*. 43; Dio 37.20.6; App. *Mith*. 116.566; Gruen 1970: 237, 239, 242-3; Seager 2002: 75; Ridley 2006: 81-2, for a full review of the different interpretations of Pompeius' reasons see Ridley's summary 83-95.
[160] Cic. *Ad Att*. 4.1.6-7; Liv. *Per*. 104; Plut. *Pomp*. 49.4-5; App. *B.C.* 2.18; Dio 39.9.3.
[161] Seager 2002: 108. This objection due to fear of Pompeius' powers may have really been another case of senatorial *invidia* as discussed above p. 37.

crews to try and interfere with the mission and perhaps as a snub to the authority of Pompeius.[162]

Later another assignment came up to aid Ptolemy XII in his mission to be restored to the throne of Egypt again.[163] The whole issue was marked with massive corruption by Ptolemy and his associates with Pompeius receiving large loans from him to buy his support to place him back on the throne.[164] However, senators claiming as they had before during the debates over the pirate command that giving a new military commission to Pompeius was a risk, moved to stop him gaining yet another extraordinary command, even going as far as to find an oracle that said an army could not be sent to restore Ptolemy.[165] At the time Pompeius was struggling with the fallout from his pact with Crassus and Caesar, which had strengthened the senatorial opposition. Instead Gabinius, then an ally of Pompeius, took the initiative and helped restore Ptolemy with a small force, some of whom were veterans of Pompeius' campaigns in the East.[166]

The situation between the senate and Pompeius was the same even as late as 52 BC during one of the most tumultuous periods before the civil war. At that time, Rome was beset with internal strife in the city caused by rival gangs supported by different political groups and there was clearly some apprehension about the power that might be granted to resolve the issues. Eventually, with no improvement in the situation at Rome and various delays to the elections and the chaos after the death of Clodius, the senate were forced to act and appoint a leader to bring order to the city again.[167] As such a large figure in public life, Pompeius was an obvious choice for the role. Soon rumours, both good and bad began to spread of

[162] Plut. *Pomp*. 27.1.
[163] The senate had already agreed to his restoration in 59 BC.
[164] Seager 2002: 111.
[165] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 1.1.1, *Q.F*. 2.2.3; Dio 39.15; Seager 2002: 111.
[166] Val. Max. 4.1.5 App *B.C.* 2.24; Dio 42.5.4.
[167] Dio 40.49-51, Plut. *Pomp*. 55.4.

Pompeius' desire for a dictatorship; amongst the instigators of the negative rumours was Brutus, who was an enemy of Pompeius because of the execution of his father during the revolt of Lepidus. As revenge, he was supposed to have penned a critical tract about Pompeius at the time to undermine his suitability.[168] The suggestion that Pompeius be made a dictator to resolve the issues caused consternation with some members of the senate, especially Cato, who tried to limit the power and make Pompeius accountable by proposing that he should instead be made consul without colleague.[169] This meant that Pompeius had less power to act on his own initiative as he would still be accountable to the senate, but he would not have to work with a colleague. This seems to have been acceptable to the senators who still claimed to feared the amount of power that Pompeius would hold.

Eventually matters became so dire due to the gang warfare that was occurring on the streets of the city that the senators went ahead and voted that Pompeius be granted an extraordinary office of a consulship without a college to restore order. Pompeius filled the city with soldiers to stop the gangs and as a means of holding trials safely, much to the consternation of certain senators, including Pompeius' ally Cicero.[170] The memory of this incident would be recalled again during the civil war when Caesar used the fear of arms being employed in the city again to imply his opponents aimed at a coup.[171]

The last great campaign for Pompeius was the command of the forces assembled to oppose Caesar's army. The ultimate demonstration that the memory of Pompeius and Sulla was still alive was in the opening months of 49 BC. Caesar's strategy was to play on the fear that Pompeius was seeking to dominate the *res publica*, in line with the longstanding memory of Pompeius as the lieutenant of Sulla and his prior reluctance to disband or reject extraordinary

[168] Tempest 2017: 24, 50.
[169] Plut. *Pomp*. 54.2-3.
[170] Plut. *Cic*. 35.5; Dio 40.54.1-4.
[171] Caes. *BC*. 1.2-3, 7.

powers.[172] Even Cicero, who took Pompeius' side from the very beginning, quickly wrote of his concern about a possible return to Sullan tactics.

From the beginning Cicero did not disguise that he held no great hopes for either side and he thought that both would return Rome to the chaos it had seen in the previous civil war. On this point Cicero was consistent, only wavering on the nature of the horrors he predicted. Indeed, to judge by the outcome of the vote on Curio's motion that Pompeius and Caesar give up their armies together, most of the senate were not willing to see another armed conflict.[173] However, at the same time, despite being allied to Pompeius, Cicero's words perpetuated the image of him as a figure capable of actions akin to those of Sulla. This was possibly because of the long-running senatorial prejudice, but also from his own experience of Pompeius as fickle in pursuit of his aims.

On the 25th December 50 BC, Cicero had the chance to meet Pompeius and had a lengthy discussion of events at the former's villa at Formiae. In a letter to Atticus either written later that day or on the following day, Cicero summed up the nature of the conversation saying, 'I was relieved of my concerns listening to a man of courage, experience, and much *auctoritas* speaking vigorously like a statesman on the peril of sowing a false peace.' (*tamen levabar cura virum fortem et peritum et plurimum auctoritate valentem audiens πολιτικῶς de pacis simulatae periculis disserentem*.) [174] However, he ended his recollection of the evening by informing Atticus that in his opinion '[Pompeius] does not presently desire the peace that you do, but rather seems to fear it.' (*non modo non expetere pacem istam sed etiam timere visus est*.)[175]

[172] Caesar had to be aware of association with Sulla's actions though. Raaflaub 2003: 60, and 2009 185; Grillo 2012: 78. Batstone and Damon 2006: 26 argue that Caesar abstained from compiling a full list of those who opposed him in the *Bellum Civile* because he wished to avoid the implication that it would be used for a planned proscription.
[173] Plut. *Pomp*. 58; App. *B.C*. 2.30; Lacey 1961: 329.
[174] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.8.4-5.
[175] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.8.5.

Later, after Pompeius had been forced to retreat from Italia, in a digression discussing his book *De Re Publica* and the notion of the ideal statesman, Cicero drew the conclusion that neither of the lead figures of the war were, in his opinion, appropriate for the position. Cicero observed that:

'Domination has been the desire of both, not acts in order to honour and delight the citizens. Neither, in truth, did [Pompeius] abandon the city because he was unable to protect it, nor Italia because he was driven from it. But his thought from the beginning has been to stir all lands and all seas, incite barbarian kings, to lead into Italia armed, savage tribes, and to produce the greatest army. He has for a long time coveted the kind of power of Sulla, and many who are in the same camp desire that also. Do you think they could not agree between them? That no pact has been able to take place? Today it can, but neither sets his sights at our happiness. Both wish for kingship.*'*

(*dominatio quaesita ab utroque est,non id actum beata et honesta civitas ut esset. nec vero ille urbem reliquit quod eam tueri non posset nec Italiamquod ea pelleretur, sed hoc a primo cogitavit, omnis terras, omnia maria movere, reges barbaros incitare, gentis feras armatas in Italiam adducere, exercitus conficere maximos. genus illud Sullani regni iam pridem appetitur multis qui una sunt cupientibus. an censes nihil inter eos convenire, nullam pactionem fieri potuisse? Hodie potest. sed neutri σκοπὸς est ille ut nos beati simus; uterque regnare vult*.) [176]

Memories of Cruelty

Aside from the assertions that Pompeius desired to become a dictator, another aspect of Pompeius' past association with Sulla that was broadcast during the civil war were

[176] Cic. *Ad Att.* 8.11.2-3.

accusations of cruelty similar to his leader.[177] Although Pompeius was not caught up in the horror of the proscriptions in Rome, his memory of service under Sulla was of a ruthless executioner. This had started as soon as he was brought into the Sullan fold, when, invested with pro-praetorian *imperium* after the capture of Rome, Pompeius crossed to Sicily where he defeated, captured and subsequently executed Carbo – who may have been a consul at the time.[178] The execution of the consular Carbo was particularly notable given the comparative youth and lack of position of his executor, which underlined the extraordinary nature of Pompeius' early career. The death also gained Pompeius a notoriety which stayed with him for the rest of his life as he likely owed *officium* to Carbo for his earlier support in court.[179] Carbo's death is probably the most detailed of those linked to Pompeius complete with varying details, which suggests there was at least one conflicting memory of the event in existence.[180]

While Carbo was the most famous victim of Pompeius, he was also accused of executing Ahenobarbus, and Brutus.[181] In both cases the accounts differ as to what happened. Ahenobarbus was either killed when his camp was stormed, or he was executed by Pompeius after the battle. Similar memories formed around Brutus after he had surrendered to Pompeius, with the accounts relating that he either reneged on this and attempted to flee or was simply executed without trial.[182]

[177] Cruelty being linked to the personality of a tyrant. See Gwyn 1991: 423-26; Tuori 2012: 111.
[178] Liv. *Per*. 89; Val. Max. 5.3.5, 6.2.8, 9.13.2; Plut. *Pomp.*10.3-4; App. *B.C.* 1.96; Seager 2002: 27 notes that elucidating Carbo's magisterial position at the time was complicated; Gelzer 2005: 43. Perhaps at least two conflicting stories were available: the one favourable to Pompeius has a non-consular Carbo, the other, hostile, has Pompeius executing a consul while only a pro-praetor. See also Keaveney 1982: 123.
[179] Caesar apparently mentioned that he will avenge Carbo and Brutus in the civil war. Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.14.2; Tempest 2017: 60.
[180] Sall. *Hist.*1.44; Liv. *Per*. 99; Val. Max. 5.3, 6.2, 9.13; Luc. *BC*. 2.547-548; Plut. *Pomp*. 10.4-6; App. *B.C*. 1.96.
[181] Plut. *Pomp*. 16.2; Seager 2002: 31; Gelzer 2005: 49-56.
[182] Plut. *Pomp*. 16.3-6; Leach 1978: 42; Seager 2002: 31-32; Gelzer 2005: 50-51; Tempest 2017: 24 has doubts about this and concludes it was probably the story put about by Pompeius.

Pompeius' role in the deaths of Sulla's enemies helped to cement Pompeius' memory as a Sullani and set his opponents against him and his memory. It did not help that many of the victims of Pompeius still had supporters or family in the senate who maintained their hostility toward Pompeius for decades – such as Marcus Brutus, who remained an enemy until the outbreak of the civil war with Caesar. [183] Therefore, every killing added more voices and, more importantly, pens to the growing camp of hostile sources.[184]

In a slightly different category was the dubious execution of Perperna (the assassin and usurper of Sertorius) at the conclusion of the campaign in Hispania.[185] What can be seen is that in each case there were conflicting versions of the event, some which emphasised the brutality and treachery of Pompeius for killing those who had surrendered and others justified his victims' demise depending where they sat in the political spectrum or relationship to Pompeius.[186] As with the memories of his earlier years, there was a battle over the details of the events, with those hostile memories likely coming from the family and friends of the victim.

Exorcising ghosts

However, although many decades passed without Pompeius resorting to this level of violence (he even developed the image of a merciful conqueror), this did not stop his enemies from keeping that memory alive.[187] In the long term, the negative memory of Pompeius' actions seems to have become one of the collective working memories of Pompeius' youth

[183] Tempest 2017: 24, 50, 60. See p. 43 above for Brutus' role in the rumours of Pompeius' desire to become a dictator.
[184] Plutarch claims that Oppius is the source of some of the cruelty that is attributed to Pompeius during his time as a lieutenant of Sulla, particularly the fate of Quintus Valerius. Plutarch warns that Oppius, as a friend of Caesar, is an unreliable source on Caesar's enemies. Plut. *Pomp*. 10.4-5 see also Townend, 1987: 330.
[185] App. *B.C.* 1.115, Plut. *Pomp*. 20.3-4.
[186] Carbo's death as cruel see, App. *B.C.* 1.93, Plut. *Pomp*. 10.3-4, On the execution of Brutus see Plut. *Pomp*. 16.4-5.
[187] Stockton 1971: 54.

through the repetition of his political enemies. The most famous account of this memory is placed in the mouth of Helvius Mancia in Velleius' narrative of a trial of Pompeius' ally Libo by the censors of 55 BC.[188] Pompeius had spoken in his defence against the aged prosecutor Helvius Mancia and as an insult asked if the old man had been brought back from the underworld for the case. Helvius replied:

'That is quite true, Pompeius: I do indeed come from the underworld, I come as accuser of Lucius Libo. But while I was there, I saw Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, bloodied and weeping, because he, the son of a great house, of unimpeachable habit of life and outstanding patriotism, had been killed, in the very flower of his youth, on your orders; I saw a man of equal distinction, Marcus Brutus, cut by swords and complaining that this was as a result of your treachery, in the first place, and then your cruelty; I saw Gnaeus Carbo, who had been a staunch protector of you when a child, and of your father's property, in chains in his third consulship, chains into which you had ordered that he be thrown, shackled, protesting that against all justice he had been butchered by you, a Roman knight, while he held the highest authority. I saw Perperna, a man of praetorian rank, with the same appearance and cry of complaint, cursing your brutality; all were united in their lament, that without trial they had died at your hands, those of a teenage butcher.'

(*Pompei: venio enim ab inferis, in L. Libonem accusator venio. sed dum illic moror, vidi cruentum Cn. Domitium Ahenobarbum deflentem, quod summo genere natus, integerrimae uitae, amantissimus patriae, in ipso iuventae flore tuo iussu esset occisus. vidi pari claritate conspicuum M. Brutum ferro laceratum, querentem id sibi prius perfidia, deinde etiam crudelitate tua accidisse. vidi Cn. Carbonem acerrimum pueritiae tuae bonorumque patris tui defensorem in tertio consulatu catenis, quas tu ei inici iusseras,*

[188] Steel 2013a: 155 concludes that this must have been when Pompeius was present to defend Lucius Libo during the hearing of the censors.

vinctum, obtestantem se adversus omne fas ac nefas, cum in summo esset imperio, a te equite Romano trucidatum. vidi eodem habitu et quiritatu praetorium virum Perpernam saevitiam tuam execrantem, omnesque eos una voce indignantes, quod indemnati sub te adulescentulo carnifice occidissent.)[189] Clearly, for Pompeius' senatorial opponents the memory of his youthful violence formed a nexus of their attacks and was a constant source of material with which to diminish his standing, as even in the 50s when this trial was being held, they were still recalling Pompeius' actions decades before. The main reason was probably the association that cruelty had with the image of a tyrant.[190]

The civil war also saw a major revitalising and broadcasting of the memories of cruelty during the Sullan years and the fear that they had generated. Caesar was quick to make good use of old invectives against Pompeius that had been in political discourse for decades and had their origins in the civil war of the 80s. This was probably part of Caesar's strategy to show Pompeius as a tyrant, which would tie back into the memories of decades of political discourse that had portrayed Pompeius as a Sulla in the making, and had been revived by senators like Helvius Mancia in the years around the consulship of 52, as discussed earlier.[191]

This is especially true in the first book of the *Bellum Civile*, by attempting to portray Pompeius as acting like Sulla or by hinting that Pompeius was still the violent character he had been in his youth. It is possible that Caesar initially targeted the senatorial elite with his propaganda as they would be well aware of these memories and had the most to fear from a return to a Sullan-style government. There are two possible motives for Caesar's propaganda strategy: Firstly, deflect a similar image attaching itself to him – he had, after all, invaded

[189] Val. Max. 2.6.8. Translation by Catherine Steel 2013a: 153. See Steel 2013a: 151-59 for discussion on the anecdote in the wider political context.
[190] Gwyn 1991: 423-26; Tuori 2012: 111.
[191] See pp. 37-49.

Italia and marched on Rome much as Sulla had – even Cicero suggests that the parallels were not lost on some.[192] While secondly, it might have persuaded the senators who were unsure to abandon Pompeius' side and either join Caesar or at least remain neutral and provide him with a facade of legitimacy through Pompeius' diminished political support. Caesar seems to have at least seen value in trying to retain more important members of the senate for such a purpose to judge by his overtures to Cicero.[193]

Preserved in Cicero's letters to Atticus is Cicero's comment on Pompeius' attitude in January, which recorded similar sentiments to the words that were recorded by Caesar. In a letter to Atticus on the 19th December 50, Cicero spoke at length on the issues at hand, although he does not seem to have taken matters to be as serious as they would appear in retrospect, possibly because he had only just returned to Rome from his posting in Cilicia. He made clear to Atticus: 'If you [the Caesarians] are victorious, proscriptions. If you are defeated, then slavery.' (*si victus eris, proscribare, si viceris, tamen servias*.)[194] But, if war was unavoidable, Cicero made his position clear: '[I] agree with Gnaeus Pompeius.' (*adsentior Cn. Pompeio*.)[195]

Aside from being another civil war, these fears were exacerbated by the words of Pompeius' allies, who were exceedingly incautious in their use of memories of the previous civil war. The senators who accompanied him made references to the aftermath of Sulla's return as a means of cajoling others into joining them, and the rumour was that Pompeius based his strategy in the East on Sulla's return in the 80s.[196] Caesar expands on these rumours when he claims that 'Lentulus is motivated by a great lack of money, the hope of an army,

[192] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.7.7, and after the war 11.21.3. Caesar even stated that he had no desire to imitate Sulla: *Ad Att*. 9.7c.1. See also Barden Dowling, 2000: 309-12.
[193] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.18.1-4.
[194] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.7.7.
[195] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.7.7.
[196] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.10.6.

province and by the bribery of those desiring the title of king. He boasts among his friends that he will be a second Sulla to whom great power will return.' (*Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur, seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperii redeat*.)[197]

This only helped to bolster the claims of Caesar and his allies who were already broadcasting propaganda of Pompeius' cruel attitude toward those who would not follow him and instead decide to remain neutral in Italia, as Cicero recorded 'he would have in the same place those who would remain in Rome and those who were in Caesar's camp.' (*eodem se habiturum loco qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris caesaris fuissent*.)[198] Pompeius' comments were certainly unwise – which might explain why Caesar was so keen to demonstrate his *clementia* to reinforce the difference between himself and Pompeius – and may have added an element of veracity to Caesar's narrative of Pompeius' cruelty, to both contemporary and later writers.[199]

In this war of letters, Caesar focussed on his *clementia* and wrote to his supporters Oppius and Balbus in Rome after the fall of Corfinium to distance himself from the memories of the last civil war. Caesar's letter was copied and distributed, as it was intended to be for men of importance, much as Pompeius' own letter explaining what his strategy was.[200] A copy made its way to Cicero, whom Caesar was trying to tempt onto his side and is preserved in his correspondence. This letter shows the subtle distortion of Pompeius' words that Caesar undertook during the war. Caesar began by promoting his treatment of those who surrendered and Cicero's support of it, he then adds the cruelty (*crudelite*) that he reports in his enemies, which means they cannot escape from hatred (*odium effugere non*).[201] Caesar unequivocally

[197] Caes. *BC*.1.4.
[198] Caes. *BC*. 1.33.
[199] Carter 1991: 13.
[200] Meier 1995: 372.
[201] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.7c.1.

answers the concern of Sulla being his model with the line 'Lucius Sulla, who I will not imitate.' (*L. Sullam quem imitaturus non sum*)[202] The emphasis on the fear of Pompeius in Caesar's writing was also another way to distance himself from similar accusations, especially given his actions, but also to counter Pompeius' own line on Sulla. It is also clear from Cicero's letters that others were uncertain that Caesar's clement stance was genuine, and Curio exacerbated this by suggesting in a letter to Cicero that Caesar's clemency was nothing but an act.[203] This may have been a strategy of Caesar to have doubt sown about his *clementia* to retain senators out of uncertainty, but to give himself plausible deniability that it was true by having somebody else state it.

Eventually, Pompeius himself seems to have finally seen some value to the rumours as the situation deteriorated; at first, he had attempted to always steer clear of acting in any way that might lead to further associations, but as the civil war deepened and Pompeius was forced to retreat into southern Italia his attitude changed. Cicero recorded this change in his letters noting the news from Pompeius' headquarters in the south: 'what threats to the municipia, to the best men by name and lastly to everyone who remained. How often [was it said] that "if Sulla could, why shall I not?"' (*quae minae municipiis, quae nominatim viris bonis, quae denique omnibus qui remansissent, quam crebro illud Sulla potuit, ego non potero?*)[204]

There was further evidence that Pompeius took a harsh line in his dealings, which corroborated these accounts. In March, Cicero wrote to Atticus with the latest news about the current situation, recounting a meeting with his ex-son-in-law, Crassipes, who left Brundisium before Pompeius was embarked for Greece.[205] Crassipes informed him of

[202] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.7c.1.
[203] Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.4.8; Wiseman 2009: 194.
[204] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.10.2.
[205] For the relationship of Tullia and Crassipes see Clark 1991.

Pompeius' vitriolic discourses on a number of topics, 'of threatening speeches' (*sermones minacis*), that Pompeius had made 'personal enemies of the best men and enemies of the municipia' (*inimicos optimatium, municipiorum hostis*), and there had also been talk of 'undiluted proscriptions' (*meras proscritiones*). Both sides apparently made use of the fear that the other would act as Sulla had on his return from the East, or more specifically that the victorious side would target their enemies with proscriptions.[206] Cicero added his own barb at the end of this letter referring to those involved as 'pure Sullas' (*meros Sullas*).[207]

Cicero, however, still perceived Pompeius as the better side in the civil war. In a letter he states his position in an imaginary dialogue with Atticus. Cicero calls Pompeius' aims in the civil war 'the best, but it will be accomplished, remember, most shamefully. The first thought is to suffocate the city and Italia with famine, then to devastate the country with fire and not stay away from the money of the wealthy. But I fear the same means from [Caesar's] party.' (*immo optima, sed agetur, memento, foedissime primum consilium est suffocare urbem et Italiam fame, deinde agros vastare, urere, pecuniis locupletum non abstinere. sed cum eadem metuam ab hac parte*.)[208]

In a letter from the 4th April, Cicero, railed against the criminality of Caesar's actions and his aggression toward Pompeius, who, he noted, had been his son-in-law.[209] Cicero recalled how Pompeius had been an ally to Caesar in more peaceful times but now concedes, with the same reservations, that Pompeius' strategy is justified and it is, 'together right and even necessary, nevertheless, it will be destructive to the citizenry if he does not win, yet also

[206] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.7.7, 9.11.3, 10.4.8. Or more generally that the war would be like the previous civil war where both sides engaged in massacres of their opponents at various times. Shackleton Bailey 1971: 37; Stevenson 2015a: 71.
[207] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.11.3.
[208] Cic. *Ad Att.* 9.7.4.
[209] Cic. *Ad Att*. 10.4.3.

calamitous if he wins.' (*cum pium tum etian necessarium, suis tamen civibus exitiabile nisi vicerit, calamitosum etiam si vicerit*.)[210]

Despite his support for Pompeius, Cicero keeps up the inference that both are essentially two sides of the same coin; referring to the war in late April as a contest between two kings, but 'where the more moderate king, the nobler and virtuous, is beaten.' *(...qua pulsus est modestior rex et probior et integrior et is*.)[211] And in early May, referred to *'*the cruelty of one and the insolence of the other.' (*alterius crudelitatem, alterius audaciam*.)[212] Furthermore, Caesar's victory would destroy the name of the Roman people *'*whereas if [Pompeius] is victorious, his victory will follow the manner and example of Sulla*.'* (*Sin autem vincit, Sullano more exemploque vincet*.)[213] It seems that few could avoid framing the current civil war in the terms of the previous conflict, which given its traumatic impact as mentioned in the introduction, is understandable.[214] The aggressive stance of Pompeius and his allies coupled with his previous association with Sulla made them the natural target for such concerns. Eventually, Cicero made the claim that 'this shameful thing our Gnaeus thought of two years before, thus for a long time already his mind was set to imitate Sulla and he desires to have proscriptions*.'* (*hoc turpe Gnaeus noster biennio ante cogitavit. Ita sulla turit animus eius et proscripturit iam diu*.)[215]

During this time, Cicero noted one of the few direct observations of the non-senatorial reactions. After the departure of Pompeius *et al*. from Brundisium, Cicero recorded the fickle nature of the local elites, noting that they now perceived Caesar in a different light and did not seek the return of Pompeius. Cicero wrote, '[Pompeius] who they trusted before, they fear

[210] Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.4.3.
[211] Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.7.1.
[212] Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.14.1.
[213] Cic. *Ad Att.* 10.7.1.
[214] See p. 21.
[215] Cic. *Ad Att.* 9.7.5.

and [Caesar] whom they feared they love.' (*illum quo antea confidebant metuunt hunc amant quem timebant*.)[216]

Their fear of Pompeius' return was probably in response to the threats of those who were with him to punish those who had remained. On the other hand, the support shown to Caesar after this point, if this statement is to be believed, possibly stemmed merely from a wish to ingratiate themselves with the new power in the Rome.[217] The populace was far more fickle than Cicero understood it. For him control of the city and the traditional seat of power meant everything, but the reality that Pompeius and Caesar likely knew was that, as with the previous civil war, military power was what mattered. It was with this understanding that Cicero's view of the war was constructed, and how he was able to be critical of both parties despite being more aligned with Pompeius.

As has been shown previously, Pompeius faced opposition throughout his career from members of the senate. Aside from his alliance with Sulla and the fears of violence, part of the reason for this was that Pompeius had made a number of enemies in his early career with various senatorial families who had been his opponents. One of the main reasons though was a wariness of the extraordinary nature of his career and his unscrupulous mode of acquiring power. In a system that limited the access to high office, many senators must have been frustrated that this young upstart was able to bend the rules and skip over the newly reinstated *cursus honorum* to attain high honours before those who had spent years moving through the ranks, this combined with his father's position led to a sense of *invidia*.[218] However, having grown up in a world where military power was a key to political success, and witnessed both his own father and Sulla amongst others make good use of the power of a command, it is

[216] Cic. *Ad Att*. 8.13.2; Holliday 1969: 45.
[217]Cic. *Ad Att*. 8.16.1-2, 9.5.2.
[218] Katz 1976: 333. See the discussion on p. 37.

unsurprising that Pompeius was eager to gain what military commissions he could, at whatever cost.

Caesar made similar accusations, claiming that Pompeius was gearing up to take over the mantle of Sulla when he claimed that his friendly tribunes had been mistreated – the lynch-pin of his propaganda strategy.[219] Crying foul, he claimed that 'Sulla had stripped all of the tribunician powers, however, free intercession he had left. Pompeius, who made good the restoration of what had been lost, now deprived the tribunes of what they had before.' (*Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse. Pompeium, qui amissa restituisse videatur bona, etiam quae ante habuerint, ademisse.*) [220]

In mid-March Cicero was still struggling to decide what course of action to take as he still held the view that both men were a danger to the functioning of the *res publica*. 'This then I see' he wrote to Atticus 'neither with these two alive nor, for that matter, with [Caesar], will we have the *res publica.'* (*sic enim video, nec duobus his vivis nec hoc uno nos umquam rem publicam habituros*.)[221] Pompeius' main problem in Cicero's eyes was still his past and the lingering suspicions about his intentions. 'For our Gnaeus wonders at Sulla's power, and desires to imitate it, nor was this ever a small secret*.'* (*mirandum enim in modum Gnaeus noster Sullani regni similitudinem concupivit.εἰδώς σοι λέγω. nihil ille umquam minus obscure.*)[222]

The assertion that Pompeius had planned the current events as a means to assume supremacy in the *res publica* can surely be dismissed on the evidence presented in both the *Bellum Civile* and the letters, which show how poorly prepared Pompeius was. What Cicero

[219] Raaflaub 1974: 152-5; Hölkeskamp 2013: 15; Peer 2016: 16 with note 15.
[220] Caes. *BC*. 1.7.3-4. Although it should be remembered that it was Lentulus who gave the tribunes their excuse. See Carter 1991: 12.
[221] Cic. *Ad Att.*9.7.1.
[222] Cic. *Ad Att.* 9.7.3.

was hinting at, and perhaps what had caused his suspicions since the beginning, was the sole consulship of Pompeius in 52 BC. While the chaos that had begun some years earlier, Cicero had noted on a number of occasions to his brother and Atticus that Pompeius was thought to be seeking an appointment as dictator on the back of events.[223] Eventually, when Pompeius was granted the unique position of sole consul, he filled Rome with soldiers to bring order to proceedings.[224] A series of courts were set up to try a number of figures under a wholly novel system, and all under the auspices of Pompeius' armed guards. Understandably, Cicero found this form of justice disturbing at the very least and was unable to deliver his defence.[225]

The violence, intimidation, and open flouting of the rules that occurred at this time probably explains why even in 49 BC Cicero is describing a *res publica* under Pompeius as likely to be slavery. In the years preceding the civil war it would become common for various historians to search the memories of Pompeius' career for signs that a civil war had been brewing, much as they would with Caesar's too. Cicero's assertion has even caused similar examinations in modern scholarship with scholars such as von Fritz attempting to fit the history around Cicero's recollections.[226]

The Varied Memories of Pompeius' Public and Private Relationships

Like the other memories that coloured the image of Pompeius, those of his unscrupulous attitude and suspicions of his loyalty towards the government and individuals date back again to the nascent years of his career. Very early on, he infamously married Antistia who was the daughter of the presiding magistrate during his trial and who eventually acquitted

[223] Cic. *Q. Fr*. 2.13.5 and 2.3.8; *Ad Att. 4.18.3.*
[224] Plut. *Pomp*. 54.4; Dio 40.53.3; App. *B.C*. 2.23.
[225] Cic. *Pro Mil.* 1-3; Dio 40.54.2.
[226] This comment has been particularly troublesome. It seems likely that in all probability Pompeius had no long-term plans for what eventually occurred, however, Cicero's claim to premeditation on the part of Pompeius has had a long life in scholarship, von Fritz 1942: 173-178, argued that Pompeius had planned the strategy for some time before the outbreak of the conflict. For a background on the argument see von Fritz 1942: 147.

him.[227] This led to suppositions that Pompeius had only been acquitted because of this arrangement – perhaps spread by Pompeius himself to distance his links to the Cinnans who supported him – although it is clear that other members of the new regime, which included Antistius, had been supportive of his defence.[228]

The main memory of this period was dominated by the events after Sulla's landing, when Pompeius quickly dropped his support for Cinna and went over to Sulla with three legions.[229] In a similar vein to the story of his trial, Sulla offered his stepdaughter Aemilia's hand in marriage.[230] This brought with it a connection to one of the great families of Roman society, the Metelli, and a bond with the powerful dictator. Although this did not improve Pompeius' image when he accepted and promptly divorced his first wife Antistia – indeed, like an anti-Pompeius, one of the memories of Caesar was his rejection of Sulla's similar attempts to interfere in his personal life.[231] This second marriage would be short-lived, however, as Aemilia died in childbirth later that year.[232] Despite his support, Pompeius was not wholly in Sulla's corner, and memories circulated that he had clashed with the dictator. The first was when he returned from Africa, and it was claimed that he tried to pressure Sulla into granting him a triumph.[233] Despite this apparent animosity, Sulla then organised the marriage of

[227] Cic. *Brut*. 230; Sen. *Contr*. 7.2.6; Plut. *Pomp*. 4.1-3; Leach 1978: 21; Keaveney 1982: 113; Seager 2002: 25; Gelzer 2005: 40.
[228] The memory of Pompeius' popularity being at such a height that he was able to marry the presiding magistrate's daughter and be acquitted may owe its origins to the later attempts by Pompeius or his circle to alter his backstory. Clearly Antistius and the rest of the regime had little interest in seeing Pompeius convicted, but this is glossed over with an anachronistic story that his popularity saved him.
[229] Cic. *Leg*. *Man*. 61, *Phil*. 5.43-44; Sall. *Hist*. 5.16; Diod 38.10.1; Val. Max. 2.29.1-2, 5.2.9; Plut. *Pomp*. 5.4-6, 8.1-4, *Crass*. 6.4, *Mor*. 203, 806; App. *B.C.* 1.80. Dio *fr*. 107.1, has Pompeius raising only a small band, perhaps from a source that downplayed Pompeius and his ability to raise three legions; Diod 38.9-1; Liv. *Per*. 85; Leach 1978: 24-5. Keaveney 1982: 114-117 has more detail about this period of Pompeius' career. See also Seager 2002: 26; Gelzer 2005: 40-42.
[230] Plut. *Pomp*. 9.1, *Sull*. 33.4; Leach 1978: 28; Keaveney 1982: 133; Hillman 1997: 104-5 agrees to the date of Keaveney but disagrees with his interpretation of Plutarch. Seager 2002: 26; Gelzer 2005: 43.
[231] Suet. *DJ*. 1.1-3.
[232] Plut. *Sull*. 33.4; Seager 2002: 26, 28; Leach 1978: 34. Aemilia was already pregnant by her first husband, Manius Acilius Glabrio, whom she had had to divorce to marry Pompeius.
[233] Leach 1979: 31; Seager 2002: 28.

Pompeius to his third wife Mucia (who would play an important role in the civil war between Sextus and the Triumvirs).

This marriage contract did not win over Pompeius entirely, and he supported Marcus Lepidus (father of the Triumvir) for the consulship of 78 BC apparently against the wishes of Sulla.[234] However, after being elected to the office of consul, Lepidus clashed with his colleague, and Sulla's choice, Catulus.[235] This eventually led to Lepidus gathering a force of those who had been disenfranchised by the Sullan regime in northern Italia, which Pompeius duly helped suppress. His reversal regarding Lepidus may have been due to political support that the exiles could provide against those seen as loyal to Sulla. However, Pompeius' decision further cemented his memory as disloyal and untrustworthy, and added to his enemies in the senate, such as the young Brutus.[236]

Further incidents aided in the creation of the image of Pompeius as treacherous. Arguably his relationships with fellow commanders during the various campaigns he was involved in over his lifetime. Commanders were required to report the progress of their campaigns to the senate thus, from these accounts, clashes that occurred during the Sertorian war, pirate campaign and the subsequent war against Mithridates were preserved and passed down. Most memorably Pompeius' was accused of trying to take all the glory in the Sertorian war by taking to the field without the support of his fellow commander Metellus.[237] This was the same story of his return from Hispania, when his forces ran into the remains of the slave army of Spartacus, which had fled north, and destroyed them. As the last action of the uprising, Pompeius claimed to have ended the slave revolt, reportedly much to the chagrin of Crassus.[238]

[234] Seager 2002: 30 suggests, unconvincingly, that Pompeius supported Lepidus knowing it would cause problems in the hope of being tasked with suppressing him.
[235] Seager 2002: 31; Gelzer 2005: 48.
[236] Tempest 2017: 24, 50. See p. 43 for the reason behind Brutus' hostility.
[237] Plut. *Sert.* 19.2, *Pomp. 19.1.*
[238] Plut. *Pomp*. 21.3, *Crass*. 13.7; App. *B.C.* 120-21.

In the years that followed from the consulship, Pompeius changed his strategy. With each success, he was able to draw more and more senators to his side and with their support he began to test the waters to see how far he could push the senate. This enabled him to avoid the odium of pressing the senate directly, although few seem to have been fooled. It should be noted, however, that although Pompeius was assumed to be behind the actions of his *adfines* in the senate, they may have done what they believed he would have desired as a means of bolstering their own position within his circle.[239]

Later Pompeius' proxies were also able to overcome opposition to taking command away from Lucullus in favour of Pompeius, much to the annoyance of the senators who supported Lucullus. After the transfer to the command of the war against Mithridates with the help of allies in the senate, Pompeius was on a collision course with the previous commander Lucullus who was vocal at the conclusion of the campaign claiming the lion's share of the fighting and that Pompeius had merely swept in at the end to claim the glory. The clash that they had over the issue survived in literature with Lucullus referring to Pompeius' assumption of the command as like 'a vulture that feeds of the carcass of other's kills.'[240] These quibbles seem to have been lost in the collective memory of the plebs in the final victory of Pompeius over Mithridates, who had been a thorn in the side of the Romans since Sulla.

Although Pompeius was now at the height of his popularity with the masses, the senators found a new way to dent Pompeius' prestige and claims to the loyalties of those he had made grants to by dragging their feet over the land distribution to his retiring veterans. The usual agreement of the senate to these acts was instead held up for many months, eventually

[239] Indeed there seems to have been a desire by Pompeius' enemies to make him appear to be all powerful and like a dictator in all but name. Sallust in particular portrays Pompeius in this fashion in his works, see pp. 136-42.
[240] Plut. *Pomp*. 31, *Luc*. 36.

forcing Pompeius to form an alliance with his old colleague Crassus and the ambitious, up-and-coming Caesar to achieve the rewards that would be due to his disbanded soldiers.[241]

The issue of this alliance was so contentious at the time that even Terentius Varro, who was closely associated with Pompeius, wrote a pamphlet called the *Trikaranos* (the three-headed monster) as a criticism of the alliance according to Appian.[242] Some tried to create the image of the alliance as an underhand affair that was secretly conducted and, as with all of Pompeius' manoeuvring, a potential coup.[243] It is clear that it was never the case.[244] The cooperation of two of Rome's leading figures was certainly a danger to the competition but it was nothing new in the functioning of Roman politics, and the supposedly secret meeting that the three held at Luca was attended by 200 senators.[245] It was probably later, when the civil war began that the alliance took on its more sinister aspect, with the broken friendship of Pompeius and Caesar – used by Caesar as a cause of the war – being linked back to these years.[246] Although the alliance pushed through the legislation that Pompeius required, the methods used to achieve these aims, such as the problematic consulship of Caesar, brought the standing of Pompeius to its lowest point, which bolstered his enemies in the senate who still kept up their attempts to curb Pompeius' aspirations.

It was not only other commanders that Pompeius was also accused of being disloyal to, but he also gained a bad reputation for a utilitarian attitude towards his allies. When Cicero had criticised Caesar's consulship in a speech to the senate. As revenge, Caesar, along with Pompeius, had officiated at the adoption of Cicero's enemy Clodius into a plebian family,

[241] Liv. *Per.* 103; Vell. Pat. 2.44.1-2; Plut. *Pomp*. 47.1-4, *Caes*. 13.3-6; Suet. *DJ*. 19.2; App. *B.C.* 2.9, 13; Dio 38. 1.7, 7.5.
[242] App. *B.C*. 2.9; Smith 1951: 130.
[243] App. *B.C.* 2.9-14.
[244] Seager 2002: 117.
[245] Plut. *Caes*. 21.5.
[246] Asinius Pollio dated the start of the road to the civil war to this compact, Hor. *Carm*. 2.1; Morgan 2000: 54; Conte 1994: 377.

which allowed him to stand as a tribune of the plebs.[247] Once elected as a tribune in 58 BC he forced Cicero into exile by prosecuting him for the execution of the Catilinarians without trial.[248] Cicero tried to appeal to Pompeius due to his connections with Clodius, but he found that Pompeius would not be drawn into the conflict between the two, even being rumoured to have left his house by the backdoor as Cicero entered through the front to plead for his assistance.[249] However, once Clodius had outlived his usefulness – turning against Pompeius and trying to rival his popularity in the city – he was quick to make himself visible in the efforts to have Cicero recalled.[250] Although Cicero was grateful for Pompeius' support in his return, he would forever remember the part that Pompeius had played in bringing about the exile, and was quite vocal in his recollections of the event, even going so far as to write an account of his triumphal return, that helped to keep the memory alive.[251]

As with many aspects of Pompeius' difficult memory, when the civil war broke out, Caesar in his speeches and writing played on the troubled relationship between Pompeius and the senate when he called on Pompeius to abandon his alliance with the senators who opposed him and mend their friendship. Caesar claimed their relationship had been damaged by a small group who were opposed to them both. Such an assertion is recorded in the *Bellum Civile* when *'*[Caesar] recalled all the times his enemies had injured him, and he complained they had led astray and corrupted Pompeius, who was envious and belittled his praise, which previously he had always favoured and whose *honor* and *dignitas* he assisted*.'* (*Caesar apud milites contionatur. omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium, queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae; cuius ipse honori et*

[247] Cic. *Ad Att*. 8.3.3.
[248] Dio 38.12.4-7, 39.11.2; Seager 2002: 92.
[249] Seager 2002: 102 questions the veracity of this rumour.
[250] Cic. *De Dom*. 35-47, *De Prov*. 17.42, *Ad Att*. 8.3.3; Liv. *Per*. 103; Plut. *Caes*. 14.16; Suet. *Caes*. 20.4; Dio.38.12.1-4; Greenhalgh 1981: 4; Seager 2002: 92, 102, 104.
[251] On the various attempts to have it memorialised see Cic. *Ad Fam.* 5.12.4; *Ad Att.* 1.16.11, 2.1.1-3. A discussion on the whole event is given in Claassen 1992: 19-20, 31-6, 40-2.

dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit.)[252] And later that 'Pompeius himself is encouraged by the enemies of Caesar, and because he wants no one to equal him in *dignitas*. He had completely turned away from his friendship with Caesar and reconciled with their common enemies, the greatest part of whom he had imposed on Caesar from the time of his relationship by marriage.' (*ipse Pompeius ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus, et quod neminem dignitate secum exaequari volebat, totum se ab eius amicitia averterat et cum communibus inimicis in gratiam redierat, quorum ipse maximam partem illo adfinitatis tempore iniunxerat Caesari*.)[253] Raaflaub has argued that, 'he undertook everything to extract Pompey again from his dangerous connection with the Optimates, and therefore he always saw in the 'seduction' of his former ally one of the most hostile acts of his adversaries. Accordingly, Caesar chiefly burdened the *inimici* with the guilt for the breakdown of his political and personal relationship with Pompeius.'[254]

What is most interesting about this brief characterization is that Caesar appears relatively restrained in his portrait of Pompeius, explaining Pompeius' *inimici* and the subsequent harm towards the *res publica* as a combination of his own desire for pre-eminence and due to his corruption by the senatorial enemies of Caesar. Carter has argued that the 'oblique and muted nature of the attack on Pompeius is certainly due to Caesar's past alliance with him. The ancients believed that character was a constant and that changes were just hidden traits being revealed. Therefore, an ascription by Caesar of serious defects to Pompey would reflect badly on himself.'[255] Raaflaub perceives the notion of Pompeius being 'seduced' (*verführte*) as 'a strange valuation' (*eine merkwürdige Wertung*), arguing that it

[252] Caes. *BC.* 1.7.1.
[253] Caes. *BC*. 1.4.1-5.
[254] Raaflaub 1974: 119 'unternahm er […] alles, Pompeius auf der für ihn so gefährlichen Verbindung mit den Optimaten wieder herauszulösen, und deshalb sah er auch in der <Verführung> seines einstigen Bundesgenossen immer einen der feindseligsten Akte seiner Widersacher. Dementsprechend lasete Caesar eben den inimici die Hauptschuld an der Verschlechterung seiner politischen und persönlichen Beziehungen zu Pompeius an.'
[255] Carter 1991: 11.

shows that Pompeius has become so blinded by his ambition that he could no longer tell who his true friend was and easily fell in with the *inimici* of Caesar, becoming an unreliable and unfaithful *amicus* who had betrayed all that he stood for.[256]

Pompeius' own legacy

Pompeius knew that for the purposes of his political aspirations his main strength lay in the memories of his military success and made repeated efforts to keep those memories alive, by making them as the key part of his own identification. In this Pompeius was largely successful, with his numerous campaigns as evidence, indeed he became a benchmark for future commanders to aspire to.[257] No matter how many groups in the senate were opposed to him, the popular opinion of the time was that he was one of the greatest generals alive, and a problem-solver for Rome, which even the senators were forced to accept when the civil war started. It was this memory that Caesar in his accounts of his campaigns during the war was keen to downplay.

As with most of the memories of Pompeius, his military career started in his youth when he raised a force for Sulla and routed an army sent to check his advance. After that, the next few decades were an outstanding series of victories, which were all the more impressive initially when his young age and lack of experience were taken into account.[258] Later the speed with which he successfully undertook difficult campaigns also brought him fame.

Aside from the adoption of the cognomen Magnus, part of keeping the memory of these victories alive was through building and other forms of public display. Rome already had a long history with these forms of commemoration and Pompeius quickly seized these means to

[256] Raaflaub 1974: 119-120.
[257] This is discussed later at p. 119, 140.
[258] Cic. *Leg. Man*. 30, 61; Liv. *Per*. 89; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Plut. *Pomp*. 11.11-12; Dio 36.25.2; App. *B.C.* 1.80; Seager 2002: 27-28; Gelzer 2005: 44-45.

cement the memories and reap the popularity that they would grant. After the victory over Ahenobarbus and Hiarbas, Pompeius on his return pushed for a triumph, which aside from the event itself would leave a permanent mark via his inclusion on the *Fasti Triumphalis* and the title of *triumphator*. Despite the difficulty of celebrating victories over fellow citizens this does not seem to have diminished this triumph, which was probably held as a victory over a foreign foe – in this case Hiarbas.[259] On top of the unique position of being the only *triumphator* to be an *eques*, Pompeius took the spectacular and novel approach of having his chariot drawn by elephants to mark his African exploits, perhaps as a nod to other generals who had used elephants in their imagery, including Alexander the Great, who Pompeius tried to emulate from early in his life.[260] However, his political enemies were quick to promote the farcical nature of the occasion when the beasts proved too large to fit through the *Porta Triumphalis*, forcing Pompeius to abandon his plan.[261]

The next opportunity for prestige presented itself swiftly, with the forces of Sertorius still active and pinning down the local governor in Hispania. The war in Hispania was a serious challenge, not only due to the guerrilla tactics of Sertorius, which had kept the older more experienced governor of Hispania Ulterior, Metellus Pius, effectively penned in, but Pompeius first had to fight his way through the Alps, where he conquered a number of settlements and subjugated many tribes.[262] Some contemporary historians recorded how hard fought the war was and the superiority of Sertorius over his young opponent.[263] Pompeius' version of the war portrayed him as the saviour undertaking what the consuls were too timid to do. The famous line from a supporter of Pompeius was that he was being sent

[259] Lange 2013: 74-75.
[260] Seager 2002: 28. Later a coin was minted linked to Pompeius which included the image of a figure wearing an elephant scalp. See Moritz 2001: 113, and pp. 76-7 below.
[261] Plut. *Pomp*. 14.4; Plin. *NH*. 2.4; Mader 2006: 397-403; Osgood 2018: 108-9.
[262] Leach 1978: 45; Seager 2002: 35; Gelzer 2005: 52-53.
[263] App. *B.C.* 1. 109-113; Plut. *Sert.* 18.1-19.6.

'*proconsulibus*' rather than just as '*proconsule*.'[264]This was likely an exaggeration of his part in line with his image as a great commander.[265]

However, after the conclusion of the campaign with the defeat of the forces of Perperna, Pompeius constructed a monument to his victories in Hispania as well as the initial campaign in the Alps at the height of the pass into Italia, so that all would see it on their travels.[266] The projection of one's memories was heavily tied to monument building as Pompeius would have been well aware. According to Pliny the Elder, writing two centuries later, Pompeius set up a trophy in the Pyrenees (the *Tropaeum Pompeii*) recording the 876 cities that he had subjugated, but refrained from mention of Sertorius, perhaps as he had been a fellow Roman, and Pompeius saw more glory in foreign conquests.[267] Such a monument would secure Pompeius' own memory of his achievements in the most permanent way possible and provide a site of memory that would commemorate and transmit that memory in the minds of audiences who passed, perhaps later influencing Augustus' *Res Gestae*.[268] Pompeius also took the opportunity to commemorate himself with the founding of settlements in Hispania with the refugees from some of the towns destroyed during the war, with the most well-known of these being Pompaelo (modern Pamplona). The city would enshrine Pompeius' memory in its annual ritualised foundation commemoration, while the founding cities also linked back again to the memory of famous commanders such as Alexander the Great who famously founded several self-named cities during his conquests in the East.[269]

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[264] *Cic. Phil.* 11.18-19.
[265] Plut. *Pomp*. 19; App. *B.C.* 1.109-12.
[266] Sall. *Hist*. 3.84-85; Strab. 3.160; Plin. *NH*. 3.18, 7.96; Weinstock 1971: 37; Leach 1978: 54; Nicolet 1988: 45-47; Kuttner 1995: 79-80; Seager 2002: 35; Gelzer 2005: 58.
[267] Pliny *NH*. VII.26.
[268] Winter 2010: 312-3; Wolfe 2000: 30; Roller 2018: 7,19 monuments also reach a wider audience and serve to refresh the memories in the mind of the viewer. See also pp.13-15 above.
[269] Villani 2012: 337 has cautioned against the assumptions of some modern scholars, such as Gelzer and Leach about the early acts of Pompeius and any links to the image of Alexander. This city later minted coins bearing the head of Pompeius (SNG Paris 1215) and later emperors continued this trend. See Boyce 1958 for the history of Pompeiopolis' Pompeian coinage.

The *imitatio Alexandri* of Pompeius is a well-known trope of his memory, several later sources remark on his attempts as a youth to model his appearance on the Macedonian king, affecting an anastole as found in the portraits of Alexander and visible in busts of Pompeius that still survive, such as that in the collection of the Carlsberg Glyptotek in Copenhagen.[270]



Figure 1:The bust of Pompeius from the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen, Inv. 733.. Author's own image.

