**Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought:**

**Philosophical Background and Theological Significance**

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For my mother, Pamela

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**List of Abbreviations**

Anonymous Callus *De potentiis animae et obiectis*

Anonymous Gauthier *De anima et de potenciis eius*

DAR *De anima rationali,* in the *Summa Halensis*

DFO  *De fide orthodoxa,* by John of Damascus

DSEA *De spiritu et anima,* Anonymous 12th-Century Cistercian text

SDA *Summa de anima,* by John of La Rochelle

*SH Summa Halensis*

*Tractatus Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae,* by John of La Rochelle

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**Key to *Summa Halensis* Citations**

When citing the Quaracchi edition of the *Summa Halensis*, I have adopted the following method of citing the text, which was outlined with the assistance of Dr Simon Maria Kopf:

Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48), L3, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2, Solutio, p. 179.

The relevant text divisions of the Quaracchi edition include, in the following order:

L – Liber   
P – Part (*pars*)  
In – Inquiry (*inquisitio*)  
Tr – Tract (*tractatus*)  
S – Section (*sectio*)  
Q – Question (*quaestio*)  
Ti – Title (*titulus*)  
D – Distinction (*distinctio*)  
M – Member (*membrum*)  
C – Chapter (*caput*)  
Ar – Article (*articulus*)  
Pr – Problem (*problema*)  
Pa – Particular (*particula*)

A further specification of the thus determined entity (to be cited as given in the edition) might, at this point, include:

[arg.] – Objections  
Respondeo/Solutio – Answer  
(Sed) Contra – On the Contrary  
Ad obiecta – Answers to Objections

p[p]. - page number[s].

Second instance of citation should read as follows (including all relevant text divisions):

SH3, In2, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti1, C7, Ar3, Pr1, Pa2, Solutio, p. 179.

Please note that according to this method of citation, the roman numeral at the start of the reference refers to the book (*liber*) of the *Summa Halensis* rather than the tome number. Hence, I refer to *SH* I, 2.1, 2.2, and 3 rather than 1, 2, 3, 4, to avoid confusion concerning the unedited book 4 which is not part of the Quaracchi edition.

**Introduction**

The soul and its powers have remained a topic of perennial interest and significance in the history of Western thought. Yet there have been periods of time when work on questions of the soul or psychology, such as the nature of human knowledge or volition, has seen an explosion of intensive activity and an almost overnight transformation, which would continue to have reverberations for many subsequent generations. The *Meditations* of Descartes and Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* represent some famous examples of this phenomenon, or at least they have been perceived as epoch-making in later historiographical construction.[[1]](#footnote-2)

A much lesser known—indeed almost entirely neglected—example, which was arguably as influential for the Middle Ages as Descartes and Kant were for modernity—can be found in the writings on the soul that were produced by or on the basis of the work of John of La Rochelle. An early thirteenth-century thinker, John was one of the first important masters of theology at the recently-founded University of Paris (c. 1200), regarded by many as the first degree-granting university, which was formed out of numerous independent schools that were already based in the city in the twelfth century.[[2]](#footnote-3) In addition, John was a member of the Franciscan religious order, which was established in 1209. In this context, he worked together with his perhaps more well-known colleague, Alexander of Hales, and other Franciscans to define a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition for the first time.

The product of their collaboration was the so-called *Summa Halensis* (*SH*)*.[[3]](#footnote-4)* This was named for Alexander, as the head of the Franciscan school of Paris which was founded in 1231. However John himself authored volumes I and III, on God, Christology and moral theology, while another author redacted volumes II.1 and II.2 on the basis of works by both John and Alexander.[[4]](#footnote-5) As one of the first texts of its kind to be produced in the university context, the Summa was mostly completed between 1236-45, though the questions on the rational soul (*De anima rationali,* hereafter, DAR), found in volume II.1, were likely written between 1241-45.[[5]](#footnote-6) The redactor responsible for this section clearly drew heavily and directly on John’s personal works on the soul. These include a *Tractatus* on the powers of the soul, written around 1232, which formed the basis for the more elaborate *Summa de anima* (SDA) of around 1236.[[6]](#footnote-7)As the only Franciscan or indeed author of any affiliation to write so extensively on the soul at this time, John was clearly the architect of early Franciscan psychology, who also wrote extensively on questions of moral theology and the moral law.

Although foundational for the Franciscan intellectual tradition, the psychological theories John developed have long been dismissed by scholars as insignificant, partly on the assumption that early Franciscans like him did little but synthesize and systematize the previously dominant tradition of Augustine in the face of the rising popularity of Aristotle. While Etienne Gilson among others have acknowledged that recently-translated Arabic sources were mined for the sake of ‘systematizing’ Augustine, these sources have been perceived as largely compatible with articulating the meaning of Augustine’s ideas. As a consequence, scholars have largely taken for granted that what early Franciscans described as ‘Augustinianism’ was a genuine rendering of Augustine’s authentic views.[[7]](#footnote-8) Any Arabic-language influence, if it is acknowledged at all, is deemed secondary to and basically compatible with that of Augustine.[[8]](#footnote-9)

The generation of Franciscan scholars who worked after John and Alexander, above all, their prize student Bonaventure, did not help to correct the common scholarly opinion in this regard. For his part, Bonaventure defended his ‘Augustinianism’ vigorously, as if the whole weight of theological orthodoxy depended upon it, without acknowledging that this tradition as he understood it was invented only twenty-five years earlier by the likes of John and Alexander, largely on the basis of sources that were not of Christian patrimony and were far removed from Augustine both conceptually and contextually. Nevertheless, Bonaventure has been regarded by many medievalists as the mature representative of the early Franciscan tradition, and thus the role his teachers played in forging it have been overlooked.[[9]](#footnote-10)

The present study will rectify that situation through a close study of the works on the soul by and based on the writings of John of La Rochelle. This study will illustrate the extent to which John invoked Augustine—or rather pseudo-Augustinian texts—and other key Christian authorities like John of Damascus, as a means to incorporating certain Islamic and Jewish philosophical sources that had been recently translated from Arabic into his own psychological framework. As the forthcoming chapters will show, the use of this tactic was not necessarily due to any embarrassment concerning the appropriation of Islamic and Jewish sources. Admittedly, there was considerable antipathy in this period towards followers of non-Christian religions, who were often persecuted and sometimes even forced into conversion, not least by members of the Franciscan religious order.[[10]](#footnote-11)

However, Latin thinkers appear to have regarded Islamic and Jewish scholars as philosophical rather than religious authorities, who had much to offer Latin scholars seeking to develop their own sophisticated intellectual tradition. Nevertheless, the comparatively ‘modern’ nature of the Arabic sources meant that, under the scholastic protocol employed in the early university, those wishing to invoke them needed to find a point of contact in the existing canon of Christian authorities, or a ‘proof text’, from the old tradition to justify the use of the new.[[11]](#footnote-12) Such referencing was not necessarily or even normally designed to explain or defend the view of the authority quoted; rather, it was a way of legitimizing whatever the scholastic author himself wanted to say.

The first step to demonstrating this, pursued in **chapter one,** involves examining the twelfth-century background against which John of La Rochelle and other members of the early university developed their psychological positions. While there was limited interest in the early middle ages in the powers of the soul in their own right—and often only so far as they facilitated Christian contemplation and action—the situation changed dramatically following the eleventh-century translation of various Greek and Arabic medical works, which described the bodily powers and their relation to the functions of the soul.

These texts attracted attention from members of the Cistercian religious order, among others, who took some important initial steps towards elucidating the various facets of the soul and its relation to the body, which proved influential for early Franciscans. However, mechanisms for offering a sophisticated account of cognitive operations only became available in the west following the aforementioned translation of many Arabic philosophical works into Latin in the mid-to-late twelfth century. The first chapter discusses what these works had to offer and the various factors that contributed to a delay in their full incorporation by Latin thinkers until the 1230s, when John of La Rochelle was active as a theologian.

The **second chapter** situates John in relation to some of his key predecessors and contemporaries at the theology faculty in the early university of Paris. The chapter gives some background on the distinctive ideas and contributions of each of these scholars to their discipline and also assesses in a preliminary way the extent to which they embraced the newly available Islamic and Jewish philosophical sources that had been translated into Latin from Arabic. As a result of these translations, scholastics were now confronted with a new set of six main questions about the soul, which are listed below:

1. Is the soul composed of matter and form, per universal hylomorphism?
2. Is the soul united to the body accidentally or substantially?
3. Is the soul united to the body through a medium?
4. Are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers three substances in the soul?
5. Is the essence of the soul identical with its powers?
6. Do the vegetative and sense powers survive the death of the body?

In addition to these more overarching psychological questions, I noted above that scholastics inherited from the Arabic sources a sophisticated framework for defining the cognitive as well as motive or volitional functions of the soul. What this chapter establishes in a preliminary way is that while some of John’s contemporaries engaged with a limited number of the six questions, John was the only member of his generation to deal robustly and comprehensively with all.[[12]](#footnote-13) Moreover, he was the only figure of his time to engage deeply with the effort to elaborate the cognitive and motive powers. The reason for this was that John, first and foremost a theologian, presumably saw addressing those matters as key to defining the status of the soul as God’s image. Although his contemporaries were also centrally concerned with that task, what it involved precisely was very much determined and delimited by their prior theological commitments, particularly concerning the extent to which theologians should engage with philosophical material, on account of which some addressed the psychological material differently, or not at all.

The **third chapter** elaborates John and the Halensian Summist’s related engagement with the first three questions mentioned above, situating their answers in the context of others that were offered by their early scholastic contemporaries. In the case of all three questions—whether the soul is united to the body accidentally or substantially, whether it is composed of matter and form, and whether it is united to the body through a medium—the chapter reveals John and his contemporaries’ debts to Arabic sources and the way in which Augustine, or in most cases pseudo-Augustinian writings, were invoked to integrate those sources. The varying answers, if any, that different early scholastics gave to those questions illustrate the extent to which there was room for interpretation as regards how to use the new philosophical sources and indeed to define what it meant to be an Augustinian.

The **fourth chapter** details John and the Summist’s engagement with the latter three questions as to whether the different powers of the soul represent three distinct substances, whether the soul is identical with its powers, and whether the bodily powers survive the death of the body. Here again, John surpassed his contemporaries both in terms of dealing with all three questions and in terms of the extent to which he did so. Once again, the differences of opinion amongst John and his contemporaries as to if and how to answer those questions confirm that there was disagreement not only on precisely how to adopt Arabic ideas in a Christian context but also on how to project them onto the existing Christian tradition and especially the work of Augustine. The unique commitment John had as a theologian to engaging with the full breadth and depth of new philosophical material is the reason why his answers so outstripped those of his contemporaries in terms of comprehensiveness and depth.

In **chapter five,** I move on to a series of four inter-connected chapters which deal with a topic where John was virtually alone amongst his contemporaries in drawing on the new Arabic sources, in particular, the great Islamic philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) who served as a proxy for Aristotle and to some extent Augustine during this period. This topic concerns the work of human cognition. As the first chapter in this series, chapter five begins with John’s earliest text on the soul, the *Tractatus,* which delineates the cognitive and other powers that John found in Avicenna’s work and his attempt to identify cognitive schema in pseudo-Augustine and John of Damascus.[[13]](#footnote-14)

The latter was key new Greek patristic authority for Latin thinkers, whose invocation alongside Augustine was apparently designed to persuade John of La Rochelle’s readers that there were points of contact in the Christian tradition which allowed for Avicenna’s full incorporation. The focus of chapter five is simply on laying out the content of John’s discussion, in the order in which he discusses matters, and to weigh in on the somewhat vexed question of the *Tractatus’* relation to the *Summa de anima,* which repeats much of the material in the *Tractatus* on the cognitive and motive powers but exceeds the *Tractatus* in dealing with the six questions that were the subject of chapters three and four.

The purpose of **chapter six** is to present a more refined interpretation of the material put forward in chapter five, with a view to elucidating precisely how John understands the nature of cognition, how it is facilitated by external and internal sensation, and the role that divine illumination plays in cognition. What emerges from this discussion is this: while John allows that the passive reception of sense data is an important first step to gaining knowledge, the actual act of knowing requires certain innate first principles, given by God, which aid in the interpretation of that data and facilitate the possibility of knowledge.[[14]](#footnote-15) To explain how this is obtained, John draws almost exclusively on Avicenna, with brief points of reference to Augustine, outlining the contours of an ‘active’ theory of cognition which would soon become a defining feature of the Franciscan intellectual tradition, despite the further adaptations and developments in would later undergo.[[15]](#footnote-16)

A brief excursus in **chapter seven** seeks to deal with a question that arises out of the discussion of chapter six. In addition to the various psychological schemata of Avicenna and Augustine and the Damascene that John of La Rochelle appeals to when explaining cognition, another scheme appears, the origins of which remain something of a mystery. This scheme distinguishes between the agent, possible, and material intellects. Although scholars in the past have debated whether the scheme suggests an early influence of Averroes (Ibn Rushd), this chapter weighs the evidence and possible sources of it in order to reach the conclusion that it is more plausibly a construct of the Latin tradition at the time, which drew eclectically on Avicennian and Aristotelian components in order to adapt them for Christian ends.

Finally, **chapter eight** turns to consider how John’s cognitive theory was adapted in the context of the *Summa Halensis.* Although the redactor certainly took liberties with the organization of John’s material, the upshot of this inquiry is that he more or less repeated the same fundamental positions that John advocated in the *Summa de anima* in terms of the question how the soul achieves knowledge. This brings us back to the question of the extent to which John’s theory of knowledge, already recognizable as the kind of theory advocated by later Franciscans, is in fact Augustinian. In the light of the foregoing chapters, it will become clear that this theory has little to do with Augustine but is a unique invention of John which draws principally on Avicenna but introduces other elements and adaptations in order to render the theory fit for Christian and specifically Franciscan purposes.

After thus completing the inquiry into John’s theory of cognition, I turn in **chapter nine** to his treatment of the so-called motive powers, otherwise called passions, which are the first emotive reactions we have to objects of seemingly positive or negative significance. Interestingly, the Summa’s treatment of these powers is very brief, given how extensively they are discussed by John. The latter’s strategy in this regard is once again to juxtapose Avicenna, pseudo-Augustine and John of Damascus in order to bring new ideas into the tradition and indeed to codify a system for treating the passions, which later influenced Thomas Aquinas.

The **tenth chapter** moves on to the question of free will, which is where the study of the passions comes to fruition, insofar as the will ultimately decides which of its passions to follow. This is the one case out of all the topics treated in this book where the position of the *Summa Halensis* is more influenced by Alexander of Hales than John of La Rochelle. However, that influence shows just as much as the study of John the extent to which early Franciscans were playing with and indeed redefining what it meant to be an Augustinian. As the chapter explains, Alexander completely twisted Augustine’s two key ideas about free will, namely, that it is ordered to the good, and consists in will and reason, to advocate his own view, which is that free will is flexible between good and evil and is principally based in the will rather than in reason. These two ideas, which became central to the subsequent Franciscan tradition, are among those which have been most commonly and mistakenly associated with Augustine on account of the Franciscan influence.[[16]](#footnote-17)

The **eleventh chapter** is something of a postscript to the book which gives a window into the way that the Summa construes the key psychological topics discussed above in the case of angels by contrast to humans—a topic John himself only treats in passing. What we find here is that the structure of cognition and free will is much the same for angels as for humans, with the major exception that it is not bound by the limitations of the body which are proper to humans. In that sense, the study of angels serves as a kind of ‘limit case’[[17]](#footnote-18) for determining how human beings might function, unfettered by their physical constraints.

The **conclusion** sums up the findings of the book and each individual chapter, throwing into question again the notion of early Franciscan ‘Augustinianism’ by highlighting the extent to which the very definition of Augustinianism was up for debate amongst John and his contemporaries, who had different views on the way and extent to which Arabic sources should be incorporated for their purposes. Although John certainly agreed with some of his contemporaries on many points, he developed his ideas with much greater depth and precision into theories which in many cases eventually became closely associated with the Franciscan tradition of thought, even after colleagues in other camps had abandoned them.

As the conclusion will endeavor to suggest, the reason he and his Franciscan colleagues ultimately exhibited a preference for certain of these views over others often had much to do with their religious ethos and indeed the example of Francis of Assisi, whose personality and vision they were in some respects attempting to articulate in theological and philosophical terms. Put differently, the reasons for appropriating Avicennian ideas, with adaptations, were fundamentally theological. Shortly after John made his efforts in this regard, Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle gained popularity, and the practice of writing commentaries or treatises ‘de anima’ became commonplace.

This genre then became detached from that of the theological Summa with which it is conjoined in the early Franciscan intellectual tradition. The resulting commentaries on the soul have been relatively well studied, no doubt due to the obvious phenomenon of their sudden proliferation and the maturation of the genre as a whole within them.[[18]](#footnote-19) Perhaps because of the theological, and thus supposedly Augustinian, context in which it was written, however, the work of John and early Franciscans has not been recognized as a potential forerunner of later developments in psychology.

By undertaking the first major study of early Franciscan thought on human nature, consequently, I seek to provide a basis for discerning how the psychological tradition John founded lived on in ways that have been eclipsed by the historiography which assumes that Franciscans before and including Bonaventure did little but rehearse the views of Augustine. What this study will show is that they did so much more, establishing the terms and contents of debates that would occupy scholars for generations to come. Although tracing those lines of influence lies beyond the scope of the present study, this nonetheless opens doors for exploring the extent to which early Franciscan psychology continued to reverberate in the later Franciscan and medieval tradition tradition and beyond.[[19]](#footnote-20)

**1. The Philosophy of the Soul c. 1150-1215**

Twelfth-Century Developments

From its origins to the Middle Ages, the Christian tradition had always concerned itself with inquiries related to the soul and especially the way in which it contemplates or knows God. The staples of this tradition included the doctrine of free will (*liberum arbitrium*), which tends to vacillate between the dictates of reason and the impulses of the body or ‘sensuality’; the Platonic distinction between the rational and the irascible and concupiscible powers, which respectively pertain to objects of aversion or desire; and Augustine’s triad of memory, understanding, and will, which comprise an image of the Trinity.[[20]](#footnote-21) Another major influence was the sixth-century thinker, Boethius, whose list of four faculties—sense, imagination, reason, and intelligence—was frequently invoked in the Middle Ages.[[21]](#footnote-22) While these sources continued to hold significance in the twelfth century and beyond, in ways the forthcoming chapters will reveal, this period also witnessed the rather rapid transformation of inquiries concerning human psychology, which resulted from the translation of medical and philosophical resources, which the present chapter will endeavor to detail.

The medical works appeared first, mostly in the late eleventh century and will therefore be treated first. These included the *Isagoge ad Tegni Galeni* by the Nestorian Christian translator Johannitius (Hunayn ibn Ishāq; 809-873), which was something of an introduction to the *Pantegni* of the ancient Greek scholar Galen; it was translated into Latin by the physician Constantine the African (c. 1010/20-1087).[[22]](#footnote-23) Constantine also wrote his own *Pantengi*, which is however based heavily on Arabic sources and served as a crucial mediator of Galen to the Latin West, along with Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine* which was translated by Gerard of Cremona (c. 1114-87).[[23]](#footnote-24) The common features of these texts include a tri-partite division of the bodily powers according to the natural ones, such as nutrition, which humans have in common with all living beings and which are governed by the liver in humans; the spiritual powers, attached to the heart, which pumps blood through the body; and the animal powers, attached to the brain, which is responsible for sense and motion.[[24]](#footnote-25)

These three powers are all described by Constantine in different ways in terms of a corporeal or animating and enlivening ‘spirit’, which is to be distinguished from the spiritual part of the soul that is concerned with God and higher things.[[25]](#footnote-26) As we will see below, Costa Ben Luca reduced Constantine’s three to just the latter two spirits—spiritual and animal—in his account of the intermediary between the body and the soul. The authors in question also speak of the vegetative functions of nutrition, growth or augmentation, and reproduction or generation, and of the four further functions involved in nutrition: appetite, retention, digestion, and expulsion. Finally, they generally make reference to the ventricle of the brain in which certain cognitive functions are carried out. The frontal lobe forms images of mental objects; the middle lobe rationally cognizes them; and the back stores the products of cognition in the memory.

In addition to the strictly medical works described above, Latin thinkers of this period gained access to the works of patristic authors who had dealt with medical material. For instance, the fourth-century bishop, Nemesius of Emesa, offered a summary of ancient medical knowledge in *The Nature of Man,* a workwhich arguably shows that he was more influenced by Galen than any other Christian author at his time*.*[[26]](#footnote-27)Part of Nemesius’ text circulated in the Middle Ages under the name of Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-c. 395). However early Franciscans knew the whole work under the name of Remegius.[[27]](#footnote-28) The work was translated in the late eleventh century (c. 1180) by Bishop Alfanus of Salerno and again in 1155-65 by Burgundio of Pisa, who produced numerous translations of Greek patristic writings.[[28]](#footnote-29)

In addition to various homilies of John Chrysostom, Burgundio translated the *De fide orthodoxa* of John of Damascus (676-749) in 1153-54. In Book II, chapters 12-28, where John deals with human nature, he excerpts extensively from Nemesius, covering many of the same topics in the same order.[[29]](#footnote-30) As J. de Ghellinck notes, however, ‘the psychology of Damascene did not leave traces in the Latin authors before Roland of Cremona (1229-1239), with the possible exception of William of Auxerre (d. 1231) and Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236).’[[30]](#footnote-31) His true incorporation awaited the Franciscan school, and indeed, John of La Rochelle, who cites him along with Avicenna and Johannitius as a medical authority.

Another important patristic work that was available to thinkers at this time was Gregory of Nyssa’s *On the Making of Man* (*De conditione homine*), which had been translated into Latin by Denis the Little already in the sixth century and was translated again by John Scotus Eriugena in the ninth.[[31]](#footnote-32) In this work, Gregory’s primary concern is to define the status of the soul as God’s image. In this regard, he famously advocates the idea that the human being is the midpoint of the universe, or the mediator between God and creation.[[32]](#footnote-33) The mediator role derives from the ruling power of reason, which Gregory likens to that of a king ruling over his kingdom.[[33]](#footnote-34) On his account, this power is evidenced by the upright stature of the human body, which unlike other creaturely bodies is capable of looking not only to things below but also towards things above.[[34]](#footnote-35)

In offering this account, Gregory does not fail to mention the vegetable and sensitive functions, in addition to reason, which are responsible for growth and nutrition, on the one hand, and sense and motion, on the other.[[35]](#footnote-36) According to Gregory, these three represent three souls, including the vegetative and sensitive, which are ultimately welded together under the authority of the ‘proper’ rational soul.[[36]](#footnote-37) Although his discussion of medical material is basic by comparison to that of Nemesius and Damascus, Gregory does speak of a spirit responsible for the pumping of blood;[[37]](#footnote-38) and of the nutritive and growth functions that are enabled by the digestion of food.[[38]](#footnote-39) In the works of such authors, consequently, Latin thinkers possessed a witness and a model from the Christian tradition of engagement with medical material.

While numerous twelfth-century thinkers followed this example, the work of Cistercian authors in this regard proved particularly influential for Franciscans like John of La Rochelle.[[39]](#footnote-40) In his *The Nature of the Body and the Soul,* for instance, the Cistercian William of St Thierry (1085-1148) begins with a reference to the ancient physician Hippocrates, who held that four elements create four humors, the balance of which is necessary for the health of the body—and thereby the soul.[[40]](#footnote-41) William also speaks of the principal organs of the brain, the liver, and the heart; the three powers that correspond to them—the natural, spiritual, and animal—and the three different senses of ‘spirit’ which can be respectively correlated to them in turn.[[41]](#footnote-42) Likewise, he discusses the functions of nutrition, growth, and reproduction;[[42]](#footnote-43) and in the case of nutrition, he mentions the appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive functions.

From Galen, he cites the tripartition of the brain into the frontal, middle, and back lobes, which correspond to imagination, reason and memory, respectively.[[43]](#footnote-44) He also highlights the division between the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, which we have seen derived originally from Plato and remained in wide circulation throughout the Middle Ages.[[44]](#footnote-45) Finally, he mentions the triad of memory, understanding, and will, which comprise the image of God according to Augustine and enable the human being to perform the regal or ruling function that Gregory described, and so to serve as the midpoint of creation.[[45]](#footnote-46)

The ultimate goal of William’s treatise is to explain how a person moves through the seven stages of ascent to God. While earlier thinkers had treated this as a purely spiritual affair which if anything involves detachment from the body, William offers a more holistic picture in which the functions of the body—as outlined by the Galenic and other medical schemata—play a part in the process as well.[[46]](#footnote-47) In this regard, William’s Cistercian colleague Isaac of Stella took a step even further in seeking to classify the powers of the soul for their own sake.[[47]](#footnote-48) To this end, he incorporates many of the standard psychological schemata already mentioned: the Platonic;[[48]](#footnote-49) the Boethian, albeit with the addition of a fifth faculty of intellect;[[49]](#footnote-50) and the theory of a two-fold corporal spirit that mediates between body and soul.[[50]](#footnote-51)

Beyond these standard categories, Isaac introduces a rather rudimentary account of the levels of abstraction, which first involves sensation—or grasping a form in matter when it is present to the senses; imagination—or grasping a form in matter even when it is absent from the senses; and intellection—or grasping a form abstracted from matter.[[51]](#footnote-52) This scheme is also adopted in the *De spiritu et anima*.[[52]](#footnote-53) Although authorship of the latter work has long been attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux, McGinn observes that it was not associated with Alcher’s name in the twelfth century.[[53]](#footnote-54) On the grounds that it contains a rather heterogeneous compilation of psychological classifications, he concludes that it may even have been written by multiple authors.[[54]](#footnote-55) In his view, the only fact that can be asserted with reasonable certainty is that the author(s) worked in Cistercian circles after 1170.[[55]](#footnote-56)

By contrast, Mews continues to see the DSEA as a coherent synthesis of Alcher’s ideas, which was nonetheless attributed in the twelfth century to Hugh of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, and above all, Augustine.[[56]](#footnote-57) In the early thirteenth century, the attribution to Augustine was particularly prevalent amongst early Franciscans like John of La Rochelle, in spite of evidence to the contrary. For instance, Philip the Chancellor, who was responsible for activating interest in the work in the 1220s, attributed it to Isaac of Stella.[[57]](#footnote-58) The Dominican Guerric of St Quentin, writing in the late 1230s and early 1240s, stated explicitly that the work was not by Augustine, noting that it does not exhibit the Church Father’s style.[[58]](#footnote-59) As G. Théry further demonstrates, Albert the Great had rejected the Augustinian attribution before 1246, in his *Sentences* Commentary and in other works. He attributed it instead to a Cistercian that he called ‘William’.[[59]](#footnote-60) Albert’s student Thomas Aquinas followed suit and rejected the Augustinian provenance of the text.[[60]](#footnote-61)

As further evidence of the DSEA’s non-Augustinian authorship, Théry observes that the text is not mentioned in Augustine’s famous *Retractationes,* where the bishop reflected at the end of his life on everything he had written.[[61]](#footnote-62) Nor is it included in the *Indiculum* of Possidius, which also lists Augustine’s works. These resources would have been available to early Franciscans, which reconfirms, in Théry’s view, that they maintained the attribution to Augustine notwithstanding reasons to reject it. As further chapters of this book will demonstrate, a significant reason why early Franciscans sought to link this work to Augustine was that it eased their efforts to appropriate the philosophy of the Islamic scholar Avicenna in a way that seemed consistent with the longstanding Christian tradition.

Although Augustine had certainly developed his own account of cognition, a key function of human beings made in the image of God, he had not gone as far as Avicenna to provide what might be described as a metaphysics of cognition, or a sophisticated analysis of the kinds of powers the soul has, their operations, and their relationships to one another.[[62]](#footnote-63) The early Franciscans were eager to incorporate this metaphysics, presumably out of a desire to give a more robust account of the human status as God’s image. The large array of cognitive schemata contained in the *De spiritu et anima* provided a resource that enabled them to do so.[[63]](#footnote-64)

For the author of the *De spiritu et anima*, the human soul basically comprises two parts: the cognitive and the affective. The rational part entails the five faculties of sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence, while the latter includes the irrational and concupiscible powers which are the source of all passions or motivated reactions to sense objects.[[64]](#footnote-65) Thus the DSEA author attempts to integrate a revised version of the Boethian five-fold scheme with the Platonic tri-partite division of the soul.[[65]](#footnote-66) The Galenic categories are also the subject of several chapters, in which the author distinguishes between the natural or vegetative, spiritual, and animal powers, as well as the nutritive powers of appetite, retention, expulsion, and distribution.[[66]](#footnote-67)

In a section on the multiple meanings of the word ‘spirit’, the author contrasts the vital spirit, responsible for pumping blood, with the truly ‘spiritual’ spirit, that is, the highest part of the soul that is orientated towards God.[[67]](#footnote-68) The animal faculties are reprised according to the normal scheme related to the three ventricles of the brain—imagination in the front, reason in the middle, and memory in the back.[[68]](#footnote-69) In one chapter, the author refers to the common trope found in Nyssa, whereby the human organism is compared to a kingdom in which citizens are employed in the service of the prince.[[69]](#footnote-70) In addition, reference is made to the standard Augustinian distinctions between higher/lower reason;[[70]](#footnote-71) the exterior/interior man;[[71]](#footnote-72) and corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual vision, which is another way of speaking about sense, imagination, and reason.[[72]](#footnote-73)

Finally, memory, understanding, and will are listed as an image of the Trinity.[[73]](#footnote-74) Interestingly, however, there is no reference to free will (*liberum arbitrium*) in the entire work, which does not seem very concerned with addressing questions of human action.[[74]](#footnote-75) One of the most innovative triads introduced in this text, which was perhaps anticipated by Isaac’s division between God, the soul, and the self—which itself stems from Claudius Mamertus—is the distinction between things that are below, next to, and above the self, namely, creatures, angels, and God.[[75]](#footnote-76) Like William of Thierry, the DSEA ultimately integrates the levels of human physical being into a scheme that is ordered to enable ascent to God.[[76]](#footnote-77)

This distinguishes the more ‘spiritual’ writings of the Cistercians from the ‘scholastic’ texts that began to be written in this period, the first and foremost of which is the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. As a theologian, the Lombard limits his discussion of human nature and the soul to those topics that can be regarded as directly related to its relationship to God. While he acknowledges that the soul is joined to the body, like Augustine, he does not venture so far as to explain how.[[77]](#footnote-78) Instead, he elaborates on the nature of the human being as God’s image.[[78]](#footnote-79) This image exists in virtue of memory, understanding, and will. In this regard, the Lombard advocates the identity of the soul with its powers, a view he attributed to Augustine, which was also found in William of Thierry, the DSEA, and Isaac of Stella. By the same token, Lombard treats the human being as a moral subject capable of free will, and discusses the corruption of the will by sin.

This corruption occurs as a result of the tension between sensuality, which desires satisfaction for the body, and reason, which seeks what is best for the human being. In accordance with these two, the Lombard follows Augustine in dividing reason into higher and lower faculties, which are respectively ordered towards eternal and temporal things. In Lombard’s wake, the scholastic tradition became more formed by the questions he did and did not pose than by those proffered in other traditions, which were more religious or spiritual in their orientation. Thus, we find little interest in questions concerning the natural—vegetative and sensitive—powers of the soul in figures like Peter of Poitiers, Simon of Tournai, Stephen Langton, Robert Courçon, Praepositinus of Cremona, and even someone as late as William of Auxerre. As Châtillon notes, their theological interests were almost entirely moral in orientation: these figures inquired how doctrines facilitate the sacramental life.[[79]](#footnote-80)

The Translation Movement

As suggested above, the situation only changed under the impetus of the great translation movement of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, which saw many Greek philosophical works translated into Latin, most famously, the major works of Aristotle. Other translations produced during this time frame included a host of important works by Islamic and Jewish authors who originally wrote in Arabic, most significantly, the great *Book of the Cure* of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna. Although Avicenna’s massive text contained treatises on all the main topics Aristotle covered—metaphysics, physics, theology, logic, and the soul—he was not a mere commentator on Aristotle. This is evidenced by the fact that his works do not appear in the manuscript tradition together with Aristotle’s, as is the case with the works of Aristotle’s great commentator, Averroes.[[80]](#footnote-81)

As recent scholarship has shown, Avicenna’s works were more popular than Aristotle’s during the first century of the translation movement, namely, between 1150-1250, which coincides with the first fifty years before and after the University of Paris was founded.[[81]](#footnote-82) The immense interest Avicenna’s work garnered in this period was partly attributable to the fact that he covered traditional Aristotelian *topoi* in a nonetheless original way, which took advantage of discoveries in medicine and science that had been made since Aristotle’s time. As Dag Hasse has observed, Avicenna’s work was attractive, because it could be more easily harmonized with the medical works like the *Pantengi* than Aristotle’s.

While many key Aristotelian works, such as *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*,circulated in various and partial forms into the first half of the thirteenth century, moreover, Avicenna’s *Book of the Cure* had been translated in its entirety between 1152 and 1166.[[82]](#footnote-83) The popularity of the work came partly down to its accessibility. According to Dales, moreover, Latin scholars regarded the translation of Avicenna itself as superior in quality to the Greco-Latin translations of Aristotle that had been produced in the mid-to-late twelfth century, mostly by James of Venice, whose translation of *De anima* appeared before 1160.[[83]](#footnote-84) The perceived flaws in these early Aristotle translations supposedly discouraged direct consultation of them until William of Moerbeke revised them in the 1260s and onwards, with his rendition of *De anima* specifically appearing between 1260-69.[[84]](#footnote-85)

In addition to the Greco-Arabic translation of *De anima*, Michael Scot had produced a translation of this work from Arabic, which appeared in Paris around 1230 alongside Averroes’ Long Commentary on the *De anima*. As we will see, the Arabo-Latin translation was widely used by early scholastics including John, in part because it permitted an interpretation of Aristotle in line with Avicenna. While scholars working in the early thirteenth century relied heavily on Avicenna in his own right, those who flourished in its second quarter exhibited a rather different tendency, which Amos Bertolacci has described in terms of ‘reading Aristotle with Avicenna.’[[85]](#footnote-86)

In some cases, this method involved explicitly referring to Aristotle and Avicenna and affirming their agreement on a matter, or describing both interchangeably as ‘the philosopher.’[[86]](#footnote-87) While the Persian philosopher was sometimes quoted explicitly, scholastics of this period often simply offered a distinctly Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle, even attributing a quotation from Avicenna to Aristotle, without mentioning Avicenna’s name. In this regard, the fact that Avicenna was an Islamic philosopher seems to have been of no consequence for his Latin readers, who regarded him as a philosophical rather than a religious authority. The philosophy in question was nonetheless amenable to Latin Christian purposes, insofar as it was ‘open to Neoplatonic accretions in psychology and metaphysics, despite its strong Aristotelian basis in logic and natural philosophy.’[[87]](#footnote-88)

This Neo-Platonic component rendered Avicenna’s work liable to insertion as an interpretation of schemata presented in the pseudo-Augustinian DSEA, which like Augustine himself was subject to Neo-Platonic influences, while at the same time allowing for the projection of Avicenna on to Aristotle. The latter practice was encouraged by the belief—quite common in the preceding Greek and Arabic scholarly worlds—that Aristotle was himself a sort of Neo-Platonist, who supposedly authored the Neo-Platonic *Liber de causis*.[[88]](#footnote-89) This work was in fact a compilation based on the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus, which was identified as such by Aquinas in 1268. The inspiration for the work was the so-called *Theology of Aristotle,* which was not translated into Latin until the Renaissance, but which was influential for Arabic thinkers like Avicenna, who wrote a commentary on this text, which is based heavily on the *Enneads* of Plotinus.[[89]](#footnote-90)

The confusion around Aristotle apparently extended to the commentaries of Averroes, which as noted were available to Latin thinkers from 1230 but were not extensively utilized or at least well-grasped until the 1240s or even later, when Aristotle himself began to be studied in a more focused and informed way.[[90]](#footnote-91) The fact that both Aristotle and Augustine tended to be read in line with Avicenna in this period meant that early scholastics and Franciscans especially found it relatively easy to synthesize these two authorities as well, even though they generally recognized that the two thinkers operated—like Plato himself and Aristotle—in distinct spheres of expertise. As Dales summarizes, the author of the *Summa Halensis* ‘saw no incompatibility between the doctrines of Augustine and Aristotle, and he tried to harmonize them, usually by interpreting Aristotle in a sense consonant with Augustine.’[[91]](#footnote-92) The key to this strategy, we have seen, involved interpreting both Aristotle and Augustine along the lines of Avicenna, with the assistance of spurious Augustinian and Aristotelian works that supported this kind of Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism.

The most utilized work in this regard, Avicenna’s *De anima,* is divided into five sections which formed the structural basis for many subsequent Latin works on psychology, including the writings on the soul by John of La Rochelle. These sections cover the general definition of the soul (book one); the faculties of the vegetative soul and the five external senses except vision (book two); vision (book three); the five internal senses and the motive faculties (book four); and the rational soul (book five). What set this work apart from previous works on the same topic was that it treated many of the powers already discussed—such as the Platonic triad of rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers—but far exceeded earlier accounts in terms of the level of complexity at which it explained the processes of external sensation, internal sensation, otherwise called ‘imagination’, and intellection.

In addition to the highly influential views Avicenna held about the soul as a separate substance from the body, to be discussed in chapter three, Avicenna was famous for his five-fold account of internal sensation, which traced every step in the process of producing a mental image of a particular empirical object at a level of detail unimagined previously. With similar sophistication, Avicenna divided the intellectual work of abstracting a universal on the basis of that image into four phases, which he described as four intellects: the material, the intellect *in habitu*, the intellect *in effectu*, and the active intellect. Famously, he posited a separate active intellect to which the human intellect must be joined in order to succeed in abstraction.

As Hasse observes, two versions of the *De anima* circulated in this period, versions A and B. Version B is the basis for the modern edition, which nonetheless gives the variants from A. While John of La Rochelle in his *Summa de anima* and Albert the Great quoted from B, Rochelle in his *Tractatus*, Gundissalinus and Blund quoted A. This suggests that B was likely a reworked version of A.[[92]](#footnote-93) As noted already, the work itself was translated between 1152-66 by Dominicus Gundissalinus (c. 1115-post 1190) and Avendauth (c. 1110-c. 1180) who were some of the most prolific of the translators based in Toledo, Spain, which was a major center for Arabo-Latin translations in this period.[[93]](#footnote-94)

In addition to producing the Latin version of Avicenna, Avendauth and Gundissalinus are credited with the translation of more than twenty other Arabic works, including the *De intellectu* of Alfarabi and the *Fons vitae* of the Jewish philosopher Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), which had far more influence in the Latin West than it did in the Jewish world.[[94]](#footnote-95) Further to such translation projects, Gundissalinus wrote several works of his own, which extracted heavily from his translations and sought to re-present and synthesize some of the themes he found, especially in the writings of Avicenna and Avicebron.[[95]](#footnote-96) While Callus declared him to be a relatively uninteresting compiler for this reason, Hasse and Polloni among others have more recently highlighted the selective and intelligent nature of his compilations and their pivotal significance for transmitting key concepts from Arabic and Jewish philosophy to the Latin West.[[96]](#footnote-97)

The personal works of Gundissalinus include his early *De unitate et uno*, which waslikely written just after he translated Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae*,given the enthusiasm he expresses there for that work.[[97]](#footnote-98) The text was very popular in the Latin West, but it was falsely attributed to Boethius, until Thomas Aquinas identified that it was not authentic.[[98]](#footnote-99) In addition, Gundissalinus most likely is the author of a short treatise *De anima,* probably between 1170-75, whose account of the soul, its constitution and origins, is based largely on Avicenna’s *De anima.*[[99]](#footnote-100) Interestingly, only two authors—Albert the Great and Anonymous Gauthier, which I will discuss below—quote this work explicitly, which is extant in only six manuscripts.[[100]](#footnote-101)

Though the *De anima* does not seem to have circulated widely in the Latin by contrast to the Hebrew-speaking world, it remains significant nonetheless as the first historical instance of a view that would become popular amongst some Latin thinkers, namely, that God is the separate Agent Intellect of which Avicenna speaks.[[101]](#footnote-102) The work is also noteworthy for the way it integrates a position of Avicebron that Avicenna did not hold, namely, that everything except God—including spiritual substances like the soul—is comprised of matter and form. While Avicenna like Avicebron did affirm a plurality of substantial forms in every being, namely, the soul and the body, where the latter is composed of prime matter and the so-called ‘form of corporeity,’ he insisted on the complete simplicity of the soul, which is not subject to hylomorphic composition.

This position also recurs in Gundissalinus’ last work, *De processione mundi*,which appears to have been particularly influential amongst early scholastics, along with his *Division of Philosophy.* Like the *De anima*, albeit in different ways, the *De processione mundi* draws heavily on both Avicebron’s *Fons vitae* and the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna.[[102]](#footnote-103) As Polloni has shown, Gundissalinus here combines Avicebron’s universal hylomorphism with Avicenna’s modal ontology of necessary and possible beings, which culminates in a proof for a Necessary Existent, or God, who exists through himself.[[103]](#footnote-104) An interesting facet of Gundissalinus’ work in this context is that he adopts the version of Aristotle’s definition of the soul that had been articulated by Costa Ben Luca, or Constabulinus (864-923), a Syrian Christian, whose short work, *De differentia spiritus et animae*,originally written in Arabic, was translated by John of Seville around 1130.

In addition to working as a physician and philosopher, who incorporated the works of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and others, Costa Ben Luca was himself a translator of Greek works into Arabic.[[104]](#footnote-105) As numerous authors have noted, Costa was the primary influence behind Latin discussions of the term ‘spirit’ in the early scholastic period.[[105]](#footnote-106) Whereas Constantine had distinguished between three spirits, Costa identified two in the human body:

One is called vital; its nourishment or sustenance is air. It emanates from the heart, and from there it is sent by the pulses through the rest of the body, and it brings about life, pulse, and breath. The other…which is called animal...operates in the brain itself. Its nourishment is the vital spirit. It emanates from the brain, in which it brings about thought, memory, and foresight, and from there it is sent through the nerves to the other members of the body to bring about sense and motion.[[106]](#footnote-107)

As purely corporeal entities, these spirits are contained in the body and die when it does.[[107]](#footnote-108) By contrast, the soul is incorporeal, that is, not contained in the body, and can go on existing after the death of the body. The soul is the ultimate cause of sensation and life in the body. In this connection, Costa Ben Luca acknowledges not only Plato’s definition of the soul as an incorporeal substance that moves the body but also offers his own aforementioned rendition of Aristotle’s definition as follows: ‘the soul is the perfection of a natural organic body potentially having life.’[[108]](#footnote-109) As we have seen, however, Costa believes the soul can only serve in this regard remotely, or through the mediation of the spirit, which is the proximate cause of life, sense, and motion in the body. Thus, it is no surprise that Costa’s work was the principal source among the Latins for the notion that the soul must be united to the body through a medium. As Dales notes, his work was widely read and cited, and remained a significant influence on Latin thinkers alongside the *Fons vitae*.[[109]](#footnote-110)

Although it is not clear that the *Fons vitae* of the Jewish philosopher Avicebron (1021/2-1057/8) was read extensively by Latin thinkers, as only five manuscripts of the text are extant, his ideas were widely disseminated through the relevant writings of his translator, Gundissalinus, which circulated in many manuscripts.[[110]](#footnote-111) Albeit indirectly, we have learned, the *Fons vitae* exerted a far greater influence on Christian than Jewish thinkers, in part because it circulated under the Latin version of the author’s name, Avicebron, rather than the Jewish name of Ibn Gabirol.[[111]](#footnote-112) On this basis, some readers like William of Auvergne simply assumed that Avicebron was a Christian, or possibly a Muslim.[[112]](#footnote-113)

In the Latin-speaking world, Avicebron became famous for two main doctrines, which are nicely summarized by Weishepl, who sees them as ‘undoubtedly Judaic and directed against Muslim philosophers: 1. God produces everything not by necessity of nature but by a creative will (*voluntas creatrix*); 2. God’s infinite and transcendent simplicity is essentially different from the composed nature of every creature.’[[113]](#footnote-114) As Weishepl notes, Avicebron sought to refute the philosophical emanationism that was advocated by Islamic philosophers like Alfarabi, Alkindi, Avicenna, Algazel, and in the *Liber de causis*, ‘by making the Divine Will the supreme cause in the production of the universe.’[[114]](#footnote-115) On his understanding, ‘the cosmic process is not a necessary and impersonal flow or radiation of all things from the First Principle but a voluntary activity of the divine will.’[[115]](#footnote-116)

In affirming this, Weishepl elaborates, ‘Avicebron so emphasizes the supremacy of the Divine Will that God’s intellectuality and wisdom somehow get buried in his hidden transcendence and are not even attributed to God.’[[116]](#footnote-117) Nevertheless, Avicebron also speaks of the divine will in terms of the divine word. This was the basis on which William of Auvergne determined that his doctrine of divine will was consistent with the Christian doctrine of the *logos* and concluded that Avicebron must in fact be a Christian. More recently, Sarah Pessin has challenged the notion that he was a voluntarist and argued that he was more influenced by the Plotinian view that creation occurred by stages of emanation from God. In her view, voluntarism was projected on to him by Latin thinkers, above all, Franciscans, who wanted to give this kind of reading of Augustine, and therefore significantly exaggerated the Bishop’s own position in addition to distorting Avicebron’s.[[117]](#footnote-118) This is a compelling argument but not one that can be dealt with at length here.

The second view for which Avicebron became known was the idea that God alone is simple, and all creatures are composed. In the Latin tradition, this doctrine of ‘universal hylomorphism’ was interpreted in terms of Boethius’ distinction between *quod est* and *quo est*.[[118]](#footnote-119) As we will discover in subsequent chapters, however, there were many interpretations of what the *quod-quo est* composition could involve. For Avicebron, it meant that God was responsible for the initial creation of universal matter and universal form, from which all further beings are derived, such that they become composed of these two elements.

As noted above, this includes not only corporal beings—which are comprised of the form of corporeity and prime matter—but also the human soul and spiritual beings like angels, which are comprised of form and spiritual matter. According to Avicebron, there is a hierarchical arrangement of forms mediating between the soul and the body, which results in a plurality of forms in all beings. As Dales notes, this doctrine ‘was known to virtually every Latin scholastic of the thirteenth century and was accepted, sometimes with modifications, by many.’[[119]](#footnote-120) This brings us to the question of the process through which the translated materials, above all, Avicenna’s *De anima*, were absorbed in the Latin tradition and thereby had an impact on psychology in the first half of the thirteenth century.

The Latin Reception

As noted above, Gundissalinus was the first to appropriate Avicenna’s intellect theory in the West. As Hasse shows, however, his is more of a ‘collage of extracts from Avicenna,’ since he selects, combines, and omits pieces of information to suit his own preferences.[[120]](#footnote-121) The first substantial witness we have to the reception of Avicenna’s *De anima* in the scholastic context is John Blund, who was born no later than 1185 and died in 1248.[[121]](#footnote-122) He was the first master of the arts to write a treatise on the soul, though we do not know for certain if he did so in Paris or in Oxford.[[122]](#footnote-123) This work, his *De anima*,is extant in only one manuscript.[[123]](#footnote-124) The fact that Blund makes no reference to Averroes means that this work was written at a very early date, probably shortly after 1200 and no later than 1210.[[124]](#footnote-125)

As Callus notes, Blund is a good example of one who, for the most part, did not try to combine Avicenna with Aristotle or justify his use in terms of Augustine, but simply appropriated Avicenna.[[125]](#footnote-126) With the exception of a final section on free will, Blund’s treatise roughly follows the outline of Avicenna’s.[[126]](#footnote-127) The artist first covers what the soul is, or its definition; he then gives an overview of the differences between the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls and their powers; as well as the differences between the irascible and concupiscible powers.[[127]](#footnote-128) After a detailed discussion of the five external senses, he explains in turn the five internal senses, which he defines basically in Avicennian terms while at the same time engaging in his own exploratory discussion of each faculty.[[128]](#footnote-129)

Albeit briefly, he discusses Avicenna’s doctrine of the intellect, again, very much on his own terms and in line with his own interests.[[129]](#footnote-130) In his account, the first material intellect or intellect in potency is like prime matter, insofar as it is receptive to all forms but possesses none of them as yet. ‘Just as form completes matter by giving it a being in act,’ so John concludes that the next, ‘acquired intellect completes the material intellect by giving it being in effect.’[[130]](#footnote-131) This effectively eliminates the need for the intellect in effect and the agent intellect, which John nonetheless mentions, while more or less reducing Avicenna’s four phases of the intellect to two and generating an account that Hasse describes as ‘hardly Avicennian.’[[131]](#footnote-132) Indeed, the language he chooses to articulate his discussion, and his explanations of various concepts, are very much his own.

An author who was clearly influenced by Blund was Alexander Neckam (1157-1217), an older contemporary of his who worked and taught in both Paris and Oxford in the last quarter of the twelfth century. Around 1200, he wrote an incomplete work of theology, the *Speculum speculationum*,which was based largely on his notes from his time in Paris between 1175-82 and his time in Oxford in the 1190s.[[132]](#footnote-133) Although he discussed various problems of the soul in book three, he makes almost no reference to Aristotle. The one exception is his reference to Aristotle’s definition of the soul, which he takes from John Blund, whose version does not correspond verbatim with any of the known variations on Aristotle’s original.[[133]](#footnote-134) This in fact is one of the grounds on which Callus establishes that Neckam borrowed from his younger colleague rather than the other way around.[[134]](#footnote-135)

Another work of relevance was dedicated to Alexander Neckam by his friend Alfred Sarashel, who probably wrote his *De motu cordis* in 1200 at the earliest and 1217 at latest—most likely around 1210-15.[[135]](#footnote-136) As an Englishman, Sarashel had moved to Spain to work in Toledo and was therefore heavily influenced by the developments in science and philosophy that came through the translation of Arabic texts. The title of his work suggests an interest in the theme introduced by Costa Ben Luca concerning a vital spirit responsible for the pumping of blood through the heart as the means to the body’s enlivenment. Although Neckam and Sarashel are clearly not unaware of Aristotle and natural philosophy more generally, they exhibit a more guarded approach to themes from his thought which may simply suggest they had other interests. Alternatively, their hesitation could also be a sign that they were anticipating the condemnation of the books of natural philosophy that came into effect from 1210 and remained so for around twenty years.

The 1210 condemnation was issued by a provincial council in Paris which forbade public lecturing on Aristotle’s books of natural philosophy or commentaries on those books, which probably implicated Avicenna. The penalty for contravening the ban was excommunication.[[136]](#footnote-137) The objects of the condemnation included certain members of the arts faculty at Paris: the by then deceased Amaury of Bène and his followers, and David of Dinant. These scholars were accused, respectively, of advocating pantheism—the idea that everything is God—and materialism—or the idea that the soul is not a spiritual substance—and of doing so on the basis of Aristotle’s metaphysical, physical and biological writings.

In August 1215, Robert Courçon, the Legate of Pope Innocent III, re-iterated the prohibition of lectures on Aristotle’s writings on metaphysics and natural philosophy and refused permission to write summae on them at Paris, citing again the threat of excommunication. As Bianchi highlights, Robert had served as a master of theology in the first decade of the thirteenth century and was therefore well-acquainted with the reasons for the 1210 condemnations.[[137]](#footnote-138) These had much to do with a hostility or at least timidity towards Aristotle amongst members of the theology faculty. As noted already, members of this generation of theology masters scarcely touched themes from the new philosophical works. This is true for instance of Peter the Chanter, Stephen Langton, Peter Comestor, Godfrey of Poitiers, and Robert of Courçon himself, most of whom focused on more moral and sacramental themes.[[138]](#footnote-139)

At the same time Robert issued the condemnation, he also prescribed a number of other texts as required reading for all students of the arts—though interestingly, not for theology.[[139]](#footnote-140) These texts included Aristotle’s logic, which increasingly took the place previously occupied by grammar and literature in the arts curriculum.[[140]](#footnote-141) Aristotle’s *Ethics*, Books I-III of which were available at the time, could be taken effectively as an ‘elective’.[[141]](#footnote-142) Although scholars could not teach Aristotle’s natural philosophy at this time, therefore, there are signs that they were reading his and related works from very early on.[[142]](#footnote-143)

When Pope Gregory IX wrote on 7 July 1228 to warn ‘the masters in theology at Paris against adulterating the Word of God with philosophical inventions,’[[143]](#footnote-144) consequently, he apparently did not seek to inhibit the use of philosophy but only to insist that it be used in the service of theology.[[144]](#footnote-145) According to Bianchi, the letter may also have served as a warning to theologians not to tread too far into the territory of the arts masters.[[145]](#footnote-146) This was something they perhaps felt entitled to do, as the arts degree, which heavily incorporated philosophy, was the main form of preparation for higher studies in theology.[[146]](#footnote-147)

Around this same time, key members of the theology faculty began to integrate Aristotle with the Christian tradition to the degree their theology allowed it. The favour Gregory showed these theologians, including William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and William of Auvergne, confirms that he had no objection to using Aristotle within appropriate limits.[[147]](#footnote-148) The case of William of Auvergne is especially striking, given that Gregory appointed him as Bishop of Paris in 1228, in full knowledge of the extent to which he engaged with Avicenna and Aristotle, though William like others at the time did this entirely on his own terms.[[148]](#footnote-149) Gregory’s congenial attitude towards the Arab interpreters of Aristotle is further reflected in his praise for Michael Scot, who was responsible for introducing Averroes and the Arabo-Latin translation of Aristotle to the West.[[149]](#footnote-150)

Ultimately, it is apparent in his own use of the Avicennian doctrine of the ‘two faces of the soul’, which he like many others at the time—particularly William of Auvergne and early Franciscans[[150]](#footnote-151)—read in terms of Augustine’s distinction between higher and lower reason.[[151]](#footnote-152) When the University of Paris dispersed in 1229, following a strike of the students and masters, Gregory notably did not impose the ban on other universities like Oxford and Toulouse, which he had a hand in founding, and to which many Parisian masters fled, even though he easily could have done so.[[152]](#footnote-153) In a letter dated 13 April 1231, known as *Parens scientiarum,* Gregory admitted that the *Libri naturales* contained useful material and gave arts masters the power to determine their own curriculum, in what was surely an attempt to summon scholars back to his ‘prize’ university at Paris and thus to end the strike.[[153]](#footnote-154) As Valeria Buffon notes, he also ‘absolved or allowed the bishops to absolve those excommunicated by the 1210-15 regulations,’[[154]](#footnote-155) effectively rendering them null and void.

A mere ten days later, on 23 April, he set up a commission to undertake the work of checking the books of natural philosophy for errors so that they could be used in an appropriate way.[[155]](#footnote-156) The haste with which he assembled this team seemingly shows what a high priority it was for him to facilitate Aristotle’s usage. The committee consisted of three theologians: William of Auxerre, Simon d’Authie, and Etienne de Provins, to whom Michael Scot probably dedicated one of his translations of Averroes and Aristotle. Nevertheless, the work of checking Aristotle was never completed.[[156]](#footnote-157) Although the death of William of Auxerre in November 1231 probably had something to do with this, the Pope might have installed a new leader of the commission to finish the job.[[157]](#footnote-158)

However, there is no evidence that he made any attempt to do this, or indeed that any work was ever undertaken by the original committee towards purging Aristotle of errors. In the past, this has been attributed to the arrival of Averroes’ works in 1230, which would have rendered the size of the task much larger than originally anticipated and even impossible.[[158]](#footnote-159) According to Gauthier’s much-contested thesis, however, Averroes’ works may have been known in Paris as early as 1225.[[159]](#footnote-160) Moreover, Gregory’s decrees do not refer to the Arab commentators explicitly, so technically speaking, the commission was evidently not responsible to purge their works as well.[[160]](#footnote-161) All of this suggests that the Pope simply may not have been entirely insistent upon the need to correct Aristotle.

The ambiguity of the situation allowed for increased use of Aristotle from at least 1231 onwards, though not altogether without resistance from some camps. In fact, some scholars maintain that the ban remained in effect, at least to a degree, until 1241, when Gregory died.[[161]](#footnote-162) In his work, for instance, Bataillon enumerates numerous criticisms of philosophy’s use in theology that can be found in university sermons dated from the 1230s. As late as 1242, the Dominican theologian Hugh of St Cher warned against the study of philosophy, which in his view contributes to pride and idle curiosity and thereby inhibits growth in genuine wisdom and understanding, which can only be found in Christ.[[162]](#footnote-163)

The rationale behind this word of caution may however have been the condemnations of 1241/4, in which a few key ideas, such as the negation of any final vision of God in the afterlife, were condemned, which had presumably resulted from a theologically distorted reading of some of the new philosophical material rather than from the reading of that material as such.[[163]](#footnote-164) For his part, Hugh’s teacher Roland of Cremona expressed the opinion – already articulated by the arts master like John Blund – that theologians should focus on questions concerning the merits and demerits of the soul and leave it to the philosophers to deal with the specific aspects of its nature and its relation to the body.[[164]](#footnote-165) For him, as for many from the time of Lombard, it was enough to acknowledge that such a relationship did exist without delving into its technicalities.[[165]](#footnote-166)

While the Dominicans exhibited a somewhat restrained attitude towards the use of philosophy, John of La Rochelle defended it enthusiastically in a sermon delivered to Franciscans in 1243.[[166]](#footnote-167) Although he acknowledged there that the study of philosophy must be ordered towards achieving the goals of theology, he invited and indeed urged his listeners to see it as essential to developing a robust and well-articulated Christian theology.[[167]](#footnote-168) Whatever initial hesitations there may have been regarding philosophy, his work signals that theologians and not only artists were starting to take an interest in the newly translated philosophical works during this period. In the arts faculty itself, these efforts resulted in a completely reorganized curriculum which was released by the arts masters themselves in 1255.[[168]](#footnote-169)

This new curriculum centred around all the known writings of Aristotle, including his metaphysics and works on natural philosophy, with the exception of *Politics* and *Poetics*,which still awaited translation; apocrypha like *De causis*,and Costa Ben Luca’s *De differentia spiritus et animae* were also required reading.[[169]](#footnote-170) The reason for the delay in the full incorporation of Aristotle along these lines, Bianchi rightly notes, was simply that grappling with Aristotle required a great deal of time and the careful study of his works alongside the commentaries of Averroes. That study could and surely did begin from at least the 1240s, but took time to culminate in the release of the new curriculum in the middle of the century.

Although the condemnations largely succeeded in squelching much written evidence of engagement with the new philosophical resources before this time, especially between 1210-30, two anonymous works from this period stand out for their employment of philosophy. The first, *De anima et de potenciis eius*,edited by René A. Gauthier, and hereafter Anonymous Gauthier, was evidently written by an arts master, after 1224 and before 1227-28, for reasons based on internal evidence which Gauthier delineates.[[170]](#footnote-171) Aside from Blund, this is the only arts text before 1240 representing the psychological tradition.[[171]](#footnote-172)

The author of the text is clearly informed about Avicenna and seeks to outline his theory of knowledge, if only briefly and in his own words. Following Avicenna, he starts with the definition of the soul, citing Aristotle’s definition in the Greco-Latin translation.[[172]](#footnote-173) He then enumerates the powers of the soul, having found five in Aristotle (vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motive, intellectual) and three in Avicenna (vegetative, sensitive, rational).[[173]](#footnote-174) He explains how cognitive acts can be distinguished, by order, by object, by organ or instrument, as well as *secundum rem* and *secundum cognitionem*.[[174]](#footnote-175)

The artist also differentiates between active and passive powers, which are mentioned obliquely by Aristotle and explicitly by Averroes. He then mentions the vegetative powers (nutrition, augmentation, generation);[[175]](#footnote-176) the external senses; Avicenna’s five internal senses; the motive—irascible and concupiscible—powers;[[176]](#footnote-177) and the rational power, in which context he treats Avicenna’s theory of the four intellects.[[177]](#footnote-178) In this connection, he emphatically rejects Avicenna’s theory of a separate Agent Intellect, affirming that this subsists in the human mind.[[178]](#footnote-179) The only reference to any remotely theological *topos* comes at the end where he mentions the distinction between higher reason and *synderesis*, which he identifies with Aristotle’s practical reason.[[179]](#footnote-180)

The second treatise, the anonymous *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, edited by Daniel Callus, hereafter Anonymous Callus, was very obviously influenced by Anonymous Gauthier both in terms of its structure and content. Callus dates the text between 1220-30. However, Gauthier makes a case that the text was probably written between 1228-32, on the ground that it was used by Philip the Chancellor in a version of his *Summa de bono* produced in 1232 and by John of La Rochelle, in his *Tractatus* written between 1233-39.[[180]](#footnote-181) The attraction for these authors was partly that Anonymous Callus was clearly written by a theologian, possibly English, who makes major changes and additions to Anonymous Gauthier’s structure in order represent his own interests.[[181]](#footnote-182)

For example, he omits the first section containing Aristotle’s definition of the soul, while preserving the criteria for distinguishing the powers of the soul in terms of their organ or instrument; object, order, essence or nature (*secundum rem*), and reason (*secundum cognitionem*).[[182]](#footnote-183) He also maintains the distinction between an active or a passive potency.[[183]](#footnote-184) Although he mentions the basic three-fold distinction between the vegetable, sensible, and rational powers, ‘like many other theologians, he misses out the vegetative faculties, and then goes through the Avicennian external and internal senses, the different kinds of intellects and the motive faculties.’[[184]](#footnote-185) Similar to Anonymous Gauthier, however, he does so briefly and in his own words. Here, ‘the author gives a more accurate account of the intellect but omits the fourth intellect and adds in other components of axiomatic theory from Western logic and theology.’[[185]](#footnote-186) As we will discover, this creative discussion, also found in Gauthier, was extremely influential for John of La Rochelle.

Another significant departure concerns the entire second part of the work, which covers theological and moral topics and has no parallel in Anonymous Gauthier, which deals only with natural powers. We find a similar treatise at the end of John of La Rochelle’s *Tractatus*. In this section, the author starts with a distinction between higher and lower reason, which is moved by sensuality, and a reference to *synderesis*, which orders higher reason, as well as the irascible and concupiscible powers that are involved in the process.[[186]](#footnote-187) He introduces the distinction between an innate, infused, or acquired habit which is picked up by Franciscans not least in the *Summa Halensis.*[[187]](#footnote-188) He then launches into a treatment of grace and the four cardinal and three theological virtues;[[188]](#footnote-189) the spiritual gifts; the beatitudes, the fruits of the spirit, and so on.

There is also a distinction which will prove key to the opening section of the *Summa Halensis* which distinguishes between the modes of taste (*gustus*) and vision (*visus*). Wisdom comes through the former and understanding through the latter.[[189]](#footnote-190) Thus the need for what the Summa, following this text, calls purity of heart (*munditia cordis*), in a move that ultimately identifies the supreme encounter with God as an affective more than a cognitive experience.[[190]](#footnote-191) As Hasse has observed, ‘this treatise is one of the earliest examples of a *divisio potentiae animalis'* (or *animae*) which appears in later theologians such as Jean de la Rochelle…the *Alexandri* and Albertus Magnus; it has been shown, in fact, that Jean de la Rochelle's *Tractatus* quotes our author.’[[191]](#footnote-192)

In his edition, however, Callus observes that John’s quotations from the text are either borrowed without acknowledgement or noted under the name of anonymous ‘alii’ (others), and they are more numerous in the *Summa de anima* than in the *Tractatus*. ‘The extreme literalness with which he handles his source shows that he had a copy before him.’[[192]](#footnote-193) This brings us to John of La Rochelle himself, whose importance lies in the fact that he was the first Latin author to undertake a full-scale appropriation of Avicenna’s psychology. One might even go further to suggest that his purpose in writing was to provide a Christian counterpart to the theory of the soul found in Avicenna’s *De anima.* This account also benefitted from all the other intellectual currents mentioned above, which happened to converge at the time he was writing. Thus it is with good reason that numerous authors, including Callus, Brady and Michaud-Quantin, have reached the conclusion ‘that John of La Rochelle was the first to give a systematic classification of the powers of the soul’[[193]](#footnote-194)

**2. Theological Background: Early Masters at the University of Paris**

In the famous encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of 1879, Pope Leo XIII summoned Catholic scholars to engage in a new wave of research on the history of medieval thought, in order to recover the philosophical resources that scholars from this period had to offer for the purpose of mounting a defense of the faith in the face of the rising threat of secularism.[[194]](#footnote-195) This call initially inspired scholarship focused mainly on Thomas Aquinas, who was perceived as the best resource for combating modern intellectual trends and remains perhaps the best studied medieval thinker to this day. However, the encyclical also revitalized research on other key thinkers of the period, such as Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, whose works were prepared in major critical editions.

In due course, scholars also turned their attention to the currents of thought that anticipated the rise of high scholasticism and especially Thomism. Their work in this regard gave rise to much valuable research on the generation of theologians that worked before Aquinas, during the first fifty years of the existence of the first ‘official’ university at Paris. However, it was accompanied by a tendency rather pejoratively to describe such early scholastics as mere ‘pre-Thomists,’ who supposedly only inchoately introduced lines of thought that Aquinas developed at a whole new level of sophistication.[[195]](#footnote-196) As a result, research on this generation was largely set to the side and remained niche after the trends that led to the development of Thomism were deemed to be sufficiently understood.

With this context in view, the subsequent chapters of this volume will endeavor to show that the Parisian theologians who worked before Aquinas were no mere forerunners to him. Rather they formulated and debated a set of questions, not least in the field of psychology, which drew inspiration from the new natural philosophy of the Arabs in ways that were distinctive in their time and indeed from the approach of Aquinas. As part of this conversation, John was not an isolated figure but a member of a lively religious and scholarly community in which ideas were constantly exchanged. At the same time, however, he advanced considerably beyond his contemporaries in addressing the standard questions of the day on the soul, to which scholars gave a nonetheless wide range of answers.

Furthermore, John boldly reckoned with an altogether new set of questions, for instance, about the work of human sensation and cognition. The conversation amongst his colleagues was crucial precisely because it created a sort of laboratory which allowed for the emergence of his distinctive ideas and innovations. These soon became associated with the Franciscan tradition, to which that founded by Aquinas is often contrasted, and thus John continued to have an impact on his order’s scholarship for generations. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for illustrating the momentous nature of John’s contribution to psychology, by outlining the unique role that both he and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries played in the development of their discipline of theology at Paris.[[196]](#footnote-197) This will become clearer through the brief account of their lives and works offered below.[[197]](#footnote-198)

William of Auxerre

As a secular master at the early University of Paris, William of Auxerre may have been a teacher of John of La Rochelle. In the previous chapter, we saw that he was one of the three scholars summoned to examine the books of Aristotle, though his involvement in this work was cut short by his death in 1231.[[198]](#footnote-199) William’s *Summa aurea* exists in two versions, one written between 1215-26, and one between 1226-29.[[199]](#footnote-200) As the editor of this text indicates, William did far more than write a mere commentary on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, as some others were doing at the time. Although he broadly follows the structure of this work, treating God, creation, the Incarnation, and sacraments in that order, he introduced many new themes in the process. In this regard, he does not however delve into many philosophical questions, despite having access to Aristotle and Avicenna, whose work he does not seem to know well.[[200]](#footnote-201) Instead, he limits himself mostly to questions that could be foreseen on the basis of the prior theological and moral tradition, which he in many respects codifies. For this reason, his work was very influential for all subsequent early scholastics, many of whom quote him extensively.[[201]](#footnote-202) The huge popularity of William of Auxerre is confirmed in the fact that there are over 120 manuscripts of the *Summa aurea* and many abbreviations of the text dating to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Philip the Chancellor

Philip the Chancellor (1160-1236) was a secular master in the University of Paris, whose major work, the *Summa de bono*, was probably written between 1228-36, towards the end of a long career in the University of Paris.[[202]](#footnote-203) The fact that twelve manuscripts of the text survive from the thirteenth century alone suggests that Philip was a highly influential figure.[[203]](#footnote-204) As a theologian, he was one of the first to embrace the new works of natural philosophy. In this connection, he shows keen awareness of Aristotle, including the *De anima,* though not yet much understanding of the philosopher’s writings. Like many other thinkers at the time, his reading of Aristotle is mediated mostly by Avicenna. He was one of the first to mention Averroes, albeit only a couple of times.[[204]](#footnote-205)

True to its name, the *Summa de bono* concerns itself firstly with the good in general, and the good of natural beings, including angels, corporeal creatures, and humans, before moving on to deal with the good diminished through sin, the moral good in general, the good of grace, and the means of achieving these goods through the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues, and the gifts of Holy Spirit. The material that is most relevant to the topic of this book is found in Philip’s treatment of the human soul.[[205]](#footnote-206) This section covers the definition of the soul, the powers of the soul, the soul as the image and likeness of God, the origin of the soul, the immortality of the soul, the greatness of the soul, its union with the body, and its location and temporality.[[206]](#footnote-207)

In his account, Philip situates these issues within a broader context in which knowing the good is the means to acting in accordance with it. Thus, he focuses not so much on the cognitive as the motive powers of the soul, above all, free will, and the so-called irascible and concupiscible powers that fuel or deter its activities.[[207]](#footnote-208) Such powers are dealt with at great length, in over 80 pages of what is ultimately only an approximately 150-page treatise on the soul in the edition. The remaining sections are nonetheless interesting for the way they edge into questions that could be derived from Aristotle via Avicenna, although generally only so far as it seemed justifiable in terms of Philip’s theological or moral agenda.

As Magdalena Bieniak has observed, for instance, Philip was the first theologian to incorporate questions about the sensitive and vegetative powers into the scope of theological inquiries that had normally focused on the rational powers which were regarded as the locus of God’s image.[[208]](#footnote-209) Such questions, which came to the Latin tradition through Blund and Gundissalinus, included whether the three powers—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—are three substances or one; and whether the soul is identical with its rational powers of memory, understanding, and will. To these and other questions, Philip is rather famous for giving somewhat ambiguous answers. Still, he is important as the first theologian to pose the questions, which greatly influenced his later contemporaries, not least John of La Rochelle.[[209]](#footnote-210)

Alexander of Hales

Alexander of Hales (1184-1245) was a contemporary of Philip the Chancellor and a prominent member of the Paris faculty of theology. Although an Englishman, he undertook his education in Paris and likely assumed a chair in theology in 1220-21.[[210]](#footnote-211) His major works include a four-volume Gloss on Lombard’s *Sentences*, completed prior to 1227.[[211]](#footnote-212) This Gloss was only the second of its kind, after that of Stephen Langton.[[212]](#footnote-213) Such Glossae would usually provide only terse comments about points originally raised or authoritative opinionsquoted by Master Peter Lombard. However, Alexander goes further in seeking to develop some of his own theological positions. Still, he does so in a cursory style and does not always provide significant detail on the topics he covers. This is partly because his Gloss is based upon student lecture notes that were not corrected later by Alexander himself.

In addition to his Gloss, Alexander composed numerous disputed questions which were probably based on his teaching activity in the university. Three edited volumes of these date to the time before he became a Franciscan friar in 1236 (‘antequam esset frater’).[[213]](#footnote-214) As Osborne has noted, Alexander entered the order towards the end of a long career in which he had taught many Franciscan students, whose school was founded in 1231, and from whom he evidently learned that his fundamental theological positions had much in common with the Franciscan ethos.[[214]](#footnote-215) Although Alexander also wrote disputed questions after he became a friar (‘postquam esset frater’[[215]](#footnote-216)), some of which have recently been edited, his ‘basic theological positions therefore remained quite constant throughout his authentic writings.’[[216]](#footnote-217)

While he was working on his Gloss, between 1223-27, Alexander grouped the many chapters of its four books into a smaller number of distinctions. Stephen Langton had already done something similar in dividing the chapters of the Bible.[[217]](#footnote-218) This facilitated efforts to employ the *Sentences*, in addition to the Bible, as a basis for lectures and disputations in the university, a practice that Alexander himself championed from as early as 1223.[[218]](#footnote-219) Initially, English scholars like Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon opposed this move, claiming that it undermined the authority of the Bible, or at least the priority the Bible was given in the morning lecture timetable. Nevertheless, Alexander persevered in establishing the *Sentences* as a central fixture of university theological education.[[219]](#footnote-220)

As a result of his efforts, the practice of commenting on the *Sentences* that began in the 1220s became a normal part of university tradition by the 1230s and 40s, until it finally became the condition for gaining the title of ‘master in theology,’ that is, the medieval equivalent to a doctoral degree. Increasingly, such commentaries served as the basis for more elaborate theological reflections that can be found in early Summae.[[220]](#footnote-221) For a long time, Alexander was also credited with the so-called *Summa fratris Alexandri* (‘Summa of brother Alexander’) or *Summa Halensis*, though it is now clear that he only oversaw the project.[[221]](#footnote-222)

The reason for the longstanding attribution to Alexander was that he was master of the Franciscan school at Paris during its composition; he obtained this position on joining the order in 1236. At this point in time, Alexander secured for the Franciscan house of studies the permanent chair that he occupied in the theology faculty, a post he either passed on to John of La Rochelle in 1241 or held independently of John’s status until 1245, when both passed away. At this time, Odo Rigaldus took over the post of regent master of the by then well-established Franciscan school in Paris and was himself succeeded by William of Melitona.[[222]](#footnote-223)

In 1255, William was commanded by the Pope to complete the fourth volume of the *Summa Halensis,* on the sacraments, which had not been written before John and Alexander’s deaths. Even before its completion, however, the positions codified in this Summa provided a basis for Franciscan education and continued to do so at least through the time of Duns Scotus.[[223]](#footnote-224) As further chapters of the book will evidence, the Summa was the first to incorporate the new philosophical resources of Aristotle and Avicenna extensively. As such, it became a prototype for the work of later Summa authors, including Thomas Aquinas, who also sought to incorporate philosophical inquiries into the course of the theological Summa.[[224]](#footnote-225)

Roland of Cremona

Roland of Cremona (d. 1269) was the first Dominican master at Paris, who read the *Sentences* of Lombard under John of St Giles, a chair in theology at the university who famously assumed the Dominican habit in the course of preaching a sermon.[[225]](#footnote-226) Roland obtained his license to teach in 1229 or 1230 from Philip the Chancellor, who was then Chancellor of the University.[[226]](#footnote-227) After a brief year in Paris, he moved to Toulouse where he taught until 1233 or 1234. In Paris, he was replaced by Hugh of St Cher, who studied under Roland himself and who taught there from 1230/31-1235/36, composing his Commentary on Lombard’s *Sentences* during this period. According to Filtaut, Roland probably wrote his own magisterial Summa in Italy, where he moved in 1234, because he does not show awareness of the compilation of Raymond of Peñafort which was completed in 1234.[[227]](#footnote-228)

Although Roland was a senior colleague to Hugh, Odon Lottin concluded after comparing some short selections from the two authors’ works that Roland had been influenced by Hugh rather than the other way around.[[228]](#footnote-229) Further support for this hypothesis can be found in the textual tradition of Roland’s Summa, which evidently had very limited influence and diffusion, not least in Paris.[[229]](#footnote-230) As Riccardo Quinto has shown more recently, however, any similarities between Hugh and Roland can be largely explained by their common dependence on William of Auxerre.[[230]](#footnote-231) Nevertheless, Bieniak notes that Hugh wrote his questions after his *Sentences* Commentary, which means we cannot rule out the possibility that he knew Roland’s Summa before composing them.[[231]](#footnote-232)

In addition to the inspiration he drew from the *Summa aurea*,Roland is obviously aware also of Aristotle and was the first to call the *Liber de causis* by this name rather than speaking of it as the *Liber de pura bonitate*.[[232]](#footnote-233) As noted already, this work was translated by Gerard of Cremona in Toledo around 1170 and was universally attributed to Aristotle both in the Arabic and Latin traditions until Aquinas recognized in 1268 that it is actually a Neo-Platonic amalgam of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*.[[233]](#footnote-234) Another important source for Roland was Avicenna and particularly his theory of cognition.[[234]](#footnote-235) Roland rehearses the philosopher’s theories of external and internal sensation as well as the doctrine of the agent intellect, which his colleagues and predecessors had been mostly too shy to discuss.[[235]](#footnote-236)

That said, he does this only briefly and in a squarely moral context, which pertains to questions about how cognition can lead to sin. As regards reason, his main concern is to ensure that it avoids evil and functions to defend the faith.[[236]](#footnote-237) On this and other topics, his work is distinguished by the frequent use of biblical examples, which are not found so frequently in other scholastic texts from this generation. The brevity of his discussion of the soul’s powers, he states explicitly, is due to the fact that such philosophical matters are not or should not be the primary concern of a theologian.[[237]](#footnote-238) As we will soon discover, however, Roland, as well as Hugh, addressed a number of the philosophical questions that Philip initially introduced. This is not surprising, given the likelihood that Philip would have interacted with the Dominicans and others who were his contemporaries and colleagues at the University of Paris. In fact, Philip spoke highly of the preachers in his sermons.[[238]](#footnote-239)

Hugh of St Cher

As noted above, Hugh of St Cher (b. c. 1190/1200-1263) wrote a *Sentences* Commentary, probably in 1229-31, and subsequently, most likely in the first half of the 1230s, a series of thirty-six disputed questions, including the disputed question on the soul which will be considered in this book.[[239]](#footnote-240) When Hugh became a Dominican between 1224-26, he was already a bachelor in theology and had evidently been in Paris for some time, probably since 1210-15.[[240]](#footnote-241) As stated above, he taught theology from 1230-35;[[241]](#footnote-242) he then became the first Dominican Cardinal in 1244 and remained in this position until his death in 1263.[[242]](#footnote-243)

Hugh’s name has often been associated with the Dominican Postilles, which are generally described as biblical commentaries, but his personal authorship of the work is contested.[[243]](#footnote-244) As Robert Lerner has noted, it is more likely that a team of friars worked on this project and others, such as a concordance to Scripture, in the 1230s, under Hugh’s direction.[[244]](#footnote-245) In Lerner’s view, the case for multiple authorship is supported not only by the immense size of the work but also by the fact that it contains a diversity of opinions, not to mention many rather off-handed remarks to which the label of ‘biblical commentary’ does not do justice.[[245]](#footnote-246)

According to Lerner, ‘postill’ is merely a term of convenience which refers to the kind of ‘continuous biblical commentary produced in the schools.’[[246]](#footnote-247) As Magdalena Bieniak adds, these postills associated with Hugh are a valuable witness to the sense of solidarity and vocation that the Dominicans shared with the Franciscans.[[247]](#footnote-248) ‘The positive references to the Franciscans show that the Dominicans of St Jacques recognized them as a sister order that shared a common cause.’[[248]](#footnote-249) That is not to deny that the two orders had distinct charisms and missions; however, their intellectual traditions were clearly closely intertwined at this time.

When Aristotle came to the fore, and was adopted by Aquinas, and before him, Albert the Great, Dominicans started to follow a different trajectory from the Franciscans. As we will see, there were some cases in which the Franciscans continued to promulgate positions they had encountered first in their early Dominican contemporaries. These latter thinkers, as Lerner has noted, were closer as a school to Peter the Chanter (d. 1197) than Albert the Great.[[249]](#footnote-250) The difference of twenty-five years or so—and their location, namely Paris, by contrast to the Cologne of Albert and the early Thomas—made a significant difference.

When it comes to cognitive theory, Hugh like William of Auxerre more or less avoided the topic of the vegetative and sense powers in his *Sentences* Commentary.[[250]](#footnote-251) As Bieniak notes, Auxerre was a major source for Hugh, who may have attended William’s lectures.[[251]](#footnote-252) Like many of his contemporaries, Hugh often ‘copies long passages of his source [i.e. Auxerre] verbatim, but only to give them his own interpretation or an independent solution.’[[252]](#footnote-253) He also clearly knew the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales.[[253]](#footnote-254) While Hugh mentions the external and internal senses briefly, this reference has no real effect on his psychology, which focuses on dealing with what were at the time entirely traditional topics.[[254]](#footnote-255) That said, Hugh did insist that it is part of the work of the theologian to treat the nature of the soul.[[255]](#footnote-256) What exactly he argued in this respect will emerge in the next couple of chapters.

Guerric of St Quentin

The Dominican Guerric of St Quentin held a chair in theology between around 1233/5, which had been acquired by his order when the secular master John of St Giles became a friar in 1230. This was a second Dominican chair to the one that Roland had acquired in 1229. In this role, Guerric served as the fourth Dominican Regent Master of St Jacques and remained in this post until 1242.[[256]](#footnote-257) He was surely one of the theologians implicated in the condemnation of 1241, after which he seemingly changed his position on the beatific vision.[[257]](#footnote-258) Interestingly, he influenced not only other Dominicans but also Franciscans; he also commented on the whole Bible.[[258]](#footnote-259)

Along with Alexander of Hales, he is often described as one of the innovators of the Quodlibetal questions.[[259]](#footnote-260) These public debates, held twice a year during Christmas and Easter, generally included all faculty members and students, and gave attendees the opportunity to ask ‘any question whatever’ (quodlibet), which would be addressed in an initial session by a bachelor and in a second session by the master. Of Guerric’s many works, only his seven quodlibetal questions have been critically edited, by Principe. The disputed questions he addressed, almost certainly in lecture format, on Lombard’s *Sentences*, as well as on other topics, remain unedited but surely overlap with the quodlibets in terms of some of the main topics they cover.[[260]](#footnote-261)

William of Auvergne

William of Auvergne (c. 1190-1249) was a secular master who taught at the University of Paris from at least 1225 and served as bishop of Paris from 1228 until his death in 1249. He is among the scholars of this era who engaged most closely with figures like Avicenna and Avicebron.[[261]](#footnote-262) He wrote more than twenty works, most of which formed part of his great *Magisterium divinale et sapientale*,which includes seven distinct treatises and exists in a serviceable early modern edition.[[262]](#footnote-263) One of these treatises is the *De anima*,which was likely the last work he wrote, around 1235-40 or even later, as he refers to previous works in the *Magisterium* in this context. As Moody notes, William did not have much influence on the next generation.[[263]](#footnote-264) However he was a key player at his time as well as an interlocutor and supporter of the Franciscans.[[264]](#footnote-265)

To describe William’s style as long-winded would be an understatement, and his writing is frequently characterized by ‘a quagmire of apparent contradictions, inexact analogies, unfinished arguments, and a capricious and inconsistent use of such technical terms from the Aristotelian vocabulary.’[[265]](#footnote-266) Nevertheless, many of William’s key convictions do come through in his writings, including his emphasis on the absolute simplicity of the soul as well as his stress on the active character of cognition, which in his view entails its independence from the senses. Precisely because of his emphasis on the intellect ‘s responsibility for knowledge, William’s account of the senses remains relatively undeveloped and does not rival that of John of La Rochelle.