It is also noted that those who wished to flatter him in these years referred to him as such.[271] There is, however, a debate on when and even where Pompeius first made practical use of his *imitatio*. He may have started to attach himself to the memory quite early on, after gaining the appellation of Magnus for his exploits in the civil war.[272] It appears that Pompeius consciously modelled some of his actions on the Macedonian king too. For example, stories circulated regarding his horsemanship and *virtus* in mounted combat, much like that of Alexander.[273] While his clement treatment of captives appears to have also been in imitation

[270] Villani 2012: 336; Kopij 2017: 124-5.
[271] Plut. *Pomp*. 2.1-2.
[272] Kühnen 2008: 57-9.
[273] Kopij 2017: 131-2.

of Alexander's famous treatment of the wives of Darius.[274] Kamil Kopij has cautioned that the memory of Alexander the Great was controversial in Rome as he was also remembered as a tyrant.[275] He argues that Pompeius may have cultivated the image of himself as the successor to Alexander in his early career before abandoning it because the memory was not wholly positive and could inadvertently be seen as a parallel with his own dubious actions.[276] Later, when Pompeius campaigned in the East, it appears he revived it, as the local population were more attuned to the positive memory of Alexander liberating the East.[277] The responsibility for broadcasting this image, Ursula Vogel-Weideman postulates, was the work of his Greek ally Theophanes.[278]

However, his next victory after Hispania would take him away from the career of Alexander and back to the politics of Rome, when, after entering northern Italia in 71 BC, he defeated the remnants of Spartacus' rebellion who had separated from the main body of the slave army and were trying to make their way north. Pompeius later wrote to the senate taking credit for ending the rebellion, much to Crassus' apparent chagrin.[279] On his return, Pompeius was greeted with great displays of public approval although whether this was for the victory in Hispania or the defeat of the slaves – perhaps both – is unclear.[280] However, to cap Pompeius' success in Hispania, in December of 71 BC he held another underage triumph for his victories.[281] To further commemorate the occasion, Pompeius also constructed a temple to Hercules near the Circus Maximus to fulfil a vow made before the campaign against

[274] App. *Mith*. 106.4; Plut *Pomp*. 36.2; Kühnen 2008: 65; Kopij 2017: 132. The memory of Alexander as a mounted warrior is perhaps been known through the mosaic found in the House of the Faun, Pompeii. It is tempting to see Caesar's own *clementia* during the civil war as an attempt to compete with Pompeius.
[275] Kopij 2017: 135.
[276] Kopij 2017: 134. See Isager 1993: 75 on the selective use of Alexander's memory.
[277] Particular the campaign in the Caucasus. This also provided a link to Hercules via the Argonauts See Villani 2012: 339-340, 343. So did the founding of cities. See Kühnen 2008: 65-68.
[278] Vogel-Weidemann 1985: 65-66; Kühnen 2005: 68; Also see Villani 2012: 339-340; Kopij 2017: 133.
[279] Plut. *Pomp*. 21.3, 31.12-13; Plut. *Crass*. 11.2-5; App. *B.C.* 1.119; Gelzer 2005: 60-61; Leach 1978: 57-58; Seager 2002: 36.
[280] Vogel-Weidemann 1985: 66; Kopij 2017: 132 agrees.
[281] Cic. *Leg. Man*. 62; Vell. Pat. 2.30.1-2, 40.4; Plut. *Pomp*. 22.1, 45.7; Plut. *Crass*. 11.8; Gelzer 2005: 63, 66.

Sertorius.[282] This meant that Pompeius now had a monument of this victory in Rome itself, to serve as a site of memory as his Pyrenean trophy was. This was arguably of greater importance as the people of Rome were more important when it came to a career in politics as they composed the electorate. The choice of Hercules is also interesting, as it was one of the deities that was favoured by Sulla, which may have provided the link between the god and successful generals to Pompeius.[283] On the other hand, there was a mythological link between Hercules and Hispania as well as Alexander the Great, whose statue famously stood in the precinct of the temple to Hercules at Gades.[284]

The censors for that year both happened to be friends of Pompeius, which allowed him to make another demonstration of his extraordinary position when he took part in the *transvectio* of the *eques* that they organised. This was a public display where the young men would be judged by the censors for their service in the army. Uniquely, Pompeius was able to stand before the podium and announce he had completed his required service in the previous campaigns under his own command.[285] Like his triumph, this provided a novel display for the assembled people, further cementing Pompeius' extraordinary career in the popular memory.[286] Pompeius knew that he owed his position to his military exploits and the popularity with the public that they granted, which also acted as a shield against the machinations of his opposition in the senate. Therefore, he continued to push for military commands from the start. His two greatest came in the middle of his career, firstly when he took up the challenge that had alluded many others of subduing the pirates that were swarming the Mediterranean sea and hindering

[282] Plin. *NH*.34.57; Luke 2014: 84 note 102; Davies 2017: 187.
[283] Luke 2014: 81-2; Davies 2017: 187.
[284] On Caesar's reaction to seeing this statue of Alexander at Gades, see Sue. *DJ*. 7.1 and Dio 37.52.2; Rawson 1970: 30-37; Roddaz 2004: 34-5; Santangelo 2007: 229. Pompeius' interest would return with his conquest of The East and the watchword at Pharsalus was *Hercules Invictus* (App. *B.C 2.76*). The road that led through Hispania was even called the via Heraclea.
[285] Cic. *Ad Att*. 1.18.6; Dio 38.5.1; Seager 2002: 39.
[286] Plut. *Pomp*. 22.6.

the shipments of the all-important grain supplies to Rome.[287] The campaign was famous for the swift speed with which Pompeius gathered his forces and swept the seas from West to East, taking only 40 days to do so.[288] In the end the remaining pirates that surrendered to Pompeius were settled in towns that had diminished populations, including Soli, a city inland from the Black Sea, which he renamed Pompeiopolis.[289] Again, Pompeius was reinforcing his memory as he had in Hispania and alluding to the actions of Alexander, except this time Pompeius was in the same part of the world as his idol. Such a view of Pompeius does not seem to have been lost on those in the East, and many cities dedicated inscriptions calling Pompeius, among other titles, benefactor and saviour.[290] Some modern scholarship has called into question the success of Pompeius' campaign as pirate attacks were still noted in the years afterward, but the belief at the time was that Pompeius had finally destroyed the pirates where many others had failed.[291] Understandably this made Pompeius extremely popular with the plebs, for whom the much needed grain to the city was pivotal. Of the back of this success, his allies in the senate were able to pass a law for Pompeius' next great command – the campaign against Mithridates.

Pompeius had ended his campaign against the pirates in the right place to conduct this mission. Although it cannot be known how much Pompeius directly influenced Cicero's words, the *Pro Lege Manilia* gives an insight into how, at least, Cicero understood the memory Pompeius wanted to be transmitted. In the speech, Cicero is very careful to avoid diminishing Lucullus directly, but he makes it clear that Pompeius is eminently suited to take command and finish a task that has long eluded the Romans. He begins by listing Pompeius' military virtues and also reminds his listeners of the youth and lack of status of Pompeius when he achieved

[287] Cic. *Leg. Man*. 34-44.
[288] Plut. *Pomp*. 28.2.
[289] Plut. *Pomp*. 28.4; Dio 36.37.6; Strab. 12.3.40-1; Morrell 2017: 63.
[290] Listed in Valverde 2001: 88-96.
[291] The main voice being de Souza 1999: 171-181, although Morrell 2017: 63-65 provides a good critique of the shortcomings of de Souza's argument.

his first victories, which are for the benefit of the state, rather than himself.[292] He also recounts Pompeius' military career, beginning with the campaign against Sertorius. It is interesting that the earlier more problematic hunting of Sulla's enemies is largely passed over and when it is briefly mentioned – for the purpose of recalling the geographic extent of Pompeius' victories – the enemies are nameless, but now referred to as enemies of the state.[293] Finally, Cicero recounts Pompeius' latest campaign in hagiographic detail mentioning not only the total defeat of the pirates but also Pompeius' mercy towards them, together with the speed that the campaign was accomplished.[294]

This speech is similar to one that is recorded by the later historian Dio in the debates that lead to the issuing of the command against the pirates. Although this speech is considered to be an invention, it is interesting to see how closely it adheres to the form of praising Pompeius' military achievements, despite Pompeius' claimed reluctance to undertake the task.[295] Clearly Pompeius was a figure who placed great value on his memory as a skilled general, as both contemporaries and later writers remembered. This can been seen in the general trend of his memory as one in which his image as a public speaker is overshadowed by that of his military career.[296]

Pompeius' bolstering of his memory in the military sphere was born from practical political considerations as part of his strategy of also securing the popular support of the plebs (another sphere of memory that he worked to control as can be seen by the recasting of his youthful popularity), as Henriette van der Blom has noted, 'Pompey advanced his career less through purely oratorical skills, and more through his popularity with the people (whom he

[292] Cic. *Pro Leg. Man*. 10.27-8.
[293] Cic. *Pro Leg. Man*. 11.30-1.
[294] Cic. *Pro Leg. Man*. 12.34-35.
[295] Dio 24.5-26.4.
[296] Although it should be noted that Cicero thought Pompeius to be a good speaker. See *Cic. Sest.* 107, *Brut.* 239.

nurtured in the *contio*), stemming from his military achievements, and through his shrewd political talent for knowing when to speak and what to say and, in particular, when not to speak and what not to say.'[297]

The next eight years were spent crisscrossing the Middle East as he fought against various kings from the Black Sea down to Judea. Many of the rulers of the territories were easily broken off from Mithridates or were subjugated by Pompeius' forces. In the years he campaigned he conquered and added to the Roman sphere by direct control or through client kings over most of the Mediterranean kingdoms of the Middle East. Eventually he cornered Mithridates, who committed suicide. Again, Pompeius had achieved what many had failed to, including Sulla, with the death of Rome's greatest foe for the past two decades. As part of the campaign, as with Hispania and the war against the pirates, Pompeius founded a number of cities that either took his name or were placed near to the location of key events of the campaign, such as his victory over Mithridates, which was commemorated with the foundation of Nikopolis.[298] The addition of so much territory to the empire and the revenue it brought in tributes cemented Pompeius among the greats of Roman military history.

The defeat of Mithridates would mark the greatest campaign of recent times until Caesar's later conquest of Gaul. Despite the attempts by others, such as Lucullus, to dispute the success and the delays and obstruction of the senate when it came to ratifying the grants of Pompeius, the campaign was a key part of Pompeius' memory. Before he had returned, the senate had already voted him the exceptional honours of the right to wear triumphal dress at the games and the toga praetexta with a gold crown at the theatre.[299] He was greeted by cheering crowds when he returned to Italia and was escorted back to the city and later held a

[297] van der Blom 2011: 555.
[298] Kühnen 2008: 65-68, the foundation of many cities could be linked to Alexander, Apollo, Heracles and Dionysos. See Kopij 2017: 129-31 for a list of all the foundations of Pompeius from Hispania to the East.
[299] Vell. Pat. 2.40.2.

two day, triple triumph for his victories. [300] Pompeius termed his triumph as the conquest of the whole world and represented this by having a trophy of the inhabited world, most likely in the form of a globe, carried in procession alongside other trophies representing the conquered nations.[301] During the triumph, Pompeius claimed to have worn the cloak of Alexander the Great that had been taken from Mithridates (himself a figure who engaged in an *imitatio Alexandri*).[302]

As part of his celebrations, Pompeius dedicated a temple to Minerva (a goddess with an association with successful generals and Alexander the Great) in Rome around 60 BC, and part of the spoils from his campaigns were vowed to the goddess with an accompanying inscription of the huge number of towns and fortresses that had been captured, ships seized or sunk, and people subjugated as well as the territory added to the empire.[303] To further advertise and perpetuate the memory of his greatest triumph, his son-in-law Faustus minted a coin at Rome in 56 BC to that effect, showing the head of Hercules wearing a lionskin headdress on the obverse and a globe surrounded with the triumphator's three laurel crowns (for the three wreaths he was given for his victories over Africa, Europe, and Asia) and with a fourth larger one, the *corona civica* (for having saved the citizens), along with an *aplustre* and an ear of corn to the lower left and right respectively symbolizing dominion over sea and land.[304]

[300] Plut. *Pomp*. 43.3.
[301] Dio 37.21.2; Seager 2002: 80. Later as an a means to surpass the memory of Pompeius military prestige, Caesar held a quadruple triumph in 46 BC over Gaul, Alexandria, Pontus, and Africa.
[302] App *Mith.*117.5; Kühnen 2008: 70-71; Kopij 2017: 125.
[303] Plin. *NH*. 7.97 Seager 2002: 79-80; Santangelo 2007: 232. This might have also tied into Pompeius links with the East, particularly with Athens and Illium who had strong connections with the Greek Athena, much as Sulla had emphasised his eastern links with Aphrodite. See also Zampieri, 2020: 324-344.
[304] *RRC* 426/4a. Another coin in the same year (*RR*C 426/3) in Rome shows the head of Venus on the obverse and three trophies, which might allude to Pompeius' signate ring (modelled after Sulla's) and/or the three areas of conquest (Africa, Europe, and Asia) with a jug to the left and a lituus to the right on the reverse marking his augurate. See Villani 2012: 347-8.

Figure 2: RRC 426/4a showing the lionskin headdress and the four corona. Image from the collections of the British Museum.

Figure 3: RRC 426/3 depicting Venus and three trophies. Imagine for the collections of the British Museum.

Another aureus coin of uncertain date depicts the personification of Asia in the manner of Alexander the Great bearing the legend MAGNVS on the obverse while the reverse shows Pompeius riding in a triumphal chariot with his son Gnaeus and Victory flying above bearing the legend PRO COS on the reverse.[305] This coin likely refers to Pompeius' Eastern triumph and perhaps alludes to his *imitatio Alexandri* with the elephant-scalp bedecked figure of Africa.

[305] *RRC* 402.

Figure 4: RRC 402/1b depicting the head of Alexander the Great with the title 'Magnus' and the symbols of the augurate on the obverse and the triumphal chariot of Pompeius with Gnaeus(?) riding a horse, Victory flying above and Pro. Co[n]s[ul]. on the reverse . Image from the collections of the British Museum.

Outside of the triumph and numismatics, Pompeius was quick to advertise his achievements, with the rams from the captured ships fixed to one of his residences within the city. This house soon became famous as the *Domus Rostrata* because of its decoration.[306] A *triumphator* had the right to display war spoils that would remain with the house for as long as it existed as a permanent memorial.[307] Unlike many other forms of commemoration, which were sometimes within a house, the rams were fixed on the main entrance that faced out into the street as a site for the perpetual reminding of the public of Pompeius' pirate campaign.[308] The displaying of rams was not new, there were already two famous examples by Gaius Maenius (the *rostra vetera*) marking the conquest of Antium, and Gaius Duilius (the *columna rostrata*) for his victory over the Carthaginians at the battle of Mylae. Both of these had been columns in the prime location of the forum, whereas Pompeius' own display was attached to his house instead, adding to what Hölkeskamp has called the 'tapestry of memory' in the city.[309] Whether this was done because Pompeius wanted to avoid the difficulties of setting up and

[306] Hölkeskamp 2010: 74.
[307] Plin. *NH*.35.7.
[308] Roller 2018: 237-38 the domus could be used to showcase the socio-political power of its owner and become a monument in its own right.
[309] Hölkeskamp 2010: 74-75; Tan 2019: 194.

maintaining a monument in a public space, or to keep the site of memory distinct and closely tied to himself, it meant that he had created his own commemorative entrance that all visitors would have to pass through. It may also have served as a replacement for the usual *imagines* that would be kept within a Roman house, advertising Pompeius as a self-made man as he likely only had his father to advertise, and, as already has been discussed, Strabo was controversial.[310]

Finally, Pompeius used his great wealth from the war for a grand building programme in Rome. The most memorable of these projects was the great entertainment complex the Theatrum Pompeii. He broke with tradition in more than one way when he built his stone theatre in August of 55 BC in the Campus Martius.[311] This was an exceptional building achievement, as before this point no one had been able to build a permanent theatre at Rome.[312] Pompeius again pushed at the boundaries of what was acceptable to the ruling elite, although it was popular with the plebs. To avoid the moral prohibition that normally permitted only the building temporary of theatres, Pompeius included a temple to *Venus Victrix* at the top of the *summa cavea*, which he supposedly claimed was a monumental staircase for the temple. This allowed Pompeius to take advantage of the rules regarding the sanctity of a temple space to prevent subsequent demolition.[313]

Venus, like Hercules, was another deity associated with successful generals most recently by Sulla, who heavily linked himself to Venus and the Greek counterpart Aphrodite. As part of his Eastern conquests, his Greek version of the cognomen Felix was Epaphroditus – Beloved of Aphrodite – perhaps as a means of connecting the two spheres of the empire.[314]

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[310] Walter 2004: 46. See pp. 31-37 above.
[311] Richardson 1992: 318-319; Sear 1993: 687; Santangelo 2007: 231.
[312] Greenhalgh 1981: 52, 56-7; Gelzer 2005: 149.
[313] Ascon. 1; Plin. *NH*. 7.34, 158, 8.20; Plut. *Pomp*. 40.5, 52.4; Tert. *De. Spect*. 10 (admittedly written centuries later); Dio 39.38.1; Leach 1978: 146-147; Greenhalgh 1981: 57; Zanker 1990: 21; Beacham 1991: 161; Gelzer 2005: 149.
[314] Santangelo 2007: 230.

Aside from the main temple, included in the theatre complex were shrines to Honos, Virtus, Felicitas, and Victoria – a series that was again tied into victorious generals such as Sulla – as recorded in various *fasti*.[315]

The inclusion of a temple brought a Hellenistic element to the design, as theatres within that sphere tended to be linked to ritual and included religious structures.[316] Mary Boatwright has referred to Roman theatres as embodying 'the close relationship of spectacles, religion, society, and politics.'[317] The scale of the theatre and its adjoining portico gardens were the height of luxury, and the theatre complex would never be surpassed in size. As a part of the complex, Pompeius had a residence constructed for himself in the grounds, again much in the style of a Hellenistic palace complex, which would often include a theatre for the performance of royal rituals.[318] Instead of a palace though, Pompeius opted for a structure that did not aid in the accusations of aspiring to monarchy by constructing a house in more modest fashion so that it was referred to as looking like a rowboat being towed behind a ship.[319]

The position of the whole complex outside of the pomerium meant that Pompeius could appear before the crowds without having to relinquish his imperium. As Richard Beacham notes 'A further attraction of the theatre to Pompey[…] was its provision of a convenient site where he could appear before a huge crowd to in effect display and validate the popular basis of his authority.'[320] Mary Sturgeon has noted the political value at the time

[315] August 12th was the date for sacrifices appointed to these temples (Inscript.Ital.13.2.493-494). The *Fasti Amiternini*, *Allifani* and the Arval Brethren. See Santangelo 2007: 230-1.
[316] Kuttner 1999: 346-9; Davies 2018: 499.
[317] Boatwright 1990: 185.
[318] Strootman 2014: 56, 61. A function that would be continued into the imperial age and beyond with the Palatine and the Circus Maximus and the similar function of the great racetrack in Constantinople.
[319] Plut. *Pomp*. 40.2.
[320] Greenhalgh 1981: 57; Beacham 1991: 158. The statue of Pompeius that Caesar was murdered at the foot of was moved by Augustus. Hallett 2005: 337 notes there is some speculation that the colossal statue in the Palazzo Spada in Rome, which was found near the theatre of Pompeius is the statue from the curia and depicts Pompeius holding a globe in his outstretched hand in reference to his last triumph as the world conqueror.

with Cicero commenting in his writing on the theatre as a good way to gauge the strength of popular feelings.[321]

The opening of the theatre itself was accompanied by the usual extravagance that normally accompanied a Pompeian show, although it was dismissed as vulgar by Cicero, and as with his earlier triumph was mainly remembered for the wrong reasons.[322] The theatre certainly provided Pompeius with a lasting monument in the city, which would prolong his name and achievements to all who saw it. An inscription later placed on the theatre proclaimed that Pompeius had been a consul three times among his other achievements, while the magnificent colonnaded portico was laid out as a visual history so that everyone (literate or not) could appreciate the extent of Pompeius' conquests. This site of memory included statues of the personified provinces lining the paths in chronological order, while an inscription on the temple made clear the exact extent of Pompeius' achievements.[323]

Included in the construction was a curia, as the original had been destroyed during the impromptu cremation of Clodius. The curia itself was crowned with a large statue of Pompeius watching over the debates of the senators as a constant reminder of the general and his beneficence.[324] Certainly the complex not only provided a space for the remembrance for Pompeius in the curia and public appreciation of shows, but also preserved his name and munificence for the future by removing the need to build temporary venues and providing a permanent space for others to hold their games and shows thereby forcing future aediles to share the credit for public entertainment.[325]

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[321] Cic. *Pro Sest*. 118-123, *Ad Att*. 14.3.2; Sturgeon 2004: 54.
[322] Cic. *De Off*. 2.57; Plin. *NH*. 7.34, 7.158, 8.20; 36.115; Plut. *Pomp*. 40.5; Dio 39.38.1-4; Greenhalgh 1981: 55-8; Gelzer 2005: 149.
[323] Seager 2002: 80; Westall 2018b: 327. There is a suggestion that the statues of the fourteen conquered nations were instead arranged around the *scaenae fons* (Plin. *NH*. 36.41, 7.97-98). It has been argued by Scott 2015: 21-34 that this was a precursor for Augustus' *Porticus ad Nationes* and the *Forum Augustum*. See also Vogel-Weidemann 1985: 59-60.
[324] Gelzer 2005: 149; Greenhalgh 1981: 61; Beacham 1991: 158; Russell 2016: 163.
[325] *RG*.20; Tac. *Ann*. 3.72; It was further repaired over the decades by the emperors. Such Caligula and Claudius (Suet. *Calig. 21, Claud*. 12).

Later Caesar would plan to build his own theatre to surpass Pompeius, but this was curtailed when he was assassinated in Pompeius' curia. He did, however, begin work on this own government buildings with his forum, curia, and his own temple to Venus in the form of *Genetrix*.[326] The choice of building has been understood as being an indicator of the builder's desire for their own perception and memory. That Pompeius built a complex aimed at entertainment for the masses perhaps hints at what he considered desirable, whereas Caesar's choice of buildings where those that had administrative functions, which fitted in with his source of political power.[327]

The whole Pompeian programme after his return from the East perhaps explains why he was later strongly associated with the oriental imagery, both mockingly and as a means of subtle remembrance. This seems to have been particularly prominent in the civil war where his enemies and allies used the memory of Pompeius' time in the East and the Hellenistic orientalism that he brought back to Rome to twist the old claims that he desired power like Sulla into a desire to assume the monarchic power of the Eastern potentates.[328] Indeed, in the years following the war, Pompeius would become deeply associated with the East, with writers such as Vergil conflating the figure of Priam with the memory of Pompeius in his Aeneid.[329] Vergil altered the location of death scene of Priam from the foot of an altar to the shoreline and noted that his corpse was headless. This allusion to the death of Pompeius was likely clear enough to any reader.[330]

The camp of Pompeius has generated much scholarly debate about how Caesar is portraying the opposition and Pompeius himself. Several scholars including Adrian Tronson,

[326] App. *B.C.* 2.10; Plut. *Caes*. 43.2, 44.1; Richardson 1992: 166, Ulrich 1993: 66-67 Caesar pledged a temple before Pharsalus that was originally going to be dedicated to Venus Victrix, like Pompeius' but later changed it to the founder of the Julian gens. See also Anderson 1984: 9-63 on the *Forum Iulium* project in general.
[327] Ulrich 1993: 53-4, 74.
[328] Rossi 2000a: 241-9; Plut *Pomp*. 67.5; *Caes*. 41.2.
[329] Ver. *Aen.*557; Bowie 1990: 473.
[330] Joseph 2018: 296-8.

John Henderson and Andreola Rossi have argued that Caesar is claiming that Pompeius has become akin to an Eastern despot or that he had become barbarised. Rossi and Tronson have both argued that the camp scene was based on a familiar *topos* that had its origins in Greek histories, particularly those dealing with Persian ethnicity, such as the Persian camp after the battle of Platea and the camp of Darius after the battle of Issus.[331] Rossi's evidence that Pompeius is being made 'the embodiment of an oriental king' lies, predominately with the luxury of Pompeius' camp.[332] While Caesar is attempting to show how his enemies are lacking in martial spirit and, therefore, how far from the perfect Roman ideal they are. Caesar is drawing on the memory of Pompeius' greatest campaign against Mithridates and claiming that the time he spent conquering the East had corrupted him. As Caesar says about Pompeius' camp:

'In the camp of Pompeius may be seen artificial bowers, a great weight of silver is exhibited, and tents constructed from fresh turf, also the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others, were covered with ivy and, besides that, many signs of excessive luxury and confidence in victory, so that it would be easy to judge them unafraid of the outcome of the day as they were seeking unnecessary pleasures. Yet these men were taunting Caesar's miserable and long-suffering army with luxuries, which had always been lacking in useful necessity.' (*in castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Luci etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula portecta hedera multaque praeterea, quae nimiam luxuriem et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirerent*

[331] Rossi 2000a: 240, 243-45; Tronson 2001: 73.
[332] Rossi 2000a: 241, 249 notes that Pompeius was called 'king of kings', but this was in Plutarch (*Pomp*. 67.5, *Caes*. 41.2) Thus, this adds little to an argument on Caesar's characterisation. See also Goldsworthy 2006: 423. Pompeius may have cultivated the image of Agamemnon, see Westall 2012b: 321-38.

voluptates. At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitu Caesaris luxuriem obiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent.)[333]

The second piece of evidence rests with the composition of Pompeius' army; Rossi and Tronson are right to note that Caesar drew attention to the number of foreign allies that Pompeius was utilising. However, his account of Pompeius' army composition in the third book (3.4) where he lists the number of legions drawn from the colonies in the East and from veterans seems to ignore that they were probably Roman citizens. It is hard to ascribe anything more to this then Caesar's need to distance himself from the killing of fellow Romans.[334] Pompeius was not acting in isolation, as even Caesar himself made no secret of his use of Gallic auxiliaries during the campaigns.[335]

Tronson rests the bulk of his argument on a scattering of personality traits that are attributed to the opposition, unconvincingly, as signs of barbarity, such as brutality and the (threat) of mutilation of fellow Romans.[336] None of these points are particularly strong nor are they symptomatic of a barbarian. This merely provides an intertextual loop that takes the reader back to the opening chapters of the narrative in the first book of the *Bellum Civile* when Pompeius and his allies are portrayed as uncivilised. Grillo, who agrees with many of the arguments of Tronson, Rossi and Henderson, suggests that the luxury of the camp is an allusion to the luxury of other events in Pompeius' career, such as his triumphs and the inauguration of his theatre.[337] However, most triumphs were grand affairs, nor was any of the *luxuria* found in the camp directly attributed to Pompeius.

[333] Caes. *BC*. 3.96.
[334] Rossi 2000a: 248-250.
[335] Caes. *BC*. 1.51 Gallic forces with Caesar in Hispania, 3.22 Gallic and Spanish horsemen with Caesar, 3.29 Antonius uses Gallic ships, 3.59 Gallic horsemen defecting to Pompeius.
[336] Tronson 2001: 97. Dehumanisation is a good way to help your own troops with the psychological effect of killing fellow citizens, also Lange 2018: 69.
[337] Grillo 2012: 126-128.

It is clear though, that Caesar was using Pompeius' own memories against him in his *Bellum Civile*, particularly his connection with the East and the clients he had acquired. Pompeius' campaigns took him all over the Mediterranean where he was able to use his position and influence to gain clients among the populace of the different territories. Pompeius was well-known for his claims of having a great number of clients made up from his various campaigns abroad and from efforts to enfranchise various communities on the Italian peninsular. This was probably exaggerated at the time for prestige, but it seems to have been a widely held belief that is noticeable in many accounts by contemporaries.[338] An alternative for the continuation of this notion was that it allowed writers like Caesar to make his own victories seem greater when the imbalance of power and resources was taken into account. For writers such as Sallust, these clients could be used to link Pompeius to incidents, such as the assassination of Piso in Hispania.[339] Both Hispania and the East were large areas where Pompeius could claim a large number of clients, but Sicily, and the northern districts of the Italian peninsular also were supposed to be clients of Pompeius.[340] Certainly, Sthenius in Sicily and the Balbi in Hispania were well known clients of Pompeius. However, Italia went over with little resistance to Caesar including the Pompeian heartland of Picenum, and Balbus changed sides at the start of the civil war.[341] The kings of the East and some of the pirates seemed to remain loyal to an extent and supported Pompeius' war efforts with grants of money and the sending of recruits.[342] Although Pompeius might claim that whole regions were his clients, in reality it was likely just the leading men who were.[343]

[338] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 9.9.2. See Badian 1958: 278-9, 282-3; Pina Polo 2008: 42, 48 and 2017: 269-70; Jehne 2015: 297-319; Rosillo-López 2015: 269-71 on the reliability of this view.
[339] Sall. *Cat.* 19; Badian 1958: 278-9; Pina Polo 2008: 42.
[340] Badian 1958: 277; Rosillo- López 2015: 269.
[341] Badian 1958: 282; Pina Polo 2008: 44 and 2017: 273-274, 278.
[342] Prag 2015: 281-94; Jehne 2015: 303-7.
[343] Pina Polo 2008: 47 and 2017: 277.

These clients were also another source of memories for Pompeius and they tended to perceive their patron in a different light than the political competitors in Rome. He seems to have left a more positive memory with the native Sicilians during his time there in the 80s; in particular Sthenius, a local elite, who remained a friend for many years and would have been able to tout Pompeius' positives to the local population.[344] As noted by the work of Diodorus Siculus, while Pompeius was in Sicily on campaign for Sulla he also began developing a client base through his careful treatment of the local population.[345] This created an alternative local memory of Pompeius, one that survived for decades. It should be noted that the Greek historians largely have a different view from the Romans. Among the main contemporary accounts of Pompeius, a rough division can be seen between those who maintained negative memories - those who tend to be Romans in the capital - whereas the more positive accounts of Pompeius come from his supporters who were largely composed of Greeks in the provinces – such as Theophanes. The Hellenistic world was much more supportive of Pompeius than the rest of the empire in the West. Pompeius had spent much time there in the 60's during the campaign against Mithridates and made many connections as well as bringing an end to the conflict which had raged on and off for many decades. It was not by chance, therefore, that Pompeius' strategy for the civil war hinged on gathering his supporters in the East. This division by language would later impact the type of memories preserved by authors when they came to research their own accounts, as has been shown earlier with Plutarch.[346]

The high standing of Pompeius in the collective memory of the plebs was manifested a couple of years after Pompeius' return from the East when he was struck down by a serious

[344] Badian 1958: 282.
[345] Plut. *Pomp*. 10.1-7; Sall. *Hist*.1.44; Liv. *Per*.89; Val. Max.5.3.5, 6.2.8, 9.13.2; App. *B.C*.1.96; Cic. *Verr*.2.2.113; Cic. *Leg. Man*. 30; Diod 38.20.1; Gelzer 2005: 44; Leach 1978: 29; Seager 2002: 27.
[346] See pp. 34-5 above on the positive view point of Plutarch.

illness, which may have been malaria that he had caught on campaign. The detrimental impact on his health was so great there were concerns that he might die; this caused a great public outpouring of support for Pompeius, with people across Italia making offerings and beseeching the gods for his recovery.[347] Eventually, Pompeius did recover from his illness to much rejoicing from the populace, however later the show of popular support at this time was one of the factors that were blamed for inflating Pompeius' belief that his was the position of strength against Caesar and his forces.[348] It may not have been Pompeius alone though and the lack of proper planning by the senate suggests that they, too, believed that Pompeius was stronger militarily.

However, the problems that Pompeius had with the senate and other elites did not always aid the preservation of his memory of military prowess. For example, the senate refused to grant Pompeius overarching command over all forces until they had already evacuated from Rome and Italia completely, which further hampered the efforts against Caesar by failing to present a unified resistance to a relatively small force. This allowed the defence of Italia to be fought piecemeal, subsequently damaging the memory of his skill as a commander especially when coupled with the boasts that he supposedly voiced in the build up to war.

Cicero also left a memory of Pompeius' military ability that was less than optimal. After initially supporting Pompeius, the retreat from Italia, and particularly Rome, in the face of Caesar's advance upset the ideologically driven Cicero into turning against the strategy of Pompeius. This criticism was quickly replaced with a deep concern about Pompeius' ability to organise an effective resistance to Caesar in Italia and even to defend Rome.[349] On the 18th January 49 BC events had taken a turn for the worse and Cicero wrote to Atticus again

[347] Cic. *Ad Att.* 6.3.4, 8.16.1, 9.5.4; *Tusc*. 1.86; Vell 2.48.2; Plut. *Pomp*. 57. 1-5 Dio 41.6; App. *B.C.* 2.28. On the interesting position of Pompeius in the minds of the plebs, see Rosillo-López 2017: 226-8 who discusses the terracotta statues of Pompeius likely from the *lares compitales*.
[348] Seager 2002: 145-6.
[349] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 16.11.3.

complaining, 'I do not know what decision our Gnaeus has taken, until now he is stupefied and confined to the towns. All will unite if he stands in Italia, but if he cedes it, I shall have to consider the matter.' (*Gnaeus noster quid consili ceperit capiatve nescio, adhuc in oppidis coartatus et stupens. omnes, si in Italia consistat, erimus una, sin cedet, consili res est*).[350] Followed three days later by:

'what do you see in Pompeius' decision? I ask this because he will relinquish the city, therefore I am at a loss. Nothing then is absurd. "You will relinquish the city" – the same accordingly if the Gauls are coming? He says "The *res publica* is not in the walls of houses" – but it is in altars and hearths. "Themistocles did it." Because one city did not have the power to endure the whole barbarian flood, but fifty years later Pericles did not – with nothing held except the ramparts. Our own people, once upon a time, relinquished the captured city, however, they held the citadel. But on the other hand, the anguish from the municipia and from the talk of those who I meet, the result this plan is about to have is visible. The lamentation of the people is extraordinary – to be without the magistrates and the senate in the city. Finally, the people are extraordinarily disturbed at the flight of Pompeius. Another fact of the matter is that at present no one values conceding to Caesar.'

(*quale tibi consilium Pompei videtur? hoc quaero quod urbem reliquerit. ego enim ἀπορῶ. tum nihil absurdius. urbem tu relinquas? ergo idem, si Galli venirent? non est inquit in parietibus res publica. at in aris et focis. fecit Themistocles. fluctum enim totius barbariae ferre urbs una non poterat. at idem Pericles non fecit annum fere post quinquagesimum, cum praeter moenia nihil teneret; nostri olim urbe reliqua capta arcem tamen retinuerunt. rursus autem ex dolore municipali sermonibusque eorum quos convenio videtur hoc consilium exitum habiturum. mira hominum querela est … sine magistratibus urbem esse, sine senatu. fugiens*

[350] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.10.1.

denique Pompeius mirabiliter homines movet. quid quaeris? alia causa facta est. nihil iam concedendum putant Caesari.)[351]

Pompeius' lack of willingness or ability to defend the city was the biggest sticking point in the relationship between Cicero and himself, who was aware of the massive psychological blow that abandoning Rome would land. As can be seen by Cicero's comments, Pompeius' strategy, regardless of its military wisdom, was unconscionable.[352] It was at this point that Cicero began to lose his faith in Pompeius and started to take a more critical view of the proceedings. A day later Cicero compounded his thoughts regarding Pompeius' decision to abandon Rome to the advancing forces of Caesar with a discussion on Pompeius' lack of future plans, stating that 'I suspect not even he knows; none of us even does.' (*ne ipsum quidem scire puto nostrum quidem nemo*.)[353] Cicero, however, was probably being kept in the dark because he was not very useful militarily, later he conceded that it would be a risky strategy for Pompeius to stay in Italia – questioning the integrity of the two legions that were in camp in southern Italia.[354]

Cicero made clear in his letter to Atticus of 5th February 49 that he remained sceptical of his side's abilities, although not blaming Pompeius alone, he instead referred to the magistrates as 'improvident and negligent leaders.' (*improvidi et neglegentes duces*.) while still retaining his faith in Pompeius, but not for his military skill, noting that if he himself fled it would only be because 'friendship with Gnaeus encourages me to flee.' (*ad fugam hortatur*

[351] Cic. *Ad Att.* 7.11.3-4.
[352] Cicero compared Rome to the head on a body (*Ad. Att.* 8.1.1-2) and the city as the *patria,* for which it would be splendid to die (*Ad. Att.* 8.2.2). Also see Cicero's letter to Tiro (*Ad Fam.* 16.12.1-2, 4) and Sulpicius (Cic. *Ad Fam*. 4.1.2). In *De Inv.*2.22.66, Cicero maintained that there were three things that one owed pietas to: the fatherland (*patria*), parents (*parentes*), and blood relatives (*sanguine coniunctos*). See also Wagenvoort 1980: 7-9, who has noted that after 45 B.C. Cicero's view changed giving prominence to the gods instead.
[353] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.1.12; Holliday 1969: 44.
[354] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.20.1.

amicitia Gnaei.)[355] Cicero's next letter two days later, however, elaborated on his views regarding Pompeius' capabilities:

'our leader is nowhere and putting nothing in motion… but our Gnaeus, (O, how miserable and incredible the matter is!) is totally inactive: no will, no troops and no diligence. I will dismiss that most shameful flight from the city, complete timidity in public meetings in the towns, and ignorance not only of the adversary but also his own forces.'

(*noster dux nusquam sit, nihil agat, nec nomina dant…Gnaeus autem noster (o rem miseram et incredibilem) ut totus iacet, non animus est, non consilium, non copiae, non diligentia. mittam illa, fugam ab urbe turpissimam, timidissimas in oppidis contiones, ignorationem non solum adversari sed etiam suarum copiarum*.)[356]

The evidence of Cicero shows that he was gravely disappointed by Pompeius' lack of action. Added to this Alfred Burns notes that Caesar changed the wording of one of Pompeius' letters to Domitius that is preserved by Cicero. In the letter Pompeius writes to Domitius, '… for neither am I confident enough of the disposition of the soldiers I have in attacking when it concerns the fortune of the whole *res publica* ….' *(… neque enim eorum militum quos mecum habeo voluntate satis confide ut de omnibus fortunis rei publicae dimicem*….)[357] However, in Caesar's version that he quoted in his account of the war 'Pompeius wrote back that he would not lead the situation into greater danger.' (*Pompeius enim rescripserat sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse*.)[358] Burns argues that 'it omits all the military justification Pompey has presented for not coming to Domitius' aid. The changes and especially the

[355] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.20.2.
[356] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.21.1.
[357] Cic. *Ad Att*. 8.12d.1.
[358] Caes. *BC*. 1.19.

omission of the word *publicam* has changed the sense… it presents Pompey as a coward and deserter of his allies.'[359]

Despite the problems of the first few months, the strength of the memory of Pompeius' skill as a general prompted Caesar – well aware of the value of a reputation of military prowess –to try and diminish it. Caesar had already made some minor attempts to attack the image of Pompeius as the leader by repeatedly claiming that, in desperation, Pompeius was recruiting slaves. Henrik Mouritsen, while discussing the role of freedmen in military affairs, notes that 'the exclusion of freedmen from active military service may be sought in concerns about their loyalty to the state as well as their fighting abilities, misgivings rooted in conventional prejudices against the "slave nature". There was a perceived incompatibility of servile origins and the moral authority that came from carrying arms and defending the state.'[360]

Initially Caesar blamed this on Pompeius' allies; 'gladiators, whom Caesar had in a *ludus*, Lentulus led to the forum, encouraged them with hope of liberty, gave them horses and commanded them to follow him.'[361] Tronson notes that the use of slaves in an army was normally the sign of a rebel force.[362] It is clear that Caesar's opponents had stooped to a new low.[363] The gladiators that Lentulus was trying to recruit and arm were from Capua, and that must have struck a chord with some readers who would remember that two decades before, Capua had been the scene of Spartacus' gladiator uprising. However, soon Caesar recorded the recruiting efforts of Pompeius: 'He [Pompeius] arms slaves and shepherds and gives to them horses; from these he produces around 300 horsemen.' (*servos, pastores armat atque iis equos attribuit; ex his circiter ccc eques conficit*.)[364]

[359] Burns 1966: 87; see also Batstone and Damon 2006: 64.
[360] Mouritsen 2011: 72, for discussion on the perceived character flaws of slaves and freedmen see 18-20.
[361] Caes. *BC*. 1.14.
[362] Tronson 2001: 50.
[363] Grillo 2012: 70 This event is also collaborated by Cicero. Carter 1991: 172.
[364] Caes. *BC*. 1.24. Westall 2019: 78 notes the links between this accusation and the similar accusation used against Sextus later by Octavian.

In the third book of his *Bellum Civile*, he finally narrates the two main generals coming to grips on the field of battle to pit their respective military skills against one another. This book predominately focuses on diminishing Pompeius' renown as a commander and attacking his strategy, while enabling Caesar to showcase his own military abilities much as he had done with the *Bellum Gallicum*. Caesar's narrative records Pompeius' preparations for the coming clash. Caesar makes the point of noting that Pompeius has had 'a year's space to bring together and prepare his forces.' (*annuum spatium ad conparandas copias nactus*.)[365] He then proceeded to catalogue the huge forces, both on land and sea, which Pompeius had amassed. Pompeius' son Gnaeus – 'in command of the Egyptian fleet' (*praeerat Aegyptiis navibus*) – is mentioned as having, 'brought with the fleet 800 men he collected from their slaves and shepherds.'(*Pompeius filius cum classe adduxerat; DCCC ex servis suis pastorumque suorum numero coegerat*.)[366] Like his father, Gnaeus is also tarred with the same brush by Caesar and the trope of recruiting undesirables for their army and fighting a war with non-citizens. Caesar's details on Pompeius' forces serves the purpose of making Caesar's eventual victory all the more spectacular, as he faced a larger force.[367] Caesar then wrote a vivid description of the affect that his approach had on Pompeius' forces: *'*so great a terror fell on [Pompeius'] army, because to make haste on the march he joined together night and day without interruption, so that nearly all from Epirus and neighbouring regions abandon the standards, many throw down their arms and the march appears like a flight.' (*tantusque terror incidit eius exercitu, quod properans noctem die coniunxerat neque iter intermiserat, ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent, ac fugae simile iter videretur*.)[368]

[365] Caes. *BC*. 3.3.
[366]Caes. *BC*. 3.4, 3.5, 3.40; Tronson 2001: 91.
[367] Raaflaub 1974: 35.
[368] Caes. *BC*. 3.13.

While Caesar portrays Pompeius' army as lacking confidence – possibly in Pompeius' abilities - Pompeius is portrayed as a poor general, with his army having little faith in him compared to Caesar. The focus on Pompeius' army also drew attention away from Caesar's own weak position as he was outmarched by Pompeius, who was able to reach Dyrrachium first. During a clash on one of the hills Pompeius had Caesar's men pinned down and, 'as a result, it was said from that time, Pompeius himself said, boasting he would not object even if no one judged him an experienced general, if, without great detriment, Caesar himself were henceforth to retrieve the legions from where they had heedlessly advanced.' (*dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse, non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae*.)[369] The men are of course able to retire with few losses according to Caesar. It has been argued by Carter that this prefigures the overconfidence attributed to Pompeius at Pharsalus later in the narrative.[370] However, the image of the arrogant Pompeius runs throughout the *Bellum Civile*, starting with Pompeius' exaggerated belief in his ability to successfully defend the Italian peninsula at *BC* 1.6.1-2.

With Pompeius' successful defence against Caesar, both sides then settled down for a siege, with Caesar recording the various attempts of Pompeius' forces to whittle down Caesar's numbers. The rest of the narrative of the clashes around Dyrrachium is one of Caesar attempting to downplay the seriousness of his position and to portray Pompeius as unmanly when compared to Caesar.[371]

Thus, every day in succession, 'Caesar brought the army out in lines to a place on the plain, to see if Pompeius would wish to fight a battle, as the legions were nearly under the walls

[369] Caes. *BC*. 3.45; Grillo 2012: 112 argues that Pompeius' wish to inflict large loses on Caesar counts toward his cruel personality.
[370] Carter 1993: 179.
[371] Caes. *BC*. 3.46-53; Rambaud 1953: 356.

of Pompeius' camp and his first line only far enough from the rampart, so that the catapults are unable to hurl missiles. Pompeius, on the other hand, wished to hold the good opinion and reputation of men, thus he places the army before the camp so that the third line touches the rampart. In fact, the whole army is arranged so that missiles hurled from the rampart may protect it.'

(*omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat uti ne telum tormento adigi posset Pompeius autem ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret sic pro castris exercitum constituebat ut tertia acies vallum contingeret omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo abiectis protegi posset*.)[372]

Rather than avoiding a battle that must have seemed superfluous given the impact of the siege on Caesar forces, Pompeius is portrayed as a man hindered by his own vanity who, according to Caesar, is unable to place the needs of the war and the *res publica* above his own reputation and standing.[373]

Eventually, Pompeius is able to force Caesar to abandon his positions through attrition and several successful probing attacks, which broke through Caesar's lines. Although Caesar claimed that Pompeius was only able to break through with the help of two deserting Allobrogian horsemen, who, having supposedly been caught committing a fraud, had crossed to Pompeius.[374] The narrative of the final clashes at Dyrrachium are full of excuses on Caesar's part and attempts to downplay Pompeius' victory.[375] Pompeius is helped by a couple of deserters who are inconsequential as 'many flee daily from Pompeius to Caesar.' (*cum paene*

[372] Caes. *BC*. 3.55.
[373] Carter 1993: 184.
[374] Caes. *BC*. 3.59-60 it could perhaps have been the dire situation in Caesar's lines which drove them to desert, with the created to discredit them and Pompeius acceptance of them. Carter 1993: 186-187.
[375] Carter 1993: 194 on Caesar's troops dying in the ditches and this victory being attributed to luck.

cotidie a pompeio at caesarem perfugerent.)[376] But Pompeius' auxiliaries are also particularly transient, although Caesar is occupying their homes.[377]

Caesar's men fall back under the assault from Pompeius' forces, but, as Caesar is keen to point out, Pompeius did not take advance of his success, fearing that it was possibly a trap.[378] In the aftermath of this victory, Caesar recorded that 'Pompeius, as a result of the battle, is addressed as *Imperator*. This title he kept and afterwards he permitted himself to be saluted. But he neither writes it in letters, nor permits laurel signs to be carried on the fasces.' (*Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutari passus sed neque in litteris adscribere est solitus neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit*.)[379] The acceptance of the title *imperator* is problematic for Pompeius, as his victory had been won over fellow Romans. Being hailed as such could lead to a triumph, as noted by Beard, which was an issue for victories over Roman armies in a civil war – hence the need by Pompeius in his youth to dress up some of his victories in Sulla's civil war as being won over foreign enemies.[380] Caesar may be painting an image of Pompeius who is reluctant to make use of this title outside of his own army due to his belief that he had not won a victory worthy of such an accolade, as a way of making Caesar's defeat seem to stem from luck on Pompeius' part rather than good command. However, one argument is that in Pompeius' view he did not need to write to the rump senate in Rome as it was illegitimate – the real senate was already with him.[381]

Caesar then withdrew from Dyrrachium and Pompeius marched out of his entrenchments after him. In the *Bellum Civile* Caesar plays down the reversal he has faced at

[376] Caes. *BC*. 3.61.2.
[377] Caes. *BC*. 3.61.2 Caesar claimed (at 3.13.5) that his garrisons were to protect settlements, but it seems likely it was to prevent them from going over to Pompeius.
[378] Caes. *BC*. 3.70.1.
[379] Caes. *BC*. 3.71.3.
[380] Beard 2007: 188, 243: Carter 1993: 194-195; Plin. *NH* 7.97. Caesar would later fall prey to the mistake of celebrating victories over fellow Romans with the inclusion of Cato *et al*. in his procession. Lange 2016: 83-94, 107-11.
[381] Roller 2001: 57 note 77 suggests that it was because it was a victory won over Roman citizens.

Dyrrachium and the failure of his strategy to defeat Pompeius. He portrays Pompeius as gloating and boastful – all of which is unjustified according to the narrative of the battle so far. Caesar is quick to blame Pompeius for failing to capitalise on the success at Dyrrachium by claiming, that in a mood of overconfidence that had swept the opposition, they have not made further plans as they 'perceived themselves to have already won.'(*vicisse iam viderentur*.)[382] As had happened in Hispania with Afranius, Pompeius sent messages out to inform people 'through all the provinces and communities on the battle of Dyrrachium carrying many facts that were inflated and grander than was the case. The rumour spread that Caesar was beaten, almost all his forces lost, and was fleeing.' (*per omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis de proelio ad Dyrrachium facto elatius inflatiusque multo, quam res erat gesta, fama percrebruerat pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus copiis amissis*.)[383]

All these accusations by Caesar strike at the keystone of Pompeius' memory: his ability to command. Throughout the third book Caesar is keen to constantly broadcast the strategic and tactical errors of Pompeius. Conversely, the reverse suffered by Caesar's army are quickly dismissed due to the hand of fate.[384] The numerous promises made by Pompeius to inflect crushing defeats on his enemies never come to fruition and Caesar's ability to withdraw is portrayed as a strategic blunder by Pompeius. It raises questions about the memory of Pompeius' tactical acumen, instead making this appear as exaggerated. All this helps to perpetuate the image of Pompeius as dangerously overconfident in the results of Dyrrachium and set him up for his fall at Pharsalus.