John of La Rochelle

John of La Rochelle was born between 1190-1200. He became a master of the arts at Paris and then master of theology under William of Auxerre. He entered the Franciscan order before 1238, possibly from 1236, though it is likely he was already teaching in the Franciscan convent before then and indeed in the time he was writing his works on the soul. During his pre-Franciscan years, he also authored numerous other works, including the *Summa de articulis fidei*, the *Summa de praeceptis*, and the *Summa de sacramentis*, which entailed elements of a Summa that John conceived before Alexander of Hales entered the order in 1236 and became head of the Franciscan school.[[266]](#footnote-267)

At this point, John abandoned his own project and began collaborating with Alexander to produce the *Summa fratris Alexandri* or *Summa Halensis.* As noted already, John was the likely author of volumes I and III. While volumes II.1 and II.2 were probably redacted by an unnamed protégé, much of their content is based, respectively, upon his *Summa de anima* and *Summa de vitiis*,possibly his first work*.*[[267]](#footnote-268) As a key mind behind the *Summa*,John can rightly be regarded with Alexander as the founder of the Franciscan intellectual tradition.

Although John was a prolific author, only two of his works had been critically edited, at least until recently: these are the focus of this book, namely, the early *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, which dates probably from 1232/3, and the aforementioned *Summa de anima*,probably dating to 1235-36.[[268]](#footnote-269) Many of John’s sermons are extant. This is not the case for a number of biblical commentaries. However, his commentaries on the Synoptic gospels and Paul’s epistles do survive. John’s other works include numerous *quaestiones* and smaller *Summae* which cover topics as diverse as the law, sin and vice, faith, the resurrection, and grace.[[269]](#footnote-270) He was clearly a leading authority on moral and psychological questions.

John of La Rochelle and his Contemporaries

As mentioned above, John was part of a larger conversation amongst early scholastics regarding a series of questions that became popular following the incorporation of newly translated philosophical materials, insofar as they helped in the development of more robust accounts of the status of the soul as God’s image. These questions and topics are listed on the two charts below. As the first chart illustrates, John of La Rochelle was effectively the only early scholastic theologian to take an interest in many of the medical and physical categories that preoccupied certain Cistercians in the twelfth century, among others, and before them, John of Damascus and Nemesius.

These include the tri-partite division of the brain into three lobes responsible for imagination, reason, and memory, respectively; the tri-partite division between the natural, spiritual, and animal powers corresponding to the liver, heart, and brain, respectively; the theory of two—in the case of Costa Ben Luca—or three—in the case of Constantine the African—corporeal spirits that mediate between the body and the soul; the division of natural or vegetative powers according to nutrition, growth, and reproduction; and the nutritive powers according to the appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive.

Although most early scholastic theologians hesitated to grapple with the medical powers, they did reference more traditional categories like the Platonic triad of the irascible, concupsicible, and rational powers and the five-fold division of sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence, which is based on a four-fold division from Boethius that excluded the intellect; the triad of memory, understanding, and will from Augustine, and his distinction between higher and lower reason. In many respects, their Augustinian moorings served as a basis for incorporating the new natural philosophy and a set of questions arising from it concerning the powers of the soul, which were perceived as consistent with their broader theological commitments and indeed useful for articulating them. These questions are outlined in the second chart, as follows:

1. Is the soul composed of matter and form, per universal hylomorphism?
2. Is the soul united to the body accidentally or substantially?
3. Is the soul united to the body through a medium?
4. Are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers three substances in the soul?
5. Is the essence of the soul identical with its powers?
6. Do the vegetative and sense powers survive the death of the body?

With the exception of William of Auxerre, who discusses only one of these questions, namely, whether the soul is identical with its powers, most of the other theologians mentioned above treat these questions to one degree or another. These topics were also covered by many of the masters at the young University of Oxford, whose work lies beyond the scope of this study.[[270]](#footnote-271) As the ensuing chapters will illustrate, however, John of La Rochelle grapples with these questions at a level of completeness and coherence that surpasses all earlier accounts. Furthermore, he is the first in his generation to explore in detail the mechanics of human external and internal sensation as well as intellection, and to follow Avicenna closely on these issues. As we have learned, earlier contemporaries hesitated to go so far, because they believed such detailed analyses should be reserved for philosophers.

That is not to say that John’s treatment of psychological matters was entirely without precedent. As noted already, the anonymous *De potentiis animae et obiectis* was strictly speaking the first theological text to deal with cognition and to invoke Avicenna explicitly in doing so. Before John, this text influenced Philip the Chancellor, who follows the anonymous author in distinguishing between a formal—otherwise known as material—intellect which is inseparable from the body and therefore corruptible;[[271]](#footnote-272) and a separable intellect, including both the agent and possible intellects, which is incorruptible.[[272]](#footnote-273) Although his brief account of this doctrine clearly derives from the *De potentiis animae et obiectiis* which also speaks of the *intellectus formalis* as another name for the material intellect, it is entirely cursory.[[273]](#footnote-274)

As Wicki has observed, Philip has no designated treatise on human knowledge and only briefly covers this issue in the larger context of inquiring about the immortality of the soul, with a view to explaining how the immaterial object of the intellect renders it eternal.[[274]](#footnote-275) For this reason, it is not even clear that Philip had devoted considerable reflection to what the doctrine entailed.[[275]](#footnote-276) Even more than Roland, who includes a brief discussion of the external and internal senses and agent intellect, Philip can hardly be said to have undertaken anything like a study or even a short explanation of the ideas to which he refers.[[276]](#footnote-277)

While John is also influenced by Anonymous Callus, which provided the most faithful account of Avicennian psychology to date, he turns to Avicenna himself and gives a fresh and full reading of the philosopher’s work in this area. As Hasse has shown, one third of the quotes in his *Summa de anima’s* treatment of Avicennacome from Avicenna himself, although this is obscured in the edition which does not demarcate them clearly. On this basis, Hasse concludes, ‘that with Jean de la Rochelle the appropriation of Avicenna's [psychological] doctrine is fully achieved.’[[277]](#footnote-278) In addition to Avicenna, John treats the psychological schemes found in both DSEA and John of Damascus’ *De fide orthodoxa* (DFO). The reason for this selection of authorities concerns the apparent points of contact between their accounts of human cognition.

These points of contact, it must be stressed, were very broad and general indeed. For instance, all three of John’s preferred sources speak in some way of the different vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers, as well as other comparable psychological categories. That does not mean however that they defined the work of these faculties in the same way. To highlight the compatibility between them nonetheless was strategically important for John, because it was a way of inscribing Avicenna’s psychology into or reconciling it with the most significant authorities in theology at the time, namely, Augustine and Damascus. In short, it was a way of justifying the use of new sources in terms of the old ones.

This full-scale appropriation of Avicenna, along with the incorporation of medical and physical powers, and a comprehensive account of the other psychological questions that sprang from the translation movement, can only be found concomitantly in the works of John of La Rochelle. As the attached tables demonstrate, John’s early *Tractatus*, which will be discussed in chapter five, focused mainly on the physical/medical and cognitive powers. It did not delve into the complex of six questions mentioned above. However, his *Summa de anima* does just that, in addition to covering much of the same ground of the *Tractatus* on the human faculties of cognition and volition.

The section on the rational soul or *De anima rationali* in the *Summa Halensis* was probably not redacted by John himself, as it does represent some variations on his original in terms of its style of presentation. In particular, it replaces Avicenna as an explicitly mentioned authority with Aristotle, who is not mentioned in the *Summa de anima*’s treatment of psychological questions. As we will see, however, the creative reordering of material and authorities by the Summist does not have a radical effect on the actual doctrines presented or endorsed, which are still in most cases aligned with John’s originals. It simply signals the transition from the phase of reading Avicenna solely to ‘reading Aristotle with Avicenna.’[[278]](#footnote-279)

Conclusion

The details of the accounts given in these three texts—the *Tractatus, Summa de anima,* and *De anima rationali*—will be covered in chapters five through eight, after an initial account in chapters three and four of the way John and the Summist deal with the six questions above in the context of the work of their contemporaries. The background provided here should however lend initial support to the conclusion towards which Callus, Michaud-Quantin, Brady, and Hasse all gesture, namely, that ‘John of La Rochelle was the first to give a systematic classification of the powers of the soul.’[[279]](#footnote-280) As we will discover, he alone in his generation exhibits an unapologetic willingness to grapple in detail with every type of question arising from the newly translated material and to do so at the level of detail that was unprecedented even for an artist or philosopher at the time.

In this light, it is hard to understand how a scholar like Richard Dales came to the conclusion that, ‘Jean de la Rochelle's psychological works have been characterized as eclectic and old-fashioned,’[[280]](#footnote-281) and even worse, ‘inept’.[[281]](#footnote-282) In the opinion of this author, Hasse is closer to the truth when he states that, ‘seen in the context of the history of psychology, they [John’s works] mark two important steps: the explicit differentiation between various psychological traditions (in the *Tractatus*) and the considerable expansion of the Peripatetic section in an otherwise theological treatise on the soul (in the *Summa*).’[[282]](#footnote-283)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Topic** | **Source** | **Johannitius** | **Avicenna** | **Nemesius** | **Damascus** | **William of St Thierry** | **Isaac of Stella** | ***De spiritu et anima*** | **John Blund** | **John of La Rochelle** |
| Three ventricles of the brain (front: imagination; middle: reason; back memory) | Galen | X | X | X | X | X | --- | X | X | X |
| Natural, spiritual and animal powers (corresponding to liver, heart, and brain) | Constantine the African | X | X | X | X | X | --- | X (organs not mentioned) | --- | X |
| Three (or two) corporeal spirits (natural, spiritual, animal) | Constantine (Three)/Costa Ben Luca (Two) | X | X | X | X | X  (Three) | X  (Two) | --- | --- | X |
| Natural/vegetative powers (nutrition, growth, and reproduction) | Constantine the African/  Aristotle | X | X | X | X | X | --- | --- | X | X |
| Nutrition (appetitive, retentive, digestive, expulsive) | Constantine the African | X | X | X | X | X | --- | X | X | X |
| Platonic triad (rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers) | Plato | --- | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Sense, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence | Boethius | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | X | X | --- | X |
| Memory, understanding, will | Augustine | --- | --- | --- | --- | X | X | X | --- | X |
| Identity of the soul with its powers | Isidore of Seville (attributed to Augustine) | --- | --- | --- | --- | X | X | X | --- | X |
| Microcosm/midpoint of creation | Gregory of Nyssa and others | --- | --- | X | X | X | X | X | --- | X |
| Three levels of abstraction[[283]](#footnote-284) | Aristotle | --- | X | --- | --- | --- | X | X | X | X |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Early 13th Century Questions about the Soul** | **Date of work** | **Is the soul composed of matter and form, as per universal hylomor-phism?** | **Is the soul substantially or accidentally united to the body?** | **Is the soul united to the body through a medium?** | **Are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers three substances in the soul?** | **Is the essence of the soul identical with its powers?** | **Do the sensitive and vegetative powers survive the death of the body?** | **External senses** | **Internal senses** | **Agent, Possible, Material Intellect** |
| **Source of the Question** |  | Avicebron | Avicenna | Costa ben Luca and Avicebron | Aristotle/  Avicenna | Pseudo-Augustine/  Isidore of Seville | Christian sources | Avicenna | Avicenna | Avicenna |
| **Avicenna** |  | No | Accidentally |  | --- | --- | No | X | X | X |
| **Gundissalinus** | 1170-75 | Yes | --- | Yes | No | --- | Yes? (ambiguous) | X | X | X |
| **John Blund**  **(Arts master)** | Shortly after 1200 | No | Accidentally | \_\_ | No | Implies yes | No | X | X | X |
| **William of Auxerre**  **(Secular master)** | First version 1215-26; Second version 1226-9 | --- | Substantially (in passing) | --- | --- | No | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Philip the Chancellor**  **(Secular master)** | Around 1230 | No? (ambiguous) | Accidentally | Yes | Yes? (ambiguous) | Yes | No |  |  | In passing |
| **Alexander of Hales**  **(Franciscan)** | Before 1237 | --- | --- | --- | --- | No—with its substance | Yes | --- | --- | --- |
| **Hugh of St Cher**  ***De anima***  **(Dominican)** | c. 1230-35 | Yes | Substantially | Yes | No | Yes | No | --- | --- | --- |
| **Roland of Cremona**  **(Dominican)** | After 1234 | Yes | Substantially (but severed at death) | Yes | No | No | --- | X | X | X |
| **Guerric of St Quentin**  **(Dominican)** | c. 1235-42 | Yes | Ambiguous | \_\_ | No | No | Yes—some | --- | --- | --- |
| **John of La Rochelle**  ***Tractatus*** | c. 1233 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | X | X | X |
| **John of La Rochelle**  ***Summa de anima*** | 1235-6 | Yes | Substantially | Yes | No | No—with its substance | Yes | X | X | X |
| ***Summa Halensis*** | 1236-45 | Yes | Substantially |  | No | No—with its substance | --- | X | X | X |
| **William of Auvergne** | 1235-40 or later | No | Accidentally | No | No | Yes | No | X | X | X |

**3. The Soul and the Body**

The medieval Christian tradition inherited though Augustine and to some extent the Platonic tradition more generally tended to assume a somewhat conflicted account of the relationship between the body and the soul. In some places, for example, Augustine seems to define the human being purely in terms of the soul or rationality and without reference to the body. Thus, he speaks in both his earlier and later works of the human being as ‘a mortal rational animal,’[[284]](#footnote-285) or in Platonic terms of a ‘soul using a body.’[[285]](#footnote-286) Although his remarks in these contexts suggest that he equates the human being with the soul, in a way that might be taken to disparage the body, there are other passages where he indicates that the human is a composite of body and soul.[[286]](#footnote-287) As McGinn notes, moreover, he often described the human being as a mediator between God and creation and thus ‘preserved the substantial unity of man by creating a theology of the temporal subject without a corresponding theology of man as corporeal nature.’[[287]](#footnote-288)

The absence of a robust theory of the soul’s relationship to the body left open a number of questions about how to define its status and significance and thus rendered Augustine susceptible to interpretations of his thought which he may not necessarily have endorsed.[[288]](#footnote-289) In the period under consideration here, for instance, his thought on this issue was often rendered along the lines of various pseudo-Augustinian works which favoured the view that the human person consists in a soul which is a separate substance from the body, even if it somehow uses a unique body to which it has been united and in which it will be resurrected. As Crowley notes, this ‘definition of the soul as a spiritual substance is to be found in the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, which had a wide circulation in the thirteenth century.’ [[289]](#footnote-290) According to Gilson, Crowley observes, that definition exhibited a ‘genuinely Augustinian character,’[[290]](#footnote-291) which in turn rendered Augustine consistent in Gilson’s view with Avicenna, who also ‘stressed the substantiality of the soul.’[[291]](#footnote-292)

The reading of Augustine along these lines was further encouraged by other spurious Augustinian works, particularly, *De fide ad Petrum*,by the sixth-century author Fulgentius of Ruspe,and the seventh-century *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* by Gennadius Massiliensis*,* which described the soul as ‘an immortal spiritual substance, created for and infused into the body of each individual by God.’[[292]](#footnote-293) It ruled the body in this life, but it was capable of an independent existence and would be eternally punished or blessed as its actions in this world merited.’[[293]](#footnote-294) Nevertheless, the still rather inchoate nature of the arguments in support of such claims meant that the impetus, as well as the resource, needed to clarify the exact status of the soul and its relationship to the body did not come to the West until the introduction of a number of Greek, Islamic, and Jewish philosophical texts in the twelfth century.

In what follows, I will show how early Franciscans and their contemporaries sought to further a tradition of thinking on the matter that was broadly consistent with what they believed to be Augustinian sympathies, while at the same time engaging fully with the new material. As noted above, they were helped considerably in this regard by Avicenna, who believed that the soul and body are two separate substances, and that the human personality resides in the soul, which is ultimately separable from the body. As Dales notes regarding this and a number of other cases, ‘Avicenna's doctrine was sufficiently similar to Augustine's,’ or at least the pseudo-Augustine’s, ‘that the two could, without much difficulty, be conflated.’[[294]](#footnote-295) Whether the Avicennian theory was compatible with the views of the authentic Augustine not to mention Plato or Platonism is of course a much more difficult and controversial question on which the analysis below will attempt to shed some light.

The Substance of the Soul

According to the *Summa Halensis*, the soul can be considered in two ways, either in its own right, independently of the body, or in relation to the body.[[295]](#footnote-296) This two-fold way of thinking about the soul—in itself or in relation to the body—derives first and foremost from Avicenna.[[296]](#footnote-297) As a corollary to it, the Summa argues, following John, that there are two ways to refer to something as corporeal: either absolutely, or by reason of some conditions.[[297]](#footnote-298) If we think of the soul absolutely, then the human soul is not corporeal. This was a point that needed to be made because Galen had actually affirmed that the soul is made up a of mixture of the elements. Thus, it is no surprise that a philosopher like John Blund felt particularly obligated to contest the idea that the soul is corporeal.[[298]](#footnote-299)

Rather than a bodily entity, early scholastics like Blund contended that the soul is incorporeal and therefore separate from the body.[[299]](#footnote-300) In bolstering this point, the Summa presents a number of arguments, largely repeated from John of La Rochelle, such as the idea that one thing which moves another is distinct from the essence of what it moves.[[300]](#footnote-301) This was an argument originally drawn from Avicenna and also repeated by John Blund, namely, that things that move at will—apparently a euphemism for the sheer enlivenment of the body—must do so by a principle other than the body which is not self-moving. That principle is the soul.[[301]](#footnote-302) As John adds, everything that moves or enlivens something else does not depend upon what it moves and exists apart from it.

Since the soul moves the body, it is distinct from the essence of the body and represents a substance in its own right, beyond the substance of the body.[[302]](#footnote-303) In this connection, the Summa invokes a famous analogy from Aristotle to further state that the soul relates to a body as a sailor relates to his ship. Here, the sailor differs in substance from the ship, as he moves the ship and is thereby moved by it accidentally. Therefore, the soul has a substance that is different from the body and a substance beyond the body.[[303]](#footnote-304) As scholars in this period put it, it is a ‘hoc aliquid’ or substance in its own right rather than part of another substance.[[304]](#footnote-305) In his earlier account in the *Summa de anima*, John of La Rochelle presented an argument for the separability of the soul that is not found in the Summa but entails one of Avicenna’s most famous contributions to the history of philosophy. This is the so-called ‘flying man’ argument that John attributes to Avicenna by name:

Assuming that a man was created perfect from the beginning, but due to his veiled vision, was not able to see exterior things, and was created in such a way that the thickness of the air did not touch him, so that he could feel it, and he was so out of touch with his limbs/organs that they did not affect him, then it is clear that a man so created, thinking of himself, would not hesitate to affirm his existence. He would nevertheless not affirm his exterior limbs or those things that are hidden in his interior, such as his brain or the like. Moreover, if it was possible for him to imagine a hand or another limb, he would not imagine this as his own limb, nor as a necessary part of his essence. As therefore everything that is affirmed is different from what is not affirmed, and that which is conceded is different from what is not conceded, and the essence which he affirms is his own, by which he is what he is; nevertheless, it is prior to his body, which he does not affirm. Therefore, woken from this state, he has an obvious way of knowing that the existence of the soul is other than that of the body.[[305]](#footnote-306)

Incidentally, William of Auvergne employed a similar line of ‘I think, therefore, I am’ reasoning to prove the independent existence of the soul.[[306]](#footnote-307) He also invoked the flying man argument as a means to providing a sort of ontological argument for God’s existence and indeed to affirm that the human personality resides in the soul, not the body—that is, to confirm that the soul is the principle of individuation.[[307]](#footnote-308) In support of his own version of Avicenna’s argument, John further marshals the DSEA of Augustine, which states:

The mind or the soul knows nothing as [well] as that it is present to itself; nor is anything more present to the mind or the soul than itself. Therefore, it knows nothing as [well] as itself. The mind knows itself to live, to remember, to understand, to will, to learn, know, and judge. And thus, with highest certainty it knows itself. It is impossible therefore that it ignores that it exists.[[308]](#footnote-309)

After establishing the existence of the soul in its own right along similar lines, both the SDA and DAR proceed to inquire into its constitution. Both texts quickly rule out the notion that the soul could be fashioned from the very substance of God, because God is unchangeable, and the soul can alternate between good and evil—a not un-controversial Franciscan view about which we will hear more in the chapter on free will. According to the Summa, this proves that the soul and God are fundamentally different kinds of beings. If the soul was made of God’s own substance, the Summa adds, then it would be identical not only with God but also with all other souls, which is absurd.[[309]](#footnote-310)

The next question raised concerns the causation of the soul. Whereas philosophers like Avicenna held that the soul is brought into existence by spiritual intelligences, that is, angels, which mediate between God and creation, the Summa asserts that God is the sole efficient cause of the soul.[[310]](#footnote-311) After all, a simple being such as the soul cannot proceed from a being that is not itself simple. In affirming this, the Summa eliminates the possibility that one soul could be created by another. Both the DAR and SDA reject this notion on the ground that the creator of all finite beings must itself be unconstrained by the limits of finitude. In other words, it must be transcendent. Since this quality only applies to God, he alone is capable of creating the soul.[[311]](#footnote-312) Assuming the soul is made by though not *of* God, the question remains what constitutes it as a substance.

The Composition of the Soul

The question of the soul’s composition and that of other spiritual substances like angels had been the subject of theological debate at least since the twelfth century. A number of authors had argued that spiritual substances, while simple in themselves, exhibit a kind of composition, insofar as they are essentially dependent on God.[[312]](#footnote-313) This is apparently what Gilbert of Poitiers had in mind in his comments on Boethius’ *De Trinitate*, which stressed that all things besides God are composed of *quod/quo est*. For his part, Peter Lombard invoked Augustine to argue that even spiritual creatures are composed of diverse qualities and are susceptible to change, which implies composition.[[313]](#footnote-314) William of Auxerre affirmed the simplicity of God but in passing denied it as a quality of spiritual substances, thus hinting at the possibility of some form of composition.[[314]](#footnote-315)

Admittedly, many twelfth-century thinkers basically neglected the matter of composition, including Praepositinus of Cremona, Godfrey of Poitiers, and Stephen Langton, while others like Anselm of Laon and Hugh of St Victor initially argued only for simplicity, at least in angels. Nevertheless, there was some precedent for affirming the composition of the soul in the Latin West, prior to the introduction of the Arabic philosophical sources.[[315]](#footnote-316) Among these, the *Fons Vitae* of Avicebron revolutionised inquiry concerning the composition of the soul by advocating a form of universal hylomorphism. According to this doctrine, all beings other than God—not just physical beings but also spiritual substances like angels and souls—must be described as composites of matter and form, in order to qualify as substances in the full sense of the term.[[316]](#footnote-317)

For Avicebron, this composition within the soul was therefore additional to the composition of the soul and the body themselves, not to mention the composition within the body. This entails prime matter and the so-called ‘form of corporeity’ which makes a body whatever kind of body that it is. While Avicenna also upheld the matter-form composition within the body, as well as the composition of body and soul, he denied that spiritual substances like the soul are subject to such composition, which in his view would undermine the soul’s simplicity. In that sense, he agreed with Avicebron that there is a plurality of substances in all beings.[[317]](#footnote-318) However, he rejected the ‘famous pairing’ (*binarium famosissimum*), as modern scholarship has come to call the combination of the plurality doctrine with universal hylomorphism, which insisted on the matter-form composition not merely of bodily substances but also of the soul itself*.*[[318]](#footnote-319)

As scholars have observed, Gundissalinus advocated Avicenna’s view at one point, namely, in *De anima* 7,while affirming Avicebron’s view in his *De processione mundi*.[[319]](#footnote-320) Precisely because his presentation of the matter is not entirely consistent, the Toledo translator of Avicenna and Avicebron became responsible for introducing both of their views to the West. Although most Latin thinkers from this period resultantly affirmed the plurality of forms, they positioned themselves differently in relation to the doctrine of universal hylomorphism which was unique to Avicebron.

As Weishepl notes ‘the earliest known reference to Avicebron’s doctrine is found in John Blund.’[[320]](#footnote-321) In his *De anima,* Blund rehearsed the argument in support of this position as found in Gundissalinus’ *De processione*,but rejected it in favour of simplicity, affirming only a composition of genus and difference in the soul.[[321]](#footnote-322) His colleague Alexander Neckam also objected to the view that the soul is comprised of form and ‘spiritual matter’, which he acknowledged was advocated by some, while denying that the soul can be simple in the same way as God, insofar as it moved from non-being to being.[[322]](#footnote-323)

As in several other cases, Philip the Chancellor was the first university theologian to pursue this question, in his *Summa de bono.* The soul in his view is comprised of *quod est* and *quo est*, a distinction that entered the tradition thanks to Gilbert of Poitiers’ aforementioned use of Boethius. For Philip, this distinction can refer either to a composition of matter-form or of essence-existence. In reference to the former pair, Philip argues that wherever there is matter, there is *quod est.* However*,* the converse is not also true: wherever there is *quod est*, there is not necessarily matter.[[323]](#footnote-324) He mentions the doctrine of universal hylomorphism as one that is entertained by some but is not entirely clear on whether he himself advocates it. However, he does say that if the doctrine is true, it is more applicable to human souls than to angels, because human beings are united to the body which is inherently composite.[[324]](#footnote-325) In another context, he further describes both angels and humans as composites of *quod/quo est*, insofar as they can be understood as compounds of power and act, which are passive in respect to God and active in their own particular ways.[[325]](#footnote-326)

Where Philip equivocated on the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, Hugh of St Cher and William of Auvergne came down decisively against it.[[326]](#footnote-327) According to William, the doctrine undermines the simplicity of the soul and its status as a self-subsisting entity.[[327]](#footnote-328) While Hugh also affirmed the ultimate simplicity of the soul, he allowed that it is composed in the sense Peter Lombard affirmed, namely, insofar as it supports multiple accidents and depends upon God. In his view, however, these are not forms of composition strictly speaking. Rather, the *quod est* of Boethius refers to the simplicity of the soul itself, while the *quo est* pertains to the faculties, by means of which the soul acts and is perfected.[[328]](#footnote-329)

By contrast to these scholars, Roland of Cremona argued that the soul like the angel is comprised of form and a kind of ‘spiritual’ matter, which he is the first on record to mention.[[329]](#footnote-330) A similar position to Roland’s is offered by his later Dominican contemporary, Guerric of St Quentin. In his treatment of the matter, Guerric outlines the two main positions on the topic that were in circulation at this time. As he notes, there were those who insisted that matter-form composition would compromise the simplicity of the soul—and here he may have had Hugh of St Cher in mind. Then there were those like Roland who said that the soul is composed of spiritual matter and form which are simultaneously created.[[330]](#footnote-331) Although Guerric comes down clearly on the side of the second position, he qualifies it by defining matter as that which makes something receptive to form.[[331]](#footnote-332)

Under the influence of Philip the Chancellor, John of La Rochelle unambiguously rejects the hylomorphic composition of the soul, holding fast to Augustine’s assertion in *De quantitiate animae* regarding the simplicity of the soul.[[332]](#footnote-333) While he admits that there is some kind of composition in all beings other than God, he denies that it can be that of matter and form in the case of the soul. After all, beings composed of matter and form are fashioned from some already existing material, but the soul is not material or derived from matter: it is created from nothing. For the soul, consequently, the only form of composition possible is that of essence and existence, which John explains in terms of Boethius’ distinction between *quod/quo est.*

In God, John observes, *quo/quod est* are the same, because it is part of his definition or essence to be the cause of his own existence and that of all other things—an argument for God’s necessary existence that derives from Avicenna.[[333]](#footnote-334) This necessity is not proper to the things God creates, whether corporeal or incorporeal, since such things have their existence not from themselves but from him and therefore exist not by their own essence but by participation in God.[[334]](#footnote-335) Thus conceived, John believes the composition ascribed to the soul successfully distinguishes it from God without compromising its simplicity in the way of the matter-form distinction.[[335]](#footnote-336)

In a rare doctrinal departure from John’s original perspective, the DAR insists that the soul, not to mention an angel, is a substance in its own right precisely because it is comprised not only of form but also of matter—not physical matter, of course, but a sort of intellectual or spiritual matter such as Roland of Cremona advocated.[[336]](#footnote-337) Interestingly, an account of this issue cannot be found in the authentic writings of Alexander of Hales, including his *Glossa* on the four books of *Sentences* and his disputed questions ‘antequam esset frater.’ This is one of a number of pieces of evidence which suggests that it was John rather than Alexander who was more inclined to the work of philosophy.

A possible reason for John’s initial hesitancy to go as far as the Halensian Summist on this topic may have been his evident eagerness to stay as close as possible to Avicenna, who insisted on the simplicity of the soul and did not accept the notion of its hylomorphic composition. As John’s quotations to Augustine suggest, he regarded Avicenna’s position as more consistent with a longstanding Western tradition of affirming the simplicity of the soul. By the time the DAR was written, the discussion seems to have moved on somewhat, and although the changes in early Franciscan thought that took place between the mid 1230s and mid 1240s were not normally very substantial, this doctrine proved an exception to that rule.

The question whether the soul is comprised of matter and form is among the first the Summa addresses in its treatise on the rational soul. Not unlike John, the Summa faced the longstanding tradition, stemming from Augustine and indeed pseudo-Augustine according to which the soul is entirely simple. As Augustine says in his *De quantitate animae*, ‘the soul can be called a simple nature, because it is not from other natures.’[[337]](#footnote-338) Likewise, the *De spiritu et anima* states that ‘the soul is a spiritual, simple, and indissoluble substance.’[[338]](#footnote-339) In the standard view, this simplicity is the way the soul imitates the divine simplicity of essence.[[339]](#footnote-340) The problem the Summa recognizes with the notion that the soul is comprised of matter and form is that a being that possesses these two elements is composed and therefore not strictly speaking simple.[[340]](#footnote-341) By contrast to what John believed, however, the Summa insists that this composition does not undermine the simplicity of the soul, because the kind of material composition in question here is not like that of a natural being.

As the Summa clarifies, the intellectual or spiritual ‘matter’ proper to the soul does not subject the soul to a composition of parts in the way that physical matter would do.[[341]](#footnote-342) In what seems like a clear allusion to John’s work, the Summa speaks of those who suggest that the soul is composed only in the sense that it depends on God for its existence and therefore exhibits a difference between *quod est* and *quo est*.[[342]](#footnote-343) As the Summa observes, however, this is a different kind of composition altogether, and it does not interest the Summist in this context. The Summist therefore rejects John’s idea that the only composition in the soul is that of essence and existence in favour of promoting matter-form composition. On his view, any substance worthy of the name must include both form and the ‘intelligible matter’ described above, which escapes John’s objection that matter-form composition entails bodily parts and features which can only be found in natural beings.

Whereas John rejected universal hylomorphism on the assumption that this was the only way to affirm Augustine’s view of the soul as simple, in summary, the Halensian Summist advocated it for the very same reason. In his account, the idea that ‘the soul consists in form and matter as in its *quod est* and *quo est*’[[343]](#footnote-344) most successfully captures the position presented in pseudo-Augustinian works like *De fide ad Petrum* that the soul is a substance that is separate from the body.[[344]](#footnote-345) For the Summist, consequently, invoking Augustine—in this case as in so many others—was not only a means of justifying the appropriation of interesting new sources that were growing in popularity, in this case, Avicebron. By the same token, the appropriation of Avicebron was a way of giving definition to aspects of Augustine’s thought that he had not fully spelled out himself.

While authors working in the 1230s, including Rochelle, tended to stick close to Avicenna in their interpretation of Augustine and thus rejected universal hylomorphism, we have seen that those working from the 1240s, above all the Halensian Summist, favoured Avicebron and consequently transformed universal hylomorphism into a defining feature of the early Franciscan school of thought.[[345]](#footnote-346) Thus we find this theory advocated not only in the *Summa Halensis* but also by the next generation of Franciscans including Odo Rigaldus, Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, and John Pecham.[[346]](#footnote-347) Whether Avicebron or Avicenna for that matter was in fact the best source for interpreting Augustine on this score is another question. But the foregoing discussion illustrates at very least that what it meant to be an Augustinian was very much up for debate in this period, and the sides of the debate were largely determined by sources other than those composed by Augustine himself.

The Soul-Body Union

As noted above, Avicenna had affirmed that the soul can be considered not only in its own right but also in relation to the body. For Avicenna, the soul has a natural inclination not just to any body but to one body in particular. This inclination sets one soul apart from another, establishing the soul rather than the body or matter as the principle of individuation. Although the soul needs the body in order to fulfil its potential for individuation, and to be distinguished thereby from other souls, the soul remains the individual that it is after the death of the body, which it does not require to complete its essence. As such a substance in its own right, the soul is only united to the body accidentally.[[347]](#footnote-348)

At the same time, we have seen that the body is an independent substance, whose matter is formed not by the soul itself but by its own specific ‘form of corporeity,’[[348]](#footnote-349) which nonetheless somehow predisposes the body for union with the soul.[[349]](#footnote-350) Put differently, the soul does not make a body a body, but simply ensures that it is actually living. This idea of a bodily form is one that Franciscans found attractive because it allowed them to affirm that a dead body is in fact the body of the soul departed from it. Furthermore, it enabled them to account for the resurrection of the body, that is, the possibility for the body of a particular soul to be reconstituted at the end of time, and also to affirm that the body of Christ in the Eucharist really is Christ’s body.

In the years just before the Summa was composed, most notably in the work of Philip the Chancellor, Avicenna’s idea of an accidental relationship between the body and the soul, mediated by the form of corporeity, was a prevalent view at Paris. In the next generation, William of Auvergne continued to advocate this view, describing the body as the instrument of the soul which is a ‘prison and chains to the soul.’[[350]](#footnote-351) As with all instruments, he claimed, the body cannot operate through itself but only through another, that is, the soul, which is not a body on the principle that what rules the body cannot be part thereof.[[351]](#footnote-352) There is some ambiguity in William’s discussion, insofar as he seemingly emphasizes the unity of the body and the soul with an analogy of their relationship to that of a lyre-player which includes both the lyre and the player.[[352]](#footnote-353) Ultimately, however, his language is too dualist to avoid the conclusion that he sees the body as united to the soul only accidentally.[[353]](#footnote-354)

As Magdalena Bieniak has shown, such a strong form of dualism had already come into question by William’s time, following the work of Hugh of St Cher.[[354]](#footnote-355) This early Dominican argued that the body is in fact intrinsic to the substance of the soul, which exhibits the quality of ‘*unibilitas substantialis*’ or a substantial unitability to the body. Before Hugh, Bieniak observes, William of Auxerre had hinted in passing that the soul is substantially related the body.[[355]](#footnote-356) However he states the opposite position in an earlier version of his work, so his ultimate viewpoint is unclear, and in any case, largely undeveloped.[[356]](#footnote-357) Although Hugh’s *Sentences* commentary certainly represents an important turning point for this doctrine, its relatively early dating—between 1229-31—left a lot of room for the theory he introduced to be elaborated. In the wake of Hugh’s work, the notion of ‘*unibilitas*’ became either explicitly or implicitly the key feature in early scholastic accounts of the body-soul union, including that of Roland of Cremona.[[357]](#footnote-358) As Bieniak notes, Roland seems to have taken the notion of *unibilitas* so seriously that he actually concluded that the soul ceases to be a soul when it leaves the body.[[358]](#footnote-359) Guerric of St Quentin also favors the idea of the body’s unitability with the soul when he argues that the soul is in every part of the body as that which contains it and moves it through the functioning of the heart which gives the body life.[[359]](#footnote-360)

However, Dominicans were far from the only ones to champion the *unibilitas* account, which was also endorsed by their Franciscan contemporaries, above all, John and authors of the *Summa Halensis*. As this suggests, the Franciscan and Dominican schools of this period were not marked by the clear doctrinal party lines that would come to typify the next generation of scholars, which included Bonaventure and Aquinas. Although Franciscans and Dominicans did differ on certain points in this period, they had more in common as inheritors of a certain set of sources and questions than divided them. The chart attached to the end of the next chapter depicts visually some of the areas in which Franciscans followed or at least agreed with their Dominican counterparts. A closer study of the version of Hugh’s doctrine that appears in John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis* will help to establish further the continuity between their schools of thought in some key areas.[[360]](#footnote-361)

While the accounts in question are very similar, it is worth examining them independently in order to highlight a few interesting discrepancies. Amongst the definitions of the soul that John presents at the beginning of his text is that of Aristotle in *De anima* II.1, 412a18-19, which describes the soul as the ‘form of the natural organic body having the potential for life.’[[361]](#footnote-362) In John’s view, this definition agrees with that of Augustine in DSEA according to which the ‘soul is a substance that participates in reason and rules the body to which it is accommodated.’ The definition itself is taken from the Greco-Latin translation of Aristotle’s *De anima,* which was produced by James of Venice before 1160.[[362]](#footnote-363) The passage in which it is found communicates what is often regarded as one of Aristotle’s signature ideas, namely, that the soul is the form of the body with which it comprises a single substance.

According to this perspective, having a body is part of what it means to be a soul;[[363]](#footnote-364) the soul cannot therefore exist without the body, and the very constitution of the body as such cannot occur without the soul, which accomplishes this feat as its ‘first act.’[[364]](#footnote-365) This is precisely what the famous sailor/boatman analogy that Aristotle invokes in the same passage is presumably meant to convey, namely, that the soul activates the potential of the body to live in the way the sailor activates the potential of the ship to sail. Thus construed, the analogy emphasizes the fundamental unity and mutual interdependence of the soul and the body rather than the separability that is implied in Avicenna’s interpretation of the body-soul relationship.

By the time of John of La Rochelle, I noted in the first chapter, another translation of the *De anima* had also been prepared, this time from Arabic into Latin, by Michael Scotus, who translated the accompanying commentary of Averroes on this work.[[365]](#footnote-366) In this version of the translation, the term ‘kamāl’, which literally means ‘perfection’, replaced the term ‘form’ to describe the soul’s relationship to the body.[[366]](#footnote-367) Thus, the Arabo-Latin definition reads that ‘the soul is the first perfection of the natural body having life in potency.’[[367]](#footnote-368) This same term is found in other works translated from Arabic such as Costa Ben Luca’s *De differentia spiritus et animae*,which presents a variation on Aristotle’s definition which is repeated by Gundissalinus:‘the soul is the first perfection of the natural, organic, and potentially living body.’[[368]](#footnote-369) While the substitution of ‘perfection’ for ‘form’ in this context might not seem significant, it had the effect of changing the meaning of Aristotle’s text entirely in the sense that the term ‘perfection’ in Arabic philosophy and Avicenna specifically was precisely the one used to describe the soul as a separate substance from the body.[[369]](#footnote-370)

On this understanding, we have seen, the soul is not the principle of a body *qua* body—that, we know, is the job of the form of corporeity—it is only the principle of the body insofar as it is actually living. The soul serves as the body’s perfection because vivifying the body is one aspect of its operation, not because having a body is essential to what it is. As noted above, the true person resides in the soul, rather than in the soul-body composite, and the soul alone continues to exist after the death of the body.[[370]](#footnote-371) There are some passages where Aristotle suggests something similar in his *De anima,* which is a notoriously difficult text, the exact teachings of which have been much debated. For instance, Aristotle gestures towards the eternality of actions proper to the soul itself, particularly the intellect, the objects of which, namely, ideas, are not corruptible like physical objects.[[371]](#footnote-372)

From these remarks, it seems to follow that the intellect itself must be immortal and separate or separable from the body, by contrast to the senses which can only inhere in it.[[372]](#footnote-373) These passages are difficult to reconcile with the notion that the soul, as the form of the body, cannot do without the body, which would seem to suggest that the soul dies with the body. I will leave it to scholars of Aristotle to address this tension in the Stagirite’s thinking. For the present purposes, it suffices to say that early scholastic interpreters of Aristotle had to find a way to affirm the immortality of the soul and at the same time confront the challenge of accounting for its embodiment, which was essential to upholding the Christian doctrine of the goodness and indeed the resurrection of the body.

In this regard, scholars turned initially to Avicenna, who as a religious thinker himself also had to explain the possibility of an afterlife for the soul. As noted above, the Persian philosopher’s method in this regard involved introducing a substantial difference between the soul and the body, which resulted in a merely accidental relationship between them. This difference is captured in his own rendering of the soul as the ‘motor’ of what it moves, a nod to Aristotle’s analogy of the sailor and boatman. Here Avicenna observes that whatever moves is distinct from what is moved or in this case enlivened, such that the two are ultimately separate and separable entities. Although both Avicenna and Costa Ben Luca did their best to describe the soul as a special kind of form that also happens to be a perfection, the apparent incompatibility between the notions of the soul as ‘form’ and ‘perfection’ was not lost on early scholastic thinkers.[[373]](#footnote-374) For example, it was clearly detected by John Blund. In discussing the definitions of the soul, Blund quotes his own version of the Arabo-Latin translation of Aristotle’s definition as follows: ‘the soul is the perfection of an organic body, which possesses the potentiality for life.’[[374]](#footnote-375) This version was repeated not only by Neckam but also by Roland of Cremona and William of Auvergne.[[375]](#footnote-376)

Although he follows Avicenna in describing the soul as the perfection of the body, Blund acknowledges that the soul could also be called a form, because form is what gives matter its existence. The problem with doing that, of course, is that ‘no form is a thing existing in itself separate from a substance.’[[376]](#footnote-377) If the soul were the form of the body, it would die with the body, which is not the case because the soul is immortal and separable from the body. Ultimately, therefore, Blund seems to reject the idea that the soul is the form of the body and reiterates Avicenna’s position that, as a ‘perfection’, the soul is accidentally related to the body while it lives, but remains a separate substance in its own right.[[377]](#footnote-378) Most likely, Blund’s position influenced his older colleague Alexander Neckam, who rejects Aristotle’s definition of the soul on the ground that the soul is a separate substance, and cannot as such also be a form which can only exist in matter.

Besides Blund, however, there were others, particularly in the theological tradition, who were not convinced of the mutual exclusivity of the terms, ‘form’ and ‘perfection’. For instance, Philip the Chancellor was one of a number of scholars in this period who simultaneously affirmed that the soul is both the form and perfection of the body—where Hugh and Roland spoke of it virtually exclusively as a ‘perfection’.[[378]](#footnote-379) To his credit, Philip recognized that there might be a contradiction in the juxtaposition of these two terms, insofar as a form can only exist in matter, while the soul *qua* perfection is ultimately a substance separable from matter.[[379]](#footnote-380) Thus, he only went so far as to suggest that the soul can be considered to be ‘like’ a form in an analogous sense, rather than in the strict sense of the term.[[380]](#footnote-381) His way of elucidating this sense involved arguing that the soul *qua* form is not limited to existing in matter like other forms.[[381]](#footnote-382) In other words, he reinterpreted the term ‘form’ along the lines of what Avicenna meant by a ‘perfection’.

On this score, Philip argued that the soul *qua* form exists in matter so long as it is united to the body, but this ceases to be the case when it is separated from the body.[[382]](#footnote-383) The separation of the soul from the body is possible because the soul is not united to the body *per se* but as an accident.[[383]](#footnote-384) This is one reason why we will see that Philip believes the soul must be united to the body through a medium, namely, because it is separate from the body in its own right and does not depend upon the body for its existence. As we will discover, the media Philip has in mind consist in the vegetative and sensitive powers, which represent the remote and proximate loci of the soul’s relation to the body, respectively. This doctrine of media was subsequently adopted by thinkers like Hugh of St Cher, even though he affirmed that the soul is substantially united to the body. This is not surprising, given that sixty percent of Hugh’s *De anima* is based on quotations from Philip.[[384]](#footnote-385) In this regard, Hugh followed a common practice at this time for scholars to reproduce large block quotes from the works of their colleagues, only to argue for a different or even a similar conclusion.[[385]](#footnote-386)

Following likewise in the footsteps of Philip, John of La Rochelle uses the terms ‘form’ and ‘perfection’ interchangeably to describe the relationship between the soul and the body.[[386]](#footnote-387) For instance, he freely conflates the terms when he affirms that ‘the soul is united to the body as its form and perfection.’[[387]](#footnote-388) In another passage, he says that the soul ‘is united [to the body] as form to its matter or as a perfection to a perfectible.’[[388]](#footnote-389) In explicating Aristotle’s definition of the soul, moreover, John states that ‘the soul is the perfection and form and first act of the body.’[[389]](#footnote-390) As he elaborates, the first act of a thing precisely is its perfection. However, there are two different kinds of perfection, which are identified in the Aristotelian tradition and incidentally also in the work of Costa Ben Luca and Avicenna.[[390]](#footnote-391)

The first concerns a perfection in habit, as in the case of a child who has achieved the age of reason. The second kind of perfection is perfection in use, which involves the actual employment of the habit of reason which is already possessed. According to John, the first act of the soul in the body is its perfection according to habit. This first act is nothing other than the formation of the body by the soul, as previously noted.[[391]](#footnote-392) As these examples illustrate, there is almost total fluidity in the use of terms that are technically contradictory.

For this reason, scholars like Bazán and Crowley have argued that pre-Thomist scholastics from John Blund to John of La Rochelle were rather confused thinkers who did not clearly perceive ‘the metaphysical problems arising out of this combination’[[392]](#footnote-393) of the terms ‘form’ and ‘perfection’. In this period, Crowley writes, ‘we find authors drawing their inspiration from Aristotle and defining the soul as the form of the body while at the same time, the soul is considered as a substance *sui juris*, and union of soul and body is regarded as a degradation for the soul. The contradiction which to us seems patent, was not perceived.’[[393]](#footnote-394)

As we have already seen with Philip the Chancellor, however, and as Dales confirms, most thinkers in this period were aware of the problems with calling the soul a form and found ways around it.[[394]](#footnote-395) For his part, John acknowledges that a form strictly speaking cannot be understood except in relation to the matter that it informs.[[395]](#footnote-396) To circumnavigate this issue, he distinguishes between three different kinds of form. The first is totally supported by matter and does not rule or sustain it but is sustained by it. This kind of form is what we find in inanimate bodies, like rocks. The second kind of form depends upon matter and rules it but can only operate through it.

This is the case with plants, such as a tree, which cannot function unless in and through its matter, which sustains and conserves the body of the tree. The same holds true for animals, because their sensible operations cannot occur unless in and through the body, and as such, the animal’s essence or form depends on the body.[[396]](#footnote-397) The situation is entirely different for the human soul, however, interpreted as the form of the body. For although the soul rules its matter, which in turn depends upon it, its principal operation is not in matter but in itself, that is, in the work of the rational soul, the proper function of which is to abstract from matter.

Incidentally, this exact argument is presented as another reason why the soul cannot be comprised of matter and form, namely, because its role is to abstract from matter.[[397]](#footnote-398) That operation is undertaken by the intellect and not through any organ of the body. While the body is dependent on the soul, consequently, the rational soul is not dependent on the body as in the case of plants and animals.[[398]](#footnote-399) Rather, the essence of the soul is ultimately separable from the body. On this basis, John concludes that it is perfectly legitimate to affirm that the rational soul is united to the body as a form or perfection to a perfectible, that is, to conflate terms that could be taken to refer to opposites.

When interpreted as he suggests, consequently, John concludes that the term ‘form’ means the same thing as a ‘perfection,’[[399]](#footnote-400) albeit only in the case of the rational soul. Although he endorses Avicenna’s definition of the soul along these lines, John takes issue with Avicenna’s idea of the soul as a ‘motor’ to a ‘moved’ or a sailor to a boat, an analogy which we have seen that the Summa continues to invoke, although we will discover that it does so in a qualified way. In John’s view, such analogies only establish an accidental relationship between the the soul and the body, which he sees as an essential component thereof.[[400]](#footnote-401) In this regard, he reveals his endorsement of the doctrine of *unibilitas substantialis* or the idea that in this life, the soul and body are part of one another’s definition. As he states, ‘the soul by nature is unitable to the body.’[[401]](#footnote-402)

Following Avicenna, John goes so far as to insist that the rational soul is determined to a specific body and cannot perfect any body other than the one for which it is designed.[[402]](#footnote-403) In an attempt to offer a revised version of the analogy, John distinguishes between a motor and an artificer who employs an organ versus an instrument. He objects to the notion that the soul could be related to the body in the manner that an artificer performs their work through an instrument, which was the view of William of Auvergne, because an instrument is separate from the being of the artificer. By contrast, an organ is conjoined to its implementor not only in operation but also in essence, as eyes are related to the power of seeing.[[403]](#footnote-404)

When interpreted along these lines, John concludes, we can say with Avicenna that the rational soul is united to the body in two ways, namely, as a form or perfection to a perfectible and as an agent to its organ or a motor to the moved.[[404]](#footnote-405) As he circumnavigated the problem of employing Aristotle’s language of ‘form’ by redefining it in terms of a perfection, so he reconstrues Avicenna’s language of motor/moved, which implied an accidental relationship to the body, with a view to advocating the opposite position of *unibilitas substantialis*,or the idea that the soul in its essence is related to a body despite their distinction in substance.

This agenda is advanced further in the *Summa Halensis*, which also invokes the Arabo-Latin definition of the soul as the perfection of the body.’[[405]](#footnote-406) Like John, however, the Summa has no problem affirming that form is what perfects *esse*, serving as the ‘first act’ of the soul in the body.[[406]](#footnote-407) Thus, the Summa insists that ‘form is defined insofar as it perfects being.’[[407]](#footnote-408) In making this case, the Summa states that everything that contains and preserves another must do so through the mode of a form. Now the soul contains and preserves the body, so that when it recedes, the body is destroyed and dissolved. This means that the soul is the perfection of the body.[[408]](#footnote-409) These two substances are united as one and constitute one nature.[[409]](#footnote-410)

According to the Summa, this account is not only consistent with a right understanding of Aristotle, as interpreted through the lens of Avicenna. It is also consistent with the DSEA of Augustine, two quotes from which are lined up right before the quote to Aristotle noted above.[[410]](#footnote-411) One of these states the following: ‘now the highest part of the body and the lowest part of the spirit have much in common, which makes it possible for them to be easily joined in a personal union without a confusion of natures. For similar things find joy in similar natures. Thus, the soul which is truly a spirit and the flesh which is truly a body exist and fittingly meet at their extremes.’[[411]](#footnote-412)

As noted previously, the tendency to confuse Aristotle and Augustine not only with Avicenna but also consequently with each other was endemic and indeed characteristic for this period in which Aristotelian and Platonic traditions were still fundamentally regarded as compatible, and the distinctive features of Aristotle’s thought were still not fully delineated. At one point, the Summa, like John, acknowledges the possible contradictions in its approach, specifically describing the soul as a form and a substance in its own right. After all, ‘a form [strictly speaking] does not have being beyond matter; but the soul has being beyond the body’[[412]](#footnote-413) and cannot therefore be united to it a form in matter.[[413]](#footnote-414)

Following John, however, the Summa finds a way around the issue which again involves distinguishing between three different ways of understanding forms.[[414]](#footnote-415) The first kind of form can be found in elements, like fire or gold, where form perfects the whole in every part, and it does so in exactly the same way. For example, every part of a fire is fire.[[415]](#footnote-416) That said, there is ‘more fire’ in a bigger fire and ‘less fire’ in a smaller one.[[416]](#footnote-417) There is another kind of natural form which perfects the whole and the parts but not in the same way. For while the whole animal is an animal, no part of the animal is an animal, even though it is still part of a sentient being; likewise, a part of a plant is a vegetable even though the part itself is not the plant in question.[[417]](#footnote-418) The rational soul represents a third kind of form because it perfects the parts in such a way that no part can participate in the whole without it.[[418]](#footnote-419)

While parts of the human being might be capable of sensation, for example, no part of a human can be called human nor is it capable of what humans are uniquely capable of, namely, intellectual cognition, without reference to the soul. This is because the rational soul is a special kind of form whose proper function is to abstract from matter in the act of thinking about it. Where other forms can only exist in matter, consequently, this particular form can exist both within and outside of a body.[[419]](#footnote-420) As the Summa states, the soul is not a form like other forms because these do not have existence beyond matter, but the soul does, and as such it is a substance that has its own proper composition of form and matter.[[420]](#footnote-421)

Although the body is also constituted of matter and form, it cannot exist in a vivified state without the soul. Indeed, ‘the human body needs the soul not only because it is moved by it but also for its being, for in the soul, it subsists and remains.’[[421]](#footnote-422) On this basis, the Summa concludes that the body subsists in a two-fold relation to the soul: as moved to motor and as perfectible to its perfection. As we will recall, John of La Rochelle had objected to the language of motor/moved because it implied a purely accidental relationship between the soul and the body. For his part, the Summist believes that while this is not the whole of the soul’s relationship to the body, it is certainly a part of it, namely, to move it from one place to another. As we will later discover, this analogy serves particularly well to describe the relationship, if any, that an angel may have to a body, that is, a purely instrumental or accidental one, which is analogous to what is involved in putting on a garment temporarily.

The highly developed angelology that can be found in the Summa by contrast to John, who mentions angels only in passing, is one likely reason why this distinction may have needed to be preserved. By contrast to what John seems to suppose, the second analogy of perfection to perfectible captured effectively the ‘second tier’ of the human soul’s relationship to the body, which entails their natural and essential unitability to one another, or *unibilitas substantialis*. While this doctrine allowed that the body and soul remain distinct substances, it ultimately established them as constituting one—human—nature.[[422]](#footnote-423) Thus, it provided John and his successors with a means of avoiding the extreme dualism of Avicenna, even while transforming his description of the soul as the ‘perfection’ of the body into ‘code language’ to affirm the unity of the soul to the body as separate substances. As we have seen, the substance dualism that underlies the Franciscan vision entered the theological scene in the years before the Franciscans, for example, in the work of Philip the Chancellor.

In the first version of his *Summa aurea*, written between 1215-26, William of Auxerre carried this view forward in the context of rejecting the idea that the human soul differs from an angel because it is united to the body substantially.[[423]](#footnote-424) On his account, there are better grounds on which to delineate the difference, which he was apparently the first to discuss in a concerted way, and which soon became a key context for inquiring about the soul’s relationship to the body as the locus of its difference from an angel. That said, Magdalena Bieniak has observed that William seems to alter his opinion in the second version of his Summa, which was completed between 1226-29.[[424]](#footnote-425) There he describes the relationship to the body as substantial, although he does so in virtually just one line and thus very much in passing.[[425]](#footnote-426) This certainly cannot be described as a developed theory of the body’s substantial union with the soul. Although William’s opinion was likely formative for subsequent thinkers like Hugh of St Cher, it waited for this Dominican to develop a full-blown account of *unibilitas substantialis*, or the substantial unitability of the soul to the body.

Hugh’s older contemporary Roland of Cremona may also have turned to William of Auxerre if not to Hugh himself – whose *Sentences* commentary he may not have known[[426]](#footnote-427) – as a source for this doctrine, which he likewise defended in a Summa that he probably wrote only after the completion of Hugh’s *Sentences* commentary.[[427]](#footnote-428) Although the doctrine of *unibilitas substantialis* was clearly introduced and initially championed by Dominicans, we have seen that it came to fruition in the work of John of La Rochelle and the Halensian Summists. As a matter of fact, it remained a feature of the early Franciscan tradition long after it was discarded by Dominicans, in particular, Thomists, who reverted to the idea that the soul is the form of the body in the more genuinely Aristotelian sense.

The Medium between the Soul and the Body

The establishment of the soul as united to the body in one human nature gave rise to what was considered at the time to be the natural next question, namely, whether the union between the soul and the body requires a medium. Augustine’s DSEA is claimed as the provenance for this question in the SDA, and without a quotation in the DAR; however, the question actually drew inspiration from the work of Costa Ben Luca, who greatly influenced subsequent Christian thinkers, including Isaac of Stella (d. 1168), Ailred of Rielvaux (d. 1167), Alan of Lille, and probably the author of the DSEA itself, as well as Gundissalinus.[[428]](#footnote-429) As we have seen, Costa Ben Luca advocated the idea of a vital spirit, which is activated by the heart, which enlivens the rest of the body and thus enables the operation of its other powers, as well as an animal spirit, located in the brain, which is responsible for the nervous system and thereby the senses, both external and internal. His view of a two-fold ‘spirit’ that mediates between body and soul was also picked up by Alfred Sarashel, who saw it as neither corporeal nor incorporeal and as suited to its purpose for that reason.[[429]](#footnote-430) Sarashel seems to be the more direct source for this doctrine in the *Summa Halensis.*

As Magdalena Bieniak has shown, Philip the Chancellor introduced the question whether the soul has a medium to the theology faculty at Paris.[[430]](#footnote-431) In fact, ‘the doctrine of the intermediary principles expounded in the *Summa de bono* was actually to become the main reference point for all thirteenth-century authors.’[[431]](#footnote-432) As Bieniak elaborates, Hugh of St Cher largely repeats Philip’s position in a disputed question on the soul.[[432]](#footnote-433) According to Philip, the soul is not the first form of the body because it is an entirely separate substance from the body. Rather the form of the body is what he calls the ‘form of corporeity’, which gives structure to prime matter.[[433]](#footnote-434) In affirming this, Philip became the first theologian to use that term.[[434]](#footnote-435) As two separate substances, he further contends, the body and soul stand at complete ontological extremes: where the soul is simple, incorporeal and incorruptible, the body is composite, corporeal, and corruptible.[[435]](#footnote-436) For this reason, a series of material dispositions are needed to prepare the body to receive the soul. This was a position Roland of Cremona also affirmed, speaking of the soul as united to the body through a spirit and through corporeal dispositions, although he does not specify exactly what those dispositions are.[[436]](#footnote-437)

By contrast, Philip the Chancellor discusses the media in detail.[[437]](#footnote-438) At the very basic level, he argues, there are the four elements, which wait to be constituted in a specific way that was known as the ‘complexion’ or ‘temperament’ of a particular being that is instantiated in matter. As Danielle Jacquart has explained, the notion of ‘complexion,’ which can be traced especially to Constantine the African, denotes, ‘a combination of elementary qualities (heat, cold, dryness, humidity), submitted to infinite gradations throughout various parts of the body, the global nature of each individual as determined by birth, age, sex, climate, etc., ‘complexion” was simultaneously the agent and the receiver of corporeal activities and also a series of situated states found in the interface between the somatic and psychological.’[[438]](#footnote-439) As Jacquart elaborates, it had an impact on behavior, and it was on that basis that medicine could claim to be a moral science. Next there is the ‘spirit’ in Costa Ben Luca’s sense of a corporeal vital spirit that gives the ‘heat’ of life and thus complexion to the elements that constitute a particular being.[[439]](#footnote-440) Then come the vegetative and sensitive souls which respectively represent the remote and proximate media between the rational soul and the body and possibly constitute what Costa would have called the animal spirit.[[440]](#footnote-441) Each of these media has something in common with the one that is inferior as well as superior to it, and it is those commonalities that ultimately enable the body to be joined to the soul.

Although Costa Ben Luca is clearly a key source of inspiration for the general notion of intermediaries, Bieniak has shown that there are two other potential candidates for the source of the full-blown version of the theory that can be found in early scholastics. A case was made by Zavalloni in favor of Avicenna, but for reasons Bieniak convincingly elaborates, the internal and external evidence does not support that reading.[[441]](#footnote-442) The other obvious candidate is Avicebron, who much more explicitly and clearly advocated a series of intermediary dispositions that seems to have influenced Philip the Chancellor. As Bieniak notes, for instance, Philip most likely had direct access to the *Fons Vitae*,althoughhe cites it by a different title, namely, the *Liber de materia et forma.*[[442]](#footnote-443)

According to Avicebron, there is a hierarchy of forms in all human beings through which the soul is connected to the body. ‘Just as in the *Summa de bono* lower forms play the role of material dispositions in regard to higher forms, so in the *Fons vitae*, lower forms play the role of matter in regard to higher forms, which, in their turn, operate in lower forms.’[[443]](#footnote-444) While the vegetative soul is similar to the body because of its concern with material existence, the sensitive soul relates to the rational soul because it prepares particular images for cognition.[[444]](#footnote-445) A similar view is presented in Gundissalinus, whose role in translating the *Fons vitae* helps to explain why he also adopted the theory of vegetative and sensitive intermediaries. For his part, John Blund basically makes no reference at all to these media, working as he did under the more exclusive influence of Avicenna.[[445]](#footnote-446)

By contrast, the vegetative and sensitive intermediaries are mentioned in the anonymous treatise, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, which influenced not only John of La Rochelle but also Philip the Chancellor. The author of this work shows great familiarity with Avicebron’s text and cites it frequently.[[446]](#footnote-447) He also adds to Avicebron’s vegetative and sensitive intermediaries two corporeal intermediaries of ‘spirit’ and *virtus elementaris*, which clearly lay the foundation for the account that Philip later develops.[[447]](#footnote-448)

In his own work, John of La Rochelle departs from the precedents set before him by insisting that the soul is immediately united to the body—and thus united without a medium—insofar as it is essentially and not accidentally united to the body. This position gains further support, in his view, when we consider that the soul is united to the body as its form or perfection, and a form is united to matter through itself and thus without a medium.[[448]](#footnote-449) Although he makes these strong affirmations, John nonetheless acknowledges a possible objection to his view, which concerns the fact that the soul and body are opposites. While the soul is simple, the body is composed; one is immortal, the other moral, one perpetual, one temporal, and so on, which would seem to pose an obstacle to their union.[[449]](#footnote-450)

In an attempt address this concern, John ultimately concludes that while the soul is united to the body without a medium insofar as it is related as a perfection to a perfectible, it is united through the medium of its powers—vegetative, sensitive, and so on—insofar as it is considered as the operator of an organ or instrument. In the view of both Dales and Bieniak, this is a clear logical contradiction, namely, to affirm as John does that the soul and body both do and do not require media to be united.

In a further charge against Hugh of St Cher, which seemingly applies to John as well, Bieniak adds that it is inconsistent to affirm simultaneously that the soul is substantially unitable to the body and yet requires media to bring about the union.[[450]](#footnote-451) The crucial point to emphasize here, however, is that the media John has in mind are not media strictly speaking such as Costa envisaged, but merely the means of rendering the soul’s intentions into act. These means consist in the powers of the soul which serve as the middle ground between the essence of the soul and its operations, without which the operations of the soul could not actually occur.[[451]](#footnote-452) Although they are required to translate the intentions of a simple soul into the diverse activities of a complex body, these media do not undermine the immediate relationship of the soul to the body that John posits but rather enact it.

In the SDA, John lists four media in total, two on the side of the body and two on the side of the soul.[[452]](#footnote-453) As in the other cases we have examined, the basic principle behind the enumeration of these media is that they need to have something in common with the powers on either side. On the part of the soul, consequently, there is first the sensible soul which feeds data to the intellect and receives it from the body in turn. Then there is the vegetative soul which provides material to the sense faculties, even while making contact with the outside world from which that material is derived.[[453]](#footnote-454)

On the part of the body, there is first and foremost what is described after Costa Ben Luca as the spirit. This is one of a number of equivocal uses of the term ‘spirit’ of which John speaks.[[454]](#footnote-455) As he notes, angels can be called spirits, as can the substance of the rational soul as separate from the body, which is on Augustine’s account concerned with ‘higher things’.[[455]](#footnote-456) Then there is the imagination where likenesses of corporeal things are imprinted; finally, there is a two-fold corporeal spirit in Costa’s sense of a neural vehicle for sense and motion, on the one hand, that is, the brain, and the blood received in the heart which causes it to beat and gives life to the body, on the other.

This latter is the form of spirit to which John refers in this context, namely, the spirit as the physical vehicle—enacted by the beating of the heart—of the soul’s powers which diffuses those powers throughout the body. The last medium is comprised of the four humours or elements of air, fire, earth, and water, which converge uniquely in the human of all beings and make that being what it is.[[456]](#footnote-457) Most likely with the arguments of John and the Summa in view, William of Auvergne treated the soul as the immediate principle of the body and seemingly denied any intermediaries whatsoever, for reasons we will better understand when we see his response to John of La Rochelle’s theory of cognition in chapter six.[[457]](#footnote-458)

The position of the *Summa Halensis* on this matter basically repeats the arguments of John of La Rochelle. As the soul is united to the body on account of *unibilitas*, it is united through its essence; but if it is united through its essence, it is united without a medium.[[458]](#footnote-459) That said, the soul requires mediating powers in the same way a motor has mechanisms or means by which its body is moved.[[459]](#footnote-460) The medium in question consists in its natural powers.[[460]](#footnote-461) As the Summa acknowledges, DSEA 14 states that there is one medium on the part of the soul and one on the part of the body.[[461]](#footnote-462) Following John, however, the Summa breaks these two media down into two on each side, or four in total, as follows:

The rational soul is an incorporeal substance which is motive, cognitive, separable and not dependent on the body; however the body, to which it is united as to an organ or perfectible is a body composed of elements and possesses a [definite] complexion. On the part of the incorporeal, there is an incorporeal substance which is motive, non-cognitive, and inseparable from the body, namely, the vegetative power, and an incorporeal substance which is motive, cognitive, and inseparable from the body, namely, the sensible power. These are the two media. On the other part is the body composed of elements, not yet possessing a [definite] complexion, and a body not composed of elements: these are two media. Thus, there are four media between the rational soul and its body, two on one side and two on the other. For the spirit is the body that is not composed of elements, and the humour is the body composed of elements but not yet having a [definite] complexion.[[462]](#footnote-463)

These were almost the exact words John had used to describe the nature of the four media. Here as in John’s account, ‘each level of soul shares two properties with those adjacent to it…It is by these shared properties that they serve as the means for unifying the body and for uniting it to the rational soul.’[[463]](#footnote-464) Through the two media represented by the vegetative and sensitive powers, which exhibit decreasing levels of simplicity or cognitive capacity, the soul maintains its maximum simplicity and the body its maximum composition.[[464]](#footnote-465) By the same token, the body possesses two media that exhibit increasing levels of simplicity, the most basic of which consists in the four elements, the next being the elements as constituted in a living being which in the case of humans is alive thanks to the pumping of blood through the heart. As the Summa states, ‘all movements in the body are made through the pre-existing movement of the heart.’[[465]](#footnote-466) This reference signals again the influence of the *De motu cordis* of Alfred Sarashel on the treatment of the soul’s powers in this period, and not least, in the early Franciscan tradition of thought on the media between the body and the soul.[[466]](#footnote-467)

Conclusion

As recipients of new philosophical resources, the early masters at Paris university confronted for the first time the task of specifying the meaning of Augustine’s somewhat open-ended comments about the nature of the soul and its relationship to the body. His—and their—belief that the soul goes on existing after the death of the body necessitated an account of the soul’s status as an independent substance, or so they assumed. The resources available for giving this account were in the first instance derived from Avicenna, whose works were incorporated in the 1230s by figures like Philip the Chancellor, who affirmed the soul is a simple substance which stands in a merely accidental relationship to the body.

By the mid 1230s, Hugh of St Cher had recognized this idea as inadequate to maintaining the Christian belief regarding the integrity of the body and its ultimate resurrection. Thus, Hugh introduced the theory, which was eagerly adopted by John of La Rochelle and other subsequent thinkers, that the soul is substantially unitable to the body. On this showing, the soul cannot do without the body, even though it remains a separate substance from it. While John and his immediate contemporaries tended to describe the soul in its own right in Aviennian terms as a purely simple substance, later thinkers including the Halensian Summists began to favor Avicebron’s theory that the soul must be comprised of form and spiritual matter, if it is to be regarded as a substance in the full sense of the term.

Another area in which early scholastics were influenced by Avicebron as well as Costa ben Luca concerns the affirmation of a series of media between the soul and the body. For Philip the Chancellor and many following him, these media included the vegetative and sensitive powers, which provide a basis for intellectual cognition, and the vital spirit—including the brain and heart—which vivify the human being in fundamental ways that allow cognitions to be translated into reality. Even more basic were the elements of which the body itself was comprised. In a departure from some of his contemporaries, with the exception of William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle, affirmed that the soul is immediately united to the body. According to some scholars, and William himself, this view conflicted with John’s simultaneously-upheld theory of the media between the soul and the body.

As we have seen, however, these two positions are compatible when we consider that the media do not strictly speaking negate the idea of an immediate connection between soul and body but rather serve to explain how the commands of the former are executed by the latter. They are not so much media as means of the soul’s operations in the body. While such theories might have a loose basis in Augustinian or better pseudo-Augustinian texts, this chapter has shown that the debate about how to define the meaning of Augustinianism in this period often came down to a debate about whether to appropriate Avicenna or Avicebron, and how. As such, it had little to do with anything conceptually or contextually close to the work of the authentic Augustine. In the following chapter, we will find this trend replicated in another context, as pseudo-Augustinian writings set the agenda, in conversation with Arabic-language sources, for the way that the Augustinianism of the thirteenth century would be conceived in relation to the powers of the soul.

1. **The Powers of the Soul**

The Unity of the Soul

In the context of considering the simplicity of the soul, a question that arises concerns whether the soul consists of one or three powers.[[467]](#footnote-468) In other words, are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers three separate souls or substances in their own right?[[468]](#footnote-469) As we have seen, there was patristic precedent for this question in Gregory of Nyssa, who defined the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers as three souls, which are welded together, under the authority of the ‘proper’ rational soul.[[469]](#footnote-470) Ultimately, however, the basis for the early scholastic debate would seem to be Aristotle, who also spoke of vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls in his *De anima*, as does Costa Ben Luca, probably following him.[[470]](#footnote-471) According to Crowley, the Stagirite’s work remains the main source for the notion of a plurality of souls (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) in the early scholastic period.[[471]](#footnote-472)

The opposing view was ascribed to Augustine, largely on the basis of a vague hint in the DSEA that there is one soul rather than three.[[472]](#footnote-473) Although this position was frequently advanced on Augustine’s authority, Callus and Gilson have argued that the main source for the theory of the soul’s unity is actually Avicenna.[[473]](#footnote-474) These scholars reached their conclusion on the basis of John Blund, who concerns himself greatly with the defense of what he takes to be Avicenna’s position that these three powers comprise only one soul in the human being.[[474]](#footnote-475) As Callus observes, Blund’s is the first recorded discussion of this topic in the scholastic context.[[475]](#footnote-476) There is no mention of this question in theological authors of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, including Peter of Poitiers, Simon of Tournai, Stephen Langton, Robert Courcon, Praepositinus of Cremona, and William of Auxerre.[[476]](#footnote-477)

This is no great surprise, given what we have already learned about scholars of this ilk, who worked in the wake of Lombard’s *Sentences* or commented upon them. Following a longstanding Christian tradition, they regarded the image of God as located in the higher powers of reason and did not generally take an interest in the lower, vegetative and sensitive, powers. Alexander of Hales went so far as to say that the ‘vegetative and sensitive powers are too closely linked with matter to be considered as the image of the divine Trinity,’ an honour he reserves for the rational soul.[[477]](#footnote-478)

As in several other cases, the first Parisian theologian to treat questions about the lower powers, including their ontological status, was Philip the Chancellor, who must have known the work of Blund, and before him, Gundissalinus, through whom the unicity theory was mediated to the Latin West. At the outset of his discussion in *De anima* 4, Gundissalinus states that the three powers—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—are in fact three souls which are distinct from one another.[[478]](#footnote-479) The vegetative soul exists in plants, the sensitive in animals, and the rational in humans. ‘The evidence that they are distinct from each other is that each one possesses a separate existence; hence, one cannot be the other.’[[479]](#footnote-480) Nevertheless, it does not follow for Gundissalinus, in this work at least, that the powers which are distinct when taken separately ‘are also distinct substances when they are united.’[[480]](#footnote-481)

This is because the higher powers presuppose the lower ones, and ‘the lower forms, when conjoined with the higher…[are] implied in the higher’[[481]](#footnote-482) and are not therefore separate from them. ‘As the sensitive includes the vegetative and has something else besides, that is, sensitivity,’ Callus elaborates, ‘so the human soul is one single substance, implying in itself not only the rational but also the vegetative and the sensitive, not however as distinct substances but simply as distinct powers.’ [[482]](#footnote-483) For Gundissalinus, in fact, the powers are temporally progressive in that the arrival of one prepares for that of another. When the sensitive and vegetative powers co-exist in a human being, consequently, they are joined to and absorbed into the highest, rational, power of the soul.

By the same token, the rational soul does not arrive until the physical formation of the embryo, including its vegetative and sensitive powers, is complete. So construed, consequently, these three powers have a separate existence only prior to being joined together as described.[[483]](#footnote-484) While Gundissalinus thus clearly advocates the unicity theory in the *De anima,* Callus believes he was also the main channel through which the plurality of souls theory entered the scholastic discussion. In his *De processione mundi*,the translator of Avicebron seems to endorse the Jewish philosopher’s belief, more aligned with what was perceived to be the Aristotelian by contrast to the Augustinian tradition, that there are three separate souls in every human.[[484]](#footnote-485) The preoccupation with bolstering what was understood as a more Augustinian way of thinking however meant that this theory largely fell on infertile ground amongst early scholastic theologians. Far more thinkers of this generation advocated some form of the Avicennian unicity theory that they found in Gundissalinus’ *De anima*.

This is certainly the case of John Blund, whose account of the matter is similar to that of Gundissalinus in this work. The topic is clearly a concern for him, as he developed it in some detail and reiterated his views on it a number of times in his treatise on the soul. The vegetative soul can either be that which makes a plant what it is or perfects it. Or it can be that part of a human being which prepares for its perfection through reason but does not perfect or enliven it as such. The same holds true for the sensitive soul.[[485]](#footnote-486) Already we can detect hints here of what would later evolve into a related question, to wit, whether the human being possesses a double vegetative and sensitive soul, one that exists before the arrival of the rational soul, and one that comes afterwards.[[486]](#footnote-487) According to Crowley, this position, advocated by John of La Rochelle, ‘does not differ from that of St Thomas.’[[487]](#footnote-488)

Before delving into John of La Rochelle’s account of the matter at hand, however, it is worth examining Philip’s view, which represents a kind of theological intermediary between the positions of Blund and Gundissalinus and those taken up in John’s generation. In his tractate on the soul, Philip took the view that the three powers—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—can be considered as three substances. In this way, he transformed the question about the plurality of souls into a question about the plurality of substances in the soul.[[488]](#footnote-489) As Bieniak notes, there has been considerable debate, owing to the ambiguity of Philip’s language, as to whether he merely presents in another form the fundamentally pluralist view that there are three distinct souls in the human being. While Lottin and Zavalloni ultimately claim that Philip affirms the existence of only one soul with three substances—which was how he was apparently interpreted by contemporary English Franciscans such as Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Adam of Bockenfield[[489]](#footnote-490)—Bieniak regards the pluralist reading of his work as the most plausible.[[490]](#footnote-491)

In Philip’s understanding, the first two powers pertain to corruptible things and are therefore corruptible: they do not survive the death of the body.[[491]](#footnote-492) By contrast, reason concerns intelligible things that are not corruptible and is for this reason constitutive of a soul which is ultimately a separate and separable substance from the body.[[492]](#footnote-493) While the first two souls are *ex traduce*,or passed on through generation, corporeally, Philip holds un-controversially that the latter is created by God.[[493]](#footnote-494) This view of the soul as immediately imparted by God was held virtually universally by early scholastic thinkers from the author of the DSEA to John Blund, Alexander of Hales, and John of La Rochelle. While Gundissalinus is ambiguous on whether he thinks the soul is *ex traduce*, he probably thinks it is not.[[494]](#footnote-495)

In affirming the rational soul’s creation by God, however, we have seen that Philip postulates the existence of three substances, not necessarily three separate souls. Although Philip like Gundissalinus holds that the vegetative and sensible souls prepare for the arrival of the rational soul, he also believes that they are ultimately assimilated to that soul, which is the only proper perfection of the human being.[[495]](#footnote-496) For this reason, a person on his understanding is not progressively a vegetable and an animal prior to obtaining the rational soul: it is simply an unformed human. As a matter of fact, an embryo possessing the vegetative and sensitive powers cannot be described as human until the power of reason is obtained.[[496]](#footnote-497)

Although the preliminary powers are necessary to achieving the perfection of the rational soul, the fact that they are assimilated to the rational soul when it arrives, even while remaining different substances to it, means that there is only one soul. Thus, Lottin and Zavalloni’s interpretation of Philip as a unitarian seems most plausible. In affirming this position, Philip arguably sought to follow a medieval theological tradition that was ascribed to Augustine which had existed even before the arrival of Avicenna on the scholarly scene. Aelred of Rivaulx (d. 1167) for one had denied the succession of souls in the embryo before it receives the rational soul, which in his view entailed the absurd consequence that at the moment of receiving this soul, the human embryo is actually an animal.[[497]](#footnote-498) The only cases in which the vegetative and sensitive powers can be described as souls in their own right concern plants and animals, which respectively achieve their perfection through these powers.[[498]](#footnote-499)

Whereas the upshot of Philip’s position has been debated, the Dominicans Hugh of St Cher and Roland of Cremona come down squarely on the side of the view that the vegetative, sensible, and rational souls are one.[[499]](#footnote-500) They openly reject the idea that these souls constitute three substances out of an ardent desire to safeguard the simplicity of the soul.[[500]](#footnote-501) According to Roland of Cremona, ‘the nutritive and sensitive souls are powers of the rational soul and are created with it.’[[501]](#footnote-502) As such, they do not emerge from the potentiality of matter. In this regard, ‘Roland of Cremona dismisses the argument from the growth of the embryo by saying that the embryo has no principle of life properly speaking but it is a member of the mother.’[[502]](#footnote-503)

Similar to Roland, Hugh holds that ‘the inferior faculties belong to the substance of the rational soul; however, their existence is strictly connected with their function in the human body.’[[503]](#footnote-504) In affirming this, Hugh was apparently influenced by the Aristotelian view that the soul ceases to exist with the body. This seems to suggest that he saw those powers as mere accidents of the soul. However, we have also seen that Hugh believes that the soul is united substantially and not accidentally to the body. Thus, Magdalena Bieniak has observed that there seems to be a contradiction in his thought.[[504]](#footnote-505) For his part, Guerric of St Quentin also affirmed that the simplicity of the soul requires a unity of the powers; still he argued that simplicity is compatible with the multiplicity of the powers in much the same way that a fire can have numerous effects—burning, illuminating, warming, and so on.[[505]](#footnote-506)

Around the same time, William of Auvergne mounted a vigorous critique of the idea that the three functions of the human being—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—in fact result in three souls.[[506]](#footnote-507) For him, the embryo is not a person before the arrival of the rational soul, though it has the potential to become one. This happens following the preliminary formation of the body, at which point the soul is infused into it directly by God, on the forty-fifth day of pregnancy, replacing or absorbing the corporeal and sensitive forms that pre-existed it.[[507]](#footnote-508)

In his time, Alexander of Hales was unique for positing in one of his disputed questions from before he became a Franciscan friar that all the potencies of the human soul are immortal.[[508]](#footnote-509) On his understanding, the vegetative and sense powers differ in humans and other beings.[[509]](#footnote-510) ‘The position and role of all the human powers are determined in fact by their relation to the rational faculty, while the potencies of the animal soul are limited to corporeal functions.’[[510]](#footnote-511) The immortality of the human soul therefore seemingly guarantees the immortality of its lower faculties. This view was adopted by John in the *Summa de anima*, specifically, in John’s section on the immortality of the soul, as follows:[[511]](#footnote-512)

Since the vegetative and sensible powers in humans are ordered to reason, and since the rational soul even acquires merit and demerit in and through them; and since, moreover, the rational soul deservedly should be united with the body also in the resurrection, and though the vegetable and sensible powers have immortal existence, nor is their operation in humans superfluous, therefore Augustine says in the book DSEA that the soul in death takes with it the vegetative and sensible powers.

As we will see below, a similar view was also adopted by the *Summa Halensis*,and even Guerric of St Quentin.[[512]](#footnote-513) The explanation the early Franciscans offered in this regard was likely motivated by a desire to account for the biblical and indeed Augustinian principle of the resurrection of the body. For different reasons, Aristotle and Avicenna did not need to account for the possibility of a bodily resurrection and the corresponding immortality of the lower powers. In the case of Aristotle, this was because he did not seemingly believe that the body survives the death of the soul.

In the case of Avicenna, it was because the soul in his view is a separate substance from the body whose life can go on without the body.[[513]](#footnote-514) While the soul is immortal, in other words, Avicenna does not believe it is possible to prove that the body is as well. Perhaps because of the intermediary role he played between the Greco-Arabic philosophical and Latin Christian traditions, Gundissalinus’ position on this issue like several others is notoriously ambiguous. In his *De anima*, he seems to present conflicting opinions on whether the vegetative and sensitive powers of the soul survive the death of the body.[[514]](#footnote-515)

The reasoning of the early Franciscans by contrast follows clearly from their religious assumptions. Since we acquire merit through bodily life, they insist that the bodily powers must be resurrected along with the rational soul. As the human soul is substantially united to the body, moreover, it is essential to what it means to be human to have a human body, and thus a resurrection without vegetative and sensitive powers is inconceivable. The unity thesis that underpins this account is clearly advocated by John of La Rochelle. He contends that the soul perfects the whole human being, which includes vegetative, sensible, and rational powers, such that these powers do not differ in substance.[[515]](#footnote-516) If they were different substances, he insists, it would be impossible for them to coordinate their operations in the way that is necessary for human knowledge. Furthermore, they could not be united in one person, because, in this case, they would be independent entities.