Pompeius was in no hurry to fight Caesar and waited for Scipio to bring his army over from Asia. According to Caesar, Pompeius' delaying caused some in the camp to accuse Pompeius of drawing out the war for personal gain stating that, 'he delighted in the command

[382] Caes. *BC*. 3.72.1.
[383] Caes. *BC*. 3.79.
[384] Grillo 2012: 258.

and declares that he possessed consuls and praetors among his servants.' While others in the camp were accused of counting their eggs before they had hatched, 'already among themselves they publicly contended for commands and sacred offices and were designating the year's consuls; others' desired the houses and goods of those who were in the camp of Caesar.' (*illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. iamque inter se palam de imperiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum, qui in castris erant Caesaris*.)[385]

These accusations tie the narrative neatly back to the earlier allegations of Caesar in Book 1, where he had portrayed Pompeius and his associates as plotting to take control of the *res publica* and instigate proscriptions. This event before the battle was probably designed to add tension to what must have seemed at the time to be a climactic battle.[386]

Before the battle of Pharsalus begins, Caesar sketches out the situation in the opposition camp and places speeches into the mouths of some of the leaders, which Caesar claims to have found out later thereby giving an air of legitimacy to his account.[387] Pompeius is portrayed as a leader without leadership qualities who is susceptible to the whims of others. Accordingly, Pompeius: '… made his decision to fight the battle from the encouragement of all.' (*Pompeius… ut postea cognitum est suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare*.)[388] Labienus gives a speech that down-plays the quality of Caesar's army, but more importantly, 'he swore not to return to the camp without victory.' (*haec cum dixisset iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum*.)[389] After Labienus' oath, Pompeius makes a similar pledge. Both Pompeius and Labienus made statements that show a poor grasp of the forces arrayed against

[385]Caes. *BC*. 3.82. See Goldsworthy 2006: 423.
[386] Marin 2009: 159 argues that Pharsalus was meant to be the ultimate battle. Cluett 2009: 115 agrees.
[387] Caes. *BC*. 3.83, 87.
[388] Caes. *BC*. 3.86.1 Tronson 2001: 98 also notes Pompeius' strange need to persuade his cavalry to act. Marin 2009: 156 notes that Pompeius might have been forced to fight but he also had superior numbers. As does Tronson 2001: 98 who sees the decision made from 'groundless optimism' and 'concern Pompey was delaying.'
[389] Caes. *BC*. 3.87 Tronson 2001: 55 notes the irony of the speech.

them, which maintains the characterisation of Pompeius and intertextually links back to the early chapters of the *Bellum Civile* when the war was still in Italia.[390] At that point too Pompeius had made assumptions about the army of Caesar and the coming fight which were to be proved false.

Finally, the two armies clash and Pompeius' army crumbles under the attacks of Caesar's forces, which is attributed to a number of bad decisions by Pompeius. Caesar's forces then chase the routing army back to their camp. However, Pompeius has previously abandoned his men at the sight of his cavalry being repulsed according to Caesar's narrative.[391] The account ends with Caesar stating that 'now because our men were moving around inside the rampart, Pompeius, obtaining a horse, removes his insignia of command and immediately rushes out of the camp from the Decuman gate, spurring on the horse, and hurries to Larissa.' (*Pompeius, iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur, equum nactus detractis insignibus imperatoriis decumana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam contendit.*)[392] There he took a ship to collect his family before heading to Egypt.

Conclusion

The memories of Pompeius' life were mainly constructed at the time from the short-term working memories of his contemporary opponents, which were probably never perpetuated with an eye to them becoming long-term cultural memories. These were likely used to influence the political situation of the moment and became part of the collective memory because of their preservation in accounts and records. The memory of Pompeius as

[390] Caes. *BC*. 3.86-87; Carter 1993: 204, 207-209. All this adds to the argument of Carter 1991: 11 that the ancients viewed the character of an individual as unchanging and certain Pompeius, throughout Caesar's account of the war, has remained consistent.
[391] Grillo 2012: 261 notes that it is the opposite of Caesar's behaviour at Dyrrachium; Tronson 2001: 97 notes that Pompeius does not stand to defend the *res publica* that he claimed to hold so highly. See Wistrand 1979: 41 on the image of Pompeius *et al*. as defenders of the *res publica*.
[392]Caes. *BC*. 3.96.

the henchman of Sulla survived because of its frequent use in the discourse in the senate, because of amusing accounts such as Helvius Mancia's '*aduluscens carnifex*' remark, and because Pompeius never seemed to completely disown his allegiance to the dictator. Similarly, the memories of Pompeius' strained relationships with other senators and elites may have come from the records, accounts and letters that contained these. Put together, it seems clear that Pompeius' opponents were creating a memory of Pompeius as a tyrant, which would later be refined and transmitted by the strength of Caesar' memories.[393] On the other hand, the memories that were created by Pompeius and his supporters, in writing and monuments, were designed to influence if not generate the long-term cultural memories of Pompeius' life. Pompeius curated his memories with a clear focus on his extraordinary military career and the popularity that he accrued. While this was useful for his political aspirations, his use of monuments emphasises the desire to preserve and pass down to future generations his own memories. However, what seems to have help to preserve and transmit the negative memories of his opponents was their use in one of the main accounts of the civil war of 49 BC and the pivotal memory of that event in the political transformation of the *res publica*.

What is clear, is that the working memory of Pompeius during his life was composed of two distinct narratives: those of Pompeius himself and his supporters, and those of his detractors. The memory of Sulla loomed large over both the collective memories, with Pompeius using Sulla as a precedent in his self-representation as a successful general through his choice of deities and some of his iconography (such as his seal ring).[394] Pompeius' political foes, however, used the memory of Sulla as a weapon, keeping both the negative

[393] Pompeius negative memories conform to at least three items on Gwyn's (1991: 425) list of the characteristics of a tyrant as understood by the Romans.
[394] Dio 42.18.3, perhaps reproduced on *RRC* 426.4. This is connection is cautioned by MacKay 2000: 207-8. Contra Grillo 2012: 127 note 73.

recollection of the dictator and Pompeius' early role fresh in the collective memory by constant retelling. Such was the impact of this narrative with its endless renewal in debates across the decades, that even figures such as Cicero, who were ostensibly on Pompeius' side, could find themselves giving some validity to claim that Pompeius would revert back to the young butcher that had served Sulla so well. Pompeius was aware of these memories and attempted to dispel them later when his power was more secure both in action - by disbanding after his return from the East - and by combating his opponents' memories with his own versions of history, as can be seen in Plutarch's accounts of his youth. Another long-running element in Pompeius' own self-identity was his *imitatio Alexandri*, which seems to have been a guiding principle of Pompeius career too. This may have been part of a shift away from the memory of Sulla although the links to both figures were sometimes shared. Parts of this memory, such as his later clemency towards the pirates and in the East, and skill as a general were later overshadowed by the civil war and the pervasiveness of Caesar's own memories. Caesar, aside from his fresh use of Pompeius' Sullan memories, also seems to have actively targeted Pompeius' self-identity with his belittling of his marshal power, greater claim to clementia, and even position as the new Alexander. The role of Caesar in the formation of memories at this time through the *Bellum Civile* and his own clique of supporters writing as the victors, helped cement some memories and create new ones by reshaping Pompeius into the runner-up to Caesar, despite the prominent and influential position he had held for decades in Roman society. It should be noted, outside of the collective memory of the elites, which was also influenced by political factors, was that of the lower levels of society. To the ordinary plebs the memory of Pompeius' youth does not seem to have much bearing. Their memories were formed from more important factors, such as security, food, and entertainment (at least in Rome). On this level Pompeius was a great figure. He was remembered as ending the wars with Sertorius, Spartacus, and Mithridates, with his largesse

after his return from the East being unprecedented, while his campaign against the pirates and *cura annonae* both help to stabilise food supplies to the masses.[395]

[395] Wistrand 1979: 17, the plebs primarily wanted peace and food and Pompeius' victories and *cura annonae* had provide some of that. His later popularity was also vocalised at the public events that were held after his death.

Chapter 3: 'The First Retrospective of Pompeius' Memory'

How a person died was, as now, important in the formation of their memory as the knowledge of their whole life and how it ended could bring perspective to the rest.[396] In Pompeius' case, his death was seen as tragic and poignant because of how low a once great figure had fallen.[397] Perhaps for this reason the focus of elite memory instead went to Cato as the main casualty of the war due to his colourful, ideologically driven suicide, which even Cicero praised.[398]

Pompeius' Obituary

Both of the main contemporary accounts are strangely quiet on Pompeius' death. Caesar passes over the event with little notice and Cicero is also subdued in his recording of the news. However, later, when the memory of Pompeius became politically valuable, Cicero seems to have anointed himself as the main conduit through which memories of Pompeius were transmitted. Caesar and his supporters used the memories of Pompeius for their political needs too, although naturally their memories were at a variance with those of Cicero. A third party also appeared at this time with Pompeius' sons, Sextus and Gnaeus, who perpetuated different memories of their father as part of their propaganda during their ongoing struggle against Caesar's lieutenants in Hispania. Such were the strategies of elites, however, the views of a large proportion of the populace are silent. But, from the letters and speeches of Cicero, it is possible to gauge the general trend of the larger collective memory among the population.

[396] Noy 2011: 3.
[397] Noy 2011: 3-4.
[398] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 9.18.2.

Caesar was likely the first to hear of the death of Pompeius as he pursued him to Egypt after Pharsalus. His account of the news is concise with little emotion shown in any particular direction. Caesar makes no comment beyond 'he learns of Pompeius' death.' (*de Pompei morte cognoscit*) before he continues on with the reaction of the Egyptians to his arrival.[399] Carter's opinion is that 'Caesar's refusal to give a detailed account of the death of his opponent, or even a passing acknowledgement of his past greatness, contributes to a feeling his narrative has already invoked – that Pompey is a man whose fight is pointless, fate inevitable, and life now valueless.'[400] He also argues that 'Caesar's account is neither dramatic nor sympathetic, nor yet is it exultant or vindictive; Pompey's character has already been sufficiently illuminated and his end is little more than a postscript to the battle.'[401] Furthermore, that the reason Caesar did not press the matter was because 'Pompey's friends (notably Cato and Scipio) were far from crushed and the outcome of the civil war was by no means settled. So, any acknowledgment, however dispassionate, of Pompey's greatness on Caesar's part would have been politically unwise.'[402] Batstone and Damon also hold a similar opinion on the status of Caesar's obituary, adding that Pompeius is eventually betrayed as he had betrayed others.[403]

On the other side of the war, there is the view of Cicero. The few letters that have come down from the months Cicero spent in Greece contain little information on the proceedings or Pompeius himself, but instead dealt with Cicero's own personal issues and continued unhappiness at the situation.[404] Cicero remained at the camp at Dyrrachium while the campaign moved on and was, therefore, absent from the critical battle of Pharsalus.[405]

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[399] Caes. *BC*. 3.106.
[400] Carter 1993: 223.
[401] Carter 1993: 223.
[402] Carter 1993: 220; Tronson 2001: 99 argues that Caesar records the death like a purely military matter and not with the sympathy of someone who had just lost a son-in-law.
[403] Batstone and Damon 2006: 106.
[404] For example, Cic. *Ad Att*. 14.2.1, 14.3.1.
[405] Liv. *Per*.111.

After the result of the battle reached the camp, Cicero concluded that the war was likely unwinnable and decided to return to Italia rather than take command of the forces assembled there, much to the fury of Gnaeus who, according to Plutarch, threatened to kill Cicero and had to be mollified by Cato.[406]

It was while he was waiting at Brundisium that he received the news about the ignominious fate of Pompeius in Egypt. Cicero's reaction to the news of the death of Pompeius - like Caesar's own reaction - was marked by brevity. Cicero's initial assessment of Pompeius was heavily affected by the ongoing civil war. The conflict had taken a great toll on Cicero's relationship with Pompeius and the letters that Cicero wrote to Atticus and other correspondents as events progressed exposed how Cicero's estimation of Pompeius steadily decreased. In a letter to Atticus on 27th November, Cicero made his brief eulogy to Pompeius: 'On Pompeius' end I was never in doubt. So great had the hopeless of his issue become that all kings and peoples held the same opinion. I judged wherever he would have come to this would be his fate. I cannot be without grief at his fall; I knew him truly as a man of integrity, good moral character, and gravity.' (*De Pompei exitu mihi dubium numquam fuit, tanta enim desperatio rerum eius omnium regnum et populorum animos occuparat ut quocumque venisset hoc putarem futurum*; *Non possum eius casum non dolere. hominem enim integrum et castum et gravem cognovi*).[407]

The brevity of his statement at the latter's death has led some scholars to question whether these words were sincerely meant by Cicero or whether the actions of Pompeius during the war had caused a rift between the two. On the depth of Cicero's regard for Pompeius, as illustrated by the eulogy, there is no general scholarly consensus. Seager noted the 'absence of any judgement on Pompeius as a soldier or Statesman is striking' but that

[406] Plut. *Cic*. 39.2.
[407] Cic. *Ad Att*. 11.6.5-6.

Cicero may have ignored these elements in part due to their role in the civil war, his own disapproval of Pompeius as a general, and the loss of the campaign.[408] Seager concluded that Cicero 'preferred simply to mourn, with some dignity, Pompeius the man.[409] Meanwhile, Carter referred to Cicero's 'curt little obituary notice' and noted that it bore a surprising similarity with Caesar's own lack of emotion when he learnt of Pompeius' death.[410]

The words of Cicero's eulogy taken in isolation can be read either way, it is the position they occupy within the letter that says much more. A simple examination of the letter to Atticus shows Cicero's concern for his deceased friend was far from his priority. These few lines of eulogy appear towards the end of a letter which was primarily concerned with Cicero's own fate, his worries about the future, the decisions he had made, and his family. In light of this evidence, it could be argued that Seager's opinion on the matter seems to be the most reasonable explanation for Cicero's concise eulogy. The importance of understanding the context of the eulogy comes from the need to understand it in terms of Pompeius' contemporary image and, as the earliest recorded opinion, it goes some way to explain how Cato became the *Erinnerungfigur* of the opposition. Cato seems to have been the figurehead for those who occupied the upper echelons of society, and were, therefore, likely to have some understanding of the philosophical ideals behind his suicide after Thapsus. Pompeius' appeal, conversely, seems to have been across the spectrum of society; although perhaps greater with the non-elite members of Roman society who had not held the suspicions that some in the senatorial circles had harboured for decades and instead remembered a great general.[411]

[408] Seager 2002: 169.
[409] Seager 2002: 169.
[410] Liv. *Per.* 122.4; Plut. *Pomp.* 80.5; Shackleton Bailey 1971: 4-5; Carter 1993: 223, in contrast to the emotion that both Livy and Plutarch would attribute to the scene.
[411] As will be seen in the war between Sextus and Octavian, especially p. 216.

Amongst the senatorial opponents of Caesar, the initial reaction to Pompeius' death seems to have been lukewarm at best, with the very nature of his demise appearing to have prevented any great veneration.[412] His death still seems to have been a shock to some, and initially there was some disbelief that the news was even true. This was perhaps in part due to the nature of the authors themselves: the senators who created the early literature about the war had been largely indifferent and even suspicious of Pompeius during his lifetime as demonstrated in the chapter above – most of them only (reluctantly) rallying around his leadership during the war out of necessity. After the defeat at Pharsalus, several of them had returned to Rome and their old way of thinking, perhaps with the new impetus to shift the blame for the defeat and a need to reconcile with the victor.[413]

Another reason for Cicero's tepid response to the news of Pompeius' death may have been the uncertainty that surrounded the allies of the defeated general. Caesar left instructions that none of the senators who had opposed him in the civil war was to be allowed to return to Rome without first having their case heard by him.[414] Therefore, after arriving back in Italia, Cicero was forced to wait in Brundisium for Caesar to return and permit him to travel freely to Rome. It was during this wait that Cicero first heard about Pompeius' death.

The nature of the letter to Atticus, with its noticeable avoidance of any overt praise of Pompeius as the statesman or conquering general, can perhaps be partly explained by the uncertainty of Cicero's situation and the need to remain discrete. Certainly, discretion played a part in Cicero's decision as he writes in the same letter that upon arriving at the town of Brundisium he ordered his lictors to blend in with the crowd so as not to draw the ire of the soldiers stationed there.[415] Likewise, in an earlier letter Cicero rebuffed a suggestion from

[412] That is if Cicero's reaction to the news (*Ad Att*. 11.6.5-6) can be deemed a valid source of general feeling at the time. Stockton, 1971: 265.
[413] Cluett 2009: 113.
[414] Cic. *Ad Att.*11.7.2.
[415] Cic. *Ad Att.* 11.6.2.

Atticus to travel by night to place himself nearer to Rome without being noticed.[416] Aside from Caesar's supporters, Cicero also feared his own side returning victorious and punishing him for his abandonment, although when the news of Pompeius' death reached Italia those who criticised Cicero for returning after Pharsalus became more muted as Cicero noted that 'his death has diminished that criticism of neglected duty.' (*exitus illius minuit eius offici praetermissi reprehensionem*).[417] Clearly, Pompeius remained a popular figure and had his supporters in the upper echelons despite Cicero's negative opinion.

Apart from a need to lie low and nurse the wounds caused by his decisions; Cicero had other reasons to be muted in his praise of Pompeius. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, Cicero had suffered at the hands of Pompeius and Caesar, in particular his exile (which Cicero constantly referred to in his letters).[418] Likewise, Pompeius' support for his restoration a year later was pivotal to Cicero's decision to join Pompeius in Greece, but the whole experience must have been a hard lesson for Cicero, and served as a pertinent demonstration of his standing. While Pompeius had been alive, Cicero had been required to toe the line but with Pompeius now dead, Cicero could relax the pretence and afford to be somewhat cooler in his remembrance.[419] Although Cicero's opinion of Pompeius during the war had already been subject to the day-to-day changes of fortune, on one point Cicero was generally consistent: the overarching memory was of a flawed figure who fought on the right side in the civil war but who personally would have been just as much of tyrant in victory as it was feared Caesar would be. This memory stripped Pompeius of much of his legitimacy in the war and made the memory of the conflict merely that of two fighting warlords rather than the

[416] Cic. *Ad Att.*11.5.2.
[417] Cic. *Ad Att.* 11.7.3.
[418] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 5.12.4; *Ad Att.* 1.16.11, 2.1.1-3. are just some examples, see Claassen 1992: 19-20, 31-6, 40-2.
[419] Steel 2013b: 5; Ball 2013: 182.

more complicated reasons, which likely played into the memory of the war formed by Caesar and his supporters.[420]

What Caesar and Cicero both did to the memory of Pompeius was to diminish his military prowess. Caesar had no reason to praise Pompeius' military abilities and Cicero had little reason to comment on them either as Pompeius had failed to emerge victorious in the civil war. Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of his death, it would seem that few were willing to comment on his much-vaunted powers as a military leader, which was critical to his own designs for his memory. However, as such a major component of Pompeius' memory it was not long before it was recovered.

The Posthumous Memory of Pompeius by His Sons

In the camp of the remaining opponents of Caesar it was a different story, although they had regrouped in the new leadership of Scipio, Pompeius' memory remained a useful tool. The sons of Pompeius were eventually dispatched from Africa to Hispania to raise forces from the local population who were in revolt and assumed to still be loyal to the memory of Pompeius.[421] However, although the conflict in Hispania was blamed on the large number of *clientelae* of Pompeius, which seems to have been a common theme – perhaps due to Pompeius' own self-aggrandising – it was likely the actions of Caesar and his governors that provided the impetus for sections of the local population to rebel.[422] Firstly, Caesar, after the surrender of the armies of Afranius, Petreius and Varro, disbanded them; although some then enlisted with Caesar and appear to have remained in service in Ulterior, most had returned to their homes or to where they could find somewhere to settle.[423] This was unusual for the war because Caesar had in previous encounters with opposing forces normally absorbed the

[420] For example Caes. *BC.* 1.7.1, 1.4.1-5. As noted in the previous chapter, in particular on p. 63.
[421] *B. Alex.* 58-59; Fear 1991: 811; Pina Polo 2017: 281.
[422] *B. Afr.* 49-64.
[423] Caes. *BC*. 1.86-7.

surrendered forces, for example, in Italia and after Pharsalus.[424] The logic behind Caesar's decision this time may have been that the armies in Hispania had been under the control of the legates of Pompeius for years – a concern that Pompeius was supposed to have had about the loyalties of the legions return from Caesar – and with this in mind Caesar might have been concerned by the loyalties of these veteran troops. As a consequence of this decision, Hispania now had a sizable population of unemployed soldiers who had served under Pompeius. At the outbreak of the military mutiny under Thorius, the soldiers had initially carved the name of Pompeius onto their shields, but they eventually abandoned the name of Pompeius due to the lack of immediate support from the inhabitants at Corduba.[425]

When Gnaeus had been sent to Hispania, the common understanding was that this was to take advantage of the large number of *clientelae* of his father, whose loyalty Gnaeus could assume to command as his father's heir.[426] However, this is probably an understanding of the situation born from an elite belief in Pompeius' own portrayal of his great number of clients in the region.[427] It seems that Gnaeus instead largely drew his forces from disbanded soldiers who had lingering support for their old commander, those already opposed to Caesar, local tribes and citizens who had an understandable grudge against Caesar and his governor because of the abuse of their territory.[428]

The Evidence of Gnaeus' Coinage

Little of the use of the memory of Pompeius can be found in the written accounts of this campaign, other than the occasional use of Pompeius' name to rally support, However Gnaeus left a valuable source of evidence with the coinage he minted at the time to pay his

[424] Caes. *BC*. 2.28, 3.98.
[425] *B. Alex.* 58-59.
[426] The role of clients has been questioned by Pino Polo 2008: 47 and 2017: 280-2, and MacDougal 2020: 81.
[427] As noted earlier, see pp. 80-81.
[428] *B. Alex.* 59; Fear 1991: 811; Pina Polo 2017: 281.

forces. This numismatic evidence provides the one direct source of use of their father's memory.[429] As the initial forces that had sprung up against Caesar's governors had used the name and memory of Pompeius to gather support, Gnaeus now included the head of his father to denote his relationship. The coinage struck by Gnaeus and his followers in Hispania also gives an interesting view on perhaps who they were primarily targeting with their attention and propaganda.

The initial coins struck in silver mainly featured the head of Pompeius on the obverse, but the reverse frequently featured the image of a Roman soldier depicted as stepping from the prow of a trireme and being greeted by a personification of a either a province or city.[430] From this, it could be argued that the target audience for these issues were predominantly the soldiers who had been sent with Gnaeus as well as those who fled to Ulterior after the defeat at Thapsus. These, together with the soldiers disbanded by Caesar in 49 BC and those who defected from the governor's armies, must have made up the bulk of Gnaeus' force.[431] Ellen MacDougal has, however, argued that the images of Pompeian soldiers being greeted by Hispanic personifications suggests instead a level of equitable cooperation between Gnaeus and the local population.[432]

[429] *RRC* 469-71.
[430] The obverse portrait of *RRC* 469 does not depict the head of Pompeius, but rather the head of Roma bearing the legend of Gnaeus' *legatus pro praetore*, Marcus Poblicius, and the reverse legend is CN MAGNVS IMP. The obverse portrait of *RRC* 470 portrays head of Pompeius bearing the legend CN MAGNVS IMP (F or B) and the reverse legend of *RRC* 470 is M MINAT SABIN PRO Q – since they were issued by M. Minatius Sabinus, proquaestor. There are 5 different reverse types – for *RRC* 469, the reverse shows Hispania carrying two spears, shield on her back, presenting a branch to a Pompeian soldier (or Gnaeus). For *RRC* 470 there are 4 variations depicting Corduba or a Spanish city goddess. See MacDougal 2020: 81-84.
[431] Lowe 2002: 72.
[432] MacDougal 2020: 90-1.

Figure 5: RRC469/1a depicting a helmeted figure of Roma with M. Poblicius Leg[atus] Pro Pr[aetor]on the obverse and a personification of a city or the province handing a victors palm to a soldier with Gn[aeus] Magnus Imp[erator] on the reverse. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

Figure 6: RRC 470/1a. Head of Pompeius with Gn[aeus] Magnus Imp[erator] on the obverse and the image of a personified city or province greeting s soldier disembarking from a ship with the name of the minter M. Minat[ius] Sabin[us] Pro Q[uaestor]on the reverse. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

A bronze issue was also made that had a more toned-down message.[433] The obverse features the figure of Janus with the faces of Pompeius, which may have related to the story that Janus had crossed the seas and tied into the nautical power Pompeius.[434] On the reverse is the prow of a trireme, a combination that had been used for centuries.[435] These coins seem to have made less of a statement regarding the military built up in Ulterior and merely show the image of Pompeius to likely underline the *pietas* element that was the *casus belli* of the Pompeii. Much of the Gnaeus' use of his father's memory, therefore, seems to have revolved

[433] *RRC* 479/1; Welch 2012: 103.
[434] Zarrow 2003: 127.
[435] Zarrow 2003: 127.

around his fame and the memory of his military successes among the Romans and perhaps the provincials. The limits of coinage mean that this cannot be completely proven, but this seems to be how Gnaeus was attempting to legitimise his control of the provinces and the loyalty of the soldiery and perhaps imply he would be like his father, as coinage was commonly used to promote hereditary qualities.[436]

Figure 7: RRC 479/1 depicting Janus with Pompeius' face Magn[us] on the obverse and the prow of a trireme with Pius Imp[erator] on the obverse. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

Cicero Tests the Waters at Rome

Meanwhile, in Rome, Cicero began to tacitly praise Pompeius. As with all of Cicero's public and private opinions, there is a difference between Cicero's attitude toward Pompeius in his correspondence and his public speeches. This may present an insight into the differences between the perceptions of Pompeius among the social circle of Cicero and the wider public. As Cicero had already stated, there were many within the elite circles who were shocked by the death of Pompeius, and the memory of Pompeius among the general population seems to have been largely positive, which may explain Caesar's careful handling of his memory unlike that of Cato. It was to these groups that Cicero probably addressed his positive, public memories of Pompeius.

[436] Alföldi, 1956: 66; Hamilton 1969: 192-194; Flower 1996: 79-90; Pobjoy 2010: 72; Woytek 2012: 327 and 2018: 362-5; Győri 2015: 231-2. With Gill 1983: 469-87.

Distinct from the propaganda of Caesar, Cicero left two memories of Pompeius to posterity, although he probably only intended the memory of Pompeius he crafted in his speeches to survive.[437] While the letters written during his time in Greece are gone, the time following Pharsalus was the most prolific period for Cicero. During the next few years, Cicero would write over a dozen treatises, several speeches, and maintain a correspondence with various acquaintances that became an almost daily record of events in the years 44-43.[438] However, the posthumous publication of his correspondence by Tiro and Atticus – persevered due to Cicero's own standing – left an alternative memory, in the form of an archive from which later authors could draw to build their memories of Pompeius.[439]

Initially, Cicero spent the next two years from his return generally avoiding day-to-day politics and hoping that Caesar would eventually restore the government to its previous state.[440] Instead he dedicated himself to writing on a diverse range of topics from philosophy to rhetoric. By 46 BC Cicero became involved in politics again with a number of speeches given before Caesar on behalf of those who sought or had been granted pardons for their actions during the war. The first, the *Pro Marcello*, was given at a senate meeting in September 46 BC as a show of gratitude to Caesar for his unexpected change of heart regarding the recall of M. Marcellus. As a consul, Marcellus had sought to have Caesar's recall discussed on 1st March 50 BC, and flogged a man whom Caesar had granted citizenship to demonstrate his opinion of Caesar's legislative legitimacy.[441] During the war, Marcellus had joined Pompeius and had been at

[437] Cicero had apparently planned to publish his letters at some future date after editing them, however, this does not appear to have occurred in Cicero's lifetime.
[438] Fantham 1999: 1.
[439] On Cicero's own thoughts see Cic. *Ad Att.* 16.5.5 and Cic. *Ad Fam.* 16.17.1; Nep. *Att.* 16.2-4; Dugan 2013: 29; Dench 2013: 122; Morello 2013: 196 note 1. Another author that made use of Cicero was Nepos, who also wrote about various famous Greek and Roman generals, which probably included an account of Pompeius. See Titchener 2003: 87.
FRHist i 2013 403; Shackelton Bailey 1969: 61, 1971 xi; Philips 1986: 228-236; Tempest 2017: 9 Although some of Cicero's earlier speeches had been published within his own lifetime as an exemplum for young men.
[440] Gotoff 1993: xxv.
[441] Gruen 1974: 461-463.

Pharsalus, but since the defeat had lived in self-imposed exile in Mytilene.[442] Marcellus' recall had been unanimously confirmed by vote of the senate but Cicero's speech of thanks to Caesar is still carefully worded and, although it is impossible to avoid the topic of the civil war, it lavished praise on Caesar's martial prowess while dismissing his opponents as mistaken in their resistance.[443] Conspicuously absent, however, is Pompeius, whom Cicero does not mention. When Cicero came to explain his own actions he conceded that he acted out of personal loyalty, but Pompeius is just referred to as 'a man' (hominem).[444] Gotoff remarked that the line was 'the most generic description possible […] Cicero might have used an honorific *dux*, or even *amicus*.'[445] It is unknown who published the *Pro Marcello* – Cicero gave the speech on the spur of the moment – but it may have been Caesar who circulated it due to the praise the speech contained of his achievements.[446]

Even after the passing of a couple of years, Cicero's memory of Pompeius' handling of the war did not change much in his mind. Writing in a series of letters to M. Marcellus around the time of his recall from exile in late 46 BC, Cicero recalled Marcellus' dissatisfaction at Pompeius' lack of preparations and the heterogeneous nature of the army Pompeius commanded. Cicero added to this by voicing his own grievances about the poor counsel that Pompeius had accepted during the war and his view, as during the conflict, that neither side would have been much different in victory.[447]

A couple of months later Cicero again gave a speech, this time in defence of Quintus Ligarius, who had fought against Caesar in the African campaign. Ligarius was prosecuted by Quintus Tubero who had also fought against Caesar – as Cicero is keen to mention – and

[442] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 4.7.4; Sen. *Dial*. 9.3.
[443] Gotoff 1993: xxxii, doubts that a senate composed of Caesar's supporters would have supported the recall.
[444] Cic. *Pro Marc.*14.
[445] Gotoff 1993: 50.
[446] Gotoff 1993: xxxii.
[447] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 4.7.2.

reinforced his claims Tubero was prosecuting Ligarius out of personal hostility.[448] In this speech Cicero is more comfortable with using the memory of Pompeius and pleaded that the mistakes and personal disagreements of those who had fought against Caesar not be elevated to something more sinister. Characterising the opposition, Cicero stated that 'they were zealous, they were angry, and they were obstinate; but allow the deceased Pompeius, and the many others, to be free from the charges of wickedness, madness, and parricide.' (*Fuerint cupidi, fuerint irati, fuerint pertinaces; sceleris vero crimine, furoris, parricidi liceat Cn. Pompeio mortuo, liceat multis aliis career.*)[449] Cicero goes on to reaffirm his reasons for joining Pompeius, noting the lack of difference between the two sides in the war but conceding that the better side had won.[450] Gotoff has called Cicero's words on Pompeius an 'epithet [of] pure pathos.'[451] This speech was probably circulating soon after its delivery, this time by Cicero, who was active in the process.[452]

The last speech was given a year later in defence of Deiotarus, King of Galatia. What is immediately different is that Cicero pled for Deiotarus in private before Caesar, rather than before the senate or in the forum as with the *Pro Marcello* and *Pro Ligario*.[453] Deiotarus had aided Pompeius during his campaigns in the East against Mithridates and took his side during the civil war, likewise he had been an ally to Cicero during his tenure as governor of Cilicia.[454] Gotoff notes that the prosecution likely focussed on Deiotarus' support for Pompeius during the war, which would explain Cicero's lengthier rebuttal than in the previous speeches.[455] Perhaps taking advantage of the privacy of the hearing in Caesar's house, Cicero tacitly

[448] McDermott 1970: 321-324.
[449] Cic. *Pro Lig.* 18. See Gotoff 1993: 145-146.
[450] Cic. *Pro Lig.* 19.
[451] Gotoff 1993: 146.
[452] Cic *Ad Att*. 13.12.2; McDermott 1970: 327 see also note 31; Gotoff 1993: xxxvii notes the popularity of the speech in later antiquity.
[453] Gotoff 1993: xxxvii.
[454] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 15.2.1.
[455] Gotoff 1993: xxxix.

reminded Caesar of his own connections to Pompeius, while at the same time making sure to flatter him. As Cicero says:

'Pardon him, pardon him, O Caesar, if King Deiotarus gave way to the *auctoritas* of a man whom we all followed; to whom not only had gods and men heaped all distinctions but also you yourself gave many and the greatest. Nor then, if your deeds have cast a shadow over the praise of others, have we, for that reason, dismissed the memory of Pompeius. Who is ignorant, how great was his name, his power, his fame in all forms of war, his honours from the Roman people, senate and yourself? Such was his glory he had surpassed his betters, but you have excelled all. Accordingly, we counted admiringly Pompeius' wars, victories, triumphs and consulships – yours are impossible to count.'

(*ignosce, ignosce, Caesar, si eius viri auctoritati rex Deiotarus cessit quem nos omnes secuti sumus; ad quem cum di atque homines omnia ornamenta congessissent, tum tu ipse plurima et maxima. Nec enim, si tuae res gestae ceterorum laudibus obscuritatem attulerunt, idcirco Cn. Pompei memoriam amisimus. Quantum nomen illius fuerit, quantae opes, quant in omni genere bellorum gloria, quanti honores populi Romani, quanti senatus, quanti tui, quis ignorant? Tanto ille superiors vicerat Gloria quanto tu omnibus praestitisti. Itaque Cn Pompei bella, victorias, triumphos, consulatus admirantes numerabamus: tuis enumerare non possumus.*)[456]

In Gotoff's opinion, the focus on Pompeius' achievements, with Caesar's forming a limited comparison, places the speech largely in favour of Pompeius, as Cicero was reluctant to denigrate Pompeius in public, no matter what he truly thought of the man.[457] This is apparently the first time any positive recollections of Pompeius' military achievements were recorded since the civil war. Clearly though, Cicero is being careful when he praises Pompeius

[456] Cic. *Pro Dieot*. 12.
[457] Gotoff 1993: 221. This could almost be a summary of the *Bellum Civile*.

so that by comparison he is making Caesar's achievements the greater. The choice of Pompeius' military achievements as the main memory for comparison perhaps proves some insight into the focus of the collective memories on Caesar's military might at this point.

Cicero may never have had a strong fear of Caesar – during the early phases of the war he had not been afraid to reject Caesar's request to speak in the senate – and it would seem that this was still true.[458] It would appear, however, that Cicero did not want to remind Caesar of his own links to Pompeius in public, let alone the senate, even though Cicero noted to a friend that Caesar spoke highly of Pompeius.[459] Perhaps Cicero considered the crowd in the forum more sympathetic to the memory of Pompeius, hence his pleading for the memory of Pompeius to be left unsullied. In the senate, Cicero was less willing to speak of Pompeius, perhaps out of concern about the mixed loyalties of his audience, even though the vote on Marcellus had been unanimous in favour of his restoration.[460] Cicero had noted before in Brundisium that Pompeius' death had diminished criticism of him and, perhaps, Cicero did not wish to stir this issue up again.

The War over Cato

The key to the problem may lie with another leading figure whose reputation was inextricably linked with the civil war: Cato. What had occurred in the months between the *Pro Marcello*, *Pro Ligario*, and the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* was the publication of Cicero's *Cato* and the flurry of responses from Caesar and his aides. At around the same time as the *Pro Ligario*, Caesar held four triumphs for his victories over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Africa; of the four, his African triumph would prove to be the most divisive of them all. During the procession,

[458] Cic. *Ad Att*. 9.19.3.
[459] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 6.6.10. Although Caesar may have been aware that many still held Pompeius in high regard and also wanted to continue to appear as a clement victor willing to forgive his enemies. The treatment of the memory of those who fell during Thapsus may prove to the contrary though.
[460] Cic. *Pro Marc. 3.*

which was ostensibly to celebrate a victory over king Juba, a number of displays passed by depicting the deaths of the Roman commanders, such as Scipio and Petreius, who had fought in the campaign.[461] However, also present was Cato, who was depicted in the act of ripping out his innards after his botched first attempt at suicide.[462] Such a display of vulgar gloating was deemed to be in bad taste by the assembled crowds who did not react well to the scene in front of them.[463] However, the victory at Pharsalus was conspicuous by its absence. Caesar may have felt that Pompeius still held popular sentiment in the city and by skipping over his memory he avoided offending the people, although he clearly misjudged the popular reaction to Cato.[464]

In a letter from early July 46 BC – three months after Cato's death – Cicero muses to a friend that 'Pompeius, your Lentulus, Scipio and Afranius had ignominious deaths, whereas Cato's was splendid.' (*Pompeius, Lentulus tuus, Scipio, Afranius foede perierunt, at Cato praeclare*.)[465] This focus on the memory of the defeated to Cato in the aftermath of the African campaign came to overshadow all the other leaders of the opposition, and become a key battleground. Although Cato played little role in the combat, his suicide to escape a life where he might not be able to act freely appealed to the popular stoic ideals.[466] Pompeius did not have the assumed moral motivation of Cato: his career was full of commands accepted to resolve exceptional issues for Rome and he likely fought because it would benefit his *dignitas*. Pompeius' death granted him no such grand imagery to accompany his failed struggle with Caesar and as such he was largely passed over by the elite, with Cato becoming a figure of mythical proportions that drew his old enemies back into a battle with his ghost. Cato was easier to convert into an idealised image of the purity of Caesar's enemies. His memory may have been elevated because others such as Pompeius were seen as too similar to Caesar. Cato

[461] Plut. *Caes*. 55.2.
[462] App. *B.C.* 2.101.
[463] App. *B.C.* 2.101.
[464] Lange 2016: 110.
[465] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 9.18.2.
[466] Goar 1987: 13-14.

also still had living family members, such as Brutus, who pushed his memory out to a wider audience.

The *Cato* had been initiated at the behest of Brutus; at first Cicero had been cautious, remarking to Atticus that writing about Cato without causing offense was a problem worthy of Archimedes.[467] However, his reservations soon vanished, and he spent the next few months writing and revising his work. Cicero probably completed his *Cato* in the summer months but withheld circulating it until around November when Caesar had departed for Hispania, perhaps out of concern for how it would be received by him.[468] Evidently Brutus, who, as a nephew of Cato, was also interested in the project, was not quite satisfied with Cicero's portrayal of his uncle and so wrote his own – less successful, but more hagiographic – work on Cato.[469]

While he was in Hispania fighting, Caesar had read Cicero's *Cato* and had clearly been displeased with it, but behaved civilly toward Cicero and wrote a letter complimenting his writing.[470] However, all this did not prevent Caesar writing a response in the form of his *Anti-Cato* and ordering his partisans to write their own accounts.[471] Hirtius in particular wrote an account that Cicero deemed to be so disastrous that he requested Atticus' help in furthering its circulation to diminish the standing of the opposition to Cato.[472] The ideological battle also influenced the works written at this time; Sallust, in his account of the debate in the senate over the fate of the captured supporters of Catiline, was probably influenced by the ideological battle that was currently being fought over the Cato. In his account the two speakers are Cato and Caesar, which, aside from the anachronistic importance attached to the two, and also

[467] Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.4.1.
[468] McDermott 1970: 320-321; Kierdorf 1978: 169.
[469] Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.21.1.
[470] Cic. *Ad Att.* 13.46.2. Caesar also praised Cicero in his own work, *Ad Att.* 12.40.1.
[471] Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.41.4.
[472] Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.45.2; Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.44.1.

downplayed the role of Cicero who was the consul during the uprising. This may have been due to Brutus' biography of Cato that had inflated his role while diminishing Cicero's.[473]

Cicero had clearly escaped any harsh reprisal for praising a figure whom Caesar appeared to hate the most, and this must have emboldened Cicero in his future dealings with the dictator, allowing him to steadily increase his public praise of Pompeius.

After Caesar's Assassination

After the events of the *Ides*, Cicero was quick to purvey his delight at the assassination.[474] However, the momentum of the assassins, lacking a plan as to what to do next, began to falter. As members of Caesar's circle, who held most of the cards militarily, now began to return after their flight during the assassination, Cicero started to lose confidence in the future. The assassins had remained on the defensive due to the lukewarm response to Caesar's death and a failed attempt to court the crowd in the forum.[475] At a meeting held at the temple of Tellus, which was surrounded by Caesar's veterans under the command of Lepidus, Cicero, among others, backed a motion of compromise that allowed the assassins to go unpunished but accepted Caesar's acts as remaining valid – allowing many of them to retain their magistracies.[476] Antonius pushed for the reading of Caesar's will and for a public funeral for the dictator, where he was able to give an impassioned speech and whip up the crowd that was present.[477] The mob burnt the body in the forum and went through the city attacking those who they believed to be part of the assassination.[478] In light of these events, the assassins left

[473] Cic *Ad Att.*12.21.1; Stockton 1988: 138-40.
[474] Cic. *Ad Fam*. 10.28.1.
[475] App. *B.C*.2.122.
[476] Sumi 2005: 133; Welch 2012: 121.
[477] Plut. *Brut*. 20.1-8.
[478] Plut. *Brut*. 20.8; Suet. *DJ*. 85; App. *B.C*. 2.147; Dio 44.50.4.

the city.[479] The reading of Caesar's will brought the news that his nephew Octavian was to become his prominent heir and set to inherit a large portion of the dead dictator's fortune.[480]

The New Battleground of Memory: The Philippicae

Once some order had been restored, Antonius held a senate meeting at the end of August where honours were heaped on the dead dictator. Cicero had returned to Rome earlier but decided to avoid the senate under the pretence of needing to rest after his journey.[481] His absence was conspicuous and angered Antonius, who believed Cicero was questioning his legitimacy.[482] As a result of this Antonius launched into a tirade against Cicero, which soon made its way to Cicero's ears.[483] In response he composed a speech to rebuff Antonius for his attitude and thus began the war of words between the two. Cicero named his speeches the *Philippicae* after those of the Greek orator Demosthenes who had centuries earlier written speeches aimed at the perceived tyranny of Philip II of Macedon.[484] If Cicero had been careful with his words under Caesar this was not the case after the *Ides*.[485] The *Philippicae* were delivered between 2nd September 44 and the 21st April 43, although the second Philippic was never presented as a speech and only existed as a pamphlet that was written as though it had been read in the presence of Antonius.[486] There were probably more *Philippicae* delivered than have survived, but they may have been speeches that did not achieve Cicero's desires or became redundant.[487] The speeches that have survived were likely reworked before publication to improve them, although the core of the text must still be close to what was said at the time.[488]

[479] Cic. *Phil.* 1.6; Plut. *Brut.* 21.1-2, *Caes.* 68.7.
[480] Vell. Pat. 2.59.1; Suet. *DJ*. 83.1-2; Dio 44.35.2; App. *B.C.* 2.143.1.
[481] Cic. *Phil*. 1.1; Shackleton Bailey 1986: 3; Lacey 1986: 15; Manuwald 2007: 19; Lintott 2008: 375.
[482] Ramsey 2003: 9.
[483] Cic. *Phil*. 1.8; Shackleton Bailey 1986: 3; Lintott 2008: 375.
[484] Ramsey 2003: 16-17; Osgood 2006: 42; Manuwald 2007: 78, and 2008: 44.
[485] Marin 2009: 162.
[486] Shackleton Bailey 1986: xi; Manuwald 2007: 9, 59; Ramsey 2003: 18 and 2010: 164.
[487] Manuwald 2007: 70-75 and 2008: 46.
[488] Ramsey 2003: 18; Manuwald 2008: 41.

Aside from the other topics that formed part of this running argument, a battle over the memory of Pompeius and control of his legacy quickly developed. In the first *Philippic*, delivered to the senate on the 2nd September 44 BC, Cicero begins by giving a lengthy recollection of the events following the *Ides* and the actions of Antonius in particular[489]. In Cicero's opinion the events after the *Ides* were improving from the initial chaos, with the agreement reached between the 'Liberators' and the staunch supporters of Caesar such as Antonius and Lepidus.[490] The dictatorship had also been abolished and a makeshift shrine to Caesar had been removed by Dolabella.[491] However, after Cicero had departed the city to visit his son in Athens, Antonius again spoke against Cicero, which prompted him to return to the city.[492]

Cicero initially praise Antonius, but later accused him of falsifying Caesar's acts.[493] As part of this speech Cicero mentions the laws of other noteworthy Romans, these include Gaius Gracchus and Sulla, but he also lists Pompeius' third consulship, which had been one of the most problematic for Caesar.[494] This is an odd choice of historical characters as Cicero did not have a favourable view of the memory of Gracchi and Sulla, so to place Pompeius with them was perhaps a slight or subtle suggestion that he was similar to the problematic tribunes and the dictator. However, one of the laws of Pompeius' third consulship was regarding the candidacy in absentia of Caesar. Andrew Lintott has noted that this is merely in reference to their official laws on bronze as opposed to the *acta* that Antonius claimed were Caesar's

[489] Kelly 2008: 26.
[490] Cic. *Phil*. 1.2.
[491] Cic. *Phil*. 1.3-5, 1.32.
[492] Cic *Phil*. 1.7.
[493] Cic. *Phil*. 1.16.
[494] Cic. *Phil*. 1.18.

intentions but only existed as notes.[495] Ramsey further notes that it is because of nature of their laws, which is matched with Antonius' proposals.[496]

At the same time Cicero calls upon Antonius to reverse his stance and reels off the examples of his unpopularity at the present, including 'the endless applause for Pompeius' statue' at the games (*Pompei statuae plausus infiniti*).[497] Ramsey proposes that this was an equestrian statue of Pompeius on the rostra, as gladiatorial combats were displayed in the forum at this time.[498]

Antonius responded to the speech of Cicero with his own. In return, Cicero composed another speech, although this was not read out in a senate meeting but instead issued as a pamphlet later.[499] The initial parts of the speech are a rebuttal of the accusations that Antonius had presumably made in his own speech. In part, Cicero used his affiliation with Pompeius to bolster his own image, claiming that Pompeius had helped to make him augur and had been very complimentary about his consulship and the suppression of Catiline.[500] He rejected Antonius' apparent accusation that he had been the reason for the war by alienating Pompeius from Caesar, which was likely an intertextual allusion to the personalisation Caesar asserted as the cause of the war in his *Bellum Civile*.[501] Cicero instead fell back on to his usual retrospective bias in his response, and states that if he had been listened to the war would have gone the other way.[502] Antonius' use of the memory of Pompeius to attack Cicero shows that he perhaps

[495] Lintott 2008: 376.
[496] Ramsey 2003: 122.
[497] Cic. *Phil*. 1.36; Sumi 2005: 84, 146.
[498] Ramsey 2003: 150.
[499] Shackleton Bailey 1986: 31 the pamphlet was sent to Atticus on 25th October (*Ad Att*. 15.13.1) and Cicero made some corrections suggested by Atticus around the 5th November (*Ad Att*. 16.11.1). It was probably published sometime after that, perhaps after Antonius had gone to Cisalpine Gaul. Lacey 1986: 16; Manuwald 2007: 20.
[500] Cic. *Phil*. 2.4, 2.12. On the full details of Pompeius' words, see Ramsey 2003: 179.
[501] Cic. *Phil*. 2.23. As noted above pp. 62-64.
[502] Cic. *Phil*. 2.37.

understood the value of Pompeius' memory for some of the audience and hoped to drive a wedge between them and Cicero in the battle over his memory.

Cicero next spoke of his closeness to Pompeius and praised him as the 'dignity and light of the empire of Roman people.' (*imperi populi romani decus ac lumen*.)[503] Not only does this suggest that, with Caesar dead, Cicero believed the mood was safe enough to praise Pompeius as such, it also paved the way for the accusations that he was about to make regarding Antonius. A large part of the second *Philippic* is dedicated to Antonius' purchase of Pompeius' house. Cicero turns Antonius' tactic of undermining his relationship with Pompeius against him with a particularly scathing attack on Antonius for his acquisition of the property. He uses the image of the house of a great Roman auctioned like a war spoil from a foreign foe coupled with the further embarrassment caused by the character of the new owner to both criticise Antonius for a lack of respect and to emphasize the tragedy of what has become of this site of memory.[504]

Cicero then follows this by reminding his audience of Pompeius 'whose valour it was that made the Roman people more terrible to foreign nations and his justice that made them more beloved.' (*Cuius virtute terribilior erat populus romanus exteris gentibus iustitia carior*.)[505] After this digression to refresh the memory of Pompeius in the minds of his readers, Cicero delves back into the disgraceful ownership of Pompeius' house by Antonius – some of the rich possessions have been doled out to slaves and what little was left was in a poor condition. Lintott has argued that this speech was largely an attempt by Cicero to salvage his *dignitas* after the attack of Antonius.[506] If this is the case, it is interesting how fulsome praise of Pompeius was assumed to be a sound strategy for winning the audience by Cicero.

[503] Cic. *Phil*.2. 54; Ramsey 2003: 253-60.
[504] Cic. *Phil*. 2.66-73.
[505] Cic. *Phil*. 2.65.
[506] Lintott 2008: 382.

The next few *Philippicae* focus on contemporary events and the actions of Antonius, Brutus and Cassius, and Octavian. Cicero returns to Pompeius' memory in the fifth *Philippic* of the 1st of January 43, when he praises Lepidus for coming to terms with Sextus.[507] This may have been part of the race that now developed between the different factions and individuals who were trying to court the commanders of armies. Cicero was perhaps aware of how weak the position that he and like-minded members of the senate were in without a source of military power.[508] After referring to Pompeius as the 'greatest and unparalleled' (*summi et singularis*), he repeats the words of praise as he had in the second *Philippic*, referring to Pompeius as the 'light of the empire of the Roman people.' (*imperi populi romani lumen*.)[509]

Similarly, when discussing Octavian, Cicero makes a lengthy positive comparison of the young leader's actions to the youth of Pompeius, in a likely attempt to win him over. However, Cicero is more diplomatic and makes use of the invectives of the Caesarians when he makes it clear that Octavian's career is an improvement on the young Pompeius', who had been associated with Sulla and had assisted in his ability to act cruelly.[510] The *Philippicae* then return to the current events as Cicero praises those who oppose Antonius. The only mention of Pompeius in these speeches is a short reference to king Deiotarus and his friendship with Pompeius, which appears to be an attempt by Cicero to again curry favour with him for the senate and perhaps to secure his assistance against Antonius.[511]

The last major use of the memory of Pompeius is in the thirteenth *Philippic* from the 20th of March 43. As Antonius had earlier accused Cicero of causing the war by breaking Pompeius away from Caesar, Cicero this time returns to his wartime view that both were problematic figures and states that the war would have been avoided 'if Pompeius somewhat

[507] Cic. *Phil*. 5.39; Lange 2016: 83.
[508] Cic. *Ad Att.* 15.29.1 Sumi 2005: 84-5.
[509] Cic. *Phil*. 5.39.
[510] Cic *Phil*. 5. 43-44; Manuwald 2007 : II 698-9.
[511] Cic *Phil*. 11.34.

relaxed his great *gravitas* and Caesar much of his greed.' (*si aliquid de summa gravitate Pompeius, multum de cupiditate Caesar remisisset*.)[512] He further requests that the senate grant Sextus the money that is needed to buy his father's auctioned property back. [513]

Eventually, Cicero dissects a letter that Antonius sent to Aulus Hirtius that had come into his hands. What it shows is that Antonius still thought in the terminology of the previous civil war; mocking the camp of Pompeius in Greece for believing themselves to constitute the senate.[514] He used the factional title 'Pompeians' with which he repeatedly referred to his enemies.[515] This prompts Cicero to recount all the senators who had been with Pompeius in Greece and claim that if the ten ex-consuls who had been present had survived then the current strife would not have occurred.[516] This digression to the past makes Cicero ask his audience whether they would rather Pompeius had lived than Antonius – Cicero had himself been disappointed that Antonius had not been assassinated during the Ides.[517]

The *Philippicae* reveal the interesting political situation of 44-43 when new factions were formed in the wake of Caesar's assassination. Some, such as Cicero try to hold together the authority of the senate now that it has been freed to an extent from the control of Caesar, although many of its members must have owed their membership to Caesar. Others, such as Antonius were trying to take control of those to whom the death of Caesar was an offence. What is demonstrated within the text is that Pompeius was still remembered fondly by many levels of society, as is witnessed by the frequent positive references to that memory made by Cicero and the reaction of the crowd to his statue. Antonius, perhaps as representative of the

[512] Cic. *Phil*. 13.2, However earlier in *Phil*. 8.7 Cicero claimed ignorance of the cause of the war '*ignoro causam*.' See the previous chapter pp.53-4 for the main discussion on this.
[513] Cic. *Phil*. 13.10-12.
[514] Cic. *Phil*. 13.26; Shackleton Bailey 1986: 341 note 30 suggests that this was a remark of Hirtius and Octavian.
[515] Cic. *Phil*. 13.38, 45.
[516] Cic. *Phil*. 13.28.
[517] Cic. *Phil*. 13.30.

working memory in Caesarian circles, clearly sees value in the use of tropes from the recent civil war; the enemy are still called Pompeians. Despite this, Antonius also intertextually uses Caesar's claim that the war is because his political enemies had led Pompeius astray to accuse Cicero for having caused the war by breaking Pompeius and Caesar's friendship.[518]

Caesar's Continuators

Cicero's speeches took place against a backdrop of a burgeoning literary battle over the memories of the decades before the war and the lives of its two main protagonists. The first major work on the war was the Caesar's *Bellum Civile.* Although likely written as the war progressed, it was not until some point after the death of Caesar that the draft of his unfinished *Bellum Civile* was expanded and likely published by his adherents.[519]

As the ending of the third book makes clear, there was a desire to complete the accounts of the civil war and another three books were therefore added to the *Corpus Caesarianum*. These covered the conflict in Egypt, the war in Africa against the remnants of the opposition, and the final campaign against Gnaeus Pompeius, the survivors from Africa, and the disaffected legions in Hispania. As a contemporary – and occasionally eyewitness – record of the events from 48 BC down to 45 BC, the three books enable us to further trace the development of Pompeius' memory.

The main problems with the texts are the poor quality of the writing and also what has survived is littered with lacunae. Cluett has argued that the rough nature of the texts and the discontinuity of the three books indicate that they were most likely drafts that had not been through a refining process.[520] This might have occurred due to the short time between Hirtius'

[518] See p. 63 above on the use of this claim by Caesar in the *Bellum Civilie*.
[519] Collins 1959: 114-116; Boatwright 1988: 35.
[520] Cluett 2009: 196; Hall 1996: 413, argues that Hirtius likely used military reports from the officers' present in the wars.

assumption of the mantle of editor (44 BC) and his own death in 43, which perhaps brought an early end to the process of correcting the manuscripts.

The books of the 'continuators' largely followed Caesar's previous one-sided view of the conflict. They avoided terming the conflict a 'civil war' and portrayed the opposition as un-Roman in their conduct. Meanwhile, Caesar's motive is silently accepted and his popularity among the masses promoted.[521] Despite the rough nature of the texts, the narratives not only maintained thematic links with the *Bellum Civile*, but also continued in the footsteps of Caesar's negative portrayal of Pompeius. The Alexandrian and African war narratives, for the most part, lack any significant mention of Pompeius. The *Bellum Alexandrinum* is almost entirely devoid of the personalisation that marked the *Bellum Civile*, while the *Bellum Africanum* continued the personalisation of the conflict as Caesar had in the *Bellum Civile*.[522] The focus of the *Bellum Africanum*, however, has now shifted and is instead predominately centred on Scipio, who has taken over as the commander of the opposition.[523] The last book of the trilogy, the *Bellum Hispaniense*, widely followed the example of the *Bellum Civile* and portrayed Gnaeus in a similar manner to his father. This book was also the only one to give coverage to Sextus, although it is clear that the author saw little reason to expend much energy on the youngest of Pompeius' sons and he remained, perhaps justifiably, a largely peripheral figure.

Beginning just after the concluding line of *Bellum Civile*, the *Bellum Alexandrinum* makes almost a dozen mentions of Pompeius in the text. Most of those instances are to frame events as occurring simultaneously with battles against Pompeius in Greece or other actions

[521] Cluett 2009: 200-203.
[522] Even the forces of Ptolemy are referred to as 'Alexandrians'. See the previous chapter on the claims made by the *Bellum Civile* especially p. 63.
[523] *B. Afr*. 4.

that were linked to Pompeius in some form.[524] Among the remaining instances was a remark that a legion was reconstituted with surviving troops from Pompeius' army – who were referred to once again as '*Pompeianis militibus'*.[525] The other occasions noted the role of Pompeius' popularity as a factor in various episodes of unrest.[526] During a digression on events in Illyria, where some of the survivors from the battle of Pharsalus were regrouping and threatening to invade Macedonia, the author commented on Caesar's urgent request that an army be assembled to defend against an attack stating: '[Caesar] believed that all that area and region would resume the war if Pompeius was alive.' (*Omnem illam partem regionemque vivo Cn. Pompeio bellum instauraturam esse credebat*.)[527] The *Bellum Civile* had made Pompeius the driving force behind the war against Caesar and here the author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* has continued this strategy.[528] How much Caesar really feared Pompeius' ability to inspire a rebellion *in absentia* is difficult to judge. However, the words of Caesar at this juncture certainly kept up the propaganda that Pompeius was the only reason for the continuing war.

Another example of this view occurred when Caesar's unpopular and avaricious governor in Hispania Ulterior*,* Q. Cassius Longinus, heard of the victory at Pharsalus, which granted new impetus to his rapacity. The narrative states that he saw the 'completion of the war' (*confectum bellum*) as ending his excesses.[529] Perhaps Longinus saw the war through the lens of Caesar's propaganda and, like Caesar, might have thought the war would end with Pompeius' defeat. Eventually Longinus' poor governance of the province led to a mutiny of

[524] *B. Alex.* 3, 42, 48, and 56 all mention events involving Pompeius. The author was always careful to note that Pompeius was at a disadvantage or that Caesar was succeeding. *B. Alex.* 51, 67,69-70 relate to supporters of Pompeius.
[525] *B. Alex.* 9.
[526] E.g. *B. Alex.* 42.
[527] *B. Alex.* 42.
[528] On the key role played in the narrative of the *Bellum Civile* see the first chapter above, particularly p. 26.
[529] *B. Alex*. 62. Marin 2009: 159 notes Caesar probably intended Pharsalus to be the end of the war.

some of the legions and a revolt breaking out, which occurred after the battle of Pharsalus but before Pompeius' death.

The author relates how Thorius proclaims that he is a supporter of Pompeius and intended to free the province from the current Caesarian governor. A further interesting detail to this incident is that the soldiers who were accompanying him wrote 'Pompeius' on their shields and claimed that they were freeing Cordoba on his behalf.[530] When they learnt that Longinus was universally unpopular and that the inhabitants did not want to antagonise Caesar they promptly removed the name of Pompeius.[531] What is clear from this episode is that Pompeius was still a popular figure in the province and that the use of his name was deemed to be of benefit to the soldiers and their mission. Those who viewed Pompeius in a favourable light were perhaps in the majority in the province and appealing to them was deemed to be a means of easing the path of the coup against Longinus. However, when it became clear that they had the support of the majority regardless, they dropped the more partisan element of their strategy. This fits with Caesar's earlier fears regarding Macedonia and places emphasis on the strong personal loyalty inspired by Pompeius, who boasted of having a large *clientele* across the empire. However, as already noted, the issues in Hispania may have had more to do with Caesar's actions then loyalty to a dead patron.

The second book, the *Bellum Africanum*, makes only one mention of Pompeius that has any propagandistic significance. Instead, the focus of this book fell on to Scipio who had now become the *de facto* leader of the opposition.[532] This shift can perhaps be attributed to the fact that Pompeius' death had done nothing to end the war and there was now a need to find a new figure on which to place the blame for the continued conflict. The key mention of Pompeius

[530] *B. Alex.* 58.
[531] *B. Alex.* 58-59.
[532] *B. Afr.* 4.

appears in a scene before the battle of Thapsus in a lengthy speech given by Cato to Gnaeus. The speech is hagiographic in nature and recalled the earlier career of Pompeius:

'Your Father, when he was your age and saw the state oppressed by criminally wicked fellow Romans, and decent men punished by death or exile and so without a country or rights as a citizen, was inspired by glory and nobility of soul; as a young man holding no public office, he gathered together the remains of his father's army and restored to freedom Italy and the city of Rome whose spirit and very existence were on the brink of extinction. He also recovered by arms, and with amazing speed, Sicily, Africa, Numidia, and Mauretania. By these actions he won for himself that brilliant reputation known to all the world, and celebrated a triumph when still only a young man and not yet a senator. And he made this entry into public life without remarkable achievements on the part of his father, without the help of some outstanding reputation won by his elders, and without exercising any great patronage or enjoying a famous name. You, on the other hand, possess fame and reputation through your father, and are well enough endowed on your own account with nobility of soul and consciousness; will you not exert yourself, and go to those who saw your father as their patron, to demand that they give assistance to you, our country, and to every right-thinking man?'

(*Tuus pater istuc aetatis cum esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis sceleratisque civibus, oppressam bonosque, aut interfectos aut exsilio, multatos patria civitateque carere. gloria et animi magnitudine elatus, privatus atque adulescentulus, paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis, paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbemque Romanam in libertatem vindicavit. idemque Siciliam, Africam, Numidiam, Mauretaniamque mirabili celeritate armis recepit. Quibus ex rebus sibi eam dignitatem, quae est per gentis clarissima notissimaque conciliavit, adulescentulusque atque eques Romanus triumphavit. Atque ille non ita amplis rebus patris gestis. neque tam excellenti dignitate maiorum parta, neque tantis clientelis nominisque claritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus. Tu, contra, et patris*

nobilitate et dignitate et per te ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus. nonne eniteris et proficisceris ad paternas clientelas auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique efflagitatum?)[533]

The author of the *Bellum Africanum* was perhaps, *prima facie*, not attuned to the line that Caesar expounded in his own accounts. A recollection such as this in the *Bellum Civile* would not have seemingly lauded Pompeius and would have been used to demonstrate how corrupted Pompeius had now become. But, as Rambaud has noted, '[the author of the *Bellum Africanum*] has chosen the arguments with skill, avoiding recalling the figure of the father in the guise of the conqueror of the pirates and Mithridates. He takes as the example the youth of Magnus, which suits not only the age of the alleged listener, but also the propaganda with which Caesar degraded the great man.'[534] This linked intertextually to both Caesar and the political discourse of the decades before the civil war when Pompeius' opponents had kept the memory his 'Sullan' period when he fought and killed fellow citizens in circulation. Aside from this, the praise for Pompeius as the 'young butcher', from the mouth of Cato, while linking with the hostile memory of Pompeius, also had the effect of making Cato, who had always been viewed as an upstanding member of the senate, appear hypocritical.

Sallust Continues the War on Memory

Around the same time as the publication of the *Bellum Civile*, one of the earliest historians to undertake an account of the recent past and attempt to explain the reasons for the civil war was the retired Caesarian governor and general Sallust. As will be discussed, his accounts appear to have been interpreted through the lens of contemporary events. His early

[533] *B. Afr.* 22. Translation Carter 2008: 199-200.
[534] Rambaud 1953: 361, 'Il a choisi avec habileté les arguments, en évitant de rappeler le personnage du père sous l'aspect du vainqueur des pirates et de Mithridate […] Il prend comme exemple la jeunesse de Magnus, ce qui convient non seulement à l'age de l'auditeur prétendu, mais aussi à le propagande ce César qui dégradait le grand homme.'

life remains a mystery, although probably born in 86 BC, he appeared as one of the tribunes in 52 BC who attacked Cicero during the troubles wrought by Clodius' death, but by 50 BC had been expelled from the senate during the census by Pompeius' relative Appius Claudius Pulcher (Gnaeus' father-in-law).[535] He sided with Caesar during the civil war and, despite failing many of the tasks assigned to him, he was eventually made governor of Africa Nova by Caesar in 46 BC.[536] On his return from his posting the following year, he was put on trial for extortion in his province but was acquitted with Caesar's help.[537] After the Ides, he retired from public life and began to write his accounts of the Catilinarian conspiracy, the Jugurthine war, and his *Historiae* from the death of Sulla down to 67 BC when the work was stopped by his own death in 35 BC[538]

Although prior to his literary career Sallust had been a follower of Caesar, there is no suggestion that he maintained a strong loyalty to the dead dictator in his writings.[539] However, it would seem that Sallust had a strong dislike for Pompeius, who scholars argue would have been given – to judge by the quantity of negative fragments – a highly negative portrait in the *Historiae*.[540]

[535] Hands 1959: 60; McGushin 1992: 1-2; Mellor 1999: 31 and Pagán 2009: xi accept the possibility of a quaestorship before the tribunate, but most scholarship is against this. Syme 1964: 11 and 28, rejects the idea of a quaestorship; Earl 1966: 306, notes that the quaestorship is guesswork at best. Earl also suggests that Sallust might have gained his military experience under Pompeius in the 60s B.C. but this is purely speculation. Syme 1964: 212, speculates that the negative attitude toward Pompeius is due to some duplicity in 52 or 50 B.C. See also Allen 1954: 4.
[536] Allen 1954: 6; Syme 1964: 37; Earl 1966: 306-7 McGushin 1992: 2; Mellor 1999: 31; Pagán 2009: xiii.
[537] Perhaps through bribery see Dio 43.47.4; Allen 1954: 7-9; Syme 1964: 39; McGushin 1992: 3; Mellor 1999: 32.
[538] Syme 1964: 13, tentatively accepts Jerome's dating of 87 B.C. for birth and 35 B.C. for death; Batstone 2010: xviii with note 8 and 150; See also Mellor 1999: 41. Contra Allen 1966: 269 who seems to argue that the *Historiae* deliberately ended in 67 to accommodate the timeline of the Catilinarian conspiracy, this has not met with general acceptance.
[539] Syme 1964: 104-111 and 116-117 although at 73 notes that Sallust probably edited out the criticisms of Caesar in Cato's speech on the Catilinarian conspirators; MacKay 1962: 187-188.
[540] Syme 1964: 191; Stewart 1968: 302, suggests Sallust hated Pompeius for having aided Sulla. While this might be the case it ignores the strong focus on Pompeius' youth prevalent in the hostile literature of the time; Katz 1981: 71; McGushin 1992: 18 notes the high probability of a negative focus on Pompeius in the *Historiae,* also 242.

Two works cover Pompeius' lifetime: the *Catiline* and the *Historiae*, which cover the 60s and the 70s BC respectively. Sallust's main aim in the *Catiline* was to show how the *res publica* had declined morally and politically to its current state, which he attributed to the destruction of Carthage in the second century BC and the lack thereafter of a unifying external threat.[541] Looking back to the past for a point when the Romans deviated from their path was nothing new as Batstone has shown, noting that Polybius had recorded a similar view.[542] In Sallust's opinion after the fall of Carthage, the Romans, without an external enemy great enough to cause an existential threat to the city, were free to focus their energies on conflicts amongst themselves. Aside from the social tensions created by this in-fighting, the Romans gradually became weakened, both morally and physically, and preferred to live a life of materialism and leisure. The leading citizens, according to Sallust, began to cynically profess support for the people and the state while only accumulating wealth, honours, and, in Pompeius' case, extraordinary powers for themselves.[543] Pompeius' memory now became part of a larger strand of ideological thought on the decline of the *res publica* in line with attempts to understand the chaos of the last decades.

Sallust's writing was influenced by, among others, the works of the Greek historian Thucydides, whose style Sallust attempted to imitate in Latin. Thucydides had become a popular historian to read in the civil war years because of the parallels in his subject matter and recent events.[544] While in linguistic terms Sallust was influenced by the archaic Latin of Cato the Elder, who had been the originator of prose Latin history, perhaps, as Syme put it, 'to look back romantically at the past coloured by the distaste for the deplorable present.'[545] The starting point of the *Historiae* also makes clear that Sallust was acquainted with other

[541] Sall. *Cat.*10.1-4; Syme 1964: 249-50; Stewart 1968: 302, adding that Sallust' opinion became canonical.
[542] Batstone 2010: vii.
[543] Sall. *Cat*. 38.2.
[544] Syme 1964: 51-2 and 245-6; Renehan 1976: 97; Keitel 1987: 300. For arguments on the influence of Herodotus on Sallust see Grethlein 2006: 322-323.
[545] McGushin 1992: 70; Syme 1964: 193.

Roman authors of more recent times, especially the earlier work of Sisenna, which Sallust criticised as too lenient towards Sulla.[546]

The characterisations in the *Catiline* and the *Historiae* are notoriously tricky to decipher, with the figures populating the works given a range of virtues. It can become hard to determine exactly what Sallust intended the reader to think of these people outside of the decline of the Roman stock.[547] Take, for instance, Catiline, who murders his stepson so that he could marry his second wife and makes an oath sealed with blood. Sallust, however, still left his enemies with some virtues, perhaps to make the characterisation seem more realistic[548] While clearly being the villain of the piece, Catiline is described as physically and mentally stronger than average, and his followers are at least portrayed as fighting bravely in the final battle.[549] Likewise, the two leading characters in the senate debate – Cato and Caesar – are not portrayed as being fully endowed with all the virtues.[550] As noted earlier, their confrontation is likely anachronistic and derived from the contemporary ideological battle that was raging between those who supported Cato and Caesar's adherents.[551] In the narrative both are given opposing speeches on the question of whether to execute or spare the conspirators who are taken alive. Syme makes a persuasive argument that Caesar's speech was designed to also hit out at the violence of contemporary politics, where the Triumvirs had instituted proscriptions against their enemies.[552] This allusion to contemporary events then adds another layer to the characters that has to be interpreted.

[546] Rawson 1979: 327.
[547] Katz 1981: 71; What Rawson 1987: 179, calls Sallust's 'even handed pessimism.'
[548] Sall. *Cat*. 15.2 and 22.1.
[549] Sall. *Cat*. 61.3.
[550] Syme 1964: 68.
[551] See pp. 111-14.
[552] Mellor 1999: 38.

Although Caesar's speech portrayed the clemency that he had espoused at the time, which linked neatly to his policy during the civil war, Cato is shown as the favoured figure.[553] The two figures both give worthy speeches but Cato's seems to match most with the views expressed by Sallust, which has clearly been improved by the removal of disparaging accusations, and ultimately ends with Cato in triumph over Caesar.[554] In the post-war Roman world, Cato had become the hero of the opposition *par excellence* and Sallust, despite his side in the war, appears to at least cater to this trend.[555] Broughton has demonstrated that Sallust was likely influenced by the recent trend in lionising Cato, noting that the importance of his speech in the senate had recently been inflated by Brutus in his book.[556] However, the characterisation of Caesar and Cato, it could be argued, also fits within the personalities developed during the civil war in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*. For example, Caesar is portrayed as arguing against the execution in line with his famous clemency during the war, while, Cato is portrayed as seeking the deaths of the captured men, much as the opposition in the war was accused of cruelty. The impact of contemporary events on Sallust's narrative has been argued by Wiseman as well, who noted that the assassination of Caesar appeared to have affected the judgement of the Gracchi in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* whose memory evolved so that they are now were described as having been slain by a small group (*pauci*) of senators.[557]

[553] So Syme 1964: 121, contra Stewart 1968: 317 note 41, also 309-310 discussing the anachronistic portrayal of Caesar as well as the equal stature given to these two figures.
[554] Renehan 1976: 97-99; Katz 1981: 75; Sklenář 1998: 211-13, contra MacKay 1962: 193 and Batstone 1988: 1, 27. Batstone's paper discusses the virtues presented in the two speeches in great depth and argues that neither party was portrayed as the superior of the other.
[555] Sallust (*Cat*. 53.5-6) began his comparison of Cato and Caesar whom he called 'two men of extraordinary virtue, divergent manner' (*igenti virtute, divorsis moribus*) with the remark that 'for a long time there had been no one born at Rome with great virtue' (*multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit*). Syme 1964: 113 - with support from Stewart (1968: 308) – suggests that this is a slight against Pompeius.
[556] Broughton 1936: 43-4.
[557] Sall. *Jug*. 42.1. See also Wiseman 2009: 181-2.

The *Catiline*, the first of Sallust's books, was probably written around the late 40s BC.[558] While the events of the conspiracy itself occurred while Pompeius was campaigning in the East against Mithridates, this, however, did not preclude Pompeius' appearance in the text itself. Sallust predominantly mentions Pompeius as a peripheral character who exerts his influence on events even in his absence. For example, the first mention of Pompeius claims that his campaign in the East against Mithridates had left Italia without an army, hence the country was vulnerable to the sort of plot that Catiline and his followers had hatched.[559] This blame probably continues the theme of Pompeius affecting events from a distance as he was accused by his political enemies in the 60s and 50s.

Aside from this, in the few instances that Sallust does include him, he focusses on Pompeius' and Crassus' turbulent relationship, which has implications for the *res publica*.[560] This seems to have influenced the later focus of the memories of the two. Sallust notes a suspicion that Crassus had known about the plot of Catiline but hoped it would create a rival to Pompeius' great power.[561] On the earlier restoration of the tribunate during Pompeius and Crassus' consulship in 70 BC, Sallust was critical, seeing the consuls' restoration as opening the pathway of exploitation by demagogues who cynically claim to act in defence of the tribunes against the senate – as Caesar did.[562]

This perhaps hints at the problem with Pompeius according to Sallust: that his power was such that it provided hard to balance the *res publica*. Prior to his assumption of the command against Mithridates, Pompeius had been granted an extraordinary command to defeat the pirates, which had caused much angst amongst the leading senators, many of

[558] MacKay 1962: 181 but later (189-90) argues for a date of 50-49 B.C.; Syme 1964: 127-8; Pagán 2009: xvi suggests a publication date of 42 B.C.; McGushin 1992: 4 notes that the language at *Cat* 53.6 implies that both Caesar and Cato were dead by the time of writing.
[559] Sall. *Cat*.16.4.
[560] Sall. *Cat*. 17.7.
[561] Sall. *Cat*. 17.7.
[562] Sall. *Cat*. 38.1-4.

whom had fought hard to prevent granting such a wide-ranging command to one man.[563] Later, perhaps as an illustration of the memory of Pompeius' lust for power and his large *clientelae*, Sallust recounts a rumour regarding the death of the quaestor Piso who, on his way to govern Hispania Citerior, had been killed by members of a troop of Iberian cavalry. These cavalrymen either killed Piso out of hatred or, so went the rumour, on the command of Pompeius, to whom they were still loyal.[564] Although Sallust implies that the assassination rumour is dubious, Pagán has argued that the comment in the second position was meant to be taken more seriously and it is in this position that we find the suggestion of Pompeius' involvement.[565] The comment inserted after the two incidents that the Iberians had tolerated worse leaders and the false claim that murder was a novel form of action for the Iberians adds weight to the suggestion that Sallust here prefers to see the hand of Pompeius in the assassination.

Conversely, Pompeius' absence on his campaign in the East was characterised as having 'diminished the resources of the plebs and increased the power of the few.' *(plebis opes imminutae, paucorum potenti crevit*.) [566] This then allowed the *nobiles* to control matters and suppress their political enemies, and thus demonstrates the duality that Sallust imbues his characters by suggesting that Pompeius was both a problem of stability but also controlled the worse impulses of the *nobiles*, perhaps being the unifying threat for them to focus on, as externally enemies had been in Rome's past. The mention of the 'few' (*pauci*) is very reminiscent of the accusation of Caesar, which Sallust must have been aware. Despite these comments, however, Sallust's characterisation of Pompeius is perhaps subtler in the *Catiline* than in the *Historiae*.

[563] Plut. *Pomp*. 25.2; Dio 36.36. See p. 40 above.
[564] Sall. *Cat*. 19.1-5.
[565] Pagán 2009: 59.
[566] Sall. *Cat*. 39.1. Batstone 2010: 171 argues that the plus posset imperium at *Cat*.39.4 does not refer to the 'first' Triumvirate but is a general observation.

Only fragments of the *Historiae* survive, but the consensus is that the memory of Pompeius was blackened more in this text than the *Catiline*.[567] Five books, two letters and four speeches are the largest portions to survive, their preservation likely owing to the grammarians and scholiasts who were interested in the words of Sallust, rather than his narrative.[568]

The *Historiae* were written into the 30s BC, although when Sallust began this work is uncertain.[569] Taking as the starting point the possible end of Sisenna's earlier history, Sallust covered the years after the death of Sulla in 78 BC, an era that saw the ascendancy of Pompeius. This has led to speculation by scholars that the *Historiae*, had the manuscript survived to a greater extent, may have charted the rise to prominence of Pompeius.[570] A number of modern scholars have argued for a large role for Pompeius within the *Historiae*, although what has survived makes the task of piecing together his portrayal, or even its extent difficult.[571] McGushin has proposed that Book 2 of the *Historiae* was preceded by a character sketch of Pompeius, from which a number of the surviving fragments are likely to have come.[572] Another clue to the portrayal of Pompeius within its pages can perhaps be gleaned from the reaction of one of Pompeius' freedmen who penned an attack on Sallust for what he deemed to be slurs against his deceased ex-master's father.[573]

Although Sallust was resuming the narrative from after Sulla's death, he still went back over the ground covered by Sisenna. This enabled Sallust to cover the bloody past of

[567] Syme 1964: 191; Stewart 1968: 302; Katz 1981: 71; McGushin 1992: 18, 242. All the fragment numbers used are from McGushin 1992 and 1994.
[568] Syme 1964: 178; McGushin 1992: 6; Pagán 2009: xxv; see Turner 2019: 30 on the popularity of Sallust in antiquity.
[569] Syme 1964: 286 suggests that the *Historiae* were published together or in parts or not at all. If they were published, then Books 1-3 could not be before 37-36 B.C. or not until after Sallust's death. Book 5 was never finished. Pagán 2009: xvi argues the *Bellum Jugurthinum* was finished in 39 B.C.
[570] McGushin 1992: 17; Pagán 2009: xvi-xvii.
[571] Syme 1964: 201.
[572] McGushin 1992: 12, 190. The character sketch came in the section of the narrative covering the year 77 B.C. and the transfer of the command in the Sertorian war to Pompeius.
[573] Suet. *Gram*.15.

Pompeius when he was one of the leading henchmen for Sulla, pursuing and executing his opponents across the empire.[574] As has been shown in the narrative of Caesar and the 'Continuators', especially the speech of Cato to Gnaeus, Pompeius' early 'Sullan' career was an area of interest to his opponents during the war, as it had been pre-war. Thus the episode of Carbo's execution by the young Pompeius has left a number of fragments.[575] This includes one that possibly recounts the embarrassing end of Carbo at the hands of Pompeius, which may have been designed to demonstrate the cruelty of the young general in line with the political acts of his opponents while he was alive.[576] Aside from recounting the executions carried out by Pompeius as a youth, Sallust seems to have focussed on, and mocked, Pompeius' appearance and famous desire to emulate Alexander the Great.[577] McGushin has cautioned against reading too much into the fragments that have survived, but notes 'from what remains of the character portrait and Pompeius' conduct of the Sertorian war […] is that the historian has concentrated on character traits and activity unfavourable to Pompeius' reputation.' And that 'the outcome is an unbalanced treatment of a very complex personality.'[578]

The other remaining fragments now resemble a series of *bons mots,* and it is probably for their value as succinct quotations that they survive. Suetonius records part of the portrait by Sallust while discussing the counter piece written by Pompeius' freedman Lenaeus, who attacked Sallust for summing up Pompeius as 'noble in appearance, shameless in spirit.'

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[574] McGushin 1992: 17.
[575] Sall. *Hist.* 1.33, 44.
[576] McGushin 1992: 109. See pp.46-48 above, particularly the reported speech of Helvius in the 50s.
[577] Sall. *Hist*. 3.84; McGushin 1992: 5, suggests that Sallust was likely using a number of sources that would have been strongly pro-Pompeius, such as Varro and possibly Voltacilius and Theophanes, hence Sallust's comments appearing as almost appended on to more positive statements. Kraus and Woodman 1997: 36, note the subtlety of Sallust's characterisation: 'if Sallust did not go on to comment explicitly on Pompey's character, his use of the convention on its own could have suggested a latent danger in the young man. Similarly, Pompey's youthful belief that he could rival Alexander the Great spoke volumes.' See also Syme 1964: 206. Sallust makes further comment on this in Book 3 (3.84) after Pompeius victory over Perperna in Hispania. On this see McGushin 1994: 132-3. See the discussion at pp. 67-8 above on the *imitatio* of Pompeius.
[578] McGushin 1992: 17-18.

(*Pompeium oris probi, animo inverecundo*.)[579] Syme noted that to the positive characteristic – something probably derived from the writings of Pompeius' entourage – Sallust had added a 'damaging appendage.'[580] Likewise a similar sentiment is found in the lines: 'moderate in all things except toward tyranny.' (*modestus ad alia omnia nisi ad dominationem*.)[581] McGushin has argued that this subtly achieves Sallust's goal of 'stressing the factor he considered most dangerous to the state – the unscrupulous ambition of Pompeius.'[582] Some fragments of uncertain placement have also been purposed as originating from Pompeius' character portrait. This view has gained traction with most modern scholars.[583] Among these is the line: 'however, from his youth he had insulted many good men.' (*Multos tamen ab adulescentia bonos insultaverat*.)[584] It refers again to the executions by Pompeius in his career as a henchman of Sulla.[585] However, the largest surviving treatment of Pompeius from the *Historiae* is the letter in Book 2 that Pompeius supposedly wrote to the senate complaining of the struggles he is facing against Sertorius in Hispania and accusing the senate of frustrating his campaign. McGushin notes 'it is not unlikely that Sallust had seen the original letter sent by Pompeius to the senate. His version of it however is in keeping with his earlier portrait.'[586]

As evidenced by Cicero's appeals to Lucceius, history to the Romans themselves was an exercise in rhetoric, rather than one of strict adherence to the facts. As such, Sallust places in the mouths (or pens, in this case) of his historical characters' words that reflected their personality according to Sallust rather than their actual statements.[587] Therefore, the letter that Sallust has written for Pompeius is arrogant in tone and makes a number of exaggerations:

[579] Suet. *Gram*.15; Syme 1964: 280.
[580] Syme 1964: 194; McGushin 1992: 192.
[581] Sall. *Hist*. 2.18.
[582] McGushin 1992: 193.
[583] Syme 1964: 194-8, 202.
[584] Sall. *Hist*. 2.19. See with Syme 1964: 201-2; McGushin 1992: 192; Batstone 2010: 211.
[585] Batstone 2010: 211.
[586] McGushin 1992: 242; Similar sentiment in Mellor 1999: 41.
[587] McGushin 1992: 6 also 14 for the benefit of speeches, especially paired, in giving greater depth to events; Pagán 2009: xxxvi.

Pompeius claimed to have raised a new army, which was not the case, nor did he push back an enemy to recover Gaul.[588] He also asserted that he had exceeded Hannibal when he found a better route to cross the Alps.[589] On the success of Pompeius' campaign, Sallust has him distort the picture completely making his role in the war decisive and taking greater credit than was due. It seems, as Sallust had previously narrated the disasters of the campaign, that his design with the memory of Pompeius was to show a duplicitous figure who exaggerated his achievements and claimed credit that was not wholly his – a criticism that was not new, with the most famous example by Lucullus, as noted earlier.[590]

The letter of Pompeius also contains an allusion to more recent characterisations that likely had their antecedent in the propaganda of the civil war against Caesar. For example, to act as a balance to these faults and to excuse himself from blame, as McGushin has argued, Pompeius makes frequent reference to his youthfulness at the time and admits that he acted 'out of greater zeal than judgment.' (*Maiore studio quam consilio*.)[591] Batstone has noted that 'since this was a complaint against Pompey on all sides at the beginning of the civil war with Caesar, it is reasonable to see in his acknowledgement a character trait.'[592]

Similarly, prior to that conflict, Pompeius had been famous for his organisational skills, his campaign against the pirates being the leading example, but also his campaign against the enemies of Sulla. Sallust has Pompeius claim to have raised his army in forty days when it was clear that Pompeius had not disbanded his forces from his campaign against Lepidus.[593] Perhaps Sallust intended to mock Pompeius' inflated claims to speedy

[588] McGushin 1992: 244-245 Pompeius' troops were already experienced in combat.
[589] Sall. *Hist.* 2.82.4-5.
[590] McGushin 1992: 218. See p. 60 above for the animosity that surrounded Pompeius' assumption of command in the was with Mithridates.
[591] Sall. *Hist.* 2.82.4; McGushin 1992: 244.
[592] Batstone 2010: 212.
[593] Sall. *Hist.* 2.82.4.

organisation, such as his campaign against the pirates and the similar claim that had proven disastrously false in the first months of 49 BC.

Lastly, the final sentence of the letter where Pompeius seemingly threatens the senate has been much discussed by scholars. Sallust has Pompeius write, 'the whole war in Hispania will cross over into Italia.' (*Omne bellum Hispaniae in Italiam transgradientur*.)[594] McGushin has noted it is both a statement of what could be if Sertorius were victorious and also a vague threat to the senate about Pompeius' own return when hostilities end.[595] Again, Pompeius had frequently been seen as a possible threat on his return from various campaigns, especially after the defeat of Mithridates in the East. A more recent case had been during the civil war, when some of Pompeius' supporters had threatened the senate into following Pompeius' demands, and later when they had all promised to treat as traitors those who had failed to show them support during the struggle.

Sallust's narrative in Book 3 covered the return from Hispania and the election that brought Pompeius and Crassus to power, with the longest fragment to survive being the speech of the tribune Macer. The speech is critical of the current lack of powers for the tribunate, still in place from the ruling of Sulla. Macer, however, is confident in their eventual restoration at the hands of Pompeius.[596] The speech of Macer also links to the earlier letter of Pompeius – and the ambiguous nature of the *nobiles* according to McGushin – when Macer says of the senate 'when they were afraid [of Pompeius] they carried him on their necks, but as soon as the fear is removed they tear him to pieces.' (*ubi pertimuere sublatum in cervices suas, mox dempto metu lacerant*.)[597] In another intertextual link back to the *Catiline* in Book

[594] Sall. *Hist*. 2.82.10.
[595] McGushin 1992: 246.
[596] Sall. *Hist*. 3.34.23.
[597] Sall. *Hist*. 3.34.21; McGushin 1994: 96.

4, Sallust again revived the troubled relationship between Pompeius and Crassus during their term in office together.[598] But this adds little that had not already been said in the *Catiline*.

Sallust in his writing, it could be argued, engaged intertextually with the prevalent trends of his age. As can be seen from the *Historiae*, Sallust was clearly conforming to the pattern of attack favoured by those who had followed Caesar. The youth of Pompeius provided fertile ground for invective against the general and, despite his death almost a decade earlier, there were still veterans of Caesar's side in the war who saw the value of denigrating the opposition. As can be seen in the attitudes of the soldiery after the death of Caesar, maintaining a negative view of their old opponents had value for those who now wished to become leading figures of this group.[599] Although Sallust had no intention of returning to politics, he clearly retained his dislike of Pompeius either from before or during the war, and certainly appears to have joined his portrait with those of the near-contemporary continuators. This is not to suggest that Sallust was a partisan of Caesar, which has been shown not to be the case, but he does not need to favour one to dislike the other. Further, there was always going to be a certain value for the surviving veterans in sustaining the narrative against Pompeius to legitimise the war in which men like Sallust had risked their lives to fight, especially in an era which questioned the actions of Caesar. Not only did he maintain the narrow focus of the 'continuators' but he also added to the body of literature that crafted Cato as the new key rival to Caesar. The speeches of the *Catiline* sets these two figures up against each other as much greater figures than they were at the time and, by relegating Cicero, allows them to duel ideologically. Pompeius never had any ideology attendant on him at the time, and in the post-war world began to suffer for this as his status as the leading opponent, which was how Caesar apparently saw him, was surpassed by Cato,

[598] Sall. *Hist*. 4.44-45; McGushin 1994: 161-162.
[599] Zanker 1990: 34.

whose honourable death gave greater lustre to the losing side of the war especially with the literary battle over Cato's memory.

Pollio: Caesar's Lieutenant and Critic

Around the 20s BC, another historian from the Caesarian side of the civil war wrote an account of the conflict. Asinius Pollio had served as a lieutenant of Caesar throughout the war and had later been assigned the governorship of Hispania Ulterior where he had been forced to retreat from a town when it was attacked by the forces of Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius.[600] Pollio's work has been almost totally lost with only a few direct quotations surviving in the works of later authors. From these fragments it is possible to glean a little information of the general theme of the work. Firstly, Pollio went back a decade to try to explain the reason for the eventual war. In his narrative, he chose 60 BC as the first step on the path to war with the formation of the political compact between Pompeius, Caesar and Crassus.[601] This is possibly an intertextual link with the assertion of Caesar that the war had related from the broken relationship between himself and Pompeius and the later evolution that saw the death of Crassus as last barrier to their hostility.

Secondly, on the nature of Pollio's views there are a few indirect statements; Cremutius Cordus, a Tiberian historian, justifies his position of praising the assassins of Caesar while on trial by arguing that Pollio likewise done the same.[602] Pollio is also noted for having refused Octavian's request to join his campaign against Antonius due to his friendship with the latter.[603] Although this is largely all that is known of Pollio, his work is widely considered to have been the main source for most of the surviving histories that covered the

[600] Dio 45.10.5.
[601] Hor. *Odes* 2.1.
[602] Tac. *Ann*. 4.34.3-4.
[603] Bosworth 1972: 447.

civil war written later, particularly the narratives of Plutarch, Suetonius, and Appian.[604] He also was part of the circle of writers, such as Horace and Livy, that were connected with the Augustan court, and influenced their writing too.[605]

The relative paucity of the surviving fragments of Pollio has led to a large amount of attribution that is conjectural. It should be noted, too, that praise for Brutus does not equate to support for Pompeius. They are not mutually inclusive and even Brutus himself appears to have been no friend of Pompeius until practical considerations forced his hand. Pollio's later clash and humiliation at the hands of Pompeius' sons would also discount his narrative containing anything positive on them. In fact, two accounts exist of the incident, one of which portrays Pollio in a positive light, and would suggest that a friendly writer, or more likely Pollio himself had written a version of the event that altered the memory.[606]

Octavian: Monumentalising memory

Decades later, when Octavian was now the sole ruler under his new name Augustus, the memory of Pompeius had shifted again, most of the historians who had witnessed the civil war of Caesar had passed away and a new group of writers appeared. The need to continue to vilify Pompeius' memory to justify Caesar's civil war was now not necessary and Octavian took a more relaxed view of Pompeius' memory perhaps to accommodate his continued popularity. Indeed, Octavian – perhaps taking a cue from Cicero – also made use of the memory of Pompeius' career to justify his own raising of forces and assumption of high offices at a young age.[607] Pompeius' memory was most visibly celebrated in the Forum

[604] He was also used as a source, among others, for Cicero by Seneca the Elder and Strabo for geographic knowledge. Feldman 1985: 241; Roller 1997: 116.
[605] Pelling 2006: 271-2 note 31 and Pelling 2011: 44-6 with note 106.
[606] Positive memories from Vell. Pat. 2.73.2 and App. *B.C.* 2.73. Negative from Dio 45.10.4-6. See Lowe 2002: 69-70 for discussion.
[607] Lamp 2013: 76-7.

of Augustus, which centred on the temple of Mars Ultor, which commemorated Augustus's avenging of Caesar.[608]

In front of the temple was a square with a statue of Augustus in a triumphal quadriga at the centre listing his accomplishments on the pedestal.[609] Around the square was a colonnaded portico, which contained niches that held statues honouring all the famous Romans, centred on Romulus, in one wing, as well as the mythical ancestors of the Julian line, centred on Aeneas, in the other.[610] This parade of heroes both real and mythical was meant to symbolically pave the way to the Julio-Claudian dynasty.[611] Additionally, the spaces between the colonnades were to be filled with a bronze statues of triumphators, while an assemblage of paintings of Alexander the Great were also included.[612] This was probably derived from the practise of the funeral procession of the ancestorial masks, except by setting this in stone, it created a permanent procession of the forebears of the Julian family.[613] The forum itself seemed to have become central to many of the ceremonial functions of the city, which would have kept up steady flow of visitors as an audience for the many messages of the complex.[614] The uses of the forum and the imagery of the complex would suggest that it was meant to emphasis the military, civic and religious nature of Augustus' reign. Little has survived of the various statues within the porticos, but it is speculated that among the famous Romans would have been a statue to Pompeius, complete with an inscription summing up his career.[615] Surviving fragments of other inscriptions allow a rough framework of the wording of such inscriptions to be pieced together.[616] Although the exact wording unknown.

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[608] Lamp 2013: 61-2.
[609] Lamp 2013: 64-5; Shaya 2013: 86.
[610] Shaya 2013: 85. This was likely to have been influenced by the statues of the 14 conquered nations in the theatre of Pompeius according to Geiger 2008: 102.
[611] Lamp, 2013: 60, 70-2; Lobur 2019: 90 Aeneas (as well as Numa) was a demonstration of the piety of Augustus.
[612] Lamp 2013: 65, Shaya: 2013 85.
[613] Geiger 2008: 26-7; Lamp 2013: 60.
[614] Lamp 2013: 66-67 Shaya 2013: 89-90.
[615] Shaya 2013: 85.
[616] Shaya 2013: 85-8.

It has been suggested that the parade of heroes in the underworld of the *Aeneid* provided a basis for the choice of some of the historical figures.[617] The author of the *eulogia* is unknown, but in the decades after the construction Pliny the Elder thought they had been authored by Augustus himself, a theory that has been widely rejected, but demonstrates how closely the princeps was associated with the complex.[618] Likely Pompeius was recorded for his many military achievements and the expansion of Roman power that came with them, and his multiple consulships. The controversial issues such as his Sullan past, bending of the norms and eventual conflict with Caesar were probably missing from the titulus.[619] Katherine Lamp has argued that the *summi viri* were related to the Epicurean ideal on examples for imitation, indeed the purpose of the forum was meant to be to provide a bench mark not only for the Roman people but Augustus and future rulers too.[620] James Anderson and Barbara Kellum have noted that most of the *summi viri* seem to have been chosen for the links between their careers and that of Augustus, such as military, civilian and religious exploits, and that they provided a precedent for Augustus' own unusual position as the majority had held multiple consulships or dictatorships.[621] Geiger has proposed that the project was also a way for the Princeps to 'educate by means of the visual arts' the plebs in the new memories of the past in support of the 'ideology' of the Principate, much like the imagery in a church would function to inform the illiterate.[622]

Later, the figure of Pompeius, now freed from that of Sextus was absorbed into the line of reputable Roman figures from history who paved the way for the princeps. As recorded in the *Res Gestae*, Octavian, by then Augustus, restored many of the structures in

[617] Ver. *Aen.* 6 – 6.756-886, cf. *Georgics* 3; Horsfall 1982: 12-18; Geiger 2008: 51; Győri 2013: 89.
[618] Lamp 2013: 76.
[619] Geiger 2008: 98; Shaya 2013: 88-9.
[620] Lamp 2013: 74-5.
[621] Lamp 2013: 76-7.
[622] Geiger 2008: 79-82.

the city.[623] The theatre of Pompeius was one of the key structures that was part of this programme. However Augustus took the opportunity to adjust the building; Pompeius' statue was moved from the curia that had witnessed the assassination of Caesar and placed on the *scaenae frons*, while the ill-omened curia itself was converted into a public lavatory.[624] An inscription was placed on the renewed theatre renaming it as the *theatrum Augustum Pompeianum*, thereby linking the two together.[625] At his death, the funeral of Augustus notably include the figure of Pompeius in the procession of the ancestors that usually accompanied an aristocratic burial.[626] Whether Pompeius was included because of his relationship to Caesar or the vague marriage connection of Augustus via Scribonia is not clear, however, the inclusion of this figure shows how much Pompeius' memory had been made acceptable by the emperor.