The conclusion which John reaches is based on the pseudo-Augustinian *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* 15, which was in fact authored by Gennadius of Massilia (d. 496), a Christian priest and historian. This particular passage is virtually ubiquitous in other defences of the unity theory, such as that of Hugh of St Cher. The conclusion it was taken to support, in summary, is that these three entities, namely, the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls, are one substance that differ only insofar as they represent three different powers.[[516]](#footnote-517) In the view of Dales, John somewhat inconsistently maintains at the same time as this the doctrine of double vegetative and sensitive souls, when he states the following.[[517]](#footnote-518)

The vegetative and sensitive powers are said to have two ways [of being] in the human being. For there are vegetative and sensitive powers that dispose and vegetative and sensitive powers that perfect. The vegetative power which disposes is the one that oversees in an embryo the acts of nutrition, augmentation, configuration, and organization, before the infusion of the rational soul, which is one in substance with the vegetative power. Likewise, the disposing sensitive power oversees the senses and motion in the embryo before the infusion of the rational soul. The vegetative and sensitive powers that perfect, however, consist in the rational soul itself, which, as one in substance with the vegetative and sensitive powers, vivifies and gives sense capacity to the body, perfecting it by vegetation and sensitivity. The first [kind of soul] is embedded with the body, and the second flows in with the rational soul. The first does not merit the name soul insofar as it is disposing not perfecting; the second however does. Similarly, the first will die with the body, but the second will not because it is founded in a substance of immortal nature.[[518]](#footnote-519)

So far, we have discovered that there was virtually unanimous support for the unicity theory amongst university masters in Paris in the 1220s and 30s, including as Lottin notes, William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, Hugh of St Cher, William of Auvergne, and of course, John of La Rochelle.[[519]](#footnote-520) The position was associated with Augustine on the basis of two spurious works, the DSEA and the *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus.* Not surprisingly, the *Summa Halensis* largely reiterates John’s conclusions in its own treatment of these matters. Invoking DSEA 13/15, the author of this text insists that the three powers ultimately represent one substance.[[520]](#footnote-521) After all, the rational power in the human being is the perfection of the whole being and thus of all of the powers which it possesses, not only rational but also vegetative and sensitive. These powers do not therefore differ in substance in the human being.[[521]](#footnote-522) If they were different substances, the act of one would impede on the other, but we see that the opposite of this occurs in practice, as the powers cooperate.[[522]](#footnote-523)

Furthermore, the Summa argues, the body will be resurrected as it is conjoined to the soul, so if the sensible and vegetative powers in the human being were different in substance to the rational power, the resurrection of the body would not be possible.[[523]](#footnote-524) The lower powers could of course be said to disintegrate at death, but then the whole would not be the same in the resurrection as it was previously, which is unnatural and absurd.[[524]](#footnote-525) While it is the case in animals that the vegetative and sensitive powers are corruptible or cease to exist at death, the Summa holds that this is only because those powers in them are exclusively ordained to bodily life. In humans, by contrast, the powers are ordained to a higher, intellectual, life, which is incorruptible and not determined by time.[[525]](#footnote-526)

After presenting these arguments, the Summist acknowledges that a case can be made for the opposing position. After all, a human embryo possesses vegetative and sensitive functions before achieving reason, and these must not exist without a corresponding substance. Since the rational soul is preceded by vegetative and sensible substances in the soul, consequently, these must be separate substances.[[526]](#footnote-527) Furthermore, they must be separate substances because two of them—the vegetative and sensitive—are corruptible while the rational is incorruptible or inseparable and separable from the body, respectively.[[527]](#footnote-528) In resolving the question, the Summist denies that this can be the case, on the ground that the embryo does not have the vegetative and sensitive powers through the mode of perfection, but only through the mode of preparing the body to receive the soul, which is its perfection, that is, in the merely disposing way John mentioned.[[528]](#footnote-529)

Although the human body cannot be prepared and organized to receive the rational soul without the prior development of the vegetative and sensible souls, a human being is not really human until it receives this ultimate perfection of the rational soul. At its purely vegetative stage, for instance, it can only be said to live in the way that an apple lives. That said, an un-formed human cannot be called a plant or an animal on receiving a vegetative or sensitive power, respectively, because plants and animals have their perfection in these powers, but the human being requires the rational power for its perfection. Only when it receives this power can it truly be said to live as a human being.[[529]](#footnote-530)

When it finally obtains this power, the vegetative and sensitive functions are fused with the intellect. As such, they are not three separate substances. Nor are they different to the substances that they were previously, as is suggested by the theory of the double vegetative and sensible souls. As we have seen in John, this entails the notion that the vegetative and sensitive souls which provide the material dispositions in the embryo for receiving the rational soul somehow differ from the ones a person possesses on obtaining reason. According to the Summist, this position is not plausible, because nature makes nothing in vain. There is a fundamental continuity, not to mention unity, amongst the powers of the rational soul.

While one might still object that a substance that is corruptible and inseparable from the body is not the same as one that is incorruptible and separable from the body, the Summa clarifies that insofar as the corruptible powers are united to the incorruptible rational power, they themselves become incorruptible and thereby separable. For in the human being, they are ordained to more than just the facilitation of bodily life, as they are in animals. While they serve this purpose in humans, they also sustain a rational life, which is not tied to the body. In humans by contrast to animals, consequently, the corruptible powers are not strictly speaking corruptible.[[530]](#footnote-531)

A related question the Summa raises later in its discussion is whether the soul has only one power or more than one. Since the Summist has already argued for three powers, we know in advance what his answer to this question will be, but it is interesting to trace his line of reasoning. In favour of the idea that there is only one power, he observes that God’s power is one, just like his essence, and human beings are made in the image of God.[[531]](#footnote-532) This, however, turns out to be exactly the reason why the Summa insists that the human soul does not have just one power. As the Summist elsewhere established, there is a difference between the Creator and the creature; while the former is identical with his essence, the latter is not. From this, it follows that the human being must have through a plurality of powers what the Creator has through a power that is undivided. This indeed accords with our experience as human beings of acting through a plurality of powers where God makes everything he makes by just one—divine—power.[[532]](#footnote-533)

A further question concerns whether the powers of the soul should be described as its ‘parts’.[[533]](#footnote-534) This notion conflicts with the claim of DSEA 13 that ‘the whole essence of the soul consists in its powers nor is it divided into parts, as it is simple and undivided.’[[534]](#footnote-535) While the powers of the soul cannot therefore be described as parts in the strict sense of the term, the Summist claims that there is a sense in which they can be described as parts, which can be inferred from the same text by Augustine. This concerns the three powers—vegetative, sensible, and rational—which comprise the substance of the soul. Although these powers are ultimately one, they diversify the substance of which they are a part. By the same token, their different acts specify or instantiate the powers of the soul and exhibit the many different possible manifestations of its substance that can occur in practice. As such, the acts of the soul can also be described as parts in a virtual but not real sense which give expression to the diverse powers of the greater whole.[[535]](#footnote-536)

The Identity of the Soul with its Powers in John of La Rochelle

The theory that the soul is identical with its powers was a major theme in twelfth-and thirteenth-century theology which was commonly traced to the work of Augustine. In his *De Trinitate*, for instance, Augustine speaks of various intellectual triads, which supposedly render the human mind the image of the Trinity, which is ultimately one in its own essence despite consisting in three persons.[[536]](#footnote-537) The first triad is mind, knowledge, and love, which is invoked to explain how the mind gains knowledge of what it desires to know. The second triad, which was extremely popular in the Middle Ages, especially amongst Franciscans, referred to memory, understanding, and will as the faculties whereby the mind seeks understanding of what it desires to know and stores the knowledge it obtains in the memory.

As Pius Künzle has shown, many authors took these triads as support for the identity thesis. At various points in *De Trinitate*, however, Augustine suggests that there is a real difference between the soul and its powers.[[537]](#footnote-538) In this connection, Lottin cites *De Triniate* 9.4 which states that ‘memory, understanding, and will…are not three substances but one.’[[538]](#footnote-539) In one of his letters, Magdalena Bieniak has observed, Augustine states even more clearly the opinion that the powers are not the same as the soul:[[539]](#footnote-540)

In this likeness there is an unlikeness, because these three, namely, memory, understanding and will, are not the same as the soul, even though they are in the soul. However, that Trinity is not in [God] but it is the same as God. For this reason, highest simplicity is attributed to him, because if we are speaking of the nature of God, to be is nothing other than to understand. However, because the soul exists even when it does not understand, it is something other than the fact of its existence.

Although Augustine does not treat the identity thesis as such in this context, the passages mentioned above confirm that it is not necessarily a view that he clearly advocated. In fact, the source of the identity thesis was Isidore of Seville, who argued that the distinction between the faculties in Augustine’s triad of memory, understanding, and will was purely nominal, because they all pertain simply to different aspects of one substance.[[540]](#footnote-541) In time, Isidore’s theory was adopted by Cistercians like Aelrid of Rivaulx, Theirry of Chartres, Isaac of Stella, and ultimately, the DSEA, which enjoyed enormous popularity in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.[[541]](#footnote-542) According to Künzle, Bernard of Clairvaux, and

Hugh of St Victor all ended up attributing the identity thesis to Augustine, partly as a result of this text.[[542]](#footnote-543)

What made the identity thesis a major fixture in early scholastic literature, particularly *Sentences* commentaries, however, was the fact that Peter Lombard endorsed the theory in *Sentences* book I, chapter 3, where he speaks of *mens, notitia*, and *amor* as one.[[543]](#footnote-544) In his view, the denial of the identity thesis would lead to the problematic conclusion that the powers of the soul are mere accidents of the soul and do not belong to it necessarily.[[544]](#footnote-545)

The thesis became a focus of early scholastic debate in the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre, who vociferously denied not only that the theory can be traced to Augustine but also that it is correct. As he stresses, essence and powers, which represent another way to talk about essence and a mode of existence, are only the same in God.[[545]](#footnote-546) That is to say, God alone is a fully actualized being, while other beings must exercise their powers discursively and with increasing fluidiy through use over time. Although William acknowledges that the teaching can be found in the work of ‘some masters,’ he does not name his opponents. Most likely, he is referring to the DSEA, which he inevitably regarded as an inauthentic work of Augustine, whose inspiration for the doctrine he had already denied.[[546]](#footnote-547)

In refuting the identity thesis, William was not alone. William of Champeaux had also rejected it.[[547]](#footnote-548) Even Avicenna denied that the soul and its powers can be identified with one another.[[548]](#footnote-549) In spite of this, many of William of Auxerre’s successors defended the thesis, including those who were extensively familiar with his work and used it heavily in other areas. In her important study, Magdalena Bieniak goes into considerable detail on the position not only of William, but also of others like Hugh of St Cher and Philip the Chancellor, building on the study of Pius Künzle.[[549]](#footnote-550) As she observes, Philip the Chancellor adheres to the identity thesis in the first redaction of his *Summa de bono*.[[550]](#footnote-551)

Likewise, Hugh defends the identity thesis just as vigorously as William had rejected it. Furthermore, he attributes the thesis to Augustine’s *De Trinitate*.[[551]](#footnote-552) In his opinion, affirming that the soul is identical with the powers of memory, understanding, and will is the only way to uphold the simplicity of the soul.[[552]](#footnote-553) This overwhelming concern is also why he denied the matter-form composition of the soul.[[553]](#footnote-554) In his view, if the soul is not identical with its powers, then as Lombard argued, the powers are mere accidents of the soul. This would be absurd, because it is impossible to conceive of the soul without its rational faculties. Whereas Hugh argued that simplicity of essence requires simplicity—or identity—of the powers, Guerric of St Quentin held that the soul differs from its powers because, like everything other than God, it is comprised of form and spiritual matter.[[554]](#footnote-555)

Likewise, Roland of Cremona denies the identity of the soul with its powers in discussing the triad of memory, understanding, and will, on the grounds that God and creatures have nothing in common.[[555]](#footnote-556) Around the same time, however, William of Auvergne continued to affirm the identity of the soul with its powers, in the interest of preserving the soul’s simplicity.[[556]](#footnote-557) A middle way between the two extremes of accepting or rejecting the identity thesis was put forward by Alexander of Hales.[[557]](#footnote-558) In his Glossa, Alexander proposes a truly novel solution. This turns on a distinction between essence, substance, and subject.[[558]](#footnote-559) The essence is the definition of a thing, which makes it what it is.[[559]](#footnote-560) The substance is ‘that to which certain things advene, without any or all of which a thing can exist.’[[560]](#footnote-561) Lastly, the subject is the ‘subsisting thing, complete with all its essential determinations, which constitutes the subject for accidental determinations.’[[561]](#footnote-562)

While in God, the rational powers of memory, understanding, and will are identical to the divine essence, this is not the case with human persons, whose powers are instead identical with their substance. After all, the soul could not be what it is or do what it does without its powers.[[562]](#footnote-563) That, however, does not mean that the essence of the soul cannot be conceived without those powers; this essence involves something more than the rational powers, although Alexander does not really specify what that is. The implications of his thesis will become clearer in John of La Rochelle, as we will see.

For the moment, however, we can simply appreciate how relevant Alexander’s solution was to resolving concerns on both sides of the argument. On the one hand, he managed to distinguish human from divine powers once and for all. There is no risk in his account, as in most versions of the identity thesis, of suggesting that human beings, like God, have fully actualized cognitive potencies. On the other hand, Alexander finds a way of confirming that the powers are somehow essential to the soul’s being or operation in accordance with what it is. In affirming the unity of the powers with the substance of the soul, he asserts its overarching simplicity.

In a remarkable turn of events, Philip the Chancellor adopted Alexander’s three-fold distinction in a later version of his *Summa de bono*, seemingly showing appreciation for its potential to address the contemporary debates.[[563]](#footnote-564) However, he does not seem aware of the solution Alexander ultimately offered with that distinction. In his own account, he uses the terms ‘essence’ and ‘substance’ interchangeably and thus basically ends up with the identity thesis he had previously affirmed.[[564]](#footnote-565) As Bieniak notes, his ignorance of Alexander’s novel solution may be due to the fact that Alexander and Philip were rough contemporaries.

For this reason, Philip may have been privy to Alexander’s provisional teachings, without having access to the Franciscan’s conclusions when formulating his own.[[565]](#footnote-566) Whatever the reason, it is safe to say that the Franciscan order is ultimately to credit for a plausible solution to the problem, which was then further developed by John of La Rochelle in the *Summa de anima.* At the start of his discussion of this topic, John adheres to the scholastic method of listing the reasons to support the position that he himself ultimately opposes. To this end, he cites DSEA 13 which states:

The soul according to its various offices is called by different names: it is called animated insofar as it performs the vegetable functions, sensible when it senses, and the soul when it acquires wisdom, the mind when it understands, reason when it discerns, memory when it retains, will when it chooses. These functions nevertheless do not differ in substance but only in name, because they are all one [in the] soul; they are diverse properties but one essence. Thus it remains that the soul is its powers and the converse.[[566]](#footnote-567)

In this connection, John cites a further passage from the DSEA which list powers of the soul as these five and affirms their identity: sense, imagination, *ratio, intellectus, intelligentia*. He then outlines another argument that was very commonly used to support the identity thesis in the scholastic texts we have been discussing. This turns on the assumption that the soul has the potential to receive all species of things, just as matter has the potential to receive all natural forms. On the grounds that the ability to receive all sensible species is the very definition of the soul, John mentions the conclusion of his opponents that the soul must be identical with the powers by which it receives these species.

In entertaining the other side of the argument, and advancing his own view, however, John acknowledges that essence and operation are only the same in God. This means that his powers—and his alone--are unlimited and always in act, by contrast to human powers, which are limited and must be exercised and developed in time rather than all at once. From this distinction between humans and God, John infers that God is the only one in whom essence and powers are the same. In place of the idea that the essence of the soul is identical with its powers, John proposes that the substance of the soul is identical with its powers, a position he clearly derived from Alexander of Hales. According to John, this is what Augustine taught in the aforementioned passages, namely, that there is an identity between the substance of the soul and its powers, not its essence.[[567]](#footnote-568)

This conclusion however leaves open the question what the essence of the soul entails for John and early Franciscans more generally. On the ground that John affirms the *unibilitas substantialis* theory, Bieniak suggests that the essence of the soul may simply consist in its being unitable to the body. As she notes, this conclusion finds support in the *Summa de anima*, where John states that ‘the soul that is united with the body through its own *unibilitas*, is united with the body with its own essence.’[[568]](#footnote-569) To be human in essence, or at least one essential aspect of being human, in summary, is to occupy a distinctly human body. The fact of embodiment is indeed something that is proper to all humans, even though they subsist as humans—or employ the rational powers—in different ways which are specific to them as individuals.

The Identity of the Soul and its Powers in the *Summa Halensis*

The *Summa Halensis* largely reiterates John’s arguments for and against the identity thesis. Moreover, it traces the identity thesis to Augustine, that is, the Augustine of the *De spiritu et anima* passage that has already been quoted above*:*[[569]](#footnote-570)

According to the exercise of its different roles, the soul is called by various names. It is called soul when it enlivens; sense, when it feels; spirit, when it contemplates; mind when it understands; reason when it discerns; memory, when it recalls; and will when it wills. These do not differ in substance, although they do differ in name, because all of these aspects are really one soul. Thus the diverse properties form one essence.[[570]](#footnote-571)

Following John again, the Summist cites the further argument for identity which derives from the idea of prime matter, which possesses the potential to receive all forms.[[571]](#footnote-572)

Much like prime matter, the soul has an ability to receive all the species of the things it knows. Since prime matter just is the potential or power to receive all natural forms, the soul must be constituted by this potential as well. Against this, however, the Summa observes that essence and its mode of existence—in this case, its powers—are only the same in God.

This means that the essence and powers of the soul cannot be the same. ‘As being and operation are not the same thing so neither are essence and power. For the essence of the soul is that through which the soul is an essence in an absolute sense; a power is that through which the soul is receptive to or affects other things.’[[572]](#footnote-573) On this basis, the Summa supports the conclusion of Alexander and John that the ‘soul’s powers are the same as its substance, because the soul cannot subsist nor is it understood without its powers nor can these powers subsist or be understood without the soul. The identity therefore which Augustine posits is referred to the substance and not the essence’[[573]](#footnote-574) of the soul.

In response to the counter-argument concerning prime matter, the Summa makes the interesting observation that the situation with the soul is not the same as that of prime matter, because the soul is not where all spiritual forms are ultimately resolved or instantiated, but prime matter is the place where all corporeal forms are ultimately resolved or instantiated.[[574]](#footnote-575) This is what is at stake in identifying the soul’s powers with its substance rather than with its essence. For the essence of a soul is something that applies to all souls. But the substance of the soul is individual to one soul only.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discovered in new ways how early scholastics, above all John of La Rochelle and his Franciscan contemporaries, reckoned with two intertwining demands. One was to assimilate the wealth of philosophical material that came to them through Aristotle, Avicebron, Avicenna and other philosophers, in order to give a more robust account of the powers of the human soul than had existed in the previous Latin theological tradition. The other task was somehow to accomplish this feat in a way that was at least marginally related to or justifiable in terms of the tradition, which had long been associated most closely with Augustine. In this regard, early scholastics were confronted with two competing options for describing the three powers of the soul: a plurality thesis stemming from the Aristotelian tradition that had been channelled through Costa Ben Luca and Avicebron; and a unitarian tradition from Avicenna. However, they showed little doubt about which one to prefer.

Both Dominicans and Franciscans opted for the unicity account which they perceived as more consistent with Augustine’s emphasis on the simplicity of the soul—a concept we have already learned that they defined in different ways, with some advocating universal hylomorphism to affirm the independent substance of the soul and others rejecting that thesis for the same reason. The thesis that the soul is identical with its powers—and therefore simple—also seemed obviously necessary to affirm for those of the medieval Augustinian ilk, even if Augustine himself did not endorse it. There was precedent for this view in Isidore of Seville, the DSEA, and Lombard. Nevertheless, further reflection proved that unqualified adherence to the identity thesis was not unproblematic. For instance, an excessively vigorous rendering of the theory could obscure the difference between human and divine powers.

In this context, Alexander of Hales offered a truly novel solution which implicitly identified the essence of the soul not with its powers but simply with its ability to be united to a human body. This solution was arguably ahead of its time in that it allowed in principle for affirming the essential humanity and thus the dignity and integrity of human beings whose rational faculties are inhibited, perhaps due to a mental or physical condition. What is fascinating about both the theories considered in this chapter, however, is that they highlight the extent to which the very meaning of Augustinianism was up for debate in this period.

As the chart at the end is this chapter illustrates, there were many cases where Dominicans and Franciscans of this generation disagreed on what it meant to be an Augustinian in the field of psychology. At the same time, however, there are virtually just as many cases where they concurred, and not always along party lines, which were only demarcated clearly in the next generation. In both cases, moreover, the debates in question did not arise on the basis of Augustine’s own writings so much as they were retrospectively projected on to him through spurious works that were interpreted in the light of newly recovered Greco-Arabic sources. We do not need to prove what Augustine actually believed about these issues—even though we have gestured towards a how one might do so—in order to reach the conclusion with some certainty that the positions early scholastics attributed to him—which vary sometimes to the point of contradiction—were at best tangentially related to his authentic works and owe their provenance instead, above all, to the legacy of Arabic sources.

**Early Scholastic Dominican, Franciscan, and Secular Masters:**

**Synergies and Influences**

**5. Cognitive Powers: John of La Rochelle’s *Tractatus***

The *Tractatus* and the *Summa de anima*

The focus of this chapter is the *Tractatus*’ treatment of the different classifications of the powers of the soul, which is based on the works of Avicenna, Johannitius, Damascus, and pseudo-Augustine, in that order. At the outset, some initial reflections are in order regarding the relationship of this text to the *Summa de anima* which will be discussed in the next chapter. The latter work treated the classifications in a different order to the *Tractatus*, covering pseudo-Augustine, Damascus, and finally Avicenna, excluding only the treatment of Johannitius’ medical categories. Many years ago, Lottin wrote articles on the relationship between the *Tractatus* and the SDA. However, these are somewhat outdated, as they were written before critical editions of the texts were prepared, and mainly sought to establish the temporal priority of the *Tractatus* to the *Summa* and the authenticity of the *Tractatus* as Rochelle’s own work. Both of these questions have now been definitively answered by the editions themselves.[[575]](#footnote-576)

As noted in chapter one, we know from the editions that the date of the *Tractatus* was probably around 1232 while the SDA is slightly later and before 1236. According to Michaud-Quantin, the editor of the *Tractatus*, the SDA rather than the *Tractatus* seems to have been used by the author of the section on the rational soul in the *Summa Halensis*,and for this reason, Michaud-Quantin sees the *Tractatus* as a rather less significant work.[[576]](#footnote-577) As we will discover, however, this is not necessarily the case if we consider the extent to which the SDA reproduces much of the contents of the *Tractatus* almost in entirety and often nearly verbatim.[[577]](#footnote-578) In helpful charts provided in their editions of the *Tractatus* and SDA, respectively, Michaud-Quantin and Bougerol catalogue the main areas of overlap between the two texts, which I have tried to present in a different, more readily discernible format, at the end of this chapter and will highlight through cross-references between the two texts in the footnotes.[[578]](#footnote-579)

The overlaps begin at the very beginning. At the time, it was customary to initiate treatises on the soul—as in Avicenna and John Blund—with a discussion of the major definitions of the soul that circulated during the period.[[579]](#footnote-580) The first part of the *Tractatus* and the first part of the SDA, not to mention the DAR, clearly follow this tradition. The first part of the *Tractatus* for one contains twelve definitions of the soul. The first comes from John of Damascus.[[580]](#footnote-581) The next one comes from Alfred Sarashel;[[581]](#footnote-582) five are from pseudo-Augustine’s DSEA;[[582]](#footnote-583) and the remaining five from Plato; Aristotle;[[583]](#footnote-584) and Nemesius of Emesa, who was known by the name Remegius;[[584]](#footnote-585) the book of Genesis;[[585]](#footnote-586) and Seneca.[[586]](#footnote-587) The first part of the SDA contains seven definitions of the soul, which are mostly repeated from the *Tractatus*: one each from Alfred Sarashel;[[587]](#footnote-588) Remegius;[[588]](#footnote-589) and Aristotle;[[589]](#footnote-590) two from the DSEA;[[590]](#footnote-591) one from the book of Genesis;[[591]](#footnote-592) and one from Seneca.[[592]](#footnote-593)

The second book of the SDA—on the powers of the soul—begins with a brief inquiry concerning the identity and differences between the soul and its powers. From there, it moves on swiftly to cover the division of the powers according to pseudo-Augustine’s DSEA in approximately seven pages; the division of John of Damascus in approximately 22 pages; and the division of Avicenna in around 70 pages. There are some obvious differences to the corresponding, also second, part of the *Tractatus*. There, the division of ‘the philosophers, especially Avicenna’, as John puts it, is foregrounded, and is discussed in over 30 pages. As Hasse observes, ‘almost exactly one third of this part consists of quotations from Avicenna's *De anima*.’[[593]](#footnote-594) However, Michaud-Quantin notes that the author mixes into this section a number of theological concepts such as free will and sensuality, a not uncommon practice at the time, which is also illustrated in the treatise of John Blund.[[594]](#footnote-595)

Next, the reader finds 10 pages on the division of the medical doctors, more specifically, Avicenna and Johannitius (c. 809-73), a Christian translator into Arabic of more than one hundred Greek writings, mostly by Galen, and who was regarded as a medical authority at the time. This section largely repeats material that had already been presented in the initial section on the division ‘according to the philosophers,’ but is nonetheless significant for the evidence it provides of John’s medical knowledge and interests. Finally, there are nine pages on the divisions of John of Damascus and six on Augustine, followed by a summation of the previous material.

The third part of the *Tractatus*—which has no counterpart in the SDA—concerns the perfection of the soul and is essentially theological in character. It covers topics like grace, the virtues, gifts, sacraments, the beatitudes, and ultimately, the final vision of God. These same topics had been covered in the anonymous treatise by a theologian, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*,or Anonymous Callus, which dates to around 1230, which possibly served as a motivator for John to treat these issues as well. In the works of Aristotle, these ethical and moral topics were considered separately from the topic of the soul, and so the approach of earlier scholastics who combined moral and psychological inquiries may have come to seem outdated and indeed heterogeneous.[[595]](#footnote-596) Michaud-Quantin posits this as a possible reason why John does not cover these topics in his SDA, though he deals with them in other works.

In addition to this, Michaud-Quantin cites some other possible reasons for the differences between the *Tractatus* and the SDA. A significant one, noted already by Lottin, concerns the idea that the *Tractatus* incited something of a scandal when it was first introduced at the University of Paris, given the way it departed so significantly from what was perceived at the time as the purview of a theologian.[[596]](#footnote-597) As we have seen, John of La Rochelle was the first Latin thinker to take a serious interest in classifications of the powers of the soul and to try to enumerate them extensively and indeed faithfully in relation to their sources.[[597]](#footnote-598) Although the third part of the *Tractatus* did deal with questions about the perfection of the soul, the second part, which placed Avicenna front-and-centre and went so far as to investigate medical and cognitive categories, could not help but seem beyond the scope of theology as the discipline was understood at the time.

As this suggests, the suppression of the medical material and the placement of Avicenna only after Augustine and Damascus in the SDA may have been part of an effort by John to render his philosophical material more palatable to his theological audience.[[598]](#footnote-599) Likewise, the incorporation into the SDA of more material related to the so-called ‘motive’ or volitional powers, including free will, probably went a long way towards appeasing colleagues who believed the main function of a theologian was to facilitate moral ends. Although John re-arranged his material in the SDA for rhetorical purposes, this does not necessarily imply that the SDA renders the *Tractatus* obsolete; this seems to be the opinion of Michaud-Quantin, whose arguments will be considered in more detail below.

The Contribution of the *Tractatus*

According to Michaud-Quantin, the *Tractatus* represents a relatively unoriginal compilation, the chief merit of which is to convey, albeit with considerable accuracy, the different conceptions of the human being that confronted scholars at the time both through key theological sources and the Greek tradition, not least as transmitted through the Arabs.[[599]](#footnote-600) As an encyclopedia of sorts, he asserts, it was probably assembled by its author to serve as an aid in teaching. By contrast, Michaud-Quantin describes the SDA as the personal work of a master of theology seeking to delineate his own opinions.[[600]](#footnote-601) Admittedly the SDA does surpass the *Tractatus* in treating the numerous theoretical questions about the soul which were in vogue at the time.[[601]](#footnote-602) These include the six main questions we have already discussed in the last two chapters, concerning the identity of the soul with its powers, the relationship between the soul and the body, the medium between the soul and the body, the composition of the soul, and the ontological status of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers.

Although the coverage of all these topics certainly does give the SDA a more comprehensive feel, the debts of the SDA to the *Tractatus* which will be explored in this and the next chapter call into question the notion that the latter is of little significance. In particular, we will see that the remainder of the SDA’s material, namely, on the cognitive schemata, more or less repeats the contents of the *Tractatus*, with the exception of the order in which the authorities are presented. Far from a mere compilation of leading authorities on the soul, theological, philosophical, and even medical, moreover, John’s assembly of sources betrays a great deal of his own agenda. That is not to deny that John was a very close reader of his sources, who took great care to present them accurately.[[602]](#footnote-603) Nevertheless, he was an independent-minded thinker who selected texts in order to accomplish an individual objective.

As noted in the first chapter, this was the time when the ban on reading Aristotle had been recently lifted and access to *De anima* in both its Arabic and Greek-to-Latin translations was readily available. Although these texts were often read through an Avicennian lens, we do see earlier contemporaries of John like Philip the Chancellor and William of Auvergne quoting Aristotle himself, even if he was interpreted in an Avicennian way. In the context, it is difficult to see John’s failure to mention Aristotle’s *De anima*, with the exception of his definition of the soul, albeit interpreted in the Avicennian manner described in chapter two, as anything but a concerted statement of his preference for the Avicennian point of view.

This was a bold and decisive move to make at a time when no other thinker—and certainly no theologian—had previously engaged so fully and explicitly with Avicennian psychology. This was no mere statement of the *status quo* in psychology. The sources John selected could have been otherwise and might indeed have been contested by other authors who not only favoured other authorities but also dis-favoured the ones selected by John, including the DSEA, the Augustinian provenance of which was increasingly coming into question.[[603]](#footnote-604) The rationale for John’s choice of a quasi-Augustinian text seems fairly clear. Although he adheres to a decidedly Avicennian agenda in psychology, Dag Hasse has rightly noted that early scholastics in his position also had to contend with their indigenous Christian tradition, which was marked by psychological schemata of its own.[[604]](#footnote-605)

The most famous of these are found in Augustine, above all, in the series of psychological triads he presents in his *De Trinitate*,few of which, interestingly, make an appearance in John’s work, and indeed only those that reappear in the DSEA. His preference for the *De spiritu et anima*,which in a sense said everything and almost nothing that Augustine might have said, made it easy to identify clear points of contact with the thought of Avicenna, thus allowing his views to be inserted into the Augustinian tradition. The choice of John of Damascus as an authority likewise becomes understandable when we consider the history of its reception in the late twelfth century, following the initial translation of his *De fide orthodoxa* by Burgundio of Pisa in 1153-54.[[605]](#footnote-606) The first major author to benefit from partial translations of Damascus’ *De fide orthodoxa* was Peter Lombard, who incorporated the Greek father’s work sporadically into his *Sentences*.[[606]](#footnote-607)

By the early thirteenth century, theologians were starting to engage with the whole work, not least as Saccenti shows because of its affinity with the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in terms of the themes it covered.[[607]](#footnote-608) Indeed, the order in which those themes were treated lent itself to the eventual division of the work—probably by Philip the Chancellor—according to the four-part structure of Lombard’s *Sentences*, which considered God, creation, Incarnation, and Sacraments.[[608]](#footnote-609) As Saccenti shows, the late twelfth-century manuscripts of Burgundio’s translation do not present the work in terms of this four-fold division but according to Damascus’ original organizational schema of one hundred chapters.[[609]](#footnote-610) Through these new divisions, consequently, Damascus was pressed into the service and even the style of early Latin scholasticism and was presented as a key resource that could and should be employed to facilitate efforts increasingly to systematize theology.

Although Philip, as Lottin notes, deserves much of the credit for introducing the Damascene’s psychology into early scholastic discussion, he did this in his typically preliminary way.[[610]](#footnote-611) Thus, it waited for John of La Rochelle to undertake the first extensive appropriation of the Greek father’s work in psychology.[[611]](#footnote-612) This was a feat he achieved first and foremost in the *Tractatus*, where he sought to demonstrate that it was not only pseudo-Augustine, the longstanding Christian authority, but also Damascus, the new light in systematic theological inquiry, who could be reconciled with Avicenna.[[612]](#footnote-613) In view of these considerations, the diverse classifications of the soul John opts to cover in the *Tractatus*, and his presumption of their compatibility, already testifies powerfully to his philosophical commitments, and above all, to his belief that the giants of the medieval Christian tradition find their full formulation in the work of Avicenna.[[613]](#footnote-614)

In arranging his discussion to promote this conclusion, John in his Trac*tatus* does not simply assemble material in the way of a dispassionate bystander but operates in the mode of an innovator, who is developing a reading of the psychological aspects of the theological tradition that were suited to his philosophical tastes.[[614]](#footnote-615) The specifics of these will begin to emerge below in the discussion of the ‘division of the powers of the soul according to the philosophers, especially Avicenna,’ according to Johannitius, John of Damascus, and pseudo-Augustine that John offers initially in the *Tractatus*. I have tried to represent the material John draws from these thinkers as and in the order in which it appears in the text, so that the reader can get a clear sense for the flow of the discussion. This will provide a basis for the next few chapters, where the comparisons with the SDA and indeed the *Summa Halensis* will come into fuller relief, and with them, the fundamental significance of the *Tractatus*.[[615]](#footnote-616)

The Division of Powers in the Philosophers

*The Vegetative Powers*

The section which delineates the classifications of the soul that can be found in the philosophers starts by observing that Avicenna in his *De anima* names three principal powers of the soul: vegetable, sensible, and rational.[[616]](#footnote-617) ‘The vegetable power is the principle of preservation of nature through generation and nutrition, as well as of perfecting it through growth. The sensible is the principle of sensation and motion in bodies of animals. The rational power is the principle of intellectual speculation and freely chosen action.’[[617]](#footnote-618)The vegetable power is divided into the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers.[[618]](#footnote-619) The nutritive power is the principle of conserving the life of the being which restores through consumption the energy that was lost in the activity of the being. The augmentative power is the principle of increasing the body and perfecting it as far as its quantity and consistency of nature is concerned. This power adds a natural proportion to the whole body in accordance with what is consumed by the nutritive power.

The generative power is the principle of life, whether in plants, or animals or humans, and of producing things of a similar kind, such as a human from a human and a plant from a plant. While the generative power therefore conserves and multiplies the species, the nutritive and augmentative powers refer to the singular being, but in different ways, because the nutritive conserves and the augmentative perfects. The work of the nutritive power to incorporate nutrition into the body itself involves four natural powers: the attractive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive.[[619]](#footnote-620) The first acquires suitable nutrition, the second retains it, the third digests what is good for the body, and the fourth gets rid of waste.

As we have seen, the aforementioned vegetable powers—including the nutritive, augmentative, and generative—were also part of the so-called ‘new medicine’ that had become available to Latin thinkers in the twelfth century through the work of Johannitius and Constantine the African, who also talk about the attractive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive facets of the nutritive power.[[620]](#footnote-621) These four powers are additionally mentioned by different names in Costa Ben Luca, and it is possibly through him that twelfth-century thinkers like William of Thierry and Isaac of Stella came to know of them.[[621]](#footnote-622) In his treatment of the ‘medical’ division of the soul’s powers, John mentions these powers again, this time in reference to Johannitius, who will be the focus of the next section of this chapter.[[622]](#footnote-623)

*The Internal Senses*

From the discussion of the natural powers, John goes on to talk about the sensible powers, which he divides into cognitive and motive powers, following John of Damascus.[[623]](#footnote-624) The cognitive or apprehensive mode is two-fold: there is apprehension in the natural mode and in the animal mode. The first is described in terms of phantasy, which is active in dreams, which are not ruled by reason. By contrast, cognitive operation according to the animal mode is subject to the rule of reason over the exterior and interior senses.[[624]](#footnote-625) The exterior senses include the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.[[625]](#footnote-626)

The interior senses according to Avicenna are also five in number and will be elaborated below.[[626]](#footnote-627) In talking about these, we will find that John following Avicenna refers to a three-fold division of the brain—in which the frontal lobe is associated with imaging objects, the middle with cognitive activity, and the rear with memory.[[627]](#footnote-628) This division goes back to Galen, and is found in Nemesius’ *Premnon physicon*, Costa Ben Luca, Johannitius, and Constantine. While John of La Rochelle does not seem to know Constantine the African, he clearly knows Costa Ben Luca as well as Nemesius in Alfanus’ translation, and above all, Johannitius.[[628]](#footnote-629) Although he was not likely himself a medical practitioner, consequently, he was well-schooled in the medical categories and one of the few university scholars and perhaps the only theologian at the time to incorporate them into his discussion of the soul’s powers.

In elaborating on the specific internal senses mentioned by Avicenna, John states that ‘the common sense is the power ordained in the first concavity of the brain which by itself receives all forms which are imprinted by the senses and transmitted to it them. This power is the center of all senses and the one from which they derive as branches.’[[629]](#footnote-630) It is called a common sense for two reasons, first because it coordinates our perception of sensible things, so that what we see is the same as what we hear and so on; in other words, it prevents a disjointed conception of any given object. In a second respect, the common sense confers to sensible things the diverse properties such as sweetness and softness that they may exhibit.[[630]](#footnote-631)

In the first way, the common sense is described as absolute, and in the second, it is comparative. In summarizing the foregoing, John affirms that the common sense is ‘the power inserted in hollow nerves in the first concavity of the brain, which receives by itself all forms that are received by particular senses, and assigns similarities and differences between them.’[[631]](#footnote-632) In contrast, ‘the imagination (formative power) is the power situated in the front of the brain which retains what the common sense receives from the senses, which remains in it after the sensible things are gone.’[[632]](#footnote-633) In that sense, the common sense and imagination are like one power which is not diversified in subject but in form, where one receives [the sensible forms] and the other retains [them].’[[633]](#footnote-634) The imaginative power, to be distinguished from the imagination, ‘is situated in the middle concavity of the brain, which is able to compound something out of that which is in the imagination together with something else, or to divide it [from another] as it wills.’[[634]](#footnote-635)

Insofar as intelligence or reason rules this power, it is called cognitive; insofar as the animal power rules it, it is called imaginative, according to Avicenna. This power is ordered to the ones preceding it, for the common sense gives to the imagination or formal power, as its recipient, whatever it obtains from the external senses; and the formal power or imagination has the power of multiplying sensible forms. In turn, the cogitative or imaginative power turns to the forms which are in the imagination and composes and divides them. In this way, it transforms them so that they come to subsist in a way that differs from how they appear to the external senses, as happens in dreams.

The next power of ‘estimation is the power located in the upper middle part of the brain which apprehends intentions of sensible things, as a lamb judges that a wolf is something to be fled from and a sheep something to live together with,’[[635]](#footnote-636) a reference to the same analogy that is found in Avicenna. This power is transcendent, because its apprehension is not of sensible and material but immaterial forms such as good and evil, fitting and unfitting, useful and dangerous, which depict general qualities that cannot befall the external senses. To grasp an object with its qualities is to obtain the intention of the sensible thing which the estimative power apprehends.

The fourth, ‘memorative power is the power situated in the back of the brain and retains what the estimative power apprehends in terms of the intentions of sensible things.’[[636]](#footnote-637) According to Avicenna, the memorative power is related to estimation in much the same way that imagination is compared to common sense. As the imagination retains and is a thesaurus of sensible forms, which the common sense apprehends, so the memorative power is a thesauraus conserving the intentions of sensible things which the estimative power apprehends. As evidence of this, John considers the difference between memory and reminiscence. According to Avicenna, John notes, memory is in all animals, but reminiscence is only possible for humans.[[637]](#footnote-638) While memory is the retention of a species or sensible intention or representation thereof, reminiscence is the recollection of a form from a memory that was previously forgotten, on the basis of a related form.

For example, I might remember someone about whom I have forgotten on remembering the place or time or way that I originally encountered them.[[638]](#footnote-639) To summarize, Avicenna posits a five-fold distinction between the internal senses, some of which apprehend sensible forms, like the common sense, imagination, and cogitative, and some of which apprehend sensible intentions, namely, estimation and memory. As John elaborates, some of these powers both apprehend and operate, such as the common sense, estimation, and the imaginative power, while some apprehend and do not have a proper operation, such as the imaginative power and memory. Some apprehend principally and some secondarily. In the apprehension of sensible forms, for instance, the common sense principally apprehends the objects of the exterior senses, while the imagination and imaginative do so secondarily.

Similarly, the apprehension of sensible intentions is principally performed by the estimative faculty and secondarily grasped by the memory. As Avicenna holds, an intention differs from a form in that the form is what is apprehended directly from the external senses. However, the intention includes the qualities or accidents of a sensible thing which are not directly apprehended through the exterior senses, as a lamb apprehends an intention of danger which is in a wolf and flees from it, even though this danger is not an actual object of the external sense in any way.

Front of brain Common sense (presents a unified image of sense object)

Imagination/formative power (retains image of form grasped by the common sense)

Middle of brain Imaginative/excogitative power (composes and divides qualities of an object)

Estimation (adds positive or negative connotations to the form of an object, generating an intention)

Back of brain Sense memory (retains the intention produced by estimation, the ‘end product’ of internal sensation and the basis for abstraction)

*The Intellectual Powers*

There are five ways, in John’s account, to distinguish the intellectual powers.[[639]](#footnote-640) First there is a difference of nature, namely, between the agent and possible intellects, which is mentioned by Aristotle in *De anima* III.3-4; second, there is a difference of objects, insofar as the intellect can be divided into the apprehensive and motive or speculative and practical modes, which are also mentioned by Aristotle in *De anima* III.10 and in Avicenna’s *De anima* I.5; third, there is a difference of order, between superior and inferior reason, which is mentioned by Augustine as well as pseudo-Augustine and in Lombard’s *Sentences* book II.24. In these works, those terms were effectively used to distinguish between the external and internal senses on the one hand and the intellect on the other. Among early Franciscans, however, these powers tended to be interpreted along the lines of Avicenna’s distinction between the ‘two faces of the soul,’ namely, theoretical and practical reason, which involve a distinction within the intellect itself concerning its reflections on things above and even divine, or matters of ordinary life.[[640]](#footnote-641) As Crowley has written:

The Augustinian distinction between a *ratio inferior* and a *ratio superior* enjoyed the particular favour of medieval theologians. Its popularity was enhanced by the prominence the distinction between the two faces of the soul received in the writings of Algazel, Avicenna, and Gundissalinus. No doubt both distinctions were offshoots of some distant neo-Platonic theme.[[641]](#footnote-642)

In addition to this popular superior/inferior reason distinction, John cites a fourth difference between the intellect that is passible and inseparable from the body and that which is impassible and separable from the body. Lastly, there is a difference of operation or in the mode of operating. As I have already noted, this multi-faceted method of distinguishing the powers, in terms of the organ, object, act, and so on, which will be detailed further below, derives first from Anonymous Gauthier but more directly from Anonymous Callus, which was a key source for John’s works on the soul.[[642]](#footnote-643)

The Organ

In elaborating on the aforementioned modes of distinguishing the intellect, John aptly observes that every power operates through an organ, such as the power of vision through sight.[[643]](#footnote-644) However, corporeal organs can only know corporeal objects.[[644]](#footnote-645) If the intellect were to know through a corporeal organ, consequently, it would not be able to know intelligible and spiritual things.[[645]](#footnote-646) However, ‘the operation of the intellectual power is always through abstraction from matter and material conditions, and every operation is according to the nature of the power, from which it comes; as therefore the intellectual power is abstract from matter, it will not have a corporeal organ and will not be materially assigned a place in the body.’[[646]](#footnote-647) In another defence of the view that the intellect does not employ a corporeal organ, John presents a further argument, as follows:[[647]](#footnote-648)

No power that is embodied, that is, defined within a part of the body, or that operates through an organ, is able to know itself, because it is not able to reflect on itself, as it is embodied. Thus, as an eye does not see itself, neither does the imagination imagine itself. As therefore the intellectual power can cognize itself, and it knows itself when it reflects upon itself, this power is not embodied nor does it operate through an organ.[[648]](#footnote-649)

Further, he states that ‘what is known is in the one knowing according to the nature of the knower and not according to the nature of the thing known, as is clear in all cases, and generally, what is received is in the recipient according to the nature of the recipient and not according to the nature of what is received.’[[649]](#footnote-650) Since therefore ‘corporeal and material things are in the intellect according to an immaterial mode when they are understood, the nature of the intellect is immaterial, and simple, and does not use a corporeal organ.’[[650]](#footnote-651) In summary, the intellectual power is not in the body, because it is not determined by any part of the body. For no part of the body ‘activates’ it as in the case of corporeal powers, like vision, which is activated by the eyes and hearing by the ears. Rather, the intellectual power is in the whole body as something separate and above it which perfects it.

The Object

Next John inquires about the object of the intellectual power.[[651]](#footnote-652) As the power of the intellect is immaterial, he contends, so its object must also be immaterial or intelligible. The object in question is an intelligible form abstracted from matter and from all the conditions of matter. Among species or forms abstracted from matter, John observes, some are abstract through their proper nature, such as spiritual things. Some, however, become abstract through an act of the intellectual power itself, which infers a species or likeness from corporeal things. The forms that are by nature abstract from matter and from all circumstances of matter are the forms by which we know God and angels and the soul, and those things that are in the soul, such as its powers, and its knowledge.

The form by which God himself is known is a likeness or image of the first truth that is impressed in the soul from its initial creation. As John of Damascus affirms: ‘a cognition of God’s existence is naturally inserted in everybody by him.’[[652]](#footnote-653) The image impressed with the first truth leads to the knowledge of the one of whom it is an image. For instance, the form by which the soul or an angel is known, to wit, the rational soul, when employed as a likeness of the soul itself, makes it possible for the soul to know itself and to understand itself in reference to itself. When, however, this form is considered as a likeness of another, so that it is known as a likeness of the one, above the self, that it imitates, the soul knows God through the mode of acquisition. Moreover, when the soul uses itself as a likeness of another, in whose image it is not made, but which is also made in God’s image, it knows angels next to itself.

To this effect, Rochelle quotes pseudo-Augustine saying that the soul knows God above itself, itself [i.e. the soul] in itself, and the angel next to itself.[[653]](#footnote-654) In order to know those things which are in itself, such as its powers and knowledge, John goes on to affirm, the soul uses itself as a likeness to those things which are known. In this context, the soul differs from the forms or objects that it knows only according to reason and not according to substance. This in fact is what John thinks Aristotle meant when he said that ‘in things lacking matter, there is an identity of what is known and that by which it is known.’[[654]](#footnote-655)

By contrast to forms which are abstract in themselves, John observes, those forms which are not abstract can only be abstracted through reflection on corporeal things, which are differentiated not merely mentally but really and substantially. Since the intellectual nature is superior to such things, John stresses that it has the power to reflect on them in the effort to apprehend them. In this regard, the mind abstracts them first from the senses, next from the imagination and the conditions of all matter, but in the mode of a singular. Finally, it knows them abstracted as universals, common and immaterial, such as genera, species, differences, and properties, according to the process outlined below.

The Order of Abstraction

According to Avicenna, John states, the order in which a corporeal form is abstracted is as follows. First, the exterior senses such as vision grasp the likeness of a form that is in matter; nevertheless, they do not comprehend it unless as present in matter, or as a form existing in matter.[[655]](#footnote-656) The interior senses such as the imagination abstract the form further in that they are capable of comprehending the form without matter. Even so, the imagination is not capable of stripping the form of the accidents of matter, such as figure and place, in terms of which it comprehends its objects. By contrast, estimation transcends that level of abstraction, because it apprehends forms which are the intentions of sensible things, such as good, evil, fitting, and unfitting, which do not have a likeness to material forms.

Nevertheless, estimation still does not apprehend the form in question without all accidents of matter, and it knows its object only as a particular through comparison to the sensible form already mentioned. Thus, an animal which is capable of knowing particulars is able to know that ‘this wolf right here’ should be avoided, on the basis of external and internal sensation, but cannot grasp the universal that ‘wolves should be avoided.’ This truth can only be achieved by the intellectual power, which apprehends a corporeal form in a way that strips it of all matter and all the circumstances of matter so that it is known not merely in its singularity but as a universal.

In this case, it becomes possible to know the human form or nature, for example, insofar as it befits all individual humans rather than just one. Because this nature is instantiated in various individuals, Rochelle observes, it is inevitably multiplied. This multiplicity does not arise from human nature itself, however. For if it were part of human nature to be multiplied, then the humanity of Peter would be different from the humanity of Paul, which is absurd.[[656]](#footnote-657) On this basis, John contends that the multiplication and division of individual human beings is not from form or nature but from matter. Through matter, he elaborates, individual humans acquire accidents of quality and quantity, place and time, which are not part of human nature itself. These accidents cannot be said to determine human nature, otherwise it would be necessary to say that all human beings have the same accidents, and thus the same quantity, quality, location, and so on, which is clearly not the case.

For this reason, John reiterates that the human form does not have such accidents by its essence; rather they come to individual humans in virtue of their particular materiality. Following Avicenna, we have seen, John construes the task of apprehending human nature as it is in itself as a matter of stripping away all the material dispositions or attributions in order to lay bare the form or forms that all humans have in common.[[657]](#footnote-658) The levels of abstraction described above correspond to the extent to which this process has been completed. While sensation, imagination, and estimation involve abstraction from matter that does not yet entail the removal of the material dispositions, the intellect in abstracting removes all the conditions of matter and thereby lays bare what the object of knowledge really is.[[658]](#footnote-659)

The Passive and Active Intellect

The next distinction John covers concerns the agent and possible intellects.[[659]](#footnote-660) Following Anonymous Callus, John holds that ‘there is the passive and corruptible intellect which Aristotle calls material, as well as the separable and incorruptible intellect.’ The passive intellect is the lower power of the rational part which is joined to the senses and which receives intelligible species in phantasms. This power is necessary so that the intellect which is separable can understand species abstracted from phantasms.[[660]](#footnote-661) Indeed, this power offers in a material form the intelligible species that is to be abstracted from a phantasm.

For that very reason, however, the passive power is not considered part of the soul, unless insofar as it is conjoined to the body. For it originates from the union of the rational soul with the body. In this context, it is called by the name of ‘rationability’, which refers to the middle lobe of the brain or the rational power, because it is able to accept universals in particulars, although not in the mode of universals. This again is what Aristotle supposedly called the passive intellect that is ‘permixtus’ with the body.[[661]](#footnote-662) In many respects, it corresponds to what we have already described as the functions of imagination and estimation. As a matter of fact, the material intellect seems to be the name Rochelle gives to the faculty of estimation when it is operative in humans seeking to know universals.

The separable intellect has two modes.[[662]](#footnote-663) One pertains to a difference of order, concerning which we speak of inferior and superior reason. This corresponds to a difference of nature, according to which we distinguish between the possible and agent intellects. The possible intellect is a blank slate, void of all pictures or forms, but capable of receiving all pictures, having none in act.[[663]](#footnote-664) The agent intellect is like a light, namely, the intelligible light of the first truth that is naturally impressed in us, always acting as light, always radiating. This light makes the species or form of a thing intelligible as light makes colors visible. As Wilpert notes, this analogy of light/colours can be traced back to Aristotle who was himself probably referring to Plato’s analogy of the way that the light of the good is like a sun which exposes intelligible truths.[[664]](#footnote-665)

The Possible Intellect and its Power

According to John, the existence of the possible intellect is certain, for unless there is a power susceptible to all intelligible species, it would be impossible to make them understood.[[665]](#footnote-666) On this basis, he insists we must consider the different aspects of the possible intellect, which ultimately amount to Avicenna’s famous four intellects, which represent four stages whereby the intellect moves from a state of pure potential for knowledge to various other grades of its actualization.[[666]](#footnote-667) In his *De anima*,Avicenna illustrates these stages in terms of the way a child who is in principle capable of learning to write proceeds to acquire the ability to write, perfects it, and uses it.[[667]](#footnote-668)

In the first case, there is what John calls a material potential for knowledge. This can be likened to prime matter, which does not itself possess any form but is subject to all forms. Here, it is worth noting that the material intellect (*intellectus materialis*) in question seems to be the same entity as the material intellect described above, which feeds sense forms to the possible intellect, but does not realize the potential for universal knowledge as yet.

In the second place, there is a disposed potential (*intellectus in effectu*), which involves knowledge of the ‘common conceptions of the soul’ (*communes animi conceptiones*), that is, the principles or propositions which are *per se nota* or self-evident to the mind, such as a whole is greater than its part. Thirdly, there is a perfected potential (*intellectus* *in habitu*), which has drawn conclusions from the aforementioned principles but is not considering them presently, while the fourth (*intellectus adeptus*) does just that*.*[[668]](#footnote-669)

The Agent Intellect

In line with the Aristotelian tradition, Avicenna argued that everything that moves from potency to act does not do so unless through a cause which leads it from potency to act;[[669]](#footnote-670) this cause is the reason why our soul actually knows intelligible things. But the cause that gives the intelligible forms is nothing other than the intellect that is in act. Therefore, it is necessary that we have an agent intellect. What John now considers, consequently, is whether the agent intellect is a separate substance from the soul, as Avicenna supposed, and if so, whether it is a created intelligence, like an angel, or uncreated, namely, God.[[670]](#footnote-671)

The argument in favour of the idea that it is an uncreated intelligence, or God, is presented on the basis of what Augustine says in his *Soliloquies* I.8.15, namely, that as in this material sun ‘we find three things, that it is, that it shines and that it makes other things known, so we understand these three things in God, namely, that he is, that he understands, and that he makes other things understood.’[[671]](#footnote-672) As one who makes things understood, this text seems to imply that God is the agent intellect.

The argument in favour of the idea that the agent intellect is an angelic intelligence, which John recounts, is based on the fact that God inhabits light inaccessible, as is stated in 1 Timothy 6:16, which suggests that he cannot illumine the human mind directly. Rather, the soul must seemingly be illumined by a created intelligence that is more closely related to it. After delineating these arguments why the agent intellect might be something other than the human soul itself, John endeavours to prove that the intellect is not in fact a separate substance from the soul.[[672]](#footnote-673) As he states, we have a light impressed at creation which enables us to know intelligible things, and on account of which we are likenesses to the divine.[[673]](#footnote-674)

This is what we call the agent intellect. For if corporeal eyes see through a light that exists in themselves, the eyes of our mind will so much more see through a light existing in the self, which is not therefore a separate substance to the soul. In response to the objection that God or an angel could be the agent intellect, John states the following.[[674]](#footnote-675) Augustine in DSEA 11 speaks of things that are above, next to, and below the human self. Those things which are above the self are things like the divine essence and the Trinity of persons that exceed the human capacity for understanding. Since these must be understood in a divine mode, the soul, exceptionally, needs a radiation of the light of the eternal first truth on its supreme power, which is the mind or intelligence, in order to know them, as Augustine says in DSEA. In the case of God himself, consequently, God is the agent intellect.[[675]](#footnote-676)

In order to know those things which are next to the self, such as the angelic essences, powers, operations, and so on, the soul likewise needs an angelic revelation, and in that sense, the angelic intellect can be described as the agent intellect with respect to the human soul. To know those things that are below the self, such as the soul and its powers and virtues, however, the soul does not need an extrinsic light, for it has an innate light by which it knows its own *esse*, its ability to know and to sense, and to attend to some things and to ignore others. Thus, Augustine says that it knows itself in itself.[[676]](#footnote-677)

To know those things which are below the self, likewise, the soul does not need an external light.[[677]](#footnote-678) For as the nature of the human intellect is superior to corporeal things, and even to incorporeal things which are in itself as in a subject, such as its powers, dispositions and affections, it does not need a separable substance or external light to achieve comprehension. The internal light of the agent intellect, the soul’s supreme power, is enough for knowledge of these affairs. In a section further elaborating these points, John notes that while the agent intellect is called an agent and a light with respect to the possible intellect and the phantasms it receives thereby, it must itself be regarded as a recipient with respect to the superior agents, namely, angels and God, from which it receives not only the knowledge of angels and God themselves but also the knowledge of the first truths which make knowledge of inferior things possible.[[678]](#footnote-679)

The Operations of the Agent and Possible Intellects

In a further description of how the two components of the separable intellect, agent and possible, work together, John states that the role of the possible intellect is two-fold. Firstly, it ‘turns and considers the [sense] forms that are in the imagination.’[[679]](#footnote-680) In this regard, the possible intellect turns to the material intellect, which performs the function of imagination or estimation in humans. Once the sense forms obtained there are illumined by the light of intelligence of the agent intellect, and abstracted or stripped of all material circumstances, the possible intellect serves its second function, whereby it receives imprints of those forms and thus become ‘formed’ with respect to the original sense forms.

As this suggests, the work of the agent intellect itself is to illumine or to diffuse the light of understanding over sensible forms existing in the imagination or estimation, and in illumining them, to abstract them from all material circumstances, and to join or order the abstracted forms in the possible intellect, in the way that a species of color is abstracted somehow and joined to the pupil through the operation of light.’[[680]](#footnote-681) This ‘light’ seems to be a euphemism for the first principles of knowledge, mentioned by Avicenna and, according to Franciscans, given by God—as a sign of his image—that allow for rendering sense forms intelligible. As the DSEA stresses, this light of the agent intellect is naturally impressed in us by God, offering first and foremost an orientation to the first truth, which is God himself.[[681]](#footnote-682)

Another way John explains the co-operation of the agent and possible intellects refers to syllogistic reasoning. This involves, first, the quiddities or essences of things, that is, the sense forms, and second, the first-known concepts which are the principles of all knowledge, and third, the conclusions that are drawn about sense forms. For example, one first knows qua quiddities some particular whole and some specific part; second, the self-evident principle that every whole is greater than its part; and third the conclusion and consequence that the whole under consideration is greater than its part.[[682]](#footnote-683)

This example, it bears noting, is lifted from Anonymous Callus.[[683]](#footnote-684) In turn, Anonymous Callus obtained the illustration from Anonymous Gauthier.[[684]](#footnote-685) As Hasse has shown, however, there is precedent for comparing the act of knowing to one of syllogistic reasoning in Avicenna himself, who invokes the Euclidian axiom that the whole is greater than its part as an example of a primary or first known concept that makes it possible to draw conclusions about empirical data.[[685]](#footnote-686)

This model confirms again that there is a two-fold mode of operation of the possible intellect. The first involves something like induction in which the possible intellect turns to consider the sensible forms. As John insists, the possible intellect can never receive an intelligible form unless it first turns to the phantasms. After the agent intellect considers these forms or quiddities in light of higher principles which are also seemingly stored in the possible intellect, thus obtaining an intelligible form, the possible intellect receives an imprint of it and thus becomes formed. As Anonymous Callus notes, this two-fold reasoning process is obviously not needed for forms that are abstract in themselves, which have already been mentioned. But it is necessary for all forms that can only be abstracted from matter.[[686]](#footnote-687)

Inferior and Superior Reason

Next, John turns to consider the division between superior and inferior reason that Augustine mentions in DSEA 4.[[687]](#footnote-688) The superior reason knows uncreated truth as the image or species of the Trinity is impressed upon it from creation. This image consists in the triad of memory, understanding, and will, which Augustine mentions in *De Trinitate.*[[688]](#footnote-689)As John elaborates, memory is the power that conserves or retains the likeness of the first truth that is inserted at creation; intelligence contemplates the first truth through the impressed likeness of the truth that is present creation, presumably consisting in the aforementioned principles of knowledge; and the will loves the first truth through an appetite for it that is fixed in it from creation. Another way of distinguishing the three faculties, outlined in DSEA 35, is this.

First, memory is the power of the superior intellect by which the rational creature can know its efficient principle, and by the same token become conscious that it did not always exist; intelligence is the impressed power of the superior intellect by which the rational soul is able to know that the first truth is present to it, as an exemplar cause of all knowledge. Finally, the will is the superior intellect’s power by which the soul is inclined to the first truth as to its end. As the aforementioned discussion suggests, the superior intellect is the means by which we utilize the first principles of all knowledge, such as that the whole is greater than a part. These are innate or in us by nature; they are a likeness to the first truth, indeed, the image of God, through which we are able to discover truth in the world. So construed, the superior intellect is the same in substance as the agent intellect, while the inferior power of the intellect is the possible intellect, by which we engage in four activities: the search for truth, judgement about what is true, the retainment of what is true in the memory, and the interpretation or application of knowledge.

The Division of the Powers in the Doctors

The next major section of John’s work treats the division of the powers of the soul according to the doctors, first and foremost, Johannitius, and secondly, Avicenna in his book of medicine.[[689]](#footnote-690) According to Johannitius, John states, the powers of the soul are initially divided into three: the natural, spiritual and animal.[[690]](#footnote-691) These powers are also called ‘spirits’ which are respectively associated with the liver, heart, and brain. The natural power itself is threefold: one is administered but does not itself minister; another is administered and ministers; and another ministers and is not administered. The natural power which is administered and does not minister is the generative. The one that ministers and is also administered is two-fold: nutritive and augmentative. The natural power that ministers only is fourfold: appetitive, retentive, digestive and explusive.

The next two powers or ‘spirits’ include the vital, which is responsible for the dilation and constriction of the arteries which cause the beating of the heart and the actual enlivenment of the body.[[691]](#footnote-692) The other, animal, spirit has both a cognitive and a motive part, which will be discussed later. As for the cognitive part, it involves not only the five senses but also the apprehensive powers that are situated in the front, middle, and back of the brain, namely, imagination, reason, and memory.[[692]](#footnote-693) Regarding these spirits, John next notes that Avicenna in his book of medicine also describes three of them, associating the natural with the liver, the vital with the heart, and the animal with the brain.[[693]](#footnote-694) However he attributes primacy to the vital spirit associated with the heart, which is essential for the operation of the others.

This observation brings John to a discussion of the other medical powers of the soul discussed by Avicenna in his book of medicine and specifically the three-fold natural powers already outlined above.[[694]](#footnote-695) Next in the order of inquiry is Avicenna’s account in the *Canon of Medicine* concerning the vital and animal powers, which as noted already are allocated to the three lobes of the brain, but in the case of Avicenna there are not just three but five internal senses which are involved in the apprehension of sense objects which were previously discussed.[[695]](#footnote-696)

The Division of Powers in John of Damascus

After considering the division of powers according to philosophers and the doctors, John of La Rochelle turns to look at the division of John of Damascus, who in his view counts as both a philosopher and a doctor and a theologian.[[696]](#footnote-697) After all, the Damascene also talks about the three vegetable powers—nutritive, augmentative, and generative—if only very briefly.[[697]](#footnote-698) The nutritive powers are further divided according to the appetitive, digestive, retentive, and expulsive.[[698]](#footnote-699) According to Damascus, we have seen that the soul has two kinds of powers, cognitive and appetitive.[[699]](#footnote-700) The cognitive powers include the intellect, mind, opinion, imagination, and sense;[[700]](#footnote-701) the appetitive, which will be dealt with in a separate chapter, are counsel and election or choice.

The senses include the five external senses which John enumerates as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.[[701]](#footnote-702) Next is imagination, which is an interior sense which makes understood that which comes to it from the exterior senses.[[702]](#footnote-703) As Augustine says in DSEA 22, so Rochelle notes that this sense is located in the back of the brain, which has nerves which connect to the organs of the exterior senses.[[703]](#footnote-704) Opinion is the power of making judgements about sensible experiences, which Damascus also calls excogitative.[[704]](#footnote-705) According to Damascus, it is based in the centre or middle of the brain, which judges the forms absent matter that are produced by the imagination.[[705]](#footnote-706)

As Rochelle summarizes: ‘the exterior senses comprehend a simple species present in matter, the imaginative comprehends a simple form absent from matter, and the excogitative power or opinion judges them.’[[706]](#footnote-707) If the objects of opinion are true according to reason, and if they are regarded as good or valuable, then they are pursued; otherwise they are avoided. The next faculty Damascus mentions is memory, which is located in the back of the brain and holds on to judgments or intentions the mind has achieved as a result of the process of internal sensation described above.[[707]](#footnote-708) This is an important point to note, because Avicenna had denied intellectual memory on the ground that every case of knowing a form involves a renewed contact with an external Agent Intellect through which all forms are abstracted.

Rochelle’s advocacy of intellectual by contrast to sense memory here is another sign that he affirms a human agent intellect that is autonomously capable of knowing the self and inferior, natural things. It may also be a sign of the influence of the DSEA, which likewise affirms both sense and intellectual memory in a passage John quotes as follows:

Memory is three-fold, as is stated in DSEA 23: there is a certain memory, which is the power of conserving sensible species, which is common to us and animals; there is a memory which conserves intelligible species which is only in us [humans], for an angel does not know through the reception of species. And there is a certain memory which conserves a likeness of the divine, and this is common to us and to angels. However rational memory, which is only in us, has a three-fold act: the first is to retain intelligible species, the second is to represent these species, and the third is to recover forgotten species and thus to remember them.[[708]](#footnote-709)

According to Damascus, the mind undertakes the work of reason which involves the activities of searching (*inveniendi*), teaching (*docendi*), and discovering (*addiscendi*).[[709]](#footnote-710) The first starts with experience acquired by way of the senses; such experience is needed in order to generate imagination and then an opinion, which the mind subsequently judges to be true or false. This process itself involves three steps, namely, knowing a universal principle, such as that the whole is greater than the part, then the minor premise, and then the conclusion. Once this is achieved, the mind has reached the stage of discovery. When the discovery is shared, this instigates the way of teaching.

The Division of Powers in Augustine

The last set of divisions John deals with are those of Augustine in DSEA 20-22.[[710]](#footnote-711) Here, the author states that there are three powers of the soul insofar as it is united to the body, namely, the natural, vital, and animal. The natural includes the appetitive, retentive, distributive, and expulsive powers we have already discussed, which respectively give us an appetite for nourishment, to retain what is needed for life, expel waste, and distribute nourishment throughout the body. The vital power is in the heart, which pumps blood to enliven the whole body. The animal power is in the brain which receives input from the five senses and causes the members of the body to move. There are three ventricles in the brain: the front, on which the images or likeness of sensible things are imprinted; the middle, where reason examines and judges those images, and the back, where the memory stores judgements.[[711]](#footnote-712)

Following this, John mentions a three-fold division found in DSEA 4 which includes the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, which can be traced all the way back to Plato’s *Republic* and had remained part of the tradition ever since.[[712]](#footnote-713) The rational power illumines the mind with the knowledge of things that are above, next to, and below the self, namely, God, angels, and creatures, respectively. The concupiscible and irascible powers help us to grasp what should be desired or hated, pursued or avoided. While the rational power is ordered towards cognition, the latter two deal with the affections—the former, with truth, the latter, what is good. These are the affective powers that we will discuss in a later chapter.

Next, John notes that Augustine posits a three-fold division of the soul’s cognitive powers as well as a five-fold division, which he discusses in turn. The first involves corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual vision—or external senses, imagination, and intellect—which are mentioned in *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.7.6.[[713]](#footnote-714) The five-fold division is according to sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence.[[714]](#footnote-715) This, John notes, is the same division that Boethius offered in his *De consolatione* V.4, except that his classification does not include intellect, even though he sometimes uses the term *intellectus* in other contexts.[[715]](#footnote-716) According to McGinn, ‘this ambiguity enabled twelfth-century commentators like Hugh and Thierry to create the five-fold scheme’[[716]](#footnote-717) mentioned above.

This was systematized most fully, in McGinn’s opinion, by Isaac of Stella, another Cistercian who preceded the author of the DSEA and clearly influenced him. In DSEA 11, there is also a distinction between superior and inferior reason, ordered to things above and below, respectively.[[717]](#footnote-718) While the intellect and intelligence fall under the purview of superior reason, *ratio* falls under inferior reason. For Augustine in DSEA 11, sense is the power of the soul that perceives corporeal forms when they are immediately present to the senses;[[718]](#footnote-719) imagination is the power of the soul that represents the forms of corporeal things when they are absent. *Ratio* is the power which perceives the natures, forms, differences, properties, and accidents of corporeal forms.[[719]](#footnote-720) For it abstracts from the body those things which naturally embodied, not by action but by consideration. Thus, *ratio* is the power which abstracts universals from singulars which it comprehends, or abstracts the forms of corporeal things.[[720]](#footnote-721) Put differently, it knows the forms of sensible things insofar as they are universal; for objects of knowledge are singular insofar as they are sensed and universal when they are understood.

The intellect is a power of the soul which perceives invisible things like angels and souls and all spiritual creatures. Intelligence is the power of the soul which is immediately united to God; it discerns the highest truth which is the unchanging God. As Rochelle summarizes: ‘In this way therefore the soul by sense perceives bodies, by the imagination, the likenesses of bodies, by reason, corporeal natures, by intellect, created spirits, and by intelligence, the unchanging truth.’[[721]](#footnote-722) However these three—*ratio, intellectus* and *intelligentia*—are understood to fall under the general power of the intellect or reason. This operates in three modes, namely, investigation (*ingenium*), discernment, and retention. The first is the mode in which the soul exercises itself to know unknown things from things that are already known. The next is the one in which reason reflects about what is found, and finally, memory retains the judgment formed as a result.

Comparing the *Tractatus* and the *Summa de anima*

Now that we have carefully followed the discussion of the *Tractatus* on the powers of the soul, cross-referencing in the notes to many of the overlaps with the SDA, not to mention Avicenna’s *De anima* and the other sources John employs, we are in a position to draw a comparison between John’s two texts. Below, I offer an outline of each text and the topics that it covers in the order in which they are covered; grey text indicates anything in the *Tractatus* that is suppressed or re-located in the *Summa de anima,* while bold text indicates anything in the *Summa de anima* that did not appear in the *Tractatus.*

As these outlines make abundantly obvious, there is almost complete overlap between the *Tractatus* and the *Summa de anima* in terms of the classifications of the powers of the soul, with the exception of the medical powers of Johannitius, which are not covered in the SDA. Indeed, the repetition of material is in most cases virtually verbatim, with some slight variations or additions here and there. Moreover, the views of Avicenna, pseudo-Augustine, and Damascus are faithfully represented, often with direct quotations or at least paraphrases with commentary. A comparison of John’s account of his sources with the sources themselves shows that he is a careful reader of his texts who is concerned to represent them accurately.

As the discussion of the three authorities has also shown, there is a good deal of overlap or at least compatibility between the three accounts, as Rochelle presents them, not least regarding the vegetative or vital powers and the external senses. Augustine and Damascus do not elaborate on the mechanics of internal sensation and cognition to the extent that Avicenna does; however they provide categories in these respects into which Avicenna’s more robust theories can seemingly be ‘slotted in’. This is precisely what John in the *Tractatus* seems to have done: he imported Avicenna’s specific understanding of how the cognitive faculties operated through the terminology employed by Augustine and Damascus, even though the latter may have defined their terms in different ways.

The main difference between the two accounts John develops, we have seen, concerns the order in which the key authorities are presented. The *Tractatus* gives pride of place to ‘the philosophers, especially Avicenna,’ who is followed by Damascus and finally pseudo-Augustine, while the *Summa de anima* foregrounds Augustine and Damascus, and concludes with Avicenna. The reason for this re-organization is not stated, but the likely goal was to give primacy to the theological sources over the philosophical ones, and especially Avicenna. With this comparison in view, we are now in a position to explore in more depth the meaning of John’s arguments on the powers of the soul in the SDA, and the cognitive powers of sense and intellect in particular, and thus to understand better the particular and indeed strongly Avicennian approach to theorizing knowledge that he develops and endorses.

**John of La Rochelle’s *Tractatus***

The Division of the Philosophers (or Avicenna)

Three-fold division of the soul: vegetative, sensitive and rational

Vegetative power: nutritive, augmentative, generative (Constantine the African)

Nutritive: attractive, retentive, digestive, expulsive (Constantine the African)

Spirit (Costa Ben Luca)

Vital: beating of the heart

Animal: internal sensation

Senses

External: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch

Internal: phantasy, common sense, imagination, imaginative, estimative, memory

Three lobes of the brain (Galen)

Front: common sense (imaging function)

Middle: imaginative, estimation (cognitive function)

Back: imagination, memory (retentive function)

Memory

In humans: recollection based on similar things

In animals: mere preservation of image

Five ways to distinguish the intellectual power

Nature: agent and possible intellect

Difference of objects: speculative and practical

Order: superior and inferior

Relation to the Body: Corruptible/inseparable versus incorruptible/separable

Mode of Operation

Organ of cognition – none because mind abstracts from matter

Objects of cognition: above, next to, and below the self (*De spiritu et anima*)

Order of abstraction: exterior senses, imagination, estimation, intellect

Passive (material) versus separable intellect

Material intellect: receives intelligible species in phantasms

Separable intellect (agent and possible): abstracts species from phantasms

Separable intellect

Nature: possible and agent

Order: inferior and superior

Mode of apprehension: inductive or syllogistic

Possible Intellect

*intellectus materialis*

*intellectus in effectu*

*intellectus in habitu*

*intellectus adeptus*

Agent Intellect

God is agent intellect for knowledge of God (*supra se*)

Angel for knowledge of angels (*iuxta se*)

Self for knowledge of self and things ‘below’ the self (*infra se*)

Mode of operation

Inductive

Syllogistic

Inferior and superior

Superior is like agent intellect

Inferior like possible

The Division of the Doctors (Johannitius and Avicenna)

Natural powers (liver)

Generative

Nutritive

Appetitive, retentive, digestive, expulsive

Augmentative

Spiritual powers (heart)

Pumping of blood through the heart

Animal powers (brain)

Fantasy (front of the brain)

Common sense (Avicenna)

Imagination (Avicenna)

Reason (middle of the brain)

Imaginative/excogiative power (Avicenna)

Estimation (Avicenna)

Memory (back of the brain)

Sense memory (Avicenna)

The Division of Damascus

Cognitive powers

Sense, imagination, opinion, mind, intellect

External senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch

Internal sense: imagination, opinion

Mind: searching, discovering, teaching

Powers obedient/not obedient to reason

The Division of Augustine (*De spiritu et anima*)

Natural, vital, animal

Natural: appetitive, retentive, distributive, expulsive

Three ventricles of the brain

Front: imaging function

Middle: reasoning function

Back: retentive function

First three-fold division

Rational, irascible, concupiscible

Second three-fold division

Corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual version – external senses, imagination, intellect

Five-fold division (based on Boethius)

Sense (knows corporeal forms as present)

Imagination (knows corporeal forms as absent)

Reason (*ratio*) (knows the natures of corporeal forms)

Intellect (*intellectus*) (knows angels and spiritual creatures)

Intelligence (*intelligentia*) (knows God)

**John of La Rochelle’s *Summa de anima* (**Bold indicates additions in the *Summa de anima*; grey indicates suppressed or in most cases re-located material)

The Division of Augustine (*De spiritu et anima*)

Natural, vital, animal spirit

Natural: appetitive, retentive, distributive, expulsive

Three ventricles of the brain

Front: imaging function

Middle: reasoning function

Back: retentive function

First three-fold division

Rational, irascible, concupiscible

Second three-fold division

Corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual version – external senses, imagination, intellect

Five-fold division (based on Boethius)

Sense (knows corporeal forms as present)

Imagination (knows corporeal forms as absent)

Reason (*ratio*) (knows the natures of corporeal forms)

Intellect (*intellectus*) (knows angels and spiritual creatures)

Intelligence (*intelligentia*) (knows God)

Irrational powers

Obedient to reason: irascible, concupiscible

Not obedient to reason: vital, generative, nutritive, and augmentative

The Division of Damascus

Cognitive powers

Sense, imagination, opinion, mind, intellect

External senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch

Internal sense: imagination, opinion

Mind: searching, discovering, teaching

The Division of Avicenna

Three-fold division of the soul: vegetative, sensitive and rational

Vegetative power: nutritive, augmentative, generative (Constantine the African)

Nutritive: attractive, retentive, digestive, expulsive (Constantine the African)

Spirit (Costa Ben Luca)

Vital: beating of the heart

Animal: internal sensation

Senses

External: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch

Internal: phantasy, common sense, imagination, imaginative, estimative, memory

Three lobes of the brain (Galen)

Front: common sense (imaging function)

Middle: imaginative, estimation (cognitive function)

Back: imagination, memory (retentive function)

Memory

In humans: recollection based on similar things

In animals: mere preservation of image

Five ways to distinguish the intellectual power

Nature: agent and possible intellect

Difference of objects: speculative and practical

Order: superior and inferior

Relation to the Body: Corruptible/inseparable versus incorruptible/separable

Mode of Operation

Organ of cognition – none because mind abstracts from matter

Objects of cognition: above, next to, and below the self (*De spiritu et anima*)

Act of abstraction: exterior senses, imagination, estimation, intellect

(referred to in *Tractatus* as ‘order of abstraction’)

Distinction: passive (material) versus separable intellect

Material intellect: receives intelligible species in phantasms

Separable intellect (agent and possible): abstracts species from phantasms

Separable intellect

Nature: possible and agent

Order: inferior and superior

Mode of apprehension: inductive or syllogistic

Possible Intellect

*intellectus materialis*

*intellectus in effectu*

*intellectus in habitu*

*intellectus adeptus*

Agent Intellect

God is agent intellect for knowledge of God (*supra se*)

Angel for knowledge of angels (*iuxta se*)

Self for knowledge of self and things ‘below’ the self (*infra se*)

Mode of operation

Inductive

Syllogistic

Inferior and superior

Superior is like agent intellect

Memory, understanding, will

**Understanding: *inventiva*, *iudicativa*, *memorativa*, *interpretativa***

Inferior like possible

\*Grey text indicates anything in the *Tractatus* that is suppressed or re-located in the *Summa de anima,* while bold text indicates anything in the *Summa de anima* that did not appear in the *Tractatus.*

**6. Cognitive Powers in John of La Rochelle’s *Summa de anima***

In the previous chapter, my aim was to follow as closely as possible the account of the cognitive powers in Avicenna, Johannitius, John of Damascus, and pseudo-Augustine that John of La Rochelle gives in his *Tractatus,* cross-referencing to similar passages in the SDA.[[722]](#footnote-723) This highlighted that the SDA more or less duplicates the *Tractatus’* description of the powers, with the exception of the order in which the authorities are presented, thus confirming the importance of the latter work to the formation of John’s unique psychological vision. At the same time, the previous chapter emphasized John’s views on the synergies between the authorities themselves. In this chapter, I will offer a deeper analysis of John’s actual positions on cognition, as they emerge through his presentation of the cognitive powers in the SDA.

In this regard, I will bracket the purely bodily or ‘medical’ powers, in order to pursue a better understanding of how the fundamental faculties of internal sensation and intellect operate in John’s understanding. This analysis will show that John advocates what has sometimes been described as an ‘active’ theory of cognition—or a theory in which the mind in some way ‘determines’ what it perceives in the world rather than simply receiving data passively. That said, his version of this account is not as extreme as that of his contemporary William of Auvergne, whose account will also be briefly discussed here.

In his more moderate account, John preserved at least some role for the kind of passive reception of sense data that is so famously associated with Aristotle, while emphasizing nonetheless that first principles acquired by God prior to experience, which are innate, structure perceptual experience and render it intelligible. For William, by contrast, sense objects play no causal role in the development of the ideas we have about them, which are generated by the intellect exclusively. To understand how the two accounts differ, I will re-iterate the distinctive features of the Summa’s position on the internal senses and the way they facilitate the process of abstracting universals, before moving on a more elaborate account of the way John sees the workings of the intellect. This account is supplemented by some relevant passages in the *Summa Halensis,* which sheds additional light on the way natural cognition for early Franciscans relates to and facilitates knowledge of God.

The Internal Senses

As we have seen in the *Tractatus,* John of La Rochelle follows Avicenna very closely in delineating the five internal senses, which process the data of external sensation for cognition.[[723]](#footnote-724) These senses include what he calls the common sense, imagination, the imaginative sense, estimation, and memory.[[724]](#footnote-725) The common sense is the power located in the front lobe of the brain which receives all forms that are imprinted by the five senses and are passed on to it.[[725]](#footnote-726) This power is common in two respects, namely, because it produces a coordinated concept of what is perceived by different senses, so that what I see is the same thing as what I hear and smell; and because it confers to sensible things all the diverse properties that they may exhibit, such as black, sweet, etc.[[726]](#footnote-727)

According to Avicenna the next power of imagination is also located in the front of the brain. While the common sense apprehends the forms of all sensible things, which it procures from external sensation, the imagination retains them when the sense objects themselves are no longer present.[[727]](#footnote-728) In that sense, these two powers are diversified not in subject but in form, with one receiving and the other retaining. The third power is the imaginative or excogitative one, which is situated in the middle of the brain and has the power of composing and dividing the contents of the imagination at will.[[728]](#footnote-729) In other words, it can combine and separate properties of things and recombine them to formulate images of things that have not yet been experienced or that may not even exist.

The next power of estimation is ordained to the upper part of the middle of the brain, which apprehends whether an object of knowledge is helpful or harmful, good or evil, and thus determines, per Avicenna’s famous example, that a wolf is dangerous and a sheep is harmless.[[729]](#footnote-730) In differentiating between objects that are to be pursued or avoided, this power does not merely grasp a sensible or material form, such as a wolf, but it also identifies qualities that are immaterial, such as that it is harmful.

The product of estimation is what Avicenna calls an ‘intention’, which captures the accidents or what Avicenna called the ‘connotational attributes’ of sensible things, positive or negative, insofar as they are still attached to those things. So construed, estimation serves in three main ways, namely, to flag up what is dangerous or harmless in our experiences; or to help us identify possible further dangers or harmless objects. Thirdly, estimation enables us to identify from some qualities of a thing, others that may also be attributed to it. For example, from the colour of an apple, we can tell that it is also ripe and sweet.

The fifth of the internal senses is the memory, which is located in the back of the brain and retains the intentions of sensible things that are apprehended by estimation. According to Avicenna, the relationship between the two powers of estimation and memory is similar to the one between imagination and the common sense. As the imagination retains and is the thesaurus of sensible forms which are apprehended by the common sense, so the power of memory is a thesaurus conserving the intentions of sensible things that are apprehended by the estimative power.[[730]](#footnote-731) However, there is a difference between memory, which is in non-human animals and memory in humans. For the sheep is only able to recall that ‘this wolf is dangerous’ on seeing a particular wolf, and cannot obtain the universal knowledge that ‘all wolves are dangerous’ which is only proper to humans.

The Process of Abstraction

In an extension of the discussion above, John explains how the abstraction of universal concepts occurs and what it entails, beginning as Avicenna does with the external senses like vision that grasp the likeness of a form that is in matter before moving on to the intellect.[[731]](#footnote-732) As he notes, the external senses do not comprehend a form unless it is present in matter and indeed to the senses.[[732]](#footnote-733) Thus, the interior senses such as imagination are required to abstract the form further, achieving comprehension of the form without matter, or procuring a mental image of an object that remains even when the object is absent. Although this is an important part of the process of abstraction, the imagination is not capable of stripping the form of the accidents of matter in terms of which it comprehends its objects, such as figure, time, and place. By contrast, estimation transcends that level of abstraction, because it apprehends forms which are the intentions of sensible things, such as good, evil, fitting, and unfitting, which do not have a likeness to material forms.

Nevertheless, estimation still does not apprehend the form in question without all accidents of matter, and it knows its object only as a particular, through comparison to the sensible or imagined form already mentioned. Thus, we have seen that an animal is capable of knowing that ‘this wolf right here’ should be avoided, on the basis of external and internal sensation, but cannot grasp the universal that ‘wolves should be avoided’ independently of experience. This can only be achieved by the intellectual power, which apprehends a corporeal form in a way that strips it of all matter and all the circumstances of matter so that it is known not merely in its singularity but as a universal.

According to Avicenna, only one instance of an intention is needed for this purpose, because there is a common essence at the basis of all things of a similar kind, which becomes evident as soon as material accidents are removed. In this regard, Avicenna’s understanding of abstraction differs quite markedly from that of Aristotle, who saw abstraction more as a matter of discerning similarities between many different sense objects of a similar kind.[[733]](#footnote-734) For him, consequently, abstraction was an ongoing process in which new experiences could always call for the revision or expansion of a previously-abstracted universal concept. In the *Summa de anima,* John shows his preference for Avicenna’s approach to this issue, by construing the task of apprehending human nature, for instance, as a matter of stripping away all the material dispositions or attributions of a given person in order to lay bare the form or indeed forms, such as body and soul, that all humans have in common.[[734]](#footnote-735)

The *Summa Halensis* also describes this process, though perhaps not in as much detail as the contemporary philosopher would hope for, when it insists that an intelligible species is only truly comprehended in abstract terms if it ‘is entirely and absolutely abstracted from corporeality; [when it is thus] understood as it is, it is understood only by an intellectual power that is entirely and absolutely detached from the body and from the corporeal mass.’[[735]](#footnote-736) The levels of abstraction described above correspond to the extent to which this process has been completed. While sensation, imagination, and estimation involve abstraction from matter that does not yet entail the removal of the material dispositions, the intellect in abstracting removes all the conditions of matter and thereby lays bare what the object of knowledge really is, in a way that John elaborates in his treatment of the intellect, to which we now turn.

The Intellect

John follows a tradition that had developed in his generation of distinguishing between a passive and corruptible intellect which he claims Aristotle calls ‘material’, as well as the separable and incorruptible intellect, which includes the agent and possible intellects.[[736]](#footnote-737) There has been a great deal of debate about the precise origins of this three-fold division of material-possible-agent intellect, with some like Gauthier, de Vaux, Rohmer, and Salman insisting that it is an early sign of the influence of Averroes, who distinguishes between a corruptible and incorruptible intellect.[[737]](#footnote-738) There are difficulties with this theory, among them, that the material intellect in Averroes, which is not in fact mentioned by Aristotle, performs the function of what John and his contemporaries ascribed to the possible intellect.

The next chapter will pursue the details of this debate in order to try to achieve some new clarity on the sources of the corruptible/incorruptible distinction. For the moment, suffice it to say, as Bazán has argued, that it was a key idea and possibly invention of early Latin scholastics such as Philip the Chancellor and John of La Rochelle, who first found it in Anonymous Gauthier and Anonymous Callus.[[738]](#footnote-739) For his part, John describes the passive or material intellect as the inferior part of reason that is joined to the senses and receives intelligible species in phantasms.[[739]](#footnote-740) This passive power offers in a material form the intelligible species that still needs to be abstracted from a phantasm by the separable intellect.[[740]](#footnote-741) Precisely owing to its materiality, however, it is not considered part of the soul, unless insofar as it is conjoined to the body. For it originates from the union of the rational soul with the body rather than in the soul itself.[[741]](#footnote-742)

Another name for this power is ‘rationability’, which refers to the middle lobe of the brain and thus to the cognitive power, because it is able to accept universals in particulars, although not in the mode of universals.[[742]](#footnote-743) This again for John is what Aristotle supposedly called the passive intellect that is ‘*permixtus*’ with the body.[[743]](#footnote-744) In many respects, it corresponds to what we have already described as the functions of imagination and estimation. As a matter of fact, the material intellect seems to be the name John of La Rochelle gives to these faculties when they are operative in humans seeking to know universals, as opposed to animals knowing mere particulars.

The separable and incorruptible intellect has two modes, namely, the agent and possible intellects. Following the Aristotelian tradition, John describes the possible intellect as a blank slate, void of all pictures, but capable of receiving all pictures, having none in act.[[744]](#footnote-745) The role of this intellect is two-fold, first, ‘to turn and consider the [sense] forms that are in the imagination, and once they are illumined by the light of intelligence of the agent intellect, and abstracted or stripped of all material circumstances, [to receive the abstracted forms] imprinted in the possible intellect; thus it is said that the possible intellect is educed into act and so becomes formed’[[745]](#footnote-746) with respect to the original sense forms.

The other aspect of the separable intellect is the agent intellect or innate light mentioned in the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* (DSEA), namely, the intelligible light of the first truth that is naturally impressed in us.[[746]](#footnote-747) The role of this agent intellect ‘is to illumine or diffuse the light of intelligence over sensible forms existing in the imagination or estimation; and in illumining them, to abstract them from all material circumstances, and once they are abstracted, to unite and order them in the possible intellect, in much the same way that a species of colour is abstracted through the operation of light and is joined to the pupil.’[[747]](#footnote-748) Indeed, the light of the agent intellect makes forms or species intelligible as light makes colours visible.[[748]](#footnote-749)

Following Avicenna, John divides the work of the possible intellect into four stages of potentiality in the intellect, or indeed four intellects, whereby the mind moves from a state of pure potential to various other grades of its actualisation.[[749]](#footnote-750) In his *De anima,* Avicenna illustrates these stages in terms of the way a child who is in principle of capable of learning to write (material intellect), proceeds to acquire the ability to write (*in habitu*), perfects it (*in effectu*), and uses it (acquired intellect).[[750]](#footnote-751)

In the first case, there is what John calls a material potential for knowledge which has in no way been actualised as yet. This can be likened to prime matter, which does not itself possess any form but is subject to all forms. The material intellect (*intellectus materialis*) in question here seems to be one and the same as the material intellect described above, which provides the possible intellect with the sense forms needed for abstraction without actually contributing to abstraction in any way.[[751]](#footnote-752) In the second place, there is a disposed potential (*intellectus in habitu)*, which involves knowledge of the ‘common conceptions of the soul’ (*communes animi conceptiones*), that is, the principles or propositions which are *per se nota* or self-evident to the mind, such as ‘the whole is greater than its part.’[[752]](#footnote-753)

In his *De anima*, Avicenna had developed a sophisticated account of the role these principles or ‘primary intelligibles’ play in human knowing.[[753]](#footnote-754) On his account, the intelligibles are innate concepts that correspond to certain properties that are ‘transcendental’—as Duns Scotus only later called them—or common to all beings. First and foremost, and thus also ‘first known’ (*primum cognitum*) among these intelligibles is being itself (*ens*).[[754]](#footnote-755) As Aertsen notes, this seems to denote ‘that something is’ (*an sit*) or what the Latins would refer to as a thing’s existence. This property is determined by two others, namely, ‘thing’ (*res*) and ‘necessary’.[[755]](#footnote-756) The concept ‘thing’ seems to denote ‘what something is’ or what Latin thinkers would describe as its essence, while necessity refers to the question whether a thing actually exists in reality as opposed to a mere state of possible existence.

These two concepts of necessity and possibility were foundational to Avicenna’s metaphysics, in which necessity denotes that any given possible *res* has acquired the property of *ens* orexistence. In elaborating this highly original idea of primary notions, Avicenna was emphatic that the intelligibles are not themselves the objects of knowledge or universal concepts that will result from abstraction, which Avicenna calls ‘secondary intelligibles’.[[756]](#footnote-757) Instead, they serve as means or guides in the process of abstraction, which we have seen involves stripping an intention of all its particularizing features or material determinations (location, time, shape, and so on), so as to seize conceptual hold of the universal essence that is at the core of the intention and to know it as actually existing.[[757]](#footnote-758) Whenever the mind perceives the ‘thing in itself’ in this way, Avicenna affirms that it makes contact with an external ‘Active Intellect’, the last in a series of celestial intelligences, which is the one and only intellect that is always in act and thus constantly knows all things as they really are.[[758]](#footnote-759) This connection is made by the fourth of Avicenna’s intellects, namely, the *intellectus adeptus,* or acquired intellect, while the third *intellectus in effectu,* is the one that has made those connections previously but is not taking advantage of them presently*.*[[759]](#footnote-760)

After elaborating on these four intellects, John invokes another approach to explaining the work of the possible intellect, which was circulating in some texts at the time, above all, Anonymous Callus, namely, through an analogy to syllogistic reasoning, which stems also from the Avicennian tradition.[[760]](#footnote-761) This firstly involves the ‘quiddities’ of knowledge, for example, *this* whole and *this* part, otherwise known as sense forms, which the possible intellect must obtain from the imagination, via the material intellect. Then come the principles possessed in the possible intellect, in specific, the *intellectus in habitu,* such as ‘the whole is greater than the part.’

Finally, there are the conclusions that are drawn from those principles about the quiddities, such as *this* whole is greater than *this* part.[[761]](#footnote-762) In drawing these conclusions, John reiterates that the possible intellect becomes ‘formed’ or complete with respect to the sense forms that it originally drew from the imagination, after the manner of Avicenna’s *intellectus in effectu*. Thus, John highlights again that the work of the possible intellect is two-fold; first it involves induction, that is, ‘a conversion through consideration to the sensible forms that the form may be abstracted through actions of the light of the agent intellect, by which it might be informed and through which it differs from the senses.’[[762]](#footnote-763) Next, there is the reception of the form that has been abstracted by the agent intellect.

The Primary Intelligibles and Divine Illumination

Although John of La Rochelle does not describe the principles that facilitate this achievement in terms of ‘primary intelligibles’ in his personal works, these innate concepts do play a significant role in the *Summa Halensis,* which enumerates them following a model that had been introduced by Philip the Chancellor, according to which the first transcendental, namely, being (*ens*), is characterized by unity, truth, and goodness, which correspond to the first, second, and third persons of the Trinity—or Father, Son, and Spirit, who respectively act as the efficient, formal, and final cause of all things.[[763]](#footnote-764) In a development on Philip’s account, clearly inspired by Avicenna, the Summists argue that this Trinity does not merely capture the key qualities of beings, but it is also impressed upon the human mind, with unity, truth, and goodness representing an image of the highest Being, the Triune God. [[764]](#footnote-765)

On account of this image, human beings are able to know any given thing as one, or indivisible in itself and distinct from other beings;[[765]](#footnote-766) as true, or intelligible in terms of what it is; and good, or fit for a certain purpose.[[766]](#footnote-767) In other words, they have the cognitive resources to do as Avicenna described when he spoke of abstraction as a matter of stripping away all the material dispositions or attributions of a thing in order to lay bare the form that all things of the same kind have in common.[[767]](#footnote-768) In a treatise on how we know God, fascinatingly, the Summa invokes Augustine’s distinction between things we can see—which are present right here—and things we believe—which are absent from our sensory or mental vision—in a way that seems to gesture implicitly towards what later Franciscans would describe as the ‘intuitive’ or immediate knowledge we have both of the transcendentals and the objects they render intelligible for us, and the ‘abstractive’ or universal knowledge of a form that remains in our minds after the moment of intuitive understanding.[[768]](#footnote-769)

To know such a form correctly—in terms of its unity, truth, and goodness, but in this case especially in terms of its truth—is for the Summist ultimately to know the thing in relation to the divine idea after which it is modelled. In affirming this, the Summa hints at its adoption of Avicenna’s idea that all things have a three-fold existence, in matter, in themselves, and in the giver of forms, which Franciscans called God.[[769]](#footnote-770) In a question devoted to the ideas or forms in God, the Summist—likely here John himself--follows the lead of Alexander of Hales, who in his disputed questions argued that that divine ideas are the same as the wisdom of God ‘*secundum rem*’ or in terms of what they are, and are therefore one.[[770]](#footnote-771) However, they differ from God ‘*secundum nomen*’ insofar as they pertain to the objects or creatures known, which are many, and in that sense, the divine ideas themselves are many. As this suggests, the Summist locates the multiplicity of divine ideas in relation to creatures as a way of preserving the unity of God. To illustrate how the relationship between the two works, he invokes an example from Pseudo-Dionysius, which had a long history in the Aristotelian commentary tradition.[[771]](#footnote-772) This observes that a point which serves as the terminus for many lines remains one even though it simultaneously serves as the principle of those lines which it virtually encompasses.[[772]](#footnote-773) In much the same way, he contends, God knows all things through himself as cause.[[773]](#footnote-774)

In this regard, the Summist goes so far as to say that the knowledge of God extends not just to things that exist—or finite beings—but also to those things that could exist through the divine cause. Thus the Summist reasons that God does have knowledge of infinite things.[[774]](#footnote-775) This indeed was the logical corollary of the Summa’s appropriation of Avicenna’s metaphysics of necessary and possible beings, namely, that God knows all things that are or could be and thus, the infinite.[[775]](#footnote-776) For the Summist, consequently, God’s own fundamental nature is to be infinite, rather than simple, which was the primary quality previous medievals thinkers followed Augustine in assigning to him.[[776]](#footnote-777)

The metaphysics that led to this conclusion also inspired the Summist’s further contention, namely, that God does not merely know the species of things in the way that previous thinkers like Augustine had suggested. He also knows individuals. As the Summist puts it, since God is equally the author of things great and small, therefore in his wisdom he must also know both great and small things’.[[777]](#footnote-778) While the Summist concedes that knowing singulars is a sign of weakness in humans who derive that knowledge from the senses, in God it is not so because he does not obtain his knowledge from the senses but through a likeness to the thing which exists in himself as cause.[[778]](#footnote-779) For human beings, by contrast, the ability to know material beings according to their ideal form in the divine ideas and thus to know them as God knows them derives as noted above from the transcendentals, or the image of God on the mind.

For this very reason, the Summist contends that the knowledge of ordinary beings in terms of their unity, truth, and goodness simultaneously gives a glimpse into the divine being who is one, true, and good, albeit in a limited way that is circumscribed by the nature of the creature itself. In fact, creatures are the only means by which God can be known according to the Summa, since the transcendental properties of the divine are known prior to all experience, such that the knowledge of them can only come through his effects.[[779]](#endnote-2) In describing how these effects give insight into God, the Summa again takes its cue from Avicenna, who states in his metaphysics that Being—or in the case of the Franciscans, God—is wholly other to all beings, while at the same time insisting that what belongs to it as to a substance can be said equally to belong to ordinary beings as to an accident.[[780]](#footnote-780) The substance has the quality as a cause or what is prior to the arrival of the accident, while the accident has it as the effect of the substance, or because the substance has it, and thus has it in a posterior way. Nevertheless, the substance and accident, cause and caused, possess the same quality. The Summist picks up on precisely this line of argument in speaking of the analogy between God and creatures:

An example of analogical agreement would be substance and accident: they agree in that they are both [a type of] being, which is predicated of them in terms of priority: substance as [a type of] being serves as a substrate to its accidents, and therefore ‘being’ is predicated in a primary sense of substance, which is ‘being’ essentially, and in a secondary sense of accidents, which are ‘beings’ [by virtue of being] in something else. Therefore, one must reply that there is no univocal agreement between God and creatures, but there is an analogical one. For example, if ‘good’ is predicated of God and of creatures, it is predicated of God essentially, and of creatures in terms of participation. This suggests that the predication ‘good’ of God and of creatures is analogical.[[781]](#footnote-781)

Although the Summa describes the creator-creature relationship in terms of analogy here, numerous authors have noted that the type of analogy that the Summist seems to have in mind is something more like an analogy of proportionality.[[782]](#footnote-782) This acknowledges the disparity between the infinite God and finite beings, but nonetheless allows for the possibility of referring to them in the same terms with the same meaning. Thus, the definition of analogy presupposed by early Franciscans differed dramatically from the understanding of analogy that would be advocated by someone like Thomas Aquinas, for whom God is who other to anything we can know.[[783]](#footnote-783) The kind of analogy the Summist seems to have in mind here seems in fact similar to what Franciscans like Duns Scotus would describe as univocity.

As Jacob Wood has observed, the upshot of univocity is that the effects of the divine, namely, creatures, have the power to make something positive, if, again, limited, directly known about the nature of God.[[784]](#footnote-784) Thus, Wood rightly notes that early Franciscan thought signals shift away from the apophatic tradition such as had dominated in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, according to which creatures can only tell us what God is not, towards a more cataphatic understanding in which something positive if partial can be known through creatures that exhibit unity, truth, and goodness about the nature of the God, who is One, True, and Good, in the proper sense of the term.[[785]](#endnote-3)

As noted, the inspiration behind this shift was clearly Avicenna’s metaphysics of necessary or actual and possible beings which helped early Franciscans to envisage a God who possesses an idea of all things that are and could be—of the infinite—and whose instantiation of some of those individual ideas makes himself directly accessible to the mind in a finite but nonetheless immediate way. Such an account can hardly help but bring to mind Francis’ emphasis on the value of creatures great and small, of God’s love for them, and the way they make God known to us. Moreover, the Avicennian doctrine of the transcendentals helped to stress the intimacy of the mind to God, such as Francis enjoyed, which enabled him to find God’s love in every creature in the first place.

While John’s *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima* do not develop these ideas about how God can be known through his trinitarian image, we have seen that his works refer to the first principles as an innate orientation to the ‘first truth’, the image of God, or the ‘light’.[[786]](#footnote-785) This brings us to the question of the role of the active intellect in achieving human knowledge. In line with the prior Aristotelian tradition, Avicenna held that everything that moves from potency to act does not do so unless through a cause which leads it from potency to act. This cause is the reason why our soul actually knows intelligible things. But the cause that gives the intelligible forms must be an intellect that is in act. Therefore, it is necessary to have an agent intellect.[[787]](#footnote-786) For Avicenna, we have seen, this intellect was separate from the soul itself; some Christian interpreters identified it with God, insisting that he is ultimately responsible for all success in human cognition.

Thus, John was constrained to consider the question whether the agent intellect is in fact a separate substance from the soul, as Avicenna supposed.[[788]](#footnote-787) In this regard, he invokes a distinction from the DSEA11 concerning things that stand below, next to, or above the self, interpreting these three in terms of 1. Natural things and the human being itself; 2. Angels, and 3. God. As John notes, angels and God obviously exceed the capacities of the human mind. For this reason, the human mind must rely on angels to serve as the agent intellect for its knowledge of angels and on God to serve as the agent intellect for human knowledge of God.[[789]](#footnote-788) When it comes to the soul and things ‘beneath’ the soul, by contrast, John is emphatic that the agent intellect is nothing other than the human soul itself rather than a substance separate from it.

Although the possible intellect is responsible for presenting the agent intellect with the sense forms to render intelligible and habitually holds the first principles of knowledge, given by God prior to all experience, or innately, which make it possible to render those forms intelligible, the actual work of utilizing those principles to produce intelligible forms and to deliver them to the possible intellect falls to the agent intellect.[[790]](#footnote-789) In doing this, human beings reflect the image of a God who knows all things and makes it possible for us to do likewise, through the light of the principles which are a sign of his image upon us.

William of Auvergne

In his *De anima,* William of Auvergne seemingly takes issue with John of La Rochelle’s way of construing the active character of cognition, though in keeping with the practice of the time, he does not mention John by name.[[791]](#footnote-790) Whereas John had allowed that innate principles acquired from God prior to experience nonetheless structure experience and render it intelligible, William preferred an account in which natural objects determine the content but are not themselves the cause of the cognitive act, which is self-caused.

To make this case, he contests the notion that the agent intellect brings forth intelligible forms from the material intellect—which seems to be his name for the possible intellect—‘like light by its rays brings forth colours from potency to the act of being.’[[792]](#footnote-791) As Gilson, Marrone, and others have noted, William rejects the idea that the soul possesses an agent intellect of its own.[[793]](#footnote-792) He points out that if the soul was the agent intellect as well as that substance in which intelligible forms are received, it would be both potential and actual, and this would be a contradiction. Likewise, if the soul was the agent intellect, it would always be in act and would understand all intelligible things all the time through itself, which it does not do and indeed only God can do.[[794]](#footnote-793)

For William, the material intellect is entirely sufficient to achieve the work that John assigned to the agent intellect, that is, to transform potential into actual knowledge. For this purpose, he contends, ‘the mind does not receive anything from the object, but it comes to have a cognitive act about that particular object affecting a sense organ on the occasion of that affection, without being caused by it.’[[795]](#footnote-794) Thus, the mind generates the forms of things entirely within itself by reflecting on the manner in which the senses are affected by the body. In this way, it extracts a sign or intelligible form, which is entirely abstracted from matter.[[796]](#footnote-795) William summarizes the process when he says that sensation:

Brings to the intellect sensible substances and intellectual ones united to bodies. But it does not imprint upon it their intelligible forms, because it [the intellect] does not receive such forms of them. Rather through itself the intellect considers that those substances underlie the variety of sensible accidents. The intellective power, then, apprehends or sees such substances under a covering.

William defends his extraordinary view that the intellect needs nothing but intelligible forms to understand, on the ground that it is superior to the senses which do not need anything but sensible things to understand sense objects.[[797]](#footnote-796) The origin of these forms entirely inside the mind is the reason why William thinks our cognitive works can be credited to us. For him, it is consistent with what we are as spiritual beings that we are incapable of being acted upon or affected by the body.[[798]](#footnote-797)

For this same reason, he contends, the sensible movements of the body do not survive its death; this is only true of the forms or signs produced by the soul.[[799]](#footnote-798) The material intellect is able to procure such intelligible forms on William’s account because it is impressed with certain first principles of knowledge which allow for knowing all forms in potency.[[800]](#footnote-799) Thus, William says that the material intellect is ‘full of forms’.[[801]](#footnote-800) Whenever the potential for knowing forms is realized, it is nonetheless thanks to God, the true Agent Intellect, who donates the first principles in the first place.

Conclusion

So far, we have explored the two distinct ways in which John and William developed accounts of the ‘active’ character of cognition. For his part, John preferred a view which nonetheless allowed for some level of passive receptivity or dependence upon the senses. The active dimension of his proposal consisted in his invocation of certain principles acquired innately, or prior to experience, from God, as the conditions of possibility for rendering sense experiences intelligible. This balance between the passive and the active may have allowed him to emphasize Francis’ care for creation, and his belief that all creatures are significant to God, while at the same time identifying God himself, and intimacy with God, as the reason we are able to know anything true about them in the first place. By contrast to John, William of Auvergne considered the senses to be more or less irrelevant for obtaining knowledge.

In his view, the mind generates the forms of things entirely within itself by reflecting on the manner in which the senses are affected by the body and thereby extracting a sign or intelligible form, which is entirely abstracted from matter. In closing, it is worth noting that the two distinct accounts of active cognition on display here are ultimately consistent with and indicative of two different ways of rendering the body-soul dualism, which circulated during the early scholastic period. Although both John and William endorsed the Avicennian idea that body and soul are separate substances—by contrast to the view that would later become popular with Aquinas that they form one substance—John echoed Hugh of St Cher in affirming that, ‘the soul by nature is unitable to the body,’[[802]](#footnote-801) which is essential to what it means to be a soul. For this reason, we have seen that John affirmed that the ‘lower’ vegetative and sense faculties survive the death of the body, as the means by which the soul exercises itself and indeed acquires merit.

In William’s view, by contrast, there is no essential relationship between the body and the soul. For him, the body and all the faculties that go along with it become detached from the soul at death, and the body is just an instrument of the soul that is necessary for this life rather than an essential component thereof. As we saw previously, this was a view to which John explicitly objected, albeit without mentioning William by name.[[803]](#footnote-802) Thus, William’s more extreme form of dualism both underpinned and resonated with his equally extreme definition of the ‘active’ character of cognition. Both forms of dualism and indeed active cognition on offer here have been described as ‘Augustinian’. In another context, I have marshalled evidence that Augustine was by no means a proponent of active cognition, let alone body-soul dualism.[[804]](#footnote-803) This is not a point that I have space to press here. The ‘negative’ evidence, namely, that early Franciscans in particular obtain their Augustine through spurious and Arab-language works is enough to suggest that their interpretations of Augustine may not have had much to do with anything genuine in Augustine. What the *Summa de anima* shows, like the *Tractatus*, is that references to somewhat vaguely defined pseudo-Augustinian as well as Damascenian psychological categories provided a sort of opportunity for John to inject an Avicennian understanding of human cognition into the Christian tradition.

A question that does need to be pursued further in this regard, however, concerns the source of the corruptible (material)/incorruptible (possible and agent) intellect distinction that we have seen upholds and ties together the diverse elements of John’s theory of cognition, from his invocation of pseudo-Augustine to his use of Avicenna’s doctrine of four intellects and syllogistic reasoning. Although the three-fold scheme of material/possible/agent intellect is initially present in Anonymous Callus and Anonymous Gauthier, as I have noted, and appears in another, more rudimentary, format in Philip the Chancellor, it does not trace exactly to any one of the major philosophical sources we have so far found the early Franciscans to be using. For example, it is not a scheme that is found as presented in Avicenna, and it is certainly not in Aristotle, who never mentioned a material intellect. The appearance of this schema in early Latin scholasticism therefore poses something of a puzzle, which it will be the goal of the next chapter to address.

**7. The Reception of Averroes in Early Scholasticism**

There are a number of possible candidates for the source of the three-fold intellectual schema we have found in the *Tractatus* and which re-appears nearly verbatim in the SDA, which is the text on which the account of this chapter will be based. As we will see, the immediate source is clearly Anonymous Callus, and before this, Anonymous Gauthier, though more recently, José Meirinhos has suggested that these texts may have derived the tripartite intellect from John of La Rochelle rather than the other way around.[[805]](#footnote-804) Either way, the question remains as to what compelled these authors to present the intellect in this format. The philosophical sources available for this purpose were of course Aristotle and Avicenna, as well as the *De intellectu* of Alexander of Aphrodisias, to which Latin thinkers had access at this time. More controversially, there was the newly available work of Averroes. In order to weigh these options, I will investigate more closely the presentation of the intellect in Aristotle, Alexander, and Averroes, and the discussion surrounding the reception of Averroes in the secondary literature, before drawing some conclusions about the likely origin of the material-possible-agent intellect distinction.

Aristotle (385-323 BC)

Aristotle’s theory of the intellect is the focus of many books in its own right, and we can only reprise it briefly here, insofar as it is relevant to our study of John of La Rochelle. As is well known, the Greek philosopher distinguished between an active power and a passive one that is capable of being acted upon, the so-called *nous pathetikos.*[[806]](#footnote-805) The Greco-Latin translation of Aristotle speaks of this power insofar as it stands in a relationship of potentiality (*potentia*) or possibility (*possibilis*) with regard to knowledge.[[807]](#footnote-806) This is echoed by the Arabo-Latin translation, which also uses the terms *potentia* and *possibilis* to describe the relationship between the mind and its capacity for knowledge. This potential is realized by the active power already mentioned.

In Aristotle’s view, the latter aspect of the mind alone is separate from and unmixed with the body and thus impassible.[[808]](#footnote-807) This view is rendered as follows from the Greek: ‘*intellectus separatus et inmixtus et inpassibilis*;’ and from the Arabic, ‘*non mixtus neque passibilis*.’[[809]](#footnote-808) Because it is impassible, the active power is immortal and eternal, a view which is rendered as ‘*inmortale et perpetuum*’ from the Greek and ‘*immortalis semper*’ from the Arabic.[[810]](#footnote-809) Even though it is necessary for active thinking, consequently, the passive aspect of the mind is destructible precisely because it is open to receiving forms of things that will pass away.[[811]](#footnote-810) This view is rendered as ‘*passivus autem intellectus corruptibilis*’ from Greek and ‘*passibilis est corruptibilis*’ from Arabic.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD)

As one of the first great commentators on Aristotle, and indeed one of the most influential, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who lived at the end of the third century AD, produced stand-alone works in addition to his commentaries.[[812]](#footnote-811) His *De anima* is one of these works, an extract from which, called the *De intellectu*, was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the mid-to-late twelfth century as part of his considerable work within the network of translators based in Toledo.[[813]](#footnote-812) As Théry notes, this work was probably not subject to the condemnation of Aristotle’s works;[[814]](#footnote-813) perhaps for this reason, it ‘apparently enjoyed a considerable vogue at Paris,’ during the early thirteenth century. At the very least, William of Auvergne felt compelled to address it directly, if only to reject some of Alexander’s key positions.’[[815]](#footnote-814)

In the *De intellectu*, Alexander introduced for the first time the term ‘material intellect’ when speaking of Aristotle’s potential power, which had not strictly speaking been referred to as an intellect before.[[816]](#footnote-815) For Alexander, this intellect is not material as such but only insofar as it is capable of receiving forms in a way analogous to matter.[[817]](#footnote-816) As Alexander states: ‘we must say, then, that the material intellect is only a kind of propensity suitable for the reception of intelligible forms; it is like a tablet on which nothing has been written, or (to express this better) more like the blank condition of the tablet than the tablet itself.’[[818]](#footnote-817) The reason Alexander refers to the material intellect as a disposition rather than an intellect strictly speaking, Davidson notes, is that this disposition perishes with the body, while the intellect presumably does not.[[819]](#footnote-818)

The next, habitual intellect, Alexander states, ‘is the form and perfection of the material intellect, a *habitus* that develops in it from its activity in apprehending the universal and in separating forms from their matter.’[[820]](#footnote-819) In other words, ‘this second intellect is thus the material intellect once it has acquired the *habitus* of actual cognition.’[[821]](#footnote-820) That is why Alexander also refers to the latter as the ‘acquired intellect.’[[822]](#footnote-821) So construed, the material and habitual intellects are two sides of one coin and thus the latter perishes with the former. ‘When the intellect as *habitus* is performing acts of understanding,’ Alexander elaborates, ‘it becomes intellect “in act,” but when it is simply in its habitual state, it is, so to speak, [all] its concepts, which lie grouped together and at rest [within it].’[[823]](#footnote-822) It is, more or less, a repository for abstracted forms.

The work of bringing knowledge into act is achieved by the agent or productive intellect, ‘through which the material intellect is caused to have a habit.’[[824]](#footnote-823) According to Alexander, ‘Aristotle compares this [agent] intellect to light: for as light is the cause that makes colors which are potentially visible to be actual objects of vision, so this third intellect transforms the material intellect from a potential to an actual intellect by producing within it the intellectual *habitus*.’[[825]](#footnote-824) With others like Plotinus and Themistius, he describes the relationship of the agent to the material intellect as one of form to matter—a theme which will reappear in Averroes and others, not least John of La Rochelle.[[826]](#footnote-825) Alexander was the first thinker to define the active intellect as an incorporeal intelligible being outside the soul, a view which heavily influenced many Arab philosophers.[[827]](#footnote-826)

Averroes (1126-98 AD)

Although Averroes wrote three major works on Aristotle’s *De anima*,only the last and longest of these, appropriately known as the *Long Commentary*, was known to Latin thinkers.[[828]](#footnote-827) Within the *Long Commentary*, Averroes presents two distinct views on the material intellect with which he had engaged throughout his career.[[829]](#footnote-828) First, there is the view of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who described the material intellect as very much connected to the body.[[830]](#footnote-829) As Salman shows, this interpretation of Alexander is reinforced by Gerard’s translation of Alexander, which states that the material intellect is entirely mixed together with and joined to the body.[[831]](#footnote-830) The alternative viewpoint transmitted through Averroes was that of Themistius, who said that the possible intellect is not a material or bodily substance but is separable from the body.[[832]](#footnote-831)

As Davidson notes, Alexander’s *De anima* and *De intellectu* and Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s *De anima* were among the only commentaries on Aristotle available in Arabic translation in their entirety. Together with Plotinus’ *Enneads*, theywere the most influential sources for Arabic writings on psychology.[[833]](#footnote-832) In the *Long Commentary*, at least, Averroes takes a view that is more closely related to that of Themistius, according to which the material intellect—his name for the possible intellect— is capable of receiving all forms and therefore cannot itself have a bodily form.[[834]](#footnote-833) On this basis, Averroes posits that the material intellect is eternal.[[835]](#footnote-834) Furthermore, he argues that the material or possible intellect is one for all humanity, and he identifies it with a single incorporeal substance that is the penultimate link in a string of celestial intelligences.[[836]](#footnote-835) To posit this one intellect that is accessible to all is the only way in his view to explain how different persons can have common objects of knowledge and share ideas.[[837]](#footnote-836)

In a move beyond Themistius, Averroes does argue that there must be a passible and corruptible intellect, which he describes in terms of the cogitative power.[[838]](#footnote-837) But this as we have seen is not what he would call an intellect, whether material or possible,[[839]](#footnote-838) strictly speaking, even though Averroes describes it in terms of Aristotle’s ‘passive intellect’.[[840]](#footnote-839) As a matter of fact, the cogitative power seems to be little more than a name for the faculty of imagination in humans. The function of this faculty, associated with the middle ventricle of the brain, is to ‘discern the individual intention which is the individual form of the particular thing,’[[841]](#footnote-840) thus preparing it to be abstracted by the intellect.[[842]](#footnote-841) Although animals are also capable of this function, they are not able to perform it in a way that anticipates intellectual abstraction, and that is why Averroes gives the function a different name in humans.[[843]](#footnote-842)

This act of abstraction is the joint operation of the material and agent intellects, which, despite being two separate substances for Averroes, are like matter and form in relation to one another, with one creating the potential for knowledge of all universal forms and the other enacting that potential. As Zeldner notes, *intellectus adeptus* is the term Averroes used to describe the activation of the material intellect by the agent intellect.[[844]](#footnote-843) To realize this material potential fully is to have one’s individuality absorbed into the Agent Intellect, which is for Averroes like so many Islamic thinkers a separate entity from the human soul.[[845]](#footnote-844)

The Latin Reception of Averroes

There is little that is known with certainty about the exact circumstances of Averroes’ translation into Latin, and it is for that reason that this topic has been the subject of intensive debate. Roland de Vaux made the case that the majority of Averroes’ works were prepared in the Court of Frederick II from 1227. However, this theory was roundly rejected by René A. Gauthier, who argued that the translations must have been in preparation from at least 1220.[[846]](#footnote-845) The main scholar at Frederick’s court was incontestably Michael Scot, who probably worked there between 1228-35, though he was likely active as a translator even earlier.

That said, it is difficult to determine exactly which Averroes translations Michael was responsible for, aside from the *De caelo* and probably also the *De anima*, which is attributed to him in several manuscripts—although Dag Hasse has recently offered convincing proof that Michael translated at least seven of Averroes’ major works.[[847]](#footnote-846) In keeping with the testimony of Roger Bacon, de Vaux credits Michael with the introduction of Averroes’ oeuvre in Paris by 1231. The apparent responsibility of Michael for bringing the works to Paris explains the well-known fact that they were received by Latin thinkers all at once. By contrast, Gauthier believes Averroes may have appeared in Paris as early as 1225, for reasons I will explain in due course. As de Vaux notes, however, this date is called into question by the fact that William of Auxerre does not mention Averroes in his *Summa aurea*,completed between 1215-26 and in a second version between 1226-29, but William of Auvergne clearly knows him in works that were written before 1235.[[848]](#footnote-847)

More contentiously, de Vaux argued that Frederick’s motive for sending the translations via Michael to Paris, after having circulated them first around Italy, was to irritate Pope Gregory IX, with whom he was supposedly in conflict at the time.[[849]](#footnote-848) As noted in chapter one, Gregory had issued a condemnation in Paris which implicated not only the works of Aristotle but also those who had commented on them. By sending the Averroes works to Paris, de Vaux hypothesises—and he admits it is a hypothesis—Frederick rendered the implementation of the ban effectively impossible, due to the tremendous increase in the number of works that now needed to be assessed.

At very least, he made this work unnecessary, since Averroes would now presumably explain points of doubt in the Stagirite’s works, even though the only way to find out if this was the case was of course to read them.[[850]](#footnote-849) According to de Vaux, Frederick’s intervention was the likely reason why the condemnation of Aristotle was effectively dropped in 1231. Although this theory is intriguing, it is called into doubt by what we have learned in the first chapter about Pope Gregory’s already positive attitude towards natural philosophy. There was seemingly no way to spite a Pope by circulating material that he already clearly welcomed through an emissary, namely, Michael Scot, whose work he clearly admired.

The Historiography of Averroes’ Reception

In the early twentieth century, Dominique Salman argued that early scholastics and especially John of La Rochelle undertook an initial reception of Averroes which was distinct from the ‘radical Averroist Aristotelianism’, which modern scholars have associated most closely with Averroes’ reception.[[851]](#footnote-850) This interpretation of Averroes developed from the mid-thirteenth century and was ultimately condemned in 1270 and 1277. Although numerous doctrines were the subject of these condemnations, one of the most sensitive issues—vociferously objected to by Aquinas, for instance—was the idea of Averroes that the possible intellect was separate and universal for all.

As Salman notes, this question does not even arise in scholars of the earlier generation at Paris, who show little to no awareness of what later came to be regarded as heretical Averroist positions.[[852]](#footnote-851) What some Latin thinkers working between around 1240 and 1250 did associate with Averroes, on his account, was the idea that the agent intellect is a power proper to the soul, rather than the separate substance Avicenna made it out to be. This idea, which Salman traces specifically to Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and Adam of Buckfield, is what he referred to as ‘First Averroism,’ a position that was also later advocated by Gauthier.[[853]](#footnote-852) Crowley nicely summarizes their views as follows:

Before 1250, far from being considered an advocate of monopsychism which denied the presence not only of an active intellect within the individual soul but also of even a possible intellect, Averroes was accredited with the opinion that the active intellect was immanent in man and a faculty of the soul, and his authority was invoked against Avicenna, Algazel and the theologians who, whilst admitting the persona and immanent nature of the possible intellect, made of the active intellect an immaterial form or substance existing altogether apart. The Averroes against which [Roger] Bacon in common with many other scholastics then raised his voice had nothing in common with the primitive Averroism known before 1250; it had become synonymous with monopsychism.[[854]](#footnote-853)

In a further study, Salman identifies what he sees as additional evidence for the reception of Averroes in early scholasticism, and specifically, in John of La Rochelle. Although John of La Rochelle only includes one quote from Averroes in his work, and more specifically, the *Tractatus*, the idea of this passage is subsumed into the SDA as well: ‘reason is corruptible, as the Commentator says in the book *De anima*;for he says: reason is corruptible and the intellect is incorruptible.’[[855]](#footnote-854) A similar reference appears in the DAR of the *Summa Halensis.* On the basis of this quotation, Salman claims that John obtained the distinction between a passive corruptible and separate and incorruptible intellect from Averroes, and he points to this as constitutive of the ‘First Averroism’ that dominated before the birth of heretical Averroism around 1265.[[856]](#footnote-855)

As Salman further observes, John in this quotation conflates the *ratio* of the DSEA with Averroes’ idea of cogitation, which takes place in the passible and corruptible intellect.[[857]](#footnote-856) On the ground that the material intellect in Rochelle performs a similar function to *ratio*,Salman concluded that this intellect performs the same work as cogitationas well.[[858]](#footnote-857) As Salman notes, the passage quoted by John already appeared in the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor, which probably dates to 1228-36, which is consistent with the idea that Averroes appeared in Paris in 1230.[[859]](#footnote-858) This passage states: ‘The Commentator in his book *De anima* posits that reason is corruptible but the intellect is incorruptible.’[[860]](#footnote-859) For Salman, this not only proves Philip’s influence on the Franciscan but also the dependence of both John and Philip on Averroes.

Almost a decade before Salman’s articles, J. Rohmer made a similar argument in a more abbreviated form. He claimed that Alexander of Hales, whom he conflates with the author or the *Summa Halensis*,equated the material intellect with Averroes’ cogitation and claimed that the distinction between the corruptible intellect and the incorruptible (i.e. agent and possible) intellect comes from Averroes as well.[[861]](#footnote-860) In that sense, Rohmer claims, the Summist identifies the material intellect with the possible intellect of Aristotle, provided this is understood in the sense of what Augustine meant by the term *ratio*, which involves the apprehension of an intelligible form in or by the sensitive, i.e. imaginative power.[[862]](#footnote-861)

While the Summist acknowledges that Aristotle might be read as having only an agent and a possible—not a material—intellect, he insists that we cannot explain the work of the material intellect solely with recourse to the imagination, because imagination in animals is not oriented towards the knowledge of universals. This is only the case for the material intellect.[[863]](#footnote-862) Where the Summist clearly departs from Averroes and the Arab view more generally is in affirming that the agent intellect is not a separate substance but subsists in the soul, with the exception of the knowledge of angels and God, which require assistance from angels and God, respectively, as agent intellects.[[864]](#footnote-863) Although Alexander rejects the idea, well known from Avicenna, of a separate agent intellect, Rohmer insists that he shows no awareness of Averroes’ idea of a separate possible intellect.[[865]](#footnote-864)

In a more recent intervention, Bazán points out that Averroes, along with virtually all Arab philosophers, their main mediator Gundissalinus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, held that there is a separate agent intellect.[[866]](#footnote-865) On this basis, he rejects the idea that Averroes could have been the source for the Latin idea that the agent intellect is proper to the soul. In defence of this view, he notes that figures like John Blund, Philip the Chancellor, John of La Rochelle, and the author of the *Summa Halensis*, all of whom held the agent intellect to be a power of the soul, did not attribute this view to Averroes.[[867]](#footnote-866)

Although he recognizes that Roger Bacon attributed to Averroes the idea that the agent intellect is the human soul, he argues that Bacon deliberately took the Commentator’s words out of context in order to construct a ‘straw man’ which he could attack in order to support his own view that the agent intellect is a separate substance, namely, God.[[868]](#footnote-867) As Bazán notes, it was not uncommon at the time for scholastics to manipulate their sources along these lines to achieve ends of their own.[[869]](#footnote-868) The real source for the view that the agent intellect belongs to the human being alone, in his view, is the distinctly Latin conviction that the soul is a form and *hoc aliquid* that is distinct from the body.

As a *hoc aliquid*, or substance in its own right, the soul needed to have what all substances have, namely, matter and form. These are constituted by the agent and possible intellects, which thus belong to the soul itself.[[870]](#footnote-869) This position, which was commonly held at the early University of Paris, had enough of a foundation in Aristotle and even Avicenna in Bazán’s view that no appeal to Averroes was needed.[[871]](#footnote-870) As a matter of fact, Bazán sees the idea that the soul is its own agent intellect as an eclectic interpretation of Avicenna, which represents a unique invention of early Latin scholasticism.[[872]](#footnote-871)

Although Bazán acknowledges that some references to Averroes can be found in texts from this period, including the *Tractatus* of John of La Rochelle, he insists that the use of Averroes was merely a tactical move. By making a reference, however brief, to the most important interpretive tool of Aristotle available, early scholastics paid lip service to a new source they may not have understood entirely by associating with him a view they perhaps took to be Aristotle’s own. In Bazán’s view, there is no legitimacy therefore to the idea of ‘First Averroism’.[[873]](#footnote-872)

‘First Averroism’ Reconsidered: Anonymous Gauthier, Callus, and Philip the Chancellor

When Salman originally wrote his articles on First Averroism, he postulated that there must have been some sort of intermediary between Averroes, on the one hand, and Philip the Chancellor and John of La Rochelle, on the other, which could explain how they came by the distinction between the corruptible (formal/material) and incorruptible (agent and possible) intellects. At the time, however, he did not know what that source was.[[874]](#footnote-873) The answer only came later with the publication of Anonymous Gauthier and Anonymous Callus. The latter particularly is clearly the source for the way that both John and Philip think about the distinction of intellectual powers.

Although John quotes the Callus text explicitly, the key doctrines he extracts from it actually originated in Anonymous Gauthier, which was the earlier of the two texts, although it was edited only after Callus’ edition appeared. The main differences between the two texts can be explained by the fact that Callus’ was clearly written by a theologian, while Gauthier’s was the work of a master of the arts. This would also explain why John, a theologian, quotes Anonymous Callus rather than Anonymous Gauthier. Although Gauthier himself acknowledges that there is no explicit reference to Averroes in his text, he follows Salman in arguing for an Averroist influence, which he sees as nowhere more evident than in the three-fold schema of material (corruptible) and possible/agent (incorruptible) intellect, which his text was the first known source to present, as follows:

The rational soul has two parts: one that is inseparable from the body and another that is separable from it. The inseparable part is called rationality, by which the human is called rational. And this is also called the material intellect, which Aristotle described as passible and corruptible. This power is a medium between the sensible power and the separable intellect; for the sensible power concerns phantasms, but the separable intellect concerns species; thus the material intellect considers species in phantasms, so that it apprehends the species with accidents and distinguishes between the species and accidents, nevertheless not abstracting them but preparing the species ‘as matter’ for the separable intellect.[[875]](#footnote-874)

The further description of the separable intellect, which Anonymous Gauthier insists includes the agent and possible intellects, sounds very similar to what we have found in John of La Rochelle. The possible intellect ‘is a blank slate which has no pictures and not even a greater aptitude to [receive] one rather than another, though it is capable of receiving any of them.’[[876]](#footnote-875) As he elaborates:

The relation of the agent to the possible intellect is like that of light to vision. As the light ensures that the species of color ‘jump’ from a colored [object] to the eye, so the agent intellect abstracts species from phantasms, which the material intellect has prepared for it, and makes them in a certain way to appear subsequently in the possible intellect. Thus the act of the agent intellect is twofold: one is to abstract species from phantasms and the other is to ordain abstracted species in the possible intellect.[[877]](#footnote-876)

In this connection, Anonymous Gauthier insists that the separable intellect belongs to the human soul, and states explicitly that Avicenna had erred in denying this. In Gauthier’s opinion, this reinforces Salman’s claims about a ‘First Averroism’, which identifies Averroes as the source of the notion that the intellect is part of the soul rather than separate from it.[[878]](#footnote-877) According to Gauthier, his anonymous text, written around 1225, was the first Latin work to advocate this opinion, which required him to posit 1225 rather than 1230 as the date of Averroes’ introduction in Paris.[[879]](#footnote-878) Following Salman, he names William of Auvergne, Adam of Buckfield, Roger Bacon, and Albert the Great, among those who associate this position with Averroes, either in order to reject it or to accept it.[[880]](#footnote-879) As he illustrates, William of Auvergne clearly thinks Averroes holds that the agent intellect belongs to the soul, and he rejects that view in favour of the more Avicennian idea that God is the Agent Intellect.[[881]](#footnote-880)

Interestingly, Daniel Callus, the editor of a text similar to Gauthier’s, comes to the opposite conclusion about the influence of Averroes. To Gauthier’s dismay, he denied that there is any evidence of this influence.[[882]](#footnote-881) While Callus himself suggested a date of 1220-30 for his text, Gauthier believed it was written between 1228-32, because it possibly exhibits the influence of Alexander of Hales’ treatment of the irascible and concupiscible powers in his Gloss on Lombard’s *Sentences*, which was completed between 1222-27.[[883]](#footnote-882) Following the Gauthier text, Anonymous Callus elaborates the division between the passible-corruptible and impassible-incorruptible intellect that Philip and John attributed to Averroes:

Let us speak first of the first power in the order of the rational soul, namely, the material intellect, which is described in the *De anima* as passive and corruptible. This receives the intelligible species in phantasms. This power is necessary so that the separable intellect can understand intelligible species abstracted from matter. However, this power never pertains to the rational soul except insofar as it is joined to the body. This [power] is nevertheless called rationality or reason because it is able to receive universals in particulars, but not universals through the mode of universals nor particulars through the mode of particulars. This therefore is the power that is inseparable from the body, namely, the passible intellect, which receives species abstracted from the body.[[884]](#footnote-883)

After describing the work of the material intellect, Anonymous Callus like Anonymous Gauthier states that ‘there is an intellect, which is separable from the body, which is of two different types: the agent and the possible intellect. The agent intellect is related to the possible as light is to vision. There is however a difference in that light is separate from the substance of vision, but the agent intellect is not separate from the substance of the soul.’[[885]](#footnote-884) Like Anonymous Gauthier, consequently, Anonymous Callus rejects the idea of certain philosophers (‘*quidam philosophorum*’) who said that the agent intellect is a separate substance from the soul.[[886]](#footnote-885) In affirming this, Anonymous Callus insists, as had Anonymous Gauthier, against Avicenna, and before him, Alfarabi, that there is no separate agent intellect which works on behalf of the human mind, which in turn stands only in a relationship of possibility to it.[[887]](#footnote-886) The corollary of the Avicennian view is of course that the possible intellect is all that can be said properly to belong to the human being.[[888]](#footnote-887)

As Anonymous Callus affirms, the only case in which an illumination from above is needed is for the knowledge of the divine essence, which must be understood in a divine mode. The same holds true for angels, which are also above our knowledge, though in a different way from God. When it comes to corporeal things, however, ‘because the intellectual nature is superior to corporeal things and superior to the incorporeal things which are in it, therefore, it does not need an illumination of a separate substance in order to know these things. Rather, the agent intellect, which is an interior light, is sufficient, with the possible intellect.’[[889]](#footnote-888)

As noted already, Philip the Chancellor also distinguishes an intellect that is corruptible from one that is incorruptible; one that is mixed with the body and inseparable from it or unmixed and separable.[[890]](#footnote-889) In the context of explaining the immortality of the soul and how the immaterial object of the intellect renders it eternal, Philip also mentions, albeit in passing, a formal intellect, which was a term used in Anonymous Callus to denote the functions that John ascribes to the material intellect, and which is, like the material intellect, ‘destructible like an accident and part of the body.’[[891]](#footnote-890) More specifically, the formal intellect seems to entail a similarity to the thing considered which is not yet subject to abstraction but makes abstraction possible.[[892]](#footnote-891)

By contrast, the agent and possible intellects constitute the incorruptible intellect.[[893]](#footnote-892) As Philip writes, ‘The agent intellect abstracts species from phantasms, and in abstracting them, it unites them with the possible intellect, which is receptive. Formally speaking, it is called the intellect that receives, and it is therefore properly in the human intellect, which in itself is not however able to understand things.’[[894]](#footnote-893) Although Philip’s account of these intellects is too brief to provide much basis for analysis, it clearly supports the claims that have been made regarding the likely influence of the anonymous texts upon him, and his influence upon John, which is documented by Lottin in other areas as well. With these sources in mind, it is time to revisit the writing of John of La Rochelle on the intellectual powers, this time in the SDA.

John of La Rochelle on the Intellectual Powers

The intellectual powers in question consist of the passive or corruptible intellect which John claims that Aristotle calls the material intellect, on the one hand, and the incorruptible and separable intellect, on the other.[[895]](#footnote-894) According to John, the material intellect is the inferior part of the intellect, which is conjoined to the senses and receives intelligible species in phantasms. As such, it is part of the rational soul only insofar as it is joined to the body. In turn, this intellect offers in a material form the intelligible species that needs to be abstracted by the separable intellect. It is situated in the middle, rational, part of the brain, because it is able to cognize the forms of things, albeit as particulars and not as universals.

Though John is clearly influenced by the author of Anonymous Callus—not to mention Gauthier—in his description of the material intellect, Daniel Callus stresses that his author does not, like John, claim that Aristotle actually spoke of a material intellect. Rather, like Gauthier, he makes the more modest claim that the material intellect is that faculty which Aristotle had described in terms of the ‘passive and corruptible’ intellect in *De anima*.[[896]](#footnote-895) As we have seen, Alexander of Aphrodisias was the first to speak of the material intellect, which is not mentioned by Aristotle himself.

While this intellect as John conceives of it remains inseparable from the body and thus ‘corruptible’, the possible and agent intellects are separable from the body and thus incorruptible. As John elaborates, the possible intellect is like a slate that is void of all forms or pictures, but which is susceptible to all of them.[[897]](#footnote-896) That is to say, it is capable of receiving all intelligible forms or species but not of making them intelligible. The agent intellect, by contrast, is like the intelligible light of the first truth which is impressed on us by nature, always acting as a light, and thereby making manifest the intelligible species of things that are presented to it by the possible intellect, thus ‘perfecting’ the possible intellect.

In delineating this three-fold schema of the intellect, John clearly follows a trend which already runs through Anonymous Gauthier, Anonymous Callus, and the Chancellor, who also adhere to the corruptible/incorruptible intellect distinction. The question that remains concerns which of the main philosophical sources available at the time—Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, and Averroes—was most influential in constructing the cognitive scheme they seem to share in common. According to Callus, the identification of Aristotle’s ‘*intellectus passibilis et corruptibilis*’ with the material intellect ‘might perhaps have originated from a superficial understanding of the opening words of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *De intellectu et intellectu*,’[[898]](#footnote-897) the first line of which distinguishes between the material intellect, the intellect *in habitu*, and the agent intellect.[[899]](#footnote-898)

However, this explanation breaks down if we try to relate the functions of Alexander’s three intellects to those described by John and his predecessors, for there is no correlation between them. Alexander’s material intellect and intellect *in habitu* perform a function more closely aligned to John’s understanding of the possible intellect. This for John is separable from the body and not intrinsically united to it as it is for Alexander. As we have ruled out Aristotle implicitly, since he does not mention the material intellect or indeed any ‘intellect’ in the strictly hypostasized sense, another remaining candidate is Averroes. He presented a three-fold schema of a corruptible power that is not separable from the body (cogitation) and a two-fold intellect (material and agent) that is not corruptible but is separable and indeed separate from the body.[[900]](#footnote-899)

The functions these powers perform certainly seem to correlate more closely to those that John and his colleagues described. The problem that Gauthier himself noted, however, is that the terminology that John used to describe the intellects does not match that of Averroes. John’s material intellect designates something like Averroes’ cogitation, not the possible intellect to which it refers in Averroes.[[901]](#footnote-900) Despite the problem around vocabulary, Gauthier insists that the correlation in the concepts of cogitation in Averroes and material intellect in John is enough of an argument in favour of Averroes’ influence. His view is that the originator of the Latin three-fold schema, the author of Anonymous Gauthier, deliberately chose to change the terminology, for unknown reasons.

On this basis, Gauthier goes so far as to say that his text and those that came in its wake are an indicator that Avicenna was being replaced by Averroes as a leading source for Latin thinkers in this period.[[902]](#footnote-901) This hypothesis loses plausibility, however, when we consider that neither Anonymous Gauthier nor Anonymous Callus explicitly cites Averroes, as the editors of both texts acknowledge. That does not necessarily indicate that the authors had no knowledge of Averroes or were not influenced by him. The Arab philosopher’s ideas certainly could have circulated in the Parisian milieu before his works were supposedly introduced at Paris in 1230. In that sense, the 1225 date proposed by Gauthier could be more accurate.

Still, we do not have hard evidence for any of this. In the absence of such evidence, I am inclined to be cautious about positing an early Averroist reception. As Wicki and Callus have noted with respect to Philip the Chancellor and Anonymous Callus, respectively, the three-fold schema could have been cobbled together in an eclectic way from existing sources, not least Avicenna.[[903]](#footnote-902) This theory makes particular sense in the case of John of La Rochelle, whose *Tractatus* and SDA epitomized the height of Avicenna’s reception, which continued, as the next chapter will show, in an altered form as Aristotle came to the fore in the 1240s.

The influence of Avicenna in John’s rendering of the three-fold schema might be difficult to discern at first glance, but it comes into relief when we consider that the material intellect which is the first of Avicenna’s four stages of potential in the intellect does indeed equate nicely with John’s understanding of the material intellect as the one that makes available the sense form needed by the possible intellect for abstraction, without yet realizing any potential in this regard.[[904]](#footnote-903) Although it is described here as part of the possible intellect proper, we have learned that the material intellect so construed is effectively the name for estimation and imagination when they are operative in humans. These are the Avicennian internal senses that produce intentions of sense objects for the purpose of abstraction. Thus, the material intellect is intricately connected with the body in just the way John describes.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Tri-Partite Intellect** | **Avicenna’s Four Intellects** |
| Inseparable from the body | Material Intellect | Material Intellect  (imagination + estimation) |
| Separable Intellect | Possible Intellect | *Intellect in habitu*  *Intellect in effectu* |
| Separable Intellect | Active Intellect | Active Intellect |

As for the ‘separable and incorruptible’ intellect, Bazán has rightly noted that there was sufficient momentum in the indigenous Latin tradition for describing this as a possession of the soul itself and not an external force such as Avicenna envisaged. On his view, this impetus came from the belief that the soul is both a form of the body and a *hoc aliquid* or substance in its own right within the human person, a view that I have discussed at length in chapter four of this book. Likewise, the language of possible and agent intellects was already in the tradition, for instance in the Arabo-Latin translation of Aristotle and in Avicenna.

Although early scholastics often used sources without naming them, the scarcity of references to Averroes in the period when the anonymous texts, at least, were written lends credence to the idea that the cognitive schema they present was not the result of his influence but an invention of the Latin tradition working if anything under the influence of Avicenna.[[905]](#footnote-904) This can be argued notwithstanding the fact that Philip the Chancellor and John of La Rochelle identified synergy between the three-fold schema of the anonymous texts and Averroes’ distinction between the corruptible/incorruptible intellect, which they presumably encountered for the first time when his works were introduced around 1230. For they may have aligned the two schemes retrospectively, to add rhetorical force or authority to opinions that already existed in the tradition inherited through Anonymous Gauthier and Callus.

As we have learned from Bazán, the medieval scholars who supposedly advocated ‘First Averroism’ in Salman’s sense did something similar to this, identifying proof texts in Averroes for a view he did not actually hold, namely, that the agent intellect belongs to the soul and is not a separate substance. This practice of attributing views to authorities which they did not actually hold was common amongst early scholastics including Franciscans, who sought to bolster their own arguments, or in this case, to create a contrast with the view of the otherwise popular Avicenna. The theory that John and Philip employed such a tactic is strengthened by the fact that they quote only one and the same passage from Averroes, which suggests they had not fully engaged with the commentator’s writings and possibly inherited their single proof text on the corruptible/incorruptible intellect through another source.

As noted already, this passage does not even mention the material-possible-agent intellect distinction, which casts further doubt on the notion that Averroes directly inspired Philip and John. At the same time, it lends additional support to the conclusion that they simply invoked Averroes’ reference to the ‘corruptible/incorruptible’ intellect retrospectively to legitimize a view that had already developed in their own indigenous tradition, under the influence of Avicenna and others. This conclusion also makes the most sense of the fact that Rochelle and his contemporaries do not mention the ideas for which Averroes would later become infamous, such as that there is one possible intellect for all. In the next generation, and between 1270 and 1277 especially, the question of the unicity of the possible intellect would become a major topic of debate, with figures like Aquinas and Bonaventure seeking to refute colleagues in the arts faculty, like Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who advocated it.[[906]](#footnote-905) Before Aristotle’s works themselves came into the spotlight, and thus before the 1250/60s, however, the work of John of La Rochelle among others suggests that there was not much of a basis for robust and informed engagement with his commentator, Averroes.

**8. Cognitive Powers: *The Summa Halensis***

The section of the *Summa Halensis* on the rational soul (*De anima* rationali) follows closely the structure of the discussion in the *Summa de anima*,as the table below illustrates.[[907]](#footnote-906) The only components it lacks include a discussion of the immortality and passibility of the soul, as well as the separated soul. These issues—especially passibility—are however treated to some extent in a section that was later added to the Summa, between 1255-56, entitled *De coniuncto*. Where John was a careful and reasonably faithful reader of texts, however, the redactor of the DAR, while drawing on the SDA, takes considerable creative license with his material. Interestingly, however, the resulting views on cognition are not really significantly different from John’s originals. Still, the way they are attributed to authorities involves a great deal of mental gymnastics that results in an almost comedic attempt to integrate the perspectives of the three authorities—pseudo-Augustine, Damascus, and ‘the Philosopher’, and in some cases to make them agree with one another.

This attempt at synchronization is undertaken in two contexts, namely, in dealing with the sense and then the intellectual powers. The Summa’s study of the sense powers focuses first on how they are described by pseudo-Augustine, and then by Damascus and Avicenna, who is named explicitly here as the Philosopher. In elaborating the Summa’s explanation and comparison of these schemes, we will see how its author tries to justify the argument that the sense knowledge schemes of both Damascus and Avicenna can be placed under Augustine’s category of the imagination. In the context of dealing with the intellectual powers, the Summa starts with a comparison between four different schemata: one from pseudo-Augustine, one from the Philosopher, whom the editors identify with Aristotle, though the Summist only calls him ‘the Philosopher’, another one from pseudo-Augustine, and two from Damascus.

Each of these schemes is treated relatively succinctly: the coverage of Augustine totals only around 2.5 pages; the Philosopher, 5; and Damascus, 2.5. The comparison of all four schemes that appears at the outset runs over 3 pages. My discussion of these schemes below will take the comparison as its foundation, integrating the relatively brief and largely repetitive material on the schemes of Damascus and Augustine into this discussion before moving on to examine more closely the scheme attributed to the Philosopher, which is dealt with in the most depth by the Summa. What we will find through this analysis, as noted already, is that the redactor of DAR does not radically change the view of the intellect that was endorsed by John of La Rochelle. However, he tries to eliminate any trace of Avicenna from the understanding of the Philosopher’s views on the intellect, perhaps in order to suggest that he associates the Philosopher more with Aristotle in this instance instead.

In order to do this, he removes Avicenna’s signature doctrine of the ‘four intellects,’ among other things, from the discussion of the Philosopher. However, he betrays his Avicennian leanings when he re-introduces this doctrine by conflating it with the second cognitive scheme presented by John of Damascus. Pseudo-Augustine’s first division, we will see, takes priority over both of these as a wider framework for thinking about knowledge into which the other schemes can be integrated. Through such machinations, we discover the great lengths to which the Summist will go to bring Avicenna into the Latin tradition. More than in the two previous texts by John, we come to appreciate the respects in which pseudo-Augustine and the Damascene serve primarily as foils for this purpose. Their own views on how the powers of the soul operate—somewhat loosely defined in any event—are eclipsed by the Avicennian views that are attributed to them—and also now to Aristotle, in the context of his increased popularity in the 1240s. We have entered the phase Amos Bertolucci describes as characterised by the reading of Aristotle (and Augustine, and the Damascene) with Avicenna, who is the dominant authority in all these cases.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| SDA | DAR |
| Whether there is a soul | Whether there is a soul |
| What is the soul | What is the soul |
| The causes of the soul | The causes of the soul |
| The properties of the soul (image of God is treated in a separate section) | The properties of the soul (including image of God) |
| Soul related to body | Soul related to body |
| Immortality of the soul | ---[[908]](#footnote-907) |
| Passibility of the soul | ---[[909]](#footnote-908) |
| Location of the soul | Under properties |
| Separated soul | ---[[910]](#footnote-909) |
| Identity of soul with its powers | Identity of soul with its powers |
| Division of Augustine | Division of Aristotle |
| Division of Damascus | Division of Augustine |
| Division of Avicenna | Division of Damascus |

The Senses

As the Summa notes, the DSEA 4 and 11 distinguish five cognitive faculties—sense, imagination, *ratio*, *intellectus*,and *intelligentia*. Two of these, namely, sense and imagination, pertain to what is described as the sensitive part of the soul.[[911]](#footnote-910) The former involves the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, which correspond to the five sense organs, namely, the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and skin, respectively.[[912]](#footnote-911) As the Summa summarizes, ‘the sense concerns sensible forms in the presence of matter; the imagination concerns sensible forms absent matter; reason concerns intelligible forms found in sensible things; memory is the cognition of past things, such as what has been sensed or comprehended by reason; intellect deals with forms that are intelligible, created, and separate from sensible things, and intelligence concerns the divine.’[[913]](#footnote-912)

According to John of Damascus, there are three facets of the sensitive soul, namely, the imaginative, excogitative, and memorative.[[914]](#footnote-913) The imaginative is located in the front of the brain and captures images of sense objects apart from matter; the memory is based in the back of the brain and retains those images; the excogitative is in the middle and composes and divides different features of imaged objects.[[915]](#footnote-914) According to Avicenna, there are five of what he describes as internal senses, namely, the common sense, fantasy or imagination, excogitative or imaginative, estimative, and memory.[[916]](#footnote-915) The first question the Summa pursues in this context is whether Damascus’ scheme pertains only to the sensitive or also to rational part of the soul.[[917]](#footnote-916) The conclusion reached is that in animals, it pertains only to the sensitive part of the soul, but in those ruled by the power of reason, the three powers he names contribute to the work of reason.

In a remarkable conceptual move, the Summa then argues that Damascus’ three powers basically perform the functions described by Avicenna in delineating his five internal senses.[[918]](#footnote-917) Like Avicenna’s, Damascus’ imagination performs an apprehending function, as does the common sense. His excogitative faculty seemingly performs the functions that could be attributed to the imaginative or excogitative faculty and estimation; while his memory performs the work that is assigned to imagination and the sense memory.[[919]](#footnote-918)

**Damascene’s categories Avicenna’s categories**

Imaginative (front of brain) Common sense

Imagination

Excogitative (middle of brain) Imaginative/excogitative

Estimation

Memorative (back of brain) Sense memory

This conclusion leads to the more general question whether Avicenna’s five-fold and Damascus’ three-fold account of the internal senses can both be contained under pseudo-Augustine’s category of imagination. Since all interior powers of the sensitive cognition deal with sensible forms absent matter, the Summa concludes that they can indeed be reduced to this faculty.[[920]](#footnote-919) Obviously, there are more specific ways to define the work of the imagination than Augustine employs, as we have seen in discussing Avicenna. In the broad sense of the term, however, the Summist believes that all the sensitive powers or internal senses described by both Damascus and Avicenna can be considered as aspects or functions of the imagination.

In a further turn of the argument, the Summa contends that the organ that achieves all of the work that is associated with imagination is precisely Avicenna’s category of estimation.[[921]](#footnote-920) This is the faculty in Avicenna which produces the final product of a whole process of internal sensation—the so-called intention, which represents a sensible form absent matter, qua particular, together with certain ‘connotational attributes’, which signify its helpful or harmful nature.[[922]](#footnote-921) In the final analysis, there is a summary of Avicenna’s account of the interior senses as follows:

Sensible forms are either apprehended or preserved or transformed or united absent matter. The act of apprehending is attributed to the common sense; preserving to the imagination or fantasy, while transforming or uniting forms absent matter pertains to the imaginative faculty. If we speak of intentions, like good or evil, or what is helpful or harmful, as a sheep nearing either a lamb or a wolf, there is either apprehending or preserving. If there is apprehending, this is called estimation, if preserving, memory. In the distinction of Avicenna, the common sense is in the front of the brain, imagination in the same part, imaginative or cogitative in the middle, likewise estimation, and the memory in the back of the brain.[[923]](#footnote-922)

Intellectual Cognition

The first task the Summa undertakes in the context of treating the rational soul is to offer an explanation and comparison of the different divisions of the cognitive part of the soul that will be its focus. In the order they are presented, these schemes include an initial one derived from the pseudo-Augustinian DSEA4 and 11, which divides cognition into reason (*ratio*), intellect (*intellectus*), and intelligence (*intelligentia*)*.* A second scheme attributed to the Philosopher, who at this stage is unnamed, separates the cognitive part of the soul into the material intellect, which knows a species in phantasms, and the possible intellect, which knows abstracted species, after they are generated by the agent intellect. A third, attributed to Augustine’s DSEA 11, distinguishes between ingenuity (*ingenium*), memory (*memoriam*), reason (*rationem*), and intelligence (*intelligentiam*).[[924]](#footnote-923) Ingenuity discriminates between truth and falsity and thus searches for the knowledge of something unknown; reason makes a judgment based on the intelligible forms found in sensible things; intelligence produces an intelligible form separate from the senses; and this is stored in the memory.[[925]](#footnote-924)

Finally, the scheme associated with the DFO of John of Damascus is divided according to intellect, mind, and opinion, which are the faculties he enumerates beyond sense and imagination, discussed above. Thus, John says that ‘through the senses of the soul is constituted a passion which is called an imagination, from imagination, opinion, then [comes] mind which adjudicates about opinions, whether they are true and false, while choosing the true. In summary, mind refers to the process of measuring and thinking and judging, but what is judged and determined as true is rightly called intellect.’[[926]](#footnote-925)

The first scheme mentioned in the context of discussing the cognitive powers is Augustine’s division between reason, intellect, and intelligence.[[927]](#footnote-926) These powers correspond to different intelligible objects that are either below, next to, or above the self.[[928]](#footnote-927) Reason knows corporeal natures: those things that are below reason or included in it, such as the self and the soul’s own powers and knowledge.[[929]](#footnote-928) Following John of La Rochelle, the Summa insists that a separate agent intellect is not needed to know such things because the mind has the power to know them of its own accord.[[930]](#footnote-929) In order to know things that are next to and above the self, namely, angels and God, by contrast, the soul does need assistance from angels and God, respectively. These are the proper objects of the intellect and intelligence, respectively, the second of which unites the mind to God. Whereas the act of the intellect comes after the act of reason and before the act of intelligence in this scheme, we have seen that Damascus by contrast places the act of the mind after opinion and before the intellect.[[931]](#footnote-930) For him, the mind adjudicates about opinions, and on this basis, the intellect attains the truth.

Another key difference between the two schemes is this: Augustine’s distinctions are according to different intelligible forms which lack complexion.[[932]](#footnote-931) However, the division of John of Damascus presupposes complexion. Although John does not state precisely what he means by ‘complexion’ in this context, it surely differs from the kind discussed in the medical context, which pertains to the temperament resulting from the composition of the four humours in a given person. The complexion referred to here presupposes instead a distinction medieval thinkers drew between simple and complex cognition, which itself was inspired by Aristotle.[[933]](#footnote-932) In simple cognition, the mind cognizes a single object, for instance, one of the abstract types of form referred to in Augustine’s *ratio, intellectus, intelligentia* distinction.

Particularly in the case of *ratio,* which involves knowledge of natural forms—not angels or God—this simple cognition, at least when it is true, entails the correspondence between the human knowledge of a form and the way it exists in the mind of God or a divine idea.[[934]](#footnote-933) In complex cognition, by contrast, the mind combines or relates two or more such forms to one another, in a way that can be conveyed through propositions such as ‘Peter is a man.’[[935]](#footnote-934) As Marrone notes, such propositions were particularly interesting to Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics,* which was starting to be used at the time of the Summa’s authorship.[[936]](#footnote-935) There Aristotle explains the process—called demonstration—through which it is possible to obtain certain knowledge about the nature of a thing on the basis of something else that is already known to be true. If we know ‘Peter is a man,’ for instance, and that ‘man is a rational animal,’ then we can conclude that ‘Peter is a rational animal.’ We can also conclude that it is false to say that ‘Peter is a cat.’ This indeed is what it means to distinguish between truth and falsity while moving from something unknown to something known, namely, to engage in a process like demonstration.[[937]](#footnote-936) Whether the Damascene had this process in mind when he distinguished between opinion, mind, and intellect is open to question. However the Summist takes advantage of the open-ended nature of his categories to define them on his own terms.

The next comparison the Summist draws is between the division of the philosopher, in this case, Aristotle, on the one hand, and Augustine, on the other, both of whom present schemes for attaining simple rather than complex knowledge.[[938]](#footnote-937) As we have seen, the three differences posited by Augustine are distinguished according to intelligible differences in forms of greater or lesser nobility.[[939]](#footnote-938) The uncreated intelligible or God is more noble than the created intelligible, and an intelligible being that is created separately from corporeal forms, that is, an angel, is more noble than the one that subsists in a corporeal form. However, the different categories posited by the philosopher pertain to different degrees in the act of abstraction. These include the material intellect, which is the power which possesses the particular form on the basis of which abstraction is performed; a power that presents that form for scrutiny in abstraction, or the possible intellect; and a power that comprehends abstract forms, to wit, the agent intellect.[[940]](#footnote-939) In summary, the Summa states, the differences posited by the philosopher relate to forms that can be abstracted, but those of Augustine pertain to forms that are abstracted already, as well as others which cannot strictly speaking be abstracted by the mind, such as angels and God. In that sense, the divisions cannot be conflated.[[941]](#footnote-940)

Following this discussion, the Summa undertakes a comparison between the division of the philosopher and that of Damascus. These two thinkers have the idea of intellect in common, but the commonality ends there, because the philosopher is concerned with intelligible forms that are considered without complexion, but the intellect of Damascus grasps intelligible forms with complexion.[[942]](#footnote-941) As noted above, the latter involves distinguishing between truth and falsity, moving from something unknown to something known, but the former involves simple knowledge of a thing in itself. That is why the Summist states that simple knowledge pertains to what is necessary and complex to what is contingent.

After this, the Summist compares the first division of Augustine to the second one proposed by the same, namely, between ingenuity, reason, memory, and intelligence.[[943]](#footnote-942) This division is concerned with the stages involved in the act of knowing in the one that has the power to know.[[944]](#footnote-943) First there is an inquiry after the truth (*ingenium*), second, adjudication concerning it (*ratio*), third, preserving a judgment (*memoria*), and fourthly, a full comprehension of what is preserved (*intelligentia*). As the Summist notes, this scheme contains two members of Augustine’s first division, namely, reason and intelligence, but lacks a reference to the intellect. Furthermore, it posits a retentive power, namely, memory, which was not listed in the first division. Likewise, ingenuity was not part of the first division.

In this connection, the Summist notes that for Augustine reason and ingenuity are basically the same power and differ mainly in terms of the phase they represent in the process of deliberation: searching for it versus achieving it.[[945]](#footnote-944) As the Summist elaborates, the former discerns between truth and falsity and other attributes of a thing, and seeks to move from what is unknown to something known. This scheme therefore involves complexion, like the aforementioned scheme of Damascus—at least in the view of the Summist. On the basis of ingenuity’s operations, reason makes a discovery or draws a conclusion about a particular sense form which is then transformed by intelligence into an intelligible form that is stored in the memory.[[946]](#footnote-945)

Here, however, intelligence clearly means something different than it does in the first scheme of Augustine. For it refers now to a complex truth, and in the first division, it concerns the non-complex and highest truth that is God. As the Summa therefore concludes, intelligence can sometimes be defined in the context of relating or distinguishing two entities, or with complexion. Alternatively, it can be understood as the cognitive power to know all intelligible forms without complexion or as standalone entities, and thus the Philosopher says that ‘all indivisible things are intelligible.’[[947]](#footnote-946) In another sense, intelligence can involve the cognitive power of receiving intelligible forms concerning what is uncreated and highest, as in Augustine’s first division.

John of Damascus speaks of intelligence in yet another sense in a second division he posits between intelligence, intention, excogitation, and phronesis. Intelligence is the intellectual power’s act of grasping something; intention is actual intelligence about or understanding of something; excogitation is the preliminary movement of reason to gain understanding; and phronesis is the consequent movement of reason to draw a conclusion about what is to be understood.[[948]](#footnote-947) According to the Summist, these four acts are precisely the ones performed by the possible intellect of the Philosopher. More specifically, the Summa later claims in the section on Damascus that they correspond to the four intellects of Avicenna, which represent four grades of potentiality with respect to obtaining knowledge.[[949]](#footnote-948)

These are listed as follows: the possible (material) intellect, intellect *in effectu*, *in habitu* and *intellectus adeptus*.[[950]](#footnote-949) The first, material intellect does not yet obtain intelligible forms but has the potential to acquire the disposition to do so (intelligence); the second is the intellect *in effectu* or *formatus* which is a disposition to receive forms (*intentio*); the intellect *in habitu* invokes previously-attained understanding when it wills (excogitation), and the fourth is the *intellectus adeptus*, which brings knowledge into act (*phronesis*).[[951]](#footnote-950) As the Summist posits, *phronesis*, ‘is seen to be nothing other than the *intellectus adeptus*;’[[952]](#footnote-951) excogitation is *intellectus in habitu, intentio* is *intellectus in effectu*, and intelligence is the material intellect, here defined as the first stage of the possible intellect.

In summarizing these comparisons, the Summa states that there are some distinctions to be drawn between cognitive powers which concern intelligible forms or truth without complexion, and those with complexion.[[953]](#footnote-952) Augustine’s first division and that of the philosopher fall into the former category. However, they differ in that Augustine concerns himself with different kinds of simple intelligible forms, while the Philosopher is concerned with the different stages or modes of seeking to know the intelligible forms which come to the intellect through abstraction from sensible phantasms.[[954]](#footnote-953) Another way of putting this is to say that Augustine is interested in the products of simple cognition—forms that are abstract in one way or another—while Aristotle is concerned with the process of simple cognition, or the means by which forms are abstracted.[[955]](#footnote-954)

In that sense, the Summa affirms, the philosopher is principally concerned with what could be described as Augustine’s *ratio*, rather than his intellect and intelligence. For while the latter two pertain to uncreated and created spirits, namely, angels and God, reason concerns those forms which are separated from the conditions of the body or sensible conditions. Similarly, Aristotle’s three intellects—material, possible, and agent—pertain to those intelligible forms that can be abstracted from sensible conditions. For instance, the material intellect knows intelligible forms in phantasms, while the possible intellect enables those forms to be abstracted from phantasms. The only sense in which the intellect of Augustine might overlap with Aristotle’s scheme concerns the agent intellect, which not only performs the act of abstraction but also ultimately possesses knowledge of the forms that are entirely abstracted or separate from matter.[[956]](#footnote-955) This second function of the agent intellect is one that can be likened to Augustine’s intellect.

A further comparison is drawn between Aristotle and Damascus. According to the Summa, their schemes have nothing in common because Damascus considers forms with complexion, and the Philosopher assesses forms without it.[[957]](#footnote-956) The former approach of Damascus—which is also implicit in Augustine’s second division—generates what the Summa calls imperfect cognition.[[958]](#footnote-957) The imperfection derives from the admixture of truth and falsity, which it falls to the mind to discern between as it moves from unknown to known, presumably in the course of undertaking demonstration in the Aristotelian sense. In describing this work, Damascus’ scheme generates its only point of contact with Aristotle’s, insofar as the possible intellect, like the mind, moves from unknowing to knowing a specific form.[[959]](#footnote-958) When certainly attaches to this judgment, what Damascus calls the intellect is achieved.[[960]](#footnote-959)

As this suggests, there is a difference between the way Augustine and Damascus understand the intellect. For Augustine, this is the power of knowing creaturely forms that are separated from matter and lack complexion, but for Damascus, it involves knowing a complex truth on the basis of a prior judgment of the mind. Likewise, the way the two thinkers understand mind is different. Whereas mind in Damascus is a faculty that discerns truth from falsity, Augustine understands mind in terms of intelligence, which is the supreme power that extends itself to the contemplation of God. Neither is Damascus’ ‘opinion’ the same as *ratio*, because for Augustine, reason is the power that attains the forms abstracted from the body and corporeal accidents, but for the Damascene, opinions are those entities which are related to one another in a complex cognition, the veracity of which the mind must adjudicate. That said, we have seen that the philosopher does speak obliquely of reason in Augustine’s sense when he talks about his three intellects, and especially the material one.

The reason that Augustine’s reason, intellect, and intelligence triad is treated before all the others pertains to the Summist’s belief that divisions which have to do with intelligible forms without complexion are prior to the others.[[961]](#footnote-960) In this regard, moreover, Augustine’s first division is prior to Aristotle’s for the reason already mentioned, namely, that it attends to the intelligible forms that the philosopher’s division seeks. For Augustine, these forms come from a superior part through illumination; this is true in the sense that angels and God must deliver knowledge of themselves, respectively, and furthermore, insofar as the innate light of the first truth is needed as a means to grasping any particular truth inferior or equal to the self. While the forms of which Augustine speaks are a product of innate cognition, those that interest Aristotle are acquired through abstraction and thus come second in an order of priority.[[962]](#footnote-961)

In the discussion above, I have tried to follow the lines of the Summa’s account fairly closely. These lines are certainly rather meandering and sometimes even a bit convoluted. However, we can take a few points from what we have learned. First of all, Augustine’s initial scheme provides a basic framework which renders it prior to the others in that it establishes the three kinds of forms human beings might seek to know—not only natural forms but also angels and God. The Philosopher’s scheme can be inserted into this one because it also pertains to different stages of knowing forms without complexion, although it only seeks knowledge of natural forms. The second scheme of Damascus supposedly elaborates the four grades of potentiality with respect to obtaining knowledge, which were already described by Avicenna’s doctrine of the four aspects of the possible intellect. The aforementioned schemes consider forms without complexion. For this reason, they are described as perfect kinds of cognition.

By contrast, Augustine’s second and Damascus’ first scheme deal with imperfect forms of cognition insofar as they deal with acts of cognition with complexion, which involve discerning truth and falsity or moving from what is unknown to what is known. This at least is what the Summist would like his readers to believe, for the sake of his argument; whether the texts of Pseudo-Augustine and Damascus actually support such a reading is open to contention. Although they communicate important intellectual processes, these are secondary in the order of nobility to those that are perfect. Despite the many differences which the Summist has highlighted, consequently, the five schemes discussed all fit within a larger picture of cognition in which each has some role to play. While the Summa does not go so far as in the context of discussing sense knowledge as to say that pseudo-Augustine, Damascus, and Aristotle all basically agree, he does find a way to integrate their accounts in a harmonious way which allows his readers to conclude that they are fundamentally compatible thinkers. Above all, they are compatible with the Avicennian understanding of cognition that he himself wants to convey.

*The Division of Powers in Aristotle*

As noted above, the Philosopher—who is listed as Aristotle in the editor’s heading but not named specifically in the body of the text—is said to present a three-fold distinction between the material, possible, and agent intellects.[[963]](#footnote-962) The material intellect understands species in phantasms. The agent intellect abstracts and understands a species entirely separated from matter and then unites itself with the possible intellect.[[964]](#footnote-963) The possible intellect is a blank slate, capable of understanding all forms abstracted from phantasms but not yet doing so actually, that is, until it receives the form from the agent intellect. While the material intellect is part of the soul that is nonetheless inseparable from the body, through which it obtains phantasms, the possible and agent intellects are part of the ‘separable intellect’ which is a substance or a ‘*hoc aliquid*’[[965]](#footnote-964) over and above the body and can survive without it.