Livy and the new age of memory

In this new climate, Livy, a particularly influential historian, wrote his monumental history of Rome, the *Ab Urbe Condita*, around a decade after the death of Sallust.[627] Beginning with the mythical founding of the city and continuing until he had reached the reign of Augustus, Livy's work comprised 142 books. Most of the earlier books survive in their entirety, but those that recorded the final decades of the *res publica* have, unfortunately, only survived in a heavily edited form as *Periochae*.[628] It is within these *Periochae* that the

[623] *RG* 20.1.
[624] Suet. *DJ*. 88, *Aug*. 31.5; Dio 47.19.1.
[625] *CIL* VI 9404; Welch 2012: 298.
[626] Dio 56.34.3.
[627] The exact date that Livy began his work is still heavily debated, it appears to be sometime within the first few years of the 20s B.C. Walsh 1961: 5. But see Burton, 2000: 429-430 with note 4 for a discussion of the problem and a list of opinions. Burton's own opinion is followed by Luce 2009: 17-48, that Livy began in the early 30s B.C. instead. Scheidel 2009: 654, 656-7, suggests that the first book was written in 28 B.C. based on Livy's note regarding earlier censuses and the recent changes to census taking that had been introduced by Augustus. One problem with this interpretation is that Book 58, according to Scheidel, was written in 8 or 7 B.C., which would leave Livy with a large amount of work to do in his remaining years. It seems improbable that Livy could have written another 83 books in 21 years, as per Scheidel's theory that the books published after Augustus' death were already written and that Livy worked at a pace of 3.3 to 3.4 books a year.
[628] There are a number of errors in the *Periochae* as we have them, which Syme 1959: 29 has suggested may have been introduced by the editor of the *Periochae*, who was most likely working from an epitome himself.

lifetimes of both Pompeius and his sons are written. Akin to the *Historiae*, scholars have continued to debate what form the *Ab Urbe Condita* originally took and the paucity of the available evidence makes an answer to this question likely to be elusive.[629] What is clear, however, is that most of the books after the first pentad were released in a steady stream from 9 BC onward, with the exception of some of the later books, which bear a subscription stating that they were not released till after the death of Augustus.[630] The books covering the rise of Pompeius and the civil war were probably released around the time of their completion while those that covered recent events were apparently withheld.[631]

There is considerable debate as to whether the *Periochae* were written based on the text of Livy directly or were composed from a middle source - an epitome. Cynthia Begbie has noted that the arguments for the *Periochae* being a reduction from an epitome are many and confused and do not discount the argument for their composition directly from the *Ab Urbe Condita*.[632] Paul Jal supports this view with his own arguments that the main '*epitometheorie*' does not preclude mistakes or alterations originating with the author of the *Periochae* rather than an intermediary text of Livy.[633]

However, most scholars agree that the brief *Periochae* are a poor record of what the later books contained, with the scholar Brunt going as far as to call them 'wretched'.[634] The compiler, it has been noted, lacks interest in the legislative measures of the years preferring

Regarding Pompeius, the errors include placing his triumph of 61 B.C. after the first year of Caesar's Gallic campaign in 58. Brunt, 1980: 488 has suggested that the author of the *Periochae* was probably copying a passage dealing with the Tigranes' escape in 58 B.C. which had noted his presence in the triumph in 61.

[629] Syme 1959: 30; Stadter 1972: 287-292; Burton 2000: 443 with note 55.

[630] Although Stadter 1972: 295-6, 299 questions the historicity of the subtitles in the *Periochae*, he accepts that the subscription noting the posthumous publication is most likely valid. Jal 1984: XV does not ascribe to the posthumous publication at all, arguing that Tiberius was less 'broadminded than his predecessor (large d'esprit que son prédécesseur).

[631] Indeed, Syme 1959: 35, argues, in line with his view on the organisation of the books, for Pompeius to form a pentad of his own, owing to his significance as a figure. See also Walsh 1961: 7.

[632] Begbie 1967: 338.

[633] Jal 1984: LIII-LIV, which is essentially the same argument made by Begbie 1967: 333.

[634] Brunt 1980: 488.

instead to focus on the actions of leading figures and great events – both natural and supernatural.[635]

The question is then what of the opinions or the portrayal of the Pompeius? If it is favourable is that because Livy wrote it thus, or is this the author of the *Periochae*'s view? Brunt was again sceptical, arguing that 'despite [the author of the *Periochae*'s] manifest errors, some scholars can still cite his statements as if they had Livy's own authority.'[636] However, Badian has noted the strength of the *Periochae* for the 90s and 80s BC, while Léonie Hayne has made a strong argument for the *Periochae* conforming to the portrayal of Pompeius found in the lost books of the *Ab Urbe Condita*.[637] Hayne's case centres on the use of words to record the deaths of Pompeius' opponents during the 'Sullan' civil war. Carbo's and Brutus' executions are described using *occidit* and *occisus* respectively, while the relatively more brutal *trucidavit* is used for the actions of Sulla.[638] This, Hayne argued, could not be a chance occurrence, either Livy had used that wording or else his narrative was sympathetic enough to Pompeius to mean that the author of the *Periochae* copied its tone in his own work. Assuming that Badian and Hayne are correct, it should be possible to at least discern the overall tone of Livy's treatment of Pompeius.

As with Sallust, little is known about Livy's life. He was born in Patavium, the modern Padua, a decade prior the outbreak of the civil war before moving to Rome as a young man.[639] Unlike Sallust, Livy did not engage in politics and never seems to have held any magistracy, although he did eventually become acquainted with Augustus and advised the young Claudius on history.[640] It was also through this acquaintance that Livy gained the

[635] Badian 1962: 48; Brunt 1980: 488; Begbie 1967: 334.
[636] Brunt 1980: 488.
[637] Badian 1962: 48.
[638] Hayne 1990: 437, however, as a word of caution, Begbie 1967: 335 argues against placing too much reliability on the choice of words.
[639] Walsh 1961: 1-2; Galinsky 1996: 280.
[640] Suet. *Claud*. 41.1.

sobriquet 'Pompeian' from the princeps.[641] This has intrigued modern scholars, who have tried to see a deeper meaning to Augustus' words – was Livy a 'Republican'? This has been the recent assumption of the meaning of 'Pompeian'.[642] There is no need to dig much deeper, however, as the answer to the sobriquet 'Pompeian' has always been in plain sight, as Hayne noted that Tacitus recorded Cremutius Cordus, as saying it was because of the 'great praise' (*tantis laudibus*) that Livy had given to Pompeius in the *Ab Urbe Condita*.[643] This reason would seem to be thoroughly plausible and avoids making the political judgments that modern scholarship has often anachronistically foisted on both Livy and Augustus.[644]

Aside from that argument, for Livy and the rest of his generation, who had grown up in the shadow of the previous civil war but had been too young to be participants, taking a partisan stance over dead protagonists whom they had never fought for must have seemed pointless.[645] By the time Livy wrote about Pompeius, the direct male line was extinct – making any attempts to call his words propaganda empty – and Augustus owed his position largely to his own hard work rather than simple inheritance. Augustus and Livy, therefore, could take greater liberties with the memories of Pompeius and Caesar, especially since both were deceased.[646] This is in contrast to the generation which included Sallust who had fought under Caesar and perhaps saw the need to be careful with the dictator's memory for their own sake, while at the same time continuing the disparagement of their old enemies – some of whom were still alive – out of continuing conviction and to maintain that they had been correct in their actions.

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[641] Tac. *Ann*. 4.34.
[642] Hayne 1990: 442.
[643] Tac. *Ann*. 4.34; Walsh 1961: 13; Hayne 1990: 44; Toher 2009: 224 argues for the term to come from Livy's treatment of Pompeius specifically.
[644] Wilkinson 2012: 41 rightly rejects that 'Pompeian' was shorthand for 'Republican' but still considers Augustus' meaning as belying a 'difference in political persuasion.' Geiger 2008: 71 argues that it is perhaps impossible to make a clear decision.
[645] Galinsky 1996: 256.
[646] Walsh 1961: 11-14 notes and rightly rejects the suggestions of some scholars that Livy was the mouthpiece of Augustus. See also Galinsky 1996: 286.

Although the *Periochae* are too short to contain any significant praise they do give an impression of the tone of Livy's treatment of Pompeius. As to why Livy chose to treat Pompeius favourably, that must remain a mystery. Possibly, like Sallust with Sisenna, he found the treatment of Pompeius by the previous generation of historians to be disagreeable.[647] He may have had a genuine appreciation for the man and his achievements. Perhaps both. It would appear that for those outside of Caesar' circle, Pompeius' memory was largely a positive one with a greater focus on his achievements and the glory that brought to Rome.

The early career of Pompeius in the *Periochae* seems to be derived from a number of sources. The favourable interpretation of his actions as a henchman of Sulla in the civil war of the 80s BC and the negative portrayal of those enemies of Sulla whom Pompeius executed would suggest that one of the main sources for this period was the autobiography of Sulla himself, which had been published around the time of Caesar's assassination.[648] The other source was possibly the historian Sisenna, who Sallust informs us, was too lenient with his treatment of Sulla.[649] Conversely, the account of the war against Sertorius in Hispania appears to be fairly balanced in its commentary toward Pompeius and perhaps had as its sources the accounts of that war given by the commanders, such as Metellus, or perhaps Sallust, hence the disparagement of Pompeius' actions in Book 92, summarized thus,

[647] Livy was aware of Sallust's work and critical of it, so Sen. *Contr*. 9.1.13. Livy's recommendation to avoid obscure words as remarked upon in Sen. *Contr*. 9.2.26 could be a comment aimed at the antiquated language of Sallust. See Syme 1959: 54.
[648] Liv. *Per*.85, 89. All the leading men are recorded as going over to Sulla so that Rome appeared to be deserted. Perhaps another example of the pro-Sullan/Pompeian bias is to be seen in the death of Carbo, which is particularly hostile in its depiction.
[649] Sall. *BJ*. 97.2; Badian 1962: 49-51 who refers to the other source as 'Sullan' rather than Sulla explicitly; Hayne 1990: 463.

'Pompeius, who desired to be part of the victory, fought with little success.' (*Cuius victoriae partem cupiens ferre Pompeius parum prospere pugnauit*.)[650]

Hayne has noted an interest in Sertorius by Livy and the criticism of Pompeius here also bears some resemblance to the comments of Sallust on the war in the Hispania. This may explain why this section appears to be less favourable to Pompeius. Similarly, in Book 99, which has an account of the pirate war, the clash over who held authority in Crete was included. The *Periochae* states that the letters Pompeius and Metellus Creticus exchanged in their tussle over the island were copied, which may have provided a more even-handed account of this event, although it is far from clear.[651] The description of Pompeius' subsequent campaign in the East against Mithridates also included a digression to events in Rome and the passage of the *lex Manilia*, which is recorded as having caused 'great indignation to the nobiles' (*magna indignatione nobilitatis*).[652] While this may appear to be a criticism of Pompeius, Hayne has argued that Pompeius was absent at the time of this debate and, therefore, distanced from this reproach, which was possibly aimed instead at Manilius.[653] This seems unconvincing as Pompeius was the one to benefit from the law, and it would be hard to ignore the common perception that Pompeius had sought this command.[654] Pompeius after all was remembered by authors such as Sallust as a figure who could influence matters from afar for good or bad.[655]

[650] Liv. *Per.* 92, 93 and 96 also appears to be complimentary to Sertorius although *Per*.92 is not. Livy possibly used the account of this war that is to be found in Sallust, which was generally negative towards Pompeius' participation in the campaign. See pp. 134-36 above.
[651] Hayne 1990: 439, has suggested that Florus' positive account, which is derived from Livy, be used to break the deadlock.
[652] Liv. *Per*. 100.
[653] Hayne 1990: 438.
[654] In general Hayne pushes the argument for the favouritism supposedly shown by Livy toward Pompeius too hard. It is reasonable to assume that Livy, while generally positive in his depiction, could also allow for the odd criticism. Even Cicero, whom Livy admired, appears to be chastised in Book 111 over his lack of martial skill.
[655] See p. 137 above on the view of Sallust.

Matters become more interesting when Caesar enters the accounts. Caesar's first candidacy for the consulship is linked with a wish to seize (*captante*) the *res publica*, which leads him to form a pact with Crassus and Pompeius.[656] The narrative that Caesar had sought dominance over the *res publica* even from an early stage seems to have begun to appear at this time in the accounts of this period, perhaps as a result of Cicero's exaggerated claims or the ancient assumption that a person's character was consistent. Later historians would take this further and claim that Caesar had spent his entire life in pursuit of the position he attained after the civil war.[657] The formation of an agreement between Pompeius, Crassus, and Caesar does not gain approval with Livy.[658] This should be of no surprise, as none of the contemporary sources appear to have been in favour of such an alliance, which meant that the memory was essentially fixed.[659]

However, the books of the civil war seem to draw their source material from both sides of the conflict. For example, the first book of the civil war (109) relates that it was the senate that decided to replace Caesar in Gaul and gave Pompeius, among others, a mandate to protect the *res publica* – an event ignored by Caesar in his own account, while the last paragraph states that Caesar pursued his enemies (*inimicos persecuturus*) and 'expelled Pompeius and his party from Italia.' (*Cn. Pompeium ceterosque partium eius Italia expulit*.)[660] Clearly Livy had available a number of divergent sources from this period that transmitted the competing memories of the period. The shift in attitudes towards Pompeius might be because the narrative of the war in Italia was presumable dominated by Caesar and

[656] Liv. *Per*.103.
[657] Plut. *Caes*. 4.8-9; various rumours in Suet. *Caes*. 9. The story recorded in several historians of Caesar desiring to achieve great deeds like Alexander may also allude to this, Plut. *Caes*. 11.5-6; Suet. *Caes*. 7.1; Dio 37.52.2.
[658] Liv. *Per*. 103.
[659] Hayne 1990: 439 has argued for a one-sided criticism of Caesar alone, but this again seems improbable, even the respected polymath and friend of Pompeius, Varro, was critical of this compact calling it the three headed monster (*tricaranus*) App. *B.C.* 2.2.9.
[660] Liv. *Per*.109.

his supporters, hence the viewpoint reminiscent of Caesar's own with the idea of a '*factio*' or 'Pompeian party' along with the use of '*inimici*' and '*Pompeiani*' in reference to Caesar's adversaries throughout the *Periochae*.[661]

Livy did not draw solely from Caesar's or a Caesarian work though. In Book 110 he again appears to have had access to a source that was either from the opposition or at least was not entirely in line with Caesar's version of events. The *Periocha* for this book records that when one of Caesar's transports was intercepted on the way to Greece the auxiliaries on board committed suicide rather than be taken alive.[662] This event appears in the *Bellum Civile*, but in that version the troops are massacred by Caesar's opponents.[663] Livy may have tried to paint a more favourable picture than the cruel Pompeius depicted in the *Bellum Civile* or perhaps had access to a more accurate work. Hirtius and Pollio were well known for their criticism of Caesar's inaccuracies when it came to narrating the events of the war.

Although Livy's narrative of the war might be couched in the terms of Caesar and his supporters, he was clearly more favourable to Pompeius. Two points can perhaps be made of this. Firstly, in the last decades of the first century there was considerable freedom to discuss Caesar's opponents. Secondly, Pompeius remained a positive figure despite the publication of a number of works that were critical of him. Concurrently, Augustus, so it seems, was quite willing to tolerate his adoptive father's enemies as were the new generation who had their own civil war against new enemies to resolve.[664] James Thorne has argued that there were many sources on the civil war, and that writers seemed to have preferred these to the work of

[661] Liv. *Per*. 109-110 This continues after the death of Pompeius, with the war transferred to Africa where the account focusses on the actions of Cato. Although the forces arrayed against Caesar are, in keeping with Caesarian writing, referred to as 'Pompeians'. See also Liv. Per. 127 where Labienus is of the Pompeian faction.
[662] Liv. *Per*. 110.
[663] Livy's version appears to have become the standard interpretation of the event, appearing in this way in Lucan's Pharsalia 4.561-2.
[664] For an overview of Livy's treatment of all the main *Erinnerungfiguren* of the civil war see Hoyos 2019: 225.

Caesar, despite the obvious appeal to modern historians. Instead, authors such as Livy probably made use of the accounts of higher quality by Pollio.[665]

A key point comes when Caesar arrived in Egypt and was presented with Pompeius' head. Livy writes that Caesar wept at the sight of it, but, as noted, this is not in Caesar's own account of his arrival in Egypt when he was informed of Pompeius' death.[666] Clearly Livy was borrowing from the tragic version of Pompeius' death that had also appeared in Vergil, but perhaps ultimately came from Cicero.[667] This new memory of Caesar's regret at the death of Pompeius perhaps originated as a means to reconcile the two and suited the apparent attitude of Caesar towards the memory of Pompeius after the war. Aside from the dramatic additions to Pompeius' death, Livy has him being cut down by the Egyptian Achillas rather than the Roman Septimus – a change which may owe more to the relatively recent demonization of the Egyptians during the war against Antonius.[668]

The shift in nationality of Pompeius' killer raises interesting questions regarding the impact of current events on the past and the extent to which Augustus influenced the history of his own times. Pompeius remained a popular figure after his death and evidently there was something to be gained from Pompeius' assassin being an Egyptian. Most of the focus on Augustan involvement in the production of the *Ab Urbe Condita* has concentrated on incidents such as the rejection of Marcus Crassus' (grandson of cos. 70) claims to the *spolia opima*.[669] In this instance Livy recorded that Augustus had found a linothorax dedicated by a

[665] Thorne 2018: 304-5.
[666] Above, p. 98; Caes. *BC*. 3.106.
[667] Peer 2016: 141; Nelis and Farrell 2013: 17, 291-94. Interestingly, the ghost of Sulla is with the blessed, Wiseman 2009: 236.Ver. *Aen*. 2.557. The allusion was noted even in the ancient world as Servius makes clear (*ad Aen*. 557). See also Mills 1978: 165; Rossi 2000b: 586-7; Sklenář 1990: 74; Bowie 1990: 473 who points to Cic. *Tusc*. 1.85-6 and *Div*. 2.22 speaking of Priam and Pompeius. Moles 1983: 287-288 makes an unconvincing case for the source being the lost work of Asinius Pollio. In support of Moles is Power 2007: 794 who adds nothing more to the argument. The episode has been much discussed according to Nelis and Farrell 2013: 28-31.
[668] Hayne notes that the killer is now an Egyptian but fails to make the link to recent events, despite making a connection between Pompeius' delayed adoption of the title 'magnus', his *imitatio Alexandri*, and the problem this posed due to recent events with Marcus Antonius.
[669] For example, Harrison 1989: 410-14; Sailor 2006: 329-88; Flower 2000: 53; McPherson 2009: 28-9.

Cossus in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius that he stated invalidated Crassus' claim. Livy records that Cossus was a tribune in one instance, which would have contradicted Augustus but at another point in the narrative he states that Cossus was a consul and therefore backs Augustus. Scholars are divided over whether Livy was supporting Augustus' assertion and forgot to correct his writing or was subtly conveying his disagreement with the Princeps.[670] Since this is the one point in Livy's narrative that is explicit about the involvement of Augustus, it is interesting to note that the princeps did not raise any objections to the portrayal of Caesar as aiming at domination of the *res publica* perhaps showing how the memory of the dictator had shifted decades after his death.

Livy's work marks an interesting turning point in the narratives of the Pompeii. Before the *Ab Urbe Condita* the sources on the civil war of 49-45 BC were mostly partisan and written by Caesar and his followers. Countering those works, Livy brought together the accounts of Pompeius' earlier career, which, while not entirely ignoring the less savoury aspects of Pompeius' youth, played down his actions and renewed the more positive accounts disregarded by recent historians such as Sallust. Perhaps this conformed to the view of Pompeius at the time, as a positive figure whose faults were reserved for the last years of his life as espoused by Cicero. While initially Caesar *et al*. tried to remember Pompeius as a wholly flawed figure based on his actions of his youth, many will have remembered him as a great general who performed many deeds on behalf of Rome.

Provincial Memory

Outside of the circle of writers based in Rome there were some authors based in the provinces who used their own localised memories to inform their works. One of these was Diodorus Siculus, a Greek historian who wrote a 'universal' history called the *Bibliotheca*

[670] Harrison 1989: 411, 414; Sailor 2006: 335, 382.

Historica. It is likely that the work was published after his death in the late 30s, although some of the earlier books seem to have made their way into the public sphere anyway.[671] Diodorus, as his geographic cognomen suggests, was himself from Sicily and he seems to have taken a keen interest in the fortunes of his native island. The work was 40 books long and divided into three parts: the first covered geography, the second the Trojan war to Alexander the Great, and the third the successors of Alexander down to around 60 BC, although he had initially planned to carry his history down to 46 at least.[672] The books were written during the 60s to the 30s BC, and, despite the latter parts being written during the Triumvirate, those that survive of Pompeius' career are remarkably positive in their treatment of him.[673] The fragment from the campaign into Sicily on behalf of Sulla contains praise for the actions and judgements of Pompeius at this time. The accounts of Pompeius' time in Sicily and the respect he showed to the local inhabitants that are recounted in Plutarch likely come from Diodorus himself.[674]

The same can be said of the narrative of the campaign in the East, where Pompeius is seen as a wise judge in his dealings with foreign kings.[675] Diodorus even goes as far as to record the inscription that Pompeius had set up to his achievements in that war at his theatre.[676] Interestingly, Diodorus stopped his account in 60 BC before the career of Caesar had really begun and therefore missed the civil war; despite this, Diodorus was able to record some details of current events as digressions to show how situations had changed since.

However, Diodorus was also extremely positive about Caesar.[677] On Octavian, the same cannot be said. He seems to have seen the young Triumvir as merely riding on his illustrious relative's coattails and undeserving of the honours that Caesar had rightly earned.

[671] Muntz 2017: 4.
[672] Sacks 1990: 199; Muntz 2017: 243, 218, 220.
[673] Sacks 1990: 197.
[674] Sacks 1990: 130.
[675] Diod. 40.2.
[676] Diod. 40.4; For more discussion of the inscription see Vogel-Wiedemann 1985; Villani 2012: 345.
[677] Diod. 108, 124.

This image of Augustus was possibly on account of the punishments meted out to the island in the wake of Sextus' defeat.[678] Even though these fell outside the scope of the work they were included as digressions.[679] The few mentions that Diodorus includes of Sextus are indeed positive.[680] On the whole though, the war between Sextus and Octavian was well outside the remit of Diodorus' history and was not therefore, treated in any length.

Conclusion

The posthumous memory of Pompeius shows a clear development and influence from his image during the civil war. Two major streams appear to have formed among the elite members of Roman society, with those who remembered Pompeius as a great (perhaps also flawed) figure such as Cicero and those of the opposite view. Those who held a negative view of Pompeius' memory tend to be the Caesarian veterans of the war, who seemed to coalesce around this collective memory of Pompeius as means to justify themselves and as a form of group identity. Politically, figures such as Marcus Antonius understood this and used these negative memories to appeal to their target audience.

This was especially the case after the death of Caesar, who had instead cultivated a more forgiving image with his lenient treatment of Pompeius' memory. In the post-Caesar political sphere, military support appears to have been the order of the day. Lepidus already had a considerable force, which left Antonius, Cicero, and the Liberators to quickly assemble what they could. Antonius drew upon the veterans whose self-identity was still predicated on opposition to the Pompeians, while Cicero targeted those with a lingering support of Pompeius. This was not a strict adherence though, as Antonius cultivated links with Sextus and also blamed Cicero for Pompeius' demise, although this was probably for the practical

[678] Sacks 1990: 194.
[679] Diod.169, 195; Sacks 1990: 192-94; Muntz 2017: 236.
[680] Sacks 1990: 208.

reason of undercutting Cicero's support. When Octavian entered the scene, he added another element. As heir to Caesar, he already had a good claim to his legacy and he seems to have focused on building on this relationship for political power.

The memory of Pompeius at this point does not seem to have been much of a factor, as Octavian battled with Antonius for the loyalty of Caesar's veterans. A similar action had already been underway across the seas in Hispania, where for years the sons of Pompeius had been utilising their father's legacy with various groups. Octavian, after he had defeated his political opponents, began the process of creating his own identity as the culmination of all the Roman greatness. As part of this he co-opted the memories of the famous Romans of the past as a means to provide an exemplary, evolutionary history. Pompeius' memory, first largely passed over by Octavian then possessed during the struggle with Sextus, now because part of the tapestry of time and a precedent for the paths to Augustus's rule. Poets, historians, and other authors were also coming to terms with the events that unfolded. Initially, they were divided by old loyalties: Sallust wrote from the position of a staunch supporter of Caesar and tried to blacken the memory of Pompeius by recalling his Sullan period, while twisting other memories to emphasis those that portrayed him as a threat to the stability of the *res publica*. Later when this old guard had passed on and the new generation began to appear, the desire to maintain the ideological conflict diminished. Octavian's own desire to reconcile Roman society for his own purposes as well as peace probably helped to speed up the process. Many of the writers of his times had little to no political aspirations which may have also helped them to move away from a need to appeal to certain groups. Therefore, figures such as Livy were able to recollect admiringly the memory of Pompeius in their works. This meant that within a few decades of his passing, Pompeius' memory was already seeing a positive revaluation.

Chapter 4: 'The Second Retrospective of Pompeius' Memory'

After Augustus and during the reigns of the subsequent Julio-Claudian emperors, the memory of Pompeius went through a further evolution as the history of the previous century and the civil wars fluctuated in the collective memory of the population and the authors of the time. The battle over the interpretation of the key figures of the civil war seems to have largely continued as it had during the reign of Augustus, but with a new impetus provided by the varying degrees of flexibility of the emperors. Perhaps because of the closeness to the events, most of the histories written during the next few decades relied heavily on a small group of contemporary authors, such as Caesar, Cicero, Pollio and Livy for their sources.

As the distance between the authors and the events grew, the collective memory of Pompeius and Caesar shrank. Although both were still held to be the instigators of the upheaval that led to the principate, it was the memory of Augustus that achieved primacy in this capacity. Just as Actium became the key battle of the civil wars so did Octavian become the *Erinnerungsfigur* for this age. By the 2nd century, Pompeius' memory was already reduced down to the key components that explained enough about him to make sense of the civil war.

A similar effect has occurred in modern times with the memory of the first half of the 20th century. Although most people would remember the First World War, its details are likely hazy, and the Second World War, which in our minds occurred soon afterwards, the intervening twenty years becoming compressed, has supplanted it. The Second, like the First, was largely fought by the same forces in roughly the same parts of the world, which likely would help blend the two memories. It was also the Second that largely brought about the world that is current now. Compare the Korean War as well, which occurred soon after the Second World War but did not produce any decisive results among other issues, and has

therefore become forgotten. To go back then to the civil wars that brought about the end of the *res publica*. What can be seen is a similar way of remembering the events that occurs with the later historians, separated by time, the memory of the events started to lose its details and with a similar civil war soon after, with similar actors but with a more decisive outcome it is easier to see why the focus became the later wars. Aside from this, Augustus' memory seems to have been less controversial than Caesar's who had become associated with tyranny.[681] Much like the Second World War, Augustus' long reign oversaw a massive outpouring of media that commemorated the war and preserved a memory of it that was favourable to himself.

As John Lobur notes the 'civil war affected the writing of every contemporary, and the theme had remarkable persistence. For example, it was a defining civic memory for Velleius Paterculus, who had had no experience of it, and the Principate derived a good deal of legitimacy *ob cives servatos* ("for having saved citizen lives"), in ending and preventing it. The emergence of the concept in the generations before was integral to the most important period of Roman self-definition, when literary elites developed narratives that formed the basis of a new implicit ideology. This ideation involved working through the causes and effects of, and possible solutions to, the problem of chronic civil war, yet not through the theoretical imagination, but concretely, through the dramatic re-working of stories of Rome's past in poetry and history – with shades of the present tinting everything. This included anachronistic projections onto narratives [….]'[682]

[681] As can perhaps be seen by the later emperors, such as Trajan and Hadrian's revival of his memory in their coinage. See discussions in Vojvoda 2008 and Beckman 2015.
[682] Lobur 2019: 88-89.

With the death of Augustus and the accession of his adopted heir, Tiberius, the relative freedom for the historians and other authors to write had changed.[683] Suddenly authors of works covering the civil war years were more rigidly restricted in comparison to what had been tolerated during the Augustan regime, and the recollection of certain figures became more problematic.[684] However, this largely seems to have been confined to the memory of Cato, Brutus and Cassius, whose memories were explicitly tied to the notion of fighting against the rule of one man.[685] Pompeius, free from this ideological battle, was predominantly safe as he had been under Augustus. Thus, under these early regimes there was no great innovation in the use of memories.

One of the most famous examples used to illustrate the restrictions under Tiberius is the trial of Cremutius Cordus, an aged historian who had written an account of the civil wars and by his own admission praised Brutus and referred to Cassius as the last of the Romans.[686] Cordus eventually committed suicide before the verdict was announced and copies of his book were posthumously burned across the empire.[687] Although his suicide has been blamed on his writing, some scholars have argued that this is the view of later historians such as Tacitus who had their own agendas to pursue and therefore altered the memory of Cordus' death into part of the struggle for *libertas* during the principate.[688] Instead, they argue that it

[683] Gerhardt 2018: 206, 208, perhaps as Tiberius had known or had family on both sides of the war.
[684] Although some authors had suffered even under Augustus. For example Titus Labienus was an orator, historian and a diehard supporter of Pompeius. He wrote works that apparently had a very positive view of Pompeius, so extreme in fact that the author did not wish for them to be recited while he still lived. However, he fell afoul of the current regime and his works were burnt, after which he committed suicide Much like the author Cremutius Cordus, whose books were also supposedly favourable to Pompeius and were burnt during the reign of Tiberius, they were allowed to circulate again under Caligula. Sen. *Contr.* 10 *Praef.* 4-8; Suet. *Calig.* 16.1; Barrett 1993: 66-67; Fantham 1999: 127-128 even though Augustus had heard the offending lines 12 years before with no ill effect; *FRHist* i. 2013 472; Strunk 2017: 148; Gerhardt 2018: 206. Similarly, an author called Fenestella wrote a now lost work.
[685] Edwards 2007: 3, 115, 155-56.
[686] Turner 2019: 45 Cordus also fairly neutral on Caesar and Augustus according to Dio 57.23.3.
[687] Turner 2019: 44.
[688] Wisse 2013:349; Libatique 2020: 12-13.

was Cordus' clash with the powerful praetorian commander Sejanus that sealed both his and his history's fate.[689] Whether the work was burned as a further punishment or Cordus was being accused of treason to disguise the role of Sejanus is unclear, but it appears that the memory of Pompeius was being caught up with the later revision of the memory of the Julio-Claudian period as part of an oblique criticism of contemporary hostile emperors, such as Domitian.[690] What does seem clear, however, is that Cato remained a problematic figure for the Julio-Claudians, perhaps because of his role as an *Erinnerungsfigur* for the previous system of government. At the same time, Brutus and Cassius had assassinated Caesar and fought Augustus making their memory hostile to both key figures of the Julio-Claudian assent. However, Pompeius does not seem to feature as a problematic figure whose inclusion would draw the attention of the regime. His memory had been quickly refocussed on his military ability and office-holding since the early years of Augustus' rule, and the positive memories associated with him were so wide-spread that it was more practical to utilise it as a convenient benchmark for Augustus than to go through the dubious effort to attempt to forget it.

Cordus was not the only author during the reign of Tiberius to undertake the task of writing on the previous civil wars. On the general memory of the civil war and Pompeius there is also the historian Velleius Paterculus who was particularly supportive of the dynasty's founder.[691] His account of Pompeius appears to have utilised the works of Cicero as a source and, while largely positive, it remains in line with the earlier Augustan historians, with the memories of Pompeius trimmed down to his military achievements.[692] Velleius'

[689] Sen. *Dial*. 6; Fantham 1999: 128.
[690] Turner 2019: 45 notes that the aim was probably not to destroy the work entirely and that the recirculated works were apparently edited to remove the troublesome parts.
[691] He probably wrote in the 20s AD, Woodman 2012: 204-5, 212-13; Gerhardt 2018: 209.
[692] Holliday 1969: 78.

narrative therefore shows how Pompeius' memory was already being edited into what society and the regime considered the salient points.

As the memory of Strabo had formed such a strong element in the political attacks on Pompeius, it is unsurprising to find that Strabo's unpopularity is recalled, although almost all the rest of Pompeius' early life is ignored except for the raising of an army for Sulla. Further to this, his actions under Sulla are never expanded on – avoiding the troublesome stories of the young butcher – instead, his deeds are recorded as avenging and restoring dignity to his country (*ad vindicandam restituendamque dignitatem patriae*).[693] This reduction of Pompeius' memory fits into the use of it by Augustus, who converted the memory of Pompeius' youth from a henchman of Sulla to one of saving the *res publica* from a faction as he claimed to have similarly done.[694] Velleius also praises Pompeius' appearance (as he does with Caesar), although he does not link it with the *Imitatio Alexandri*, perhaps because the memory of Alexander was co-opted by the Julio-Claudians.[695] His account of Pompeius' life is largely the same as other positive authors.[696] However, twice within a few chapters Velleius makes the accusation, as Cicero and Caesar had, that Pompeius could bear no equal.[697] Following the narrative of Livy, he includes the war of words that accompanied the relief of Lucullus' command during the Mithridatic war.[698] The rest of Pompeius' military career is condensed into the most notable commands. Where they are recorded, it is formulaic and lacks any detail. This might have been done to give Caesar the greater accomplishments and share of the narrative, as Velleius notes when he states that Caesar's spirit is forcing him

[693] Vell. Pat. 2.29.1. The other author of the period was of course Valerius Maximus who wrote nine books of *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* on exempla from across history for use in speeches. There are few references to Pompeius in the work, the longest being the reply of Helvius Mancia during Libo's trial that was discussed earlier at pp. 48-50.
[694] Luke 2014: 150, 177-8, 199-200.
[695] Vell. Pat. 2.41.1.
[696] Vell. Pat. 2.29.2, 29.4, 30.2, 31.2-3, 32.4-6, 37.1-3, 40.1-4.
[697] Vell. Pat. 2.29.44.33.
[698] Vell. Pat. 2.32.4.6. Repeated at 2.49.1. On their mutual animosity see Marin 2009: 78.

to tarry on his memory, while conceding his own paucity of writing for Pompeius noting that to do justice to him would require 'multiple volumes' (*multorum voluminum*).[699]

Unsurprisingly much space is dedicated to the civil war. Notably, Velleius follows the claims of Cicero, when he states that the path to war began two years before.[700] In the build-up to the war he describes Curio as 'at first for the party of Pompeius, that is to say, as regarded at the time, for the *res publica*.' (*Hic primo pro Pompei partibus, id est, ut tunc habebatur, pro re publica*).[701] Calling Caesar's opponents the party of Pompeius seems to be an echo of the general Caesarian version of the civil war – in which the combatants are personalised to detract from their respective causes. As noted, this view of the war was continued even later by figures such as Antonius who used it as the label for his political opponents. Velleius' other comment that Pompeius' allies were representative of the *res publica* is open-ended, either on purpose, to avoid accusations of sympathy for the enemies of Caesar, or perhaps because they considered themselves the legitimate government, although Caesar ascribed the same to his side of the civil war. However, the wording would suggest that the claim that Pompeius was fighting for the *res publica* was temporary and perhaps doubted, probably because when he lost to Caesar his claim triumphed in the narrative instead.

The memory of the civil war has now been reduced to the view of the war expounded in the Augustan era: Velleius blames the death of Julia for the breakdown of relations between the two men and records that most people desired the two to lay down their arms rather than fight, probably in reference to the vote held by Curio (who Velleius later accuses of being the chief agitator of the conflict).[702] He also laments that Pompeius had not perished

[699] Vell. Pat. 2.29.1-2, Sulla may have become a less problematic fear as Augustus seemed to use some of his own slogans, according to Lange 2016: 104.
[700] As noted earlier on pp. 57-58.
[701] Vell. Pat. 2.48.2.
[702] Vell. Pat. 2.47.2, 48.1-2. On Curio, 2.48.3.

when he fell dangerously ill years before so that he would have died at his height and not been brought low by the civil war.[703] Although he praises Caesar, he refers to Pompeius as 'leading the better cause' (*ducis causa melior*), something that Cicero had written, and notes that the senate and Cato both supported him.[704] The rest of the accounts of the war are balanced, with Velleius only recounting the bare facts without much comment.[705] The Battle of Pharsalus is noted for its importance and he notes that many nobles had fought with Pompeius and perished.[706] He records that Caesar exhibited his famous *clementia* and called a halt to the fighting as soon as he could – although this must have been from another pro-Caesarian source, as this does not exist in the *Bellum Civile*.[707] Velleius also narrates the flight and death of Pompeius, highlighting the tragic nature of the event with a pithy summation: 'after three consulships, the same number of triumphs and dominating the whole world, the most venerable and most outstanding man attained that position which it is not possible to ascend beyond… so that recently he who was wanting for lands to conquer, was now lacking a place of burial.' (*Hic post tres consulatus et totidem triumphos domitumque terrarium orbem, santissimi atque praestantissimi viri in id evecti super quod ascendi non potest… ut cui modo ad victoriam terra defuerat, deeset ad sepulturam*.)[708]

The early reign of Caligula, however, seems to have been more relaxed about memories of the civil war than Tiberius, as he allowed the publication of the banned works during his reign – including those of Cordus.[709] As most of the memories that Tiberius had found problematic seem to have been other opposition figures, such as Cato, this seems to

[703] Vell. Pat. 2.48.2.
[704] Vell. Pat. 2.49.2-3.
[705] Vell. Pat. 2.51-3.
[706] Vell. Pat. 2.52.2.
[707] Vell. Pat. 2.52.4.
[708] Vell. Pat. 2.53.3.
[709] Sen. *Contr*. 10 *Praef*. 4-8; Suet. *Calig*. 16.1; Barrett 1993: 66-67; Fantham 1999: 127-128 even though Augustus had heard the offending lines 12 years before with no ill effect; Dio 57.24.2; *FRHist* i. 2013 472; Strunk 2017: 148; Gerhardt 2018: 206; Turner 2019: 44. Similarly, an author called Fenestella wrote a now lost work.

have made little impact on the memories of Pompeius. Caligula's reign, however, was short, and he was assassinated in a few years, and succeeded by Claudius, who as a child had been warned off writing a history of the civil war.[710] Little seems to have changed under his reign and it was not till the turbulent reign of his successor Nero that the memories of the civil war, and the subsequent ascension of the Julio-Claudians returned to the spotlight.

Lucan and the Memory of the Civil War

During the reign of Nero, one of the most famous surviving authors of the period, Lucan, wrote an epic poem on the topic of the civil war. The meaning of the poem and even if the poem was completed has been much debated.[711] Nor are scholars united on which, if any, protagonist is the hero of the poem.[712] Pompeius is certainly a key figure of the narrative and his characterisation in the text seems to rely on the tragic memory of his downfall that appeared soon after the civil war in the works of contemporaries especially Cicero and Livy.[713] This, coupled with the apparently negative portrayal of Caesar, has led some scholars to argue that the whole poem was intended to be a rebuke to Nero and his increasingly dissolute reign.[714]

The time the poem was likely composed, and the eventual fate of Lucan has added to the case of scholars who argue that Lucan was part of an anti-Neronian faction and that this work displays his distaste for the emperor.[715] Lucan was the nephew of the respected Seneca the Younger – himself related to Seneca the Elder – who had been Nero's tutor and advisor until he fell from favour and withdrew from court after two rejected attempts to retire.[716]

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[710] Suet. *Claud*.1.
[711] Holliday 1969: 13; Bartsch 1997: 2; Hardie 2005: 94.
[712] Holliday 1969: 13-14; Bartsch 1997: 6.
[713] The central argument of Holliday 1969; Bartsch 1997: 89. Holliday's choice of Cicero's letters is described as 'arbitrary and not in the evidence' by Bartsch 1997: 87-88.
[714] Grimal 2010: 61; Holmes 1999: 75-6.
[715] Holmes 1999: 75-6.
[716] Leigh 1997: 1.

Eventually, both would be forced to commit suicide after their implication in the Pisonian plot, an attempt to assassinate Nero and replace him with the aristocrat Piso.[717] The suicide of Lucan has also prompted arguments that he intended to continue his poem further into the civil war, but it was abruptly brought to an end by his condemnation.[718]

What did survive narrates the war up to the death of Pompeius and his sons' response. Pompeius is the key character and his decline and fall is told with the use of tragic imagery. Lucan does this by picking up the role of women in the turmoil between Caesar and Pompeius that had been present in Velleius' work. This then allows him to use Pompeius' wife Cornelia for a lengthy soliloquy on her assumed role in her husband's misfortune.[719] Sextus too makes an appearance, but this is unstintingly negative.[720] The *De Bello Civili* is one of the few works of any length explicitly on the topic of the conflict written decades after the event to survive in a near complete state. After this point, the next authors would be writing towards the end of the century and beyond.

Lucan was born in 39 AD in Corduba, long after the civil wars had concluded and had slipped from living memory.[721] As the son of an aristocratic family with connections to the imperial house, he was educated in Rome where he befriended Nero and was eventually made a quaestor in 62-3 AD ahead of the normal time.[722] It has been proposed that Lucan composed the early books of the *De Bello Civili* during this period until a falling out with Nero, which possibly influenced the negative representation of Caesar and drove Lucan to participate in the doomed conspiracy to replace the emperor that saw him forced to commit suicide in 65 AD.[723]

[717] Holliday 1969: 53; Bartsch 1997: 90; Mayer 2005: 67.
[718] Holliday 1969: 13; Bartsch 1997: 2; Hardie 2005: 94.
[719] Luc. *BC*. 81-103.
[720] Luc. *BC*. 6.419-22, 589.
[721] Joyce 1993: ix; Leigh 1997: 1; Fantham 2011: 4.
[722] Joyce 1993: x; Leigh 1997: 1; Fantham 2011: 13.
[723] Joyce 1993: xi, xii; Leigh 1997: 2; Fantham 2011: 16.

Elaine Fantham proposed the reason for the disfavour of Nero was because of jealousy arising out of Lucan's prolific and superior authorship compared to the emperor's own attempts to find success in the arts.[724] The ancient sources are obscure for the reasons, only that Lucan may have recited something that did not sit well with the emperor. The argument is that Lucan's *Incendio Urbis* written in the wake of the Great Fire of Rome in 64 somehow offended Nero with its contents. A similar claim has been advanced for the earlier books of the *De Bello Civili* causing offense.[725] Combined with the evidence of the ancient authors, it seems likely that it was something that Lucan wrote, perhaps exacerbated by jealously, that caused the break between the author and the emperor. Which work it was that brought about this event is now most likely unfathomable. Although Lucan is supposed to have altered his poem to be less amenable to the one-man rule of the Caesars after the rupture with Nero, it may already have contained some of elements of this if it caused Nero to snub Lucan by calling a senate meeting during a recital of his work.[726] Indeed, Lucan's poem almost reads as a deliberate attempt to upend the more positive cultural memory of Caesar that the Julio-Claudians were circulating. However, he was not content with merely taking some of the sheen off those memories, but perhaps wanted to go completely to the other extreme and make Caesar evil and his opponents good.[727]

Lucan's poem seems to be based heavily on the writings of the contemporaries of the civil war. However, Lucan selectively uses his sources to craft a new memory of the war, placing his narrative designs above strict adherence to events. The *De Bello Civili* likely draws heavily on the narrative of Caesar's *Bellum Civile*. Almost all the events follow the narrative pattern of those that appear in Caesar – the flight of the consuls, the sieges of

[724] Fantham 2011: 14, 17. Contra Gresseth 1957: 25-7.
[725] The first three books were those recited in the presence of Nero. See Fantham 2011: 16.
[726] Joyce 1993: xii; Fantham 2011: 8; Suet. *Vit. Luc*.
[727] Masters 1992: 17-18; Joseph 2018 :298, 301-3.

Corfinium, Brundisium, Massilia, Ilerda, and Dyrrachium, the defeat and destruction of Curio's army in Africa, and the final battle of Pharsalus.[728] Other than the poetic elements and speeches presented by some of the leading characters, the events are told through a very Caesarian lens – the attempted crossing of the Adriatic by Caesar being one minor incident that gains much attention.[729]

The influence of Cicero's letters on proceedings, especially in the early books, where the victory of either Pompeius or Caesar is stated as ending in similar ways, i.e. loss of liberty for the *res publica* seems to be in evidence.[730] Even Marius and Sulla make several appearances in the text of the poem. Perhaps taking a cue from their appearance in the underworld in Vergil's *Aeneid,* they appear as ghosts awoken by the new slaughter, but both are now reduced to a simple pair of opposites, perhaps demonstrating how the cultural memory of both had been much reduced by this stage.[731] In light of how Sulla has now become a minor memory, Pompeius' youthful connection to Sulla continues to fade from the cultural memory, and, while not totally forgotten, is treated as less problematic than it was by contemporaries.

Lucan begins his poem by mourning that Romans chose to turn on their fellow Romans when they should have instead fought against their real enemies, such as the Parthians, or else expanded the boundary of the Roman empire, perhaps in a nod to the words of past authors such as Sallust and Horace.[732] Meanwhile in the perhaps disingenuous

[728] Lintott 1971: 489-91; Joseph 2018: 298.
[729] Luc. *BC*. 504-675.
[730] Joyce 1993: xviii the end of the *res publica* in her words. Holliday 1969: 52, sees the letters as a major influence on Lucan and his bias toward Pompeius is because of his identification with the senate, which matches the letters of 54-51 BC. Contra Bartsch 1997: 87-88.
[731] Luc. *BC*. 1.581.
[732] Luc. *BC*. 1.1-14. See Sall. *Cat*. 10.1-4 and Hor. *Odes* 3.2.13.

laudation for the coming of Nero, Lucan lists the various conflicts of the civil war that brought him to the purple.[733]

Lucan understands the war as two rivals held apart only by Crassus, the third member of their pact who had fallen at Carrhae, and Julia, the daughter of Caesar, who died in child birth while wed to Pompeius.[734] This then leaves the two rivals with no obstacle to what Lucan sees as their pride: Pompeius will allow no equal and Caesar no rival.[735] Although some contemporaries saw the breakup of the familial relationship of Pompeius and Caesar as an aid in the eventual conflict, and that was the version broadcast by Caesar himself, the rivalry with Crassus seems to have been largely the creation of later authors, who implanted this into the memories of Pompeius' life.[736] For Lucan, Pompeius is already the tragic shadow of a great man whose high point is behind him and who would rather win the approval of the Roman people through projects such as his theatre. Lucan thus describes him as

> '[…] with his years dipping
>
> towards dotage, grown slack with wearing the toga too long,
>
> had now, with peace, forgot the leaders role; chasing
>
> fame, he lavishes gifts on the rabble; his whole being
>
> responds to popularity's veering winds; applause

[733] Luc. *BC.* 1.33-44.
[734] Luc. *BC*. 1.99-100, 1.113-116; Possibly from Livy, as this understanding of the war appears in Florus *Ep*. 2.13.
[735] Whether this sentiment appeared in Livy, it certainly appears in Florus *Ep*. 2.14, and also partly in Vell. Pat. 2.29.3-4; Sen. *Ad Marc.* 14.3.
[736] Luke 2014: 65-69 has questioned this narrative stating that this probably leads on from the reported clashes with Crassus, which culminated in them staging a reconciliation at the end of their term in office to satisfy a rumoured plebian's dream. Although Luke states that the reasons behind the clash are unknown and he does not explain why this story came about, perhaps it was to do with the general trend in the memory of Pompeius as somebody who frequently clashed out of jealousy and desire for honours (e.g. with Metellus in Hispania). This may have been a current trend or it may have retrospectively originated from the claim by Caesar that Pompeius could bear no equal.

in his own theatre thrills him [….]'

(*vergentibus annis*

in senium, longoque togae tranquillior usu

dedidicit iam pace ducem, famaeque petitory,

multa dare in vulgus, totus popularibus auris

impelli, plausuque sui gaudere theatre.) [737]

To further reinforce the downward trajectory of Pompeius' life Lucan adds that:

'Magnus is become a Great Man's, a great name's shadow.

Imagine a towering oak tree in a lush field of wheat,

decked with a nation's ancient trophies, gifts her leaders have

consecrated; clinging with roots no longer healthy,

it stands fixed by its own weight; naked branches splay

leafless across the sky; only its trunk casts a shadow'

(*stat magni nominis umbra,*

quails frugifero quercus sublimis in agro,

exuvias veteres populi sacrataque gestans

dona ducum, nec iam validis radicibus haerens

pondere fixa suo est, nudosque per aera ramos

[737] Luc. *BC*. 1.129- 133. Translation Joyce 1993: 8.

effundens, trunco non frondibus efficit umbram.)[738]

Caesar, on the other hand, is portrayed as the eager younger general still willing to fight, which probably contradicts the ideals of Caesar himself, who tried to appear as the peacemaker in his own writing.[739] The image of Caesar the warmonger seems to owe its origins to the works that appeared after the war, when Caesar's memory gradually shifted to one who had set out to destroy the *res publica*. Lucan further diminishes Caesar by stating that he had not won equal repute nor fame as Pompeius, contradicting Caesar' own claims that jealousy had been a factor in denying him what he wanted. The people of Rome are not innocent of the war either, here Lucan chastises the negative role of luxury gained in conquest on the simple morals of the past Romans in an intertextual nod to authors such as Caesar and Sallust.[740] The complexities of months of negotiations in the senate over the end of Caesar's term and his replacement are abandoned in the interest of much simplified version of the war as between two great men, much as it had in the works of recent authors. This would signal the gradual reduction of the memory of these events to just the more dramatic aspects.