At the outset of its discussion of these three intellects, the Summist acknowledges that the material intellect might not seem to be needed, because there is a sensible power which receives and stores phantasms that have yet to be abstracted and thus provides the material for doing so.[[966]](#footnote-965) In addressing this issue, the Summist states that the material intellect of which the Commentator, Averroes, speaks is different from imagination, in that the latter is not susceptible to the operations of the intellect, as is evidenced by animals.[[967]](#footnote-966) These creatures are only able to know singulars such as ‘this wolf is dangerous’ and not universals such as ‘wolves are dangerous’, but humans are capable of knowing both.

While imagination is common to humans and animals, consequently, it does not anticipate the possibility of species being abstracted by the intellect. By contrast, the material intellect, which possesses species in phantasms, allows for the possibility of those species being abstracted through the agent intellect, when the latter is united with the possible.[[968]](#footnote-967) That is why it is necessary to posit a material intellect, which according to the Philosopher is corruptible precisely because it depends upon a union with the body through which the phantasms are received.

In treating the agent intellect, the author reiterates the Aristotelian principle that nothing can be moved from potency into act unless by something that is in act.[[969]](#footnote-968) If the possible intellect is to realise its potential for knowledge, therefore, it must be led into act by the agent intellect which performs abstraction and thus unites with the possible intellect.[[970]](#footnote-969) In this regard, the Summa insists that we do not need to posit a separate agent intellect outside the substance of the soul. If this existed, then the whole substance of the intellectual soul would entail only the possible intellect, and that is all that would belong to the human being of the separable intellect.[[971]](#footnote-970)

In the view of the Summist, it would be unfitting to say that the intellectual part of the soul is unable to gain understanding of its own accord, as it is more perfect than the vegetative and sensitive powers which are sufficient for knowing in their own ways. As the Summa insists, the soul has a natural light by reason of which it has the ability to know intelligible things, from its beginning or creation, by virtue of the part of itself that is an immaterial substance that is separate in itself, although by virtue of another part it can be conjoined to the body. In fact, it would not be possible to say that the rational soul is an image of God unless it had the perfection of being able to know of its own accord.[[972]](#footnote-971)

Therefore on account of that part, by which the soul which has this perfection of knowing knowable things, according to a certain likeness to the First, it is the agent intellect; when this part encounters intelligible forms in existing phantasms, it abstracts them in order that they may be understood in act; while on account of the part, by which the soul does not yet have those intelligible forms, it is called the possible intellect.[[973]](#footnote-972)

The only exception to this rule, the Summa concedes, concerns things that are next to or above the self, including angels and God, which respectively require an illumination from an angel or from God to be known.[[974]](#footnote-973) In moving on to the possible intellect, the Summa describes its relationship to the agent intellect as follows: while the agent is like the form of the intellect, which performs its proper act, the possible intellect is like its matter, which comprises the potential of the soul with respect to those things which are done in it.[[975]](#footnote-974) As the Summa re-iterates, the possible intellect is a ‘blank slate’ which has no forms in itself but is capable of receiving all forms which are abstracted by the agent intellect. This happens when the agent intellect unites itself to the possible intellect following the act of abstraction.

While the possible and agent intellects are separable from the body and incorruptible, by contrast to the material intellect, which in grasping species in phantasms is necessarily connected with the body and thus corruptible, the product of the possible intellect—a form abstracted from a phantasm—always has a relation to the phantasm from which it is abstracted and thus to the body.[[976]](#footnote-975) Notwithstanding its separation from the body, it is conjoin-able or relatable to the body in the way the agent intellect is not. Thus, it serves as a mediator between the agent intellect and the material intellect which is both conjoin-able to the body and separable from it.[[977]](#footnote-976)

By understanding a species abstracted from a phantasm, consequently, the possible intellect coordinates the knowledge of a species in a phantasm (material intellect) and that of a species entirely separated from matter (agent intellect). In summarizing the relationship between the three intellects, the Summa states the following: ‘the sensible powers prepare the intelligible form so that it is ready to be abstracted, while the agent intellect actually abstracts the form and unites it to the possible intellect. In turn, the possible intellect is completed in receiving the intelligible species abstracted from a phantasm.’[[978]](#footnote-977)

The heading under which the foregoing material is developed is ‘*De divisione Aristoteles*’: the division of Aristotle of the cognitive powers of the soul. However, I have noted that there are no references to the name of Aristotle in the material of this section itself. We only find references to ‘the Philosopher’, a term which had earlier been used to refer to Avicenna in treating his doctrine of internal senses. There are quotations from Aristotle’s texts in this section; however, they do not seem to represent a genuine reading, let alone an attempt to present faithfully, the Greek philosopher’s thought.

For example, there is a reference to an intellect that is corruptible.[[979]](#footnote-978) However, this is used to describe the material intellect which has no place in Aristotle’s thought. As I showed in the previous chapter, Aristotle only referred to a passive and an agent intellect, and even then, he did not do so in strongly hypostatized terms. Still, there is one place where the Summist, like John in the SDA, actually ascribes his three-fold doctrine of the intellect to Aristotle, which simply is not plausible.[[980]](#footnote-979) There are some other Aristotelian references to the idea of deriving species from phantasms;[[981]](#footnote-980) and to the notion that anything possible can only be brought into act by something that is in act.[[982]](#footnote-981) But these are basically truisms, which can be interpreted in different ways, rather than deciding factors for the actual substance of the theory the Summa develops subsequently.

When we compare this account of the intellect with those presented in the *Summa de anima* and the *Tractatus*,the similarities are striking. In all cases, the three-fold scheme of material/possible/agent intellect described in Anonymous Callus is employed. In the SDA, we saw that John inserted Avicenna’s doctrine of the four intellects under the auspices of the possible intellect. This is removed from the discussion of Aristotle or ‘the Philosopher’ in the DAR, perhaps because it is too obviously Avicennian. Yet we have seen that the relevant material is simply relocated to the section on John of Damascus. Likewise, the DAR jettisons the material in the SDA on inductive/syllogistic modes of reasoning which drew its inspiration from Avicenna to explain how the possible intellect comes to receive a form abstracted from a phantasm, perhaps because it is also too obviously non-Aristotelian.

Indeed, the strategy of the Summa as exemplified in such cases is seemingly to relocate or cut material that cannot be in some loose fashion attributed to Aristotle. But the basics of its cognitive theory remain the same. This involves an Avicennian understanding of intellectual cognition, inscribed into a three-fold theory of the intellect which was inherited from Anonymous Callus. The Avicennian nature of the Summist’s theory is reinforced by the fact that Avicenna is explicitly named in treating his doctrine of the five internal senses.

As Hasse and Alpina have shown, the major work of abstraction in Avicenna’s perspective takes place at the level of producing an intention by the internal senses, which means that it is difficult if not impossible to hold explicitly to his theory of internal senses without also presupposing Avicenna’s idea of how the four intellects finish the job of abstraction.[[983]](#footnote-982) This is reinforced by the account of the stages of abstraction in both John and the DAR, which begin with external sensation before moving on to imagination/estimation and finally the work of the intellect. Clearly, the early Franciscans see internal sensation and intellection as a continuous process, which is further confirmed by the use of the term ‘material intellect’ to refer to estimation in humans.

Despite the references to Aristotle in the DAR, therefore, we can conclude on the basis of the text studied here that it is emblematic of a phase that Amos Bertolacci has characterized as one in which Aristotle was commonly read together with or in light of Avicenna. While an earlier generation might have turned to Avicenna in his own right, as we have seen in the work of John of La Rochelle, the Summists and other authors of the 1240s tried to pay lip service to Aristotle even while relying heavily on the Avicennian theories of which they had a better grasp and which they still regarded as a legitimate and indeed privileged means of interpreting the Greek philosopher’s thought.

This is precisely the pattern we find in the transition from the SDA to the DAR. A growing awareness of Aristotle’s importance, perhaps precipitated by the recent introduction of the Averroes commentaries, called for an attempt to engage with him in a more concerted fashion. Although the reading of Averroes may have led to a retrospective attribution to him of the three-fold scheme of material/possible/agent intellect, the limited engagement with Averroes suggests that his work likewise had yet to be fully absorbed. Thus, we find the Summist clinging to the essentials he learned from the reading of John of La Rochelle, and those were in key respects Avicennian. Together with these, however, he draws in components of the DSEA, such as the distinction of what is below, next to, and above the self, such that the Philosopher of which he speaks in this section, while broadly Avicennian on fundamentals, is ultimately an amalgam and a name for no one. The philosophical authority on which the Summist’s account rests in this section ‘*de divisione Aristoteles*’ is one the Summist, following John, has constructed himself: it is based on the theory of John of La Rochelle.

Revisiting Franciscan ‘Augustinianism’

This conclusion calls for reconsidering some strongly held opinions advocated in the scholarly literature on early Franciscan thought, according to which this tradition represents little but an unsophisticated attempt to systematise the tradition of Augustine. In an article devoted to the theory of the agent intellect, for example, Leonard Bowman completely ignores the pseudo-Augustinian and Avicennian sources of this doctrine in John and the DAR, which he implausibly ascribes to Augustine, even though the texts themselves attribute the Franciscan view to Avicenna and to Aristotle, respectively, and even though neither Augustine nor pseudo-Augustine ever spoke of the possible or agent intellects.[[984]](#footnote-983)

Likewise, Margaret Curtin attributes all the pseudo-Augustinian material in the DAR to Augustine himself, even though most of the quotations are obviously not authentic. Furthermore, she shows no awareness of the Avicennian and other philosophical sources for the reading of Aristotle that is given in this context.[[985]](#footnote-984) After offering a summary of the divisions of Augustine, Damascus, and Aristotle in the *Summa Halensis*, moreover, she argues they are not reducible to one another, even though the whole point of this section is to show that they can in fact be integrated.[[986]](#footnote-985)

The German scholars Otto Keicher and Paul Wilpert, who wrote in the early twentieth century, are more sensitive to the influence that Arab thinkers had on the Latin reception of Aristotle, as well as Augustine.[[987]](#footnote-986) In particular, they recognized that Avicenna’s Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism was perceived by early Franciscans as conducive to interpreting both of these ancient philosophical traditions. However, their preliminary and indeed very early observations clearly do not appear to have been taken very much to heart by subsequent generations of scholars working on early Franciscan theories of the intellect.

In this context, the current chapter has sought to challenge the *status quo* and show definitively that, far from a mere reiteration of any Augustinian theory, the Summist weaves a complicated picture in which Avicenna and other important philosophical sources are incorporated into the Christian tradition on the basis of spurious Augustinian texts and a rather implausible reading of John of Damascus not to mention pseudo-Augustine. What it throws into relief, in summary, is that the story of Augustine’s reception in this context is far more complex than it has been made to appear, and that the early Franciscans who supposedly simply rehearsed his old arguments are actually innovative thinkers whose primary debts if any are to Avicenna.

**9. The Motive Powers**

While the cognitive powers we have been discussing so far are ordered towards the knowledge of the truth, the motive powers, as John of La Rochelle understands them, are ordered towards the good. At an initial level, they help to register what is helpful or harmful, good or evil in sensory things and ultimately therefore provide a basis for making choices about how to deal with ordinary circumstances. Whereas the present chapter is concerned with the motive powers—or so-called passions—that perform the former function, the next chapter will be concerned with the latter, and thus the doctrine of free will.

The order in which John presents the motive powers in his two works, the *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima*,mirrors the order in which he presents the cognitive powers. The *Tractatus* first treats the account of the motive powers in the philosophers, especially Avicenna, then Damascus and pseudo-Augustine. Although John in this context only makes reference to Aristotle’s *Ethics* books I-III, which were likely the only sections available to him at the time, he is part of a generation that was dominated by the reception of the Damascene in the field of ethics more than Aristotle, whose ethics became prominent only with Aquinas and his generation. Thus, the SDA focuses on the same authorities as the *Tractatus,* but in the following order: pseudo-Augustine, Damascus, and Avicenna.[[988]](#footnote-987)

What ultimately emerges from the following study of the passions in both texts, as well as in the *Summa Halensis*, however, is that John—with some justification—regards his major authorities as basically compatible in their way of thinking about this topic. Through a synthetic reading of his sources, he not only builds on a pre-existing tradition but also lays the foundation for further scholastic engagement with three main issues related to these powers: the typology of the passions, or the motivated reactions humans have to sense objects, the question whether they are intrinsically sinful, and their relationship to the governing powers of reason and will. These topics are treated in turn below.

Typology of the Passions

In both the *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima*, John draws a fundamental distinction between natural and animal sensible motive powers. The natural ones are non-voluntary and are not therefore subject to the rule of reason. These include the vital power, which causes the heart to beat.[[989]](#footnote-988) By contrast to the natural powers, the animal powers dispose a being to voluntary motion.[[990]](#footnote-989) Following Avicenna—in the *Summa de anima*, and ‘the philosophers’ in the *Tractatus*—John insists that the animal powers turn on fantasy and estimation, because fantasy presents the appetite with an image or sensible form, and estimation attaches to it a notion of whether it is good or evil, which in turn motivates the movement of the body towards or away from an object.[[991]](#footnote-990) This discussion therefore brings John to what Avicenna describes in terms of the irascible and concupisicible powers in *De anima* IV.4.

These powers produce the passions which represent an ‘interior motion following on the apprehension of good or evil,’[[992]](#footnote-991) and thereby cause the actual movement of a being towards or away from its object. While the concupisicible power is the one that moves us to acquire things that are necessary or useful for satisfying the appetite for what is good, the irascible power repels us from what is harmful or inspires us to conquer what is dangerous.[[993]](#footnote-992) Thus, the power that is moved to and rests with the good is the concupiscible, and what is moved against evil and recedes from it is the irascible. That said, Damascus notes that evil can also serve as a principle of movement towards the good insofar as it leads us to love what is excellent or proper to order.[[994]](#footnote-993)

On this basis, John contends that the concupiscible appetite concerns goods that are desirable without qualification, while the irascible appetite pertains to the arduous good that is expeditious or useful.[[995]](#footnote-994) An example of the former is food, and of the latter, medicine or other things needed for the health of the body. Following pseudo-Augustine and the Damascene, John states that all passions spring from these two powers.[[996]](#footnote-995) In this connection, he enumerates four primary passions of desire or hope (*spes*), joy (*gaudium*), pain (*dolor*), and fear (*metus*), echoing pseudo-Augustine again in affirming that the first two are the product of the concupiscible and the latter two the irascible.[[997]](#footnote-996) He further divides the passions according to whether they pertain to present or future concerns. While joy refers to a present good and hope to a future or desired good, pain concerns a present evil and fear a future one.[[998]](#footnote-997)

Although he specifically invokes pseudo-Augustine as his authority in affirming this, his typology of the passions was far from unique at the time he was writing. As a matter of fact, John built upon a long tradition of categorizing the passions that had been evolving since antiquity, specifically in the Stoic tradition. This was the initial context in which the four passions were divided according to whether they pertained to pleasures and pains in the present (joy and sadness) or in the future (desire and fear). The Stoic division can also be found in Constantine the African, who gave a ‘psycho-physical’ analysis of the passions in terms of the physical responses they involve, based on Galen’s medical philosophy, which is reiterated in Nemesius of Emesa and John of Damascus.[[999]](#footnote-998)

Although these more recent precedents certainly informed John’s depiction of the passions, it was likely through Augustine as well as Boethius that the Stoic division was initially passed on to Latin thinkers, for whom it became a staple.[[1000]](#footnote-999) In time, that four-fold division came to be combined with the idea that some of the passions are related to the good and thus the concupiscible power and others to evil and the irascible power. For instance, the idea that the concupiscible power is ordered to the good and the irascible to evil was a common one which is also found in Avicenna.[[1001]](#footnote-1000) In his *Letter on the Soul*, the CistercianIsaac of Stella summarizes this way of thinking as follows:

Affect is fourfold: as for things which we love, we either rejoice as present or hope for as future, while with respect to things which we hate, we are already plunged into distress or else are in fear of being plunged into distress. And so joy and hope arise from the concupiscible power, while distress and fear arise from the irascible power.[[1002]](#footnote-1001)

As recent research has shown, Isaac’s schema was reiterated in some form not only in the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* which John cites;[[1003]](#footnote-1002) but also in John Blund;[[1004]](#footnote-1003) the anonymous *De anima et potentiis eius*;[[1005]](#footnote-1004) and Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de bono*.[[1006]](#footnote-1005) This was one of the likely channels by which it came to John of La Rochelle.[[1007]](#footnote-1006) Through John, however, this scheme took on a properly scientific character and achieved a level of detail and sophistication that had not been present in any prior thinker.[[1008]](#footnote-1007) As Silvana Veccio notes, John goes beyond past precedent, albeit claiming to follow Avicenna, in delineating 15 further passions associated with the irascible power and 8 with the concupiscible.

For instance, he names *paupertas* (poverty), *desperacio* (despair), *humiliacio* (humiliation), *reverencia* (reverence), *penitencia* (penitence), *impaciencia* (impatience), *timor* (fear), *ambicio* (ambition), *spes* (hope), *superbia* (pride), *contemptus* (contempt), *audacia* (audacity), *ira* (anger), *magnanimitas* (greatness), and *insurgere* (rising up/insurgence) as passions associated with the irascible power.[[1009]](#footnote-1008) He also describes the following concupiscible passions in relation to their opposites: *concupiscere* (to long for) or *desiderare* (to desire) vs. *abhominari* (to abhor), *gaudere* (to take pleasure in) vs. *dolere* (to suffer), *letari* (to rejoice) vs. *tristari* (to be sad), *amare* (to love) and *diligere* (to prize) vs. *odire* (to hate).[[1010]](#footnote-1009) This framework subsequently became the key point of reference for later scholastics, particularly Thomas Aquinas, who sought to develop more advanced typologies of the passions.[[1011]](#footnote-1010) With good reason, therefore, Alain Boureau identifies Rochelle and Aquinas as the two key figures in the medieval development of passion theory.[[1012]](#footnote-1011)

Passions and Sin

In delineating his typology of the passions, John raises a question which greatly concerned scholars at this time as to whether the movements of the sense powers, or passions, such as desire and fear, are intrinsically sinful or merely neutral in their significance.[[1013]](#footnote-1012) This discussion can be traced back to Augustine, who presupposed a distinction between the unavoidable initial stage of a movement towards sin, and a second stage involving its continuation and encouragement, which could be prevented by the controlling will.[[1014]](#footnote-1013) For Augustine, the first stage is not imputable as sin, but simply represents a benign movement of the sense appetite, which only becomes sinful when it produces distorted appetites which are implemented by the will.[[1015]](#footnote-1014)

This is the thrust of Augustine’s account of sensuality or concupiscence, which involves a disordered love for temporal things, which does not denigrate those things as such but involves mistaking them for the highest goods of the soul. This type of perverted love is contrasted to that which is rightly ordered by reason, and thus preserves the proper order of lesser to greater goods.[[1016]](#footnote-1015) Not unlike Augustine, John of Damascus held that the passions are not strictly speaking sinful but are capable of turning for or against reason.[[1017]](#footnote-1016) According to Knuuttila, a position like Augustine’s was in some form or another carried forward by Anselm of Canterbury and even by Peter Abelard in his own way.[[1018]](#footnote-1017) However, Peter Lombard, who mediated the theological and indeed Augustinian tradition to early scholastics, articulated a different understanding of the connotations of the passions.

For him, any passionate reaction to a sense object is a venial sin. In Lombard’s view, these reactions are not entirely outside of human control, and that is why they are culpable. They can in principle be controlled by reason and thus prevented from occurring. This position, also found in Hugh of St Victor’s *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*,is actually closer to that of Gregory the Great than Augustine.[[1019]](#footnote-1018) Nevertheless, Lombard attributed it to Augustine and to Jerome, who was another key figure in this debate.[[1020]](#footnote-1019) His term ‘pro-passion’, which Knuuttila translates as ‘pre-passion’, was often used in the Middle Ages to denote an involuntary response to external stimuli—something which was also described in Stoic thought as a ‘first movement’ of the soul, which is to be contrasted with the ‘second movement’ which involves actual consent of the will to the feeling in question.[[1021]](#footnote-1020) While Lombard counts even pre-passions as venial sins, he acknowledges that the sin only becomes mortal once it becomes a matter of reason’s approval and consent.[[1022]](#footnote-1021)

Although Lombard’s view was influential, it was not uncontested. Around 1160, Simon of Tournai questioned whether first movements are indeed sinful. In his view, first movements do constitute the ‘tinder of sin’, which can lead to sin, but they do not become venial sins until we take pleasure in them, even before we consent to them or act on them. A similar view was held by Alan of Lille.[[1023]](#footnote-1022) Nevertheless, the position of the Lombard was accepted by William of Auxerre, who undertakes a more elaborate discussion of the matter.[[1024]](#footnote-1023) In his view, the first movements of the irascible and concupiscible powers are sinful because they are indirectly voluntary.[[1025]](#footnote-1024) Although we cannot control or stop them universally, they are in our power as individual movements, which we can prevent from occurring.[[1026]](#footnote-1025)

By contrast to William, Hugh of St Cher insists that the first movements of the concupiscible and irascible powers are in no way sinful, because these powers are not rational in their essence, and sin can only occur at the level of the rational approval of and consent to wrongdoing.[[1027]](#footnote-1026) This view is also upheld by Roland of Cremona.[[1028]](#footnote-1027) For his part, Philip the Chancellor elaborates the traditional position also advocated by Auxerre.[[1029]](#footnote-1028) The very fact that sensible movements in humans, by contrast to animals, are able to be subjected to reason implies that first movements, which are prior to the influence of reason, are indeed sinful, although they are only venially so until approved not only by reason but even more so by the will that chooses to follow them.[[1030]](#footnote-1029)

John of La Rochelle partly follows in the argumentative line of Philip the Chancellor, affirming that the passions count as venial sins because they are in principle capable of being checked by reason. Nevertheless, John seems to think that these movements of the irascible and concupiscible powers are not strictly speaking sinful, because we cannot help but have them. In this connection, he distinguishes between natural and unnatural passions that are the result of the fall. The first, constitutive of human nature, include the ability to receive intelligible species of cognitive objects and grace from God. The unnatural passions include the feelings of joy, pain, fear, and desire that were described above.

As Vecchio and Casagrande write, such passions are in effect ‘a sign of necessity that now overwhelms man, both in his soul in his body, and represent the pain that reaches the soul because of its junction to a crippled body.’[[1031]](#footnote-1030) In other words, they are a product of original sin, namely, Augustine’s concupiscence, or ‘the permanent inherited weakness we have for sinful things [that] inclines us to evil desires,’ even though they are ‘not counted as fresh additional sins if they are immediately defeated. They become sins only through consent.’[[1032]](#footnote-1031) In his account, Knuuttila notes that John’s view became highly influential for subsequent thirteenth-century thinkers and is found in some form in William of Middleton, Bonaventure, as well as the Dominican masters Guerric of St Quentin and Albert the Great.[[1033]](#footnote-1032)

Although I have noted that Thomas Aquinas was heavily dependent on John of La Rochelle in terms of his actual classification of the passions, he turned under the influence of Aristotle to the idea closer to Augustine’s that the passions are neutral movements of the sense appetite, whose positive or negative connotations are determined at a higher level, that of the will. While this represents a crucial innovation in the medieval theory of the passions, it remains the case that his typology of the passions—if not the connotations assigned to them—drew a great deal from the foundational work of John of La Rochelle.

Natural and Rational Will (*Thelesis/Boulesis*)

A crucial aspect of John’s motive power theory draws on John of Damascus. This concerns his distinction between so-called *thelesis* or natural appetite and *boulesis* or rational and deliberative will.[[1034]](#footnote-1033) As Adelman notes, the term *thelesis* has no precedent in the Aristotelian tradition, whether in Aristotle himself, or in his commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias or John Philoponus.[[1035]](#footnote-1034) The origins of this term seem to come principally from Maximus Confessor, who used the distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis,* which was subsequently copied by Damascene,to differentiate between Christ’s human and divine wills, in opposition to the heresy of monotheletism.[[1036]](#footnote-1035) For his part, ‘the Stagirite believed that man with his intellect could control his lower appetites in a deliberative process that entailed reasoning about the means for what is thought to be good and proper as a kind of goal. Thus, for Aristotle the will is appetitive reason or reasoning appetite, and he refers to this activity as *boulesis*.’[[1037]](#footnote-1036)

As Adelman further notes, the ‘Damascene emphasizes that *boulesis* refers to willing the end and not the means. The end, then, is that which one wishes or wills; that which concerns the means is that about which one deliberates (*bouleuton*) [concerning] the way in which we are able to accomplish the end or goal. Thus *bouleusis* differs from *boulesis* as the deliberative process differs from the definite act of first willing the end.’[[1038]](#footnote-1037) As Lottin has explained, however, a common mistake made by Philip the Chancellor up through Thomas Aquinas was to assume that Damascus’ term ‘*boulesis*’ refers to willing the means as well as or instead of the ends, which is technically not correct.[[1039]](#footnote-1038)

In both the *Tractatus* and the *Summa de anima*, John works towards explaining *thelesis/boulesis* by distinguishing between motive powers that rule and are not ruled; that rule and are ruled; and that are ruled only.[[1040]](#footnote-1039) This is a distinction he attributes both to Avicenna/the philosophers and to John of Damascus.[[1041]](#footnote-1040) The motive powers that rule and are not ruled are two-fold. There is a rational motive power which is undetermined to either good or evil. Moreover, there is a motive power *ut natura*,which is determined to the good in one of three ways. Firstly, it is determined to the *bonum honestum* or the spiritual or moral good, ultimately, God, by means of *synderesis* or an innate appetite for the good; or it is determined to the natural good, through *thelesis*, or the natural will that is mentioned by Damascus.[[1042]](#footnote-1041) This will concerns human activities like being, living, understanding, feeling. [[1043]](#footnote-1042)

The rational motive power that is *not* determined to the good is also two-fold. In the first place, it considers and discerns what is to be done, and this is called right reason (*ratio recta*). Secondly, it desires the good known and moves towards it, which is *boulesis* or the deliberative will of which Damascus speaks.[[1044]](#footnote-1043) Thus, John holds that *boulesis* encompasses deliberation about both ends and means to ends.[[1045]](#footnote-1044) More generally, John concludes that the rational will in its two phases is the same in substance with free will or *liberum arbitrium*, which is the power that John says the philosophers, namely, Aristotle, called the practical intellect, insofar as it entails the judgment of reason (*arbitrium*) and the free movement of the will (*liberum*).[[1046]](#footnote-1045)

As we will see in the next chapter, free will for John is not so called because it is flexible between good and evil but because, as John of Damascus affirmed, it is able to do or not to do any given thing, as it consults and is instigated by *synderesis*, the innate orientation towards excellence or the supreme good; or as it is suggested by sensuality, that is, the base tendency to confuse goods of the body with the supreme ends of human life.[[1047]](#footnote-1046) For John, in fact, the life of the soul consists in the turning of free will to the unchanging good which is God, while death or evil come from an aversion to the incommunicable good and conversion to commutable goods as if they were the ultimate source of happiness in life.

In turning next to the powers that rule and are ruled, John invokes the concupiscible and irascible passions.[[1048]](#footnote-1047) According to Avicenna, he reminds us, the concupiscible power is the ruling motivator which concerns the appetite for useful or pleasing things.[[1049]](#footnote-1048) The irascible power is the ruling motivator that repels from what is dangerous or what corrupts the appetite for overcoming evil to obtain the good.[[1050]](#footnote-1049) While these motive powers are not rational in themselves like free will, John follows Aristotle in affirming that they can be described as such in a qualified sense insofar as they are ruled by reason to pursue what is excellent (*honestum*).[[1051]](#footnote-1050) In turn, these powers serve as the efficient cause of movement, through which Avicenna states that the nerves and muscles relax or extend, contracting the ligaments and tendons conjoined to the members of the body, which are powers that are ruled only.[[1052]](#footnote-1051)

Although these members can be subject to the rule of reason, via the irascible and concupiscible powers, the Damascene adds a further group that are not subject to the rule of reason. This includes the already-mentioned vital power which is called pulsative, the generative power, the nutritive power, and the augmentative power, which are governed by nature, not reason.[[1053]](#footnote-1052) As Saccenti has shown, the distinction between powers that are irrational or rational, that is, which can or cannot be persuaded or made obedient to reason, dates back to Aristotle.[[1054]](#footnote-1053)

However this is one of a number of cases where Aristotle is broadly compatible with Damascus not to mention Avicenna, no doubt due in part to the Damascene’s Greek philosophical inheritance.[[1055]](#footnote-1054) In addition to distinguishing between things which are or are not in our power or subject to voluntary action, John further follows the Damascene, who in turn follows Aristotle, in speaking of acts that are part voluntary and part involuntary.[[1056]](#footnote-1055) These actions become possible through violence or ignorance, for instance, when one is forced of necessity or by another person to do something that one would prefer not to do, or when one does something without being aware of it, perhaps because of being in an altered state of mind (i.e. sleepy, drunk).[[1057]](#footnote-1056)

The circumstances of an action mitigate the severity of these cases, namely, who did what, what was done, by what means, where, when, how, and for what reason. For example, if a sailor needs to throw cargo overboard to save his ship in the middle of a storm, this lessens the evil of waste. This discussion of semi-voluntary acts was another Aristotelian aspect of Damascus’ thought that would also be picked up by Thomas Aquinas. What this material shows is that Aquinas was not the first to address this question, which may be another case in which he followed the typology that John of La Rochelle laid down before him. This aspect of the Damascene’s thinking, synthesized with Avicennian or philosophical elements both as regards the irrational/rational distinction and the ruler/ruled distinction can be summed up as below. The chart found in an appendix to this chapter further depicts the overlaps in the *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima*’s use of these sources to treat these and other aspects of the theory of motive powers.

Powers that rule and are not ruled – *persuadable by reason/rational*

1. Determined to the good
2. Synderesis determined to the highest good, namely God
3. Natural will (*thelesis*) determined to natural good
4. Undetermined to the good = free will/practical intellect
5. Right reason—knows what is to be done
6. Deliberative will (*boulesis*)—moves towards the good known

Powers that rule and are ruled – *persuadable by reason/rational*

1. Concupiscible/Irascible powers
2. Efficient cause of voluntary physical movement
3. Moving powers of the bodily members are ruled only

*Powers that are not persuadable by reason/irrational*

1. Pulsative, generative power, nutritive power, and augmentative powers
2. Part-voluntary and part-involuntary acts from ignorance or force

The *Summa Halensis*

In drawing this chapter to a close, it is worth recounting the Summa’s discussion of what it calls the sensible or motive powers. This has only recently been treated in an excellent article by Silvana Vecchio, who rightly observes that this text seems much less interested than John of La Rochelle in the question of the passions.[[1058]](#footnote-1057) Nevertheless, the Summa basically codifies some of the material that we have seen can be found in the writings of John of La Rochelle*.*[[1059]](#footnote-1058) In that sense, the Summa is not terribly innovative but goes to show the influence of Rochelle on its authorship. In line with the latter’s works, the Summa observes that the Philosopher—evidently Avicenna, posits phantasia and estimation as motive powers, along with the concupiscible and irascible passions, to which the Summist adds and pseudo-Augustinian sensuality.[[1060]](#footnote-1059) The affection of joy (*gaudium*) belongs to the concupiscible power, while pain (*dolor*), anger (*ira*) and fear (*timor*) belong to the irascible.

The first question the Summa considers in treating the motive powers is why phantasy and estimation are categorized as such powers, when they are also listed amongst the cognitive powers. According to the Summa, they are called motive powers, because they dispose one to motion through the mode of cognizing good or evil, inclining one to pursue or avoid’[[1061]](#footnote-1060) an object in question.[[1062]](#footnote-1061) They differ in the way they do this, however, because ‘phantasy disposes to motion through the apprehension of a sensible form of what is fitting or unfitting, but estimation disposes to motion through the apprehension of an intention in the sensible thing.’[[1063]](#footnote-1062) In other words, phantasy incites motion through apprehension of the object itself, while estimation does so through the apprehension of some quality in it.

The Summa next shifts to discuss the motive power of sensuality which is mentioned by Augustine.[[1064]](#footnote-1063) Sensuality is a faculty which pertains to the senses, which suggests whether an object of sense is good or bad and thus compels movement towards or away from it. In humans, who possess reason, Augustine also refers to it as the ‘exterior man’ or lower reason, which is concerned with external things, by contrast to the interior man or higher reason, which is concerned with intelligible goods and ultimately God.[[1065]](#footnote-1064) Although it is a power held in common with animals, sensuality can or should be ordered to and participate in the work of reason in those beings who have the rational power.[[1066]](#footnote-1065)

When it fails to do so, the result is a perverted desire for sense objects which is the definition of sin.[[1067]](#footnote-1066) As DSEA 9 elaborates, ‘when the exterior sense pursues its good of the flesh, the interior sense of the mind falls asleep. Thus, the person who is captivated by an exterior good does not think of the goods in the inferior sense.’[[1068]](#footnote-1067) In light of its perceived importance, the Summa inquires why the philosophers did not know about sensuality, even though they knew about other faculties shared in common with animals, like phantasy and estimation. The reason for this is that sensuality concerns a power which is able to rebel against reason, while the irascible and concupiscible powers, which the philosophers also knew, are defined by being able to be guided by reason.

Thus, the reason for their ignorance of sensuality concerns their ignorance of the root of all sin, which is sensuality itself.[[1069]](#footnote-1068) This highlights the theological or indeed religious motivation behind the early Franciscan theory of the passions, namely, to explain how sin is possible. Finally, in this section, the Summa comes to those sensible motive powers which are described as irascible and concupiscible. As regards the question whether these are part of the rational or sensible part of the soul, John of La Rochelle follows John of Damascus in saying that the irascible and concupiscible powers include elements of both. While they strictly speaking belong to the irrational part of the soul, they are discussed in terms of the way they can be obedient to reason, moving sometimes according to right reason, and sometimes according to what is not right and thus according to themselves.[[1070]](#footnote-1069)

According to Damascus in DFO II.12, the Summa claims, the concupiscible passions are determined by the good and irascible by the bad. For these two affections, namely, happiness (*laetitia*) and desire respectively concern a present or an absent or expected good. Likewise, sadness and fear concern a present and future or expected evil.[[1071]](#footnote-1070) This opinion is supposedly affirmed in DSEA 14, which states that the ‘concupiscible power chooses and the irascible nature reproves. For choosing and reproving concern good and evil, respectively.’[[1072]](#footnote-1071) John of Damascus’ conclusions on these two powers are as follows and as depicted in the chart below:

The irascible and concupiscible powers are understood and thus distinguished in three ways: one mode is according to an appetite for the good and an aversion to evil, and in this regard good and evil distinguish concupiscible from irascible. In another way, they are distinguished according to different appetites, as the concupisicible is according to the appetite for what is pleasing, and the irascible for what is arduous or honorable. The third mode concerns a present good and its opposite and a future good with its opposite. In the first mode, both joy (*gaudium*) and desire, which are respectively said to concern a present good and a future good, pertain to the concupiscible power. Pain and fear which consist in an aversion to evil whether present or the future, pertain to the irascible power. This is the way in which the philosophers distinguished between the four affections according to which it is possible to will or not to will: for these [affections] pertain to appetite and aversion. In the second mode, these two powers are understood insofar as they respond to the cardinal virtues of temperance and fortitude, for temperance concerns desirable things, while fortitude concerns the appetite for what is arduous or honorable. That is why it can include sadness and undesirable things. As regards the third mode, pain and joy are said to pertain to the concupiscible, hope and fear to the irascible. This is how Damascus distinguishes them, saying that desire and sadness pertain to the concupiscible and fear and anger to the irascible.[[1073]](#footnote-1072)

**Irascible Concupiscible**

**Object** evil good

**Appetite** honour pleasure

**Virtue** fortitude temperance

**Evil Good**

**Present** pain pleasure/joy

**Future** fear desire

In a summary of the motive powers the Summa writes: ‘John of Damascus posits a division between *thelesis* and *boulesis*, or through natural and elective will; by the name however of elective will one understands free will.’[[1074]](#footnote-1073) ‘Augustine in the book *De spiritu et anima* posits reason, concupiscible, and irascible, and says the whole soul consists in these powers.’[[1075]](#footnote-1074)These powers are however distinguished in the sense that the latter two are motive and the first is cognitive. Following this, there is what is called *synderesis*, which is posited by Gregory the Great and in other places.[[1076]](#footnote-1075) For his part, the Philosopher only spoke of the practical intellect as a motive power of the soul, which is known as free will.[[1077]](#footnote-1076) This for the Summa is convertible with free will, which is the topic of the next chapter.

**Motive Powers in John of La Rochelle**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***TRACTATUS*** | **Philosophers** | **Pseudo-Augustine** | **Damascus** |
| Natural powers: pulsative, generative, nutritive, augmentative | X | --- | X |
| Animal powers: phantasy/estimation | X | --- | --- |
| Animal powers: physical motion | X | --- | X |
| Animal powers: irascible and concupiscible | X | X | X |
| The four affections (joy, hope, pain, fear) | X | X | X |
| Rational power *ut natura*: synderesis, sensuality, natural will (*thelesis*) | X | --- | --- |
| Rational power *ut ratio:* determined to a changing good (*synderesis*), unchanging good (sensuality), or undetermined (free will) | X | --- | --- |
| *Ratio, voluntas, liberum arbitrium* | X | X | X |
| *Thelesis/boulesis* | X | --- | X |
| Voluntariness | --- | --- | --- |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***SUMMA DE ANIMA*** | **Avicenna** | **Pseudo-Augustine** | **Damascus** |
| Natural powers: pulsative, generative, nutritive, augmentative | X | --- | X |
| Animal powers: phantasy/estimation | X | --- | --- |
| Animal powers: physical motion | X | --- | X |
| Animal powers: irascible and concupiscible | X | X | X |
| The four affections (joy, hope, pain, fear) | --- | X | X |
| Rational power *ut natura*: *synderesis*, sensuality, natural will | X | --- | --- |
| Rational power *ut ratio:* determined to a changing good, unchanging good, or undetermined | X | --- | --- |
| *Ratio, voluntas, liberum arbitrium* | --- | --- | X (*liberum arbitrium* only) |
| *Thelesis/boulesis* | --- | --- | X |
| Voluntariness | --- | --- | X |

**10. Free Will**

The doctrine of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) represents an area of intensive early scholastic interest.[[1078]](#footnote-1077) While Augustine and Anselm’s writings by the title *De libero arbitrio* were well known in the Middle Ages, works by John of Damascus, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Abelard, among others, which had become available more recently, stimulated new discussion and debate on the topic in this period. This chapter will show that the *Summa Halensis* takes a decisive new stance on the nature of free will, locating it more in the will than in reason, and defining it as capable of both good and evil rather than simply the good.

In these respects, the Summa’s source of inspiration, rather exceptionally, was not John of La Rochelle but Alexander of Hales, whose evident interest in the subject can be noted in his fairly extensive writings on the topic. The voluntarism he endorses, along with his definition of free will, would become defining features of the Franciscan school, not least in the work of John Duns Scotus. Here, consequently, the Halensian sources of later Franciscan thought are highlighted for the first time. As important as those sources are, I wish to show in this chapter that the Summa’s account emerges as part of a conversation amongst predecessors and contemporaries, whose theories in some respects lay the groundwork for—though none goes so far as—the Summa itself.

The demonstration of this point in the present chapter will take the following form. I will first recount briefly the doctrine of free will advocated by Augustine, for whom free choice was a matter of reason and will’s orientation to the good. This view, we will see, was elaborated further by Anselm. John of Damascus added new terms and arguments to the discussion, which factored into key aspects of twelfth-century thought on the subject, which will then be treated briefly. The result will be to place on full display the constellation of sources and concepts that was at Alexander of Hales’ disposal and that he was to some extent constrained to reconcile with his own opinions. A recounting of his theory of free choice as well as that of John of La Rochelle and the Summa will reveal that the latter depends upon Alexander, even while taking the ‘irrefragible doctor’s’ position to new heights.

Augustine

There are many different interpretations of Augustine on free will, and there are some who would say he changed his mind on the subject over the course of his career.[[1079]](#footnote-1078) By contrast, Eleonore Stump observes that Augustine himself states in his *Retractationes* that his earlier thought on this topic was simply underdeveloped by comparison to his later views and is ultimately consistent with them.[[1080]](#footnote-1079) The views presented in his early work are very clearly outlined in the *De libero arbitrio*, one of the texts that was most well known and most cited by the Summists and their contemporaries.[[1081]](#footnote-1080) There, Augustine states that free will is given for the purpose of choosing the good. As such, it is incompatible with sin and evil.[[1082]](#footnote-1081) At the foundations of this opinion is his privation theory of evil, according to which evil is not a substance in its own right but rather represents an absence of the good. In the view of many modern theorists, this kind of theory denies the reality of evil and the devastation it causes. For a proponent like Augustine, however, the concept of privation simply emphasizes that evil distorts or detracts from the order of things that God intended. To choose evil is not to take up a legitimate option, consequently, but to reject or turn away from what is good.[[1083]](#footnote-1082)

While Augustine does acknowledge in a later work, *De correptione et gratia*, that humans are free to do good or evil after the fall, he qualifies this claim in insisting that choosing evil renders us ‘free of justice but enslaved to sin.’[[1084]](#footnote-1083) This enslavement comes from confusing greater goods—above all, God—with lesser goods which are perceived as ultimate sources of happiness and fulfilment, something Augustine elsewhere describes in terms of concupiscence, which was mentioned in the last chapter. The finite and fleeting, or changeable nature of goods other than God means that pursuing them as matters of supreme importance for our happiness inevitably leads to the frustration of our desires.[[1085]](#footnote-1084)

To seek those goods as a matter of priority, consequently, enslaves us to the pursuit of things we cannot always possess and therefore ensures that we will never be happy.[[1086]](#footnote-1085) That said, Augustine is quick to stress that the objects of our desires themselves are not good or evil—only the use we make of them and the proportional or disproportional level of significance we attribute to them.[[1087]](#footnote-1086) That is why it is so important to attribute absolute significance to God alone: not because other goods are insignificant or devalued in Augustine’s thought, but because we can only perceive their significance accurately and avoid enslavement to desires for them when we keep them in proper perspective.[[1088]](#footnote-1087) The success or failure to do just this, that is, to exercise free will, is precisely the realm of our moral responsibility in Augustine’s paradigm.

In this regard, Augustine states in his later works that we require God’s grace for all the good that we do, in opposition to Pelagius who supposedly affirmed the possibility of achieving perfection without God’s aid.[[1089]](#footnote-1088) Apart from the ongoing support of grace, Augustine insists, a person would simply revert to evil and sin. In contrast to some interpretations of Augustine, however, this does not imply that the human being is ‘totally depraved’ and defunct for the purpose of performing any good act. What it suggests is simply that God is the one who gives the ability to prioritize the greater over the lesser good in the first place and restores it following its loss to sin, by restoring the knowledge of himself through the Incarnation of his Son. Only insofar as we ourselves make use of a God-given ability, therefore, can be described as truly free.

Anselm

Anselm’s account of free will in the *De libero arbitrio*, which was the text that was most well-known to the Summists and their contemporaries, follows the early Augustine in stating in no uncertain terms that the power of sinning is not a matter of free will.[[1090]](#footnote-1089) As noted already, sin enslaves us to desires for things that cannot fully satisfy us and limits our freedom accordingly.[[1091]](#footnote-1090) Thus, Anselm concludes that free will strictly speaking can only will what is good. As Anselm puts it, in language which had been hinted at but not employed to the same extent by Augustine, the purpose of free will is to preserve the rectitude, justice, or the righteousness of the will, for its own sake.[[1092]](#footnote-1091)

To do precisely this is what Anselm following Augustine affirms that human beings fittingly ‘owe’ to God; it is the way we fulfil his will for us.[[1093]](#footnote-1092) At the same time, preserving justice is in our own interests, since there is nothing about being a slave to sin that is consistent with human happiness and flourishing. As Augustine had affirmed, so Anselm posits that willing what God wants us to will, which is to will to treat him as the supreme good and regard all other goods as second to him, helps us put ordinary goods in proper perspective so that desires for them do not become inordinate and enslaving. In summary, the will to preserve the just and proper order of our will, first to God, and then to other things, is what truly liberates the will.

John of Damascus

Already, we have learned about the significant role that John of Damascus plays in early Franciscan accounts of the cognitive as well as the motive powers. This principle also applies to the doctrine of free will. From Damascus, early Franciscans adopt the idea that ‘everything that is generable is changeable (*vertibilis*).’[[1094]](#footnote-1093) In the case of human beings, changeability for the Damascene entails that we can will to do or not to do any given thing (*facere et non facere*). In other words, we can voluntarily desire one thing but not another.[[1095]](#footnote-1094) As we will see, Alexander of Hales stretched the idea that free will entails wanting ‘opposites’ in the sense of ‘this and not that’ so far as to suggest that it allows for willing good or evil.[[1096]](#footnote-1095)

This perspective on the will represents a rather extreme take on the position of John of Damascus.[[1097]](#footnote-1096) As Michael Frede writes, ‘looking at John of Damascus’ account shows us that he does not construe choice as inherently a choice between two options, the good and the evil.’[[1098]](#footnote-1097) The Damascene’s much simpler point, which is the product of his complex reception of Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Greek Church Fathers, is that the human will is not fixed to one object or another.[[1099]](#footnote-1098) The differences amongst individuals and their interests amount to different objects of desire. Moreover, the desires and preferences of individuals can change over time. To observe this is far from affirming that evil is a legitimate object of free will.

Twelfth-Century Developments

In addition to Augustine, Anselm, and Damascus, the thirteenth-century canon of authorities on free will expanded to include Bernard of Clairvaux, who wrote his account of ‘grace and free will’ around 1128.[[1100]](#footnote-1099) There, he argued, among other things, that free will consists in consent which is not subject to any constraint or necessity.[[1101]](#footnote-1100) This consent is ultimately to God and thus to the good which is the source of all freedom. Although free will can choose evil since its definition is not to be compelled to one thing or another, sin diminishes freedom which is more ordered or genuine in doing good than evil.[[1102]](#footnote-1101)

In this connection, Bernard formulated a distinction between a three-fold freedom, namely, from necessity or compulsion, from sin, and from the misery of punishment for sin, which became a fixture of medieval discussions of this topic, not least because it was included in Lombard’s *Sentences*.[[1103]](#footnote-1102) The first freedom is a gift of nature or natural life, the second of grace or redeemed life, and the third of glory or eternal life. In his *De sacramentis fidei* (1135-40),Hugh of St Victor also espoused the basic idea of free will as not being subject to any compulsion.[[1104]](#footnote-1103) So construed, freedom could be attributed not only to humans, but also to angels and God. As Tobias Hoffman has shown, it was a priority for scholars in this period to find a definition that applied across the board.[[1105]](#footnote-1104)

Another key moment in the history of free will theory came with Peter Abelard, who introduced the definition of Boethius, or ‘the philosophers’ in his *Introductio ad theologiam* around 1138. This involved the idea of free will as ‘*voluntate iudicium*’, or a ‘free judgment concerning the will’ whereby we decide whether or not we will follow an inclination of the will.[[1106]](#footnote-1105) As Lottin notes, the deliberation in question is free, because it is exempt from any necessity. Thus, Abelard upholds the growing consensus that free will is the power to achieve what reason decides without any force or compulsion. That is not to say that free will entails freedom to sin, for sin diminishes freedom. The kind of freedom Abelard has in mind is of a different sort, and pertains to the power to choose between different good alternatives.

A further advance which Lottin identifies in the twelfth-century history of free will concerns the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*, which has sometimes been attributed to Hugh of St Victor, but which Lottin assigns to Otto of Lucca, and which has more recently been traced to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers.[[1107]](#footnote-1106) This is the text that would formulate the definition of free will as the ability or ‘*facultas*’ of reason and will to choose the good, if the grace of God assists, and to choose evil, if grace ceases.[[1108]](#footnote-1107) Although the author supports this idea with citations from Bernard, Peter Lombard would later associate it with Augustine.[[1109]](#footnote-1108)

The Lombard’s work thus gave rise inadvertently to the subsequent debate on whether free will consists mainly in reason or in the will or even some other faculty that perhaps contains or exceeds those two.[[1110]](#footnote-1109) While Lombard continued to maintain the idea, also found in the *Summa sententiarum,* that free will is essentially the power to choose between different alternatives, he and his followers still did not count evil as a legitimate one of those options. This is why God can be said to have free choice in the truest sense of the term.[[1111]](#footnote-1110) For Lombard, free choice is unequivocally freer when one is not able to sin.[[1112]](#footnote-1111)

The situation changed with Gandolph of Bologna, who around 1160-70 argued that free will involves a choice between good and evil, although Lottin notes that it is difficult to identify the sources of inspiration for this rather unconventional view.[[1113]](#footnote-1112) Simon of Tournai, a follower of the school of Gilbert of Poitiers, further elaborated a case for the idea that there are two different kinds of free will, namely, to do good, and to do evil.[[1114]](#footnote-1113) In some respects, he argued, the freedom to do evil is greater than that to do good, because we need grace to avoid evil. Nevertheless, the natural inclination of reason untainted by sin, and its true and proper end, is to choose the good.

Early Thirteenth-Century Developments

Although he is considered part of the school of Peter Lombard, Praepositinus of Cremona, whose career spanned the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, pushed much further the idea that free will consists primarily in reason rather than the faculty of both reason and will, as Lombard supposed.[[1115]](#footnote-1114) On his account, reason plays the crucial role of discerning between good and evil; it chooses the good and detests evil. The will simply executes the orders of reason regarding our moral or immoral activities. As we move into the early thirteenth century, John Blund takes the more traditional line on the nature of free will.[[1116]](#footnote-1115) He sees free will as entailing both reason and will, where reason knows what is good and the will chooses it, thus ‘preserving righteousness’ and rejecting its opposite.

Although John does not mention Anselm by name, the latter is clearly at the background here, as is Augustine, whose spurious definition of free will is quoted, albeit from the *Sentences*, as ‘a faculty of reason and understanding by which, with the help of grace, the good is chosen, and by which, when grace ceases, evil is chosen.’[[1117]](#footnote-1116) Augustine’s own wording of this sentiment states that ‘free choice must be acknowledged as the ability we have to do good and to do evil.’[[1118]](#footnote-1117) Blund’s indebtedness to Augustine becomes evident in his emphatic rejection of the notion that it is possible for free will to sin. As he stresses, this would involve slavery to evil desires, which is incompatible with freedom.[[1119]](#footnote-1118)

William of Auxerre’s *Summa aurea* offers one of the first in-depth treatises on free will in the period post-Lombard.[[1120]](#footnote-1119) However, the authorproves resistant to departing from the traditional Augustinian line in his account of free will.[[1121]](#footnote-1120) Like Blund, he states Augustine’s view as represented by Lombard:[[1122]](#footnote-1121) ‘free will is the power of will and reason by which good is chosen with the assistance of grace and evil when grace is lacking.’[[1123]](#footnote-1122) In this connection, he expounds on Praepositinus’ argument that free will consists primarily in reason—which he now perhaps under Aristotle’s incipient influence refers to specifically as ‘practical reason’. He makes his case by distinguishing between two levels of judgment, the first of which discriminates between two options and the second of which elects one over the other.[[1124]](#footnote-1123)

The latter is the proper act of free will and the locus of merit. For William, consequently, there is, as Augustine said, a place for the will proper as well as reason within free will. This can therefore be said to include both, yet only insofar as the will is part of reason’s second act.[[1125]](#footnote-1124) In addition to this, William insists that free will is more related to good than evil, citing Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* XII.7, which states that ‘the cause of evil is not efficient but deficient.’[[1126]](#footnote-1125) Later on, he reiterates this view, and its association with Augustine, quoting the latter’s *De libero arbitrio* II.19.53, which states that ‘the ability to sin is not an ability’ strictly speaking, for precisely the reason Blund already mentioned, namely, that it limits the scope of free will rather than facilitates it.[[1127]](#footnote-1126)

In summary, for William, free will is the power of choosing to do what *synderesis* dictates.[[1128]](#footnote-1127)2 As has been noted, *synderesis* or right reason, also described by some as natural law, was a term derived from the writings of Jerome and first given an extended treatment by Auxerre, after which it became a standard topic in the schools. The proper motion of free will is to choose to do or not to do one thing over another—but its options must always be consistent with what *synderesis* would require.[[1129]](#footnote-1128)

As Saccenti observes, Philip the Chancellor represents a new phase in work on free will.[[1130]](#footnote-1129) This is not only because his account of free will takes up more space in his section on human nature than all other topics combined: around 75 pages of an approximately 150-page text.[[1131]](#footnote-1130) Nor is it simply because he introduces the *thelesis/boulesis* distinction as well as the distinction between cognitive and motive powers which are found in John of Damascus and would later be more or less adopted in the same way by John of La Rochelle.[[1132]](#footnote-1131) Although Philip is indebted to the main sources—Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard[[1133]](#footnote-1132)—that also feature in the *Summa Halensis*, he breaks from his predecessors to argue that free will is identical with the will rather than reason. In his opinion, it is the will rather than reason that possesses the power to act or not to act and thus to acquire or lose merit.[[1134]](#footnote-1133)

While Philip by no means denies that reason has a role to play in the work of free will, he does not attribute it the primacy it once had in this context. According to Philip, free choice is ultimately the power to do what one wills, that is, the power of self-determination. As Lottin explains, however, this power for Philip does not include that of doing evil, which diminishes freedom.[[1135]](#footnote-1134) Although Philip in that sense adheres to Anselm’s definition of free will, he acknowledges that it is not adequate to explaining how those who do evil can have free will. To address this problem, he argues that the power of preserving the rectitude of which Anselm speaks remains even in the person who fails to use it.[[1136]](#footnote-1135)

By contrast to Philip, Hugh of St Cher takes a more ‘intellectualist’ line on free will. He acknowledges that some see free will as reason, others as will, others as a composite of these two, adding that still others, presumably Godfrey of Poitiers, regard it as something over and above reason and will.[[1137]](#footnote-1136) Nevertheless, he refuses to accept that there is any faculty in the person that is superior to reason, which has the power to determine how to act, which determination that is executed by free will. In this regard, as Lottin notes, he is visibly influenced firstly by William of Auxerre, whose work, we have learned, he often reiterates while sometimes making additions or changes to William’s solutions.[[1138]](#footnote-1137)

Elsewhere, Hugh acknowledges that free will can be defined as flexible to do whatever it wants, or as flexible between good and evil. In his view, however, free will is not flexible between good and evil but only to do what it wants within the parameters of the good.[[1139]](#footnote-1138) Further details of the accounts given by both Philip and Hugh are superbly outlined by Riccardo Saccenti in his book on the subject and are not therefore elaborated here.[[1140]](#footnote-1139)

Although Roland of Cremona was Hugh’s teacher, we know that he was probably more influenced by his student than the other way around, since he likely only wrote his own Summa after Hugh’s major *Sentences* Commentary was completed. However, he offers a somewhat unique solution, which seemingly seeks to accommodate in a qualified way the idea that free will can choose evil. To this end, Roland invokes the famous Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason, which was codified by Lombard, arguing that while lower reason, which is linked to the body, is capable of choosing good and evil, higher reason is independent of it and always retains its preference for the good.[[1141]](#footnote-1140) At this level, consequently, free will only involves the power to discriminate and choose amongst various good options, without being determined to prefer any one in particular.[[1142]](#footnote-1141) As this suggests, Roland follows Hugh or at least William of Auxerre in emphasizing that free will—at least higher by contrast to lower free will—is basically reason.[[1143]](#footnote-1142)

John of La Rochelle

Before moving on to Alexander of Hales, it is worth pausing to reflect on John of La Rochelle’s treatment of free will. Although John was influenced by Philip the Chancellor in his account of many matters, this is a case where he does not take Philip’s radical line of referring free choice to the will. As Lottin observes, he instead identifies free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) with the rational faculty, more specifically, the practical intellect, which is comprised of reason (*ratio*) and will (*voluntas*) and their co-operation, which is the purview of *liberum arbitrium* itself. For John, these three represent one and the same faculty that only differs according to its acts.[[1144]](#footnote-1143) While reason discerns or refrains from knowledge (*agnoscit*) of what is to be done, the will, previously described as *boulesis*, desires the good to be done, and *liberum arbitrium* chooses the desired good.[[1145]](#footnote-1144)

As Augustine put it, consequently, free choice is one power in its root but three in its branches.[[1146]](#footnote-1145) This for John was consistent with Augustine’s broader view, presented in *De Trinitate,* that the mind, its knowledge and its will represent an image of the Trinity. To give one primacy over the other would be to imply inequality within the Trinity and thus heresy.[[1147]](#footnote-1146) In this connection, John notes that free choice can be understood in two ways, distinctly or indistinctly. In a distinct or specific sense, free choice is the final arbiter of the work of will and reason. In this case, each of the three faculties has its own proper operation: reason discerns, the will desires, free will chooses. In an indistinct sense, however, Damascus says that free will can be said to apply to any aspect of the process of free willing and thus to the work of reason and will individually, as when we say that one thinks freely, wills freely, and chooses freely.[[1148]](#footnote-1147)

Although John agrees with his contemporaries that free will is the power to act without determination or external pressures, this does not amount for him to a power to choose between good and evil. As John notes, ‘free will is not called *liberum* because it is flexible between good and evil, but because it is able to do or not to do something, as it consults and is instigated by synderesis, or as it is suggested by sensuality.’[[1149]](#footnote-1148) On his account, the power to will freely is what sets human beings apart from animals, which operate under the force of instinct and are in that sense tied to their desires for material objects. Since volitions follow intelligible goals which are free from matter, by contrast, John concludes that they are undetermined and can be focussed on any good end or object whatever.

Alexander of Hales

As Lottin has aptly observed, Alexander of Hales has little in common with his Franciscan contemporary John of La Rochelle as regards free will.[[1150]](#footnote-1149) This is a topic Alexander covers in both his Glossa and his disputed questions, and the level of interest he had in the subject is apparent from the amount of space he devotes to it in both places.[[1151]](#footnote-1150) For instance, questions about the relationship between sin, grace, and free will consume around half of the second volume of his Gloss.[[1152]](#footnote-1151) The three volumes of disputed questions that date from before Alexander became a friar are highly selective in the topics they cover; the questions overwhelmingly deal with issues in moral and sacramental theology and the Trinity.

Among these is Alexander’s lengthy question 33 on free will and several appended questions, which witness to his preoccupation with the subject matter. Although much of the material from the Gloss is repeated in the disputed questions—most importantly question 33—the account of free will in that question is the most coherent and extensive one he left us, partly because the Gloss format constrained Alexander to follow Lombard’s line of reasoning, more than his own. The overlaps between Alexander of Hales’ question 33 on free will and the account of this topic in the *Summa Halensis* are countless and striking and make evident that his work, not John’s, is the source for the Summa’s treatment of this issue.[[1153]](#footnote-1152)

Alexander’s reasoning in this context proceeds as follows. Every creature that comes into being moves from non-being: it is created from nothing.[[1154]](#footnote-1153) Thus, he says, as Damascus writes, everything generable is changeable.[[1155]](#footnote-1154) The ability to change can be *simpliciter* or unqualified, involving a simple reversion from being back into non-being, except in the case of rational beings which are immortal and cannot therefore cease to exist.[[1156]](#footnote-1155) For this reason, Alexander insists, changeability for human beings must involve an ability to alternate between the good in which they were made and evil according to which they were not made. As regards free will, in other words, Alexander says that the rational creature must be changeable in the sense of being flexible between good and evil.

In response to the objection that humans should not be able to will evil because God is good, and humans are made in his image, Alexander observes that creatures are unlike God, precisely because they are made from nothing and are therefore changeable and able by nature to turn away from the good in which they were made.[[1157]](#footnote-1156) In response to Anselm’s claim that ‘willing evil is a defect of liberty,’ Alexander states that this is only the case when we think of graced human nature—and that, Alexander claims, is the state to which Anselm refers.[[1158]](#footnote-1157) In the case of the liberty of nature, humans are able to do good as easily as evil. The power of doing evil is not called servitude in this instance, moreover, because it is not simply a matter of being compelled by nature or instinct to do something, as is the case with animals. Later on in the question, Alexander reinforces this point when he says that Anselm’s definition only really applies insofar as free will is common to God, good angels, and graced human beings.[[1159]](#footnote-1158) This, Alexander believes, is how Lombard understands free will in his *Sentences*, namely, insofar as it is common to God and creatures and thus not related to evil.[[1160]](#footnote-1159) When it comes to rational beings in their own right, however, he reiterates that free will pertains to both good and evil.[[1161]](#footnote-1160) In short, it involves consent to one or the other.[[1162]](#footnote-1161)

In relation to another contemporary debate, Alexander takes the view that free will is a distinct faculty which contains both reason and will.[[1163]](#footnote-1162) This tri-partite dimension is what renders free will an image of the Trinity—where the Son represents knowledge or reason, the Spirit, will, and the Father an ultimate decision—that therefore involves both reason, will, and their co-operation (*facultas*).[[1164]](#footnote-1163) After marshalling a series of proof texts from some of the usual suspects—Bernard, Damascus, and Augustine, however—Alexander draws the conclusion that even though a preliminary cognitive act is needed to weigh what one should do, free will is ultimately a matter of willing to do it and thus in essence pertains more to the will than reason.[[1165]](#footnote-1164) In fact, Alexander goes so far as to say, following Philip the Chancellor, that it is really just a matter of the will.[[1166]](#footnote-1165) To justify this claim in relation to Augustine, he notes like John that one can speak of free will distinctly or indistinctly. To speak of free will indistinctly is to speak of reason, will, and their operation as Augustine does.[[1167]](#footnote-1166) But to speak of it distinctly is only to speak only of the will.[[1168]](#footnote-1167)

On this basis Alexander further argues that sin is primarily in the will.[[1169]](#footnote-1168) In other words, it is not a matter of possessing the knowledge of what is right or wrong. This is instilled in us by *synderesis* or the natural law, which gives us an innate orientation to the good. Thus, sin is simply a matter of refusing to do what we know is good. When we do this on a consistent basis, Alexander allows, the will can gradually obscure its knowledge of God and the natural law, thereby compromising its ability to will what is good. However, we cannot simply forget what we know about God as the highest good, for this would imply a deficiency in God and his ability constantly to make himself knowable to us through his image in us. While a bad will can make us ignorant of the good, consequently, Alexander concludes that the knowledge of it in *synderesis* can never be extinguished.

This view represents quite a contrast to that of Augustine and after him Anselm and Aquinas, who held that sin was a matter of both reason and will. In the account of these thinkers, reason starts to regard its supreme good as consisting in something other than God—as this or that ‘lesser good’—and therefore organizes life around obtaining that good, by virtue of a will to do so.[[1170]](#footnote-1169) The co-operation of reason and will in Augustine’s account of free will therefore calls into question the legitimacy of the kind of voluntarist reading of his thought that was offered by early Franciscans.[[1171]](#footnote-1170) Although many modern scholars have taken that reading to be legitimate, Alexander’s writings provide evidence that early Franciscans departed from Augustine’s thinking on this matter in the very act of interpreting him. They illustrate how far someone like Alexander had to stretch Augustine’s words in order to make a case to readers that the bishop attributed primacy to the will.

In light of this attribution, Alexander insists that we cannot accumulate merit on account of what we know, since this is common and infallible in all. Instead, merit and demerit consist in what we decide to do with that knowledge.[[1172]](#footnote-1171) As such, they depend primarily on the will.[[1173]](#footnote-1172) According to Alexander, the philosophers, particularly Aristotle, did not know about free will precisely because they did not know the principle of meriting by consenting to the divine will.[[1174]](#footnote-1173) Through the natural grace that all human beings possess (*gratia gratis data*), Alexander claims, human beings are able to resist venial though not mortal sin.[[1175]](#footnote-1174) The latter can only be overcome or resisted with so-called sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciente*), which works on those who are open to receiving it by faith, which is a movement of the will to conform to the will of God.

The *Summa Halensis*

The *Summa Halensis* clearly follows the lead of Alexander of Hales on the matter of free will. This becomes clear at the very outset of its inquiry into whether free will exists.[[1176]](#footnote-1175) In this context, the Summist addresses the question raised by Alexander as to how human beings can will evil as well as good given that they are made in the image of a good God. The counter-argument to this cites the standard passage from the Damascene’s *De fide orthodoxa* II.27 which highlights the difference between God and creatures which are generated from nothing and thus subject to change.

For the Damascene himself, this simply implied that free will is the power ‘to be moved or not to be moved, to order to do or not to do, to desire or not to desire.’[[1177]](#footnote-1176) In other words, it instils the ability to choose between multiple good options.[[1178]](#footnote-1177) Following Alexander, the Summist stretches this position to support the idea that ‘free will is that by which one is able to sin or do right.’[[1179]](#footnote-1178) While irrational beings undergo physical changes, the Summist elaborates, rational beings change by means of what they think and what they choose. Thus, the Summist concludes that rational beings are flexible between good and evil.

The Summa provides additional support for this contention in a further section which more specifically addresses the question ‘whether free will is indifferent to good and evil.’[[1180]](#footnote-1179) Here again, the Summa quotes the Damascene saying that ‘the rational creature is changeable so far as choice is concerned.’[[1181]](#footnote-1180) From this, the Summa concludes that free will is what is able to choose or to refuse something. As therefore choice is indifferent to the two options, free will is indifferent to good or evil.’[[1182]](#footnote-1181) In this regard, the Summa acknowledges that Anselm and Bernard denied that the power of sinning is part of free choice.[[1183]](#footnote-1182) The same objection is traced to Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio* II.1-2, which states that God gives human beings free will so that it can be rightly used, not so that it can be used for wrongdoing.

Additionally, the Summist quotes Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* 14.11.1, which states that free will is free insofar as it is not enslaved to sin.[[1184]](#footnote-1183) In reckoning with these references, the Summist states that free will can be considered in three ways.[[1185]](#footnote-1184) In the first way, it is considered insofar as it is not restricted (*non cogitur*), and in this sense, it is indifferent to good or evil. In another mode, free will is considered according to nature, which is assimilated to God and thus ordained to the good, and in this way, as Anselm says, the ability to do evil is not a part of freedom.[[1186]](#footnote-1185) The third way interprets free will in relation to the defect of nature which it possesses as the faculty of a creature, as a result of which it tends more to evil than to the good. At the same time, however, the Summa denies that there is any fundamental difference between free will in the states of nature, grace, or glory.

In all cases, free will entails the ability to choose either good or evil. The main difference between the pre-lapsarian state and the present one is simply that humans started out adhering to the good, and were indeed designed by God to do good, even though they did not use the power they had to remain steadfast in it. As the Summa summarizes: ‘Just as humans could change their choice and remained flexible in the first state [of innocence], so [they can] in the states of sin and grace.’[[1187]](#footnote-1186) On this basis, the Summa concludes that ‘the servitude of sin is not compatible with the freedom of grace, but it is compatible with natural freedom. For this reason humans, do possess free choice that stems from natural freedom in both states, i.e., of grace and sin.[[1188]](#footnote-1187) Perhaps conscious that its radical position was not so easy to reconcile with the leading authorities on free will, namely, Anselm, Augustine, and Bernard, the Summa proceeds to dedicate an entire section to the exposition of their opinions, which are also found already in Alexander of Hales’ question 33, and to seek essentially to explain away the thrust of their perspectives in order to justify its own.[[1189]](#footnote-1188)

Anselm, Augustine, and Bernard on Free Will

The first definition of free will the Summa considers is that of Anselm in *De libero arbitrio* 13, which states that ‘free choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake.’[[1190]](#footnote-1189) On this account, the power of sinning lessens freedom and is no part of free will. The problem this poses for the Summa is that its definition entails that free choice involves both the the options of preserving and deserting rectitude.[[1191]](#footnote-1190) To get around the problem, the Summa observes that the power of preserving rectitude can be understood in several ways, namely, on the part of the one who preserves rectitude, on the part of what is preserved, that is, ‘the right thing to do’, and on the part of the means through which rectitude is preserved.

When all three of these factors are taken into account, there is no power of preserving rectitude without rectitude itself. However, when we consider the power to preserve only in terms of the nature of the one who has the power, then the power of preserving rectitude can be said to exist even if there is no rectitude. This, the Summist surmises, is the view of Anselm and what he intends to convey with the analogy of vision he presents in his *De libero arbitrio*, which notes that the power of seeing remains in the agent even if there is no object of vision—as in the dark—and no actual vision is taking place.

That of course was not the sense in which Anselm clearly intended his analogy to be interpreted in *De libero arbitrio* 7. His objective was only to suggest that free will is present even when we are not using it, as when asleep. Nevertheless, this same justification for effectively rejecting Anselm’s position was given by Alexander of Hales in his question 33, namely, that the power of preserving rectitude remains even when the right thing is not done but evil is done instead.[[1192]](#footnote-1191) On this basis, the Summist concludes that, for Anselm, the power to preserve rectitude which is the definition of free will does not actually depend on acting rightly. In this way, he paves the way for the view that free will can also serve evil.

The next definition the Summist considers if that of Augustine, or at least Lombard’s rendering of Augustine, as follows: ‘free will is the power of will and reason by which the good is chosen through the assistance of grace and evil resisted when grace is absent.’[[1193]](#footnote-1192) As Anselm says, so the Summa here admits that the power of sinning lessens freedom, and thus the one who is able to act rightly and is not able not to do so is more free.[[1194]](#footnote-1193) In order to allow for the possibility of willing evil, consequently, the Summa outlines a three-fold liberty, namely, of nature, grace, and glory. The liberty of nature is from force or compulsion, the liberty of grace from sin, and the liberty of glory from the misery of eternal punishment.

According to the Summa, the liberty of nature does not preclude sin, for as Bernard says, ‘as in the good, so in the bad, the will equally endures.’[[1195]](#footnote-1194) Rather, it concerns the liberty from guilt and misery. For guilt can be augmented and lessened as can misery, rendering the will less free, but this is not the case with nature, which is always changeable between good and evil. Thus, the power of choosing evil when grace is lacking is part of liberty, not insofar as it is enjoyed in common with God, under grace, but insofar as it pertains to creatures only, by nature. As in the case of Anselm above, so this justification for rejecting Augustine is reproduced virtually verbatim from Alexander of Hales’ question 33.[[1196]](#footnote-1195)

Finally, the Summa addresses the definition of Bernard of Clairvaux in his *De libero arbitrio* II.4: ‘free choice is consent on the basis of the freedom of the will that cannot be lost and the judgment of reason that cannot be changed.’[[1197]](#footnote-1196) According to Bernard, this consent is a medium between the sense of the mind and the sense of the flesh. While the sense of the mind cannot pertain to evil, the sense of the flesh cannot produce anything good. When understood in terms of the mind, consequently, Bernard says that ‘no one would think that free will is so called because it is a power or faculty that can alternate between good and evil.’[[1198]](#footnote-1197) As the medium between the mind and the senses, however, consensus is indifferent to good and evil. For it is capable of preferring what is good and ultimately God or of declining the good.[[1199]](#footnote-1198) This again is a position largely repeated from Alexander of Hales.[[1200]](#footnote-1199)

Free Will: Will or Reason?

As noted already, Alexander and the *Summa Halensis* take the position that free will is comprised of both reason and will and cannot be reduced to just one of them. As the Summa nicely puts it, free will ‘is *arbitrium* according to reason and *liberum* according to will,’[[1201]](#footnote-1200) although the operation of *liberum arbitrium* is something over and above reason and will which presupposes both of their operations. On this basis, Lottin notes that free will for the Summist takes place in two stages, namely, deliberation and choice. In its first stage, free will judges what to do according to the moral law. Secondly, it chooses, and in this sense, it can become released from the law to do as it pleases.[[1202]](#footnote-1201)

To defend its position, the Summa marshals quotations from both Bernard of Clairvaux and Augustine which respectively seem to deny and support the idea that free will primarily concerns the will rather than reason.[[1203]](#footnote-1202) On the authority of Augustine, who says that nothing is in our control except the will, the Summa eventually concludes that free will is primarily a matter of the will.[[1204]](#footnote-1203) This is because the will is the one that ultimately exercises the power of free choice. The Summa responds to the objections to its position as follows:

Therefore, to those authoritative statements of the saints that seem to conclude that free choice is the will, one must reply that the saints do not intend to say that free choice is essentially the will, but that freedom mostly has to do with the will, and free choice is called will for this reason alone, namely, that it [the will] has mostly to do with freedom.[[1205]](#footnote-1204)

On the basis of this conclusion, the Summa addresses the further question whether merit and demerit are based on the will only or on the work of both reason and will. The Summa’s answer to this question clearly states that merit consists in a general sense in all aspects of free will, namely, reason, will, and their co-operation through the exercise of free choice. The involvement of all three renders free choice an image of the Trinity, where the Son represents reason, the Spirit, will, and the Father the ultimate arbiter of free choice. The fact that free will pertains more to the will than to anything else, however, suggests that merit is accumulated mostly through the will. The reason the philosophers, presumably Aristotle, did not know about free choice or discuss it explicitly, the Summist argues, is that they did not concern themselves with the principle of merit and demerit before God.

They apparently knew about the power of choosing opposites, though they did not speak of it in terms of *liberum arbitrium* as the Summists do.[[1206]](#footnote-1205) However, they did not know about the grace that makes free willing meritoriously possible. With such words, the Summist introduces what would soon become one of the defining features of the Franciscan school: its voluntarism. As we have seen, all human beings on the early Franciscan view have an innate knowledge of the Highest Good that gives them equal access in principle to the knowledge of what is good to do and ultimately God. What determines whether that access is utilized is however the will. According to the Summa, all human beings have in principle the complete freedom to choose without any compulsion between good and evil. For this very reason, the choices they make to prefer the good can be credited to them as meritorious.

A Metaphysics of Evil

The early Franciscan view that evil can vacillate between good and evil was not an isolated position. A broader metaphysics of evil runs throughout the *Summa Halensis*, which derives mostly from Alexander of Hales. As Oleg Bychkov has shown, Alexander was the pioneer of a quite remarkable position that evil contributes to the beauty of the universe by throwing the good into greater relief.[[1207]](#footnote-1206) Alexander argued this in sharp contrast to Peter Lombard before him, who insisted that God did not want evil to exist or to emerge, and to Albert the Great, who strongly opposed Alexander’s position.[[1208]](#footnote-1207)

In addition to what Bychkov describes as the ‘aesthetic value’ of evil, we have seen that early Franciscans regarded evil as essential to free choice, precisely because freedom and merit can only be attained when there are two legitimate options to choose from, namely, good and evil. As noted already, evil is an option because human beings are created from nothing and can therefore alternate between the good God intended for them, and its opposite.[[1209]](#footnote-1208) The reason God is not responsible for evil, on this showing, is that he is only the cause of the good in which he originally created humans, albeit with the power to will the opposite of the good, namely, evil, to their own merit or demerit.[[1210]](#footnote-1209)

A significant consequence of this position is that it attributes some kind of substantiality to evil, in contrast to the previous Western tradition, which was dominated by the idea that evil is not strictly speaking ‘something’ but an absence of the good. This is certainly a view to which the *Summa* pays lip service, not least through quotations to the major proponents of the theory, including Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Isidore of Seville, and Gregory the Great.[[1211]](#footnote-1210) All of these thinkers deny that evil is a substance and treat it as a privation of the good. In a radical departure from the tradition, however, the Summa tries to create a space for a positive conception of evil by distinguishing between three different ways of defining a being, in terms of *esse rationis*, *esse naturae*,and *esse moris*.

In the first sense, something is an entity if there is a correspondence between a thing and the mind. Here, evil is something because it deforms that in which it exists, namely, the human mind.[[1212]](#footnote-1211) As regards *esse naturae*, moreover, evil is something, by virtue of the fact that it is diffused in the world through evil acts which are in fact ‘something’.[[1213]](#footnote-1212) When talking about *esse moris*, the Summist admits that evil is not strictly speaking ‘something’, because *esse* in this sense refers to the order human beings have to God, which is lacking in evil persons. In that sense, *esse moris* refers only to ‘graced’ human nature rather than human nature as such, defined in terms of *esse rationis* and *esse naturae*.[[1214]](#footnote-1213)

As Theo Kobusch has shown, this way of categorizing modes of *esse* is unique to the *Summa Halensis*,and the latter category of *esse morale* in particular was crucial to establishing the freedom of the will, as defined in the present chapter, as the fundamental feature of human nature.[[1215]](#footnote-1214) The *Summa Halensis* actually appears to have created this third category partly in order to establish a sphere of grace over and above that of nature, which in turn allowed it to attribute substantially to evil in precisely the two areas of *esse rationis* and *esse naturae* where the prior tradition stemming from Augustine had denied it. For him, evil thoughts (*esse rationis*) and evil actions (*esse naturae*) lack substance, because they lack the qualities that God intended human thoughts and acts to possess: they exhibit a deficiency in the good that reduced their quality as beings. In the view of the Summist, by contrast, the reality of the thoughts and actions in the realms of *esse naturae* and *rationis* needs to be recognized so that they can be considered as legitimate objects of free choice, per the Summa’s account of this topic above.

Thus, the Summa attributes substantiality to evil in precisely the two areas where earlier thinkers followed Augustine in rejecting it.

For all practical purposes, consequently, the Summist rejects the idea of evil as a privation of the good in favor of one which renders it a positive reality, even if it is one that is only entertained by those who disobey the will of God. By offering such an account, however, early Franciscans aimed to define evil is something that God can incorporate into accomplishing the good. In summary, the substantiality attributed to evil by early Franciscans means that it is material that can be employed, whether by God or by good humans, to achieve his ends, at the impetus of the will to do so.

**10. Angels**

In the modern period, the study of human nature has often laid emphasis on the similarities between human and other animals, and in many ways, rightly so.[[1216]](#footnote-1215) For medieval thinkers, however, scholars have observed that the way into understanding human nature was often in comparison with angels. Although the two species—angels and humans—were associated with different purposes, namely, to minister to humanity and govern creation, respectively, they were regarded as similar insofar as they are both rational beings made in the image of God.[[1217]](#footnote-1216) The present work therefore fittingly concludes with a brief postscript on the early Franciscan account of the similarities and differences between humans and angels.

This account and some others contemporaneous with it mark a sharp rise in the level of sophistication with which scholars treated the nature of angels. The increased interest in defining the metaphysical status and cognitive work of angels was undoubtedly attributable to the translation of many Greek and especially Arabic philosophical works, which offered Latin thinkers a resource as well as an example for explaining the nature of ‘separate spiritual substances’, namely, angels, in a philosophically advanced way.[[1218]](#footnote-1217) The *Summa* delineates the differences between humans and angels with the help of a four-fold distinction mentioned in the last chapter, which concerns the *esse naturale* (natural being), *esse metaphysico* (metaphysical being)*, esse rationale* (rational being), and the *esse theologicum* (theological being) or *esse morale* (moral being) of the rational beings in question.[[1219]](#footnote-1218)

In the context of distinguishing human beings and angels, to summarize, the category of *esse naturale* refers to beings which are either ‘unitable according to substance’ (*unibile secundum substantiam*) with the body, namely, humans, or ‘separate according to substance’ (*separatum secundum substantiam*) from the body, like angels.[[1220]](#footnote-1219) The category of *esse metaphysico* further distinguishes human beings that pursue knowledge and make discoveries using their senses from angels that ‘just know’ what is true in the intellect or mind. In terms of their *esse rationale* or *esse logicum,* consequently, rational souls differ from angels because they engage in discursive reasoning where angels know simply.[[1221]](#footnote-1220) Nevertheless, the Summa insists that both can be described as images of God in virtue of the rational power to know him and other things in relation to him.[[1222]](#footnote-1221) Finally, angels and humans differ in terms of their *esse theologicum,* otherwise known as *esse morale,* which concerns their capacity to will freely the good and thus to follow the will of God. In angels, this capacity is fixed following an initial decision to pursue good or evil, while human beings can continually vacillate between good and evil over the course of life.

Relation to the Body *(Esse naturale)*

In defining *esse naturale* more specifically, the Summa reiterates that the essential difference between an angel and the rational human soul is that ‘an angel is a substance separate from the body, but the soul is unitable to the body.’[[1223]](#footnote-1222) As we have seen, the idea of *unibilitas* came into wide circulation following its introduction by Hugh of St Cher, and it blossomed in the work of John of La Rochelle, who saw it as the key feature which sets the rational soul apart from the angel. In an expansion of John’s position, the author of the *Summa Halensis* observes that angels can actually be united to bodies in a merely instrumental sense, despite the fact that it is not natural for them to do so.[[1224]](#footnote-1223) That is to say, they can rule and be moved by a body, even though they do not rely upon it for their life in the way of the human soul.[[1225]](#footnote-1224) In such cases, consequently, the Summist insists that the angel is not joined to a human body as a ‘perfection to a perfectible,’ like the human soul that is naturally inclined to a specific body, but merely as a motor to a moved,’[[1226]](#footnote-1225) as Avicenna put it.

In Aristotle’s terms, to summarize, angels relate to the body as a sailor relates to the ship that he navigates but from which he remains separate in terms of his essence.[[1227]](#footnote-1226) On this basis, the Summa elaborates, angels cannot really be said to perform the natural functions they might seem to perform when they assume human bodies. Though an angel might appear to eat, or laugh, or talk, for instance, it only does so to show familiarity with human beings which eat, and laugh, and communicate verbally—not because such activities are necessary to the angelic mode of being.[[1228]](#footnote-1227) Likewise, angels do not really possess sense organs like a mouth or eyes, but only seem to do so for the sake of relating to humans.[[1229]](#footnote-1228) The sole purpose of assuming a human body, for the angel, in summary, is to imprint upon the senses and thus communicate divine instructions or support to human beings.[[1230]](#footnote-1229)

Although angels are not naturally embodied, the Summa affirms that they, like all spiritual substances, are comprised of both form and matter.[[1231]](#footnote-1230) In this regard, the Summa acknowledges that some philosophers like Avicenna construed intelligences or angels as forms without matter in order to affirm their simplicity. However the Summa denies that the composition of angels undermines their simplicity, at least in comparison to physical creatures, on the grounds that their matter is spiritual and of a different order from corporeal matter-form compounds. In the case of angels, matter simply refers to the capacity to receive intelligible forms from God. The reason for the composition of angels, the Summa follows Avicebron in affirming, is that everything other than God is composed of *quod* and *quo est*.[[1232]](#footnote-1231)

For this same reason, the multiple powers angels possess as images of God, such as memory, intelligence and will, are not the same as their essence, since essence and power are only the same in God.[[1233]](#footnote-1232) The very fact that angels possess a plurality of powers is another sign for the Summist of their difference from the Creator, whose powers are invisible.[[1234]](#footnote-1233) The composition of angels is further cited by the Summa as the reason why there are multiple individuals of every species of angel.[[1235]](#footnote-1234) Since matter is the principle of individuation, Keck writes, ‘distinction between angelic persons rises from the actual conjunction of each angel’s form with matter.’ [[1236]](#footnote-1235) This is also why the Summa argues that multiple angels cannot occupy the same place at once, and individual angels can only be in one place at one time.[[1237]](#footnote-1236)

Although angelic matter is only spiritual, it nonetheless affords angels a sort of location in space and time that cannot be occupied by more than one of them, and that requires them to move from one place to another.[[1238]](#footnote-1237) By contrast to his earlier Franciscan contemporaries, Thomas Aquinas held that multiple angels can occupy the same place, and that their movement is not bound by quasi-spatio-temporal constraints. This is because he regarded angels as pure form rather than matter-form composites, which can coincide insofar as they share a similar form.[[1239]](#footnote-1238) For the same reason, namely, because angels are entirely immaterial, each one in his view is a species unto itself, and there are no individuals within species. Thus, the topic of angels emerges as a prime example of the way Franciscan and Dominican views diverged on fundamental philosophical grounds in the generation of Aquinas himself.

Metaphysical Status *(Esse metaphysicum)*

The next category the Summist invokes to distinguish angels from rational souls concerns their *esse metaphysicum*, or way of being receptive or in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing.[[1240]](#footnote-1239) Here, the key difference is between human beings, who depend upon receiving phantasms or images of sense objects, as if from below, in order to abstract knowledge on the basis of them, and angelic beings whose knowledge of things is not triggered by and dependent upon the senses but is purely intellectual.[[1241]](#footnote-1240) The reason that human beings possess sense as well as intellectual faculties is precisely that they mediate between creatures and God, knowing the former in relation to the latter.[[1242]](#footnote-1241) Because angels only mediate between intellectual creatures, that is, humans, and God, they do not need sense faculties to know sense objects, even when they assume a body that possesses those faculties.[[1243]](#footnote-1242)

As noted above, the only reason angels assume a body is in order to communicate with the human intellect, namely, by imprinting on the senses, which are visual, auditory, and so forth.[[1244]](#footnote-1243) Although angels therefore need a body in order to accomplish aspects of God’s mission amongst human beings, they remain separate from the body even when they assume one.[[1245]](#footnote-1244) According to the Summa, consequently, the only manner in which angels exist in a state of potentiality or receptivity concerns their ability to receive knowledge from God and from superior angels, if they have superiors.[[1246]](#footnote-1245) Through illumination from above, they receive the forms of all things that are or ever could be, from the moment of their creation.[[1247]](#footnote-1246)

According to a tradition stemming from Augustine, the Summa holds that angels can possess such knowledge in one of two respects, which are described in terms of ‘morning’ or ‘evening’ knowledge.[[1248]](#footnote-1247) While morning knowledge entails knowledge of things in the Word, evening knowledge concerns knowledge of things in the self and in themselves, or in terms of their species alone.[[1249]](#footnote-1248) So construed, the two kinds of knowledge do not concern different objects but different modes of knowing the same object. The morning knowledge is superior because it is in the mode of knowing in relation to the divine.[[1250]](#footnote-1249) Either way, however, the angels possess innate species of all things which they receive at their origins from God.

Cognition *(Esse rationale)*

As the Summa is quick to stress, these species are universals. In order to know particular or singular things, consequently, the angelic mind must actively combine all the forms that make up a particular thing in the mode the Summa describes in terms of its *esse rationale*. This allows for comparing the mental concept to the real object without ever even seeing it. Although angelic knowledge is thus distinct from human knowledge, which relies on the senses, the Summa describes it as more similar to human than divine knowledge, insofar as it involves an act of composition, such as humans undertake when they abstract species from phantasms. This as we have seen is something that the human mind achieves with the help of ‘transcendental’ concepts received by illumination, which are not the objects of knowledge as for angels but the means of rendering sense objects intelligible.[[1251]](#footnote-1250)

By contrast to early Franciscans, Aquinas saw the knowledge of angels as more similar to divine than human knowledge.[[1252]](#footnote-1251) For him, angels know particulars in virtue of knowing universals and do not therefore have to engage in a further act of composition in order to know singulars specifically. The angels that are closer to God need fewer species because their knowledge is more universal and therefore entails knowledge of a broader range of particulars.[[1253]](#footnote-1252) Whereas Aquinas’ account clearly distinguishes angelic knowledge from that of humans, Dominik Perler has pointed out that the similarities—despite differences—between angels and humans in the Franciscan account lent itself to the construction of ‘thought experiments’,[[1254]](#footnote-1253) which allowed for assessing the functions that angels share in common with humans, like cognition, ‘under ideal conditions,’[[1255]](#footnote-1254) that is, without reference to the weaknesses or constraints that characterize human life.

Through the study of angels, in other words, medieval and specifically Franciscan ‘philosophers could isolate the intellect from the body and study it in an unmixed environment.’[[1256]](#footnote-1255) Indeed, the ability of angels to receive forms immediately from God contributes on the Summa’s account to the velocity with which they can acquire knowledge of things by comparison to humans.[[1257]](#footnote-1256) Moreover, it allows them know the future in a way that humans and indeed evil angels cannot—though the latter can make some conjectures.[[1258]](#footnote-1257)

Free Will *(Esse theologicum)*

A final distinction the Summa draws between the rational soul and angels concerns their *esse theologicum,* which the Summa refers to in other contexts as *esse morale*.[[1259]](#footnote-1258) This distinguishes between beings that are changeable mutably or non-permanently versus immutably or permanently.[[1260]](#footnote-1259) Unlike God whose freedom entails that he does not alternate between good and evil but remains fast in the good, angels and human beings are free in the sense that they are changeable or able to alternate between good and evil options. This is because they are both beings which are created from nothing. However, they differ in that the angelic will, once it has turned in a certain direction, remains determined in its decision for eternity.[[1261]](#footnote-1260) Thus the angel that chooses initially to serve the good remains good forever, and the angel that chooses at its origins to follow evil remains evil forever—a demon. By contrast, the rational soul remains perpetually capable of alternating between good and evil, even if it has shown a preference for one or the other in the past. On this basis, the Summa posits that freedom can be described as highest in the good angels, less in humans, even less in evil humans, and not at all existing in demons.[[1262]](#footnote-1261)

Conclusion

In light of the analysis above, we can discern both the similarities and differences the Summa envisages between angels and human beings, whose nature has been the subject of previous chapters in this book. The fundamental difference is between beings that are or are not essentially united to a body, that is, beings which are spiritual and corporeal or spiritual only. Despite this difference, angels share with the human soul the quality of being composed of form and spiritual matter, which renders them individuals. This distinguishes both humans and angels from God and thus entails that the powers of both beings are not identical with their essence and that these powers are multiple where God’s are indivisible. As noted above, both angels and humans achieve knowledge of reality through an act of composition.

For humans, this involves abstracting a universal from sense knowledge with the help of illumined principles of knowledge, whereas for angels, it simply involves combining the right forms to construct the right object, without reference to the senses. The nature of free will in angels and humans is also similar, with the exception that angelic decisions are permanent in their effects whereas humans can alternate between good and evil over the whole course of their lives. This and the other differences fundamentally arise from the fact that angels are not corporeal but spiritual in their nature and are as such not subject to change in the way of humans. Nevertheless, the study of the angelic nature and operations goes a long way, as Perler rightly notes, to shedding light on the way in which human operations might function without the limitations of the body.

**Conclusion**

In an important article concerning Avicebron’s influence on the medieval doctrine of universal hylomorphism, James A. Weisheipl notes that, following the Oxford and Paris condemnations of 1277, which was directed at radical Averroist Aristotelians, John Pecham, Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury ‘wrote in 1285 that the authority of Saint Augustine and traditional, orthodox Christianity had been challenged by irreverent innovations in language introduced within the last twenty years into the depths of theology against philosophical truth.’[[1263]](#footnote-1262) In speaking of these ‘innovations’, Pecham almost certainly implicated the works of Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas who had recently sought to recover Aristotle on his own terms.

By contrast, John Pecham states that the doctrines of Augustine had been upheld by the sons of St Francis, namely, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and others like them. These doctrines, as Weisheipl enumerates them, included: 1. voluntarism; 2. universal hylomorphism; 3. a plurality of forms in every creature; 4. an Avicennian interpretation of knowledge and divine illumination; and 5. the identity of the soul with its powers.[[1264]](#footnote-1263) Although Pecham presented such doctrines as authentic to Augustine, Weishepl rightly notes that Pecham’s own writings make abundantly clear that his personal understanding of these issues comes from sources far removed from Augustine. As a matter of fact, the ‘Augustinian’ tradition he claims that his views represent was effectively the invention of Franciscans like Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle who worked in the 1220s­-40s under the influence of philosophical works by Avicenna and Avicebron that had been translated from Arabic in the twelfth century.

Far from longstanding, this tradition was barely a generation old when Pecham encountered it. While Étienne Gilson was therefore right to say that ‘the positions of Pecham conform to the *theologia communis* of the thirteenth century,’[[1265]](#footnote-1264) his statement is correct only so far as that theology is defined not in relation to Augustine himself but to the first generation of Franciscan masters who either supplanted or heavily revised Augustinianism in the act of re-interpreting. A primary objective of this book has been to lay bare for the first time how early scholastics debated and re-conceived what it meant to be an Augustinian in their period by highlighting all the sources foreign to Augustine that they used for this purpose, including spurious Augustinian works. As I have demonstrated, readings of Augustine in this period were closely linked with readings of the other great authority, Aristotle, whose thinking was likewise distorted as a result of a belief, based on Avicenna and the *Liber de causis*, that he was himself a Neo-Platonist of sorts like Augustine.

After revised translations of Aristotle were introduced from around 1250, and the *Liber* was identified as spurious by Aquinas, it became possible for the next generation and Aquinas above all to begin to disentangle Aristotle’s legacy from Augustine, Avicebron, and Avicenna, and to understand him in his own right. However, the same rite of purification was never undertaken for Augustine and other presumed members of his tradition, like Anselm of Canterbury, as well as Plato and Platonists more generally. For this reason, there are many respects in which, throughout the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and beyond, the way Augustine and members of his tradition are understood has been heavily slanted by the interpretation of him that early Franciscans above all, but among others, offered in the early thirteenth century.

That is not to deny that there are scholars like Weishepl who have paid tribute to this distortion in one way or another.[[1266]](#footnote-1265) Gilbert Dahan also notes that the first half of the thirteenth century was a unique period when Averroes and Maimonides were largely unknown, and scholars read both Augustine and Aristotle in light of the *Liber de causis*, Avicebron, Avicenna, and their translator, Gundissalinus, thus producing variations on ‘Augustinisme Avicennisant’ or ‘Augustinisme Avicébrolisant’.[[1267]](#footnote-1266) Already at the origins of modern studies of the Middle Ages, Fernand Van Steenberghen had ‘advanced the view that what has been called the traditional Augustinian school was neither traditional nor essentially Augustinian but had its origin in the new literature which found its way into the faculties of arts and later into the faculties of theology of the medieval universities.’[[1268]](#footnote-1267)

These examples notwithstanding, a nuanced understanding of how Augustine not to mention Aristotle was employed in this period has largely been buried in the overwhelming flood of literature that takes early Franciscan claims about Augustine at face value, however obvious it is in the texts themselves that his words, or in many cases, words that were not even his, were being manipulated to new ends. In drawing the discussion of this book to a close, therefore, it is worth summarizing the findings of every single chapter in order to clarify how each one contributes to deconstructing the Augustinianism and indeed the Aristotelianism of the early Franciscan tradition. This effort will further highlight the respects in which the early scholastic period was unique in the way it interpreted both sources, in conversation with Islamic and Jewish sources originally written in Arabic. Ultimately, moreover, the conclusion provides an opportunity to reflect on the theological significance of early Franciscan philosophical views on human nature, which were not presented in a vacuum but with a view to laying down a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition for the first time.[[1269]](#footnote-1268)

The **first chapter** laid the groundwork for the present study by outlining the various currents of thought that converged in the early thirteenth century to make John of La Rochelle’s innovations possible. By contrast to earlier medieval thinkers, whose reflections on the powers of the soul, especially the natural or physical powers and their relation to the body, remained relatively under-developed, I noted a new interest that emerged amongst twelfth-century Cistercians, among others, in precisely these topics and in the Galenic medical tradition that facilitated efforts to discuss them. The Cistercian work that was most influential for early Franciscans was undoubtedly the anonymous *De spiritu et anima*,wrongly attributed to Augustine until the 1240s.

Even more significant than the Cistercian background were the philosophical resources that became available in Latin from the second half of the twelfth century through the Greco-Arabic translation movement. Among these, the most important sources were not only Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy but also Avicenna’s *Book of the Cure* which was available in Latin translation by 1166. Although this massive treatise covered standard topics in the Aristotelian tradition—such as metaphysics, psychology, physics, theology, and logic—Avicenna approached these matters in an original way that was nonetheless marked by his Neo-Platonism.

Following a longstanding tradition in Greek and Arabic philosophy, we have seen that Avicenna regarded Aristotle as himself a kind of Neo-Platonist. The wide-scale reception of Avicenna in this period therefore encouraged Latin thinkers to read not only Aristotle but also their own Christian Neo-Platonic sources like Augustine both in line with Avicenna and relation to each other. As noted above, the reading of Aristotle in his own right only matured in the 1250s and 60s, when improved translations of his works were produced, which could be studied with the aid of the Averroes commentaries that appeared from around 1230.

In addition to Avicenna, a number of other Arabic-language sources influenced Latin thinkers working in the first half of the thirteenth century, including the Jewish philosopher Avicebron, who is known for his universal hylomorphism, or the theory that all things including the soul and angels consist of matter and form; and Costa Ben Luca, a Syrian Christian who popularized the idea of a physical medium between the body and the soul. An important transmitter of these sources was Dominicus Gundissalinus, who divided the work of translating them with Avendauth and served to channel the ideas of Avicebron and Avicenna particularly to Latin thinkers through his own writings.

Although these sources were available from the late twelfth century, their reception in the West was delayed and mitigated by a variety of factors. In the first place, theologians were initially hesitant about the idea of incorporating natural philosophy into their own curriculum and thinking, not least because of certain misuses of it in the arts faculty that led to the 1210 condemnation of Aristotle’s major works in this area. The renewal of the condemnation in 1215 and 1228 basically prevented public lecturing on Aristotle, though it did not inhibit private study, which was certainly taking place in the 1220s and 1230s, increasingly with implicit Papal support and approval.

Over the course of this time frame, theologians started to warm to the idea of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, at least as interpreted through Avicenna and Avicebron. Still, the majority delved into the subject matter only so far as they considered it consistent with the limits and goals of their discipline and the broadly Augustinian tradition from which they drew their primary inspiration. From the combined consideration of these translated sources and their own Christian sources, they developed a common set of questions that most sought to address in one way or another. These included the following:

1. Is the soul composed of matter and form, per universal hylomorphism?
2. Is the soul united to the body accidentally or substantially?
3. Is the soul united to the body through a medium?
4. Are the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers three substances in the soul?
5. Is the essence of the soul identical with its powers?
6. Do the vegetative and sense powers survive the death of the body?

As I showed in **chapter two,** a relatively limited engagement with these questions is found in William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, who were nevertheless among the most sophisticated and influential figures of the 1220s. The first to reckon with them more seriously was Philip the Chancellor, whose work greatly impacted the development of early Franciscan thought. Also important was the earlier, though anonymous, text edited by Daniel Callus, which was itself influenced by an anonymous text edited by Gauthier. Although the Dominicans Hugh of St Cher and Roland of Cremona worked in the early 1230s, as Paris started to emerge from the weight of the condemnations, they still proved timid in treating the work of Aristotle. They addressed some of the questions mentioned above, albeit briefly, which they felt were appropriate for theologians, but left most others to one side.

In this context, therefore, John of La Rochelle emerges as a daring figure who was prepared as early as 1232 and 1236 in his *Tractatus* and *Summa de anima*,respectively,to branch out into completely new territory and to encompass not only the new medical material but also the full scale of Avicenna’s theories of external and internal sensation and intellection. As we have seen, he read these theories in relation to pseudo-Augustine and the new authority for systematic theologians, John of Damascus, in order to highlight the relevance or importance of his effort in relation to the Christian tradition. In the *Summa de anima* in particular, he additionally reckoned in the most extensive manner to date with the questions mentioned above.

The reason for his boldness in these respects is not one he discloses to us, and thus we can only guess that he may have been motivated by a desire to establish the scholarly primacy of the Franciscan order in a university context where the legitimacy of their presence was often questioned, precisely on the grounds of the religious ethos for which they were famous. This emphasised care for the poor and downtrodden and for creation, in the one hand, as well as spiritual fervour and ecstatic union with God, on the other, both of which might have seemed I compatible with a robust intellectual life.

Whatever John’s reasons for engaging so heavily in philosophy, we saw in **chapter three** that he went further than any of his immediate predecessors or contemporaries in trying to describe the interaction between the body and the soul. While he followed Avicenna, like most others at the time, in affirming that the soul and body are separate substances, he took Hugh of St Cher’s theory of the substantial unitability of the soul and the body to new lengths in expounding the notion that it is an essential property of of the soul to assume a body. Theologically, this was crucial for affirming the value of the body as God’s creation and the possibility of its final resurrection. For the Franciscans in particular, the notion of *unibilitas substantialis* seemingly helped to affirm the value Francis of Assisi attributed to every person, no matter how poor or lowly, as well as his concern for all creatures, each of which serves as a reflection of God’s love that deserves our care and attention in turn.

Following the trend of the 1230s, John of La Rochelle went on to reject Avicebron’s idea that the soul itself is comprised of matter and form, in favour of Avicenna’s theory of the soul as a single form, insisting that this was more consistent with the Augustinian principle of the soul’s simplicity, and giving arguments to this effect which far exceeded earlier precedents. This move was important to affirming that the soul is a spiritual, non-bodily substance capable of relation to God. The *Summa Halensis* took the opposite position on this matter, affirming universal hylomorphism, or Avicebron’s idea that the soul is comprised of form and ‘spiritual’ matter, which by the 1240s had come to be conceived as the position more compatible with Augustinianism.

This shift in opinion illustrates nicely that what it meant to be an Augustinian in the early thirteenth century was very much up for debate. While many found Avicenna more faithful to Augustine on the question of the soul’s simplicity in the 1230s, the consensus opinion shifted in the 1240s in favour of Avicebron, particularly amongst Franciscans. As we have seen, the doctrine of universal hylomorphism as they upheld it allowed them to attribute a kind of matter to angels and human souls which therefore renders each one an individual. This was consistent with a broader Franciscan tradition of stressing God’s knowledge of and care for individuals rather than mere universals. As regards the question of a physical medium between the soul and the body, moreover, John worked in the context of efforts already undertaken by Philip the Chancellor, who introduced the topic at Paris, along with Hugh of St Cher and Roland of Cremona, who affirmed the theory in their writings.

While Costa Ben Luca was the lead source for the general idea of a medium, early scholastic accounts of this topic particularly in the Chancellor were supplemented by recourse to Avicebron, who delineated a hierarchy of forms through which the soul is connected to the body. This scheme was adapted by John of La Rochelle, who posits four media in total, two on the side of the body—the four humours and the vital spirit of Costa—and two on the side of the soul, namely, the vegetative and sensible souls. Despite affirming this position, which is repeated in the *Summa Halensis*,John of La Rochelle also posits that the soul is united to the body without an intermediary, as it is essentially and not accidentally united to the body.

Theologically, this was important for highlighting that the soul made in God’s image bears the same kind of direct relationship to its body as God does to the soul, as the one who creates it. In the Franciscan context particularly, the immediacy of the soul’s relationship with God and by implication the body went a long way towards emphasizing the intimacy with God that Francis enjoyed. The apparent contradiction that has been associated with John’s thought on this score can be overcome, as we have seen, by emphasizing that the media between the soul and body simply serve as the means to rendering the soul’s intentions into act. They do not disrupt the immediate connection between the two strictly speaking.

Where chapter three examined John’s account of the first three questions mentioned above in the context of his early scholastic interlocutors, **chapter four** looks at his approach to the latter three. The debate over whether there are three—vegetative, sensible, and rational—souls or just one was fundamentally a debate over whether to follow Aristotle or Avicenna and pseudo-Augustine, and most early scholastics of the generation in question followed the latter pair of thinkers. Moreover, this was another manifestation of the debate about how to affirm the simplicity of the soul. The first recorded discussion of this topic in the university context is found in the arts master John Blund, though it had been treated before him by Gundissalinus, who mediated the unicity theory to the West.

The first theologian to engage with the question was Philip the Chancellor, whose view on this subject, like others, is famously ambiguous, in part because he transformed the discussion of three souls into one concerning three substances, the existence of which he affirmed. For him as for his predecessors, the first two substances—vegetative and sensitive—are passed on through generation and are corruptible, while the latter is created by God and survives death. These souls are progressive in that the first two prepare for the arrival of the third into which they are ultimately assimilated, which suggests that Philip endorsed the unicity theory in the last analysis. The Dominicans Roland of Cremona and Hugh of St Cher advocated this theory much more emphatically, as part of an effort to safeguard the simplicity of the soul, which they saw as an Augustinian theological axiom.

Amongst his contemporaries, Alexander of Hales was unique for arguing that the vegetative, sense and rational powers are so tightly bound together that the former two are actually immortal, a view that was adopted by John of La Rochelle and the *Summa Halensis.* These two sources also clearly support the unity thesis, which John following his contemporaries defends on the basis of spurious Augustinian texts like *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* and the *De spiritu et anima.* For his part, John advocates what has come to be known as a ‘double theory’ of the vegetative and sensitive souls, which differentiates between these souls insofar as they exist before and after the arrival of the rational soul. While the first set of souls merely dispose an embryo to receive the infusion of the rational soul, the second set gives expression to its operation.

The Summa endorses a similar theory but denies that it implies two distinct sets of vegetative and sensitive souls. For the Summa, rather, the vegetative and sensitive functions that pre-exist the arrival of the intellect are ultimately fused with it. Although the human body cannot be prepared and organized to receive the rational soul without the prior development of the vegetative and sensible souls, the Summist takes the view that a human being is not really human until it receives this ultimate perfection of the rational soul. At its purely vegetative stage, consequently, it can only be said to live in the way that an apple lives. Like many others at the time, including William of Auvergne, therefore, the Summa holds to a relatively late infusion of the rational soul.

Another major question dealt with in this context is whether the soul is identical with its powers. Although this question was widely attributed to Augustine in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on the basis of the DSEA, its source is actually Isidore of Seville’s interpretation of Augustine. This evidently stuck in the cases of Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St Victor, and ultimately Peter Lombard, who was responsible for introducing the identity thesis as a topic of early scholastic discussion. While William of Auxerre rejected both the identity thesis and its association with Augustine, he was exceptional in this regard.

In one way or another, Philip the Chancellor, Hugh of St Cher and Roland of Cremona all supported the theory, in Hugh’s case particularly, on the grounds that this was the only way to affirm the Augustinian principle of the simplicity of the soul. Alexander of Hales developed a unique ‘middle way’ by distinguishing between the substance, essence, and powers of the soul. While he denied that the powers of the soul are identical with its essence, he affirmed that they are the same as the soul’s substance, which is that by which it subsists. For Alexander, in other words, the powers are important as means by which the soul exercises itself, but they do not reflect what the soul fundamentally is. According to the doctrine of *unibilitas substantialis*,the essence of the soul consists in its union with the body. Theologically, this view was important for affirming the value of human life without reference to intellectual activities, in keeping with the value Francis placed on all human lives, especially the poor, uneducated, and downtrodden, and indeed the Franciscan view that love for God supersedes knowledge.

The **fifth chapter** turns from the discussion of the ‘systematic’ questions dealt with in John’s *Summa de anima* and his contemporaries to John’s *Tractatus*, which does not address these questions as such but deals exclusively with the powers of the soul delineated by philosophers, principally Avicenna, the medical doctors, especially Johannitius, Damascus, and pseudo-Augustine. For this reason, the editor of the *Tractatus*, Pierre Michaud-Quantin, has argued for the relative insignificance of the work by comparison to the slightly later *Summa de anima.* As this chapter demonstrates, however, the *Tractatus* is crucial precisely insofar as it provides the initial statement of John’s views on human psychology, which would be largely replicated in the *Summa de anima*,and in a different format in the *De anima rationali* section of the *Summa Halensis.*

In some respects, one could argue that John sought in this early work to offer a Christianized counterpart to the new natural philosophy and especially psychology whose primary source of inspiration was Avicenna. Indeed, the explicit use of Avicenna at a time when some other contemporaries preferred to invoke Avicenna under the guise of Aristotle, or avoided his psychology overall, is a clear indication of John’s enthusiasm for the Islamic thinker’s approach to human knowledge. Although the majority of the material drawn on in this section is derived directly and faithfully from Avicenna, we discovered that John’s idea of ‘the Philosopher’ is in some respects a construct of his own making which incorporates categories from Anonymous Callus, and even ones from Damascus and Augustine, that can be roughly aligned with Avicenna’s thinking.

This syncretistic approach to reading sources facilitated John’s efforts to reconcile Avicenna with the Christian tradition, which he accomplished conclusively by juxtaposing Avicenna, Damascus and pseudo-Augustine. The choice of these authorities was timely, in that Damascus had become increasingly important since Peter Lombard, particularly in the Franciscan tradition, as an authority in systematic theology. Although Augustine’s authority was always crucial, John’s neglect of his authentic works in favour of the DSEA, which was already effectively known to be inauthentic, shows that he was not so much interested in the ‘real Augustine’ as in one that he could form for his own purposes.

In this regard, the fifth chapter lays out the powers of the soul as John describes them with relatively little commentary, which is reserved for the sixth chapter, on the *Summa de anima.* Under the first heading, as mentioned, John deals with the division of the powers according the philosophers, especially Avicenna. He starts with the vegetative powers, which are nutritive, augmentative, and generative, and in turn treats the four nutritive powers of attraction, retention, digestion, and expulsion. These same powers were also subjects of the so-called ‘new medicine’ of which John was a beneficiary, via Avicenna and Johannitius.

John moves next to the five external senses before going on to deal with Avicenna’s signature doctrine of the five internal senses of common sense, the retentive imagination, compositive imagination, estimation, and memory. Following Anonymous Callus, a theological text from between 1220-30 that greatly influenced John, the *Tractatus* considers the intellectual powers in terms of their organ, object, and the order of abstraction. As the goal of the intellect is to abstract from matter, John states, there is no physical organ associated with its work. There are three types of form abstracted from matter that can be the object of the intellect: two are abstract in themselves, namely, God and angels, and the third is produced through intellectual cognition on the basis of knowledge of natural things.

The order of abstraction begins with external sensation and then moves on to internal sensation, in particular, estimation, which is the closest the internal senses can come to achieving a form apart from matter. Subsequently the order moves on to the intellect. According to John, this is divided into a passive and corruptible component, inseparable from the body, which is called the material intellect. This is another name for estimation insofar as it operates exclusively in human beings. There is also an incorruptible component that is separable from the body, which consists of the agent and possible intellects.

When describing the work of the possible intellect, John refers to Avicenna’s famous doctrine of four intellects, which represent four stages in the transition from potentiality to act in knowledge. These include the material intellect, which is here understood as a state of potential for knowing that has not been actualised. This is effectively convertible with the material intellect described above, as passive and corruptible. The second intellect in *habitu* has acquired the potential for knowing. This consists in certain first principles of knowledge, such as that a whole is greater than its part, which are innately given by God and represent his image, insofar as they enable human beings to render sense objects intelligible by stripping them bare of all material determinations to see the form that lies beneath. The intellect *in effectu* is the one that has actualized that potential in the past but is not doing so currently. Finally, the *intellecus adeptus* is the one that performs the act of knowing presently.

Another way John describes this process is drawn from Anonymous Callus, which invokes the example of syllogistic reasoning involving quiddities or knowable forms; the aforementioned first principles of knowledge—such as that a whole is greater than its part—and the conclusions that can be drawn from them about the quiddities. The process by which the conclusions are reached represents the way that the possible intellect becomes actualized by the agent intellect, which is ultimately responsible for achieving knowledge.

Whereas Avicenna affirmed that the agent intellect is in fact a separate intelligence, which some scholastics at the time identified with God, John rejects the notion that God serves as the agent intellect in human knowledge of ordinary things. For this purpose, namely, that of knowing things ‘beneath’ and including the self and its powers, the human intellect itself is sufficient. As noted already, John insists that the human mind possesses an innate knowledge of the First Truth—the first principle of all principles of knowledge—and an image of the Trinity—which serves as the condition of possibility for knowing all truth.

The only way we can say that the human being is akin to God, in his opinion, is if the human mind is self-sufficient in terms of knowing inferior things. When it comes to knowing things next to and above the self, namely, angels and God, John insists that angels and God, respectively, must serve as the agent intellect, in order to compensate for the human mind’s inadequacy to reach beyond itself in these respects. As we have learned, this schema concerning what is ‘below’, ‘next to’, and ‘above’, the self was derived from DSEA and was used by John as a means of linking his account, however tenuously, to Augustine.

The same strategy was employed in John’s use of the distinction between inferior and superior reason. While Augustine saw these as performing the functions of internal sensation and intellection, respectively, John follows Avicenna in treating them as two aspects of the intellect itself, namely, theoretical and practical, which Avicenna described in terms of the ‘two faces of the soul’. For John, in fact, lower and higher reason correspond to the possible and agent intellects, respectively, although he recognizes that there is another sense in which they can correspond to the material intellect on the one hand and the separable—possible and agent—intellect on the other.

When he passes on to the scheme of John of Damascus, we find that Rochelle is often reiterating themes he had already mentioned in relation to Avicenna. This is because, as Rochelle surely wanted to emphasize, there were common, if very general, conceptual threads in those sources, due to their shared Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic heritage. On account of this, he repeats from the Damascene much of the medical material we saw in Avicenna and Johannitius concerning the nutritive, augmentative and generative powers and the five external senses. He gives a more simplistic account of the imagination or interior senses and of the intellect, which is nonetheless broadly compatible with Avicenna’s in his view.

One major difference is that the Damascene as well as pseudo-Augustine advocate an intellectual memory, which had been rejected by Avicenna, who believed every act of knowing involves fresh contact with an external Agent Intellect. Here as in the discussion to the agent intellect itself, John seeks to stress that God created human beings with the capacity to know natural beings of their own accord; for him, this is essential to the integrity of human nature, and God would not make a nature that is intrinsically defunct. The last set of divisions that Rochelle treats are those of pseudo-Augustine in the DSEA. Here, he mentions the natural, vital, and animal powers, which respectively oversee nutrition, circulation, and sensation. Then he speaks of the Platonic division between the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers; and the five-fold division of sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence, which respectively pertain to external and internal sensation, and knowledge of things below, next, to, or above the self.

While things below are subjects of lower reason, those which are next to or above the self are dealt with by higher reason. Although these categories do not map on exactly to those of the Damascene and Avicenna, there are clearly many broad points of contact between them, which it is surely Rochelle’s intent to highlight, simply by juxtaposing the three schemes. Furthermore, the outline at the end of the chapter and the cross-references within it highlight the extent to which the SDA largely duplicates the *Tractatus’* treatment of the powers of the soul, with the exception of the order in which the authorities are presented.

While the *Tractatus* first discusses the division of the Philosophers, especially Avicenna, followed by Johannitius, Damascus, and pseudo-Augustine, the *Summa de anima* starts with pseudo-Augustine before moving on to Damascus and Avicenna. This re-arrangement of the material is clearly intended to place Augustine and Christian authorities front and centre and thus to subject Avicenna to them rather than the other way around, lessening the blow that might have been perceived in John’s initial bold strategy of presenting Avicenna first in the *Tractatus*. The upshot in any case is that the *Tractatus* is not the insignificant psychological encyclopaedia that Michaud-Quantin made it out to be, but the beginning of a sophisticated psychology that is largely re-iterated in the *Summa de anima.*

The **sixth chapter** takes a more focussed approach to assessing the SDA,seeking to come to grips with the way of understanding knowledge that John outlines there. Through a more detailed inquiry into John’s understanding of the transition from sensation to the intellect’s work of abstraction, this chapter demonstrates that John and his Franciscan contemporaries advocate what has sometimes been described as an ‘active’ theory of cognition—or a theory in which the mind in some way ‘determines’ what it perceives in the world rather than simply receiving data passively. That said, their version is not as extreme as that of their contemporary William of Auvergne, whose account is also briefly discussed here.

This is because the Franciscans preserve at least some role for the kind of passive reception of sense data that is so famously associated with Aristotle, while emphasizing nonetheless that first principles acquired by God prior to experience, which are innate, structure perceptual experience and render it intelligible. For William, by contrast, sense objects play no causal role in the development of the ideas we have about them, which are generated by the intellect exclusively. The reason the Franciscans did not go so far as to discount the value of the senses in human knowledge, I suggested, comes back to their order’s emphasis on the preciousness of creation in God’s sight and on the senses as a window into the knowledge of God. Although early Franciscans recognized that all knowledge begins with sense data, their simultaneous stress on the innate knowledge of the transcendentals as the condition for knowing creatures reinforced the Franciscan idea that intimacy with God, and thus the purity of the will, is the key to opening the doors of genuine knowledge.

A lingering question that remains at the end of this discussion, however, concerns the three-fold distinction between the material, possible, and agent intellect, which does not have an obvious source in any of the available authorities of the time, whether Aristotle, Avicenna, Augustine, Damascus, or otherwise. Thus, it raises the question of a possible early reception of Averroes, which is addressed in **chapter seven.** The immediate source for the three-fold distinction between the material-possible-agent intellect is clearly Anonymous Callus (c. 1220-30), which is itself based itself on Anonymous Gauthier (c. 1225). The editors of these texts respectively denied and affirmed that the distinction was introduced in their works as a result of the influence of Averroes’ incorruptible/corruptible intellect distinction. The evidence on Callus’ side is that there are no references to Averroes in the texts themselves or in any other texts from the period, such as the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerrre. Explicit references to Averroes only begin after 1230/1, which is the date normally associated with the introduction of his complete oeuvre of works to Paris, although Gauthier posits an earlier date of 1225, which is consistent with the date he assigns to his anonymous author’s work.

Notwithstanding Callus’ sound objections, there is a compelling case to be made on Gauthier’s side, which was articulated before him by Salman and Rohmer, who drew their comparisons only on the basis of Rochelle’s work, since they did not yet have the editions of the anonymous texts. The evidence consists in the fact that the material, possible, and agent intellects, as understood by John of La Rochelle, have no exact counterpart in Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna, or even Alexander of Aphrodisias, some of whose works were available at the time. As Gauthier observes, the schema corresponds closely to the way that Averroes understands the relationship between cogitation and the material and agent intellects.

The problem here of course is that the terminology does not match, although this is something Gauthier dismisses as irrelevant. While there is certainly a resemblance between the two schemes conceptually, however, John and Philip the Chancellor do not mention Averroes’ account of cogitation, material and agent intellects and only cite his distinction between the incorruptible and corruptible intellects. That does not necessarily mean that they were not aware of his three-fold scheme, but the further evidence from the anonymous texts does mitigate against this prospect, in that these were written at a time when it seems unlikely there was any direct knowledge of Averroes.

My own inclination is to conclude with Bazán that the material-possible-agent intellect scheme was a unique invention of the Latin Christian tradition, which drew eclectically on a variety of sources, including Aristotle and Avicenna. The material intellect as Avicenna defined it, for instance, seems to perform much the same function as in John. Likewise, the language of possible and agent intellects was already present in the tradition, for instance, in the Arabo-Latins translation of Aristotle and Avicenna. As regards the agent intellect, moreover, Bazán has noted that early Latin scholastics already held commonly to the belief that the soul is both a form of the body and a *hoc aliquid* or substance in its own right within the human person—as opposed to an independently-existing, external substance.

When Averroes became available, his early readers evidently discerned a point of contact between their three-fold scheme and his corruptible/incorruptible intellect distinction. As a result, John and his contemporaries may have determined to invoke Averroes retrospectively as an authority, in order to lend credence to their preconceived notion of the intellect, or perhaps to create a contrast with Avicenna’s view that the human intellect relies on an external Agent Intellect. In the absence of more definitive evidence, it is difficult to rule out an early reception of Averroes altogether; but given the circumstances, the more modest case made above seems the most plausible.

Following this discussion, **chapter eight** moves on to explore the DAR section of the *Summa Halensis.* Although this text is based on John’s works, it clearly had a different redactor who re-organized the relevant material, starting with pseudo-Augustine before moving on to the Philosopher—whom the editors identify with Aristotle—before concluding with John of Damascus. Despite these changes, the psychological outlook presented is largely the same, although the redactor takes a much more syncretistic approach to dealing with it. Rather than simply juxtaposing the three authors and allowing their compatibilities to come into relief that way, he takes great pains to show that the schemes are compatible or can be nestled within or even reduced to one another.

In this regard, he begins with the sense powers, arguing first that John of Damascus’ three internal senses of imagination, excogitation, and memory can basically be reduced to Avicenna’s doctrine of the five internal senses. This striking manoeuvre shows the lengths to which the redactor is prepared to go to make his sources agree. To that end, he goes one step further to argue that the schemes of both Damascus and Avicenna can ultimately be reduced to pseudo-Augustine’s category of imagination. In his view, this concept provides the broad banner under which the other schemes can be situated. By the same token, those schemes specify the work of the imagination more than Augustine himself had done, at least in the spurious works. A similar strategy is pursued when the redactor moves on to discuss the cognitive faculties.

Here things become quite complicated given the sheer number of cognitive schemata the redactor discusses—two from Augustine, one from the Philosopher, and two from Damascus. In treating these schemes, the author attempts to identify every single point of contact between them. Although the discussion seems at times convoluted, it is ultimately fairly straightforward. Pseudo-Augustine’s scheme of *ratio*, *intellectus*, and *intelligentia*, which respectively pertains to knowledge of things below, next to, and above the self—creatures, angels, and God—provides a broad framework into which all other cognitive schemata can be slotted. This is because it establishes the three main kinds of forms that human beings can know and thus exceeds the aspiration merely to know the kinds of natural things which concern the Philosopher.

The latter’s scheme of material-possible-agent intellect can be inserted into this one because it also pertains to different stages of knowing natural forms abstracted from matter. According to the redactor, the second intellectual scheme of Damascus (intelligence, intention, excogitation, and phronesis) corresponds to Avicenna’s doctrine of the four stages of the possible intellect, which can therefore be integrated into the three-fold scheme. This comparison is particularly striking because there is of course no sense in which Damascus could have or did anticipate the famous Avicennian doctrine. The attribution of the doctrine to Damascus was therefore a way of ‘smuggling’ that ostensibly non-Aristotelian doctrine back into the mix, without necessarily attributing it to the Philosopher himself.

According to the redactor, the schemes mentioned so far consider abstracted forms without complexion, that is, forms which are considered in isolation rather than in relation to other forms, i.e. ‘woman’ rather than ‘Lydia is a woman.’. The Summist describes such kinds of cognition which lack complexion or complexity as perfect. By contrast, Augustine’s second and Damascus’ first scheme deal with imperfect forms of cognition. These involve discriminating between truth and falsity or moving from what is unknown to what is known. That in turn entails moving syllogistically from the knowledge of a universal principle and a particular to the understanding of the particular in universal terms, i.e. ‘Humans are rational animals,’ and ‘Lydia is a human woman,’ therefore ‘Lydia is a rational animal.’

Although such lines of reasoning are important and are presupposed in the above-mentioned ‘perfect’ forms of cognition, nevertheless, they are secondary in the order of nobility to those that are perfect. Despite the many differences which the Summist has highlighted, consequently, the five schemes discussed all fit within a larger picture of cognition in which each has some role to play. While the Summa does not go so far as in the context of discussing sense knowledge as to say that pseudo-Augustine, Damascus, and the Philosopher all basically agree, he does find a way to integrate their accounts in a harmonious way which allows his readers to conclude that they are fundamentally compatible thinkers.

While the Philosopher does not take first place because he, unlike Augustine, was not concerned with knowledge of higher things like angels and God, he remains nonetheless significant as the chief source for understanding the mechanics of knowledge of natural forms. In this case, however, it is worth stressing that we are not dealing here with any specific philosopher, but with a construct, who ascribes to the material-possible-agent intellect distinction that is not actually traceable to any one philosophical authority at the time, but whose thought is supplemented by Avicenna, brought in under the guise of John of Damascus. In light of all this, the chapter concludes by revisiting and rejecting the standard narrative that John of La Rochelle, the DAR, and early Franciscans more generally are pure and simple Augustinians in the field of psychology. While they do subject other authors to pseudo-Augustine, they completely revise what it means to be an Augustinian in the process.

After examining John’s account of the cognitive powers that seek to know the truth, I turn in **chapter nine** to assess his discussion of the so-called motive powers that seek what is good. In the first instance, these powers include the passions or immediate reactions we have to our experiences in the body. From the Stoic tradition, John inherited a classification of the passions according to those concerned with present and future or anticipated goods, namely, joy and desire, or present and future evils, namely, pain and fear. He followed a more recent tradition of associating the passions concerning the good with the concupiscible power and those with evil with the irascible, although he went further than any prior thinker in further dividing the concupiscible into eight additional passions and the irascible into fifteen.

In thus presenting the most developed typology of the passions to that point, John laid the groundwork for the account of Thomas Aquinas, who nonetheless departed from him under Aristotle’s influence in defining their connotations as neutral rather than negative. Although John did not regard the passions as intrinsically sinful, since we cannot help but experience them as a result of the fall, he nonetheless describes them as venial sins because they are in principle capable of being checked by reason. This is a matter he addresses in his account of the motive powers that rule and are not ruled; rule and are ruled; or are ruled only. The powers that rule and are not rule include two natural or innate powers, one of which is orientated towards the highest good and one of which, *thelesis*, is oriented towards the natural human goods of living and understanding; there are then two rational powers of determining what is right to do and moving or desiring to do it (*boulesis*), which together are described in terms of free will which decides what is right and freely does it.

The powers that rule and are ruled are the irascible and concupisicible which are or should be ruled by reason and in turn rule the movements of the body, while those which are ruled only concern the powers of movement in the members of the body, which are facilitated by muscles and nerves. Following a discussion of the motive powers which serve as a sort of preamble to free choice, the **tenth chapter** of the book examines the early Franciscan doctrine of free choice itself, which pioneered not only a form of voluntarism, which lent primacy to the will over reason, but also the new theory that free will is flexible between good and evil rather than merely anchored in the good.

In both these respects, it was Alexander of Hales more than John of La Rochelle who was the source of the Summa’s innovations. Although Alexander certainly paid lip service to the standard authorities on free choice at the time, namely, Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and above all, Augustine, he ultimately rejected their views in the act of re-interpreting them. As is well known, Augustine for one held that free choice is not merely a matter of the will but of both reason and will. In his account, sin occurs when reason starts to think of its supreme good as consisting in something other than God—as this or that ‘lesser good’—and therefore organizes life around obtaining that good, by virtue of a will to do so.

Since things other than God are finite and fleeting, pursuing them above all else involves putting one’s happiness at the mercy of circumstances that are out of one’s control, which is the definition of slavery and indeed misery. That is why Augustine, in common with Anselm and Bernard, held that free choice cannot strictly speaking prefer evil. In a break from this tradition, and indeed from the entire consensus opinion in the Western Middle Ages, represented not least in Lombard, William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and the Dominicans Hugh of St Cher and Roland of Cremona, Alexander of Hales argued that free will is able to choose between equally viable good and evil options.

In this regard, his argument is based entirely on John of Damascus, who writes in *De fide orthodoxa* II.27 that every creature that comes into being moves from non-being into being and is therefore changeable. For the Damascene himself, this was the basis for the claim that free will can choose between a variety of equally legitimate or good options: it is not fixed or determined to any one option but can alternate between them. Alexander stretches this line of thinking to allow for the possibility of willing both good and evil. In his view, this is the only way to place merit and demerit squarely in the realm of responsibility of the individual person, namely, to make evil a viable option.

The effort to do so meant that Alexander had to attribute some kind of positive substantiality to evil, where previous generations following Augustine had more or less unanimously described evil as a mere absence or privation of the good. The *Summa Halensis* repeats Alexander’s conclusions as well as his attempt to justify his position on free choice in relation to Anselm, Augustine and Bernard. I will re-iterate here only the example from Augustine, simply to show how far he departs from Augustine’s own intended meaning.

The starting point for his discussion is a definition of free choice that had been attributed to Augustine by Peter Lombard and others but was actually spurious and only resembled Augustine’s personal definition vaguely: ‘free will is the operation of will and reason by which the good is chosen through the assistance of grace and evil resisted also by grace.’ In dealing with this quotation, the Summist follows Alexander in distinguishing between a three-fold liberty of nature, grace, and glory.

The liberty of nature is from force or compulsion, the liberty of grace from sin, and the liberty of glory from the misery of eternal punishment for sin. According to the Summist, free choice is incompatible with evil in the contexts of grace and glory but not in the state of nature, which is always flexible between good and evil. This was clearly inconsistent with Augustine’s own argument that even in the state of nature, as the Summist calls it, free choice properly prefers the good. However, it was the way the Summist, in typical scholastic fashion, re-interpreted his source in order to justify his own views.

A similar manoeuvre characterizes the Summist’s attempt to locate free choice primarily in the will rather than in the co-operation of reason and will, as Augustine himself had done. In this regard, he builds first and foremost on Alexander of Hales and secondarily on Philip the Chancellor, who was the first major Western thinker to promote this perspective. Although Alexander had allowed that reason and will do both play a role in free choice, he ultimately concluded that free choice pertains more to the will than to reason because this is the faculty that fulfills the preferences of free choice. As we know, this position would be taken to further extremes in the later Franciscan tradition, where figures like Duns Scotus would develop a more robust version of voluntarism.

The fact that early on, a more tempered version of this position was justified in terms of a heavily qualified reading of Augustine means that modern scholars have tended to accept the voluntarist reading of Augustine that early Franciscans offered. This however, does an injustice to Augustine, who we have seen had a more balanced perspective on the role that both reason and will play in free choice and indeed on sin which in his view is incompatible with free choice. Thus, the Franciscans departed from Augustine in the very act of offering a reading of his thought. Here as in the other examples, moreover, they do so for seemingly ‘Franciscan’ reasons. In this case, the goal was to assert the view of Francis that love for God takes priority over knowledge and is the key to attaining knowledge of God or anything else.

The last topic of the book is angels, covered in **chapter eleven**, which early Franciscans regarded as useful for understanding various aspects of human nature in a ‘pure environment’, that is, without reference to the limitations of the body. In fact, the fundamental difference between angels and humans concerns beings that are or are not essentially united to a body, that is, beings which are spiritual and corporeal, versus spiritual only. Despite this difference, angels share with the human soul the quality of being composed of form and spiritual matter, which renders them individuals, and distinguishes them from God, who is not subject to composition.

In treating another similarity-in-difference, John notes that both angels and humans achieve knowledge of things through an act of composition, with the difference that this involves abstracting a universal from sense knowledge with the help of illumined principles of knowledge, in humans, whereas for angels, it simply involves combining the right forms to construct the right object, without reference to the senses. The nature of free will in angels and humans is also similar with the exception that angelic decisions are permanent in their effects whereas humans can always vacillate between good and evil.

Thus, we see that the tendency to redefine Augustinian or other theological principles in light of the introduction of Arabic and other new philosophical and theological sources extended to all levels of creaturely existence. The result, however, was some altogether new ways of thinking, presented most robustly and most extensively in the early Franciscan intellectual tradition, which have colored philosophical debates and indeed scholarly understanding of Augustinianism ever since. The motivation for thus redefining Augustinianism was undoubtedly to some extent the availability of the new philosophical works themselves, especially Avicenna, and the desire to provide a Christian or even Franciscan counterpart to the system of thought he offered.

At the same time, however, the philosophical works of Avicenna and others provided a crucial means to parsing theological principles stemming from the Augustinian tradition, that had only been loosely defined in the past or indeed in the work of Augustine himself. The principles in question pertained to some of the most central tenets of Christianity, at least as scholars of this period understood it. They included the idea that the human being, soul and body, is made in the image of God, that creation is good, and that the body will be resurrected after death. Another key concept concerns the status of the soul as a substance that is simple, like God, though not in the way that he is simple. The soul reflects his image in part through the exercise of intellectual and volitional powers that are unique to humans, who are nonetheless limited in exercising them in a way God is not.

As we have seen, some early scholastic theologians hesitated to specify the meaning of such theological ideals with the help of the new philosophical sources on the grounds that this would take them too far from the principles themselves. John was unique in his generation precisely because he did not see the work of defining theological concepts as incompatible with philosophical specificity and sophistication. On the contrary, he saw philosophy as essential to a robust elaboration and defense of his most cherished theological assumptions. In the process of providing such an elaboration of human nature, I have tried to show that John did in fact interpret many of the fundamentals of his tradition in a way that was perhaps not entirely implausible but was nonetheless foreign to Augustine’s own thought.

This interpretation held significance not only in John’s own intellectual milieu but also in the context of his religious order, which was seeking at the time to forge its own precise theological identity, which now required a stance on philosophy as well—even if it was an apathetic, agnostic, or antagonistic one. Although scholastic authors like John did not explicitly reflect on their reasons for writing, I have suggested that many of John’s philosophical choices—and his preference for Avicenna—seem consistent with an attempt to offer a philosophical account of human nature, as it was conceived by Francis of Assisi, or at least an account that took Francis as a model. For instance, John may have championed Hugh’s idea of *unibilitas substantialis* not merely because he—like all theologians at the time—wanted to affirm the goodness of creation and the idea of a bodily resurrection—but especially because he followed Francis in affirming the value of all physical creatures.

This fundamental emphasis is the likely reason why John did not go to the extreme of William of Auvergne in discounting the value of the senses to human knowledge. At the same time, however, he described God’s image—consisting in the transcendentals—as the condition for genuine knowledge, seemingly in order to explain why Francis enjoyed such insight into the world. This was due to his intimacy with God, which in turn was fostered by his will and love for God, which took priority over the intellect in Francis’ estimation.

While the views early Franciscans adopted on these and other issues were in some cases shared or even invented by their contemporaries, they were quickly appropriated by John and his contemporaries who developed them far more extensively than anyone else at the time. From this point, they were passed down to subsequent Franciscans like Bonaventure, John Pecham and even Duns Scotus, who elaborated them in their own ways and defended them in the face of opposition from other parties, especially followers of Aristotle like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In this later polemical context, the references to Avicenna and Avicebron fell away and the kinds of views we have been discussing became more exclusively associated with Augustine, starting not least with Bonaventure.

Through this study of human nature in Franciscan thought *before* Bonaventure, I have been seeking to bring those original sources back into the light along with the theological motives for adopting them in certain ways in the first place. The Arabo-Latin translation movement certainly inspired early scholastics—not just Franciscans—to define some of their cherished theological principles more specifically. However, the reason early Franciscans favored certain interpretations of those principles and continued to champion them long after they had been abandoned by Dominican and even secular counterparts, comes down to way they gave expression to the distinctly Franciscan ethos, and helped to achieve specifically Franciscan ends, in the context of the new universities.

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1. I am grateful to Dag Hasse for making this point to me. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See for example Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London: Wiley, 1968). Hilde de Ridder-Symoens and Walter Rüegg, *A History of the University in Europe*, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992-2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II *Summae Fratris Alexandri,’* in *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica* (Quaracchi, Florence: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1948), cccvi, cccliv-lv. After John and Alexander died in 1245, the fourth volume on the sacraments remained unfinished but was completed between 1255-56 by papal order to William of Melitona, then head of the Franciscan school. On the Summa’s composition and circulation, see Riccardo Saccenti ‘The Reception of the *Summa Halensis* in the Manuscript Tradition until 1450,’ in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 353-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West* (London: Warburg Institute, 2020), 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. *Jean de La Rochelle. Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae. Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables,* ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin(Paris: Vrin, 1964). John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima,* ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Étienne Gilson, ‘Les sources Greco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 4 (1929), 5-107. Idem., ‘Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 1 (1926-7), 5-127. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Berard Vogt, ‘Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Franziskanerschule,’ *Franziskanische Studien* 9 (1922): 139 in 137-57. This is a very brief, almost superficial overview of some of the main thinkers and themes of the early Franciscan school through the time of Scotus and his followers. Unfortunately, it betrays no real appreciation of the way members of this school and their ideas were shaped by Jewish and Islamic sources like Avicebron and Avicenna who are mentioned only in passing. Indeed, Vogt reproduces old reductive binaries according to which Franciscans are Platonic and Augustinian and Aquinas and Albert are Aristotelian in their allegiances. He recognises that Alexander engaged in a preliminary way with Aristotle and sought to reconcile his work with the older Platonic-Augustinian tradition, but shows no awareness that Hales’ understanding of Aristotle as well as Augustine was indebted to Avicenna. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St Bonaventure* (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1965). Jacques Guy Bougerol, *Introduction à l’étude de S. Bonaventure* (Paris, 1961). Joshua C. Benson, ‘Augustine and Bonaventure,’ in *T&T Clark Companion to Augustine and Modern Theology*, ed. C.C. Pecknold and Tarmo Toom (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 131-50. Christopher M*.* Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. On this, see Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982). Alexander Fidora, ‘The Talmud and the *Summa Halensis,’* in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 169-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. See Jacques Guy Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and *Auctoritates* in Scholastic Theology to Bonaventure,’ in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 1,ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 289-335. Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 235, 262. Marcia L. Colish, ‘From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the Summa: Parisian Scholastic Theology, 1130-1215,’ in *Studies in Scholasticism*, by Marica L. Colish (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 9-29. Marcia L. Colish, ‘Authority and Interpretation in Scholastic Theology’ in *Studies in Scholasticism* by Marica L. Colish (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 1-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Richard Cross, ‘The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis,’* in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 71-90. Johannes Zachhuber, ‘John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis: The Use of Greek Patristic Thought in the Treatment of the Incarnation,’* in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* 91-116. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. As I have argued elsewhere, later Franciscans like Duns Scotus rejected the idea that the innate first principles or ‘transcendentals’, a theory derived from Avicenna, were God-given rather than innate. However, they still affirmed a role for them in human knowledge, in line with earlier Franciscans. Thus, it is not altogether true that later Franciscans abandoned the earlier Franciscan theory of knowledge. See Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). On the evolution of the theory of transcendentals from Scotus onwards, see Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. On active theories of cognition in medieval Franciscan and other scholastic thinkers, see José Filipe Silva, ‘Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview,’ in *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy,* ed. José Filipe Silva and Mikko Yrjönsuuri(New York: Springer, 2014), 117-46. On the relation of John Peckham in particular to John of La Rochelle, see José Filipe Silva, ‘John Peckham’s Theory of Natural Cognition: Perception,’ in *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 283-310. Compare also with Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus’ Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. On this topic, see Olivier Boulnois, *Duns Scot: la rigeur de la charité* (Paris: Le Cerf, 1998). Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995). Mary Beth Ingham, ‘Franciscan Identity, Poverty and the Rational Will: From the *Summa Halensis* to John Duns Scotus,’ in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* 257-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. I am grateful to Dominik Perler for introducing me to this concept of ‘limit cases’ and for his research on angels in this regard: Dominik Perler, ‘Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology,’ in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*,ed. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 143-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Bernardo Carlos Bazán, ‘Thirteenth-Century Commentaries on *De anima:* From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas,’ in *Commento Filosofico nell’Occidente Latino* (secoli XIII–XV), ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi and Stefano Perfetti (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 119-84. Sander de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De anima, c. 1260-1360* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013). J. De Raedemaeker, ‘Une ébauche de catalogue des commentaires sur le *De anima* parus aux XIII, XIV et XV siècles,’ *Bulletin de la société internationale pour le étude de la philosophie médievale* 5 (Louvain: SIEPM, 1963): 149-83. Idem, ‘Informations concernant quelques commentaires du *De anima,’ Bulletin de la société internationale pour le étude de la philosophie médievale* 10-12 (Louvain: SIEPM, 1968-70): 194-211. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. See Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought* for a series of studies on areas in which first-generation Franciscans influenced the development of later Franciscan and scholastic thought. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances de l’âme au XIIe siècle,’ *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* 5 (1949): 17: Boethius’ list was reproduced for instance by Thierry of Chartres (1100-1150) and William of Conches (1090-1154), also of the famed School of Chartres. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. See Gregor Maurach, ‘Johannicius: *Isagoge ad Techne Galieni,’ Sudhoffs Archiv* 62:2 (1978:2): 148-74. Monica H. Green, ‘Gloriosissimus Galienus: Galen and Galenic Writings in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century Latin West,’ in *Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen,* ed. Petros Bouras-Vallianatos and Barbara Zipser (Leiden, Brill, 2019), 328. Behnam Dalfardi, Babak Daneshfard, Golnoush Sadat Mahmoudi Nezhad, ‘Johannitius (809-873 AD): A Medieval Physician, Translator and Author,’ *Journal of Medical Biography* 24:3 (2016): 328-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Danielle Jacquart, ‘La reconstruction médicale de la nature de l’homme aux XIe et XIIe siècles,’ *Revue de synthèse* 134:6:4 (2013):446. On the Arabic sources of Constantine, see: *Constantine the African and ‘Alī ibn Al-‘Abbās Al-Magūsī: The Pantegni and Related Texts,* ed. Charles Burnett and Danielle Jacquart (Leiden: Brill: 1994). P.O. Kristeller, ‘The School of Salerno: Its Development and Its Contribution to the History of Learning,’ 495-551, in *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome, 1956), 508-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. See for example Maurach, ‘Johannicius,’ sections 12-15, pp. 153-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. M.D. Chenu, ‘*Spiritus:* le vocabulaire de l’âme au XIIe siècle,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 41 (1957): 209-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man,* trans. and introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. Van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), 12, 24. E. Dobler, *Nemesius von Emesa und die Psychologie des menschlichen Aktes bei Thomas von Aquin: Eine quellenanalytische Studie* (Luzern, Werthenstein, 1950); E. Dobler, *Indirekte Nemesiuszitate bei Thomas von Aquin: Johannes von Damaskus als Vermittler von Nemesiustexten* (Freiburg, Universitätsverlag, 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Ignatius Brady, ‘Remegius-Nemesius,’ *Franciscan Studies* 8 (1948), 275-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Translation of Alfanus, *Nemesii Episcopi Premnon Physicon*, ed. C. Burkhard (Leipzig: Teubner, 1917); Burgundio of Pisa, *Gregorii Nysseni (Nemesii Emesini) Peri Physeos Anthropou, liber a Burgundio in latinam*, ed. C. Burkhard (Vienna, 1981). See also *Gregorius Nyssenus Latinus,* ed. G. Verbeke (Leiden: Brill, 1975). On Burgundio’s contribution to Greco-Latin translations, see Riccardo Saccenti, *Un Nuovo lessico morale medieval: il contributo di Burgundio da Pisa* (Aricca: Aracne, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. See *Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus,* ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), 112. On page vii of his introduction, Buytaert lists the translations of Damascus into Latin, including a partial version made in Hungary before 1145, perhaps by Cerbanus; the popular translation of Burgundio, 1153-54; and the version of Robert Grosseteste that sought to correct Burgundio, which was produced between 1235-40. On Damascus’ use of Nemesius see Moreno Morani, *La tradizione manoscritta del De natura hominis di Nemesi* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1981), 104-14. John affirms the four nutritive powers in DFO (Buytaert, 123: chapter 30) as well as the three vegetable powers (nutrition, growth, reproduction). He locates imagination in the back of the brain (Buytaert, 124-5: chapter 31); cognition in the middle of the brain (Buytaert, 129: chapter 33); and memory in the back of the brain (Buytaert, 129-31: chapter 33). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Eligius M. Buytaert, ‘Introduction,’ in *Saint John Damascene,* xvi. J de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1914), 409. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. The translation of John Scotus can be found in M. Cappuyns, ‘Le de imagine de Gregoire de Nyssa, traduit par John Scot Erigène,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965): 205-62. See also Philip Levine, ‘Two Early Latin Versions of St Gregory of Nyssa’s περὶ κατασκευης ἀνθρώπου,’ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), 473-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Gregory of Nyssa, *De conditione homine* (PL 67), 16.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Ibid., 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Ibid., 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Ibid., 8.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Ibid., 14.2-3, 15.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Ibid., 30.12. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Ibid., 30.18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 20. Other scholars at the time who incorporated medical material include William of Conches, as Danielle Jacquart points out in, ‘Les emprunts de Guillaume de Conches aux theories médicales,’ in *Guillaume de Conches Philosophie et science au Xiie siècle,* ed. Barbara Obrist et Irène Caiazzo(Florence: SISMEL, 2011), 79-110. See also Jacquart’s ‘The Introduction of Arabic Medicine into the West: The Question of Etiology, in *Health, Disease and Healing in Medieval Culture,* ed. Sheila Campbell, Bert Hall, David Klausner (Toronto: Center for Medieval Studies, 2992), 186-95. Charles Burnett, ‘The Contents and Affiliation of the Scientific Manuscripts Written at, or Brought to, Chartres in the Time of John of Salisbury,’ in *The World of John of Salisbury,* ed. M. Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 127-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. J.M. Déchanet, *Aux sources de la spiritualité de Guillaume de St Thierry* (Bruges, 1940), especially chapter 3 on ‘Guillaume de St Thierry: L’homme et son oeuvre.’ Carmen Angela Cvetković, *Seeking the Face of God: A Study on Augustine’s Reception in the Mystical Thought of Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St Thierry* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. William of St Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae libri duo* (PL 180, 695-726), trans. Benjamin Clark in, ‘The Nature of the Body and the Soul,’ in *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology,* 112-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. William of St Thierry, ‘The Nature of the Body and the Soul,’ 112 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Ibid., 114 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Ibid., 139 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Ibid., 107, 135, 146. See also ‘Introduction’ to *Three Treatises on Man,* 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 21. William of St Thierry, ‘The Nature of the Body and the Soul,’ 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Ibid., 24. Isaac’s reception amongst later scholatsics and in particular Albert the Great has been treated by Alexander Fidora in, ‘The Soul as Harmony: A Disputed Doctrine in Twelfth-Century Cistercian Anthropology,’ *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 55:3 (2020): 333-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Isaac of Stella, *Letter on the Soul*,trans. Clark,157. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Ibid., 162. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Bernard McGinn, *The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella* (Washington: Cistercian Publications, 1972); Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*, 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Isaac of Stella, *Letter on the Soul*,trans. Clark,168. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. *De spiritu et anima*,trans. Clark, 195. See also Teresa Regan, ‘A Study of the *Liber De spiritu et anima*,’ PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1948. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man,* 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. Ibid., 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. Ibid., 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Constant Mews, ‘Debating the Authority of Pseudo-Augustine’s *De spiritu et anima*,’ *Prezgląd Tomistyczny* 24 (2018): 321-48; idem., ‘The Early Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima* and Cistercian Reflection on the Powers of the Soul,’ *Viator* 49 (2019): 297-330. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man,* 71. Constant Mews, ‘The Early Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima*,’ 318*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. J.-P. Torrell, ‘Introduction,’ in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet: A Critical Edition*, ed. W.H. Principe (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 21, quodlibet 3.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. G. Théry, ‘L’authenticité du *De spiritu et anima* dans Saint Thomas et Albert le Grand,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 10 (1921): 376. Although some of Albert’s later writings admittedly ascribe passages from the text to Augustine, this does not mean in Théry’s view that Albert changed his mind about the authorship; it only reflects his awareness of the fact that there are some authentic elements or extracts from Augustine within the work, which is not itself the product of Augustine’s hand. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. Ibid., 377: In response to the rejoinder that Albert and Thomas Aquinas also quote the *De spiritu et anima,* Théry points out that they only do so in responding to their Franciscan counterparts, who quote the text extensively. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. Ibid., 377.  [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Thanks to Dominik Perler for highlighting this distinction for me between an account of cognition and a metaphysics of cognition. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Ibid., 376. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. DSEA, trans. Clark, 183 (Platonic division); 185 (Boethian). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. Ibid., 213 [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Ibid., 192 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 26; DSEA, trans. Clark, 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. DSEA, trans. Clark, chapter 27; Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. DSEA, trans. Clark, 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. Ibid., 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. Ibid., 201, 237-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. Ibid., 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances,’ 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. DSEA, trans. Clark, 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Ibid., 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. Peter Lombard, *Libri sententiarum*. *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, 3rd ed. (Grottaferrata, Roma: Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81)*,* I.17.1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Peter Lombard, *Libri sententiarum,* I.3.2. See also Bk. 2, d. 16 on the body-soul relationship; II.16.1-2: on the creation of humans in the image and likeness of God. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. Jean Châtillon, ‘Le Mouvement théologique dans la France de Philippe Auguste,’ in *La France de Philippe Auguste: Le Temps des Mutations*,ed. Robert-Henri Bautier (Paris: CNRS, 1982), 887, 898. See also John W. Baldwin, ‘Masters at Paris from 1179 to 1215: A Social Perspective,’ in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable with Carol D. Lanham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 138-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Dag. N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. Amos Bertolacci, ‘On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization,’ in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 197-223. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. The *Ethica vetus,* which included books II and II of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics,* was translated in the twelfth century by Burgundio of Pisa. The *Ethica nova* included Book I and fragments of some of the other nine books of the text. These works have been edited by René A. Gauthier in *Ethica nicomachea* (Leiden: Brill, 1972-4). See also David Luscombe, ‘Ethics in the Early Thirteenth Century,’ in *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter,* ed. Ludger Honnefelder (Munster: Aschendorff, 2005), 660. The first complete translation of Aristotle’s *Ethics* was that of Robert Grosseteste, which was produced between 1246-48, as Valeria Buffon points out in, ‘Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness: An Analysis of Early Latin Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics,’* *Laval théologique et philosophque* 60:3 (2004): 454-55. As Amos Bertolacci shows in his article ‘On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus,’ 204, *Metaphysics* was another work that circulated in several versions before about 1210: the so-called *Metaphysica vetusissima* by James of Venice, which included up to chapter four of book four; and the anonymous translation—or *Anonyma sive Media—*probably produced in the late twelfth century, which included the first eleven of the twelve books in total, but did not start to be circulated widely until the mid-thirteenth century.. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Richard C. Dales, ‘The Understanding of Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy by the Early Scholastics,’ in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Gründler,* ed. Nancy van Deusen (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1997), 141-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Dag Hasse*, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West,* 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. Amos Bertolacci, ‘On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics,’ 202. See also Amos Bertolacci, ‘Reading Aristotle with Avicenna: On the Reception of the *Philosophia Prima* in the *Summa Halensis*,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 135-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. The simultaneous reception of Aristotle with Arabic sources was highglighted by Martin Grabmann, *Forschungen über die lateinischen Aristotelesübersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1916). See also Paul Wilpert, ‘Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom lntellectus agens bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie* III.1 (1935): 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. This is a quote from Amos Bertolacci, taken from his comments on this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Cristina D’Ancona, ‘The *Liber de causis*,’ in *Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the Renaissance,* ed. Stephen Gersh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 137-61. Steven J. Williams, ‘Defining the Corpus Aristotelicum: Scholastic Awareness of Aristotelian Spuria in the High Middle Ages,’ *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 58 (1995), 29-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Averroes and Avicenna on Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. Dag Hasse*, Avicenna’s De anima*, 35, 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. See Charles Burnett, The Institutional Context of Arabic-Latin Translations in the Middle Ages: A Reassessment of the School of Toledo,’ in *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research Between the Middle Ages and Rennaissance,* ed. Olga Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 214-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. *Avencebrolis (Ibn Gebirol) Fons Vitae: Ex arabico in latinvm translatvs ab Iohanne Hispano et Dominico Gvndissalino: Ex codicibvs Parisinis, Amploniano, Colvmbino*,ed. Clemens Baeumker (Münster: Aschendorff, 1892-95). [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. See the excellent study of his thought by Nicola Polloni, *Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics: Gundissalinus’s Ontology of Matter and Form* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 17. Josep Puig, ‘The Transmission and Reception of Arabic Philosophy in Christian Spain (Until 1200),’ in *The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe*, ed. Charles E. Butterworth and Blake Andrée Kessel (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 7-30. Alexander Fidora, *Die Wissenschaftstheorie des Dominicus Gundissalinus* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. Nicola Polloni, ‘Dominicus Gundissalinus’ *On Unity and the One*,’ in *Medieval Philosophy and the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian Traditions: Essays in Honor of Richard Taylor,* ed.L.X. López Farjeat, K. Krause, and N. Oschman, forthcoming. There are three critical editions of Gundissalinus’ *De unitate*. These include, *Die dem Boethius fälschlich zugeschriebene Abhandlung* *des Dominicus Gundisalvi De Unitate*, ed. Paul Correns (Münster: Aschendorff, 1891). M. Alonso Alonso, ‘El Liber de unitate et uno,’ *Pensamiento* 12 (1956): 179-202. M. J. Soto Bruno and C. Alonso del Real, *De unitate et uno de Dominicus Gundissalinus* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron—A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism,’ in *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays,* ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan, 239-60 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. J.T. Muckle, ‘The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940): 23-103. *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. Simone van Riet, introduction by G. Verbeke (Leiden: Brill, 1972). Daniel A. Callus, ‘Gundissalinus’ *De anima* and the Problem of Substantial Form,’ *The New Scholasticism* 13 (1939): 338-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 18. On the relationship between Gundissalinus and Albert see, Alexander Fidora, ‘Arabic into Latin into Hebrew: Aristotelian Psychology and its Contribution to the Rationalisation of Theological Traditions,’ in *Philosophical Psychology in Medieval Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism*, ed. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp (Paris: Vrin, 2013), 17-39. Yossi Schwartz, ‘The Medieval Hebrew Translations of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ in *Latin-into-Hebrew : Studies and Texts,* vol. 2, ed. Alexander Fidora, Harvey J. Hames, Yossef Schwartz (Leiden : Brill, 2013), 19-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 209. According to Hasse, Gundissalinus does not affirm that God is the Agent Intellect, though he may imply it. It was Gilson who really insisted on this doctrine, for example, in his introduction to J. T. Muckle’s ‘The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ 23-27, which particularly vociferously rejects the claim of Roland de Vaux that Gundissalinus represents a purely ‘Latin’ rather than ‘Christian’ or ‘Augustinian’ Avicennism which is not specifically religious. See de Vaux’s chapter, ‘Y-a-til eu un Avicennisme Latin?’ in *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins des XIIe-XIIIe siècles* (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 9-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. See the following editions of the work: *Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift von dem Hervorgange der Welt* (*De processione mundi*), ed. Georg Bülow (Münster: Aschendorff, 1925). John A. Laumekis (trans.), *Dominicus Gundissalinus: The Procession of the World (De processione mundi)* (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 2002). Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De processione mundi,* ed. Maria Jesús Soto Bruno and Concepción Alonso del Real (Pamplona, EUNSA, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. N. Polloni, ‘Toledan Ontologies: Gundissalinus, Ibn Daud, and the Problems of Gabirolian Hylomorphism,’ in *Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions,* ed. Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni (Barcelona/Rome: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Etudes Médiévales, 2017), 34. See also Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics,* 261. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,’ 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Qusta ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ PhD dissertation (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985), 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*, 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. Carl Sigmund Baruch (ed.), *Excerpta e libro Alfredi Angelici De motu cordis item Costa Ben Lucae De differentia animae et spiritus liber translates a Johanne Hispalensi* (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagnerschen Universitaets-Buchhandlung, 1878), 130, quoting Costa Ben Luca: *[I]n humano corpore sunt duo spiritus: unus qui vocatur vitalis, cujus nutrimentum vel sustentatio est aër et ejus emanatio est a corde, et inde mittitur per pulsus ad reliquum corpus et operatur vitam, pulsum atque anhelitum; et alter, qui... dicitur animalis, qui operatur in ipso cerebro, cujus nutrimentum est spiritus vitalis; et ejus emanatio est a cerebro, et operatur in ipso cerebro cogitationem et memoriam atque providentiam, et ex eo mittitur per nervos ad cetera membra, ut operatur sensum atque motum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Questa ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. *Anima est perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, potentialiter vitam habentis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. According to James A. Weisheipl, in ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,’ 246, there are only five Latin manuscripts of the *Fons vitae,* but many of Gundissalinus. This suggests that Avicebron was generally received by Latin thinkers through the mediation of Gundissalinus. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. Sarah Pessin, ‘Avicebron,’ in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* online edition: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-gabirol/. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,’ 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. Sarah Pessin, *Ibn Gabirol’s Theology of Desire: Matter and Method in Jewish Medieval Neoplatonism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,’ 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*,191. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ in *Autour d’Aristote: Recueil d’Etudes de Philosophie ancienne et médiévale affert à Monseigneur A. Mansion* (Louvain, 1955), 472. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. D. A. Callus O.P. and R. W. Hunt, ed., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*(London, 1970). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ 477. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. Ibid., 483. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. Ibid., 480. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. Ibid., 484-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 33-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. Ibid,125-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. Ibid., 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. Ibid., 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 191. See also Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik: Von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus,’ *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 66:1 (1999): 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. Rodney M. Thomson, ed., *Alexander Nequam Speculum Speculationum,* inAuctores