Lucan also does away with Caesar's unreliable timeline of events and follows that which appears in Cicero's letters with Caesar marching before matters come to a head in the senate although this also in line with the overall portrayal of Caesar as the warmonger. He does, however, keep the expulsion of the tribunes in the narrative, despite Cicero's claim that they were not expelled.[741] Once the tribunes arrive at Caesar's camp, he gives a speech to his assembled men, lambasting Pompeius and accusing him of desiring to never give up his position, asking 'so too will he seize honours and never relinquish them?' *(ille semel raptos*

[738] Luc. *BC*. 1.135-140. Translation Joyce 1993:8.
[739] Luc. *BC*. 1.143-149. Although the difference in age was only about 6 years.
[740] Luc. *BC*. 1.158-162. For Caesar see above pp. 78-80, for Sallust p. 128.
[741] Luc. *BC*. 1.266.

numquam dimittat honores?)[742] This sounds much like the accusations made during the war, but, as Lucan was writing with hindsight, also sounds ironic in light of Caesar's actions. Caesar also claims Pompeius caused a famine to achieve his personal aims, which may owe its origins to Clodius' invective after the recall of Cicero.[743]

> Likewise, the use of arms within the city is recalled, 'who does not know how
>
> his camp crowded the timorous Forum, when grimly glittering
>
> blades cordoned the horrified court – an unlooked for audience?
>
> how, when bold soldiers broke in on the due process of law,
>
> Pompeian standards closed round the defendant, Milo?'
>
> (*quis castra timenti*
>
> *nescit mixta foro, gladii cum triste minantes*
>
> *iudicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona,*
>
> *atque auso medias perrumpere milite leges*
>
> *Pompeiana reum clauserunt signa milonem*?)[744]

Caesar then refers to Pompeius' early career with Sulla, calling him a student of Sulla and saying that, like Sulla, he should retire.[745]

The fear of Pompeius' power is to be found throughout the early books, just as in the early stages of the war.[746] In a conversation between Cato and Brutus, Cato remarks that he

[742] Luc. *BC*. 1. 317. See p. 63 for the similar view of Caesar.
[743] Tatum 1999: 183-184.
[744] Luc. *BC*. 1.319-323. Translation Joyce 1993: 13.
[745] Luc. *BC*. 1.326, 1.335.
[746] Cic. *Ad Att*. 7.7.7.

will act as a block on Pompeius' ambition to rule.[747] Yet the popularity of Pompeius is undeniable.[748]

The identification of Pompeius to the senate was now frequently noted.[749] The poem, following the narrative of Caesar, deals with the siege of Corfinium and the surrender of Domitius, who declares that Pompeius' cause is also that of the senate.[750] This is reinforced in a speech where Pompeius states 'here are both consuls, here in the frontlines are stood your leaders.' (*hinc consul uterque, hinc acies statura ducum e*st.)[751] Likewise, Pompeius refers to his side, like Cicero, as the better of the two factions in the war.[752] Later on in the poem Lucan refers to the host arrayed against Caesar as 'not the party of Pompeius but the party Pompeius was in.' (*non Magni partes, sed Magnum in partibus esse*.)[753] This seems to be a deliberate attempt to combat the memory of the opponents of Pompeius who referred to those arranged against Caesar as the *Pompeiani* and treated the war as a conflict between two parties.

The speeches of the various historical figures tend to take the views that they presumably would have had. Curiously though sometimes they speak out of character – this was likely a deliberate choice by Lucan who twisted the narrative to create new versions of old memories, although over the proceeding decades these events had lessened in their infamy to contemporaries. The main example for Pompeius is the inclusion in a speech that makes numerous references to his own past triumphs and victories.[754] Here he recounts deeds in Sicily under Sulla, particularly his execution of Carbo who 'lies buried in a Sicilian tomb.'

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[747] Luc. *BC*. 2.319-323.
[748] Luc. *BC*. 2.453.
[749] Holliday 1969: 62.
[750] Luc. *BC*. 2.520, 4.792. A sentiment shared on numerous occasions even by 'Caesarians', such as Scaeva, 6.245-46.
[751] Luc. *BC*. 2.565-566.
[752] Luc. *BC*. 2.531, 2.537. Repeated by Domitius with his dying breath. See p.53 for discussion on the view of Cicero.
[753] Luc. *BC*. 5.14.
[754] Luc. *BC*. 2.547, 549, 561-563, 578-594.

(*Sicanio tegitur qui Carbo sepulcro*.)[755] It would seem unlikely that Pompeius would have raised this subject, given how problematic it had been politically for him over the previous decades, but by Lucan's day it was perhaps not viewed in such a light. The portrayal of Sulla has already been noted as being stripped of many of the memories of the civil war as has the portrayal of Marius. Both are merely caricatures remembered for being the leaders of opposing sides in the civil war with little detail.

Despite his earlier confidence as displayed in his speech, Pompeius is ultimately forced to abandon Italia.[756] Although Lucan's narrator is unhappy at the recollection of Pompeius' departure, he is comforted by the knowledge that at least Italia will not witness his downfall, 'and Roman soil kept unstained by Magnus' blood.' (*Romanaque tellus immaculata sui servetur sanguine Magni*.) [757] This statement then closes out the second book. Caesar then marches against the forces arrayed in Hispania and the third book is largely taken up with a theatrical narrative of the siege and sea battle of Messilia. Interspersed with this is the speech of Pompeius' last wife Cornelia who believes that the misfortune that has befallen Pompeius is caused by their marriage and the jealousy that arouses in the ghost of Julia.[758] This proves an intratextual link to the start of the poem where Lucan had blamed the opening of the path to war on the death of Julia, who is now, in a dramatic flourish, also accused of affecting the event from beyond the grave. Although Lucan then partly reneges on this when Curio is referred to as being the war's 'author' (auctor).[759] Lucan further plays with the role of different relationships in the civil war as, in Book 4 it is noted that despite their supposed kinship with Caesar, the people that inhabit the area that had been Troy chose to join with

[755] Luc. *BC*. 2.548.
[756] Luc. *BC*. 2.608.
[757] Luc. *BC*. 2.735-6.
[758] Luc. *BC*. 3.9-23.
[759] Luc. *BC*. 4.738-39.

Pompeius.[760] Perhaps this was a deliberate taunt at Caesar or the rest of the Julio-Claudians, including Nero, who prided themselves on their descent from the Trojans, via Aeneas.

Pompeius is portrayed as a peaceful figure in contrast to Caesar who would prefer to retire from war and bathed in the glory of his fame, as at the beginning of the poem he would rather be in his theatre being lauded by the people. In his dream while on campaign,

'He dreamed

he had taken his seat in Pompey's Theater

and was scanning the numberless faces

of a Roman crowd…

By their joyful voices

his own name was tossed

starward –

section vying with section, chanting, and stamping…

The dream repeated a scene from long ago –

friendly

folk cheering him,

then a youth enjoying his first Triumph

(for defeating of tribes

The Ebro's current encircles and

[760] Luc. *BC*. 3.112-13.

of every guerrilla force

Sertorius flung against him –

Pacification of the West.)

He was acclaimed in his pure white

toga, as if it were conqueror's scarlet.

Senators stoop clapping

when he, still a knight, took his seat.'

(*Pompeiani visus sibi sede theatri*

innumeram effigiem Romanae cernere plebis

adtollique suum laetis ad sidera nomen

vocibus et plausu cuneos certare sonantes;

Qualis erat populi facies clamorque faventis

olim cum iuvenis primique aetate triumphi

post domitas gente, quas torrens ambit Hiberus,

et quaecumque fugax Sertorius impulit arma,

Vespere pacato, pura venerabilis aeque

quam currus ornante toga, plaudente senatu,

sedit adhuc Romanus eques.)[761]

[761] Luc. *BC*. 7.7-18. Translation Joyce 1993: 170-1.

Many of the speeches and dreams of Pompeius are expositions on his earlier career, perhaps emphasising the comment at the start of the poem that Pompeius' best days along with his greatest achievements are behind him.

This is in contrast to the figure of Caesar, who since the beginning has been marked as a war hawk. At Pharsalus, Lucan claims, in line with his characterisation, that Pompeius' force was composed of the nobility of Rome and that Caesar sought them out to destroy the old senate who were an impediment to his power.[762] Caesar descends further when after the battle he refuses the dead burial so as he can sate himself on viewing the carnage.[763] Pompeius leaves the field as in Caesar's account but he does so not out of cowardice as in the *Bellum Civile*, but to try and bring an end to the slaughter (perhaps in an intertextual link to Cicero's comment that Pompeius was the target of the Caesarians).[764] In his defeat Pompeius becomes a humbled figure, who nevertheless is willing to sacrifice everything to rescue Rome from Caesar including the lives of his family.[765] This contrasts the motives of the two forces with the claims by Caesar and Augustus to have freed the state from a faction. Here Pompeius is the one who selflessly tries to save the *res publica* while Caesar fights for himself alone.

As Pompeius departs on a ship with other survivors he ruminates on allying with the Parthians (who have been a major enemy throughout the poem) as Caesar accused him in the *Bellum Civile*.[766] But this idea is rebutted in a lengthy speech by Lentulus.[767] Thus he eventually heads to Egypt expecting a warm welcome from the son whose father he had

[762] Luc. *BC*. 7.357, 578-585. Caesar in his own account of the battle does not list the Roman nobility as an element in Pompeius' force in order to avoid the characterisation as a fratricide. Holliday 1969: 63.
[763] Luc. *BC*. 7.797-99, In later historians this event was remembered as Caesar's famous post battle walk across the field where he complained that such destruction had been forced upon him. Suet. *Caes*. 30.4; Plut *Caes*. 46.1.
[764] Bartsch 1997: 79.
[765] Luc. *BC*. 7.66-62.
[766] Luc. *BC*. 8.237-9; Caes. *BC*. 3.82.
[767] Luc. *BC*. 8.328-455.

aided. This turns out to be a false hope and he is killed but, as has been the case throughout the poem, he dies (bravely) recounting his great deeds.[768] Lucan's narrator bemoans the fickle nature of fate and the tragic downfall of a great man who now lies unburied on the sands with the lines 'from this highest summit of the state his death seeks, and all destroyed, it ended in one furious day.'[769]

Pompeius' body is eventually found and buried by a friendly quaestor named Cordus who, in a lengthy scene, weeps over the body and recalls the victories of Pompeius again.[770] Lucan interjects his narrator's voice into the scene to air his desire to be the one to bring the ashes back to Italia.[771] The story for Pompeius is not over, however, as his soul now goes through an apotheosis.[772] His soul then returns to enter into both Brutus and Cato to guide them.[773] This may have been pushback at the deification of Caesar, showing that deifying a great figure was merely words and could just as easily be done by anyone.[774]

Cato, in a reverse of his usual voice as a critic of Pompeius in the *Bellum Civile*, recalls his earlier career as one of moderation and respect for the senate,

'He kept Liberty safe

when in power; he alone remained a private citizen

when people pleaded to be his slaves; the Senate's guide,

but governed by them. He made no claim of 'Might is Right.'

[768] Luc. *BC*. 8.613-35. The death may have drawn on the tragic accounts of earlier authors such as Velleius. See Vell. Pat. 2.53.3.
[769] Luc. *BC*.8.702-4. Nelis and Farrell 2013 30-36, 160 note the intertextual links to earlier writers such as Vergil and Ovid. Westall 2018b: 312.
[770] Luc. *BC*. 8.715-820.
[771] Luc. *BC*. 8.844-45. Although according to Plut. *Pomp*. 80.6 the ashes had been returned to Cornelia, who buried them.
[772] Luc. *BC*. 9.4-14. Perhaps a reference to the divinity attributed to him by Sextus as the son of Neptune. See Zanker 1990: 39, 44.
[773] Luc. *BC*. 9.17-18.
[774] As Lucan's relative Seneca had done with his mocking *Apocolocyntosis* of the emperor Claudius.

What he did want, he wanted from those who could refuse him.

immoderate wealth he possessed, but paid more revenues in

than he withheld; picked the sword up, but had learnt to lay it

down; preferred arms to the toga but, when armed, loved peace;

a leader pleased to get power, pleased to put it aside.

A decent household, without grandeur, and never corrupted

By its master's good fortune. A shining and honorable name

among nations, he has done our City much service.'

(*salva*

libertate potens, et solus plebe parata

privatus servire sibi, rectorque senatus,

sed renantis, erat. Nil belli iure poposcit

quaeque dari voluit, voluit sibi posse negari.

Immodicas possedit opes, sed plura rententis

intulit. Invasit ferrum, sed ponere norat.

Praetulit arma togae, sed pacem armatus amavit;

Iuvit sumta ducem, iuvit dimidssa potestas.

Casta domus luxuque carens corrutaque numquam

fortuna domini. Clarum et venerabile nomen

Gentibus, et multum nostrae quod proderat urbi.)[775]

After all the mourning for the death of Pompeius the scene turns to Caesar who is touring the site of Troy.[776] Caesar is greeted by a messenger carrying Pompeius' embalmed head and reacts not with the emotion that earlier authors attribute to the scene but with a cynical version: 'Not spontaneously do tears fall, and he forces out a sigh from a glad chest, else arranged to conceal his evidently joyful heart as he could with tears.' (*larimas non sponte cadentes effudit, gemitusque expressit pectore laeto, non aliter manifesta putans abscondere mentis gaudia, quam lacrimis*)[777] Caesar has not won though, as the narrator looks forward in time and near the end of the poem, as it is, calls the assassination of Caesar revenge for the death of Pompeius, stating that 'until the swords of patriots fall on Caesar's viscera, will Pompeius be unavenged.' *(dum patrii veniant in viscera Caesaris enses, Magnus inultus erit*)[778]

Lucan is an anomaly when it comes to the memory of Pompeius, as his writing was probably influenced by a very particular set of circumstances, namely Lucan's distancing from the Julio-Claudian regime and its founding myth. However, the poem does provide an insight to the memories of the era it was written, such as the understanding of the causes of the war with the emphasis on the breakdown of the relationship of Pompeius and Caesar, and the desire for popular appeal that Pompeius displays. Despite these issues, Lucan's dramatic narrative of the civil war provides a vector for these new memories that had an impact on the later historians.

[775] Luc. *BC*. 9. 192-203. Translation Joyce 1993: 236.
[776] The ruins of Troy may be meant to represent the fallen senate, according to Nelis and Farrell 2013: 119.
[777] Luc. *BC*. 9.1038-41,. The story that Caesar wept at the sight of Pompeius' head probably began with Liv. *Per*. 112.4. A similar story is told in Plut. *Caes.* 48.3.
[778] Luc. *BC*. 10.528-29.

The Greek Memories of Pompeius

Decades later Plutarch, a Greek author from Boeotia, wrote his *Parallel Lives*. He had earlier written biographies of all of the emperors up to his time, however these are now largely lost or fragmented. His later project of *Parallel Lives* has survived and includes the account of Pompeius. In the introduction to his *Life of Alexander* Plutarch sets out his programme with his works, namely that he is not writing pure history, but rather studying the character of his chosen subject. As part of this, he does not judge it necessary to recall all aspects of his subject's life and includes minor observations by contemporaries that he views as providing greater enlightenment on the personality.[779] For this reason, Plutarch's story of Pompeius is markedly different. The focus with this life is to demonstrate Pompeius' popularity, which Plutarch appears to understand as his key character trait and therefore the recollections are heavily shaped around these memories.

Plutarch also appears to have had access to many of the anecdotes of Pompeius which did not fit the theme of some of the other authors of generations before or after. This may have been due to the distance at which Plutarch was writing, perhaps straddling a point in time where it was no longer be difficult to talk positively of Pompeius as the Julio-Claudians were no longer in power, but still with access to detailed memories that could be recalled. Plutarch's *Life of Pompeius* seems to be constructed of the memories left by favourable accounts when he narrates his early years, which would suggest that these were the accounts written by Pompeius' Greek entourage later.[780] The decision to use these may have been because these would have provided the best material to fulfil Plutarch's own aim to demonstrate the popularity of Pompeius that he saw as a key personality trait.

[779] Plut. *Alex*.1.2.
[780] See chapter 2, particularly the discussion on Strabo pp. 35-38.

Plutarch also provides details of the *imitatio Alexandri* and claims that Pompeius was noted to be like Alexander the Great in appearance in his youth.[781] As already discussed, the *imitatio* may have been a greater aspect of Pompeius' memory among the Greek speaking inhabitants of the empire, as it was likely that Pompeius focussed on his claims to be a new Alexander while he was in the East.[782] The sources for Pompeius' campaign in the East appear to be mainly the Greek historians with Theophanes being the source for the most part as Plutarch mentions his role in the narrative of the campaign against Mithridates where he blamed Rutilius.[783] Plutarch also mentions Pompeius' stop at Theophanes hometown on Mytilene, where he is listened to poets praise his achievements. The naming of the different speakers, such as Posidonius, may suggest that Plutarch had knowledge of their words or that he was using a – possibly Greek – source that did.[784]

Aside from Pompeius' physical resemblance to Alexander, he also was destined for fame as the Plutarch claims anachronistically, for instance Sulla appears to have been in awe of the young general.[785] The early career of Pompeius is, as noted previously, positive to an anachronistic level. These memories seem to have emanated from hagiographic biographies, not unlike that of Augustus, which treats the eventual success of the individual as preordained. Meanwhile the violence of Pompeius' youth is excused as Cinna and Marius are described as enemies of the state and the execution of Carbo has a lengthy digression on the unreliability of some of the sources on these years, which serves to sow doubt about the claims of Pompeius cruelty.[786]

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[781] Plut. *Pomp*. 2.2.
[782] See pp. 67-9 for the details of the *imitatio*.
[783] Plut. *Pomp*. 37.3. Greek authors seem to have also formed a large part of the sources for Pompeius' memories as Plutarch also notes that Timagenes recorded the requests for assistance written by Ptolemy at *Pomp*. 49.7.
[784] Plut. *Pomp.* 42.5. On Posidonius see Plin. *NH*. 7.112; frg 81; Arr. *De Tac.* 1.1-2; Nock 1959 1-5; De Wet 1981: 119; Kidd 1988: 334; Villani 2009: 285-6.
[785] Plut. *Pomp*. 7.2.
[786] Plut. *Pomp*. 8.1-2, 9.1 and 10.4-5.

When the command against the forces of Sertorius in Hispania comes up, Pompeius is portrayed as essentially saving the situation as Metellus' army was unable to do so under his command. In fact, Pompeius' appearance in the peninsular is said to have brought new hope to the soldiers of Metellus. Although there are some reverses and Pompeius is noted as not willing to wait for Metellus before joining battle with Sertorius – the source of which might be Metellus' own account – Pompeius is not really criticised.[787] Plutarch mentions the letter that Sallust uses, however, he only summarises it in one line, as it likely did not contribute to the memory that he was creating.[788]

There is some discussion on the relationship Pompeius had with others, although the clashes with the senate are now attributed to jealousy much as the feud with Crassus – again likely intertextually drawn from the work of Sallust – although Crassus is accused of faking his fears over Pompeius' return during Cicero's consulship.[789] The focus on Pompeius' memories placed greater emphasis on his later campaigns as they were probably deemed more interesting and explained Pompeius' position before the civil war, as well as having many of the sources in Greek. Although the senate's attempt to stifle the command against the pirates is included. But the accusations of the time have now been reduced to mere jealousy on the part of the senators – although Pompeius' command is likened to a monarchy.[790]

However, by the time Plutarch reaches the civil war, his sources obviously become more mixed, with most of them probably written by the supporters of Caesar, who appear to have dominated the narratives of the war soon after the fighting stopped. Plutarch's narrative certainly seems to draw heavily on the accounts of the Caesarians, but they are tempered by

[787] Plut. *Pomp*. 18.1.
[788] Plut. *Pomp.* 20.1.
[789] Plut. *Pomp*. 21.1-2, 23.1-2.
[790] Plut. *Pomp*. 25.2.

the shift in memory that occurred in the following decades, with Lucan's narrative of the war perhaps accounting for the breakdown of Pompeius and Caesar's relationship being blamed on the death of Julia.[791] Plutarch clearly used the accounts of the battles of Dyracchium and Pharsalus that Caesar had left as they included some of the same comments that Caesar used about Pompeius' strategy. However, he used Asinius Pollio for the battle casualties, implying that they were considered more accurate.[792] Pompeius' flight to Egypt seems to draw on the narrative of Lucan, with a speech by Cornelia to her doomed husband.[793] Unlike Lucan though, Plutarch retains the more dramatic memory of Caesar weeping at the sight of the dead Pompeius.[794] It is clear that Plutarch held Pompeius as one of the great figures of Roman history and seems to have chosen sources that allowed a very flattering portrayal, but it is also clear that for some parts of the narrative the memories used had been recorded by Caesarian sources. Plutarch does however, push back at some of the negative memories by digressing at times to explain why the source would be against Pompeius. At the same time, Plutarch also held the memory of Caesar quite highly, having paired his memory with that of Alexander the Great, and so refrains from disparaging him in Pompeius' life; hence the retention of the story of Caesar weeping at the news of Pompeius' murder, even though the more recent work of Lucan had tried to change that narrative.

Decades later, in the middle of the 2nd century, more Greek authors wrote their own universal histories. Of these Appian and Dio are the two main authors. In both their accounts the memory of Pompeius is now largely dominated by his involvement in the civil war with Caesar. The memory of Pompeius in both cases really begins with the pirate campaign, as this was a memorable campaign and lead to the war against Mithridates, probably Pompeius'

[791] Plut *Pomp*. 70.4.
[792] Plut. *Pomp*. 72.3.
[793] Plut. *Pomp*. 74.3.
[794] Plut. *Pomp*. 80.5.

greatest campaign, but also the one that likely had the most Greek sources. The campaign in the East also explains the formation of the Triumvirate with Crassus and Caesar, the subsequent bond with Caesar, and the breakdown of that relationship which presages the civil war.

Writing around the reign of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, Appian was a Greek-speaking lawyer and historian from Alexandria.[795] He wrote a history of many of Rome's earlier conflicts, such as the campaign against Mithridates, of which his narrative of the civil war is the most complete surviving work. Much research has focussed on the sources that Appian used to write his account of the civil war. One of the leading scholars of Appian, Emilio Gabba, argues that Asinius Pollio was Appian's source for the work, which might explain why his account of Pompeius is mainly of events during 60 BC onward.[796] Other scholars have questioned this certainty, noting that some of his narrative appears to mirror that of other authors such as Plutarch, who noted that he had used Messala Corvinus as a source.[797] Osgood has noted that 'it is certain that in literature written in the later 40s and 30s BCE, in particular works by Sallust, Vergil, and Horace, authors were starting to create a picture of the civil wars in which the greed and ambition of all of Roman society, and the ruling class in particular, were to blame.'[798] It would be unsurprising if Appian made use of Plutarch as a source, his account been written in Greek. Appian did make use of other sources though, mentioning a letter of Caesar, while his speech by Pompeius on the nature of the state

[795] Bucher 415-16.
[796] Direct mention of Pollio in App. *B.C*. 2.40, 45-46, While *B.C*. 2.70 suggests several differing sources on the numbers at Pharsalus, at least one of which might have been Pollio's, who criticised Caesar's account for his inaccuracy on his figures, such as recorded at BC. 2.82. Gabba 1958: 219. See also Turner 2019: 37-38 for the issues with Pollio.
[797] Gowing 1990: 160.
[798] Osgood 2019: 156.

as a concept that is not tied to the hearths and homes appears to mirror the words mentioned earlier as recorded by Cicero.[799]

The memory of the civil war at this point was much removed from the event, and the impact of contemporary understanding altered these memories further.[800] Aside from this, Appian also overlays his own agenda on the memories of the civil war. Writing after more than a century of rule by emperors, Appian appears to view history up to that point as very much one of the gradual journey towards the contemporary imperial system of government – one which Appian appears to view as the best form.[801] Appian therefore, distils the *res publica* down to a series of periods of unrest and outright war with little detail given beyond the necessary explanation of how an outbreak of violence had occurred. Rome's power is likewise understood as a divinely-ordained inevitability, which Bucher has noted as giving Appian an excuse to avoid delving into the complexities of causation.[802] He appears to write from the perspective of a provincial who sees Rome's history in light of its impact on his homeland of Egypt, and that also seems to be his target audience to judge by his constant need to explain aspects of Roman life to his reader.

As Bucher has argued, 'Gabba also perceived that Appian's assignment of blame for the Civil War of 49 B.C.E. is about even: Gabba rightly identified Appian's remoteness from events as one cause; another lies in the probability that Appian's narrative is a thorough mixture of diverse source material selected to depict (in the case of the *BC*) a series of violent *stasiarchs*, not to create a consistent portrait of one leader or another. […] Appian is not

[799] App. *B.C.* 2.50 sounds suspiciously like the words Cicero used when he criticised Pompeius' abandoning of Rome (Cic. *Ad Att.* 7.11.3-4), but with added elements of Greek history that might be expected from a Greek author. Meanwhile *B.C.* 2.69 bears a great deal of resemblance to the image of Pompeius' camp in the narrative of Caesar. The letter of Caesar is mentioned at *B.C.* 2.79.
[800] The neutrality that the current regime felt towards the memory this time can perhaps be seen in the account of the restoration of the monument to Pompeius in Egypt by the emperor Hadrian (App. *B.C.* 2.86).
[801] Bucher 2000: 431.
[802] Bucher 2000: 431-3 Such that the gods hindered Pompeius so that the *res publica* would be defeated. The interference of the gods is a theme that will appear again with the narrative of Sextus.

objective in putting forward his case for monarchy: despite his restraint, his strong preference for monarchy is clear.'[803]

As part of his view, Appian structured his work as a series of books on various geographical topics or military events with a plan to culminate in a narrative of the history of Egypt.[804] However, only fragments of some of these works have survived. The remaining account of the campaign against Mithridates unsurprisingly contains several references to Pompeius in its later books. Most of the narrative is a recollection of the events of his war, and there are a few allusions to perhaps differing sources on Pompeius either from contemporaries or later authors. Some of these must have been drawn from positive accounts of Pompeius, such as the popular acclamation he received on his return from the East, the great two-day triumph, lists of cities that were founded or resettled, and the inscriptions set up with the lists of conquests.[805]

On the other hand Appian includes some remarks that probably owe their origins to more hostile sources, although employed out of context in his account, for example at one point he refers to Pompeius' position as a 'king of kings', a title derisively given to him during the build-up to Pharsalus by one of the senators in the camp.[806] Appian does not seem to realise the context and merely appears to use it to note the great power that Pompeius had been granted to achieve his military aims – for him 'king' does not seem to be a problematic title as he notes when he refers to the emperors as kings in all but name.[807] To illustrate Appian's poor understanding of the period, he also twice notes that Pompeius only took the title 'Great' after his victory over Mithridates, as this was the pinnacle of his career.[808]

[803] Bucher 2000: 441-2.
[804] Bucher 2000: 420.
[805] App. *Mith*. 20.96, 23.115, 24.116-17.
[806] App. *Mith*. 19.94 Appian does, however, note this sarcastic title later in his narrative of the civil war (*B.C.* 2.67).
[807] App. *Pr*. 6.23.
[808] App. *Mith*. 20.97, 24.118.

It could be argued, that by this point in time, although the civil wars of the *res publica* were still an important moment in Rome's history and set the stage for the world that Appian inhabited, the memories, especially those of Caesar's opponents were becoming less important – almost to the point of becoming mythical abstracts.[809] The cultural memory of this time period had suffered from the slow decay of details that were no longer important to the fundamental role of these memories, instead Pompeius and others had their legacy reshaped to fit the narrative arguments that the authors wanted to make.

The main work to survive, the *Bellum Civile* (as it is known) only covers aspects of the life of Pompeius until it reaches the campaign in the East, where Appian starts to build his narrative up to the eventual civil war between Pompeius and Caesar. The parts of the life of Sulla and his civil war only include scant detail of Pompeius' actions, while Strabo has become largely irrelevant. Although the death of Carbo is related, he is the only casualty of Pompeius' youth to be remembered, possibly because of the frequency of this memory in the earlier works from Livy and Valerius, and as the only victim to be mentioned in Lucan.[810] Despite this, Appian's narrative is mostly devoid of the memory of the young butcher. The limited scope of the *Bellum Civile* means that it is not possible to know what has passed out of the cultural memory at this stage, but it is notable that most of the accusations that had dogged Pompeius' memory for over a century seem to have now largely vanished. All that remains is a slight reference to Pompeius' service under Sulla, some of his campaigns, and the envy that his success brought.

The campaigns against the pirates and the East seemed to have become the focus of Pompeius' memory as they were some of his most memorable achievements. The difficulties he faced in the senate on his return brought about the connection with Caesar and the

[809] For example, App. *B.C.* 2.84 narrates the death of Pompeius, with the chief assailant being a Roman veteran of his pirate campaign, but names him as 'Sempronius' when all the other major accounts have him as Septimus.
[810] App. *B.C.* 2.96. The earlier accounts are found in Liv. *Per.* 89; Val. Max. 2.6.8; Luc. *BC.* 2.548.

problematic alliance with Crassus, which is the starting point of the path to civil war according to some of the contemporary historians. Also swept away are most of the memories the constant accusations that Pompeius desired to seize control of the *res publica*, as by this point it was the memory of Caesar that underwent the transition so that various incidents were noted where he showed that desire at earlier times.[811] As Lucan portrayed Pompeius as one who desired the adulation of the plebs above all, so this was maintained and appears to have become part of the cultural memory, with Pompeius now dreaming of his theatre before the battle of Pharsalus.[812]

Much of the narrative of the war has become clouded beneath Appian's own interest in the powers of the divine. Many incidents in the war are surrounded by portentous events, such as strange births or signs in the heavens.[813] Likewise, Appian attributes a lot of the decisions of the leading figures during the war to divine intervention, with Caesar being helped by Fortune and other deities, while his enemies are hindered by divine intervention with what he refers to as *θεοβλάβεια* (madness from the gods).[814] Appian also retains some dramatic elements with the memory of Caesar being upset by the sight of Pompeius' head survived into the cultural memory of Caesar learning of Pompeius' fate following Plutarch despite Lucan's best efforts.[815]

Decades after Appian, another Greek author Dio Cassius wrote a more in-depth history of the Roman world from its mythical founding to his own time in the 3rd century. Dio appears to take a line that is more supportive of the memory of Caesar recording some strange, hostile accusations against both Pompeius and Cicero that can only have come from

[811] Although *B.C.* 2.48 notes the very Ciceronian view that the winner would be sovereign and at 2.69 Pompeius supposedly predicted that whoever won at Pharsalus, it would be the beginning of trouble for the Romans.
[812] App. *B.C.* 2.68.
[813] App. *B.C.* 2.36, 67, 68.
[814] Goldmann 1988: 33-44; Gowing 1990: 178 note 178, and 1992 16; Cowan 2015: 197.
[815] App. *B.C.* 2.90.

a pro-Caesarian source.[816] However, this is mixed with some of the more obvious negative memories about Pompeius. While his account is more detailed and not as focussed on the wars that brought about the principate, he still largely chooses to quickly pass over Pompeius' youthful career emphasising how little these memories mattered at this date. Like Appian, he focusses on the pirate campaign as the beginning point of Pompeius' rise but, as a means to quickly cover Pompeius' earlier life, he gives Pompeius a speech during the *contio* on the command against the pirates where he neatly recalls all of his previous achievements to date. However, most of the Sullan period is missing from Pompeius' speech.[817] The use of the memory of Sulla and dictatorship by Pompeius' political opponents is nevertheless recalled in the guise of the counter speech given by Catulus.[818] Cicero is remembered as being against Caesar and Crassus although it is also claimed that he was behind a plot to have Pompeius murdered, which must surely be based on attempted propaganda of the time or a later hostile source.[819] Pompeius is, like Cicero claimed, remembered as preparing against Caesar as early as the mid-50s and is noted as being jealous of Caesar's popularity and fame, which seems quite anachronistic at this stage.[820] The account of the battles of the civil war is fairly neutral, but Pompeius' demise in Egypt is given great attention and many added details to emphasis the tragic drama of the event. The reversal of fortune is one element that is particularly focussed on by Dio, who records how far Pompeius had fallen, much like some of the earlier accounts and as well as omens. As with many accounts of Pompeius' death, the memory of Caesar weeping, possibly originating with a speech of Antonius, is included

[816] The story of the failure of the *venatio* due to the crowds sympathy with the elephants (Dio 39.38.1-4), the rumour that Pompeius did not build his own theatre and instead gave the job to a freedman (Dio 39.38.6), and that Cicero had attempted to assassinate Pompeius and Caesar in conjunction with Lucullus, which is given as the reason behind his eventual exile (Dio 38.9.1-10.1).
[817] Dio 36.25.2-3.
[818] Dio 36.34.2-3.
[819] Dio 38.9.2.
[820] Dio 39.26.1-3.

too.[821] Like Appian, Dio does not seem realise that the title of Agamemnon was given to Pompeius as a term of derision, whereas unlike Appian, he is aware of more of Pompeius' assassin being called Septimius, suggesting better or different sources.[822]

Conclusion

The emperors that followed Augustus seem to have had views on Pompeius which were very individualistic and tended to be related to their own sense of security in their position as emperor. Tiberius was very careful with how the recent past was portrayed although some such as Velleius were able to praise Pompeius as the main problems were instead the memories of those who opposed the idea of government by one man. Hence, Cato seems to have remained a controversial figure for Tiberius. As time progressed there seem to have been less need to adhere to the informal rules regarding the memory of the civil war, as Caligula later reversed some of the prohibitions and restored some historical works. Pompeius' memory as one who might have taken sole power may have made him more palatable to the new imperial regime. But by this stage, like with the writers under Augustus, he was largely remembered as a great figure of the past. His memory was flexible, however, as authors such as Lucan have shown, when his memory could ostensibly be used to criticize Caesar and the Julio-Claudians. By the end of the century, with a new, unrelated dynasty now ruling Rome, the founding myth of the imperial system was no longer directly tied to the occupant of the throne and became a remote memory. This condensed into a more simplistic cultural memory form with Pompeius' conquest of the East and his clash with Caesar now forming a large part. His early years were now no longer of interest to the historians at the

[821] Dio 42.5.1-7, 44.45.5 Dio's Antonius even goes as far to claim that the Egyptian war was in revenge for Pompeius.
[822] Dio 42.3.3, 42.5.5.

end of the 1st century AD, as they had little function in the memory of his greatness or role in the civil war, and the details simply faded from cultural memory.

Chapter 5: 'The Memory of Sextus'

Pompeius' memory was undergoing an evolution just as the memory of his sons was being formed. Although there was little conflict over the negative memory of Gnaeus as his time in the spotlight was brief and he made a bad impression with almost all the other key players at this time, Sextus was different – his career lasted much longer and he was a major thorn in the side of the Triumvirs – until his memory was eclipsed by the war between Octavian and Antonius and the battle of Actium. Sextus, like his father before him, was the eventual loser of the war, but unlike Pompeius, his opponent was not as forgiving to his enemies' memory. The Triumviral years of the 30s are probably one of the most contested periods of memory in Roman history due to the propaganda battle that raged between the multiple sides. The success of Octavian's propaganda was probably because he reigned much longer than Caesar did, meaning he was able to exert a greater influence on the memories of his rise to power than Caesar before his assassination. Additionally, Octavian built up a stable of far more competent writers than Caesar did with his lieutenants, such as Hirtius, and this aided him in disseminating his version of Sextus' memory.

Contemporary Memory during the Civil War

Octavian was not Sextus' first enemy, from the start Sextus had been at war with Caesar. Starting in the aftermath of the murder of his father, he quickly joined his older brother Gnaeus first in Africa and then in Hispania. The accounts of the war in Hispania are the first time that Sextus appears in the accounts of a contemporary, in this case written by his opponents. As noted, Gnaeus had already appeared briefly in the anonymous account of the civil war in Africa, where the memory of this time was heavily influenced by the strategy of the Pompeius' opponents. As Pompeius was still the enemy in the eyes of the Caesarian

authors, the memory of his controversial youth was used when comparing Gnaeus to his father. This then provided the dual function of refreshing the memory of Pompeius' violent youth while also negatively demonstrating Gnaeus' lack of ability and making him an unworthy son.[823] Clearly the author of these chapters was not aiming solely at Pompeius with Cato's supposed praise, but also at diminishing his son using his own father's example as a stark contrast.[824] This sets an interesting precedent within the rhetoric of the civil war, as similar methods would later be employed against Sextus during his war with the Triumvirate.

While the focus of the continuators was on Gnaeus, Sextus was barely noticed by contemporaries. He had been too young at the start of the civil war and was sent to safety at Lesbos with Cornelia. It seems that he was still largely kept out of harm's way gaining no mention in the *Bellum Africanum* and only commanding a garrison at Corduba while his brother was in the field in the *Bellum Hispaniense*. His role was so minor that it led later historians to occasionally forget he survived.[825]

The main contemporary narrative of the sons, The *Bellum Hispaniense*, where most of the information on the campaign comes from, is more intertextually familiar to the *Bellum Civile* in its damning treatment of the opposition leaders. The narrative is very visceral in nature with both sides engaging in brutal actions. Due to its greater realism, it has been proposed that its author was a party to the fighting.[826] While parts of the text are unclear and it suffers from lacunae throughout making the progression of events hard to follow, the portrayal of the opposition leaders is clear enough.[827] Since Scipio and Cato had both died during the conflict in Africa, Gnaeus and Labienus have become the focal point of the war. The characterisation

[823] *B. Afr.* 22; Rambaud 1953: 361.
[824] Cluett 2003: 123.
[825] Oros. 6.16.7-8.
[826] Hadas 1930: 49. In particular, the author of the *Bellum Hispaniense*, who is criticised as a poor writer but still probably at least an officer. See Storch 1973: 381. The fact that the narrative only begins when Caesar arrives and gives no clues as to the actions before that time would appear to reinforce that assumption.
[827] Cluett 2003: 196.

of Gnaeus is particularly striking in its resemblance to that of his father in the *Bellum Civile* and the actions of his forces closely resemble the characterisation of the opposition in the early Book 1 of the *Bellum Civile*.

The first chapter of the *Bellum Hispaniense*, much like the early chapters of the *Bellum Civile*, deal with abuses of the law and greed, and downplay the popular support of the opposition. Accordingly, when Gnaeus captures a city even a citizen who is supportive is at risk if he was too wealthy and 'he was done away with and out of his money a gift is made to the brigands.' (*ut eo de medio sublato ex eius pecunia latronum largitio fieret.*)[828] This is not dissimilar to the portrayal of Scipio and others who sought to enrich themselves in the war to cover their debts found in the first book of the *Bellum Civile*. What is particularly notable is the use of the word *latrones* (brigands) to describe Gnaeus' supporters, which is perhaps the first time it is applied to the opponents of Caesar.[829] Sextus himself would later be discredited as a pirate (*praedo*) during his campaign against Octavian, and like his older brother before him, Sextus' war was characterised as brigandage by the writers of the time.[830]

The *Bellum Hispaniense* is clearly engaging intertextually with the *Bellum Civile* when it comes to the characterisation of the opposition. In several places the author appears to draw inspiration from the narrative of the *Bellum Civile* and the common *topoi* of the time. For example, Gnaeus and Sextus are both accused of recruiting slaves and other undesirables into their forces.[831] These soldiers are described as being of poor quality, prone to moments of overconfidence because of small successes but otherwise lacking martial virtues such as

[828] *B. Hisp*. 1; de Souza 1999: 13.
[829] On the terms used see Raaflaub 1974: 192-200; Roller 2001: 55.
[830] Although this seems to have been a fairly frequent term of abuse for one's rivals as can be seen by Cicero's use of the term for Antonius throughout the *Philippics*. see Grunewald 2004: 75.
[831] *B*. *Hisp*. 7, the author uses the term runaways (*fugitivis*) which can refer to runaway slaves, but it would seem in this instance to refer to genuine deserters from other armies as was noted later when two soldiers are captured and admitted to being deserters at *B*. *Hisp*.12. *B*. *Hisp*. 34 Sextus recruited slaves manumitted from their owners in Corduba. Caesar claimed similar actions: Caes. *BC*. 1.24, 3.4, 3.5, 3.40. See above at pp. 87-8 for discussion on the meaning.

frequently refusing to face their opponents.[832] They also prove to be difficult to control and, like the soldiers of Pompeius in Greece, they are accused of leading their commander rather than following orders. As a consequence of this, the soldiers of the opposition engage in massacres of prisoners and civilians on a number of occasions.[833] While Gnaeus and Labienus are reportedly disgusted by the actions of their soldiers, they do nothing to stop a massacre of civilians who are suspected of pro-Caesarian sympathies.[834] Again, the cruel actions of Caesar's opponents in the *Bellum Hispaniense* brings the narrative full circle with the *Bellum Civile* as Gnaeus is portrayed as being like his father in his cruelty and his inability to command successfully.

However, the intertextual relationship does not end with the forces of the father and the son. The *Bellum Civile* had made good use of speeches placed into the mouths of civilians and citizens caught up in the conflict, and the *Bellum Hispaniense* similarly made use of this strategy. As with Pompeius, it was designed to show Gnaeus' limited support, which is an important factor in establishing legitimacy, as Caesar had shown by his reliance on such speeches in his earlier campaign. Thus, when a citizen escapes from a town controlled by the opposition and gives a speech to Caesar, he discredits Gnaeus' conduct of the war while making it clear that Caesar, as the legitimate authority and superior general, is the most deserving of victory.[835] Later in the narrative two equestrians desert from Gnaeus and bring news to Caesar that all those of a similar rank had pledged to go over to Caesar but had been prevented by the betrayal of a slave.[836]

To emphasise that point, as Caesar had done in the *Bellum Civile* with Pompeius' letter before Pharsalus and the author of the *Bellum Africanum* had with the speech of Cato, the

[832] *B. Hisp*. 14.
[833] *B. Hisp*.15,18, 21.
[834] *B. Hisp*.18, 21.
[835] *B. Hisp*.17.
[836] *B. Hisp. 26.*

Bellum Hispaniense has Gnaeus send a letter to the people of Urso claiming that he is on the verge of victory: 'although according to our good fortune, we have, thus far, driven off the enemy to our satisfaction. If we had had the opportunity to fight him on equal ground, then I would have ended the war quicker than you think. But their inexperienced army is not brave enough to be led into the field against us and, furthermore, as they are pinned down, they are prolonging the war. […] I shall conserve the cities on our side and also end the war at the first opportunity.' (*Etsi prout nostra felicitas ex sententia adversarios adhuc propulsos habemus. si aequo loco sui potestatem facerent, celeries quam vestra opinio fert bellum confecissem. Sed exercitum tironem non audentt in campum deducere nostrisque adhuc fixi praesidiis bellum ducunt... civitates nostrarum partium conservabo et bellum primo quoque tempore conficiam*.)[837]

Gnaeus' letter served to highlight his overconfidence, dishonesty and perhaps prefigure his defeat at the battle of Munda. Like his father, he too is portrayed as being led to fight by the opinion of others namely the fallacious view expressed by the people of Urso, that he had inspired himself, 'thus, trusting this view, he judged himself able to accomplish it all.'(*ita hac opinione fretus totum se facere posse existimabat*.)[838]

Ultimately though Caesar won the battle of Munda, Labienus was killed in the fighting, while Gnaeus, wounded, was forced to flee. Sextus who was still at Cordoba bribed some cavalrymen and fled from the town on the pretence that he was going to make peace with Caesar.[839] Again, this is perhaps an allusion to the defeat at Pharsalus and Pompeius' own excuse before his flight from the camp. Although Gnaeus was able to remain on the run for some time he too was killed and his head brought to Hispalis for public display.[840] Caesar

[837] *B. Hisp*.26.
[838] *B. Hisp*.28.
[839] *B. Hisp*.32.
[840] *B. Hisp*.39.

arrives later, and in a public speech, harangues the assembled citizens for supporting the wrong side in words that almost seem to be a criticism of Pompeius' youth: 'you received the young Gnaeus Pompeius from his flight, and from your urging he, as a private citizen, seized the fasces and imperium for himself, killed many citizens, raised forces against the Roman people, and devastated the land and the province.'(*privatus, ex fuga Cn. Pompeius adulescens a vobis receptus, fascis imperiumque sibi arripuit, multis interfectis civibus, auxilia contra populum Romanum comparavit agros provinciamque vestro impulsu depopulavit*.)[841]As usual the speech also emphasises the legal position of Caesar, as a consul, against his enemies.

Unfortunately, the rest of the speech is missing and, therefore, how the *Bellum Hispaniense* ended is unknown. Cluett has criticised the narrative for neither emphasising the importance of the defeat and death of Gnaeus on the rest of the opposition, nor noting that this was the last campaign of Caesar.[842] Since the end of the book is missing it is not possible to know for certain that the author did not make this point later. This lack of emphasis could perhaps be due to the unfinished nature of the *Corpus Caesarianum* – the author of the *Bellum Hispaniense* would probably have been unsure if this was the last battle of the civil war or if there was going to be a further resurgence as there had been many times prior.[843]

Another point of interest is that Gnaeus is the focus of attention in the *Bellum Hispaniense*, and not Labienus. Although Labienus was likely the more experienced of the two commanders, Gnaeus was understood to have a greater claim on the loyalty of the populace of Hispania Ulterior and it was probably for that reason that he appears to have held the overall command. This conveniently allowed the *Bellum Hispaniense* to continue the theme of a 'Pompeian' opposition and could explain how Labienus is largely relegated to the shadows in

[841] *B. Hisp*. 42.
[842] Cluett 2009: 199.
[843] Hirtius, in his plan for the corpus, was to have it continue to the present day, after the assassination of Caesar, which he viewed as a continuation of the same civil war.

the narrative. The focus on Gnaeus did not, however, extend to his motives for continuing the fight, such as a desire for revenge. The only clue to this was that the watchword given at Munda was *pietas* for Gnaeus' forces.[844]

The author of the *Bellum Hispaniense* appeared to be content to allow the reader to guess the motives for themselves or rely on accusations of greed that intertextually linked to the earlier claims of Caesar. Since this was likely written during or not long after the campaign by a Caesarian veteran, it is unsurprising that the memory of Pompeius was still largely negative. Clearly, during the period of its composition, Pompeius was still remembered by the opposition as he is in the *Bellum Civile*, and, therefore, could still be utilised to make negative comparisons, with his sons mirroring these familial traits. It would not be till later, when the memory of Pompeius was reappraised in a positive light under Octavian that the memories of the sons' unworthiness would instead become the focus and it was necessary to split them from their father.

Pompeii and Coinage

Although much like Caesar, the *Bellum Hispaniense* does not record the propaganda circulated by the opposition, which can now only be pieced together from the coinage produced during this campaign. This seems an odd choice for the author to make, as by this point Gnaeus' coinage would, if anything, have supported Caesar's strategy of personalising the civil war. [845] For example, the silver coinage that Gnaeus struck drew heavily on his heritage as most of the obverses feature the head of Pompeius and clearly indicate that

[844] App. *B.C.* 2.104.
[845] The same could be said for the author's lack of noting Gnaeus' campaign, and that of Sextus especially, copying Pompeius enemy Sertorius. Octavian would later grasp the line that the son had become that which his father had fought.

Gnaeus saw the value in using his father's memory to aid his war, as the image of Pompeius underlined the *pietas* that was the key ideological component of their propaganda.[846]

As the only surviving documents on the son's use of their father's memory, the coinage of the Pompeii is the sole means of understanding how those outside of the circles of Caesar or Cicero comprehended Pompeius' memory. Although able to reach a large number of people, coinage is a limited means of circulating messages. By their very nature they are constrained in what detail can be portrayed upon them, and symbolistic imagery is the main means to reach a mass audience of differing levels of understanding.[847] As can be seen in the initial issues of Gnaeus, he was clearly utilising the memory of Pompeius as a famous figure and also emphasising his own relationship and his piety to his dead father on the coins that were likely aimed at the more Romanised peoples with is choice of images on his higher value coinage, while the bronze issue is much more simplified in its message noting the Pompeian claims to naval supremacy within more traditional Roman coinage iconography.