     Britannici Medii Aevi 11 (London, 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 31ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 32; Carl Sigmund Baruch, ed., *Excerpta e libro Alfredi Angelici*, 16: Sarashel wrote his text most likely between 1220-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. Leland Edward Wilshire, ‘The Condemnations of 1277 and the Intellectual Climate of the Medieval University,’ in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University*,ed. Nancy Van Deusen(Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), 162. Luca Bianchi, ‘Les interdictions relatives à l’enseignement d’Aristote au XIIIe siècle,’ in *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du Guide de l’étudiant du ms. Ripoll 109*, ed. Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 117, 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. Luca Bianchi, ‘Les interdictions relatives à l’enseignement d’Aristote au XIIIe siècle,’ 117; c.f. S.C. Ferruow, ‘The Paris Statutes of 1215 Reconsidered,’ *History of Universities* 5 (1985): 1-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. Gordon Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*: *An Institutional and Intellectual History* (London: Wiley, 1968), 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. The prescribed texts are listed in *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (CUP), ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain (Paris: Delalain, 1889-1894; repr. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation, 1964), t. l, n. 20, 78. They are also listed by Claude Lafleur with Joanne Carrier in, ‘La réglementation curriculaire dans les introductions à la philosophie et les guides de l'étudiant de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle: Une mise en context,’ in *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du Guide de l’étudiant du ms. Ripoll 109,* ed. Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 522. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. Steven J. Williams, ‘Aristotle in the Medieval Classroom: Students, Teaching, and Educational Change in the Schools of Paris in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,’ in *The Classics in the Medieval and Renaissance Classroom: The Role of Ancient Texts in the Arts Curriculum as Revealed by Surviving Manuscripts and Early Printed Books*, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, et al. (Turnhout:  Brepols, 2013), 224.  [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. As Irene Zavattero points out in ‘Le début de la réception de l’Éthique à Nicomaque à Paris: Maîtres dès arts et théologiens in comparaison,’ *Annuaire de l’Ecole pratique des hautes études* (2019*)*: 297, William of Auxerre was the first to cite the *Ethica nova* in Paris and was followed in this regard by Alexander of Hales, Philip the Chancellor, John of La Rochelle, and Roland of Cremona; but the first significant exegesis of the text took place in the faculty of arts rather than theology. As Fernand Bossier observes in ‘Les ennuis d’un traducteur: Quatre annotations sur la première traduction latine de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Burgundio de Pise,’ *Bijdragen* 59 (1998): 406-27, the *Ethica vetus* included only books II-III of Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics,* while the *Ethica nova* included a translation of book I, the revision of books II-III and the translation of books IV-X. René A. Gauthier argues in ‘Le cours sur ‘l’ethica nova d’un maitre des arts de Paris (1235-40),’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 42 (1975): 71-141 that one anonymous commentary on the *Ethics* was actually written by Alexander of Hales. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. Lesley Smith, ‘The Theological Framework,’ in *The Cambridge History of Christianity,* vol. 4: *1100-1500*, ed. Miri Rubin and Walter Simons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. C. R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ *Angelicum* 45 (1968): 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231 du pape Grégoire IX sur l’étude des libri naturales d’Aristote à l’Université de Paris,’ in *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du Guide de l’étudiant du ms. Ripoll 109*, ed. Claude Lafleur (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. Luca Bianchi, ‘Les interdictions relatives à l’enseignement d’Aristote au XIIIe siècle,’ 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. Alain de Libera, ‘Faculté des arts ou Faculté de philosophie?’ in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, Xllle-xve siècles),* ed. Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (Paris: Brepols, 1997), 443. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. Gabriel Jüssen, ‘Aristoteles-Rezeption und Aristoteles-Kritik in Wilhelm von Auvergne’s *Tractatus de anima,’* in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Reijo Työrinoja et al (Helsinki, 1990), 87-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 145. Already at this point, the Dominican constitutions allow for brief consultation of Aristotle’s texts. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 142, 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
150. Beryl Smalley, ‘Gregory IX and the Two Faces of the Soul,’ in *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning: From Abelard to Wyclif* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1981), 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
151. Beryl Smalley, ‘Gregory IX and the Two Faces of the Soul,’ 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
152. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
153. Spencer Young undertakes an important study of what he calls the ‘*Parens scientiarum* generation’ of theology masters in *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215-1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Ian P. Wei examins the views of early masters on a variety of moral topics in *Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University c. 1100-1330* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For her part, Ayelet Even-Ezra explores how the early Parisian masters of theology forged their ideas about the nature of their own profession in *Ecstasy in the Classroom: Trance, Self, and the Academic Profession in Medieval Paris* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
154. Valeria Buffon, ‘Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness: An Anlaysis of Early Latin Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*,’ *Laval theologue et philosophique* 60:3 (2004): 453. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
155. Luca Bianchi, ‘Les interdictions relatives à l’enseignement d’Aristote au XIIIe siècle,’ 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
156. R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 2 (1933): 211. See also C.R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
157. R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
158. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
159. Both Williams and Bianchi accept Gauthier’s dating of the appearance of Averroes. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
160. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
161. Ibid., 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
162. Louis Jacques Bataillon, ‘Problèmes philosophiques dans les oeuvres théologiques,’ in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, ed. Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (Paris: Brepols, 1997), 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
163. Deborah Grice discusses the condemned articles in, *Church, Society and University: The Paris Condemnation of 1241/4* (London: Routledge, 2019). See also the older studies of Henri F. Dondaine, ‘L’objet et le ‘medium’ de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIIIe siècle,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 60-130. P.-M. De Contenson, ‘Avicennisme latin et vision de Dieu au début du XIIIe siècle,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 34 (1959): 29-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
164. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ 482; *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 13-15. On Roland, Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 38; Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
165. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Function of the Philosopher in Thirteenth-Century Oxford,’ in *Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des mittelalterlichen Menschen,* ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1964), 156. Here, Callus notes that the division of labour outlined here between philosophers and theologians does not necessarily denote any animosity between the two faculties in the university—only a sense of appropriate spheres of expertise and influence. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
166. Steven J. Williams, ‘Repenser l’intention et l’effet des décrets de 1231,’ 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
167. Louis Jacques Bataillon, ‘Problèmes philosophiques dans les oeuvres théologiques,’ 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
168. Luca Bianchi, ‘Les interdictions relatives à l’enseignement d’Aristote au XIIIe siècle,’ 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
169. Ibid., 114. Steven J. Williams, ‘Aristotle in the Medieval Classroom,’ 224. The complete list of works required are listed in CUP, 246, 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
170. René A. Gauthier, ‘La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d’un maitre des arts (vers 1225): Introduction et texte critique,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (Paris: Vrin, 1982): 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
171. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
172. René A. Gauthier, ‘La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius*,’ 27: *Anima est actus primus corporis phisici potencia vitam habentis*, citing Aristotle *De anima* II, 412a27-28 from the James of Venice translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
173. Ibid., 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
174. Ibid., 31-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
175. Ibid., 34-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
176. Ibid., 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
177. Ibid., 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
178. Ibid., 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
179. Ibid., 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
180. Ibid., 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
181. Ibid., 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
182. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19(1952), 146, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
183. Ibid., 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
184. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*,35. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
185. Ibid., 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
186. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
187. Ibid., 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
188. Ibid., 161-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
189. Ibid., 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
190. Ibid., 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
191. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*,35. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
192. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
193. Ignacius Brady, ‘The *Liber de anima* of William of Vaurouillon O.F.M.,’ *Medieval Studies* 11 (1949): 247-307; Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
194. https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\_l-xiii\_enc\_04081879\_aeterni-patris.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
195. On ‘pre-Thomists’, see Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances de l’âme au XIIe siècle,’ *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* 5 (1949): 15-34. Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode,* 2 vols (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1909-11). Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,* 6 vols (Gemblou: J. Ducalot, 1957-60). Étienne Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955). A.M. Landgraf, *Introduction à l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante,* trans. L.B. Geiger (Paris: Vrin, 1973). J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 3 (1928): 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
196. An excellent introduction to the different faculties of the University of Paris and their masters has been provided by Nathalie Gorochov, *Naissance de l’Université: Les écoles de Paris d’Innocent III à Thomas d’Aquin (v. 1200-v. 1245)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2016). Although somewhat outdated, Palemón Glorieux’s *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols(Paris: Vrin, 1933-4) remains an important catalogue of known thinkers from this period. See also Ayelet Even-Ezra, ‘The *Summa Halensis: A Text in Context,’* in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter 2020), 219-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
197. In some cases, an excellent up-to-date bibliography and description of the work of the thinkers treated here can be found in Alexander Brungs, Vilem Mudroch, Peter Schulthess (eds.), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 4: Die Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
198. Jean Ribaillier, ‘Introduction,’ in William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum vol. 16 (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1980), 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
199. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris ca. 1200-1250* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
200. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
201. Johannes Arnold, *Perfecta Communicatio: Die Trinitätstheologie Wilhelms von Auxerre* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1995) 15-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
202. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,15, note 22: The Summa was commonly dated to between 1228 and 1236 (the death of Philip the Chancellor), but the editor proposes a decidedly earlier date. *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*,2 vols,ed.Nicolas Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985). [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
203. Philip’s work rather than the *Summa Duacensis* probably influenced the *De anima* attributed to Robert Grosseteste according to Leo W. Keeler, ‘The Dependence of R. Grosseteste’s *De anima* on the Summa of Philip the Chancellor,’ *The New Scholasticism* 11:3 (1937): 197-219. D.A. Callus, ‘The *Summa Duacensis* and the Pseudo-Grosseteste’s *De anima*,’ *Recherches de thólogie ancienne et médiévale* 13 (1946): 225-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
204. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier Averroisme,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 322-7. This corrects Roland de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 22 (1933): 193-245. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
205. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*,25: ‘The fragmentary anonymous *Summa Duacensis* [is] a work that is very similar to those parts of the *Summa de bono* with which it coincides. Victorin Doucet attributed the similarity to the fact that the *Summa Duacensis* was not a finished work prepared by the author for publication, but rather an early version of the material that Philip put into final form in the *Summa de bono.* Palémon Glorieux, however, the editor of the *Summa Duacensis*, has judged that there are too many differences of “style and presentation” for this to be the case and attributes it to an unknown master; but he also considers the *Summa Duacensis* to be the earlier work. Nicolas Wicki, the editor of the *Summa de bono*,presents the opinions of Doucet and Glorieux without attempting a solution, remarking that both schools of thought have found their champions. I personally think that Doucet's case is the more probable. But the hard evidence is slight and the arguments on both sides tenuous, and in any case it was through Philip's work that these views influenced generations of Latin thinkers.’ See also Victorin Doucet, ‘A travers le manuscript 434 de Douai,’ *Antonianum* 27 (1952), 531-80. Palemon Glorieux, ed. *La ‘Summa Duacensis’ (Douai 434)* (Paris: Vrin, 1955), 10. Idem, ‘Les 572 Questions du manuscrit de Douai 434,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 10 (1938): 112-34. See also Wicki’s Introduction in *Summa de bono*,49. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
206. *Summa de bono*, 155-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
207. See also Christian Trottmann, ‘Science et sagesse dans la *Summa de bono* de Philippe le Chancelier,’ in *Philippe le Chancelier, prédicateur, théologien et poète parisien*, ed. Gilbert Dahan et Anne-Zoé Rillon-Marne (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 149-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
208. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,97. See also Christian Trottmann, ‘Science et sagesse dans la *Summa de bono* de Philippe le Chancelier,’ in *Philippe le Chancelier, prédicateur, théologien et poète parisien*, ed. Gilbert Dahan et Anne-Zoé Rillon-Marne (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 149-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
209. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,* vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1960), 149-69: on the literary influence of Philip the Chancellor on the Franciscans. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
210. *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951), vol. 1, 56-75. According to the prolegomena to Alexander’s Gloss, Alexander was an Englishman born in Hales Owen, now in Shropshire, around 1185 to a fairly well-off but not noble rural family. After studying the arts in Paris, he became a master of the arts in 1210 and in the same year began teaching at Paris. Around 1215, he began to study theology, becoming a regent master around 1221-1. He died at age 57 in Paris on 21 August 1245. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
211. Victorin Doucet, ‘A New Source of the ‘*Summa fratris Alexandri*,’ *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946): 403-17. As Doucet notes, the critical edition of Alexander’s Gloss was produced between 1951-7; the Gloss itself was probably written after 1222 and completed before 1227. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
212. On Alexander’s role in developing the *Sentences* Commentary tradition, see Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook,’ in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Gründler,* ed. Nancy van Deusen (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1997), 27-52. Philipp W. Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s Sentences* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)*,* 60-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
213. [*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*](http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/primo_library/libweb/action/display.do?tabs=detailsTab&ct=display&fn=search&doc=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&indx=1&recIds=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&recIdxs=0&elementId=0&renderMode=poppedOut&displayMode=full&frbrVersion=&dscnt=1&scp.scps=scope%3A(%22OX%22)&frbg=&tab=local&dstmp=1298799544709&vl(217121274UI0)=any&srt=rank&vl(204862243UI1)=all_items&mode=Basic&dum=true&tb=t&vl(1UIStartWith0)=contains&vl(freeText0)=Magistri%20Alexandri%20de%20Hales%20&vid=OXVU1) (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960). [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
214. Keenan B. Osborne, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ in *The History of Franciscan Theology* (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2007), 1-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
215. *Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae quae ad rerum universitatem pertinent* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXIX), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). *Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae de peccato originali* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXX), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). *Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae de peccato veniali et de conscientia* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXXII), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). *Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae de lapsu angelorum ac protoparentum* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXXI), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
216. Keenan B. Osborne, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
217. A. d'Esneval, ‘La division de la Vulgate latine en chapitres dans l'edition parisienne du XIII' siecle, *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 62 (1978): 559-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
218. M.V. Dougherty, ‘Twenty Moral Dilemmas from Two Early Thirteenth-Century Summaries of Theology: William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* and the Franciscan *Summa Halensiana,’* in *Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought From Gratian to Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 46 [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
219. Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook,’ 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
220. Marcia L. Colish, ‘The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century,’ in *The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Grundler* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1997), 1-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
221. Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III,’ 360-1; cf. ‘The History of the Problem of the Summa,’ 310-11. *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48). [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
222. Adam Jeffrey Davis, *The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-century Normandy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). Sophie Delmas, ‘Odo Rigaldi, Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis,’* in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020). Nathalie Gorochov, ‘Odo Rigaldus at the University of Paris (c. 1220-48),’ in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 151-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
223. Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
224. Berard Vogt, ‘Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Franziskanerschule,’ 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
225. Odon Lottin, ‘Roland de Crémone et Hugues de Saint-Cher,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiéevale* 12 (1940): 136. Roland was the first Dominican master to teach theology at Paris; cf. E. Filthaut, *Roland von Cremona O.P. und die Anfänge der Scholastik im Predigerorden* (Vechta i.O.: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag der Dominikaner, 1936), 20-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
226. *Summa de bono*, 26-7. On the close relationship between Philip and the mendicants, see Sophie Delmas, ‘Philippe le Chancelier et les orders mendicants: anatomie d’une relation,’ in *Philippe le Chancelier, prédicateur, théologien et poète parisien*, ed. Gilbert Dahan et Anne-Zoé Rillon-Marne (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 25-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
227. E. Filthaut, *Roland von Cremona O.P.*, 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
228. O. Lottin, ‘Roland de Cremone et Hugues de Saint-Cher,’ 136-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
229. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*,36. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
230. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 28-30. R. Quinto, ‘Le Commentaire des *Sentences* d’Hugues de Saint-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,’ in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (d. 1263): bibliste et théologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Batallion, Gilbert Dahan, Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 314-315, footnote 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
231. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
232. C. R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ 433. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
233. Cristina D’Ancona, ‘The *Liber de causis*,’ in *Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the Renaissance,* ed. Stephen Gersh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 137-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
234. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 36-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
235. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*,ed. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), 167-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
236. Ibid., 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
237. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 38; Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Function of the Philosopher,’ 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
238. *Summa de bono*, 26-7. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
239. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 24; see also her article on ‘The *Sentences* Commentary of Hugh of St Cher,’ in Philipp Rosemann, *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*,vol. 2, 112 in 111-47, where she shows that the date of Hugh’s work is actually disputed. See also Magdalena Bieniak, ‘Contents of Hugh of St Cher’s Commentary on the *Sentences*, Books I-II,’ *Przeglad Tomistyczny* 19 (2013): 9-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
240. Jacques Verger, ‘Hugues de Saint-Cher dans le context universitaire Parisien,’ 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
241. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘Contents of Hugh of St Cher’s Commentary on the *Sentences*, Books I-II,’ 9: born around 1190, he became a Dominican in 1224-5 and taught theology from 1230-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
242. Jacques Verger, ‘Hugues de Saint-Cher dans le context universitaire Parisien,’ in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (d. 1263): bibliste et théologien*, ed. Louis-Jacques Batallion, Gilbert Dahan, Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 13. See also John Fisher, ‘Hugh of St Cher and the Development of Medieval Theology,’ *Speculum* 31:1 (Jan. 1956): 57-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
243. Lesley Smith, ‘Hugh of St Cher and Medieval Collaboration,’ in *Transforming Relations: Essays on Jews and Christians throughout History in Honor of Michael A. Signer*, ed. Franklin T. Harkins (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 241-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
244. Robert E. Lerner, ‘The Vocation of the Friars Preacher: Hugh of St Cher Between Peter the Chanter and Albert the Great,’ in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (d. 1263): bibliste et théologien*, 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
245. Lesley Smith provides a nuanced and persuasive argument in ‘Hugh of St Cher and Medieval Collaboration,’ 241-64 that collaboration was common in this period and that it did not mean that overseers of major works like the Postills were not also original thinkers. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
246. Robert E. Lerner, ‘The Vocation of the Friars Preacher,’ 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
247. Ibid., 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
248. Robert E. Lerner, ‘The Vocation of the Friars Preacher,’ 229 [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
249. John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle*,vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 107-14. John W. Baldwin, ‘Masters at Paris from 1179-1215,’ in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 138-72. Robert E. Lerner, ‘The Vocation of the Friars Preacher,’ 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
250. While the Dominicans generally did follow Augustine in discussing the relationship between higher and lower reason, or reason ordered to things above and things below, they mainly did so in the context of explaining how temporal goods can distract us from our true purpose—what they called sensuality—and how we should evaluate them in order to prevent this from happening. They were not normally interested in the details of bodily or natural life as such but limited their use of natural philosophy to what they thought was consistent with the exposition of traditional theological or even Augustinian *topoi*, such as the notion of human rationality—comprised of memory, understanding, and will—as the locus of the image of God. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
251. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘The *Sentences* Commentary of Hugh of St Cher,’ 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
252. Ibid., 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
253. Ibid., 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
254. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*,37. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
255. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 95, 97, 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
256. J.-P. Torrell, ‘Introduction,’ in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet,* 3. B.-G. Guyot, ‘Guerric de Saint-Quentin,’ *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 6 (1967), 1121-22. Th. Kaepelli, ‘Guerricus de S. Quintino,’ *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, t. 2 (Rome 1975), 61-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
257. H.-F. Dondaine and B.-G. Guyot, ‘Guerric de Saint-Quentin et la condamnation de 1241,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiquese et theologiques* 4 (1960): 225-242. Antoine Côté, ‘Note sur Guerric de Saint-Quentin et la question de l’infini divin,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 62 (1995): 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
258. J.-P. Torrell, ‘Introduction,’ in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet,* 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
259. Bernardo Carlos Bazán, ‘Les questions disputées, principalement dans les faculties de theologie,’ in Bernardo Carlos Bazán, J. Fransen and J. Wippel, eds. Les questions disputees et Ies questions quodlibetiques dans les

     facultes de theéologie, de droit et de medicine,’ *Typologie des sources du Moyen Age occidental* 44-45 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 13-149. P. Glorieux, ‘Aux origines du Quodlibet,’ *Divus Thomas* 38 (1935): 502-522. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
260. François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Les Écrits Du Frère Guerric De Saint-Quentin, O. P,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 6 (1934): 184-214, 84-312, 94-410. François-Marie Henquinet, ‘Notes additionnelles sur les écrits de Guerric de Saint-Quentin,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 8 (1936): 369-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
261. Roland J. Teske, ‘William of Auvergne’s Debt to Avicenna,’ in Roland J. Teske, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris 1228-1249* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006), 217-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
262. *Guillelmi Alverni Opera omnia*, 2 vols (Paris, 1674). Franco Morenzoni, and Jean-Yves Tilliette, eds. *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
263. Gabriel Jüssen, ‘Wilhelm von Auvergne und die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Übergang zur Hochscholastik,’ in *Thomas von Aquin im philosophischen Gespräch,* ed. Wolfgang Klugen (Freiburg, 1975), 185-203. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
264. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic*,ed. Ernest A. Moody (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 17. Ephrem Lonpré, ‘Guillaume d’Auvergne et Alexandre de Halès,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 16 (1923): 426-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
265. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
266. Ignatius Brady, ‘Jean de La Rochelle,’ in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* VIII (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 599-602. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
267. Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summa Fratris Alexandri,’in *Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica* (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae,1948), 211-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
268. Riccardo Saccenti has prepared several editions of John’s works, including *Iohannis de Rupella, Quaestiones Disputatae de legibus* (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2021) and his forthcoming editions of John’s *Summa de divinis nominibus* and *Summa de articulis fidei*. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
269. J.G. Bougerol, ‘Jean de La Rochelle. Les oeuvres et les manuscrits,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 87 (1994): 205-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
270. See a very good introduction to major English Franciscan thinkers on these and other issues by Dorothea Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964). See also Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021). A.G. Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19 (1926): 803–74. Leonardo Sileo, ‘I primi maestri francescani di Parigi e di Oxford,’ in *Storia della teologia nel Medioevo 2: La grande fioritura*,ed. Giulio d’Onofrio (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1996), 645-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
271. Anonymous, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, ed. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952) : 143. Nikolaus Wicki, ‘Die intellectus agens-Lehre Philipps des Kanzlers (d. 1236),’ in *Festschrift für Martin Anton Schmidt* (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1989), 163. As Wicki notes on page 172, the agent intellect for Phillip abstracts the universal and unites it to the possible. These two intellects relate as matter to form. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
272. *Summa de bono,* 270: *Ad intelligendum tria exiguntur: intellectus possibilis, agens et formalis. Intellectus agens abstrahit species a phantasmatibus et abstrahendo unit cum possibili qui est recipiens. Formalis autem dicitur qui recipitur, et hoc est in intellectu humano proprium, qui se ipso res non intelligit. Inter has autem tres differentias solus intellectus formalis est destructibilis, quia ac­quisitus est et tolli potest et secundum diversa intellecta diversus est. Sed secundum utramque differentiam alter incorruptibilis est.* On Philip’s tripartite concept of intellect as possible, formal, and agent, see Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013), 81-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
273. Dag Nikolaus Hasse indicates that the first instance of this term *intellectus formalis* may be in John Blund’s *De anima;* see‘Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik: von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 66 (1999): 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
274. *Summa de bono,* 270. Nikolaus Wicki, ‘Die intellectus agens-Lehre Philipps des Kanzlers (d. 1236),’ 162. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
275. *Summa de bono,* 157: *intellectus formalis* seems to be another name for the material intellect. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
276. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, ed. Aloysio Cortesi (Bergamo: Humberto Midali, 2016), Ch 117, 167-8; Chs 119-29, 171-83. Roland also deals with some of the medical questions, for example, concerning the vegetable powers. See for example Ch 135, 189-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
277. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
278. See Amos Bertolacci, ‘Reading Aristotle with Avicenna: On the Reception of the *Philosophia Prima* in the *Summa Halensis*,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 135-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
279. Ignatius Brady, ‘The *Liber de anima* of William of Vaurouillon OFM,’ *Medieval Studies* 11 (1949): 247-307. *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
280. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*,205. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
281. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*,86, 89. See also F. Van Steenberghen, *Die Philosophie im 13. Jahrhundert* (Munich: F. Schöningh, 1977), 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
282. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima*, 48 [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
283. Sensation or grasping a form in matter as present; imagination, or grasping a form in matter as absent; intellection: grasping a form without matter [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
284. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*,8, citing Augustine, *De ordine* II.11.31 (PL 32, 1009), *De quantitatae animae* I.25.47 (PL 32, 1062), *De civitate dei* IV.13 (CC 47, p. 261). [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
285. McGinn cites Plato, *Alcibiades* 129e; Plotinus, *Enneads* I.1.3 and VI.7.5; Augustine, *De quantitatae animae* 13, 22; *De moribus ecclesiasticae catholicae* I.4.6 and I.2752; *In Iohannes Evangelium* 19.5.15; *De civitate Dei* IX.9-10, X.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
286. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 7.27.38; *De quantitatae animae* I.2; *De civitate Dei* I.13, X.29, XIII.24. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris ca. 1200-1250* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 23, citing Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.35.68, ed. Zycha, CSEL 28.1 (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1894), 72, n. 194: *Naturalis appetitus corpus administrandi.* [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
287. Ibid.,9. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
288. R.A. Markus, ‘Augustine—Man: Body and Soul,’ in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 354-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
289. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Dublin: Maes Duffey, 1950), 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
290. Ibid., citing Étienne Gilson, *Introduction a l’etude de S. Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1929), 55, n. 1. See also Gilson’s ‘Les sources Greco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929-30): 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
291. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
292. Bernhard Blumenkranz, ‘La survie médiévale de saint Augustin à travers ses apocryphes,’ in *Augustinus Magister* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 1012. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
293. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
294. Ibid.,8. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
295. *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, 4 vols (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48), L2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2, 385; cf. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
296. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*,8: ‘The human soul may be considered from two points of view: as it is related to the body, and as it is in itself.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
297. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2, 385: *Corporeum dicitur dupliciter: vel absolute vel ratione alicuius conditionis sive respective. Si absolute, secundum hoc non est anima hominis corporea, immo incorporea; dicitur tamen corporea, quia aliquam habet circumscriptionem vel definitionem localem comparitione ad Deum, qui omnino incircumscriptus est.* ‘Corporeality can be defined in two ways, either absolutely or by reason of some condition or relation. If it is said absolutely, then the human soul is not corporeal but incorporeal. However, it is called corporeal [because], insofar as [it is embodied], it is somehow circumscribed and has a defined location by contrast to God who is entirely uncircumscribable.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
298. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, eds., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima* (London: British Academy, 1970), 18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
299. *Summa de anima*, 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
300. Ibid., 80; cf. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2, 385: *Quod autem sit substantia non tantum ut forma substantialis sed ut quid ens in se, praeter hoc quod est actus corporis.* ‘The soul is not only a substantial form of the body but also a being in itself beyond being the actualization of the body.’ Also, Respondeo 2c, 386: states that the soul perfects itself and not merely matter; thus it is beyond matter. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
301. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ in *Autour d’Aristote: Recueil d’Etudes de Philosophie ancienne et médiévale affert à Monseigneur A. Mansion* (Louvain, 1955), 486 in 471-95; D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt (eds.), *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*,3. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
302. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2a, 386a: *Quod movens per se est distinctum per essentiam a mobili sed anima movet corpus; ergo est distincta per essentiam a corpore; ergo est substantia praeter substantiam corporis.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
303. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2b, 386, citing Aristotle *De anima* II.1: *Anima habet ad corpus sicut nauta ad navim, sed nauta secundum substantiam dividitur a navi, cum movet navim et secundum accidens movetur; ergo anima secundum substantiam dividitur a corpore, et si movetur secundum accidens movetur, ergo anima secundum substantiam dividitur a corpore et si movetur secundum accidens movetur; ergo, anima est substantia praeter corpus.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
304. *Summa de anima*, 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
305. Ibid., 51: *Posito quod subito esset homo creatus perfectus et, velato visu suo, non videret exteriora, et taliter creatus esset quod non tangeret eum spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire posset, et membra sic essent disiuncta ut non concurrerent sibi, neque contingerent; constans est, quod sic conditus homo, cogitans de se, non dubitaret affirmare se esse: non tamen affirmaret exteriora suorum membrorum vel occulta suorum interiorum, sicut cerebrum vel alia: immo si possibile esset ei imaginari manum, vel aliud membrum, non imaginaretur illud membrum sui, nec necessarium sue essencie. Cum ergo omne quod affirmatur aliud est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab eo quod non conceditur, essencia autem quam affirmat est propria illi, eo quod illa est ipsemet: tamen est preter corpus eius, quod non affirmat. Expergefactus igitur ab huiusmodo statu, habet viam euigilandi et cognoscendi quod esse anime aliud est quam esse corporis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
306. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic*,ed. Ernest A. Moody (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 20. William of Auvergne, *The Soul,* trans. Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000), 50. For a detailed analysis of Auvergne’s psychology, see Thomas Pitour, *Wilhelm von Auvergne’s Psychologie: von der Rezeption des aristotelische Hylemorphismus zur Reformulierung der Imago-Dei-Lehre Augustinus* (Paderborn: Ferdinand and Schönling,2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
307. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’25, 55. See also William of Auvergne, *The Soul*,trans. Teske, S.J., 91, 140-2. Roland J. Teske, ‘William of Auvergne on the Individuation of Human Souls,’ in Roland J. Teske, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris 1228-1249* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006), 121-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
308. *Summa de anima*, 51-2: *Nichil tam novit mens vel anima quam id quod sibi presto est; nec menti nec anime quicquam magis presto est quam ipsa sibi. Ergo nichil tam novit quam se: cognoscit enim vivere se, meminisse se, velle, cognoscere, scire, iudicare; et hec omnia certissime novit de se. Impossibile est igitur quod ignoret se esse.* [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
309. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, M1, 389a: *Si esset de substantia Dei, substantia Dei, vel esset ipsa anima vel pars animae, ita quod anima de substantia Dei produceretur. Si vero substantia Dei anima esset, non esset anima mutabilis a bonitate in malitiam, a veritate ad errorem, a gaudio ad tristitiam: substantia enim Dei incommutabilis est.* ‘The soul is not of God’s substance, because if this were the case, then God’s substance would be the soul or part of the soul, so that the soul would be produced out of God’s substance. As God is entirely unchanging, this means that if the soul were of God’s substance, the soul would not be changeable from good to evil, etc…The soul would be the same as God and as other souls, and there would be one soul in all, which is absurd.’ See also John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 64, which states that the soul is not made of the substance of God. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
310. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C2, Solutio II, 401. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
311. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
312. On the twelfth-century developments, see Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles,’ *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 34 (1932), 22 of 21-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
313. Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles,’ 23: This view was picked up by Simon of Tournai. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
314. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea,* ed. Jean Riballier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 16 (Rome: Quarrachi, 1980), Liber 1, Tr 2, p. 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
315. Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles,’ 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
316. E. Kleineidam, *Das Problem der Hylomorphen Zusammensetzung der Geistigen Substanzen im 13. Jahrhundert* (PhD, Breslau, 1930). See also Odon Lottin’s review of Kleineidam in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* (1931): 430-1; and his *Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), 427-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
317. D.A. Callus, ‘Gundissalinus’ *De anima* and the Problem of the Substantial Form,’ *The New Scholasticism* 13 (1939), 432. Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol) Fons Vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum Translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino, ed. Clemens Baeumker (Münster: Aschendorff, 1892), 298, 17-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
318. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 1, 427-50. See a relevant article by Daniel A. Callus, ‘Two Early Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms: Adam of Buckfield – Richard of Cornwall,’ *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 63 (1939): 411-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
319. D.A. Callus, ‘Gundissalinus’ *De anima*,’ 348. Nicola Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics: Gundissalinus’s Ontology of Matter and Form* (Toronto: PIMS, 2020), 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
320. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron—A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism,’ in *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays,* ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
321. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt (eds.), *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
322. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
323. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*,22. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
324. *Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono*, ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 157: *Deinde querendum est de principiis si habet materiam et formam, cum non sit omnino simplex quemadmodum Primum…in anima autem sunt due differentie, una ad recipiendum et altera ad faciendum. Ex quo accipitur quod habet materiam et formam, cum materia sit principium recipiendi, forma autem agendi; nam sunt eius hee differentie intellectus agens et possibilis. Similiter estimatur idem ex hoc quod omne ens simplex est aut compositum, et anima non est ens simplex, quia tunc idem esset in anima quod est et quo est... Preterea, in libro De Trinitate habetur quod in omni causato a primo est hoc et hoc et ita materia et forma. Preterea, idem estimari potest ex diffinitione philosophorum qui posuerunt materiam spiritualem et formam spiritualem…Est tamen in anima rationali amplior accessus ad compositionem materie et forme quam in intelligentia, quod ostenditur in natura eius secundum quam corpori materiali unitur. Unde in ipsa sunt differentie diverse intellectus agentis et possibilis, in intellectu vero angelico non sunt ita diverse differentie.* See also Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles,’ 29-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
325. See also Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles,’ 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
326. Ibid., 24-26.

     See also Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 105; Richard Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
327. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’26. William of Auvergne, *The Soul*,trans. Teske, 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
328. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris,* f104. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
329. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis O.P., Liber Secundus,* ed. Aloysio Cortesi (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), Ch 12, 34; Cf. Ch 74, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
330. Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet: A Critical Edition*, ed. W.H. Principe, with preface by J. Black, introduction by J.-P. Torrell (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), Quodlibet 8.4a, 352; cf. Quodlibet 9, Article 5, Solutio, 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
331. Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet***,** Quodlibet 8.4b, 353. J.-P. Torrell, ‘Introduction,’ in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
332. *Summa de anima*,68; E. Kleineidam held that the main defender of universal hylomorphism was the author of the *Summa Halensis* while opponents included John of La Rochelle and William of Auvergne. See his *Das Problem de hylomorphen Zusammensetzung der geistigen Substanzen im 13. Jahrhundert, behandelt bis Thomas von Aquin* (PhD, Breslau, 1930). [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
333. See Lydia Schumacher, ‘Theistic Proof,’ in *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 103-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
334. *Summa de anima*, 69: *Ad hoc dicendum quod partes entis essenciales dicuntur dupliciter: uno enim modo partes entis dicuntur quod est et quo est; et iste partes entis inveniuntur in omni eo quod est citra Primum, in omni scilicet creatura. Quod manifestatur sic: quia omne illud quod est citra Primum est ens per participacionem. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo quo est, scilicet sua essencia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essencia. Quod manifestatur sic: sicut enim bonum quod est Deus, est bonum per essenciam, quia est se ipso bonum, nec est ei aliud esse et bonum esse: ideo in eo indifferens omnino bonum et bonitas. Creatura autem, cum sit bona, non est ex seipsa bona, nec ipsa bonitas; immo ex hoc est bona quod ordinabilis ad summam bonitatem; et ideo non est bona per essenciam sed per participacionem ipsius summe bonitatis, quam habet ex ordinacione ad ipsam, bona est. Ideo differt in creatura quod est bonum et quo est bonum, et hoc ipsum bonum et ipsa bonitas. Similiter ens quod est Deus, cum sit ens se ipso, est ens per essenciam. Ens vero creatum, cum sit ens ab alio quod est Deus, est ens per aliud, est ens per participationem. Et ideo erit differens in ente creato quod est et quo est.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
335. *Summa de anima*, 70: *Preterea, omne ens creaturm est ens a Deo de nichilo. In eo autem quod dicitur quod est creatura intelligitur quod est ens de nichilo. In eo autem quod dicitur quo est, intelligitur essencia a Deo sive quam accipit a Deo. Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiva et passiva; iuxta secundum modum, potencia activa. Alio modo dicuntur partes essentiales materia et forma; et hec partes solum inveniuntur in illos solis que a Deo sunt de aliquo, non autem in hiis que a Deo sunt de nichilo. Corporalia ergo, que sunt de aliquo composicionem habent materie et forme; materia enim est de qua est aliquid vel fit aliquid; forma vero per quam est aliquid. Dicendum est ergo quod spiritualia et anima racionalis composicionem habent ex partibus essencialibus que partes sunt quod est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de nichilo; et non habent composicionem que est materia et forma proprie dictis, quia on sunt a Deo creata de aliquo.* [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
336. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, T2, C1, Solutio, 399: *Ad quod dicendum quod anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia intellectuali.* [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
337. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 1, 398, citing Augustine’s *De quantitatae animae* 1.2: *Simplex natura animae dici potest, quia ex aliis naturis non est.* [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
338. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 2, 398: *Anima est substantia spiritualis, simplex, indissolubilis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
339. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 4, 399. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
340. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 5, 399: *Si formam contingit esse simplicem, non compositam scilicet ex materia et forma.* [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
341. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 6, 399. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
342. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Contra 6, 399. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
343. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Solutio 3, 425: *Anima enim est resolubilis in suam formam et materiam sive in suum 'quod est' et ' quo est'.* [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
344. Many thinkers at the time believed that *De fide ad Petrum* was Augustine’s authentic work, and that led to dualistic perspective on body and soul. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
345. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, e, 398. See also Ad objeca 1, 399: *Non dicitur simplex absolute: sic enim convenit Deo esse simplicem* (referring to an angel). [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
346. Much of the Summa’s account of universal hylomorphism is repeated by Odo Rigaldus in his commentary on the *Sentences*. See James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,’ 253. See also Odon Lottin, ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
347. Bernardo Carlos Bazán, ‘The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 64 (1997), 104. For Avicenna, as Bazán writes, citing Avicenna’s *De anima* V.7, ‘the relationship between soul and body ceases to have any meaning after death, once the goals that were sought with the union are achieved the soul continues to live its substantial self-sufficient existence in the company of the superior intelligences that are its true realm. The spiritual substance is the real self of a human being: we are our soul.’ See also his article entitled, ‘Pluralism de formes ou dualism de substances? La pensée pré-thomiste touchant la nature de l’âme,’ *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 67 (1969): 30-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
348. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*,12. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
349. Avicenna, *De anima* I.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
350. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’39. William of Auvergne, *The Soul*, trans. Teske, 43, 277; cf. 395, 400, 410. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
351. William of Auvergne, *The Soul*,trans. Teske, 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
352. Ibid., 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
353. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 26, 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
354. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘Una questione disputata di ugo di St Cher sull’anima edizione e studio dottrinale,’ *Studia Antyczne I Mediewistyczne* 37 (2004): 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
355. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 24. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 17 (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), 751-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
356. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 17, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
357. For example, Roland makes implicit reference to the dependence of the soul on the body when he says in *Summae Mgistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P. Liber Secundus,* ed. Aloysio Cortesi (Bergamo: Humberto Midali, 2016),Ch 263.7, 339: ‘Similiter patet quare anima hominis non creatur ante infusionem, quia creatur cum viribus dependentibus a corpore, unde, si crearetur antequam infunderetur, cruciaretur ex hoc quod non posset exercere potentias suas dependentes a corpore, et ita pena esset antequam culpa, quod est inconveniens.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
358. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 28-9: ‘Indeed, while discussing the punishment of purgatory, Roland dwells upon the difference between the human soul and the angel. Whereas the angel, since it is a separate substance, acquires its perfection outside the body – he writes – the human soul can receive its ultimate perfection only in the resurrected body: for the soul somehow depends upon its body; “*Set contra: talis differentia non est nisi accidentalis, intra corpus et extra corpus; set angeli et omnes anime differunt secundum speciem, ergo per aliud, quod concedimus. Differunt enim ab inuicem quia anima creatur cum dependentibus a corpore, et hec est substantialis differentia, angelus autem non*”.’ Cf. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
359. Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet: A Critical Edition,* ed. Walter H. Principe (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), Quodlibet 3, Article 6, 228-32. See also Quodlibet 7, Article 5, 328-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
360. C. R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ *Angelicum* 45 (1968): 438: Roland said the soul wants to be united to a body naturally. On Roland, see also E. Prête, ‘La posizione di Rolando da Cremona nel pensiero médiévale,’ *Rivista di Folosofia neoscolastica* 23 (1931): 484-89. E. Filthaut, *Roland von Cremona OP und die Anfänge der scholastic im Predigerorden: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der ältern Dominikaner* (Vechta i.O.: Albertus-Magnus-Verlag der Dominikaner, 1936). [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
361. *Summa de anima*, 53: *Anima est… actus et perfectio ipsius et forma, et secundum hoc diffinitur ab Aristotele, in libro de anima: ‘Anima est actus primus corporis phisici, organici, potencia vitam habentis.’* This supposedly agrees with Augustine DSEA 6, which states: *anima est substance quaedam racoons participio, regendo corpore accomodata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
362. On the translations see L. Minio-Paluello, ‘Le texte du *De anima* d’Aristote: la tradition latine avant 1500,’ chapter 14, 250-76; the later translation of William of Moerbeke, in use by 1270s corrected numerous problems with the earlier translations off John of Venice, including poor word choice. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
363. Aristotle, *De anima* 412a27. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
364. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 13. This definition of the soul as ‘first act’ is another one that Aristotle gives following his first definition, and he uses the two definitions interchangeably. See Sander De Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De anima, c. 1260-1360* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2017), 125. As de Boer elaborates, ‘being a substance qua form already implies being the first actuality, since the substantial form is that which by definition gives the first actuality to a substance,’ realising its potential for actual existence. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
365. The translation of Aristotle is contained in a lemma translated from Arabic, as noted by Minio-Paluello in ‘Le texte du *De anima* d’Aristote,’ 270. See *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,* ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 136: *Anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia. Et est secundum quod est organicum* (The soul is the first perfection of a natural organic body having the potentiality for life). See also 138: *Si igitur aliquod universale dicendum est in omni anima, dicemus quod est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici*. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
366. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
367. This definition reads as follows: *Anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia.* See Sander De Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, 123. The slightly later Greco-Latin translation of William Moerbeke reads: *Anima est primus actus corporis physici in potentia vitam habentis.* D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul’, 491, lists several variants of the definition that were used in the early thirteenth century, all of which contain the term ‘perfectio’. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
368. *Anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, viventis potentialiter.* See Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 9: This version is found in Gundissalinus; see J.T. Muckle, ‘The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940): 40. Costa’s version stated as follows: *Anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, viventis potentialiter vitam habentis.* See Carl Sigmund Baruch (ed.), *Excerpta e libro Alfredi Angelici De motu cordis item Costa Ben Lucae De differentia animae et spiritus liber translates a Johanne Hispalensi* (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagnerschen Universitaets-Buchhandlung, 1878), 134. See also the excellent dissertation by Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Questa ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ PhD dissertation (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985), 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
369. Avicenna, *De anima* V.1. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 17: ‘The Arabic definition of the soul as perfection of the body enters the Latin West not only through Avicenna, but also thanks to Costa Ben Luca’s treatise *De differentia spiritus et animae*. It is through the latter that the definition is assimilated into the first Latin work influenced by Avicenna, i.e. the *De anima* by Dominicus Gundissalinus.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
370. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
371. Ibid., 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
372. *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,* ed. F.S. Crawford, 417: *Sentiens enim non est extra corpus; iste [i.e., intellectus] autem est abstractus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
373. Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Questa ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
374. *Anima est corporis organici perfectio, vitam habentis in potentia.* D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, eds., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
375. D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
376. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt (eds.), *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De anima*, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
377. Ibid., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 5-6: ‘The word soul...signifies a kind of substance that has an accidental relation to the organic body, insofar as it animates and vivifies that body by itself, and because of this accidental relationship it is said to be its perfection, that is, because it gives the body life. *Hoc nomen 'anima' ...[s]ignificat...substantiam sub quodam accidente in relatione ad corpus organicum in quantum ipsum animatur et vivificatur per ipsam, et gratia illius accidentis dicitur esse perfectio ipsius, eo scilicet quod ipsa ipsum animat.*’ [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
378. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
379. *Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono*,ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 264, 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
380. *Summa de bono*, 284. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
381. Ibid.,282-3: *Dicendum est quod anima, sicut dictum est, non est forma tantum sive perfectio, sed et substantia... Intelligendum est quod non est sicut forma in materia secundum omnem modum, quia separatur a corpore secundum quod substantia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
382. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 121. In *Summa de bono*,283, Philip calls the soul the form and perfection and substance of the body; while it is form to matter, it is not a form in all respects because it also remains a separate substance. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
383. *Summa de bono*, 284: *Manifestum est igitur quod, licet sit ut forma, non tamen per se corpori necesse est coniungi.* [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
384. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
385. Lesley Smith, ‘Hugh of St Cher and Medieval Collaboration,’ *Transforming Relations: Essays on Jews and Christians throughout History in Honor of Michael A. Signer,* ed. Franklin T. Harkins (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 241-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
386. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
387. *Summa de anima*, 115: *Item, cum anima uniatur corpori ut forma et perfectio eius.* [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
388. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 116: *Anima racionalis unitur corpori secundum duplicem modum: unitur enim ut forma sue materie sive ut perfectio suo perfectibili; unitur eciam ei ut suo organo sive instumento per quod operator, duplex est ergo racio unionis. Secundum primum modum unitur anima corpori sine medio.* [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
389. Ibid., 58: *Anima sit perfectio et forma et actus corporis, est actus primus, non secundus.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
390. Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Questa ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
391. *Summa de anima*, 58: *Sciendum igitur quod actus ibi dicitur rei perfectio; tamen quia perfection est duplex, scilicet perfectio secundum habitum, quemadmodum nos dicimus puerum perfectum racionabilitate, et perfectio secundus usum, sicut dicimus virum perfectum racionabilitate, quia potest racione uti: similiter distinguitur duplex esse et duplex actus essendi, sive completio secundum habitum et secundum usum. Actus sive perfectio secundum habitum est actus primus; actus secundum usum est actus secundus. Cum igitur anima sit perfectio et forma et actus corporis, est actus primus, non secundus, Cuius autem sit actus, determinatur quia corporis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
392. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
393. Ibid., 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
394. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
395. *Summa de anima*, 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
396. *Summa de anima*, 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
397. Ibid., 64: *Intellectus ipsius anime est immaterialis quia eius operacio est per abstractionem a materia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
398. Ibid., 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
399. Ibid., 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
400. Ibid., 125. The soul and body are not united as motor to moved or sailor to ship because this is a union which is not according to substance, but the human body and soul are united by substance or essentially. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
401. Ibid., 52. *Anima vero per naturam unibilitatis cum corpore per quam corpus animando vivificat; quedam vero substancia est que nec spiritus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
402. Ibid., 128. *Nam una anima racionalis determinata est ad unum corpus, et non est possibile ut perficiat splendore suo aliud corpus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
403. Ibid., 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
404. Ibid. *Anime racionalis dicendum est quod unitur secundum duplicem modum corpori: unitur enim sicut forma vel perfectio suo perfectibili et ut Artifex suo organo, sive motor mobili.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
405. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar1, Contra c, 418. Cf. C6, Ad objecta 2, 417: *Anima rationalis praecedit suum corpus, sed est perfectio corporis organici, potentia vitam habentis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
406. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C3, Ar3, Sed contra a, 428, citing Aristotle, *De anima* II.2: *Vita est primus actus animae in corpore.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
407. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Ar1, 1, 425: *Forma autem dicitur in quantum perficit esse.* [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
408. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1, Contra e, 418: *Item, omne quod continet alterum et salvat per modum formae, facit unum cum illo quod continetur et salvatur; sed anima est huiusmodi: ipsa enim continet et salvat corpus ens in corpore, ipsa vero recedente destruitur et disolvitur corpus; ergo ipsa est perfectio corporis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
409. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1, Solutio, 418: *Ad quod dicendum quod coniungibilia sunt anima et corpus et uniuntur in unum, ut fiat una natura.* See also ad 1 on page 73 and ad 3 on page 151, quoted by Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*,28: ‘For the soul is a *hoc aliquid* apart from its matter, and one cannot say this of a natural form in an absolute sense. Whence [the soul] is not here, properly speaking, the act of matter, but the act of a natural body completed in its natural form, which form is called the corporeal form. *Est enim anima hoc aliquid praeter suam materiam: quod non est dicere in forma simpliciter naturali. Unde non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis*.’ See also SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1, 2, 418: *Anima rationalis et corpus humanum se habeant ut entia completa in suo genere: in genere enim corporeorum est completissimum corpus humanum, in genere incorporeorum valde completum est anima rationalis, ut per se potens subsistere.* [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
410. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar1, Contra a, b, 418. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
411. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*,14. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
412. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar4, 1, 421: *Forma non habet esse praeter materiam; sed anima habet esse praeter corpus; ergo non dicuntur unum illo modo.* [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
413. On this topic see, Cecilia Trifogli, ‘The Creation of Matter in the *Summa Halensis,*’ in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 15-36. In the same volume, see Magdalena Bieniak, ‘The Body-Soul Union in the *Summa Halensis,* 37-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
414. *Summa de anima*, 124, on three different modes of union. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
415. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C1, Contra c, 386. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4, Solutio, 422. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
416. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti1, C3, Ar1, Solution, 394: *Praeterea, igneitas partem habet extra partem in igne: unde et maior dicitur in maiori igne et minor in minori; anima vero non sic: neque enim habet partem extra partem nec est maior in maiori nec minor in minori. In hoc autem est convenientia, quod utrobique est similium ex similibus productio: unde animatum dicitur ex animato.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
417. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4, Solutio, 422. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
418. This example is also mentioned in *Summa de bono*,288-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
419. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar4, Solutio, 422: *Haec unio, quae est animae et corporis, dicitur nativa et se habet ad modum formae cum materia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
420. SH 2.1 In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1, Ad objecta 5, 399: *Non est simile de forma et anima; forma enim, praeter hoc quod est materiae forma, non habet aliquam actualitatem; sed anima praeter hoc quod est anima habet virtutem quamdam secundum quam dicitur habere compositionem propriam, cui respondet agere et pati, etiam cum est separata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
421. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar1, Ad objecta 3, 419: *Corpus vero humanum indiget anima, non tantum ut moveatur, sed etiam ut in esse, in quo est, subsistat et permaneat, et ideo duplicem habet comparationem: ut mobilis ad motorem et perfectibilis ad perfectionem suam, unde unum in natura constituunt, scilicet hominem.* [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
422. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar1, Solutio, 418: *Coniungibilia sunt anima et corpus et uniuntur in unum, ut fiat una natura.* [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
423. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 17 (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
424. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
425. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 17, 751-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
426. Riccardo Quinto, ‘Le commentaire des *Sentences* d’Hugues de Saint-Cher et la littérature théologique de son temps,’ in *Hugues de Saint-Cher (1263): bibliste et théologien*,ed. Louis-Jacques Batallion, Gilbert Dahan, Pierre-Marie Gy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 316. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
427. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 30: ‘Indeed, in a question entitled *De intentione necessaria in baptismo*, i.e. outside a strictly psychological context, Roland states that the soul, after its separation from the body, becomes a spirit that cannot even be called ‘soul’: the separation brings about the abandonment of the relation with the body, thanks to which the soul receives its name.’ See also C. R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ *Angelicum* 45 (1968): 438. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
428. DSEA 14 is quoted to affirm the need for a medium; Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 123-4.

     Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
429. Ibid., 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
430. Ibid., 120, 130-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
431. Ibid., 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
432. Ibid., 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
433. *Summa de bono*,284. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
434. Leo W. Keeler, ‘The Dependence of Robert Grosseteste’s *De anima* on the *Summa* of Philip the Chancellor,’ *The New Scholasticism* 11 (1937): 218: Philip was the first to use the term *forma corporeatatis*. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
435. *Summa de bono*, 285-6: *Ad quod intelligendum accipienda est distantia prime anime rationalis ad corpus. Et est multimoda distantia. Anima enim rationalis tres habet oppositiones ad corpus ipsum; est enim simplex, incorporea et incorruptibilis, corpus vero compositum, corporeum et corruptibile. Propter igitur nimiam sui distantiam a corpore non posset anima rationalis corpori coniungi, nisi advenirent dispositiones sive adaptationes alique, que essent media coniungendi hec ad invicem*. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
436. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, ed. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
437. *Summa de bono*,283. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
438. Danielle Jacquart, ‘La reconstruction médicale de la nature de l’homme aux XIe et XIIe siècles,’ *Revue de synthèse* 134:6:4 (2013):44. [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
439. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 120; *Summa de bono*,286-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
440. *Summa de bono*,284. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
441. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
442. Ibid., 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
443. Ibid., 128. Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol) Fons Vitae, ed. Baeumker, 294. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
444. Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol) Fons Vitae, ed. Baeumker, 185-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
445. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
446. Ibid., 139-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
447. Anonymous, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, ed. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952):149-150. [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
448. *Summa de anima*, 115: *Primo ergo queritur an anima corpori uniatur per medium, an sine medio; et cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis anime sed essencialis et sit illud quo essencialiter differt anima racionalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius. Unitur anima corpori per suam unibilitatem: ergo unitur per suam essenciam ergo sine medio. Item, cum anima uniatur corpori ut forma et perfectio eius, forma autem unitur per se materie, ergo anima uniter per se corpori; ergo sine medio.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
449. Ibid., 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
450. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 137. On Gueric of St Quentin’s account of the medium between the soul and the body, see Ayelet Even Ezra, *Ecstasy in the Classroom: Trance, Self and the Academic Profession in Medieval Paris* (New York: Fordham Univeristy Press, 2018), 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
451. *Summa de anima*, 116-17: The soul is united to the body in two ways: *unitur enim ut forma sue materie sive ut perfectio suo perfectibili; unitur etiam ei ut suo organo sive instrumento per quod operatur, duplex est ergo racio unionis. Secundum primum modum unitur anima corpori sine medio: corpori dico in ultima disposicione se habenti secundum quod est in corpore, sicut materie necessitas ad forme susceptionem scilicet anime, sicut lignum in ultima disposicione se habens calefactionis et siccitatis: cum scilicet est summe calefactum, se habet immediate ad susceptionem forme igneitatis. Secundum vero secundum modum unitur anima per medium, et medium istud est potencia sive vis eius: secundum enim quod anima unitur corpori ut suo organo per quod operatur, est comparacio anime sicut artificis operantis per instrumentum, quia secundum hunc modum se habet anima ad corpus…vero medium est sive virtus inter essenciam et operactionem. Quia ergo operacio animae fit organo, secundum quod anima per corpus animatum operator, videndo scilicet et audiendo et huiusmodi; unio ipsius anime ad corpus ut organum erit mediante potencia et vi eius; verbi gracia, ut mediante virtute vegetativa et sensitiva.* [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
452. Ibid., 123: *Quattor ergo erunt media uniencia, natura sensitiva, vegetativa, spiritus qui est natura celestis, et natura elementaris.* [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
453. Ibid.,120: Four media are necessary, two on the side of the body and two on the side of the soul: *Quia ergo media debent habere equaliter convenienciam cum extremis, quattuor autem sunt media necessaria: ergo duo debent esse ex parte anime et duo ex parte coroporis…ex parte anime sunt duo natura sensibilis et vegetabilis, et est natura sensibilis simplex, non contraria, incorporea, cognoscitiva, dependens. Simplex enim est, aliter species et imagines sensibiles facerent distanciam in ea et replerent istam.* See also 121: *Natura vero vegetabilis est incorporea, simplex, non contraria, obtuse, dependens. Simplex est; hic enim simplicitatem dicimus que opponitur compositioni que est in elementatis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
454. Ibid., 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
455. Ibid., 60-1: Spirit can be considered in two ways either as that which gives life to the body, as in Costa Ben Luca, or as the substance of the rational soul. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
456. Ibid., 121: *Ex parte vero corporis ponenda sunt duo media: unum pertinens ad naturam celeste, que est quinta essencia, quod dicitur spiritus, dicitur a phisicis vehiculum virium animae.* [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
457. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’41, 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
458. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar2, 1, 419: *Ergo, cum anima uniatur corpori unibilitate, unitur sua essentia; sed quod unitur sua essentia, unitur sine medio.* [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
459. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T1, C5, Ar2, Solutio, 410: *Anima rationalis coniungitur suo corpori ut motor mobili et ut perfectio formalis suo perfectibili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
460. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar2, Ad objecta 2, 420: *Sicut anima habet media ex parte sua vires animales et vitales et naturales, et corpus ex alia parte habet medium spiritus tres respondentes, et istud ex via qua motor et organum, quod est mobile, coniunguntur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
461. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar3, 1, 421. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
462. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar3, Contra a, 421: *Anima rationalis est substantia incorporea, motiva, cognoscitiva, separabilis sive non dependens a corpore; corpus vero, cui unitur tamquam organo sive perfectibili, est corpus compositum ex elementis, complexionatum. Ex parte vero incorporei est substantia incorporea, motiva, non cognoscitiva, inseparabilis a corpore, sciIicet vegetabilis, et substantia incorporea, motiva, cognoscitiva, inseparabilis, scilicet sensibilis: et ita duo sunt media. Ex altera vero parte est corpus compositum ex elementis, non complexionatum, et corpus non compositum ex elementis: et ita duo sunt media. Et ita quatuor erunt media inter animam rationalem et suum corpus, duo ex una parte et duo ex alia: spiritus enim est corpus non compositum ex elementis, humor vero est corpus compositum ex elementis, sed non complexionatum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
463. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*,24. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
464. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar2, Ad objecta 3, 420. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
465. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C3, Contra 1, 429: *Omnes ergo motus in corpore fiunt praeexistente motu cordis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
466. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C3, 428-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
467. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), 463-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
468. On this subject, see Dominik Perler, ‘How Many Souls Do I Have? Late Aristotelian Debates on the Plurality of Faculties.’ In *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle’s De anima*, ed. R. Friedman & J.-M. Counet (Louvain: Peeters 2013), 277-296; ‘What Are Faculties of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background,’ *Proceedings of the British Academy* 189 (2013): 9-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
469. Gregory of Nyssa, *De opificio hominis* (PG 44, 124-256), trans. H.A. Wilson in *On the Making of Man* (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1893), 14.2-3, 15.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
470. Judith Carol Wilcox, ‘The Transmission and Influence of Questa ibn Luca’s *On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul*,’ PhD dissertation (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985), 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
471. See Lottin in *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 459. M. Wittmann, *Die Stellung des hl. Thomas von Aquin zu Avencebrol (Ibn Gebirol)* (Munster: Aschendorff, 1900), 1-32. Wittmann established that the plurality thesis derived from the influence of Avicebron channelled to the Latins by Gundissalinus. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
472. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Dublin: Maes Duffey, 1950), 136; DSEA, trans. Clark, 256. See Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, vol. 1, 449 and ‘La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles: Les débuts de la controverse,’ *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 34 (1932): 21-41. Here he observes that Théry, developing the thesis of De Wulf, argued that it would be wrong to see Augustine as a pluralist. G. Théry, ‘L'Augustinisme médiéval et le problème de l'unité de la forme substantielle,’ in *Revue de Philosophie* 1:660 (1930): 140-200. See also Maurice De Wulf, ‘Le traité *De unitate jormae* de Gilles de Lessines (Texte inédit et étude), in *Les Philosophes Belges*, t. 1 (Louvain: Institut Supérior de Philosophie de l’Université, 1901), Introduction, 10-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
473. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ *The Thomist* 24:2 (1961): 268. Étienne Gilson, ‘Les sources Greco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929-30): 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
474. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, eds., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima* (London: British Academy, 1970), 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
475. ### D.A. Callus, ‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul,’ in *Autour d’Aristote: Recueil d’Etudes de Philosophie ancienne et médiévale affert à Monseigneur A. Mansion* (Louvain: Publications universitaíres de Louvain, 1955), 494.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
476. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 277; Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,97. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
477. Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951), d. 3, n. 30, 52. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, eds., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima,* 10-13. *Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono*,ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 231-7. J.T. Muckle, ‘The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940), 44-7. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 465-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
478. D.A. Callus, ‘Gundissalinus’ *De anima* and the Problem of the Substantial Form,’ *The New Scholasticism* 13 (1939): 348 in 344-48; D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 263, 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
479. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
480. Ibid., 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
481. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
482. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
483. D.A. Callus, ‘Gundissalinus’ *De anima*,’347. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
484. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
485. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, eds., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 21-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
486. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 127: ‘John replies by distinguishing a twofold nutritive soul. One is transitory and has for its function to adapt the body for the infusion of the rational soul. The other, con-created with the rational soul and one in substance with it is the perfection of the body and remains as long as the rational soul remains. The first disappears *completo fieri*, i.e. when the body is prepared and adapted. The same holds true for the sensitive soul. It will be seen that John’s solution of the problem does not differ from that of St Thomas.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
487. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 126, citing Aquinas’ *De potentia* q 3 a 9 ad 9. ‘Thomas Aquinas taught that previous to the infusion of the rational soul, the human embryo is successively animated by a nutritive and sensitive soul whose function is to prepare and adapt the body for the reception of the rational soul. The two souls do not co-exist. The sensitive replaces the nutritive, and this in turn is replaced by the rational soul… In general, the schoolmen held for the late infusion of the rational soul into the body. This was in accordance with the universally accepted view that matter had to have certain dispositions which made it apt to receive a particular form. Those who admitted the unity and simplicity of the human soul and its creation were faced with the problem of how to explain the life of the embryo prior to the infusion of the rational soul. Must we ascribe to the embryo a principle of life, a soul? If so, what becomes of such a principle when the rational soul is infused.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
488. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
489. According to Richard Dales, the plurality view was more common amongst arts masters like Adam of Bockenfield. See *The Probem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
490. *Summa de bono*, 233-4: *Sed licet sint tres substantie incorporee, non tamen sunt tres anime, eo quod anima nomen est perfectionis. Ideo non est anima vegetabilis nisi in plantis et consimilibus, quia earum est perfectio completa. Et non est anima sensibilis nisi in brutis, quia ibi similiter est perfectio. In homine autem sunt quasi materiales ad rationalem et rationalis est completio, et ipsa tantum est anima in homine, et ille tres uniuntur ita quod sint una anima. Et quod sint anima habent a completivo; et sic tres substantie incorporee et una anima.* On page 237, Philip seems to deny that the soul is three substances. Thus, Wicki and Lottin say that this is his position favors unicity. See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 467, 478-479. Nikolaus Wicki, *Die Philosophie Philipps des Kanzlers: ein philosophierender Theologe des frühen 13. Jahrhunderts* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2005), 102, 123. However, Magdalena Bieniak argues in favour of the idea that Philip does hold the pluralist position in *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,122-3; and idem., ‘The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St Cher,’ in *Psychology and Other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interactino (1250-1750)*, ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Sander W. de Boer, Cees Leijenhorst (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 164. See also Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des forms* (Louvain: Editions de l’Institut superieur de philosophie, 1951), 397-8, 407-9. Odon Lottin, ‘La pluralité des forms substantielles avant saint Thomas d’Aquin: Quelques documents nouveaux,’ *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 34 (1932): 451-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
491. *Summa de bono*, 232-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
492. Ibid., 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
493. Ibid., 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
494. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 14; DSEA, trans. Clark, 257; *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 201. Both affirm the soul was created. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
495. *Summa de bono*, 233: *Non tamen sunt tres anime eo quod anima nomen est perfectionis…ille tres uniuntur ita quod sint una anima.* [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
496. As noted above, a similar position was held by Thomas Aquinas, as Robert Pasnau has shown in his article on ‘Souls and the Beginning of Life,’ *Philosophy* 78: 306 (October 2003): 509-19. Here and in his *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of the Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Pasnau takes this argument as a basis for his claim that Aquinas’ thought does not preclude abortion early in a pregnancy. I find Pasnau’s arguments compelling, though they have been contested by John Haldane and Patrick Lee in, ‘Aquinas on Human Ensoulment: Abortion and the Value of Life,’ *Philosophy* 78:304 (April 2003): 255-278. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
497. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances de l’âme au XIIe siècle,’ *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* 5 (1949): 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
498. *Summa de bono*, 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
499. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*, ed. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), Ch 134, 189. C.R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ *Angelicum* 45 (1968): 439-40. Odon Lottin, ‘La pluralité des forms substantielles,’ 450-1. D.A. Callus, ‘The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,’ 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
500. For a full account of Hugh, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 130-40 and 174; ‘Una questione disputata di Ugo di St Cher sull’anima Edizione e Studio Dotrrinale,’ *Studia Antyczne I Mediewistyczne* 37 (2004): 127-6; ‘Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher sull’anima Umana,’ in *L’origine dell’Ordine dei Predicatori e l’Università di Bologna,* ed. Giovanni Bertuzzi (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2006), 105-17. On Roland, see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 464-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
501. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
502. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
503. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St Cher,’ 165. See also her edition of Hugh’s *De anima* in *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,175. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
504. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 139; Odon Lottin, ‘La pluralité des forms substantielles,’ 459-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
505. Guerric of St Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, 72 (introduction), Quodlibet 8.4a, 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
506. William of Auvergne, *The Soul*, trans. Teske, 154, 163-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
507. Ibid., 158-9, 166, 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
508. [*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*](http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/primo_library/libweb/action/display.do?tabs=detailsTab&ct=display&fn=search&doc=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&indx=1&recIds=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&recIdxs=0&elementId=0&renderMode=poppedOut&displayMode=full&frbrVersion=&dscnt=1&scp.scps=scope%3A(%22OX%22)&frbg=&tab=local&dstmp=1298799544709&vl(217121274UI0)=any&srt=rank&vl(204862243UI1)=all_items&mode=Basic&dum=true&tb=t&vl(1UIStartWith0)=contains&vl(freeText0)=Magistri%20Alexandri%20de%20Hales%20&vid=OXVU1)*,* 3 vols (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), Q32, M3. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
509. Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*, Q32, M3, 565. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
510. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St Cher,’ 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
511. *Summa de anima*, 143: *Et dicendum quod cum vegetabilis et sensibilis in homine ordinem habeant ad racionem, cum eciam anima racionalis mereatur et demereatur in eis et per eas, cum eciam anima racionalis merito unienda sit corpori eciam in resurrectione, et per vires vegetabilem et sensibilem habeat immortale esse, nec est superuacua operacio earum in homine. Unde Augustinus in libro De anima et spiritu, dicit quod anima in morte secum trahit vegetatiuam et sensitiuam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
512. *Summa de anima*, 142-3; SH 3, 237-51. J.-P. Torrell, ‘Introduction,’ in Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet: A Critical Edition*, ed. W.H. Principe (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 81, see also Quodlibet 2.3. Here, Guerric argues that the vegetative and sensitive powers which are still needed will remain active, such as vision and capacity to speak, but others will pass away. In Quodlibet 8.4, 355, Guerric affirms that while the separated soul does not have its senses, it has the potential to have them, as lines can be potentially be drawn out of a centre. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
513. Aristotle affirms that the bodily powers die with body in *De anima* II.1 (413a). [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
514. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,141. Gundissalinus affirms that the vegetative and sensitive powers are accidental, so not immortal, but subsequently seems to suggest differently. See J.T. Muckle, ‘The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus,’ 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
515. *Summa de anima*, 85-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
516. On John, see Odon Lottin, ‘La pluralité des forms substantielles,’ 458-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
517. Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
518. *Summa de anima*, 142: *Ad secundum dicendum quod uegetatiua et sensitiua dicuntur secundum duos modos in homine. Est enim in homine uegetatiua et sensitiua disponens et est uegetatiua et sensitiua perficiens. Vegetatiua disponens est illa que in embryone operatur actus nutricionis, augmentacionis, configuracionis, et organizacionis ante infusionem anime racionalis, que una est in substancia secundum uim uegetabilem. Similiter sensitiua disponens que sensum et motum operatur in embryone ante infusionem anime racionalis. Vegetatiua uero et sensitiua perficiens est ipsa anima racionalis que, una in substancia secundum uim uegetatiuam et sensitiuam, corpus uegetat et sensificat, uegetacione et sensificacione perfecta. Prima seminatur cum corpore, secunda infunditur cum ipsa infusione anime racionalis. Prima non meretur nomen anime eo quod sit disponens, non perficiens; sed secunda. Similiter prima interit cum corpore, secunda non quia fundatur in substancia immortalis nature.* See also *Summa de anima*, 137: *Duplex est vegetative, scilicet disponens et vegetativa perficiens. Una est forma in fieri, alia in esse; prima autem traducitur et seminatur cum corpore; secunda vero infunditur cum rationali animae. Prima ergo transit complete fieri, idest formate corpore et organizato; secunda autem manet posita in esse rationalis animae. Et similiter etiam distinguendum est de sensibili.* *Summa de anima,* 186: *Prima seminatur cum corpore; secunda infunditur cum ipsi infusione animae rationalis; prima non meretur nomen animae, cum sit disponens et non perficiens; secunda meretur. Similiter prima interiit cum corpore; secunda non, quia fundatur in substantia immortalis naturae.* See also the discussion of Zavalloni in *Richard de Mediavilla*, 402-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
519. Odon Lottin, ‘La pluralité des forms substantielles,’ 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
520. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Solutio, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
521. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, a, 404; cf. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar1, 1, 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
522. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, b, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
523. Cf. *Summa de anima*, 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
524. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, c, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
525. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ad objecta 2, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
526. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Contra 1, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
527. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Contra 2 and 3, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
528. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ad objecta 1, 404. The Summa contests this on the ground that the embryo had those powers not through the mode of a perfection but through the mode of *artificis praeparantis ipsum corpus, quod debet esse organum ipsius animae, quae est perfectio.* SH 2.1, In4, Tr3, Q1, Ti2, C4, Ad 4, 682: The human body cannot be prepared and organized in order to receive the rational soul without the prior development of the vegetable and sensible souls. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
529. SH 2.1, In4, Tr3, Q1, Ti2, C6, Solutio, 683. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
530. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ad objecta 2 and 3, 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
531. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar1, 2, 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
532. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar1, Contra a, 426: *Sicut ergo creatura differt a Creatore in hoc quod virtus in creatura non est omnino idem quod sua essentia, sic differet in hoc quod habet per pluralitatem virtutis quod habet Creator per virtutis indivisionem, ut Creator una virtute agat omne quod agit, creatura vero agat pluribus virtutibus differentia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
533. On this broader question in medieval philosophy, see Dominik Perler and Klaus Corcilius*, Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz* (Berlin: De Gruyter 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
534. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar2, Contra b, 426: *Tota essentia animae in suis potentiis consistit nec per partes dividitur, cum sit simplex et individua.* [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
535. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C2, Ar2, Ad objecta, 427: *Vel quae particulant posse animae per actus differentes, et sic aliae vires dicuntur partes: et hae proprie dicuntur partes virtuales, quae in una substantia animae conveniunt et differunt per actus differentes in specie.* [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
536. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C5, Ar3, Solutio, 411: *Dicitur autem ad imaginem Trinitatis propter rationem supra dictam, quia sicut unitas essentiae divinae est in tribus personis, quarum una procedit ab altera, ita unitas est essentiae animae d in tribus viribus, quarum virium una dependet per intellectum ab alia et actus mediante actu elicitur.* See also Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 483-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
537. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen; problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin* (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1956), 21, citing Augustine *De Trinitate* 15.17.28, ed. W.J. Mountain and F. Glorie, CCSL 50A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968). [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
538. Odon Lottin, ‘L’identité de l’âme et de ses facultés pendent la première moitié du Xiiie siècle,’ *Revue néoscolastique de* philosophie 41 (1934): 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
539. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris,* 99. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*,22; cf. Augustine, Epistle 169.2.6: *Primo ergo in hoc invenitur ista similitudo dissimilis, quod tria haec, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, animae insunt, non eadem tria est anima; illa vero trinitas non inest, sed ipsa Deus est. Ideo ibi mirabilis simplicitas commendatur, quia non ibi aliud est esse aliud intelligere vel si quid aliud de Dei natura dicitur; anima vero quia est, etiam dum non intellegit, aliud est, quod est, aliud, quod intelligit.* In *Augustinus Epistulae 124-184,* ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1904; repr. 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
540. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*,34-38; cf. Isidore of Seville, *Differentiae* II.29.97 (PL 83, 9A-98A), 84 B-C. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
541. Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 13 (PL 40, 788-789): *Dicitur namque anima, dum vegetat; spiritus, dum contemplatur; sensus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; dum intelligit, mens; dum discernit, ratio; dum recordatur, memoria; dum consentit, voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima est: proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una.* See Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*,43, 157, 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
542. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*, 59-63; in reference to Bernard of Clairvaux, *Ad clericos de conversione*, ed. J. Leclercq and H.-M. Rochais (Roma: Editiones Cistercienses, 1974), 72-4. Hugh of St Cher, *Didascalicon* II.5*,* ed. H. Buttimer (Washington: The Catholic University Press, 1939), 2728-810. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
543. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*,100. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*, 74-77, in reference to Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae,* bk 1, d3, c2*,* (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1981): *Sed iam videndum est quomodo haec tria dicantur una substantia: ideo scilicet quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiectis, quae possunt adesse vel abesse. Unde Augustinus in libro IX De Trinitate ait: Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in animo existere substantialiter, non tamquam in subjecto, ut color in corpore, quia etsi relative dicuntur ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in sua substantia. Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur esse unum vel una substantia.* See also Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX.4.5 and Künzle, 83-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
544. Odon Lottin, ‘L’identité de l’âme et de ses facultés,’ 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
545. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, in Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 17 (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), 237, 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
546. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 101. William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, 243: *Quidam tamen dicunt quod hec tria sunt proprie unum, et intelligunt hoc de ipsa potentia. Dicunt enim quod anima idem est quod sua potentia, sed dicuntur esse tres potentie propter diversos actus, cum non sit nisi una anima et una potentia in essentia. Et hoc volunt habere verbis beati Augustini, que dicunt quod hec tria sunt una vita, una anima, et per hoc quod ipse dicit: hec tria non sunt in anima ut in subiecto; ergo non sunt qualitates anime, sed ipsa anima.* [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
547. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*, 50. G. Lefevre, *Les variations de Guillaume de Champeaux et la question des Universaux: Étude suivie de documents originaux* (Lille: Université de Lille, 1898), 24: *Ponit iterum de anima et ratione. Sed iterum ratio, licet potentia sit animae, non tamen eiusdem cum anima substantiae sed eius inseparabilis forma. Nam quod in praedictis ratio et anima una est anima, convenienter est intelligendum, ut potius illa dicamus simul et inseparabiliter inhaerere et non idem etiam in substantia esse.* [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
548. P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele*,100-1. Avicenna, *De anima* I.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
549. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 100-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
550. Ibid., 107-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
551. Ibid., 102-6 and 103, which refers referring to Hugh of St Cher’s *Sentences Commentary,* bk 1, d3, 2; see the edition within her book at pages 189-90. This shows that Hugh believed the soul was identical with memory, understanding and will, not with the vegetative and sense powers. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
552. Magdalena Bieniak, ‘The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St Cher,’ 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
553. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
554. Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quodlibet,* Quodlibet 9, Article 5, Solutio, 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
555. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus,* ed. Aloysio Cortesi (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), Ch 114.7, 163. C.R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the Current of Thought,’ 440. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
556. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’ 28-9; William of Auvergne, *The Soul*,trans. Teske, 116-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
557. On Alexander’s position, see also Rega Wood and Zita Toth, ‘*Nec idem nec aliud:* The Powers of the Soul and the Origins of the Formal Distinction,’ in *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 171-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
558. Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951), d. 3, 65: *Essentia est illud, quo res est id, quod est, ut homo humanitate. Substantia vero, quo res est substans sive subsistit inseparabiliter. Subiectum est cui adveniunt aliqua et sine quorum aliquo vel quodlibet res potest esse. Unde et definitur a Philosopho: Subiectum est in se completum ens, occasio alterius existendi in ipso (...) Subiectum dicitur anima respectu accidentium, substantia respectu proprietatum, essentia respectu essentialium.* [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
559. *Alexandri de Hales Glossa*,vol. 1, d. 3, Respondeo c, 65: *Essentia est illud quo res est id quod est, ut homo humanitate.* [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
560. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 110. *Alexandri de Hales Glossa*,vol. 1, d. 3, Respondeo c, 65: *Substantia vero, quo res est substans sive subsistit inseparabiliter.* [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
561. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 110. *Alexandri de Hales Glossa*,vol. 1, d. 3, Respondeo c, 65: *Subiectum est cui adveniunt aliqua et sine quorum aliquo vel quodlibet res potest esse.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
562. *Alexandri de Hales Glossa*, vol. 1, d. 3, Respondeo c, 65: *Tres enim personae conveniunt in essentia; memoria, intelligentia, voluntas in substantia, separantur autem in essentia. (...) Istae ergo tres potentiae distinguuntur secundum essentiam, sed conveniunt in substantia, quia anima non est completa substantia sine suis potentiis. Cum autem in eo quod dico ‘substare’ duo sunt: ‘sub’ et ‘stare’, anima uno modo supponitur potentiis, alio modo e converso. Prout enim actus primo est ab anima, quae et operatur per potentias, sic est super potentias; sed in quantum operatio est in anima mediantibus potentiis, sic supponitur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
563. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 107-8, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
564. Nikolaus Wicki, *Die Philosophie Philipps des Kanzlers*, 359-60; Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
565. Contradictory conclusions have been reached concerning the relative chronology of Alexander’s Glossa and Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de bono.* The editors of the Glossa maintain the temporal priority of Alexander’s work, whereas Nicolaus Wicki argues for the priority of the *Summa de bono*. See the ‘Prolegomena’ in Alexander’s *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* and the Introduction in Wicki’s edition of the *Summa de bono*,64-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
566. *Summa de anima*,182: *Anima secundum sui operis officium variis nuncupatur nominibus; dicitur namque anima dum vegetat; sensus dum sentit; animus dum sapit; mens dum intelligit; racio dum discernit; memoria dum recordatur; dum vult voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substancia quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam ista omnia una sunt anima, proprietates quidem diverse, sed essencia una. Ex quo relinquitur quod anima est sue vires et potencie et econverso.* [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
567. *Summa de anima*, 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
568. Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris*, 93-4; *Summa de anima*,118. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
569. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2, Solutio, 404: *Ad quod potest responderi quod una est substantia in homine habens has virtutes; unde ‘anima rationalis, cum separatur secum trahit sensum et imaginationem’ sicut dicitur in libro De anima et spiritu.* [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
570. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, 1, 424, citing DSEA 13: *Anima secundum sui operis officium variis nuncupatur nominibus. Dicitur namque anima, dum vegetat; sensus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; mens, dum intelligit; ratio, dum discernit; memoria, dum recordatur; dum vult, voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam omnia ista una sunt anima; proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una.* [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
571. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Solutio, 425: *Sicut enim non est idem esse et operari, ita nec essentia et potentia: essentia enim animae est id per quod anima est absolute essentia; potentia est id per quod anima ad aliud est efficiendum vel recipiendum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
572. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Solutio, 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
573. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Solutio 1-2, 425: *Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod in nullo alio a Primo est idem essentia rei quod sua potentia; unde dicunt quod anima non est idem in essentia quod sua potentia, dicunt tamen quod sunt idem in substantia. Sicut enim non est idem esse et operari, ita nec essentia et potentia: essentia enim animae est id per quod anima est absolute essentia; potentia est id per quod anima ad aliud est efficiendum vel recipiendum. Dicunt tamen quod idem est in substantia, eo quod anima non subsistat sine suis potentiis nec etiam intelligatur nec ipsae potentiae sine anima. Identitas ergo, quam ponit Augustinus, referenda est ad substantiam, non ad essentiam.* *Dicunt tamen quod idem est in substantia, eo quod anima non subsistat sine suis potentiis nec etiam intelligatur nec ipsae potentiae sine anima. Identitas ergo, quam ponit Augustinus, referenda est ad substantiam, non ad essentiam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
574. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, C1, Ad objecta 3, 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
575. Odon Lottin, ‘Les traités sur l’âme et les vertus de Jean de la Rochelle,’ [*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*](https://www.persee.fr/collection/phlou)25 (1930): 5-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
576. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in *Jean de La Rochelle. Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae. Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables* (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 23: ‘Tout au plus pourrait-on dire qu'il dut s'écouler un certain délai avant que l'auteur ne remaniât sa compilation pour en introduire les matériaux dans la composition d'une oeuvre personnelle, qui est à son tour largement utilisée dans la deuxième partie de la *Summa fratris Alexandri*, achevée avant 1245.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
577. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 3 (1928): 107.  [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
578. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in the *Tractatus*, 17-18; see also the chart comparing the two works provided by Jacques Guy Bougerol in his introduction to the *Summa de anima*, 34-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
579. See *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus I-II-III,* ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1972), I.1, 14-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
580. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables,* ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 54: *Magnus theologus, medicus et philosophus, anima est substantia viuens, simplex et incorporea, corporalibus oculis secundum propriam naturam inuisibilis, immortalis, rationalis et intellectualis, infigurabilis, organico utens corpore et huic vite et augmentationis et sensus et generationis tributiua, non aliud habens extra seipsam intellectum sed et partem suiipsius purissimam (sicut enim oculus in corpore, ita in anima est intellectus), arbitrio libera et voluntatiua et operatiua, vertibilis id est voluntate vertibilis quoniam et creabilis, omnia hec ex eius qui condidit eam gratia suscipiens, ex qua et esse et natura ita esse suscepit.* The quote is derived from John of Damascus, *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1955), 26.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
581. *Tractatus*, 57: *Anima est substantia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminationum que sunt a Primo ultima relatione perceptiva*, quoting Alfred Sarashel, *De motu cordis*, ed. Carl Sigmund Baruch, *Excerpta e libro Alfredi Angelici De motu cordis item Costa Ben Lucae De differentia animae et spiritus liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi* (Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagnerschen Universitaets-Buchhandlung, 1878). [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
582. *Tractatus*, 57-8, quoting passages from DSEA (PL 40, 788-789) in the following order. DSEA 8: *Anima est substantia rationalis et intellectualis, spiritualis, a Deo facta non ex Dei natura sed potius creata, ex nichilo facta, in bonum malumque conuertibilis et ideo aliquatenus mortalis aliquatenus immortalis.* DSEA 24: *Anima est substantia spiritualis, simplex, incorporea et indissolubilis, passibilis atque mutabilis, carens pondere, figura atque colore.* DSEA 13: *Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper uiuens, semper in motu, bone maleque capax voluntatis*. DSEA 6: *Anima est omnium simulitudo*. DSEA 1: *Anima est substantia quedam rationis particeps regendo corpori accomodata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
583. *Tractatus*, 57, quoting Aristotle, *De anima* II (412a 19-22, 27-28, 412b 5-6): *Anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici potentia vitam habentis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
584. *Tractatus*, 63, quoting Plato’s *Crato*: *Anima est substantia incorporea mouens corpus*. Here also is quoted someone called Remegius, who is actually Nemesius of Emesa in the *De natura hominis*, c. 2 (PG 40, 589A). *Anima est substantia incorporea regens corpus*. See Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, trans. and introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. Van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008). Ignatius Brady, ‘Remegius-Nemesius,’ *Franciscan Studies* 8 (1948): 275-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
585. *Tractatus*, 58, quoting Genesis 1:26: *Anima est deiforme spiraculum vite; et sumitur hec diffinitio ex Genesi*; also mentioned is Genesis 11:7 which states that God makes man in his own image. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
586. *Tractatus*, 58, quoting Seneca, *Epist.* 92, 1-2: *Anima est spiritus intellectualis in se et in corpore ad beatitudinem ordinatus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
587. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*,ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 53: quoting Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis*, I: *Anima est substancia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminacionum que sunt a primo ultima relacione perceptiua.* [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
588. *Summa de anima*,53: quoting Nemesius: *Anima est substancia incorporea, regens corpus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
589. Ibid., quoting Aristotle: *Anima est actus primus corporis phisici, organici, potencia uitam habentis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
590. Ibid., quoting DSEA 6: *Anima est omnium similitudo; alio modo, per comparacionem ad corpus cuius est perfectio, et sic iterum diffinitur ab Augustino.* DSEA 1: *Anima est substancia quedam racionis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
591. Ibid., 53, Genesis 2:7: *Formauit Deum hominem de limo terre et inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum uite.* [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
592. Ibid., 53, quoting Seneca: *Anima est spiritus intellectualis in se et in corpore ad beatitudinem ordinatus.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
593. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West* (London: Warburg Institute, 2000), 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
594. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in the *Tractatus*,10: ‘Ce procédé qui consiste à compléter et à parfaire le tableau composé par Avicenne à l'aide de facultés rencontrées chez les théologiens est une méthode couramment utilisée au début du хше siècle: elle se retrouve même dans une oeuvre composée à la Faculté des Arts comme le *Traité sur l'âme* de John Blound.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
595. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in the *Tractatus*, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
596. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Les puissances de l’âme chez Jean de la Rochelle,’ *Antonianum* 24 (1949): 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
597. Ibid., 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
598. Ibid., 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
599. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in the *Tractatus*, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
600. Ibid., 21: ‘La Summa est l'oeuvre personnelle d'un magister in sacra pagina, qui porte un vif intérêt aux données scientifiques récemment mises à la disposition des Latins par les traducteurs du grec ou de l'arabe, mais dont l'exposé se situe dans le cadre de son enseignement et de la Faculté où il le dispense. Le *Tractatus* est au contraire une compilatio, un recueil de documentation, dont le but et le principal mérite sont d'être un reflet fidèle et exact des doctrines qu'il a entrepris de faire connaître, il se rapproche beaucoup de ce genre très goûté des médiévaux, que l'on a désigné du nom d'encyclopédie.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
601. Ibid., 19: ‘On trouve donc dans la Summa alors qu'elles sont absentes du *Tractatus* d'importantes questions doctrinales, dont la place est marquée dans la problématique et l'enseignement de l'époque, et sans lesquelles il est impossible de concevoir un *De anima* satisfaisant et suffisant.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
602. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Les puissances de l’âme,’ 494. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
603. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Une division “augustinienne” des puissances de l’âme au moyen age,’ *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 3 (1957): 235-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
604. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), 393-414: John of Damascus’ influence on psychology in the thirteenth century. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
605. See Eligius M. Buytaert, ‘Introduction,’ in *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, especially pages XII-XV in I-LIV. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino), 60. Irena Backus, ‘John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*: Translations by Burgundio (1153/4), Grosseteste (1235/40) and Lefèvre d’Etaples (1507),’in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 49 (1986): 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
606. On the use of *De fide orthodoxa* by Peter Lombard, seeJ. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle: Sa préparation lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard, ses rapports avec les initiatives des canonistes: Études, recherches et documents* (Bruges, Éditions De Temple, 1948), 374-415. E. Bertola, ‘Le citazioni di Giovanni Damasceno nel primo libro delle Sentenze lombardiane,’ in *Pier Lombardo* 1 (1957): 2-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
607. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
608. Eligius M. Buytaert attributes the partitioning of the text to Philip the Chancellor. See his ‘Introduction,’ in *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, XXI. The study of Lottin concerning the influence of the psychology of the human action of the Damascene on the theology of the thirteenth century shows in fact that Philip is the first author to make extensive use of the contents of the *De fide orthodoxa.* See his section on ‘La psychologie de l’acte humain chez Saint Jean Damascene et les théolgiens du XIII siècle occidental,’ in *Psychologie et morale,* vol. 1, 400-1, 405-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
609. Eligius M. Buytaert, ‘Introduction, in *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, XXXV-XXXVI: ‘The oldest code that certifies the version of Burgundio, the Vaticanus latinus 313 (late 12th century), does not present the division into four books but only the partition of the text into 100 chapters, according to the original organization given to the work by Damascene.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
610. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 393-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
611. Ibid., 399: Aside from a brief reference to irrational versus rational powers in Hugh of St Cher, it was really Philip the Chancellor who introduced the Damascene’s psychology to the West. [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
612. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 3 (1928): 106-7. As Rohmer noted long ago, the early Franciscan attempt to integrate Augustine and Damascus with a broadly Aristotelian philosophy resulted in giving all these authors a new orientation from Avicenna. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
613. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, ‘Introduction,’ in the *Tractatus*,13: ‘Les diverses définitions de l'âme, de la grâce, des vertus, de la béatitude, les classifications des facultés et des vertus ne se contredisent pas réellement, elles donnent des points de vue différents; les théologiens et les philosophes, en face d'une réalité complexe et difficile à embrasser en une seule formule ou un seul tableau, l'ont saisie chacun selon son génie propre et sous son angle de vue personnel.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
614. Ibid., 18: ‘Le *Tractatus* se préoccupe d'accumuler les définitions et énumérations, les développant tout au plus en de brefs exposés qui donnent les explications indispensables pour pouvoir les saisir; il n'y a ni formules de transition ni introduction: Jean de La Rochelle y offre au lecteur de la documentation pure, à l'état brut pourrait-on dire, et il rassemble le plus grand nombre de matériaux qu'il peut atteindre, sans se soucier de leur intérêt propre et de leur mise en valeur. La Summa se présente au contraire comme une oeuvre plus personnelle, conforme aux règles habituelles de la composition littéraire médiévale, avec son prologue articulé à partir d'un texte scripturaire, et la transition entre les deux parties, qui fait appel à l'aide divine.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
615. Ibid., 13: on the use of the *Tractatus* for teaching, 16: ‘En de nombreux endroits les lignes selon lesquelles l'auteur a organisé le développement de ses deux exposés sur l'âme humaine sont parallèles, et certains passages d'une fort notable étendue sont littéralement identiques dans l'un et dans l'autre.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
616. *Tractatus*,70, quoting *Avicenna Latinus*: *Liber* *de anima* I.5, 79-82 [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
617. *Tractatus*,70-1: *Vis vegetabilis est principium conseruationis nature per generationem et*