Sextus in the Senate: Creating a Memory with Cicero

After the death of Gnaeus, Sextus, once he had regained his offensive momentum, began to mint coinage again. He likely used his brother's old dies to do so, but also appears to have put greater stress on the claims to *pietas* as that was a key component in his propaganda strategy.[848] Sextus' issues make no secret of this by including his self-assigned cognomen of '*pius*' to his own name, so that it was unmistakable. The connection between Sextus and *pietas* seems to have been well broadcast as Cicero was able to reference it in his *Philippic*

[846] Kopij 2011: 209.
[847] Kopij 2011: 206; Zarrow 2007: 23.
[848] Kopij 2011: 209.

speeches not long after the death of Gnaeus and the assassination of Caesar when a power vacuum had formed.[849]

Figure 8: RRC 477/2. Coin of Sextus with his head on the Obverse surrounded with Sex[tus] Magnus Imp[erator] and the Reverse showing the goddess Pietas. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

By the time of the fifth *Philippic*, Cicero praises Lepidus for coming to terms with Sextus, and attributes *pietas* to the cause of the two brothers and refers to Sextus' survival as a gift of the gods.[850] This was probably part of the race that now developed between the different factions and individuals who were trying to court the commanders of armies. Cicero was perhaps aware of how weak the position that he and like-minded members of the senate were in without a source of military power.[851] In his statement for honours to be granted to Lepidus for the restoration of Sextus, Cicero uses the new cognomen 'Magnus' that Sextus (and previously Gnaeus) was using himself in Hispania. Clearly Sextus was tying himself to the memory of his father by adopting his *cognomen ex virtute* as if it was a family name. The thirteenth *Philippic* contains much praise for Lepidus again who has come to terms with Sextus and brought him into communication with the senate in Rome. Cicero exaggerates this achievement claiming that Lepidus' efforts to have Sextus disarm has brought peace to the *res publica*.[852] Such fulsome praise by Cicero was likely aimed at Lepidus and Sextus to try to win over some desperately needed military support to Cicero's side and strengthen his

[849] Cic. *Phil.* 5.39; Manuwald 2007: 688.
[850] Cic. *Phil*. 5.39-40; Lange 2016: 83.
[851] Sumi 2005 84-5.
[852] Cic. *Phil*. 13.8.

hand against Antonius. He further requests that the senate grant Sextus the money that is needed to buy his father's auctioned property back. [853] This appears to have been one of the main aims of Sextus and he made the same request throughout his life.[854] Sextus also appears to be aware of his own standing with the Caesarians when he rejects attempts to draw him into the conflicts between the various factions in Italia. Although the rejection can hardly have been what he wanted to hear, Cicero goes as far as praising Sextus' refusal to help with the siege of Mutina out of concern for 'offending the veterans.' (*ne veteranorum animos offenderet*.) [855]

As part of the new reconciliation with Sextus, the senate granted him the title of praefect of the fleet and seacoast in line with his capabilities as the commander of a large fleet, and it seems this was possibly done to keep him and his forces away from an already troubled Rome.[856] This gave Sextus his first real legitimacy, which judging by the addition of PRAEF. CLAS. ET. ORAE. MARIT. EX. S. C on the coinage he produced was appreciated.[857] Welch has argued that early in 43 BC, Sextus probably moved with the new the authority of his command to take possession of more ships and places of anchorage, and it is perhaps around this time that he seized Sicily from its governor Pompeius Bithynicus.[858]

However, in August of that year Octavian, with the support of some legions, marched on Rome and secured for himself the office of consul with his relative Q. Pedius as his colleague.[859] One of their early acts was to pass the *Lex Pedia*, which made the assassins of Caesar criminals. Among the legitimate names of those present at the *Ides*, was the name of

[853] Cic. *Phil*. 13.10-12.
[854] Ramsey 2003: 266-8
[855] Cic. *Phil*. 13.13.
[856] App. *B.C*. 4.94.
[857] *RRC* 511/1-4. See Zanker 1990: 38 on the legitimising impact of the *Senatus Consultum*.
[858] Welch 2012: 166-9. App *B.C*.4.84-5 contradicts this as he states that Sextus only took the island after the *Lex Pedia* had been passed and that two of the proscribed had persuaded Bithynicus to surrender. Dio 47.12.2 suggests instead that Sextus held the island before the proscriptions, although Dio implies that Sextus only partially captured the island after the *Lex Pedia* at 48.17.4. See also Finley 1979: 148.
[859] Manuwald 2007: 30.

Sextus, who had been in Hispania at the time, a fact which seems to have been well known.[860] As a result of this law, Sextus was stripped of his command and became a wanted man. However, having never disarmed, despite Cicero's claim otherwise, he was able to seize control of the rest of Sicily. Sextus also had naval superiority due to his gathering of ships during his brief command and this permitted him control over the narrow straits of Messina, which allowed him to disrupt the flow of shipping to Rome.[861]

Sextus' inclusion in the *Lex Pedia* is interesting as it seems to have been well known that he had nothing to do with the *Ides*, it is likely that Octavian was targeting Sextus as a rival to power. Initially this was probably due to the threat posed by his large force and proximity to Italia, but later he had the most to fear from Sextus as a rival to his own claim to legitimacy based on his father, and the use of their fathers' as divine figures (Sextus by allusion rather than officially) was problematic for Octavian too. This was especially true since he held the weaker position when compared to Sextus, for Caesar was his adoptive father and views on his assassination were polarising since he had been killed to liberate the *res publica* from a tyrant. A similar situation existed with Brutus and Cassius. until their defeat at Philippi, the Liberators – as they styled themselves – remained alive to spread that message and to provide a rallying point to all those who had opposed Caesar. Pompeius on the other hand had fallen to the treachery of a foreign king whilst trying to defend the *res publica*. To those outside of Caesar's circle, his death seems to have largely been a source of sorrow in Roman society.

Neither sons really had cause to fight the other, as both fathers had fallen at the hands of different assassins. It would appear that Sextus at least was willing to end his campaign with the death of Caesar, and the plebs in Rome seemed to reluctant to believe that the war

[860] App *B.C.* 4.96; Dio 45.48.4, 48.17.2; Welch 2012: 169. The wording of the *Lex Pedia* was broad enough at the start to allow for even fringe figures to be caught in its net. See also Welch 2012: 172.
[861] App. *B.C.* 5.15; Dio 47.12.2, 48.17.5.

was continuing because of Sextus' unwillingness to surrender.[862] The evidence for this comes from the letter that Cicero saw and the various attempts at negotiating during the civil war.[863] Therefore, Octavian probably never had an intention to make peace with Sextus, who he viewed as a threat from the outset.[864] By adding Sextus to the list of those who had murdered Caesar, Octavian made him a 'legitimate' target of his *pietas*.

Pietas

Richard Saller argues that *pietas* is best summed up in the term 'devotion', but it can have elements of submission and obedience.[865] Saller also defined *pietas* as 'reciprocal, dutiful affection.'[866] In Vergil's *Aeneid*, the titular hero Aeneas rescued his father and the household gods, from the attack of the Greeks: both were acts of piety. One was *pietas erga parentes* the other *pietas erga deos*. Sextus would have been aware of such stories, however the links to the Caesar were too strong – Aeneas, had a connection with the Julian family and had already appeared on the coinage of Caesar.[867]

Figure 9: RRC 458/1. Coin of Caesar showing Venus on the obverse and Aeneas carrying his father on the reverse with Caesar inscribed. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

[862] App. *B.C.* 5.67.
[863] Cic. *Ad Att.* 16.4.1-3.
[864] Welch 2012: 298; Zanker 1990: 34.
[865] Saller 1994: 106.
[866] Saller 1994: 150.
[867] *RRC* 458; Crawford 1974: 458.

Therefore, one issue of coinage minted for Sextus when he was in Sicily had an image of the Catanaean brothers instead.[868]The story of the mythical brothers was that they had saved their infirmed parents from the eruption of Mount Etna in Sicily by carrying them away from the approaching lava.[869] This was probably meant to conjure a connection to the *pietas* of the sons of Pompeius towards their father and the *pietas* of the Catanaean brothers towards their parents.[870] The choice of the Catanaean brothers is interesting, as it makes use of a local Sicilian myth, and avoided using Aeneas, the other famous figure of *pietas*. The strength of the need to display *pietas* by both sides as their cause belies a need to overcome both their lack of authorised command and inexperience, instead they initially lead their armies by the virtues of *pietas* and connection to famous fathers.

Figure 10: RRC 511/3a. The head of Pompeius with the implements of the augerate and on the reverse Neptune with one foot on a ships prow holding an apulstre and flanked by the Catanaean brothers. Note the inclusion of Clas[sis] et Orae Marit[imae] ex S.C. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

The whole propaganda campaign of the Pompeii can be summed up by *pietas* – it was the watch word given at Munda and featured heavily on their coins – and Sextus knew that the strength of his position and his source of recruits rested on the esteem that his father was held across the empire.[871]Although he kept the theme of *pietas* for his whole campaign, his own action in support of those who were persecuted brought him approval separately. This

[868] *RRC* 511/3a.
[869] Lycurg. *Leoc*. 95-96; Paus.10.28.4.
[870] Zanker 1990: 40.
[871] App. *B.C.* 2.104.

might explain how later in his campaigns he began to mint reverses that portrayed images that celebrated his own achievements.[872] Octavian was acutely aware of this also and made a great effort to diminish the claims of Sextus, showing instead that Sextus was not staying true to his father's memory by consorting with what he portrayed as pirates.[873] However, Octavian struggled to live up to his father's memory too and chose to forego his *clementia* towards defeated foes. Octavian instead proscribed his enemies and a malicious rumour spread that he had even sacrificed prisoners to the shade of Caesar after the siege of Perusia.[874]

This claim to *pietas* had allowed Octavian to gather some of Caesar's veterans to his cause, especially when Antonius had seemingly come to terms with the assassins of Caesar.[875] Octavian introduced himself to the political scene as the champion of the elements that wanted action against the assassins and with some bribery had broken away some of Antonius' forces. Cicero, writing to Atticus, recounts a speech given by Octavian at a *contio* in 44 BC where Octavian, addressing the crowd, pointed to a statue of Caesar stating, 'so may I attain the honours of my father.' (*ita sibi parentis honores consequi liceat*) [876] Likewise, Antonius knew well enough that 'he owes all to a name,' (*omnia nomini debes*) and Cicero agreed.[877] With his father's veterans at his back, Octavian suddenly gained a distinct advantage in pursuing his claims to a political career. All that Octavian achieved in his early public life was achieved with the help of soldiers, who increasingly became a powerful force in the politics of this era. They had made Octavian consul in 43 with the famous phrase, 'This [sword] will make him consul, if you will not.' (*Hic faciet, si vos non feceritis*.)[878] However, they also wanted revenge on all their old enemies. Therefore,

[872] Such as *RRC* 511/4.
[873] Gurval 1998: 146.
[874] An interesting combination of pietas toward Caesar and perhaps some anti-Octavianic propaganda. Suet. *Aug.* 15; Dio 48.14.4.
[875] Zanker 1990: 34.
[876] Cic. *Ad Att.* 16.15.3.
[877] Cic. *Phil*. 13.11.24.
[878] Suet. *Aug.* 26.1.

Octavian's policy was to a certain extent driven by a need to appease the veterans, some of whom will have fought against the sons of Pompeius in Hispania. Sextus was aware that these veterans were not willing to have anything to do with a Pompeian. This seems to have been common knowledge, hence during the siege of Mutina Sextus told the negotiators he spoke to in Massilia that he would be willing to send troops to assist if it had not been for consideration of the veterans' opinion.[879]

The Proscriptions

However, the events that followed were to have a major influence on the memories of Sextus and added a new popularity beyond that of his father's memory. After seizing control, Octavian eventually formed the Triumvirate with Antonius and Lepidus, which divided the empire between them. Despite their claims to be restoring the *res publica*, their main goals were, however, to purge the opposition militarily and politically. After the *Lex Pedia* had been passed against the assassins of Caesar, which likely pleased his veterans, they then enacted proscriptions. These targeted the wealthy to pay the armies and those who were deemed to be enemies of the Triumvirate, and while many were killed some escaped from the bounty hunters. Using his naval power, Sextus was able to send ships along the coasts of Italia to rescue the proscribed who had managed to escape. To aid the refugees, he also spread the message that twice the bounty which had been placed on the head of the victim would be offered if they were saved.[880] The coinage that Sextus used to pay the rewards may also introduced his propaganda to the mainland if it was already know. While Sextus benefitted from the image of a saviour, he was likely driven by the pragmatic need to bolster the numbers of wealthy and connected Romans in his camp. Sextus apparently respected the rank of those who made their way to him; those of senatorial rank were assigned offices that

[879] Cic. *Phil. 13.6.*
[880] App. *B.C.* 4.36; Dio 47.12.1-3; Welch 2012: 179.

would be commensurate with those they could have been awarded on the mainland, which likely securing himself some further positive recollections from their collective memories.[881]

Such was Sextus' strength on the seas around western Italia and his control of the shipping lanes that Octavian despatched a force under his admiral Quintus Salvidienus Rufus to attempt to dislodge him, but this ended in failure.[882] The destruction of part of Salvidienus' fleet near the location of the mythical Scylla in the straits of Messana may have prompted the minting of Sextus' coin that featured the image of Scylla on its reverse.[883]

Figure 11: RRC 511/4a. The obverse shows the pharos of Messana topped with a statue of Neptune with a foot on a prow and the words Mag[nus] Pius Imp[erator] Iter. Reverse shows the sea monster Scylla wielding an apulstre as a weapon with Sextus' 'official' title as Prae[fectus] Clas[sis] et Orae Marit[imae] ex S.C.. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

The location tied in with the pre-existing nautical theme of the Sextus' propaganda and must have reinforced the assertion that Sextus was being aided by the supernatural forces of the deep. It is notable that the later historians from whom the information on Sextus' campaign against Octavian comes seem to have struggled with the chronology of the key events. This may suggest, as with aspects of Pompeius' life, that the exact details may have started to fade from memory and the few memorable events that had remained were just assigned to a likely place in the narrative. Further to this, Welch has contended that the

[881] App. *B.C.*4.36, 39; Welch 2012: 215-216. Almost as a reversal of his father's problem, where the relatives and friends of his victims maintain a collective memory of his violent youth.
[882] App. *B.C.* 4.85.
[883] *RRC* 511/4a-d. The obverse also had the image of a statue of Neptune on top of the Pharos of Messana. Wright 2020: 115-6 notes the possible appeal of this image to the population in southern Italia. Alternatively, this coin may have been minted to commemorate a similar victory after Octavian's attempted invasion later.

impact of Sextus' victories has been obscured in the history by a focus instead on the perceived arrogance of the celebrations by Sextus, who may at this point have claimed to have been the son of Neptune, which marks the final divine amalgamation of the memory of his father's naval superiority that had been present in a minor form on the coinage from Hispania, and now became a key aspect of his personal image.[884]

Figure 12: RRC 483/2. A coin minted by Sextus' ally Q. Nasidius after the Ides. Obverse is the head of Pompeius with a trident and the title Neptuni. Reverse shows a trireme sailing and the name of the minter. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

Sextus' nautical association together with the rescue of many of the proscribed from a terrible fate was to provide him with a strong memory in the contemporary collective consciousness that affected those of all political inclinations and seems to have been pertinent enough to survive, becoming one the key cultural memories of Sextus.[885]

What also helped boost Sextus' standing in the collective memory of the people of Rome was the heavy-handed rule of the Triumvirs and their continuous need for money and land for their discharged veterans, which made them deeply unpopular in Italia.[886] The victory at Philippi only exacerbated problems as Octavian was left with the task of settling the veterans of the combined armies of Antonius and himself in his sphere of control, namely Italia.[887] The seizure of large tracts of land from towns created a dangerous group of

[884] Zanker 1990: 39; Lange 2009: 39 notes the competition to have divine links at this time.
[885] Welch 2012: 179.
[886] Gabba 1971: 153.
[887] App. *B.C.* 5.3.

dispossessed and disgruntled people in Italia.[888] The preference that the Triumvirs showed toward their soldiers, who had become now become an indispensable force to be reckoned with in this period, meant they were allowed great license and, coupled with the poor harvests due to the veterans' inexperience, all added to the numbers who took refuge on Sicily and fed the popularity of Sextus. [889] The need for the Triumvirs' to distance themselves and the soldier's role in the famine may have been why the propaganda of the time tends to blame the famine entirely on Sextus actions.

At the same time, Antonius' wife Fulvia and his brother Lucius took advantage of the dissatisfied groups and raised a rebellion against Octavian.[890] The uprising took a year to finally crush, with the surrender of the town of Perusia. Many of the survivors made their way to Sextus as had the remnants of Brutus and Cassius' armies in the aftermath of Philippi.[891] Included in their number was Tiberius Claudius Nero, his wife Livia and their baby, the future emperor Tiberius.[892] Despite the stance that he later took as emperor towards the memory of Sextus, the gifts given to the him by Sextus' sister Pompeia later became part of a public display at the town of Baiae where they had landed.[893] Another important refugee was Antonius' mother Julia, whom Sextus promptly sent to her son, gaining his gratitude too.[894]

Although Sextus continued to use the image of his father to advertise *pietas* as his main characteristic, after the rescue of the proscribed and the defeat of the fleets sent against him, Sextus began to rely less on this image in his coinage. His aid to those in fleeing the

[888] App *BC*. 5.12; Gabba 1971: 139-42. Included in the dispossessed were some of the later authors of the Augustan period, such as Horace and Livy.
[889] App *B.C*. 5.18; Gabba 1971: 141-5; Welch 2012: 206. On veterans being poor farmers see Huzar 1978: 130.
[890] App. *B.C*. 5.43. Possibly the closest to a 'republican cause' as is possible to find.
[891] Vell. Pat. 2.72.5; Gabba 1971: 151.
[892] Vell. Pat. 2.77.2; Dio 48.15.3; Finley 1979: 150.
[893] Suet. *Tib*. 6.3; Welch 2012: 232.
[894] App. *B.C*. 5.52; Dio 48.15.2; Huzar 1978: 134-36; Osgood 2006: 189.

Triumvirs made him popular in his own right, and it appears that he was aware of this, shifting the visual messages he was transmitting as a result.[895] As a part of this, Sextus' later issues instead featured his own face on the reverse while other issues only featured images related to his own mastery of the sea, such as Scylla, on both sides.[896]

Figure 13: RRC 511/2b. Neptune surrounded by Mag[nus] Pius Imp[erator] Iter on the obverse and a naval trophy with Praef[ectus] Clas[sis] et Orae Marit[imae] ex S.C. on the reverse. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

The Road to War and Memory

After the defeat of Lucius and the death of Antonius' governor in Gaul, Octavian took over the Gallic legions and became the sole power in the west.[897] Antonius therefore sailed for Italia to conduct a new conference on spheres of influence for the Triumvirs. After landing at Brundisium he found a hostile reception and his entry to the city barred. In the face of what appeared to be open hostility, Antonius requested Sextus to make raids on Italia, which he duly did, seizing Sardinia from Octavian's governor and attacking settlements along the Italian coast.[898] Eventually, the two parties made peace and Antonius was asked to stop Sextus. Despite the help he had given to Antonius, as part of the new agreement between the two, Octavian would focus on destroying Sextus unless he made a treaty.[899]

[895] Gowing 1992: 203.
[896] *RRC* 511/4a, 2b.
[897] Huzar 1978: 135.
[898] App. *B.C.* 5.56-9, 62; Huzar 1978: 140; Osgood 2006: 187.
[899] App. *B.C.* 5.65; Lange 2016: 114.

Unable to stop Sextus militarily, and realising he was being hemmed in by various supporters of Antonius, in 40 BC, Octavian attempted to draw Sextus away from Antonius who had come to some agreement in the aftermath of his brother's defeat (according to Gabba) or as a means to break his father-in-law Libo away (according to Welch), by marrying Scribonia who was Libo's sister.[900] This now meant that Sextus and Octavian were related, like Pompeius and Caesar had been, and which some contemporary historians had argued had kept them from open hostility.

At some point during this time, Sextus repulsed an attempt by Octavian to retake Sardinia and took Corsica.[901] With the western seas off Italia now almost totally under the control of Sextus' ships, few traders were willing to venture out of harbour.[902] This exacerbated the grain shortages that were already occurring further and soon afterwards negotiations began to bring the different parties to agreement. Sextus in all probability emulated his father's own strategy from the civil war and used the knowledge and sailors acquired by his father's campaigns to exploit the main weakness of Italia and Rome.[903] Thus Sextus was able to create a highly effective blockade of Italia, particularly with the lack of ships available to the Triumvirs due to their seizure by Sextus in 43 BC.[904]

Without the vital shipments of grain, the city, with its population approaching one million people, was very susceptible to starvation. Sextus' father had known this and planned to use that to his advantage during the war, as Cicero had complained. The plebs however, blamed the Triumvirs rather than Sextus for the lack of food in the city.[905] They saw no

[900] App. *B.C.* 53-4; Dio 48.16.2-3; Gabba 1971: 152; Osgood 2006: 205 Welch 2012: 236. The account of Appian does seem to agree more with the assessment made by Gabba, although Libo was a useful ally in his own right.
[901] App. *B.C.* 5.78; Welch 2012: 263.
[902] App. *B.C.* 5.67.
[903] Powell, 2002a: xii.
[904] Welch 2012: 169.
[905] Gabba 1971: 153.

justifiable reason why their leaders could not come to terms with Sextus and end the blockade. Octavian however, tried to ignore popular sentiment and attempted to use this as an excuse to campaign against Sextus, which only made matters worse.[906] In the end the Triumvirs would later be forced to the negotiating table to save themselves from the angry mobs, who were further incensed by an infamous banquet that Octavian held at the height of the crisis.[907]

Matters reached a critical point when, during the *pompa* at the start of games in the circus, a statue of Neptune was hailed by the crowd as Sextus – demonstrating how much the populace identified with his own propaganda – Octavian, therefore, had it removed from the parade, which, rather than ending the situation, caused rioting.[908] Eventually, disturbances broke out across the city and a number of key figures – including Sextus' mother Mucia who still resided in the city – were targeted by the mob who demanded negotiations.[909] Octavian was assailed in the forum and had to be rescued by Antonius, who the plebs did not initially attack as he was believed to be in favour of a treaty with Sextus.[910] As a result of the disturbances, a message was sent via Libo to Sextus to start negotiations.[911] Sextus' admiral Menodorus was opposed to making peace with the Triumvirs, arguing instead that starvation would do their work for them. He also cast doubt on the loyalty of Murcus, an advisor to Sextus, who was subsequently executed as was Bithynicus, the previous governor. Octavian's propaganda evidently emphasised to damaged Sextus' popular image by making him look

[906] Welch 2012: 241.
[907] Vell. Pat. 2.77.1; Suet. *Aug.* 16.1; Zanker 1990: 49; Gurval 1998: 94-96.
[908] Lange 2009: 30 and the toppling of statues of Octavian and Antonius. Dio 48.31.5; Suet. *Aug.*16; Zanker 1990: 40; Gurval 1998: 92; Welch 2012: 241.
[909] Welch 2012: 240.
[910] App. *B.C.* 5.68.
[911] App. *B.C.* 5.69.

cruel and also weak for listening to freedmen as Pompeius was remembered by the Caesarians.[912]

In the end Sextus' strategy worked and Triumvirs were forced to come to terms, although they did not give into everything Sextus probably demanded, they made a number of concessions. In 39 BC Sextus, Octavian, and Antonius met at Misenum, a seaside town in southern Italia. Here they agreed to allow the proscribed to return and restore part of their property. Aside from the return of the proscribed, Sextus made some attempts to regain the *Domus Rostrata*.[913] The household held a special place as it gave Sextus a link with his father that played on both figures' nautical prowess since the *domus* was a physical monument to the supremacy of the Pompeians on the sea. Both Sextus and his elder brother's propaganda made a point of alluding to Pompeian success on the waves.[914] As noted above, once Sextus was alone he minted coins replete with images related to the sea and to naval victory, as well as the sea monster Scylla who resided in the straits of Messina.[915] The return of the property would also have been a return to legitimacy for Sextus, as to legally hold property had a defining position for Roman citizenship and participation in the political arena.

Sextus was to also be granted a consulship in absentia in 33 BC and made augur (like his father had been), as well as the re-legitimisation of his current command plus the addition of the Peloponnese to his territory.[916] In a further attempt to bond him to Octavian, his infant

[912] Vell. Pat. 2.77.2; App. *B.C.* 5.70-1; Gabba 1971: 155 notes the hypocrisy from the mass-murdering Triumvir; Welch 2012: 239. See also Fündling 2003.
[913] Cic. *Ad Att.* 16.4.2, the senate voted money to Sextus for the purpose of buying it back, but this does not seem to have occurred. Cic.*Phil.*13.10 the comment at the banquet after the treaty of Misenum could be interpreted as a veiled attempt to point out that Antonius had still not return the house. Dio 48.38. Powell 2002b: 106, notes that the house was 'politically important.' See also Flower 2006: 50.
[914] Welch 2002: 19; *RRC* 469/1a and 470/1a.
[915] *RRC* 511/2-4.
[916] Lange 2016: 118.

daughter was also engaged to a young nephew.[917] In return Sextus was to remove his garrisons from the mainland and do nothing to hinder shipping.[918]

However, he neither received his family property back – Antonius never returned the property, even with the offer of payment for it – nor does he seem to have been granted a reason to return to Rome.[919] The Triumvirs must have been aware that once in the city the great popular sentiment for Sextus and his father's memory would likely have acted as a shield to openly trying to harm him, and as one of the most popular figures of the time, Sextus would have held considerable sway over the plebs through his father's patronage and from the nobles he had rescued. With such a large support base the Triumvirs would risk being rivalled by Sextus so it was best, therefore, to keep him away from his supporters.

In this light the intention behind granting Sextus continued command of his fleet and the islands as received from the treaty of Misenum seems clear. As a result, Sextus never returned to the capital, so it can only be speculated, but his appointment as consul designate for the year 33 BC would imply that he had an interest in becoming involved in the politics of city, indeed the plebs apparently feared that he would just become another member of Triumvirate.[920]

At the conclusion of the treaty, Menodorus appears in Appian's account again urging Sextus to seize the two Triumvirs while they were on his ship, Sextus however declines to use this underhand tactic.[921] In Dio's account of the post-Misenum celebrations he has Sextus make a joke that his ship is now his home, playing on the district in Rome where his father's house was, known as *Carinae* – the keels.[922] Even this played into Octavian's propaganda as

[917] Huzar 1978: 141.
[918] Vell. Pat. 2.77.2; Gabba 1971: 156.
[919] App. *B.C.* 5.71-2.
[920] App. *B.C.* 5.77.
[921] App. *B.C.* 5.73.
[922] Dio 48.38.2.

being homeless and dwelling on a ship could be used quite effectively in the creation of the pirate image of Sextus. Bandits and pirates are not settled people, but nomadic, scouring the roads and sea-lanes looking for their targets and prowling wherever the quarry resides. Sextus was homeless because of the circumstances, but it is easy to see how that fact could be ignored in favour of the piracy propaganda.

Despite this, the plebs were pleased with the result and saw the treaty as ending hostilities, perhaps even the civil war.[923] The grain ships were now free to travel to the city without fear of capture and the son of a popular father was restored to the Roman people.[924] However, the treaty did not last. Octavian's marriage to Scribonia broke down and he divorced her to marry the newly returned Livia.[925] Octavian also caused a rupture when he accepted Menodorus, one of Sextus' leading admirals when he defected to him taking Sardinia, Corsica and thousands of soldiers.[926] In a sign of things to come, Octavian also ordered the construction of new warships.[927] Antonius likewise did not keep his side of the terms either, refusing to allow Sextus command over the Peloponnese until the money they owed was paid.[928] This did nothing to improve matters and soon open hostilities broke out. Sextus probably attacked one of the Italian ports as a result of his poor treatment, much as Octavian may have wished, as he later meddled with the chronology of events to claim Sextus had attacked first.[929]

Despite this, the attempt by Octavian to show Sextus as the aggressor who had broken the treaty does not seem to have been successful.[930] Octavian was forced to engage in a

[923] App. *B.C.* 5.74.
[924] For the lingering support of Pompeius see Beacham 2012: 153.
[925] Finley 1979: 149.
[926] App. *B.C.* 5.78; Gabba 1971: 156.
[927] App. *B.C.* 5.80.
[928] App. *B.C.* 5.77.
[929] Gabba 1956: 202-203; Gowing 1992: 192 with note 30 on the various traditions, especially with regards to Antonius' role
[930] Welch 2012: 262.

campaign of propaganda to justify his unpopular war; he claimed that Sextus had encouraged 'piracy' and that the captured 'pirates', along with Menodorus, and Antonius' refusal to cede the Peloponnese provided the motive for his bellicosity.[931] The mention of captured sailors as pirates at this point would suggest that this may be the genesis of Octavian's propaganda, the point when Sextus' label as a pirate became a standard term of reference in Octavian's circle.

Coinage part two

The earlier defeats and the uprising of Lucius and Fulvia seems to have changed the strategy of Octavian who now became set on removing rivals who were in his sphere of influence and combating their influence on the populace. Sextus had been minting coins bearing the image of his father and using the cognomen *Pius* since his days in Hispania and in 41 coinage began to appear that depicted Marcus Antonius with the *pietas* on them.[932] A couple of years after the rebellion headed by Lucius was crushed and Octavian had been forced to the negotiating table by the civil unrest towards the treatment of Sextus, Octavian began to mint coinage that named him *Divus Filius*, despite the deification of Caesar almost six years prior.[933] This emphasis on revenge for Caesar may have been in preparation for the eventual clash with Sextus and as a reaction to the use of *pietas* by his two main enemies to justify their struggles.

[931] App. *B.C.* 5.80. Although the blame placed on Antonius may have been added to the narrative later when their own alliance broke down.
[932] Gabba 1971: 149.
[933] Koortbojian 2013: 21.

Figure 14: RRC 516/2. Coin of M. Antonius marking his membership of the triumvirate, augurate and command (III V[iri]. R[ei]. P[ublicae]. C[onstituendae]. Aug[ur] Imp[erator] with the figure is the goddess Pietas on the reverse with Pietas Co[n]s[ul] underneath. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

It could be argued that the coinage of this era was well known across the different sides of the war, and was a key battleground for propaganda with each side reacting to the output of images by the other. Just as Octavian was probably influenced to mint his own advertisements to *pietas* by the use of similar titles on Sextus', Sextus may have been influenced by the coin of Marcus Antonius after the issue that showed a bearded figure in mourning for Caesar.[934]

Figure 15: RRC 480/22. Coin of M. Antonius showing a bearded face in mourning for Caesar on the obverse. Reverse shows a desultor on horseback and the name of the minter, P. Sepullius Macer. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

Figure 16: RRC 490/1. Coin of Octavian shown bearded on the obverse with C[aius] Caesar Imp[erator]. Reverse shows equestrian statue of Octavian with hand raised and the authority of the senate with S.C. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

[934] *RRC* 480/22 (44 BC). Later followed by Octavian *RRC* 490/1-4

Figure 17: RRC 490/2. Coin of Octavian showing his portrait on the obverse with his name and offices: C[aius] Caesar Co[n]s[ular] Pont[ifex] Aug[ur] and Caesar's with the same: C[aius] Caesar Dict[ator] Perp[etuo] Pont[ifex] Max[imus] on the reverse. Image from the collection of the British Museum.

In the same vein, Sextus probably saw the coinage of Brutus which influenced his own design with a wreath around his head. Welch has argued that Sextus' actions were part of a coordinated strategy with Brutus and Cassius *et al*. and that his coinage was also part of this. [935]

This is not completely convincing. Sextus' iconography and his strategy both suggest that he was predominately following his own objectives. The quoted text of Dio does not, as Welch asserts, demonstrate an agreement between the assassins, instead it merely notes that Pompeius naval blockade was useful for the campaign of the navy of Brutus and Cassius.[936]

The coinage of Sextus from that time might show, on one obverse at least, a similar image to the coins of Brutus – that of a head surrounded by the oakleaf crown of the saviour of a citizen's life – but the reasons were surely different.[937] Brutus, by using the head of his ancestor who expelled Tarquinius, also surrounded by the oak crown, would possibly imply that it is for the saving of the *res publica*. In Sextus' coinage it cannot be certain that the crown is not instead a reference to the actual preservation of the lives of citizens through his rescue of the proscribed.[938]

[935] Welch 2012: 166-67.
[936] Welch 2012: 166-67.
[937] Kopij 2011: 214.
[938] Osgood 2006: 204.

Figure 18: RRC 511/1. Coin showing the head of Sextus surrounded by an oak wreath with Mag[nus] Pius Imp[erator] Iter on the obverse and the heads of his father and brother with the tools of the augurate surrounded by the title of Sextus' command as the Praef[ectus] Clas[sis] et Orae Marit[imae] ex S.C. on the reverse. Image from the collection of the American Numismatic Society.

Nothing has survived that explicitly demonstrates any links between Sextus and the Liberators. Sextus was at war before, during and after the *Ides*, and his main request before and after Philippi was the return of his family property. His coinage only commemorates and celebrates persons and events that are expressly relevant to his own campaign (i.e. his father, brother and his dominance of the sea) rather than the *res publica* or the restoration of the functioning of the senate within government. Instead he seems to have acted largely alone.[939]

Sons of Famous Fathers

Another reason to want to eliminate Sextus was the competition that the fight between two sons avenging their famed fathers created. Sextus was already making good use of his pietas before Octavian and was well-known for it. Therefore, it would diminish the unique position Octavian probably wanted to occupy with his own claims. Octavian's strategy was simple: by naming Sextus as a pirate who was starving the city, Octavian was diametrically opposing Sextus to his father's legacy, as a general who had freed the seas from the pirate menace and fed the citizens of Rome. Sextus' choice of Sicily also made it much easier for Octavian to make accusations of piracy, especially given the history of the waters around Italia and the links to previous pirate activity and slave rebellions.[940] By naming Sextus an

[939] Lange 2016: 117.
[940] Lange 2009: 38.

existential threat to the city it also would forgo the need to have him declared a *hostis* and perhaps invoke the wrath of the populace for such a blatant attack on the son of a popular figure.[941]

The next confrontation with Sextus saw Octavian emphasis the memory of Caesar and his piety in his propaganda. However, the initial phase of Octavian's campaign was a failure, which some attributed to the displeasure of the gods, suggesting that it was because Octavian was the oath-breaker.[942] An attempt to bring together the two halves of his fleet for an attack on Sicilia was disrupted by Sextus' navy. At Cumae Sextus' forces first defeated Calvisius and then turned their attention to Octavian, ambushing him in the straits of Messina near Scyllaeum – the legendary home of the sea monster Scylla.[943] Octavian's fleet was badly damaged both in the battle and in a subsequent storm.[944] Octavian was now in a difficult position as he needed to rebuild his force but the popular opinion in Rome was against him, the famine was still in effect, which the plebs blamed on Octavian and the failure of the earlier treaty.[945] Menodorus abandoned Octavian and returned to Sextus supposedly because he had not been rewarded enough and also threatened by Antonius, who technically owned him as Pompeius' property.[946] Trying to improve his chances, Octavian replaced Calvisius with Agrippa, who had just returned from a successful campaign in Gaul, and negotiated with Antonius to pledge his support to Octavian, saving the campaign.[947]

Utilising the memory of his adoptive father's defeat of Pompeius while alive, and perhaps relaying on his deification to provide supernatural help to defeat another Pompei,

[941] Cornwell 2018: 56-7.
[942] Gabba 1971: 156.
[943] App. *B.C.* 5.81-6.
[944] App. *B.C.* 5.89. As noted earlier with the different versions of Sextus memories, it also may be this victory that Sextus celebrated with his coin that featured the image of Scylla destroying ships. See Zanker 1990: 40, who postulates that this image appeared on coins earlier.
[945] App. *B.C.* 5.92. Gurval 1998: 97.
[946] App. *B.C.* 5.96.
[947] App. *B.C.* 5.93, 96.

Octavian next prepared to attack Sicily in July, the month named after Caesar, which he thought might bring better fortune.[948] Instead a storm wrecked the fleet again and he was forced to postpone his plans until he could repair his ships.[949] He should have waited until the next year, but the force of the popular unrest made him proceed. The situation in the capital was dire enough for Maecenas to be sent to quell the crowds, who were still supportive of Sextus as the son of Pompeius.[950] It may be this victory over Octavian that was the basis of the memory, mentioned earlier, of Sextus claiming to be the son of Neptune and dressing in sea-blue instead of the purple of a Roman commander and sacrificing both horses and men in the straits of Messina, as Welch argues.[951]

When the fleet was repaired and reinforced, Octavian made another attack which also turned into a disaster for him. Although Agrippa was successful in his naval battle near Mylae and Sextus' ships had to retreat, Octavian was almost captured after landing at Tauromenum and had to flee leaving his army trapped on the shore in Sicily.[952] Such was the reverse suffered by Octavian, that Maecenas had to be dispatched to Rome to deal with disturbances again.[953] On Octavian's side, the success of Sextus was not attributed to his own skill but, like Pompeius at Dyracchium, was dismissed as being due to the assistance of the sea and fortune.[954] After abandoning his men and returning to the mainland Octavian regrouped and was able to make a landing in an area that Agrippa had secured.[955] Sextus requested that the matter be settled on the sea (perhaps to try and take advantage of his self-

[948] App. *B.C.* 5.97
[949] Vell. Pat. 2.79.3; App. *B.C.* 5.98-9.
[950] App. *B.C.* 5.99.
[951] App. *B.C.* 5.100. The sacrifice is only recorded in Dio 48.48.5-6; Futrell 1997: 195-6; Lange 2009: 42. The use of human sacrifice as a means to blacken the reputation of a person seems to have been popular at this time, see for instance the supposed sacrifice of prisoners by Octavian after the fall of Perusia, the accord of which is very much in favour of Antonius.
[952] Vell. Pat. 2.79.4; App. *B.C.* 5.111.
[953] App. *B.C.* 5.112.
[954] Brenk 1988: 69.
[955] App. *B.C.* 5.116.

proclaimed relation to Neptune) but the subsequent battle of Naulochus saw Agrippa as the victor again.[956] After this defeat, and with the island covered with the armies of his enemies, Sextus disguised himself and withdrew to the East where he was eventually executed by Antonius' lieutenants.[957]

In the aftermath Gabba notes 'Octavian's position in Italy changed. He appeared to the very peoples, who had so long been hostile to him, as a savior. The Senate, having also become obsequious because it was filled with recent partisans of the Triumvirs[….] previously senators and knights, who had shared the cause of Sextus Pompeius, had been "punished."'[958] Octavian maintained the guise of having defeated a pirate by being celebrated with an *ovatio* for his victory over Sextus as was fitting for someone who had defeated slaves.[959] The senate also voted to award Octavian an arch but he only accepted a column in the forum covered in captured ship's rams (reminiscent of the *Columna Rostrata* of C. Duilii from the first Punic War, and Pompeius' *Domus Rostrata* after the pirate campaign), topped with a golden statue of himself and the wording that he had pacified the sea.[960] Agrippa was awarded the *corona navalis* for his victories at sea and allowed to display a blue flag to memorialize his achievement.[961] The day of the victory was made into a festival of commemoration to be held every year, while coins were struck that marked the event.[962] Octavian claimed that the civil war was now over.[963] He also vowed the temple of Apollo that was eventually built on the palatine in 31 BC after his victory at Actium.[964]

[956] App. *B.C.* 5.118, 120; Osgood 2006: 298; Marin 2009: 33.
[957] Vell. Pat. 2.79.5; App. *B.C.* 5.122, 133, 144.
[958] Gabba 1971: 159.
[959] Plin. *NH.* 34.20; Lange 2009: 34, 2016: 45-6, 121; Finley 1979: 150; Sacks 1990: 194; Gurval 1998: 146.
[960] Zanker 1990: 41, 54; Gurval 1998: 132; Lange 2009: 35, 2016 119; Osgood 2006: 300.
[961] Zanker 1990: 39; Lange 2009: 33, 2016: 47.
[962] Gurval 1998: 57-63, 120. Some, such as those struck at Lugdunum, would still be minted decades after the event. See Lange 2009: 34.
[963] Gabba 1971: 159; Gurval 1998: 115; Lange 2009: 29, 35.
[964] Zanker 1990: 50; Bowditch 2009: 410-11; Galinsky 1996: 213; Gurval 1998: 113; Lange 2009: 40.

The numerous construction projects in the city and the addition of festivals and calendar events show how much value Octavian placed on the memory of Sextus' defeat. At this stage defeating Sextus was probably the largest threat that Octavian had faced and his success gave his leadership an air of legitimacy by divine approval. Once Actium had occurred some of the sites of memory were remodelled to celebrate that victory instead. The decoration of the temple of Apollo seems to imply the struggle against Antonius instead and Welch notes other objects that had their memories later edited to show success over Antonius in the post-Actium world.[965]

Re-evaluating Sextus' Memory

Years later on the eve of Actium, Octavian accused Antonius of the illegal killing of Sextus.[966] The mixed stories of Sextus' last days and the role of Antonius conceivably show how much the memory of Sextus' death was manipulated by different sides as he may have remained a popular figure and therefore had propaganda value. Octavian was quick to manipulate the memory of recent events as noted by Gabba, 'by anticipating the near end of the Triumvirate, he initiated the clever policy which eventually brought him to denying his responsibilities in the tragic period of the Triumvirate and to presenting himself as a champion of Roman and Italic traditions in the approaching and foreseeable war against Antony. The general weariness and a basic need for assurance and legality favoured his new policy, and thus there came into being the myth of the *Pax Augusta* and of the saviour of the world.'[967] However the propaganda campaign by Octavian seems to have continued this separation of father and son as before, even after Sextus' defeat.[968]

[965] Welch 2012: 298.
[966] Valentini 2009: 62; Osgood 2006: 302.
[967] Gabba 1971: 159-60; Lobur 2019: 88.
[968] Lange 2009: 37.

Aside from the speeches of Cicero, many contemporary works written during the time by those who took part have not survived to the present day. From the backgrounds of several of the authors, most of these would probably been negative in their recollections, as almost all of the known versions of Sextus' life were written by those who fought against him. Other than the author of the *Bellum Hispaniensis*, it is known that Pollio wrote his own account of the civil wars, which probably extended from 60 BC covering his term as Caesar's governor in Hispania in the 40s.[969] In the aftermath of the battle of Munda, Sextus' force grew bold enough to raid some of the cities in Hispania Citerior, and Pollio was caught by surprise during one such attack and had to flee in disguise.[970] Therefore, it seems unlikely that Pollio's account of this event would have been totally honest, given the embarrassment he suffered. In fact two differing accounts survive of the event. One where Pollio beats back Sextus' force and the one where he flees, suggesting conflicting accounts existed. Pollio had little reason to be positive about this, and although he was critical of the inaccuracy of Caesar's battle reports he was none the less on his side during the civil war and remained fairly loyal. After Caesar's assassination, he sided with Antonius.[971] Although Antonius was at various times amiable to Sextus – being behind the order to Lepidus to begin negotiations with Sextus, which Cicero chooses not to mention – he always eventually came down on the side of the other Triumvirs, while his role in Sextus' eventual death would likely have precluded allowing any positive memories to circulate amongst his entourage. [972]

The memory of the Triumviral period and that of Pompeius seems to have shifted in the later years of Octavian's reign. Initially Octavian seems to have concentrated on the

[969] *FRHist* i. 2013 430; Turner 2019: 36.
[970] *FRHist* i. 2013 431 this account is missing from the narratives of Velleius 2.73.2 Appian 4.84.1 but is mentioned in Dio 45.10.5.
[971] Broughton 1952: 372-3, 377-8.
[972] Hadas 1930: 159, has it at the end of 35 B.C. Welch 2012: 283, 291 agrees with the year. Titius was tarnished for life by his part in Sextus' death. see Vell. Pat. 2.79.6. On Lepidus' negotiations see App. *B.C.* 4.84; Dio 45.10.6, 48.17.1; Gabba 1971: 140, 154.

memory of Caesar as that was the most pressing and politically useful to him and did not become too involved with the memory of Pompeius. Once it was decided that a serious campaign was needed to remove Sextus in the early 30s, Octavian's propaganda utilised the popular appeal that the memory of Pompeius had, and therefore tried to demonstrate that Sextus was an impious son by acting in the opposite manner. The past might have been a different territory, but the memories of the Triumvirate was another matter. When Augustus came to write up his life's achievements the war with Sextus was glossed over without mentioning his name with the lines '*Mare pacavi a praedonibus.'* – 'I freed the sea from the pirates'.[973] In the end Sextus became the pirate in the *Res Gestae*, and was engraved as such for posterity on the bronze pillars that were placed before Augustus' mausoleum and on the copies throughout the empire.[974] Although this might appear to be counter-intuitive given the Roman dislike for lauding over the killing of fellow citizens, for Augustus it was apparently deemed necessary.[975] To erase these events would take away from his military prestige, gained through the great battles that were won on his behalf. The second problem was that Augustus claimed to have 'protected the liberty' (*libertatem vindicavi*.) of the *res publica*.[976] To do that the liberty of the *res publica* needed to have been under attack; and so, this meant that for Augustus' claims to make sense he had to compromise by keeping these 'enemies' in the narrative, but they did not have to be named.[977] Even though the original bronze did not survive, the notion that Sextus was a pirate was preserved in copies of the *Res Gestae* and continued by poets and historians.

[973] *RG*.25.1; Welch 2012: 262.
[974] Sue. *Aug*. 104; Geiger 2008: 68.
[975] Welch 2002: 18. Although where possible the wars were against suitable foes, the war was Sextus was tied to the return of slaves, making it a servile war, while Antonius' memory was subsumed by Cleopatra to make a foreign war.
[976] *RG* 1.2.
[977] Gurval 1998: 146; Lange 2019: 193-4 with note 31.

Another prominent source for this time was Augustus' own autobiography. The original is lost but it must have made an impact on historians writing in later ages. Although no fragments survive on the war against Sextus, the narrative that has survived covers the history pre and post Sicily.[978] It would, therefore, seem likely that Augustus gave a narrative of the war in Sicily and his campaign against Sextus.[979] If the text of the *Res Gestae* reveals anything about the mindset of its author, it can almost certainly be argued that Augustus' memoirs contained no positive recollections of Sextus.

There is little to be said of the fragments that remain of the other main accounts. including one written by Agrippa, who brought Sextus' time on Sicily to an end. It is likely that Agrippa would have included his battles against Sextus, as he was granted several honours by Octavian.[980] The probability of Agrippa's memoirs being a source of any of the accounts of later historians is uncertain, although the one fragment of any certainty from Agrippa comes from the war against Sextus.[981] The details about the training of the fleet and the construction of Portus Julius may also owe their origins to the work of Agrippa, but this is unknown.[982]

The Impact of the Hostile Memories of Sextus

The autobiography of Augustus probably influenced the work of the Syrian Greek Nicolaus of Damascus who wrote a universal history of 144 books in length and a biography of Augustus. The universal history covered events from the early eastern empires to the year 7- 4 BC.[983] From the fragments that have survived, these books covered the events of the Roman world as well. Since book 116 covers the Gallic War, the civil war may have been in

[978] *FRHist* i. 2013 456-7.
[979] Lange 2019: 194.
[980] Vell. Pat. 2.81.3; Plin. *NH*. 16.7-8; App. *B.C*. 5.130; Dio 49.1.4.
[981] *FRHist* i. 2013 452-3; Serv. *Georg*. 2.162.
[982] Vell. Pat. 2.79.1-2; Suet. *Aug.* 16.1; Paget 1969: 29-30.
[983] Toher 1989: 162.

117 or 118 at least, although no fragments from the years covering the civil war of 49-45 appear to have survived.[984] The biography was likely written between 12 BC and 10 AD.[985] It is hagiographic in nature and covers the earlier years of Octavian's life, including his travels to Hispania to be with Caesar during the campaign against Pompeius' sons. A fragment of this narrative has survived and interestingly the enemy is described only as the eldest son of Pompeius i.e. Gnaeus.[986] The other leading figures Sextus and Labienus are conspicuous by their absence, especially Labienus. As the biography was written after the death of Sextus, this may have been due to the apparent desire by the princeps of not naming some of his recent enemies, or perhaps because at that point Sextus played such a small part, as the author of the *Bellum Hispaniensis* seems to have decided. Gnaeus' career was short and himself disliked by many, nor had Octavian actively fought against him, therefore, he was not perhaps seen as a threat, as the anonymity seems to only have extended to those who had actually opposed Octavian during his career. The biography's original length would have taken the narrative down to at least 20 BC, which would have easily encompassed the war against Sextus in Sicily.[987] But while nothing of this narrative has survived it seems clear from the general tone of the earlier works and the personal relationship that Nicolaus had with Augustus that this would have likely taken the emperor's viewpoint.

Most of the accounts that were written by members of the imperial family, however, do not seem to have fared as well, of these there were the works of Timagenes. An Alexandrian and a fairly staunch opponent of Pompeius to judge from his clash with Theophanes. He was originally a friend of Augustus although he later fell out with princeps and was asked to leave the imperial household.[988] This he did and moved into the house of

[984] Toher 1989: 162.
[985] Toher 2016: 23.
[986] Nic. Dam. *Bios* Μάγνου Πομπηίου πρεσβύτατος παῖς, Jacoby 1923: *FGrH*. 127. 21.
[987] Toher 2016: 43.
[988] Sacks 1990: 136; Kaster 1997: 2.

Asinius Pollio. In revenge he burnt all his writings that dealt with the achievements of Augustus' reign.[989] Although the destruction of the Augustan parts means that they probably did not reach a wide audience it is possible that some of Timagenes' view became disseminated as it was common to send copies of works in progress to friends or give public recitals, as Livy had to Augustus.[990] The chapters that dealt with Caesar and the civil war do not seem to have been part of those that were destroyed, although what view they espoused is lost.

Lastly, there is the poem by Cornelius Severus, who wrote in the late Augustan period.[991] He wrote a poem called the *Bellum Siculum* on the war over Sicily, that seems to have also included the general events of the time.[992] Little is known about the work, as the main surviving fragment to come from it covers the death of Cicero.[993] Octavian also wrote his own poem on the topic, but that too has not survived.[994]

Horace: The Voice of Octavian's Rome

A contemporary observer for whom we do have a sizable body of work is Horace. Born in 65 BC to a successful freedman father in the provincial town of Venusia in southern Italia, Horace had been educated, perhaps unusually for a person of his background, in Rome.[995] After he had completed his studies there, he then followed in the footsteps of many of his upper-class compatriots and travelled to Greece to round off his education. While he was in Athens, Brutus began to assemble his army to face the successors to Caesar. Many of the young Roman men who were in the city were drawn to the army including Horace who

[989] Rogers 1959: 225-228; Clarke 1968: 578; Fear 2010: 429-30.
[990] Luce 2009: 22.
[991] Gabba 1971: 153; von Albrecht 1997: 827.
[992] von Albrecht 1997: 827; Fantham 1999: 22.
[993] von Albrecht 1997: 827.
[994] Suet. *Aug*. 85; Gabba 1971: 153.
[995] Armstrong 1970: 92; Griffin 1993: 1; Mayer 1995: 279-80; Lyne 1995: 1-2.

was appointed as one of tribunes for a legion.[996] In this role he was present at the battle of Philippi where he was one of the survivors that surrendered to the armies of Octavian and Antonius. Having been pardoned, his lands were confiscated, although Horace remained wealthy enough to purchase a position as one of the *scribae quaestoriae* of the treasury.[997] Around this time Horace began to write poetry and eventually, through fellow writers Vergil and Varius, came to the attention of Octavian's lieutenant and friend Maecenas, who brought Horace into his literary circle around the time of Octavian's renewed campaign against Sextus in 38 BC.[998]

Horace's themes are largely concerned with day-to-day life: characters one encounters in the street, traveling, writing, and matters of the heart. On occasion, however, Horace delves into the politics of the day with poems on morality and the emotions of the civil war that culminated with the *Carmen Saeculare* - written at the behest of Augustus. The *Epodes*, from where many of Horace's comments on the characters of the civil war derive, are some of his earliest works. Probably written in the decade of 42-31 BC, beginning around the time that Horace was first becoming noticed. In a small way they provide an eyewitness account to the events they describe.[999] However, it would seem that the *Epodes* were not published until much later when Horace assembled them into a collection for publication.[1000] This readjusted layout of the collection means that the *Epodes* are no longer necessarily in the order they were written – for instance, the 7th and 16th are considered among the earliest.[1001]

There are two *Epodes* which obliquely mention Sextus: the 4th and the 9th. The 4th *Epode* was presumably written around the time of the campaigns against Sextus in 38-36 BC.

[996] Armstrong 1970: 93 Griffin 1993: 1; Mayer 1995: 280; Lyne 1995: 3-5.
[997] Starr 1969: 59; Lyne 1995: 4-5.
[998] Starr 1969: 59; Mayer 1995: 281.
[999] Watson 2003: 1.
[1000] Their publication was post-Actium. See Kiernan 1999: 51 published around the time of the second book of *Satires* in 30-29 BC.
[1001] Salmon 1947: 8; Seager 1993: 23; Watson 2003: 2 has *Epodes* 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12 as the earliest.

The evidence for this is found in Horace's indignant complaint against an unnamed interloper who is no better in his eyes than the 'pirates and servile bands' (*laetrones atque servilem manum*) that they are currently fighting.[1002] The scholarly consensus is that the reference to 'pirates and servile bands' alludes to the forces of Sextus gathered on Sicily.[1003] This interpretation is furthered by the methods by which the 'pirates' and 'slaves' will be countered, by 'ships weighted down with heavy rams.'[1004] This conclusion has been based on the similar wording of the *Res Gestae* and the terms used to describe Sextus and his forces in the works of historians. The figure to whom Horace's ire is apparently directed is harder elucidate. There have been attempts to name the figure as Menodorus, the admiral of Sextus who swapped his allegiance between Octavian and Sextus repeatedly before finally settling with Octavian where he remained to enjoy the equestrian status granted to him upon his first defection.[1005] This is the rank that the nameless figure is assumed to hold much to Horace's implied chagrin.[1006] Scholars have, however, argued that the nameless figure instead is a classic parvenu, one deliberately chosen for his similarities to Horace's own early career as the freedman's son made tribune. Watson has noted the 'disturbing' closeness of the character and argued that 'Horace is being provocative, quite consciously undermining the validity of his statements and the authority of his persona.'[1007] Mouritsen has noted that being the son of a freedman did not come with the 'taint' of servility, and that some could rise to the ranks of equites or even senators.[1008] The discussion even uses Horace as an example, which seems to undermine the assumption that Horace was commenting on a figure who was similar to himself.[1009]

[1002] Hor. *Ep*. 4.19.
[1003] Watson 2003: 3; Mankin 1995: 108
[1004] Hor. *Ep*. 4.17-8; Mankin 1995: 108
[1005] Vell. Pat. 2.73.3.
[1006] Welch 2012: 285 note 14.
[1007] Watson 2003: 196-7; also Johnson 2012: 99.
[1008] Mouritsen 2011: 263.
[1009] Mouritsen 2011: 264-274.

The 4th *Epode* is our earliest evidence for the Roman enemies of Octavian being deliberately left nameless, perhaps to avoid reminding the public that they were fighting fellow Romans but maybe also that they were fighting the scion of one of Rome's great generals. Caesar, in his *Commentarii*, had shown no concerns with naming his Roman adversaries. Instead, he had taken great pains to portray them as enemies of the state and abusers of power. Octavian appears however, to have taken a different path. Even figures such as the assassins of Caesar who, it could be argued, Octavian had a right to pursue, where consigned to oblivion, if the *Res Gestae* is a reliable insight into the mind of the Princeps. Seager has pondered when this became the official line, assuming that at some unknown point all Octavian's enemies had still been named. That point may never have existed if the inscription on the column set up to mark Octavian's victory over Sextus recorded by Appian is correct.[1010] The inscription says only that the seas had finally been cleared and mentioned no names at all. Evidently Octavian's choice of anonymity began quite early, becoming what Assmann has described earlier as active forgetting.[1011]

The same situation can be clearly seen when the final clash between Antonius and Octavian occurred later that decade. Writers such as Vergil and Horace make the effort to disguise Octavian's Roman enemy by focusing instead on Cleopatra. This turns what is really the last move in Octavian's consolidation of power into a war between the Roman and the foreigner 'other', who sought to destroy the Roman way of life with unnatural female rule and a government of eunuchs.[1012]

Horace's 9th *Epode*, while clearly discussing the battle of Actium, likewise, does not mention Antonius by name at all. The poem concerns itself mainly with how the victory over

[1010] App. *B.C.* 5.130.
[1011] On p. 12; Assmann 2010a: 97-104.
[1012] Seager 1993: 23; Commager 1995: 95; Gurval 1998: 135; Watson 2003: 322; Nelis and Farrell 2013: 4; Westall 2019: 78.

Antonius' forces should be celebrated. Horace asks Maecenas whether it will be like the last great victory of Octavian when they had toasted the triumph with a good wine.[1013] The victory, as Horace makes as clear as possible, was probably against the forces of Sextus. Even with the passing of time, however, there is no relenting with the anonymity given to his defeated foe. As with the unnamed leader in the 4th *Epode*, the only name given Octavian's defeated foe is the 'Neptunian leader' The description is further enhanced with the lines 'having been driven from the sea… his ships burnt' and 'his faithless slave friends.' (*actus…freto Neptunius dux fugit ustis navibus minatus…servis amicus perfidis*) [1014] No reader would have been in any doubt to the identity of the 'Neptunian leader'- the only naval battles prior to Actium had been against Sextus who had identified strongly with Neptune.[1015]

Indeed, later scholiasts on the texts of Horace saw references to Sextus and the war scattered throughout the works. Any theme that was remotely nautical was attributed to the war against Sextus, even centuries after the campaign. Take, for instance, *Carmin*.1.14 with its image of the storm-ravaged ship. This in particular seems to have caused some speculation according to writer of the Pseudo-Acron scholia.[1016] The Scholium for this particular passage notes that some favour interpreting the section as pertaining to the civil war, while others see the ship as the *res publica* – no doubt a reference to the opinion of Quintilian.[1017] The scholiast himself prefers to the see it as representative, in a convoluted way, of the renewed war and the soldiers and officers. 'Yet it is certain, that he is warning Sextus Pompeius, the son of Pompeius, who, after making a treaty with the Triumvirs, wished to once again renew the civil war… however, he chose the metaphor of a ship from whose equipment he wished the soldiers and commanders to be understood.' (*Certius tamen est, quod Sextum Pompeium,*

[1013] Hor. *Ep*. 9.1-5; Mankin 1995: 159-60.
[1014] Hor. *Ep*. 9.7-10; Mankin 1995: 164.
[1015] Gurval 1998: 146.
[1016] Ps. Acron *Schol. Hor. Carm*. 1.14.1.
[1017] Quint. *Inst*. 8.6.44.

filium Pompei, moneat, qui, posteaquam foedus cum triumviris fecit…metaphoram autem sumpsit a navi ex cuius armanmentis et milites et diversas voluit administrationes intellegi.)[1018]

While this *Ode* could have conjured images from the recent civil war it is too vague to attribute it solely to the campaign against Sextus. Actium would itself have an equal claim and Horace has avoided giving any of the characteristic remarks he does for the attributable conflicts: i.e. slaves for Sextus and eunuchs for Antonius. Therefore, the scholiast's argument seems hard to imagine, and even he notes that most instead see the ship as the *res publica*.[1019] The comment that Sextus had broken the treaty demonstrates that the cultural memory of the time was firmly on the side of Augustus' narrative of the events.

Any discussion of Horace's writing appearing to follow an 'official' line must involve a discussion of Horace's relationship with the leading figures. The *Epodes* have been referred to as 'pure propaganda' by Seager and 'explicitly supportive of Octavian' by Griffin.[1020] However, Galinsky has cautioned that the tone in his works may be more a product of his time than an echo of a 'party line.'[1021] What motivated Horace, who had once supported the Liberators and lost his family farm as a result, to seemingly join the winning side? Mere social climbing according to Griffin who asserts that Horace's service with the Liberators was only because they had taken the son of a freedman and made him a tribune, a rank that in civilian life was equestrian at least.[1022]

It seems hard to accept that Horace, who would have been aware of the dangers of fighting in the second chapter of what had already been a particularly bloody episode of

[1018] Ps. Acron *Schol. Hor. Carm*. 1.14.1.
[1019] Ps. Acron *Schol. Hor. Carm*. 1.14.2.
[1020] Seager 1993: 23; Griffin 1993: 8.
[1021] Galinsky 1996: 225. See also Nelis and Farrell 2013: 13.
[1022] Griffin 1993: 2.

Roman history, would have been willing to place his life on the line for a title that would be useless to a dead man. There must have been more to Horace's support of the Liberators, especially given his military promotion. Perhaps the young man was taken in by the words of Brutus – at least one *Satire* makes it clear that Horace attended Brutus' public hearings.[1023] Or it was a youthful desire for adventure and glory that has seen young men join wars throughout the ages? It would probably not be too far-fetched to presume that Horace was drawn to the armies of the Liberators by their charisma as well as the idealism that accompanied them.[1024] Conceivably, as with others in the previous war, it was a calculated gamble on who looked likely to be the eventual victor.

As is well demonstrated, Horace and Maecenas appear to have enjoyed a strong relationship, but the same cannot perhaps be said of Horace and Octavian.[1025] While Horace had suffered reverses at the hands of Octavian, as Salmon has noted, this does not necessarily make one an 'eternal enemy' – land confiscation had been enforced on Vergil with little later ill-will.[1026] Salmon has argued that what stopped Horace from giving his full support to Octavian may have had more to do with ideological differences: Horace was a follower, although admittedly weak, of the Epicurean school of thought. These views were incompatible with Octavian's desire to attain his adoptive father's position and the threat to liberties that would result.[1027] It equally could be that Horace could not agree with a leader who appeared to be moving in a direction that was not compatible with the government of Horace's childhood or youth, and which he appears to have at least been in some agreement

[1023] Hor. *Sat*. 1.7.18.
[1024] Brutus was probably a celebrity in his day. At a court case presided over by Brutus, as recounted in the *Satire*, one of the claimants goes as far to recall Brutus' king-slaying heritage by means of flattery.
[1025] Starr 1969: 60-62 has argued that Horace probably held Maecenas in greater stead than Octavian as the gift of the Sabine farm, among other support, had helped bring 'order into his life.'
[1026] Salmon 1947: 7; Gabba 1971: 140 Although the writers it had affected did complain about it in their works it did not stop them from supporting the ruling family.
[1027] Salmon 1947: 7-8.

with when he sided with Brutus. Watson has also made the logical observation that simply neither Octavian nor Antonius were particularly popular in the 30s BC.[1028]

Salmon has also postulated that Horace might have chosen to temper his remarks earlier in his career because Octavian's position seemed tenuous and he did not desire to become too closely linked in case a rival – such as Antonius – toppled the young man.[1029] However, it should be noted that some of Horace's more pessimistic works were written after Octavian had defeated all his rivals and that danger had been removed.[1030] Lyne prefers to accept Horace's service in the army of the 'republic' as genuine, to the extent that Horace was reluctant to publish his more political poems in case he was again caught on the wrong side.[1031] This seems improbable. Firstly, both poems make the same characterisation: a figure reliant on slaves. Secondly, although Sextus is given the title of Neptunian leader in the 9th *Epode* it would be clear that Sextus was the figure to whom Horace referred.

The writings of Horace have therefore been characterized as the work of one 'sympathetic with this vast effort to stabilize anew the Roman frame of life.'[1032] But throughout there was a distance and later a pessimism about the new ruler of the Roman world.[1033] Horace seems to have been a figure who revelled in ambiguity – the 4th *Epode*, for example makes that clear. What does seem to be evident in Horace's writings is a frustration at the continuing wars among fellow Romans when a better use of Roman arms would be against foreign powers and the expansion of the empire.[1034] Horace makes this point clear enough throughout his works: the frustration of the 7th *Epodes*: 'where, where do you rush wicked men?' (*quo, quo scelesti ruitis*) or the *Odes*: 'what coast is devoid of our blood?'

[1028] Watson 2003: 2.
[1029] Salmon 1947: 10.
[1030] Salmon 1947: 10.
[1031] Lyne 1995: 13, 28-29.
[1032] Starr 1969: 60.
[1033] Starr 1969: 61.
[1034] Seager 1993: 31-3. Again, in line with the views of Sallust.

(*quae caret ora cruore nostro*)[1035] It would be hard to ignore Octavian's role in these conflicts.

But if Horace was not fully supportive of Octavian, why would he bother to present his enemies in such a way? Firstly, it should be remembered that Sextus was not like the Liberators that Horace had fought for, Sextus made no secret that he was fighting to be returned to Rome and his social position with the return of his father's property, rather than the restoration of senatorial government. His fight was not the fight of those who stood with Brutus and Cassius at Philippi. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that, if Horace struggled with Octavian, he found little if nothing to support in Sextus. Secondly, Horace had fought and lost, and now seemed to be keen to see an end to the cycle of violence that had stretched across the years. Instead, Horace would prefer that the Romans turn their eyes to new lands, perhaps to unite around a common enemy – a new Carthage – such as Parthia.[1036]

The influence of Maecenas should not be underestimated in the decision-making of Horace. Whether or not Horace supported Octavian, he was well disposed toward Maecenas. As noted by Johnson, the *Epodes* make clear Horace's allegiance to Maecenas, indeed he comments that he is writing for a patron.[1037] It is likely that Maecenas managed the war of words during the campaign against Sextus on behalf of Octavian. According to Appian, when Octavian's attempt at invading Sicily met with disaster it was Maecenas who was dispatched to Rome to quell any unrest.[1038] It would seem probable that this was a matter of dispelling any dissenting rumours as no mention of force is made. Perhaps then, Maecenas was the

[1035] Hor. *Ep*. 7.1; Hor. *Odes* 2.1.33.
[1036] For example, Hor. *Odes* 3.2.13; Seager 1993: 31-3. This desire to unite around an external threat had been in literature for almost a century, such as the works of Sallust. See Sall. *Cat*.10.1-4.
[1037] Johnson 2012: 22.
[1038] App *B.C*. 5.99, 112.

figure who directed that Sextus should remain anonymous; such a request would not, after all, be excessive and a small favour to ask after the support Maecenas had given Horace.

While Horace is a deeply ambiguous writer who still poses a puzzle to scholars – his works can be read as in a number of ways, (e.g. the 4th *Epode*). However, it would be hard to ignore the obvious reluctance to name the enemies of the Octavian and the use of the same imagery that was used by other members of Maecenas' circle as well as the absence of names from the official inscriptions set up contemporaneously or later. The poems of Horace demonstrate how contemporaries dealt with the wars of Octavian and his enemies, even the previous civil war has become old news in the writings of Horace.

Livy on the Son

The most dramatic shift and an obvious example of support or perhaps compliance with the Augustan propaganda comes when Livy's history reached the period of the Triumvirate. Augustus may have been more relaxed regarding memories of recent history than some of the emperors that came after him, but it was clear that there were unofficial limits. Sextus, especially, seems to have been a *persona non grata* with Augustus, even decades after his death. In fact, the whole Triumviral period appears to have fallen in to a different category, as Philip Stadter has noted: 'the deeds of Octavian and Antonius, and later Augustus, require an account different in nature and subject to far more pitfalls than the history *liberae rei publicae*.'[1039] To this end, Livy appears to have followed the lead of Augustus and many of the writers of the period in viewing Octavian as destined to rule the

[1039] Stadtler 1972: 299. Augustus even went as far as burning all the official records on the recent civil war, App. *B.C.* 5.132.

Roman world.[1040] Therefore Octavian's first appearance in the *Periochae*, when he landed in Italia after Caesar's death, was 'full of auspicious signs' (*ominibus prosperis*).[1041]

Sextus is not the only figure to be demonised, the shift in Livy's tone when dealing with Octavian's opponents can be noticed on a number of occasions. For example, the *Periocha* recording Antonius' actions in his term as consul in 44 BC uses the words 'he feebly dominated and through violence carried a law on changing the provincial commands.' (*impotenter dominaretur legemque de permutatione provinciarum per vim tulisset*)[1042] On his actions towards Octavian, Antonius 'gave great injury' to Octavian (*magnis iniuriis adfecisset*) and in putting down a mutiny notes the 'savagery' (*saevitia*) of Antonius' deeds.[1043] Meanwhile Brutus deceptively takes control of the army and province of Publius Vatinius 'under the pretext' (*sub praetexta*) of doing so on behalf of the *res publica*.[1044] Compare Brutus's actions with those of Octavian, who gathered a force of veterans for 'himself and the *res publica*' (*sibi et rei p.*). Octavian's dealings with the senate tend to have a bias towards the former, for example, after the victory of the armies sent by the senate to raise the siege of Mutina where the consuls Hirtius and Pansa had been killed in battle and only Octavian returned. The summary for Livy's text reads, 'toward [Octavian], who alone out of the three leaders survived, the senate was insufficiently grateful. It decreed triumphal honours to Decimus Brutus, who [Octavian] had liberated from the siege of Mutina, but it had not spoken gratefully enough of Caesar and his soldiers.' (*adversus C. Caesarem, qui solus ex tribus ducibus supererat, parum gratus senatus fuit, qui Dec. Bruto obsidione Mutinensi a Caesare liberato triumphi honore decreto Caesaris militumque eius mentionem*

[1040] Sen. *Dial.* 6.22.4. This conveniently excuses Octavian's seizure of power as preordained.
[1041] Liv. *Per*. 117 One has to be cautious regarding Livy's opinions of the supernatural though, as it is not clear whether Livy wholly believed these kinds of stories. Livy may have simply recounted these tales of the omens that accompanied Octavian's appearance without any judgement from himself, but the brevity of the *Periochae* has occluded a proper view of the matter. see Sailor 2006: 335, 343, 355-359.
[1042] Liv. *Per*. 117.
[1043] Liv. *Per*. 118.
[1044] Liv. *Per*. 118.

non satis gratam habuit.)[1045] The blame for Cicero's execution is likewise placed at the feet of Lepidus and Antonius, whose list of proscribed figures is elucidated. Octavian's role, however, appears to have been minimised or passed over in silence.[1046]

Perhaps then it is not a surprise that Sextus was denigrated heavily, his introduction into events brought a figure of irredeemable character. 'Sextus Pompeius, the son of Magnus, collected the proscribed and fugitives from Epirus and with this army, for a long time without any base, first possessed the sea by piracy, then Messina and then occupied the whole province and killed the praetor Pompeius Bithynicus. He defeated in a naval battle Q. Salvidienus, [Octavian's] legate.*'* (*Sex. Pompeius, Magni filius, collectis ex Epiro proscriptis ac fugitivis cum exercitu, diu sine ulla loci cuiusquam possessione praedatus in mari Messanam primum, dein totam provinciam occupavit occisoque Pompeio Bithynico praetor. Q. Salvidenum, legatum Caesaris, navali proelio vicit*.) [1047]

In the *Res Gestae*, which is our clearest source on Augustus' own opinions, and was composed before Livy wrote these passages, Sextus was known as a pirate, and so far Livy conforms to the standard set by the Augustan propaganda. It would be interesting to know whether the genealogical information at the start of the passage was a Livian original or an addition by the author of the *Periochae*. If the former then why did Livy chose to make a strong link between Pompeius, who had been portrayed in a positive light, and Sextus, who was about to be portrayed in a negative light? Possibly the intention was to make a contrast between the father and the son, as appears in other works of the Octavianic/Augustan period, in order to make Sextus an unworthy son to his deceased father. After all, Sextus was, like Octavian, marching under the banner of *pietas* to a murdered father.

[1045] Liv. *Per*. 119.
[1046] Liv. *Per*. 120; Westall 2018a: 14. Velleius would do the same, Welch 2018: 141.
[1047] Liv. *Per*. 123.

Further to Sextus' supposed piracy, was his duplicity when it came to honouring treaties made with the Triumvirs. Per Livy: 'With an enemy neighbouring Italia – Sextus Pompeius was holding Sicily and impeding the grain trade – [Octavian] and Antonius made peace with him, as demanded, so that he could hold Sicily as a province.' (*cum vicinus Italiae hostis Sex. Pompeius, Siciliam teneret et commercium annonae impediret, expostulatam cum eo pacem Caesar et Antonius fecerunt ita ut Siciliam provinciam haberet*.)[1048] The treaty does not last long though and in the next *Periocha* the war has resumed. In the later histories, who broke the treaty first is a matter of debate. It would appear that Sextus at least did not feel bound by the agreement due to the disobedience of the others: Antonius' control of the Peloponnese, and Octavian by accepting the defecting admiral Menodorus.[1049] However, the *Periochae* is more certain, 'when Sextus Pompeius returned to infesting the sea with pirates and did not stand by the peace he had accepted, Caesar undertook a war against him out of necessity and fought two naval battles with uncertain outcomes.' (*cum Sex. Pompeius rursus latrociniis mare infestum redderet nec pacem quam acceperat praestaret, Caesar necessario adversus eum bello suscepto duobus navalibus proeliis cum dubio eventu pugnavit*.)[1050] Uncertain outcomes (*dubio eventu*) is putting a positive spin on the memory of the campaign, from the accounts of later historians Octavian's early attempts to dislodge Sextus ended in disaster.[1051] Later, after the defeat of Sextus and his flight East he is portrayed as treacherously preparing to attack Antonius, who has him put to death.[1052]

Modern scholarship has concerned itself with the question of Augustus' involvement in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* by looking at the story of Cossus, or the 'Pompeian' comment. However, it seems that one of the missed opportunities are the *Periochae* on Sextus.

[1048] Liv. *Per*. 127.
[1049] App. *B.C.* 5.77, 80; Dio 48.45-46.
[1050] Liv. *Per*. 128.
[1051] App. *B.C.* 5.83,85,88-92; Dio 48.46.6, 48.5.
[1052] Liv. *Per*. 131.

Although this does not prove anything definitively, it is clear that Livy was either constrained or felt obligated to portray Sextus as he does. The fact that his portrayal conforms to the collective memory put out by so many writers of the age and by the Princeps himself probably belies its origin. Livy, as a respected author, would set the tone for much of Roman history when it came to Sextus. Therefore, Sextus would forever be the son who failed to meet the standards of his father, the memory of which was recorded by authors such as Livy. Octavian's attitude probably influenced, at least partly, the shift in tone between the *Periochae* that narrates the previous war and those that covered the wars fought by Octavian.

Outside of Octavian's circle

Not all the accounts by contemporaries were negative, although there are even less survivors when it comes to positive accounts. These seem to have been written by Greeks who lived away from Rome, and perhaps had greater freedom to write as a result. Thus, they preserved different memories. The main example of a contemporary memory is the fragmentary comments of recent matters in Sicily by Diodorus Sicilus. As noted with Pompeius, Diodorus preserved the memories of the Sicilian population and his own experience, which tended to vary with those of the Roman authors in the post-war years. As with Pompeius, Diodorus he had a positive view of Sextus, noting that he had been a fair ruler when he had been in control of the island.[1053]

Due to the paucity of detailed accounts to survive from contemporaries and the oblique methods of referenced used by some authors when recalling the memory of Sextus, there have been attempts to examine other works for similar allusions. In light of the mass of written work on the topic of the *Bellum Sicilium*, it has been recently suggested by Jennifer

[1053] Sacks 1990: 208.

Gerrish that Sallust's narrative of the war against Spartacus, taken together with the digression on Scylla and Charybdis, should be viewed as a veiled reference to Sextus.[1054] The evidence, as Gerrish argues, is that Sextus' war against the Triumvirs was masked as a war against slaves and Sextus' coinage issue celebrating his victory over Octavian's forces that utilised the image of Scylla.[1055] Although a number of events in the different works of Sallust have been perceived as allusions to recent or contemporary events, it is difficult to attribute these two narratives to the image of Sextus.[1056] Firstly, it is difficult to ascertain how much Sextus was associated with Scylla, he only minted one issue with the image, while there is clear evidence that he was more attached to the image of Neptune, which was recognised – especially among those on the mainland.[1057] Secondly, the war between Spartacus and the war with Sextus bear no real resemblance to each other in terms of events, with Gerrish's assumption based purely on the terminology used by Octavian – that he was fighting a war against pirates and slaves.[1058] This is a vague link at best and the portrayal of Spartacus by Sallust is itself troublesome, as Barry Strauss has noted.[1059]

Velleius on the other Pompeius

Unsurprisingly, during the reign of Tiberius, the historian Velleius recalls the same memories as had been current in the Augustan period. Of the war in Hispania all Velleius has

[1054] Gerrish 2016; 193.
[1055] Gerrish 2016: 202-4.
[1056] Syme 1964: 122, 136; McGushin 1992: 146-7 notes the similarities between the Lepidian revolt of 77 B.C. and the Perusine revolt; Mellor 1999: 41, argues that the narrative of the Catiline is a 'plea for common sense' in the midst of the proscriptions; Gerrish 2016: 197 regards the whole of the *Historiae* as an 'indirect critique of the of Triumviral Rome.' Katz 1981: 334 made a similar argument for Sertorius' treaty with Mithridates being a reference to the pact that Sextus was supposedly prepared to make with the Parthians. Rawson 1987: 180 note 114, thought that Syme was too strong in his argument about the influence of the Triumviral period on Sallust's narrative.
[1057] The digression on Scylla and Charybdis in Sallust is nothing special in either Sallust nor the histories of the period in general. It was common to include some details of the locality in which events were taking place, especially ones of interest. On the coinage see DeRose Evens 1987: 109 on *RRC* 511/2, a partial image of Scylla, and 119 on *RRC* 511/4, a full portrait of Scylla. The statue of Neptune paraded before the games in Rome had to be removed after the crowd began to hail it as Sextus.
[1058] Gerrish 2016: 195-8.
[1059] Strauss 2009: 204 suggests that Sallust's Spartacus is a heroic figure and is portrayed in a sympathetic light.

to say is that it was hard fought and that Gnaeus was killed.[1060] While his account of Octavian's war with Sextus is one of the most negative. Although he commends Sextus for the rescue of the proscribed, he is otherwise unstintingly dismissive.[1061] Velleius contends Pollio had fought well against Sextus and that the senate which voted to allow the return of Sextus' family property and command of the coastline was 'almost entirely Pompeian' (*paene totus adhuc e Pompeianis*.) perhaps drawing on a source that took an Antonian view of proceedings, or drawn from Pollio since there was a positive spin on his failed defence of Hispania.[1062]

Velleius' account also takes a cue from the Octavianic attempts to distance Sextus from his father, with its lengthy discourse on the difference between the father and son. Sextus 'was uneducated, barbarous of speech,[…] a son different from his father, a freedman to his freedmen and a slave to his slaves.' *(erat studiis rudis, sermone barbarous […] fide patri dissimillimus, libertorum suorum libertus servorumque servus*.)[1063] Sextus' forces are characterised as slaves and runaways, while the many citizens who fled to Sicily and took up arms are forgotten.[1064] He is remembered as supporting his army by piracy, which leads Velleius to chide Sextus for becoming that which his father had fought, 'he was not ashamed to infest the sea that had been freed by his father's leadership and arms with piratical robbery.' (*eum non depuderet vindicatum armis ac ductu patris sui mare infester piraticis sceleribus*.)[1065] Further to this the rioting at Rome is caused by hunger because of the 'piracy', which ignores the more complicated reasoning that lay behind the social problems in the capital, as the later historians were able to relate. When the treaty of Misenum is eventually signed, the story of Sextus' noble refusal to take the Triumvirs hostage is absent

[1060] Vell. Pat. 2.55.2.
[1061] Vell. Pat. 77.2; Gabba 1971: 154.
[1062] Vell. Pat. 73.2. For Antonius' use of the term see Cic. *Phil*. 13.38, 45.
[1063] Vell. Pat. 73.1.
[1064] Vell. Pat. 73.3.
[1065] Vell. Pat. 73.3.

and replaced with a pun, that later appears in Dio.[1066] The treaty is eventually broken it is because ' [Sextus'] restless spirt would not endure [the treaty].' (animus inquies manere non potuit)[1067]

Conversely, and perhaps drawn from Augustus' later justification against Antonius, Velleius preserves the story of Titius, Sextus' killer, and how he was hated in Rome for his deed, 'to which the odium that this crime drew endured for a long time as afterwards, while presenting games in the theatre of Pompeius, he was driven out of the show which he was providing by curses from the audience.'(*cui in tantum duravit hoc facinore contractum odium ut mox ludos in theatre Pompei faciens execrtione populi spectaculo quod praebebat pellerentur*.)[1068] This provides a hint of the popular support that Sextus and his father had in city, even after their deaths. Despite this, Velleius is loyal in his histories to the collective memory of ruling house and manipulates his narrative to make them favourable to Augustus' point of view.[1069]

Lucan and the Witch

Even the Neronian author Lucan, although he largely uses the positive memories of Pompeius, does not extend this to those of the sons. Gnaeus is almost totally absent – perhaps because his career was so short-lived that it was barely remembered – although Munda is mentioned on occasion.[1070] Instead, the light falls (anachronistically) on his younger brother Sextus. The memory of Sextus does not seem to have evolved much from the views of Octavian/Augustus and the Tiberian authors. As the contemporary authors of the time had largely alluded to Sextus so does Lucan initially. In the laudation for the coming of Nero,

[1066] Vell. Pat. 3.77.1; Welch 2012: 245. The keels of his ship, as his father's property was a district called the keels (Carinae).
[1067] Vell. Pat. 77.2.
[1068] Vell. Pat. 79.6.
[1069] Gerhardt 2018: 212-17.
[1070] Luc. *BC.* 1.39, 1.42.

Lucan lists the various conflicts of the civil war in no particular order, recalling Munda by name but the 'servile war from beneath fiery Etna' (*ardenti servilia bella sub Aetna*) is probably a veiled reference to the Sicilian war against the forces of Sextus Pompeius.[1071] Throughout the selective recall of his memory, Lucan does include the element of *pietas* and the recourse to naval power is too.[1072] His memory is generally that of an unworthy son and is further blackened with the lengthy tale of his meeting with the necromancer Erictho, which itself seems to owe its origins to a tale from the war time.[1073]

In Lucan's narrative, Sextus goes to see a necromancer, Erictho, who uses black magic to learn his father's fate.[1074] Gowing postulates that it is Sextus' youth and fears for his own father that make him consult the witch and that readers should view him in a more sympathetically, while Tesoriero advances the conclusion that Sextus is presented in a negative light because Lucan perceived his future campaign as not for the good of the *res publica* but to place himself in power. He is accordingly a 'second Caesar.'[1075] But perhaps the knowledge of the future and Lucan's desire to keep the memory of Pompeius highlighted meant he does not stray from the views of the Tiberian era authors in his portrayal of Sextus. He enters the scene as 'the incompetent Sextus. The unworthy son of his father Pompeius, who soon exiled to the Sicilian straits sails about, the Sicilian pirate polluting the waves with victories.'(*inerti Sextus erat. Magno proles indigna parente, qui mox, Scyllaeis exsil grassatus in undis, polluit aequoreos Siculus pirate triumphos*.)[1076] While he is later named as the 'the cowardly son of Pompeius.' (*Pompeii ignava propago*.)[1077] Jamie Masters has

[1071] Luc. *BC*. 1.8-11. Later the poets would conflate the major battles of the civil one into one by setting both on the same battlefield, See Masters 1992 :96; Joseph 2012: 59 note 89.
[1072] Luc. *BC*. 9.117-65.
[1073] Plin. *NH*. 7.178-9; Tesoriero 2002: 231; the arguments in Ogden 2002: 255-56 that stories of necromancy were vaguely in fashion around that time do not seem convincing.
[1074] Gowing 2002: 196-7; Tesoriero 2002: 235-239.
[1075] Tesoriero 2002: 239.
[1076] Luc. *BC*. 6.419-22.
[1077] Luc. *BC*. 6.589.

called Sextus' portrayal 'positively evil; blackened into a pirate (along the lines of conventional anti-republican propaganda) who disgraced his father's name. Sextus emerges as the evil anti-exemplum of the Pompeian cause, which is surprising if we believe Lucan's sympathies to be republican.'[1078]

The Greek memories of Sextus

Almost everything that has survived on Sextus in any great detail was written about a century and a half after his death. Aside from this, the two main writers on this period to have survived are both Greek historians: Appian and Dio; almost all contemporary memories as recorded by his opponents have been reduced to fragments or excerpts recorded by later authors. But both the Greek writers would have had access to them and the sources that have been uncovered from their texts show that a similar list of mainly pro-Augustan writers such as Pollio, Livy and Augustus' own biography provided their research.[1079] Westall notes that 'the autobiographies of Augustus and Messalla, for instance, may be discerned as ultimately lying behind much of Appian's narrative for the final campaign of Caesar the Younger against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE. On a number of occasions, the names of these two appear as protagonists of that narrative, and the natural inference is that Appian (or rather one or more of his sources) drew upon their accounts in weaving together a detailed, global account of the events of that episode of Roman civil war.'[1080] Gowing has noted that generally Dio favoured the Augustan source over Pollio, whereas Appian seems to have largely favoured Pollio over Augustus.[1081] Both however seem largely unsure of Sextus'

[1078] Master 1992: 181.
[1079] Gowing 1992: 40.
[1080] Westall 2019: 70, 83.
[1081] Gowing 1992: 43.

motives, although even centuries later Appian and Dio could still record that the populace at Rome were sympathetic to Sextus because of his father.[1082] Although Appian questions the motives and honesty of Octavian in his dealing with Sextus, his rescue of the proscribed is universally praised.[1083] Despite this suspicion around Octavian, this was clearly not enough for the historians to query the memory of Sextus as a pirate, especially as the memory of the Sicilian campaign was eventually succeeded by the war against Antonius, which finally brought the civil wars to an end and inspired writers and poets to focus on these events as the decisive moment in the conflict.

Appian is the most unusual of the later authors as he seems to have been more sympathetic to the memory of Sextus.[1084] However, as with Pompeius, Sextus' battle against Octavian is couched in the terms of minor delay on the inevitable journey of Octavian to become Augustus and bring about the principate. Therefore, Sextus' failures and defeats are attributed to the inexperience and *θεοβλάβεια* (divine madness) that had affected Pompeius at Pharsalus. On Appian's comments on Sextus' missed opportunities Gabba argues that 'the historical tradition which is reflected in Appian, and which ought to go back to a contemporary source, is full of sad regret because Pompeius lost so many times the opportunity of landing in force in Italy, putting down Octavian, and re-establishing the Republic. Even if this element is historically important, it expresses rather an interesting state of mind, not a serious historical evaluation.'[1085] The assumption that Sextus was aiming at the restoration of the *res publica* just demonstrates the lack of understanding about Sextus' motives and strategy.

[1082] Gowing 1992: 199-200.
[1083] App *B.C*. 4.36 and 5.77.
[1084] He possibly had access to and chose to use more favourable sources, see Gowing 1992: 280-1.
[1085] Gabba 1971: 155.

The part of Sextus' memory that most interests Appian is the rescue of the proscribed – the whole memory of the proscriptions itself is a source of fascination for Appian – which is recalled at length and in detail with praise for Sextus' role in the rescues.[1086] Despite the more positive view of Sextus that Appian records, his narrative is still peppered with descriptions of Sextus' activities as robbery or piracy.[1087]

On the death of Sextus, Appian clearly had access to the differing accounts that may have been circulating in the East. Although Titius is still the killer, Appian records that there were competing memories on who had signed off on the deed.[1088] Antonius is blamed but Appian notes that there was also a version where Plancus, the governor of Syria at the time was also accused of authorising Sextus' death by some. The reasons given were that Plancus could issue commands in Antonius' name and with his seal in cases where expediency was required and also – rather dubiously – that there was a fear that Sextus would combine forces with Cleopatra, who was still loyal to the memory of Pompeius.[1089] The version that blames Plancus seems to be the more fleshed out in Appian's narrative and it is tempting to see this as his preferred explanation. The memory of Plancus as the real killer of Sextus perhaps relates to the attempts to frame Antonius for the killing by Octavian and the different memory of the event perhaps broadcast among the population in the East, with the blame instead shifted onto Plancus as he was famously unpopular for his shifting of allegiance to Ocatvian.[1090] Gowing concludes: 'Appian was quite correct, therefore, to portray Sextus as a victim of the Triumviral period rather than merely a foolish renegade. In spite of its flaws,

[1086] App. *B.C.* 4. 36-41.
[1087] Appian's sources for these years would have included this description and as Gowing 1992: 47 notes '[he] has unwittingly transferred from his sources interpretations as well as facts and failed to reconcile them with his own views.'
[1088] See a similar treatment of the reasons behind Brutus' involvement in the assassination of Caesar (BC. 2.112). see Gowing 1992: 41.
[1089] App. *B.C.* 5.144.
[1090] A similar figure, Quintus Dellius the 'desultor bellorum civilium' (Sen. *Suas* 1.7) also blamed Cleopatra for his actions (Plut. *Ant*. 59). This seems to have been a popular excuse to make after the queen had died to curry favour with the victors.

Appian's portrait is to be preferred to that of Dio. Appian approached Sextus critically, with an eye to sifting the false from the true, the propaganda from the reality. While he omitted to clarify the aim of Sextus' actions, he nevertheless appreciated their significance.'[1091]

Dio, like Appian, holds the a negative view of the Triumvirate, and prefers the monarchy of the principate, so much so that his narrative seems to favour the memories of Octavian and is largely written from his perspective.[1092] Therefore most of what Dio records appears to be influenced by the memories of the opponents of the Pompeii – Gnaeus' defeat during the Spanish war is presaged by supernatural signs for example.[1093] Sextus' forces are made up of pirates and slaves, to whom he was dedicated, much as Velleius had recorded.[1094] The motives of Sextus are more generalised in Dio's account than Appian and the memory of his rescue of the proscribed is lacking the praise found in Appian's.[1095] Sextus, however, is remembered as a secondary figure who is the object of others' actions, in particular, Antonius' various dealings. On several occasions, Antonius is noted as having betrayed Sextus over agreements they had made.[1096] His lieutenant, Titius is also remembered for his betrayal of Sextus who had rescued him from the proscriptions.[1097] It might be that the sources Dio used were largely from a Octavianic position – perhaps from libraries when he was a senator in Rome – as he used of the death of Sextus at the hands of Antonius later as part of his casus belli in the build-up to war. This may explain why much of Antonius' treatment of Sextus is criticised. As Gowing has noted, 'Dio was clearly interested in him only insofar as he was involved with Octavian. As a consequence, Dio's portrait of Sextus,

[1091] Gowing 1992: 205.
[1092] Gowing 1992: 35.
[1093] Dio 43.35.
[1094] Dio 48.17-19 and 48.30. Dio's claim that Octavian was an eyewitness to Salvidius' failed attempt to land his forces might betray that his source for this was Augustus' own autobiography, which would explain the negative stance Dio takes toward Sextus. On this see Gowing 1992: 184.
[1095] Gowing 1992: 184-5.
[1096] Dio 45.9, 48.30.
[1097] Dio 48.30.

which admittedly derives from a hostile source, is fragmented and unsatisfactory. There is no summing up, no effort to clarify precisely what Sextus was attempting to do, nothing to suggest that Dio himself had formulated any precise opinion of Sextus beyond that which he found in his sources.'[1098]

Conclusion

On Gnaeus, there was little change with his memory, he was unpopular and did not achieve the fame that his younger brother did, his time in the collective memory was short and he lacked supporters needed to preserve and transmit positive memories. Sextus' memory however, was clearly dealt with in a different way from his brothers'. Although he initially linked himself heavily to the memory of his father as well. He took the element of pietas to a level beyond which Gnaeus had, treating it as his main identity trait. Later he was able to create his own identity based on his exploits and role in saving the proscribed from the Triumvirate. It was his actions during the proscriptions and the negative memories that the Triumvirate generated at the time that helped to preserve his popular memory. Unlike Gnaeus he was also able to stay alive long enough to have an impact to in the collective memory of the era. Although Octavian tried to destroy the memory of Sextus, his relationship to Pompeius, and Octavian's own numerous celebrations at his defeat likely prevented Sextus from being completely forgotten. The slew of material that was written by the chief actors and their entourage at the time also helped to preserve Sextus' memory, even if it was highly partisan What was subsequently lost in Octavian's diminishing of Sextus was the seriousness of the threat he posed. At the time, Sextus was a major issue for Octavian and thus generated a powerful memory from the anxiety of the time. The works of the Greek historians centuries later attest to the size of the cultural memory that surrounded Sextus. In the Roman world

[1098] Gowing 1992: 202-203.

though the collective memory of the supporters and court of Octavian won out in contrast to the failure of those who had supported Caesar in the aftermath of the civil war of the 40s. This would even survive to have its impact on the historians of the modern age, which perhaps demonstrates the strength of an unchallenged cultural memory.

General Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, the memory of the Pompeii were treated in markedly different terms within the cultural memory of Roman society. All three Pompeii show the influence of different collective groups and social trends as Halbwachs noted in his work on the frameworks of memory. Firstly, Pompeius' was affected by the civil war of Sulla and its continuous existence within the working memory of his peers. This was largely as a result of its function as an excellent source to diminish his standing by his political opponents, who appear to have maintained the image of Pompeius as a tyrant in the collective memory of the group. However, the scale of his achievements helped to counter the narrative of his opponents. Pompeius' own resources later in his career, particularly with the entourage of Greek authors that he assembled, such as Theophanes, further enabled him to construct his own memories with which to combat and in some cases overwhelm the collective memory of his opponents and supplant it with his own well-broadcasted version. Pompeius' achievements themselves also made him unforgettable in many respects.

Although Pompeius' Caesarian opponents rebroadcast the memories of the past decades of political debate, they reinforced specific memories, particularly those that dealt with Pompeius' skills as a general. As Caesar' own accounts of the time have survived, they provide an insight into the influence that his opinions had on his direct circle of friends and the wide collective memories. Likewise, the evidence of Cicero on Caesar's directing of attacks on the memory of Cato clearly demonstrate just how much oversight Caesar maintained on the formation of the memories of his opponents. It is unsurprising then, that many of the accounts written by members of Caesar's circle adhere to varying degrees of success to the common threads of the collective memory as fleshed out in Caesar's own works.

Despite the ideological unity of Pompeius' memory within the Caesarian Corpus, there was no official unified strategy in place. This can be witnessed in the change of direction that Caesar took upon the news of his rivals death; not only did Caesar adopt a more conciliatory tone towards Pompeius memory in the aftermath of the war, as Cicero records, but he likely turned away from the publication of his *Bellum Civile* in part because of his shying away from its narrative.

However, the short reign of Caesar, the controversial legacy he and the rapidly changing situation hindered the imposition of his collective memory fully. While Sallust had created a legacy of Pompeius as a danger to the *res publica,* once this generation had largely passed away, there was little innovation on this collective memory. The writers of the Julio-Claudian era decades later merely picked up on the Caesarian memories, as the Caesarians had those of the decades prior, and utilised them dependant on their own political leanings and the social trends of memory of the time. In time the *Erinnerungsfiguren* of this period were condensed, especially those of the civil war of the 80s. The same eventually happened with those of the civil wars at the end of the *res publica*, As can be witnessed in the *Aeneid* where the memoires of Marius and Sulla are fairly benign. The civil wars of Caesar and Octavian where on a slightly different plain of memory though due to their pivotal role in the formation of the imperial system and remained stronger in the cultural memory. This new trend was also driven by society's desire to move past the internecine conflicts that had riven the *res publica* for many years. This shift was largely driven from the top-down by Octavian after his victory over his rivals, and his practical use of the memories of the *res publica*. This may explain why a lot of the details were lost, as they did not add anything to the narrative that Augustus wanted to promulgate.

With the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, and the varying societal pressures on memory that had accompanied their rule, the negative cultural memory of Pompeius slowly

began to fade and the memory of Pompeius the great general largely replaced it. The last great Roman author to reassess the civil war was the Neronian poet Lucan, who despite being well-read on the history of the war, showed how the minor memories had likely started to fade. This was particularly true of the Sullan period of Pompeius life, which, as has been demonstrated, Lucan only knew of brief details and perhaps viewed them as less problematic in line with contemporary views and those of previous generations, starting with Vergil. Memory of the civil war and its aftermath rendered the Sullan memory of Pompeius obsolete.

The conflict that dominated the downfall of the last Julio-Claudian has no doubt brought the memories of the last civil war back into vogue, as the civil war of the last century of the *res publica* had made the accounts of Thucydides return to popularity due to their topical theme. The fall of the Julio-Claudian dynasty also saw a revitalising of the memories of its opponents and the *Erinnerungsfiguren* of the war. This legacy slowly became more concrete as the memories of this time became more abstract to writers far removed from events.

The Greek authors who began to explore the memories of the end of the *res publica* centuries later were largely on trend with their accounts. By now the early years of Pompeius were largely irrelevant to the main cultural memory of Pompeius as the opponent of Caesar in the more important memory of the civil war that brought the system of government that they lived in to being. This can be seen in the disparity of words assigned to the life of Pompeius up to the civil war, or the complete lack of detail or even narrative for his life before the Mithridatic war. Part of this likely spoke to the period of the greatest evidence, especially in Greek, as Pompeius had gained most of his (Greek) court historians around the time of his Eastern campaigns.

Even without Theophanes *et al.* Pompeius' memory was too prominent to be totally eclipsed by his rivals or the passage of time. Therefore, he remained in the cultural memory of the Roman world. His memory had been condensed down though to one of the greats without much recourse to further details, like the busts that would decorate the library of a Roman aristocrat – chosen for symbolic, and meaningful reasons on the surface but ultimately obscure.

Pompeius' sons, however, generate their own questions and answers on the nature of memory. Gnaeus is the most extreme example of the impact of collective memories on the viability of long term memory. He had a short career and no friendly relations, and is largely consigned to oblivion because of the limited memories he had been able to generate during his time. However, his brother Sextus fared better. He seems to have been more politically astute and his role was much greater. His links to his father helped to bolster his memory, but it should be argued that his own deeds and the threat he played towards the Triumvirate, although later downplayed, also made him worthy of remembrance. The connection of his memory and the horror of the proscriptions, and his role in trying to save people are probably one of the main reasons he did not become a footnote in history like his brother.

Although Sextus had lived longer and achieved more than his older brother, it was still not enough to protect his memory like that of his father. Also, unlike his father, Sextus' memory was the victim of a much more sustained and organised effort, and while, as with the memory of his father, it could not remove him completely, the circle of Octavian/Augustus was able to produce a much more effective and long-lasting impact on the collective and cultural memory, which even today has survived.

The history of Sextus is a story of duality of the memory. On the one hand he is a case study for the memory of Pompeius outside of the Caesarian collective. Sextus had been

isolated from the mainland for years and was surrounded by his own supporters like Caesar had been when he formed his memories of Pompeius. Sextus, therefore, probably formed his memories in an information vacuum, or at least an echo chamber free from the ideological battles over the memories that had occurred in Rome in the intervening years. As Pompeius' son, it is unlikely that his memories would have negative, however, in the early years of Sextus' career they formed the keystone of his own standing a political and propaganda strategy in a similar vein to Strabo for Pompeius. Perhaps because of his isolation, Sextus did not engage with the propaganda of the Caesarians, he never seemed to have tried to combat the narrative of Pompeius as a wannabe tyrant. Instead he followed the line that Pompeius seems to have taken himself, by advertising his status as the great conqueror.

Sextus' memory went through a transition later when he achieved his own fame due to his campaign against the overbearing rule of the Triumvirs, particularly the rescue of the proscribed. In light of this and perhaps Octavian's rehabilitation and connections with Pompeius, Sextus developed his own image in a similar way to his father. From his coinage, it can be observed that Sextus promoted his strength on the sea, although there was still a place for family, his divine father Pompeius/Neptune. Eventually Sextus was defeated, and although his links to the traumatic proscriptions helped to preserve his memory, most of it faded out of the collective and eventual cultural memory as is clear from the confused accounts of the later Greek authors.

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