     *nutrimentum, et perfectionis eius per augmentum. Sensibilis vero est principium sensus et motus in corpore animalis. Vis autem rationalis est principium intellectiue speculationis et libere electionis actionum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
618. Ibid., citing Avicenna, *De anima* II.4; cf. *Summa de anima*, 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
619. *Summa de anima*, 222. *Avicenna Latinus*: *Liber* *de anima* I.5, 105-13 on the vegetative powers. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
620. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
621. Ibid., 30, 41; See also Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1923). [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
622. *Tractatus*,103-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
623. Ibid., 72, citing Damascus’ distinction between cognitive and motive powers in chapter 36 of *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Buytaert, 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
624. Ibid., 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
625. Ibid., 73-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
626. Ibid., 74; cf. *Summa de anima*, 240. On the internal senses, see *Avicenna Latinus*: *Liber* *de anima* I.5, 87ff.; *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus IV-V,* ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1968), IV.I, 1-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
627. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*, 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
628. Ibid., 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
629. *Tractatus*, 75: *Sensus autem communis est vis ordinata in prima concauitate cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas que imprimuntur sensibus et redduntur ei. Hec autem virtus est centrum omnium sensuum et a qua deriuantur ut rami.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 240. Alain de Libera, ‘Le sens commun au XIIIe siècle: De Jean de La Rochelle à Albert le Grand,’ *Revue de métaphysique et morale* 96 (1991): 475-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
630. *Summa de anima*, 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
631. *Tractatus*, 75: *Unde bene a quodam diffinitur sic: sensus communis est vis insita in neruis concauis in prima concauitate cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas receptas a sensibus. particularibus, assignans conuenientias et differentias inter illas.* [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
632. Ibid.:*Ymaginatio est vis ordinata in extremo anterioris concauitatis cerebri, retinens quod recipit sensus communis a sensibus, et remanet in ea post remotionem illorum sensibilium.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
633. Ibid.: *Vult ergo dicere Auicenna, quod sensus communis est apprehendere formas omnium sensibilium; virtutis uero formatiue, que vocatur ymaginatio, est retinere. Dicit ergo quod sensus communis et ymaginatio sunt quasi una virtus et non diuersificantur in subiecto sed in forma: hic enim recipit, illa retinet.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
634. Ibid., 76: *Ymaginatiua est vis ordinata in media concauitate cerebri, potens componere aliquid de eo, quod est in ymaginatione, cum alio et diuidere, secundum quod vult.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 243 [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
635. Ibid.: *Estimatiua est vis ordinata in summo medie concauitatis cerebri, apprehendens intentiones sensibilium, sicut in oue diiudicans, quod a lupo est fugiendum et quod cum agno est cohabitandum. Est autem ista virtus transcendens, quia apprehensio sua non est formarum sensibilium et materialium sed immaterialium.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
636. Ibid.: 76: *Vis memoratiua est vis ordinata in posteriori concauitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit vis estimatiua de intentionibus sensibilium.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
637. Avicenna, *De anima* IV.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
638. *Summa de anima*, 250. Another difference that John discusses in this context is between is between *recordari* and *addiscere*. Both involve a movement from what is unknown to known, but in different ways, because *recordatio* involves speculating about how something will be in the future on the basis of what has happened in the past, while in true learning or *addiscentia*, which is only possible for humans, the soul comes to know that of which it did not yet have any knowledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
639. *Tractatus*, 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
640. See for example *Avicenna Latinus:* *Liber* *de anima* I.5, 94 on the two faces of the soul. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
641. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Dublin: Maes Duffey, 1950), 188. This position was already stated by J. Rohmer, who notes that the doctrine of the two faces of the soul came to Latin thinkers through the Arab tradition and more directly Gundissalinus’ *De immortalitate animae.* See his ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 3 (1928): 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
642. *Summa de anima*,268. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
643. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
644. *Tractatus*, 81-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
645. Ibid., 82: *Item nullum organum corporale habet possibilitatem vel dispositionem ad incorporalia…si ergo intellectiua intelligeret per organum corporale, intelligeret tantum corporalia et non spiritualia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
646. Ibid.: *Preterea operatio virtutis intellectiue est semper per abstractionem a materia et materialibus conditionibus, sed omnis operatio est secundum naturam virtutis, a qua egreditur; cum ergo virtus intellectiua sit abstracta a materia, non habet organum corporale vel materialem in corpore assignationem.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 269. [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
647. See also *Avicenna Latinus:* *Liber* *de anima* IV.2, 81-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
648. *Tractatus*, 82: *Item nulla virtus incorporata, id est parti corporis determinata siue operans per organum, est cognitiua sui, quia non potest reflecti supra se, cum sit incorporata, unde oculus non videt se nec imaginatio ymaginatur se; cum ergo virtus intellectiua sit cognitiua sui, intelligit enim se, cum reflectitur supra se, ergo virtus intellectiua non est incorporata nec operans per organum.* Cf. *Summa de anima*,269. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
649. Cf. *Summa de anima*, 269. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
650. *Tractatus*, 82: *Item quod cognoscitur est in cognoscente secundum naturam cognoscentis et non secundum naturam rei cognite, et generaliter quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis et non secundum naturam recepti, sicut dicunt sancti et philosophi. Cum ergo corporalia et materialia sint in intellectu secundum modum immaterialem, cum intelliguntur, ergo natura intellectus est immaterialis, ergo simplex, non utens organo corporali, quod concedendum est.* [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
651. Ibid.; cf. *Summa de anima*, 270. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
652. Ibid., 83, citing *De fide orthodoxa* 1.2: *Omnibus cognitio existendi Deum ab ipso naturaliter inserta est.* cf. *Summa de anima*, 270. [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
653. Ibid., citing DSEA 4: *Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, quod anima cognoscit Deum supra se, se in se, angelum iuxta se.* [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
654. Ibid., citing *De anima* III.4: *In hiis que sunt sine materia, idem est quo intelligitur et quod intelligitur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
655. Ibid., 84, citing *De anima* II.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
656. *Avicenna Latinus:* *Liber* *de anima* II.1, 114-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
657. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 132, discusses the phases of abstraction in John’s thought. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
658. *Avicenna Latinus:* *Liber* *de anima* II.1, 116-21 [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
659. *Tractatus*, 86: *Consequenter dicendum est de diuisione virtutis intellectiue apprehensiue. Sciendum igitur quod est intellectus passiuus et corruptibilis, qui dicitur ab Aristotele materialis, et est intellectus incorruptibilis et separabilis. Intellectus autem passiuus est vis inferior partis intellectiue coniuncte sensibili, que recipit species intelligibiles in fantasmatibus; oportuit enim hanc vim esse, ut intellectus, qui est separabilis, species abstractas a fantasmatibus intelligeret.* [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
660. J. Rohmer discusses John’s treatment of the material intellect in, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
661. *Tractatus*, 87, citing *De anima* III.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
662. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
663. Ibid.: *Una est possibilis ut tabula rasa, nuda ab omni pictura, sed susceptiua omnium picturarum, nullam habens actu, sed possibilis ad omnes, et hec est intellectus possibilis.* See also the Anonymous, *De anima et de potentiis eius,* ed. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d’un maître des arts (vers 1225): introduction et texte critique,’ *Revue sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 52: *Sequitur de intellectu possibili, qui primo dicitur intellectus possibilis cum ipse sit potencia anime et nichil actu; cuius exemplum est tabula nuda nullam habens picturam nec etiam aptitudinem ad unam magis quam ad aliam, potens autem habere quamcunque.* [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
664. Aristotle, *De anima* III.5, 430a17-18. Paul Wilpert, ‘Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom Intellectus agens bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte: Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, vol. 1, ed. Albert Lang, Josef Lechner and Michael Schmaus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 447. See also Aristotle *De anima* II.7, 418b on the light/colours analogy. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
665. *Tractatus*, 87; cf. *Summa de anima*, 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
666. These four phases of the intellect in John are treated by J. Rohmer in ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 136. See also Dag Hasse, ‘Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik: von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus,’ in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 66 (1999): 21-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
667. On the four grades of the possible intellect see, *Avicenna Latinus:* *Liber* *de anima* I.5, 95ff.; V.6, 134-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
668. *Tractatus*, 88: *Primus dicitur materialis. Secundus dicitur intellectus in habitu, respectu intellectus consequentis conclusionem, vel intellectus in effectu conclusionum, respectu intellectus materialis precedentis. Tertius dicitur intellectus adeptus et in habitu, in habitu respectu intellectus consequentis, in usu et in effectu, respectu intellectus precedentis principiorum. Quartus dicitur intellectus accomodatus in usu. Hii sunt quatuor ordines intellectus speculatiui possibilis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
669. Ibid., citing Avicenna, *De anima* I.5. On the agent intellect see Avicenna, *De anima* V.5, 126-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
670. *Summa de anima*, 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
671. *Tractatus*, 89: *Sicut in isto sole materiali tria aduertimus, scilicet quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat, sic in secretissimo Deo tria intelligere debemus, scilicet quod est, quod intelligit, quod cetera intelligere facit.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 277. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
672. Ibid., 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
673. *Summa de anima*, 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
674. *Tractatus*, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
675. *Summa de anima*, 279. [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
676. *Tractatus*, 91, citing DSEA 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
677. *Summa de anima*, 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
678. *Tractatus*, 91. [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
679. *Summa de anima,* 280: *Intellectus uero possibilis operacio est primo conuertere se per consideracionem ad formas que sunt in ymaginacione; que cum illuminantur luce intelligencie intellectus agentis, et abstrahuntur denudate ab omnibus circumstanciis materie, et imprimuntur in intellectu possibili, sicut dictum est, et educitur in actum et formatur intellectus possibilis et tunc dicitur intellectus formatus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
680. *Tractatus*, 93 quoting, *De anima* V.5: *Notandum ergo, secundum Auicennam, quod operatio intellectus agentis est illuminare, siue lumen intelligentie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginatione siue estimatione, et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstantiis materialibus, et abstractas copulare siue ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operationem lucis species coloris abstrahitur quodammodo et pupille copulatur.* Cf. *Summa de anima*, 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
681. *Tractatus* 91, 95; as mentioned in DSEA4 [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
682. *Summa de anima*, 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
683. Anonymous, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, ed. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
684. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d’un maître des arts (vers 1225),’ 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
685. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik,’ 32, citing Avicenna, *De anima* I, 5. As Hasse elaborates on page 48, the Avicennian tradition meets here with the Western doctrine of the first principles or maxims of knowledge based on Boethius and the Aristotelian *Organon*. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
686. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
687. *Tractatus*, 95; cf. *Summa de anima*, 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
688. Augustine, *De Trinitate*,X.11-12, 17-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
689. Avicenna, *Canon medicinae*, trans. Gerard of Cremona (Venice: Paganino de Paganini, 1507; repr. Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2003). See also *Avicenna’s Medicine: A New Translation,* ed. Mones Abu-Asab, Hakima Amri, Marc S. Micozzi (Toronto: Healing Arts Press, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
690. *Tractatus*, 104; cf. ‘Johannicius: *Isagoge ad Techne Galieni,’* ed. Gregor Maurach. *Sudhoffs Archiv* 62:2 (1978): section 12, 153-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
691. ‘Johannicius: *Isagoge ad Techne Galieni,’* section 14, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
692. *Tractatus*,105. Johannicius: *Isagoge ad Techne Galieni,’* section 15, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
693. Ibid.,105-6. Avicenna, *Сanon*, Lib. I, fen 1, doct. 6, cap. 4 (22vb). [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
694. Ibid.,106-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
695. Ibid.,109-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
696. Ibid.,113. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
697. Ibid.,118-19, citing *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Butyaert, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
698. *De fide orthodoxa*, ed. Butyaert, 123-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-699)
699. *Tractatus*, 113, citing *De fide orthodoxa,* ed. Butyaert, 134; cf. *Summa de anima*,197. [↑](#footnote-ref-700)
700. *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Butyaert, 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-701)
701. Ibid.,126-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-702)
702. *Tractatus*, 114, citing *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Butyaert, 124-5; cf. *Summa de anima*,200. [↑](#footnote-ref-703)
703. Ibid.,citing *De fide orthodoxa*, ed. Butyaert, 125 and DSEA 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-704)
704. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-705)
705. *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Butyaert, 129; cf. *Summa de anima*, 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-706)
706. *Tractatus*, 115: *Circa que notandum quod sensus exterior comprehendit speciem presentem in materia et simplicem, ymaginatiua comprehendit formam absentem a materia et simplicem. Excogitatio siue opinio iudicat de ea.* [↑](#footnote-ref-707)
707. Ibid., citing *De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Butyaert, 131; cf. *Summa de anima*,201-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-708)
708. Ibid., 132, quoting DSEA 23: *Memoria triplex est, sicut dictum est superius. Est enim memoria quedam vis conseruatiua specierum sensibilium, que communis est nobis et brutis. Est alia memoria conseruatiua specierum intelligibilium, que tantum est in nobis; angelus enim non cognoscit per receptionem specierum. Est iterum memoria quedam conseruatiua diuine similitudinis, et hec communis est nobis et angelis. Memorative autem rationalis, id est que tantum est in nobis, triplex est actus. Primus est species intelligibiles retinere, secundus easdem species representare, tertius amissas vel oblitas species reparare et hoc est reminisci.* [↑](#footnote-ref-709)
709. Ibid., 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-710)
710. Ibid., 122; cf. *Summa de anima*, 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-711)
711. Ibid., 123, citing DSEA 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-712)
712. Ibid., 124; cf. *Summa de anima*, 191-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-713)
713. *Summa de anima*, 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-714)
714. *Tractatus*, 125; cf. *Summa de anima*, 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-715)
715. *Tractatus*, 129. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*, 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-716)
716. Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction,’ in *Three Treatises on Man*, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-717)
717. *Summa de anima*,205. [↑](#footnote-ref-718)
718. Cf. DSEA 23: *Summa de anima*, 194: *Sensus, sicut dicit Augustinus, illa vis anime que rerum corporearum corporeas percipit formas presentes; ymaginacio vero est vis anime que rerum corporearum percipit formas, sed absentes; sensus namque formas in materia percipit, sed ymaginacio extra materiam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-719)
719. *Summa de anima*, 193. According to the *Summa,* this faculty is infallible. Either it thinks of things that are true, or it does not think at all. By contrast, the external senses can be mistaken; we can perceive something from afar for instance as something that it is not; our senses can mislead us. The spiritual vision sometimes fails, and sometimes it does not. It depends upon the quality of the input it receives from the external senses. Since the spiritual power can remember images after the objects of sensation are gone, it can also conjure up or combine images of things that are not actually the case. [↑](#footnote-ref-720)
720. *Summa de anima*,194: *Racio vero est ea vis anime que rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differencias et propria accidencia percipit, scilicet universalia omnia incorporea sed non extra corpus nisi racione subsistencie.* [↑](#footnote-ref-721)
721. *Tractatus*, 126: *Sic ergo anima sensu percipit corpora, ymaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligentia incommutabile verum. Ratio huius diuisionis per se est manifesta*. [↑](#footnote-ref-722)
722. In an introduction to his edition of the *Summa de anima*,Jacques Bougerol recognizes that the most important source for this work was Avicenna. As Hasse notes, however, Bougerol neglects to identify around half of these extensive quotations from Avicenna. See Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West* (London: Warburg Institute, 2000), 49. Otherwise prone to count quotations, Bougerol identifies 49 references to DSEA across 20 chapters; 45 cites to John of Damascus across 24 chapters; and 48 cites to Augustine, including 15 to *De Trinitate*,12 to *De genesi ad litteram*,and 8 to *83 Different Questions*. Anonymous Callus is cited 12 times, amongst other works. See Jacques Guy Bougerol, ‘Introduction,’ in John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 31. As Bougerol also notes in his introduction, there is some variation amongst different manuscripts of the SDA regarding chapter titles. For his part, Bougerol states on page 24 of his introduction that he follows the transcription prepared by Cholet, a decision that some have found problematic. See also *Somme de l’âme*, introduction by L.-J. Bataillon, trans. J.M. Vernier (Paris: Vrin, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-723)
723. *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus IV-V,* ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1968), IV.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-724)
724. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima,* ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-725)
725. Ibid., 240: *Sensus communis est vis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas que imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei.* [↑](#footnote-ref-726)
726. Ibid., 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-727)
727. Ibid., 242: *Est autem sicut dicit Avicenna vis ordinata in extremo concavitatis anterioris partis cerebri, retinens que recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanet in ea post remocionem illorum sensibilium. Vult ergo dicere quod sensus communis est apprehendere formas omnium sensibilium. Vertutis vero que vocatur ymaginacio, retinere.* [↑](#footnote-ref-728)
728. Ibid., 243: *Tertia virtus est que vocatur imaginativa, sive excogitativa. Que est, secundum Avicennam, vis ordinata in media concavitate cerebri, potens componere aliquid de eo quod est in ymaginatione cum alio, et dividere secundum quod vult.* [↑](#footnote-ref-729)
729. Ibid., 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-730)
730. Ibid., 249: *Quinta virtus est memorativa que est vis ordinata in posteriori concavitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit vis estimacionis de intencionibus sensibilium. Comparacio autem virtutis estimative ad virtutem memorativam secundum Avicennam est qualis est comparacio virtutis ymaginacionis ad sensum communem: sicut enim ymaginacio retinet, et est thesaurus formarum sensibilium quas apprehendit sensus communis, sic virtus memorativa est thesaurus conservans intenciones sensibilium quas apprehendit virtus estimativa.* [↑](#footnote-ref-731)
731. Ibid., 271-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-732)
732. *Jean de La Rochelle: Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables,* ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin(Paris: Vrin, 1964), 84, citing *De anima* II.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-733)
733. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘Avicenna on Abstraction,’ in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton; NJ: Markus Wiener, 2001), 39-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-734)
734. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 132, discusses the phases of abstraction in John’s thought. [↑](#footnote-ref-735)
735. *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, 4 vols (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48),L1, Tr Intro, Q2, M1, C5, 4, 21: *Species omnino abstracta et absoluta a corporeitate, si intelligitur sicuti est, non intelligitur nisi a vi intellectiva omnino absoluta a corpore et expedita a mole corporea*. [↑](#footnote-ref-736)
736. *Summa de anima,* 274: *Sciendum igitur quod est intellectus passiuus et corruptibilis qui dicitur ab Aristotele materialis; et est intellectus incorruptibilis et separabilis*. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 3 (1928): 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-737)
737. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier Averroisme,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 322-7. R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 2 (1933): 211. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* (1947-8): 133-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-738)
738. René A. Gauthier, ‘La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d’un maitre des arts (vers 1225): Introduction et texte critique,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (Paris: Vrin, 1982): 3-55. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 131-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-739)
739. Ibid.,274: *Intellectus autem passiuus est uis inferior partis intellectiue coniuncte sensibili que recipit species intelligibiles in fantasmatibus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-740)
740. Ibid.: *Oportuit autem hanc uim esse ut intellectus qui est separabilis, ut species abstractas a fantasmatibus intelligeret.* [↑](#footnote-ref-741)
741. Ibid.: *Нec enim ex fantasmatibus offert materialiter species intelligibiles abstrahendas. Нec autem uirtus nunquam est anime racionalis nisi, dum coniungitur ad corpus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-742)
742. Ibid.,275. [↑](#footnote-ref-743)
743. *Tractatus* 87, citing *De anima* III.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-744)
744. *Summa de anima,* 275: *Una est quasi materialis, alia formalis. Una autem est possibilis, ut tabula nuda ab omni pictura, sed susceptibilis omnium picturarum, nullam habens actu, sed possibilis ad omnes. Et hoc est intellectus possibilis.* Cf. *Tractatus,* 87: *Una est possibilis ut tabula rasa, nuda ab omni pictura, sed susceptiua omnium picturarum, nullam habens actu, sed possibilis ad omnes, et hec est intellectus possibilis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-745)
745. Ibid.: *Intellectus uero possibilis operacio est primo conuertere se per consideracionem ad formas que sunt in ymaginacione; que cum illuminantur luce intelligencie intellectus agentis, et abstrahuntur et denudate ab omnibus circumstanciis materie, et imprimuntur in intellectu possibili, sicut dictum est, et educitur in actum et formatur intellectus possibilis et tunc dicitur intellectus formatus* [↑](#footnote-ref-746)
746. *Tractatus* 91, 95; as mentioned in DSEA4 [↑](#footnote-ref-747)
747. *Summa de anima,* 280: *Notandum ergo secundum Avicennam, quod operacio intellectus agentis est illuminare sive lumen intelligencie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginacione sive estimacione; et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstanciis materialibus, et abstractas copulare sive ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operacionem lucis species coloris abstrahitur quodam modo et pupille copulatur.* Cf. *Tractatus*, 93 quoting, *De anima* V.5: *Notandum ergo, secundum Auicennam, quod operatio intellectus agentis est illuminare, siue lumen intelligentie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginatione siue estimatione, et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstantiis materialibus, et abstractas copulare siue ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operationem lucis species coloris abstrahitur quodammodo et pupille copulatur.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-748)
748. *Summa de anima,* 275: *Alia uero est agens ut lumen. Est enim lumen intelligibile prime ueritatis nobis per naturam impressum, semper agens sicut lux, semper irradians.* As Wilpert notes, this analogy of the way light makes colors visible was as old as Aristotle who was himself probably referring to Plato’s analogy of the way that the light of the good is like a sun which exposes intelligible truths. Aristotle, *De anima* III.5, 430a17-18. Paul Wilpert, ‘Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom Intellectus agens bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte: Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, vol. 1, ed. Albert Lang, Josef Lechner and Michael Schmaus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 447. See also Aristotle *De anima* II.7, 418b on the light/colors analogy. [↑](#footnote-ref-749)
749. *Summa de anima*, 276. These four phases of the intellect in John are treated by J. Rohmer in ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 136. See also Dag Hasse, ‘Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik: von den arabischen Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus,’ in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 66 (1999), 21-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-750)
750. *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus,* vol. 2, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1972), V.6. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima,* 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-751)
751. *Summa de anima,* 276: *Prima est intellectus habens possibilitatem tantum; et est sicut potencia materialis ad similitudinem materie prime que ex se non habet aliquam formam, sed est subiectum omnium formarum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-752)
752. Ibid.: *Secunda est intellectus disposicionem habens; quod est cum iam habentur in intellectu principia, hoc est proposiciones quas contingit credere non aliunde sed per se note; sicut omne totum est maius sua parte, et si ab equalibus equalia demas, que relinquantur sunt equalia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-753)
753. Michael E. Marmura, ‘Avicenna on Primary Concepts,’ in *Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens,* ed. R.M. Savory and D.A. Agius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press, 1984), 219-39. Avicenna, *Metaphysics,* I.1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-754)
754. *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I-IV (Meta.),* ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1977), I.1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-755)
755. Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-756)
756. *Meta.* I.5. Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-757)
757. Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-758)
758. Avicenna, *De anima* V.5. Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima,* 187-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-759)
759. *Summa de anima,* 276: *Tercia est intellectus perfectus, cum iam habet intellectus conclusionum eorum que secuntur ad principia, sed non est conuersio actu ad illa per consideracionem. Quarta est intellectus in usu, cum iam considerat in actu.* [↑](#footnote-ref-760)
760. Ibid., 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-761)
761. This example comes originally from: Anonymous, *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, ed. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ 158. René Gauthier, ‘Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d’un maître des arts (vers 1225),’ 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-762)
762. *Summa de anima,* 281: *Unus est quasi inductiuus. Conuersio ipsius est per consideracionem ad formas sensibiles ut abstrahatur forma per actiones luminis intellectus agentis, qua informetur et in hoc fit differencia ad sensum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-763)
763. Henri Pouillon, in ‘Le premier traité des propriétiés transcendentales, La *Summa de bono* du Chancelier Philippe,’ *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 42 (1939): 40-77. Antonella Fani, *‘Communissima,* trascendentali e Trinità: da Filippo il Cancelliere alla prima scuola francescana,’ *Il Santo: Rivista Francescana de storia dottrina arte* 49:1 (2009): 131-54. Odon Lottin, ‘Alexandre de Halés et la *Summa de anima* de Jean de la Rochelle,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 2 (1930): 396-409. [↑](#footnote-ref-764)
764. *SH* Vol 2.1, In4, Tr 1, S1, Qu3, T1, C5, Ar6, Solutio, 414; cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* X. [↑](#footnote-ref-765)
765. SH, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II, 113: *Dicendum quod cum sit ens primum intelligibile eius intentio apud intellectum est nota* (Avicenna, *Meta* I.6); cf. Vol 2.1, In1, S1, Q1, C2, 3. SH 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2, Solutio, 522: *Deus sicut efficiens, primum eius nomen est ens*. [↑](#footnote-ref-766)
766. SH 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo, 114-15: ‘Secundum quod ens aliquod consideratur absolutum, ut divisum ab aliis et in se indivisum, determinator per “unum”. Secundum vero quod consideratur aliquod ens comparatum ad aliud secundum distinctionem, determinatur per “verum”: ‘verum’ enim est quo res habet discerni. Secundum vero quod consideratur comparatum ad aliud secundum convenientiam sive ordinem, determinatur per “bonum”: 'bonum' enim est ex quo res habet ordinary. (‘Insofar as a being is considered as absolute, undivided in itself, and separated from other [beings], it is delimited by “oneness”. However, insofar as a being is considered in relation to another [being] in terms of its distinctness, it is delimited by “truth”, for “true” stands for the ability of a thing to be detectible. However, insofar as [a being] is considered in relation to another [being] in terms of agreement or order, it is delimited by “goodness”, for “good” stands for the ability of a thing to fit into an order.’) Translation by Oleg Bychkov in *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology*, ed. Lydia Schumacher and Oleg Bychkov (New York: Fordham University Press, 2021), 142-43. Cf. Vol 1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C2, Respondeo, 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-767)
767. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ 132, discusses the phases of abstraction in John’s thought. For a further discussion of how the transcendentals aid in abstraction in the *Summa Halensis,* see the chapter on ‘theological vision’ in Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation,* 72-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-768)
768. This was first pointed out to me by Oleg Bychkov and noted in our jointly edited *Reader in Early Franciscan Theology.* SH I, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C3, I. a, 33: ‘Ad hoc ergo primo introducitur illud quod dicit Augustinus, in libro De videndo Dei, ‘Inter videre et credere hoc distare dicimus: quia videntur praesentia, creduntur praesentia autem in hoc loco intelligimus omnia quae praesto sunt sensibus sive corporis sive animi, unde sumpto vocabulo praesentia nominantur.’ (‘Regarding this matter, the first opinion to be introduced is that of Augustine in his book On Seeing God [i.e., Letter 147.2.7]: We say that the difference between seeing and believing is that the things that are present are seen and the things that are absent are believed. By “things that are present right here” we understand all those things that are instantly accessible (praesto) to our sensory awareness, either mental or bodily. Therefore, borrowing the term [praesto] they are called ‘present’ (praesentia).’) Translation by Oleg Bychkov in *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology,* 16. Cf. SH I, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1, 1, 15-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-769)
769. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 1.5; cf. Damien Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 428. [↑](#footnote-ref-770)
770. SH I, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M4, C1, Respondeo, p. 258: *De ideis rerum et rationibus in dei sapientia quod licet sint idem secundum rem, tamen differentia est inter haec secundum nomen.* Cf. [*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*](http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/primo_library/libweb/action/display.do?tabs=detailsTab&ct=display&fn=search&doc=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&indx=1&recIds=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&recIdxs=0&elementId=0&renderMode=poppedOut&displayMode=full&frbrVersion=&dscnt=1&scp.scps=scope%3A(%22OX%22)&frbg=&tab=local&dstmp=1298799544709&vl(217121274UI0)=any&srt=rank&vl(204862243UI1)=all_items&mode=Basic&dum=true&tb=t&vl(1UIStartWith0)=contains&vl(freeText0)=Magistri%20Alexandri%20de%20Hales%20&vid=OXVU1), vol. 2 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), Q. 46, \*25. [↑](#footnote-ref-771)
771. *De divinis nominibus,* trans. Thomas Gallus, ed. Declan Anthony Lawell, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 223 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), c. 5, \*6, p. 342. [↑](#footnote-ref-772)
772. SH 1, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M4, C1, Respondeo IV, pp. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-773)
773. SH 1, P1 In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M2, C2, p. 248 [↑](#footnote-ref-774)
774. SH 1, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M2, C2, Respondeo p. 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-775)
775. See Jon McGinnis, ‘Avicennian Infinity: A Select History of the Infinite through Avicenna,’ *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medieval* 21 (2010): 212-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-776)
776. Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), chapter on the divine nature. [↑](#footnote-ref-777)
777. SH 1, P1 In1, Tr5, S1 Q1, M3, C6, Contra, p. 256: Ergo ipse Deus aequaliter est artifex magnorum et parvorum; ergo in arte sua aequaliter cognoscit magna et parva. Item, quod potest cognoscere creatura, non potest Deus ignorare. Si ergo creatura potest cognoscere singularia, Deus non potest ignorare singularia. [↑](#footnote-ref-778)
778. Once again, the center/line analogy is used to justify this claim. [↑](#footnote-ref-779)
779. *SH* 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II (n. 72), 113: II. *Non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posteriora, ut per abnegationem vel effectum consequentem. Hinc est quod in notificatione 'unius' est una notio per abnegationem, alia vero per effectum consequentem: per abnegationem oppositae intentionis, quae est divisio vel multitudo, cum dicitur ‘ens indivisum,’ per effectum consequentem, qui est distinguere ab aliis: unitas enim distinguit ‘unum’ ab alio et ideo dicitur ‘divisum ab aliis.’* Translation by Oleg Bychkov in *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology,* 139: ‘Therefore, there could be nothing prior to them specifically for the purpose of making them known. Therefore, if they do become known, this can only be through something posterior, for example, through a negation or a consequent effect. This is why the recognition of “one” goes both by way of negation and by way of consequent effect. The negation is of the opposite meaning, which is “division” or “multitude,” when we refer to a being as “undivided.” The consequent effect is to distinguish [this being] from other [beings]: indeed, unity distinguishes “one” from another, and therefore [that one] is referred to as “separated from other [beings]”.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
780. Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing,* trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2006), Book I, Chapter 5, 27. *Avicenna latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I, c. 5 (ed. Van Riet, p. 40): *Dicemus igitur nunc quod quamvis ens, sicut scis ti, non sit genus nec praedicatum aequaliter de his quae sub eo sunt, tamen est intentio in qua convenient secundum prius et posterius; primum autem est quiditati quae est in substantia, deinde ei quod est post ipsam. Postquam autem una intentio est ens secundum hoc quod assignavimus, sequuntur illud accidentlia quae ei sunt propria, sicut supra diximus.* (‘Although the existent (*ens*), as you have known, is not a genus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaning agreed on with respect to priority and posteriority. The first thing to which it belongs is the quiddity, which is substance, and then to what comes after it. Since it [has] one meaning, in the manner to which we have alluded, accidental matters adhere to it that are proper to it, as we have shown earlier.’) [↑](#footnote-ref-780)
781. Translation by Oleg Bychkov in *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology*, 99-100. *SH* Tr Int, Q2, M3, C2, Respondeo, 32: 1: *Convenientia secundum analogiam: ut substantia et accidens convenient in ente, quia d dicitur secundum prius et posterius de illis: quia ens substantia est principium accidentis, et ideo per prius dicitur ens de substantia, quae est ens per se; per posterius de accidente, quod est ens in alio. Dicendum ergo quod non est convenientia Dei et creaturae secundum univocationem, sed per analogiam: ut si dicatur bonum de Deo et de creatura, de Deo dicitur per naturam, de creatura per participationem. Similiter omne bonum de Deo et de creatura dicitur secundum analogiam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-781)
782. See for example Neil Lewis, ‘The Problem of the Unicity of Truth in the Early Oxford Franciscan School,’ in *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 149-70. See also Jan A. Aersten, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought,* 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-782)
783. Lydia Schumacher, ‘Aquinas’ Five Ways: A Pastoral Interpretation,’ *Theology* 119:1(2016), 26-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-783)
784. SH 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II, 113: II. Jacob W. Wood, ‘Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology: The Anthropological Context of the Triplex Via in the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and Albert the Great,’ *The Heythrop Journal* 57 (2016): 293–311. [↑](#footnote-ref-784)
785. Jacob W. Wood, ‘Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology: The Anthropological Context of the Triplex Via in the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and Albert the Great,’ *The Heythrop Journal* 57 (2016): 293–311. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
786. *Summa de anima,* 278: *Est signacio luminis similitudinis divine; habemus ergo lumen impressum a creacione ad cognoscenda intelligibilia; sed hoc est quod diciums intellectum agentem.* [↑](#footnote-ref-785)
787. Ibid.,277: *Omne autem quod exit de potencia in effectum, non exit nisi per causam que educit illud de potencia in effectum. Est ergo hec causa quare anime nostre in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potencia in effectum. Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligencia in effectu; necessario igitur est agens intellectus.* Cf. *Tractatus*, 88, citing Avicenna, *De anima* I.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-786)
788. Ibid.,278. [↑](#footnote-ref-787)
789. Ibid.,279: *Respectu horum intelligibilium que excedunt intellectum humanum, omnino dicitur Deus intellectus agens.* Cf. *Tractatus*, 91. [↑](#footnote-ref-788)
790. Ibid.,280: *Ad cognoscenda uero ea que sunt infra se, non indiget similiter lumine intelligencie que sit extra se. Cum enim natura intellectus humani superior sit rebus corporalibus, superior eciam incorporalibus que sunt in ipsa ut in subiecto, utpote potencia, habitus, disposiciones et affectiones; ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est necessaria illuminacio substancie separate, sed sufficit lumen internum quod est intellectus agens, vis anime suprema de qua fit hic sermo.* Cf. *Tractatus*, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-789)
791. William of Auvergne, *De anima,* in *Guillelmi Alverni Opera omnia*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1674); trans. Roland J. Teske, *The Soul* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000). Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De anima*,’in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic*,ed. Ernest A. Moody (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Roland J. Teske, ‘William of Auvergne’s Debt to Avicenna,’ in Roland J. Teske, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris 1228-1249* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006), 217-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-790)
792. *De anima* 7.3 (Teske, 429); William also objects and with the comparison between the material intellect and matter, which has a relationship of potency to all forms without having any forms as such. [↑](#footnote-ref-791)
793. Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955, 256). Stephen P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Thirteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-792)
794. *De anima* 7.3 (Teske, 430). [↑](#footnote-ref-793)
795. These are the words of Filipe da Silva to me. See also José Filipe Silva, ‘Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview,’ in *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy,* ed. José Filipe Silva and Mikko Yrjönsuuri(New York: Springer, 2014), 123: ‘The human soul does not receive anything from external physical objects. Instead, the intellect, excited (*excitatus*) by the presence of things that are external to the senses, makes swiftly (*mira velocitate*) images of them. The action of the external things provides the occasion to the soul to exercise/execute its…inclination for knowledge.’ Da Silva provides another exceptionally clear account of William’s views on cognition in ‘The Chameleonic Mind: The Activity versus the Actuality of Perception,’ in *Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries,* ed. Elena Baltuta (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 43-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-794)
796. *De anima* 7.7 (Teske, 449): forms self-generated; 5.7 (Teske, 203), 5.15 (Teske, 241): through reflection on the body. [↑](#footnote-ref-795)
797. *De anima* 7.4 (Teske, 434). [↑](#footnote-ref-796)
798. Ernest A. Moody, ’William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De Anima,’* 46. Roland J. Teske, ‘William of Auvergne’s Spiritualist Concept of the Human Being,’ in *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne († 1249),* ed. Franco Morenzoni and Jean-Yves Tilliette (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 35-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-797)
799. *De anima* 7.14 (Teske, 470). [↑](#footnote-ref-798)
800. *De anima* 7.4 (Teske, 434). [↑](#footnote-ref-799)
801. *De anima* 7.6 (Teske, 445). [↑](#footnote-ref-800)
802. *Summa de anima*, 52: *Anima vero per naturam unibilitatis cum corpore per quam corpus animando vivificat; quedam vero substancia est qua nec spiritus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-801)
803. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise *De Anima,’* 39. *De anima* 1.1 (Teske, 43); 5.20 (Teske, 277); cf. 6.35 (Teske, 395); 6.36 (Teske, 400); 6.40 (Teske, 410). [↑](#footnote-ref-802)
804. Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination,* chapter 1, 26-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-803)
805. This is a compelling suggestion, although work would still need to be done to prove the later dating of these two anonymous works. See José Meirinhos, ‘*Intellectus agens triplex distinguitur*: Early Franciscans and Avicenna in Petrus Hispanus’ Theory of the Agent Intellect in the *Scientia libri de anima,’* in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Grutyer, 2021), 297-322. [↑](#footnote-ref-804)
806. Aristotle, *De anima* III.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-805)
807. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis - De anima* (TAGL.12.1), liber: 3, cap.: 4 (Bekker: 429a): *Despectum apparere enim prohibet extraneum et ei obicitur; quare est neque ipsius esse naturam neque unam sed aut hec: quia possibilis sit.* [↑](#footnote-ref-806)
808. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis - De anima* (TAGL.12.1), liber: 3, cap.: 5 (Bekker: 430a): *Et hic intellectus separatus et inmixtus et inpassibilis substantia actu est.* [↑](#footnote-ref-807)
809. *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,* ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 440: *Et iste intellectus etiam est abstractus non mixtus neque passibilis, et est in sua substantia actio. Agens enim semper est nobilius patiente, et principium nobilius materia. Et scientia in actu eadem est cum re.* See also the translation by Richard Taylor, *Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordova: Long Commentary on The De Anima of Aristotle* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-808)
810. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis - De anima* (TAGL.12.1), liber: 3, cap.: 5 (Bekker: 430a): *Separatus autem solum est hoc quod vere est, et hoc solum inmortale et perpetuum est*. Averroes, *De anima*,ed. F.S. Crawford, 443: *Et quod est in potentia prius est tempore in individuo; universaliter autem non est neque in tempore. Neque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit. Et cum fuerit abstractus est illud quod est tantum et iste tantum est immortalis semper. Et non rememoramur quia iste est non passibilis et intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis et sine hoc nichil intelligitur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-809)
811. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis - De anima* (TAGL.12.1), liber: 3, cap.: 5 (Bekker: 430a): *Non reminiscimur autem, quod hoc quidem inpassibile sit, passivus autem intellectus corruptibilis est, et sine hoc nichil intelligit.* [↑](#footnote-ref-810)
812. G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210: Alexandre d’Aphrodise: aperçu sur l’influence de sa noétique* (Paris: Le Salchoir, 1926), 11. This work includes a discussion of the Arabic and Latin translations of some of Alexander’s writing, such as *De intellectu.* [↑](#footnote-ref-811)
813. G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210*,82. [↑](#footnote-ref-812)
814. Ibid., 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-813)
815. Ernest A. Moody, ‘William of Auvergne and His Treatise De anima,’ in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic, Collected Papers 1933–1969 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 21. G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210*, 110. In particular, William objected to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ materialist belief that the intellect is a function of the body. [↑](#footnote-ref-814)
816. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias: A Translation and Commentary,’ (PhD Dissertation, Marquette University, 1978), 303. The translation is based upon Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima,* ed. Ivo Bruns, Pars I, Voluminis II: *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis, Praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1887). Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-815)
817. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 138 (text), 312 (commentary). [↑](#footnote-ref-816)
818. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 110-11; referencing Aristotle, *De anima*, III.5, 430a 10-12 and III.4, 430a 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-817)
819. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 37. Arthur Hyman, ‘Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators,’ in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsten (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 188-98, citing the *Long Commentary*, ed. Crawford, III.5, 393-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-818)
820. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 111. See also Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*,10. [↑](#footnote-ref-819)
821. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 140 (text), 306-7 (commentary). [↑](#footnote-ref-820)
822. Ibid., 287 (text), 314-15 (commentary). [↑](#footnote-ref-821)
823. Ibid., 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-822)
824. G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210*,76: *Tercius autem est preter duos predictos, qui est intelligencia agens per quam intellectus materialis fit ut habeat habitum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-823)
825. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-824)
826. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 26, 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-825)
827. Athanasios P. Fotonis, ‘The *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ 121, 159. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*,13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-826)
828. Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 25 (1951): 172. The term *intellectus adeptus*, was used by Averroes to name cases where the material intellect is activated by the agent intellect. [↑](#footnote-ref-827)
829. See Averroes, *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in libros De anima,* ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953), III.5, pp. 387ff. See also the online version of Michael Scot’s translation at: https://dare.uni-koeln.de/app/sourceviewer?type=text&textid=33. [↑](#footnote-ref-828)
830. *Summa de anima*, 284. See also David Wirmer, *Averroes: Über den Intellekt: Auszüge aus seinen drei Kommentaren zu Aristoteles' De anima* (Herder: Freiburg i. B., 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-829)
831. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* (1947-8): 143; G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210: Alexandre d’Aphrodise: aperçu sur l’influence de sa noétique* (Paris: Le Salchoir, 1926),81. [↑](#footnote-ref-830)
832. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect,* 262. Arthur Hyman, ‘Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators,’ in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsten (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 193, citing the *Long Commentary*, ed. Crawford, III.5, 393-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-831)
833. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-832)
834. Ibid.,286. Richard Taylor, *Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordova: Long Commentary on The De Anima of Aristotle Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordova,* trans.Richard Taylor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009),302-5. Cristina D’Ancona provides an extremely helpful list of known commentaries on Aristotle that were available in Arabic, and when they became available, in ‘The Origins of Islamic Philosophy,’ in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity,* ed. Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 869-93. [↑](#footnote-ref-833)
835. Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-834)
836. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 317. [↑](#footnote-ref-835)
837. Ibid.,290. [↑](#footnote-ref-836)
838. Ibid. Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ 170. Arthur Hyman, ‘Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators,’ 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-837)
839. Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-838)
840. Alfred L. Ivry, ‘Averroes’ Three Commentaries on *De anima,*’ in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition,* ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsen (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 213. See also Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-839)
841. Richard C. Taylor, ‘Remarks on *Cogitatio* in Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis *De anima* Libros,’in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition,* ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsen (Leiden: Brill, 1999),224 in 217-55. See also Harry A. Wolfson, ‘The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts,’ *Harvard Theological Review* 28:2 (1935): 70–133. [↑](#footnote-ref-840)
842. Richard C. Taylor, ‘Remarks on Cogitatio,’ 227-8. Alfred L. Ivry, ‘Averroes’ Three Commentaries on *De anima,*’ 213. *Long Commentary,* 476.76. [↑](#footnote-ref-841)
843. Richard C. Taylor, ‘Remarks on Cogitatio,’ 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-842)
844. Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘Problem: Averroes on the Possible Intellect,’ 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-843)
845. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 317; *Long Commentary* III.19, 440. Arthur Hyman, ‘Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators,’ 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-844)
846. R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 2 (1933): 241. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier Averroisme,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 334. [↑](#footnote-ref-845)
847. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century* (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2010), 30: *Comm. mag*. *De caelo;* *Comm. mag*. *Physics; Comm. mag*. *De anima; Comm. mag*. *Metaphysics; De substantia orbis; Comm. med. De generatione; Comp. Parva naturalia.* R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ 215, 220. Charles Burnett, ‘Michael Scot and the Transmission of Scientific Culture from Toledo to Bologna via the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen,’ *Micrologus* II (1994): 101-26. Charles Burnett, ‘Vincent of Beauvais, Michael Scot, and the New Aristotle,’ in *Vincent de Beauvais, frère precheur, un intellectual et son milieu au XIII siècle,* ed. Marie-Christine Duchenne, Serge Lusignan, and Monique Paulmier-Foucart(Grâne: Rencontres à Royaumont, 1997), 189-213. [↑](#footnote-ref-846)
848. R. de Vaux, ‘La première entrée d’Averroës chez les Latins,’ 234. [↑](#footnote-ref-847)
849. Ibid., 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-848)
850. Ibid., 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-849)
851. This term was coined by Ernest Renan, *Averroès et l’Averroisme: essai historique* (Paris: Calmann Lèvy, 1882). [↑](#footnote-ref-850)
852. Dominique Salman, ‘Note sur le première influence d’Averroès,’ *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 54 (1937): 203-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-851)
853. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts du premier Averroisme,’ 334-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-852)
854. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Dublin: Maes Duffey, 1950), 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-853)
855. *Tractatus*, 129: *Item ratio sic sumpta est corruptibilis, sicut dicit Commentator super librum De anima; dicit enim: Ratio est corruptibilis, intellectus incorruptibilis*. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 16 (1947-48): 136 refers to page 129 of the *Tractatus*, which distinguishes between a corruptible *ratio* and and incorruptible intellect, attributing this distinction to Averroes, *Long Commentary*, III.20, ed. Crawford, 446, 449. See also *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*, 2 vols,ed.Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 272 for a quotation of the exact same passage from Averroes.  [↑](#footnote-ref-854)
856. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-855)
857. Ibid., 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-856)
858. Ibid., 137, 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-857)
859. Ibid., 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-858)
860. *Summa de bono*, 272: *Commentator super librum De anima ponit quod ratio sit corruptibilis, intellectus autem incorruptibilis.* De Vaux also highlights two quotations to Averroes by the Chancellor in his ‘Le premiére entré d’Averroes chez les Latins,’ 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-859)
861. J. Rohmer, ‘La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halés à Jean Peckham,’ *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 3 (1928): 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-860)
862. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-861)
863. Ibid., 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-862)
864. Ibid., 114, 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-863)
865. Ibid., 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-864)
866. B. Carlos Bazán, ‘Was There Ever a First Averroism?’ in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert,* ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-865)
867. Ibid., 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-866)
868. Ibid., 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-867)
869. Ibid., 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-868)
870. Ibid., 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-869)
871. Ibid., 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-870)
872. Ibid., 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-871)
873. Ibid., 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-872)
874. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-873)
875. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius* d’un maître ès Arts (vers 1225),’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1985): 49: *Anima rationalis duas habet partes: unam inseparabilem a corpore, aliam separabilem. Inseparabilis dicitur rationalitas, a qua homo dicitur rationalis. Et dicitur etiam intellectus materialis, quem uocat Aristotiles passibilem et corruptibilem. Hec potencia media est inter potenciam sensibilem et intellectum separabilem: potencia enim sensibilis est circa fantasmata, intellectus separabilis circa species, hic autem intellectus materialis considerat species in fantasmatibus, ita quod apprehendit species cum accidentibus, distinguens inter speciem et accidencia, non tamen abstrahens; et sic preparat materialiter species intellectui separabili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-874)
876. Ibid., 52: *Est tabula nuda nullam habens picturam nec etiam aptitudinem ad unam magis quam ad aliam, potens autem habere quamcunque.* [↑](#footnote-ref-875)
877. Ibid., 51: *Est autem talis comparatio agentis ad possibilem qualis est comparatio lucis ad uisum. Sicut enim lux facit resultare speciem coloris de ipso colorato in oculum, ita intellectus agens abstrahit species a fantasmatibus, quas preparauit ei intellectus materialis, et facit eas quodam modo resultare in intellectu possibili. Vnde duo sunt actus intellectus agentis: unus est abstrahere species a fantasmatibus, alius est species abstractas ordinare in intellectu possibili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-876)
878. Ibid., 17: Gauthier notes here that, in his view, Robert Miller has shown that many texts of Averroes were conducive to the interpretation of him as affirming that the intellect belongs to the soul. See Robert Miller, ‘An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St Albert,’ *Mediaeval Studies* 16 (1954): 61-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-877)
879. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts (1225-40) du premier Averroisme,’ *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 66 (1982): 367. [↑](#footnote-ref-878)
880. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius*,’ 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-879)
881. René A. Gauthier, ‘Notes sur les débuts du premier Averroisme,’ 366. [↑](#footnote-ref-880)
882. Ibid., 336. Daniel A. Callus. In ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952) : 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-881)
883. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius*,’ 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-882)
884. Daniel A. Callus. In ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 155: *Loquamur ergo primo de prima vi in ordine isto anime rationalis, scilicet, intellectu materiali, qui ponitur in libro De anima, passivus et corruptibilis. Et iste recipit species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus. Oportuit enim hanc vim esse, ut intellectus, qui est separabilis, species intelligibiles abstractas a phantasmatibus intelligeret...hec autem virtus numquam est anime rationalis nisi dum coniungitur ad corpus…dicta est autem rationalitas aut ratio, quia potens est accipere universalia in particularibus, non tamen universale per modum universalis, aut particulare per modum particularis. Hec autem est virtus inseparabilis a corpore, scilicet, intellectus passibilis, qui recipit species abstractas a corpore.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-883)
885. Ibid., 156: *Post hanc virtutem est intellectus qui est separabilis a corpore, cuius sunt due differentie: est enim intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis. Et ponitur talis comparatio intellectus agentis ad possibilem, que est comparatio lucis ad visum. Hec tamen differentia est quod lux est separata a substantia visus, intellectus autem agens non est separatus a substantia anime.* [↑](#footnote-ref-884)
886. Ibid.: *Fuerunt tamen quidam philosophorum qui dixerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam a substantia anime.* [↑](#footnote-ref-885)
887. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-886)
888. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-887)
889. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 156: *Sed quia natura intellectualis est superior rebus corporalibus et supra res incorporales que sunt in ipsa, ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est necessarium illuminatione substantie separate, sed sufficit intellectus agens, qui est lumen interius, cum intellectu possibili.* Dag Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West* (London: Warburg, 2000), 202: ‘The distinction between forms abstracted and forms illuminated was to travel through the anonymous *De potentiis animae et obiectis* to Jean de la Rochelle and the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-888)
890. *Summa de bono*,232; Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-889)
891. *Summa de bono*,270: *Intellectus autem formalis acquisitus est destructibilis ut accidens; et hoc habet ex parte corporis.* René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius*,’ 13: As Gauthier notes, the term *intellectus formalis* appeared not only in Anonymous Callus but also before him in the *Liber de causis primis et secundis,* and in John Blund. It is picked up by Philip the Chancellor and the *Summa duacensis*. See also his, ‘Notes sur les débuts du premier Averroisme,’ 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-890)
892. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 157: The formal intellect involves a similarity to the object of knowledge and relates to the faculty of common sense. See also René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius*,’ 16-17. P. Glorieux, *La Summa duacensis*, (Paris: Vrin, 1955), p. 44, 5-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-891)
893. *Summa de bono*, 270. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-892)
894. *Summa de bono*,270: *Intellectus agens abstrahit species a phantasmatibus et abstrahendo unit cum possibili qui est recipiens. Formalis autem dicitur qui recipitur, et hoc est in intellectu humano proprium, qui se ipso res non intelligit.* [↑](#footnote-ref-893)
895. *Summa de anima*, 274. [↑](#footnote-ref-894)
896. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 143: ‘It is true that our author identifies the *intellectus materialis* with the “passive and corruptible intellect” of the *De anima* II.5, but unlike John of La Rochelle, he nowhere states that the name *intellectus materialis* comes from Aristotle himself. The identification might perhaps have originated from a superficial understanding of the opening words of Alexander of Aphrodisias,’ which refers to a material intellect. [↑](#footnote-ref-895)
897. *Summa de anima*,275. [↑](#footnote-ref-896)
898. Daniel A. Callus, in ‘The Powers of the Soul,’ 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-897)
899. G. Théry O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210*,74-5: *Dixit Alexander quod intellectus apud Aristotelem est tribus modis. Unus est intellectus materialis…intellectus autem qui nondum intelligit, sed possibile est ut intelligat.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-898)
900. Averroes, *De anima*, ed. F.S. Crawford, 447-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-899)
901. René A. Gauthier, ‘Le Traité *De anima et potenciis eius*,’ 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-900)
902. Ibid., 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-901)
903. Nikolaus Wicki, ‘Die intellectus agens-Lehre Philipps des Kanzlers (d. 1236),’ in *Festschrift für Martin Anton Schmidt* (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1989), 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-902)
904. Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect,* 10: While the potential and material intellect appear in Avicenna, they have a much more central role in Averroes. [↑](#footnote-ref-903)
905. B. Carlos Bazán, ‘Was There Ever a First Averroism?’ 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-904)
906. Dominique H. Salman, O.P., ‘Jean de La Rochelle et les débuts de l’Averroisme Latin,’ 204. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 164. Fernand Van Steenberghen in ‘Maître Siger de Brabant,’ *Laval théologique et philosophique* 35:1 (1979): 3-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-905)
907. Odon Lottin, ‘Alexandre de Halés et la *Summa de anima* de Jean de la Rochelle,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 2 (1930): 396-409. [↑](#footnote-ref-906)
908. SH 2.1, In4, Tr3, Q1, Ti2, D1, 685-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-907)
909. A section on this topic is included in the treatise entitled *De coniuncto*,which was one of a few sections added to the *Summa Halensis* in 1255-6 by William of Melitona and his team. This section can be found in SH 2.1, In4, Tr3, 631-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-908)
910. This topic is also dealt with to some extent in *De coniuncto*, SH 2.1, In4, Tr3, 631-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-909)
911. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, 434, quoting DSEA 4 and 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-910)
912. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2, Solutio, 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-911)
913. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, C3, Ar2, Solutio, 456: *Sensus enim est circa formas sensibiles in praesente materia; imaginatio vero est circa formas sensibiles absente materia; ratio vero est circa formas intelligibiles inventas in rebus sensibilibus; memoria vero est cognitiva praeteritorum, ut quod sensit aut quod ratione comprehendit; intellectus autem formarum intelligibilium creatarum separatarum a sensibilibus; intelligentia vero divinorum.* See also SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2, 2, 435, quoting DSEA 11: *Imaginatio est vis animae, quae formas corporeas rerum corporearum percipit, sed absentes sive absente materia.* ‘Imagination is the power of the soul which perceives the corporeal forms of corporeal things, but absent or in abstraction from matter.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-912)
914. *Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), II, 17, 19, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-913)
915. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1, b, 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-914)
916. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-915)
917. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C1, Solutio, 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-916)
918. Citing Avicenna’s *De anima* IV.1 and IV.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-917)
919. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C4, A2, Solutio, 439. [↑](#footnote-ref-918)
920. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2, Contra 1, 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-919)
921. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M2, C2, Solutio, 436, citing Avicenna, *De anima* I.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-920)
922. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C2, Ad objecta 2, 436, citing Avicenna *De anima* I.5: *Aestimativa rationalis apprehendit etiam intentiones abstractas a materia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-921)
923. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C4, A2, I, 438: *Quae vero est circa formas sensibiles aut est apprehendens aut custodiens aut transformans sive conferens absente materia. Si vero est apprehendens, dicitur sensus communis; si vero custodiens, dicitur imaginatio vel alio modo phantasia; si vero est transformans vel conferens absente materia, dicitur imaginativa. Si vero est circa intentiones, ut bonitatem et malitiam, sive nocumentum et iuvamentum, prout accidit de agno respectu ovis aut lupi, aut est apprehendens aut custodiens. Si apprehendens, dicitur aestimativa; si custodiens, dicitur memorativa. Et distinguuntur, secundum Avicennam, ut sensus communis sit in anteriori parte cerebri, imaginatio vel phantasia in eadem parte, imaginative vero vel cogitative, in media, in eadem aestimativa, memorativa vero in ultima parte cerebri.* [↑](#footnote-ref-922)
924. *Ingenium investigat, ratio iudicat, memoria servat, intelligentia comprehendit.* [↑](#footnote-ref-923)
925. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C3, 455. [↑](#footnote-ref-924)
926. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, 446, quoting *De fide orthodoxa* II.22: *Per sensum animae constituitur passio quae dicitur imaginatio, ex imaginatione* *vero fit opinio, deinde mens diiudicans opinionem, sive vera sit sive falsa, iudicat veritatem: unde mens a metiendo et excogitando et indicando dicitur; quod autem diiudicatum et determinatum est, recte dicitur intellectus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-925)
927. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, 446. [↑](#footnote-ref-926)
928. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C1, Solutio III, 450, citing DSEA 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-927)
929. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C1, Solutio III, 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-928)
930. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C1, Solutio III, 450: *Ea vero quae sunt intra, sicut sunt scientiae et virtutes et quod ipsa anima se ipsam cognoscit, quia non est necesse similitudines alias ab intelligibilibus pervenire ad intellectum, ideo non computantur in vi separata, sed cognoscuntur a vi in qua nata sunt esse.* [↑](#footnote-ref-929)
931. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Sed contra a, 446, citing *De fide orthodoxa* II, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-930)
932. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, I.b, 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-931)
933. I am grateful to Rega Wood for helping me to clarify the meaning of complexion in this context. See Stephen P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 20, citing Aristotle’s *De interpretatione* I.1 and *De anima* III.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-932)
934. SH I. P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C3, Ad objecta 11, 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-933)
935. The Summa holds by contrast to some others at the time that God does in fact know the content of such propositions, referred to as ‘enunciables,’ not however through the mode of enunciables but through the mode of the things which are enunciated, and not moreover through the mode of the thing but the mode by which they are in him as cause. SH I. P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, C4, 254 [↑](#footnote-ref-934)
936. Ibid., citing *Posterior Analytics* I.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-935)
937. According to the Summa, SH I. P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, M3, C2, Ar1, 155-6, falsity exists in the interior senses, which project their misperceptions on to data received by the external senses. [↑](#footnote-ref-936)
938. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, II, 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-937)
939. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, II.2, 447: *Nam illae tres differentiae, quas ponit*

     *Augustinus, distinguuntur secundum intelligibilia differentia in nobilitate maiori vel minori: nobilius enim est intelligibile increatum quam creatum, intelligibile vero creatum separatum a formis corporalibus quam illud quod est in corporibus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-938)
940. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio, 448: [↑](#footnote-ref-939)
941. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, II.2, 447: *Differentiae intelligibilium, assignatorum a Philosopho, attenduntur secundum comparationem ad formas abstractibiles, differentia vero Augustini ad formas has et alias; non ergo secundum unum modum accipiuntur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-940)
942. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, III, 447 and III, 449. [↑](#footnote-ref-941)
943. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, IV, 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-942)
944. DSEA 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-943)
945. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C3, Ar1, Solutio, 456. [↑](#footnote-ref-944)
946. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C3, Ar1, Solutio, 455: *Ingenium enim est vis naturaliter discretiva veri et falsi et aliarum differentiarum; ratio vero per ea quae accepta sunt, iudicat. Cum ergo non differant inter se nisi sicut natura et natura disposita, erunt ingenium et ratio una vis intellectiva. Quod videtur ex rationibus illorum: Ratio enim est vis per ea quae conceduntur perveniendi ad incognita; ingenium autem est vis instinctu naturae intellectualis cadendi super occulta. Restat ergo quod eadem sit vis, sed ratione differens.* [↑](#footnote-ref-945)
947. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, IV, 449, quoting *De anima* III.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-946)
948. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C4, Ar3, Ad objecta 2, 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-947)
949. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C4, Ar3, 458. [↑](#footnote-ref-948)
950. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C4, Ar3, Ad objecta 3, 459: *Differentiae enim quas ponit Philosophus, sumuntur secundum gradus potentiae: est enim potentia prima, quae simpliciter dicitur possibilitas; est etiam potentia secunda, scilicet possibilitas disposita; est potentia completa, quae dicitur habitualis et est potentia in actu. Secundum hunc modum in genere intellectus sunt quatuor gradus: primus est intellectus possibilis, cum nondum susceperit formas intelligibiles; secundus est intellectus in effectu, cum dicitur formatus, et dicitur potentia disposita; tertius est intellectus in habitu, cum potest intelligere cum vult, et dicitur potentia habitualis; quartus est intellectus adeptus, cum iam exivit in actum, et dicitur potentia completa in suo actu per hoc quod sibi acquisivit.* ‘The differences posited by the philosopher are organized according to grades of potency: there is a first potency, which is simply called possibility and a second potency, which is disposed possibility. There is also a formed potential, which is called habitual, and there is a potential in act. According to this mode, there are four grades in the genus of the intellect: first is the possible intellect, which does not yet receive intelligible forms; then is the intellect in effect, which is called a formed or disposed potential; third is the intellect in habit, which is able to understand as it wills and is also called a habitual potential. Fourth there is the *intellectus adeptus*, which proceeds into act and is called a completed potential in its act insofar as it has acquired [knowledge] for itself.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-949)
951. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C4, Ar3, Ad objecta 3, 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-950)
952. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M2, C4, Ar3, Pro 3, 458. [↑](#footnote-ref-951)
953. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio, 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-952)
954. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio, 447-8: *Sed in hoc differunt quod illa quae est Augustini accipitur secundum differentias formarum intelligibilium simplicium, illa vero quae est a Philosophi accipitur secundum modum perveniendi ad cognitionem illarum formarum intelligibilium quae veniunt ad intellectum per abstractionem a phantasmate sensibili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-953)
955. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, II.1-2, 448. [↑](#footnote-ref-954)
956. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, II.1-2, 448. [↑](#footnote-ref-955)
957. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, III, 449. [↑](#footnote-ref-956)
958. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio 448: *Aliae vero divisiones respiciunt veritatem formarum intelligibilium in complexione entium, sed in hoc differunt quod una accipitur secundum acceptionem perfectam et imperfectam ex parte cognoscibilis.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-957)
959. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, III, 449. [↑](#footnote-ref-958)
960. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio, 448: *Est enim accipere verum cum quadam admixtione falsitatis, et sic dicitur opinio, vel cum discretione veritatis a falsitate, et sic est mentis, vel cum certitudine veritatis, et sic dicitur intellectus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-959)
961. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, 449: *Constat autem quod divisiones virium cognitivarum, quae respiciunt formas intelligibiles sine complexione, sunt priores aliis.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-960)
962. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, 449: *Est enim duplex modus: a parte inferiori mediante sensu et a parte superiori per illuminationem sive a principio datam, quae dicitur cognitio innata, alia dicitur acquisita sive ens subsequenter.* [↑](#footnote-ref-961)
963. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-962)
964. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar3, P3, Ad objecta 1, 454: *Et ad primum primo. Licet enim non sit intellectus possibilis ut forma separata a materia, est tamen separabilis; differentiae autem illae ‘separatum’ et ‘coniunctum’ sunt formarum in esse, sed secundum rationem sunt hae differentiae ‘separata, coniuncta, separabilis et coniungibilis’, et hoc modo se habet intellectus possibilis animae ut separabilis et coniungibilis, et ideo suum intelligere proportionale medium est inter intelligere speciem in phantasmate et speciem omnino separatam, et hoc est intelligere speciem abstractam a phantasmate.* [↑](#footnote-ref-963)
965. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar3, P3, Solutio, 454. [↑](#footnote-ref-964)
966. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, 1, 450, citing *De anima* I.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-965)
967. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, Solutio, 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-966)
968. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, Solutio, 451: *Intellectus vero materialis habet species in phantasmatibus, quas possibile est abstrahi per intellectum agentem, ut uniantur cum possibili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-967)
969. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, I.1, 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-968)
970. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, II Sed contra, 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-969)
971. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, III a, 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-970)
972. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, Solutio, 452: *Est enim ipse spiritus in se habens lumen quoddam naturale, ratione cuius habet actum intelligibilium, a principio scilicet creationis, ex parte scilicet illa qua est substantia immaterialis secundum se separata, licet ex alia parte corpori sit coniungibilis: non enim videtur quod ita condiderit animam rationalem ad imaginem suam quin ei dederit perfectionem aliquam respectu cognoscibilium.* [↑](#footnote-ref-971)
973. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, Solutio, 452: *Ex illa vero parte qua habet*

     *hanc perfectionem cognoscibilium ad quamdam similitudinem Primi, ex illa est intellectus agens; quae pars, cum obviaverit formae intelligibili in phantasmate existenti, abstrahit eam ut sit actu intellecta, et ex illa parte qua nondum habet anima illas formas intelligibiles, dicitur intellectus possibilis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-972)
974. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, Ad objecta 1, 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-973)
975. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, Solutio, 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-974)
976. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar3, P2, Ad objecta 2, 454: *Ad secundum patet per hoc responsio, quia, cum sit formarum abstractarum a phantasmate, aliquam habet comparationem ad phantasma ut a quo fit abstractio, et ita ad corpus, sed non sic ut sit animae in quantum est actus in corpore.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-975)
977. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar3, P2, Ad objecta 1, 454: *Et ideo suum intelligere proportionale medium est inter intelligere speciem in phantasmate et speciem omnino separatam, et hoc est intelligere speciem abstractam a phantasmate.* [↑](#footnote-ref-976)
978. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, Ad objecta 2, 452: *Pars ergo intellectiva in anima quae coniuncta est parti sensibili, ex illa parte est possibilis et sufficientiam habet ex agente et viribus praeambulis sensibilibus, ut educatur de potentia ad actum. Vires enim sensibiles praeparant formam intelligibilem ut sit conveniens abstractioni, intellectus vero agens actu abstrahit eam et unit cum possibili. Sic ergo completur intellectus possibilis in receptione specierum intelligibilium a phantasmate abstractarum.* See also SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, Ti1, M1, C1, Solutio 2, 431: *Ratio autem est, quia intellectus convertit se ad formas abstractas a materia, sensus autem convertit se ad formas in materia; formae vero existentes in materia habent disparationem sive oppositionem in specie.* [↑](#footnote-ref-977)
979. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, 450-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-978)
980. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, I, 451, quoting *Metaphysics* VIII.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-979)
981. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar1, 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-980)
982. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, M1, C2, Ar2, I, 451, quoting *Metaphysics* VIII.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-981)
983. Tommaso Alpina, ‘Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect, and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna’s Kitab al-Nafs and Its Aristotelian Background,’ *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 131-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-982)
984. Leonard J. Bowman, ‘The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century,’ *The Modern Schoolman* 50 (1973): 251; on Alexander: 253-5; on John: 255-7. Bowman does make one point of interest on page 266, namely, that John Peckham, who largely reproduces the view of Roger Bacon on God as the Agent Intellect, affirms what Bacon believed to be Averroes’ view that human beings possess only the possible intellect, but this somehow has both a passive and an active dimension of receiving input and then preparing it for God’s illumination. [↑](#footnote-ref-983)
985. Margaret M. Curtin, ‘The *intellectus agens* in the Summa of Alexander of Hales,’ *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945): 418-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-984)
986. Tomas Nejeschebi is more sensitive to the Avicennian influence in his article, ‘Thomas Aquinas and the Early Franciscan School on the Agent Intellect,’ *Verbum* 6:1 (2004): 69-70. However his main focus is Bonaventure, and he only mentions Alexander and Rochelle briefly as background on pages 75-6. His overall interest is only to discuss their ideas insofar as Franciscans supposedly had a hand in condemning Aquinas’ view on the intellect in 1277. [↑](#footnote-ref-985)
987. Otto Keicher, ‘Zur Lehre der ältesten Franziskanertheologen vom *intellectus agens*,’ in *Abhandlung aus dem Gebiete der Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte:* *Ein Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag Georg Freiherrn von Hertling*, edited by Matthias Baumgartner et al. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1913), 173-82. Keicher also notes the influence that Aristotelian commentaries had on the Arabic reading of Aristotle. The Arabs received two ways of thinking about the agent intellect in Aristotle (174): from Alexander of Aphrodisias, they obtained the idea that the agent intellect is God, and from Theophrastus, that it is the human soul itself. They tended to favour Alexander, and the early Franciscans had to confront his idea as well. Though some later Franciscans called God the agent intellect, the Halensian authors defined it as the soul (176) at least when knowing ordinary things and distinguishes is from the passive intellect. This distinction seems to come from Alexander of Aphrodisias, and contrasts with Themistius’ tendency to conflate them in one faculty, which is what William of Auvergne would later do. The Summa draws in this regard on Rochelle (178) who said the agent intellect is God for knowledge of God, angels for knowledge of angels, and the human soul for knowledge of the soul and things below it. Very similar ground is covered with some additional nuances, such as a treatment of Albert and Aquinas, in Paul Wilpert, ‘Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom *Intellectus agens* bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts,’ in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Studien und Texte: Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60: Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, vol. 1, ed. Albert Lang, Josef Lechner and Michael Schmaus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), 447-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-986)
988. On the early reception of Aristotle’s *Ethics,* see Valeria Buffon, ‘The Structure of the Soul, Intellectual Virtues, and the Ethical Ideal of Masters of Arts in Early Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics,*’ in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages,* ed. István P. Bejczy (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 13-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-987)
989. *Jean de La Rochelle: Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*,ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin(Paris: Vrin, 1964), 78. John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*,ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-988)
990. *Tractatus*, 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-989)
991. *Summa de anima*,253-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-990)
992. *Tractatus*, 79: *Affectio vero est motus interior consequens secundum boni uel mali apprehensionem*, citing Avicenna, *De anima* IV.4. *Summa de anima*, 254-5, citing Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, VIII.7 and *De fide orthodoxa* 30.1. *Summa de anima*, 263, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-991)
993. *Summa de anima*, 256; cf. *Tractatus* 111-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-992)
994. *De fide orthodoxa* 30.3, ed. Buytaert, 256. [↑](#footnote-ref-993)
995. *Tractatus*, 79, citing Avicenna, *De anima* I.5. *Summa de anima*, 254-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-994)
996. *Tractatus*, 126, quoting DSEA 2 and 11. *Summa de anima*, 196, citing DSEA 4. *Tractatus*, 118, citing DFO 26.45. [↑](#footnote-ref-995)
997. *Summa de anima*, 263: *Notandum ergo quod appetitus est motus imperii, siue irascibilis siue concupiscibilis. Affectio uero est motus interior consequens secundum apprehensionem boni uel mali. Unde affectiones multiplicantur secundum quattuor differencias, et hoc secundum sanctos et philosophos, scilicet gaudium seu leticia, dolor seu tristicia, cupiditas seu spes, metus seu timor; quarum patet numerus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-996)
998. *Summa de anima*, 196, citing DSEA 4. *Tractatus*, 127, citing DSEA 20, 46. *Tractatus*, 127: *Vult ergo dicere Augustinus, quatuor esse anime affectus, duos respectu boni, scilicet gaudium et spem — sed gaudium de presenti bono, spes vero est de futuro — duos respectu mali, scilicet dolorem et metum — sed dolorem respectu presentis, metum vero respectu futuri — Hec diuisio sumpta est ex verbis Augustini, ex diversis locis ex libro ‘De spiritu et anima’.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-997)
999. *Saint John Damascene: De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*,ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), chs 27-30. Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*,trans. and introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. Van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), chs 18-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-998)
1000. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-999)
1001. Ibid., 219-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-1000)
1002. Ibid.,228, citing Isaac’s *Letter on the Soul* 1878d. [↑](#footnote-ref-1001)
1003. *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40, 782; cf. 814). [↑](#footnote-ref-1002)
1004. Simo Knuuttila, ‘Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,’ in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 65. D.A. Callus O.P. and R.W. Hunt, ed., *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima* (London: British Academy, 2012), 18.25-19.2, 20.19-24, 22.11-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1003)
1005. René A. Gauthier, ‘La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d’un maitre des arts (vers 1225): Introduction et texte critique,’ in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (Paris: Vrin, 1982): 3-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-1004)
1006. *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*,2 vols,ed.Nicolas Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 133-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-1005)
1007. See Michael Bertram Crow, *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-1006)
1008. *Summa de anima*, 256-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-1007)
1009. Following Philip the Chancellor, Rochelle also links the irascible power to the notion of something arduous,which is one of the concepts that would become fundamental for Thomas Aquinas in his system of the passions. I am grateful to Silvana Vecchio for pointing this out to me. [↑](#footnote-ref-1008)
1010. *Summa de anima*, 256-61; Silvana Vecchio, ‘Passions and Sins: The *Summa Halensis* and John of La Rochelle,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*,ed. Lydia Schumacher (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-1009)
1011. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 234-54. See also his ‘Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,’ 66-9. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, ‘Les theories des passions dans la culture médiévale,’ in *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Age*, ed. Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008), 120. Simo Knuuttila, ‘Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,’ 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-1010)
1012. Alain Boureau, ‘Un sujet agité: Le statu nouveau des passions de l’âme au XIIIe siècle,’in *Le sujet des émotions au moyen age*,ed. Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008), 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-1011)
1013. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 2 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948), 493-57. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, ‘Les theories des passions dans la culture médiévale,’ 107-22. Alain Boureau, ‘Un sujet agité: Le statut nouveau des passions de l’âme au XIIIe siècle,’ 187-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-1012)
1014. Simo Knuuttila discusses Augustine on the passions in *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 152-72; he also discusses Gregory the Great at 172-6. See also G. J. P. O'Daly and A. Zumkeller, ‘Affectus (passio, perturbatio),’ in *Augustinus‐Lexikon*, ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986–), i. 166–180. Gerald Bonner, ‘Concupiscentia,’ *Augustinus‐Lexikon*, vol. I (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994), 1113–22; idem., ‘Cupiditas’, *Augustinus‐Lexikon*, vol. II (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 166–72. Augustine likened the first movements or passions of concupiscence to the woman, Eve, who presented her husband Adam with a temptation in the garden, and the second movements or consent to Adam who chose to follow her rather than reject her suggestion. This theme was picked up by Lombard and many other commentators. [↑](#footnote-ref-1013)
1015. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 183. See Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* 9.4-5 and 14.7-8. Carla Casgrande, ‘Agostino, I medievali e il buon uso delle passioni,’ in *Agostino d’Ippona: Presenza e pensiero: La scoperta dell’interiorità,* ed. A Marini (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004), 65-75. Richard Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch 26 on Augustine, 400-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-1014)
1016. Peter Lombard, *Magistri Petri Lombardi, Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae* (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971), II.24.3-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1015)
1017. *De fide orthodoxa* 36, ed. Buytaert, 132: *Passio est motus appetitivae virtutis, sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali. Suspicio enim boni concupiscentiam movet; suspicio vero mali iram.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1016)
1018. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 180. Anselm of Canterbury, *De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato*, ed. Franciscus S. Schmitt, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1968), 4, 144.4–12; cf. Augustine, *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos* (PL 35, 2066). See also Peter Abelard, *Scit te ipsum,* ed. R.M. Ilgner, CCCM 190 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001). *Sententie Petri Abelardi (Sententie Hermanni)*, ed. S. Buzzetti (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1983), 151.50-69. On consent in Abelard, see John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 251-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-1017)
1019. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 173: ‘According to Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141), involuntary sexual desire is a penal movement of the soul and a venial sin (*De Sacramentis*, PL 176, 315C–316A, 391B). In the anonymous *Summa sententiarum* (from the same period) it is said that moderate sexual feelings are not sins as such, and that Gregory the Great's view of the sinfulness of any sexual intercourse should be understood as referring to immoderate sexual desires (PL 176, 156C–157A). Hugh's attitude towards first movements is not quite clear. He elsewhere says that to sin is to consent to what is forbidden (525B–D); for a similar formulation in the *Summa sententiarum*, see PL 176, 74B. Both these works were used by Peter Lombard.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1018)
1020. *Magistri Petri Lombardi, Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, II.33.5.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1019)
1021. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 179: Jerome’s term pro-passion was often used in Middle Ages to describe an unpremeditated emotional response to external stimuli. It represents a first movement contrasted with a second movement of the will. [↑](#footnote-ref-1020)
1022. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 182, citing *Magistri Petri Lombardi, Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*,II.24.9.3-12.1; cf. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 2, 495. [↑](#footnote-ref-1021)
1023. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 184-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1022)
1024. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 2, 520. [↑](#footnote-ref-1023)
1025. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,vol. 3, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1982), 42-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1024)
1026. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 188. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, II.2, 526–7. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 2, 514-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-1025)
1027. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 2, 527; on Hugh, see the edition by Riccardo Saccenti in *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013), 227-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-1026)
1028. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 2, 2 528; on Roland, see *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus,* ed. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), 186-91, 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-1027)
1029. Silvana Vecchio, ‘Passions et vertus dans la Summa de bono,’ in *Philippe le Chancelier: prédicateur, théologien et poète parisien du début du XIIIe siècle*, ed. by Gilbert Dahan, Anne Zoe Rillon-Marne (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 169-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-1028)
1030. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 2, 536-7; *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono,* vol. 1, 161-2; cf. 213-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1029)
1031. *Summa de anima*, 253. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 2, 541, 544. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, ‘Les theories des passions dans la culture médiévale,’ 120: ‘Les theories des passions dans la culture médiévale, signe de la necessite qui desormais accable l'homme, a la fois dans son ame dans son corps, et representent la peine qui atteint l’âme a cause de sa junction a un corps infirme.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1030)
1032. Simo Knuuttila, ‘Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,’ 53l, and *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 169. Augustine discusses the passions in, *De Triniate* 12.12 and *De civitate Dei* 14.19. [↑](#footnote-ref-1031)
1033. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, 190-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1032)
1034. *De fide orthodoxa* 36, ed. Butyaert, 135-6. See also Richard Cross, ‘The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis,*’ in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* ed. Lydia Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 71-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-1033)
1035. Frederick J. Adelman, ‘The Theory of Will in St John Damascene,’ in *The Quest for the Absolute*,ed. Frederick J. Adelman (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1966), 22-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-1034)
1036. Ibid., 37. R.A. Gauthier, ‘Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’acte humain,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-1035)
1037. Frederick J. Adelman, ‘The Theory of Will in St John Damascene,’ 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-1036)
1038. Ibid., 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-1037)
1039. Ibid., 30. See also Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1960), 401: Philip the Chancellor misunderstands *boulesis* and makes it about means rather than ends, when for Damascus, it only concerns ends. This is an error he passes on to Rochelle and later Aquinas. See also Irene Zavattero, ‘La boulesis nella psicologia dell’agire morale della prima metà del XIII secolo,’ in *Il desiderio nel Medioevo,* ed. A. Palazzo (Rome: Edizione di Storia e Letteratura, 2014), 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-1038)
1040. *Tractatus*, 101-2, referring to *De anima* II, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-1039)
1041. *Tractatus*, 118, citing DFO 26.15, Avicenna, *De anima* II.3; *Summa de anima*,207. [↑](#footnote-ref-1040)
1042. John of Damascus, DFO 36, 8-9. Alexander of Hales also treats the *thelesis/boulesis* distinction in, ‘De libero arbitrio,’ in *Magestri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*,vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), qu 33, Respondeo, 590. [↑](#footnote-ref-1041)
1043. *Tractatus*, 98: *Est enim bonum superius bonum rationale, quod dicitur honestum et bonum simpliciter, quod sua vi nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit. et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; iterum est bonum medium, quod est bonum naturale, sicut esse, viuere, intelligere et sentire.* The idea of the *bonum honestum* comes from Cicero and a natural good from *De fide orthodoxa* 36, ed. Buytaert, 8-9. *Summa de anima*, 287: *Est enim bonum superius bonum racionale, quod dicitur honestum, et bonum simplex, quod sua ui nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit; et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; et est bonum medium quod est bonum naturale quemadmodum esse et uiuere, et intelligere, et sentire, et quecumque sunt substancialia nature.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1042)
1044. John of Damascus, DFO 36, 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1043)
1045. *Summa de anima*, 212. Irene Zavattero also points this out in ‘*Voluntas est duplex*: La dottrina della voluntà dell’anonimo commentario di Parigi sull’ethica *Nova* e *Vetus* (1235-40), *Medioevo* 40 (2015): 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-1044)
1046. *Tractatus*, 120: *Sufficientia predicte diuisionis patet sic: vis motiua rationalis aut est determinata ad bonum, sicut est thelesis siue voluntas naturalis, aut indeterminata ad bonum, et hec triplex est : aut enim discernit bonum, sicut est ratio ; aut bonum cognitum appetit, sicut est voluntas rationalis siue deliberatiua vel bulisis ; aut bonum cognitum et appetitum eligit, sicut liberum arbitrium*; citingDFO 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-1045)
1047. *Tractatus*, 121: *libero arbitrio. Tractatus*, 119: *Voluntatem autem diuidit in thelisim et bulisim, id est in voluntatem naturalem et rationalem; thelisis siue voluntas naturalis est respectu bonorum naturalium, que non possumus non appetere, sicut sunt esse, viuere, intelligere; voluntas rationalis est respectu bonorum non naturalium, que possumus velle et non velle.* The rational will concerns things that are possible or not possible (DFO 36, 10) as well as ends and those things that pertain to ends (DFO 36, 11). [↑](#footnote-ref-1046)
1048. *Tractatus*, 118, citing DFO 26.45. [↑](#footnote-ref-1047)
1049. *Tractatus*, 111-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-1048)
1050. *Tractatus*, 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-1049)
1051. Ibid., citing Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-1050)
1052. *Tractatus*, 112, quoting Avicenna’s, *De anima* I.5: *Motiua etiam, secundum quod est efficiens motum, est vis infusa neruis et musculis, contrahens cordas et ligamenta coniuncta membris versus principium, aut relaxans et extendens in longum et conuertens cordas et ligamenta e contrario contra principium.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1051)
1053. *Tractatus*, 118-19, citing DFO 26.15. *Summa de anima*, 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-1052)
1054. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* I.13.1102a27-b14, in *Aristoteles Latinus* 26, 1-3, fasc. 2, 92-3, ll. 8-14; I.13.1102a26-b4, 1102b13-15; references are drawn from Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*,103. [↑](#footnote-ref-1053)
1055. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 220, quoting *De anima* I.5 and IV.4. As Knuuttila notes, the distinction between commanding (i.e. the irascible and concupiscible) powers and powers that execute those commands (i.e. the nervous system and muscles of the body) is common to both Avicenna and John of Damascus. See also Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-1054)
1056. *Summa de anima*, 215: *libero arbitrio.* See also 217: *in nobis sunt que nos sumus libero arbitrio facere et non facere; hoc est omnia que per nos uoluntarie aguntur.* On this see also Alexander of Hales, *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, vol. 2 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1952), 394-7. See also *Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa*,ed. Buytaert, chapter 38, 144-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-1055)
1057. *Summa de anima*, 218-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-1056)
1058. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, 439. See also Silvana Vecchio, ‘Passions and Sins: The *Summa Halensis* and John of La Rochelle,’ 211-25. Silvana Vecchio, ‘Passions de l’âme et péchés capitaux: les ambigüités de la culture médiévale,’ in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Christof Flueler and Martin Rohde (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2009), 45-64; Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *Passioni dell’anima: Teorie e usi degli affetti nella cultura medievale* (Firenze: Sismel-Ed. del Galluzzo, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-1057)
1059. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M4, C2, 485. [↑](#footnote-ref-1058)
1060. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, 439, citing DSEA 4 and Avicenna, *De anima* I.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1059)
1061. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C1, Solutio, 439: *Ad quod dicendum quod motivae*

      *dicuntur, quia disponunt ad motum per modum cognitionis boni et mali, inclinantis ad appetitum vel fugam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1060)
1062. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar1, 441. [↑](#footnote-ref-1061)
1063. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C1, Solutio, 439: *Differunt autem inter se, quia phantasia est disponens ad motum ex apprehensione formae sensibilis convenientis vel inconvenientis, aestimativa vero est disponens ad motum ex apprehensione intentionis in re sensibili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1062)
1064. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar1, Ad b and Contra 1, 440: quoting *De Trinitate*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1063)
1065. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar3, 442. [↑](#footnote-ref-1064)
1066. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar1, Solutio, 440. [↑](#footnote-ref-1065)
1067. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar1, Solutio, 440. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar3, Solutio II, 442: *Exterior homo dicitur proprie, cum convertitur homo ad exteriora bona concupiscenda propter se; interior vero homo dicitur, cum convertitur ad interiora bona sive superna appetenda propter se, et secundum hoc, cum exterior corrumpitur, interior renovatur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1066)
1068. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar2, Ad 3, 441: *Cum exterior sensus carnalis bono suo utitur, interior sensus mentis quasi obdormit; non enim cogitat bona interioris sensus, qui iucunditate exteriorum bonorum capitur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1067)
1069. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar4, II Solutio, 444. [↑](#footnote-ref-1068)
1070. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M2, Ad objecta II, 445: *Ioannes autem Damascenus, licet loquatur de irrationali parte, loquitur tamen de ea prout est obediens rationi et movetur aliquando secundum rationem rectam, aliquando secundum non rectam, aliquando secundum se ipsam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1069)
1071. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M1, 439: Avicenna posits aestimative, concupisible and irascible powers (*De anima* I, 2), and Augustine posits sensuality in DSEA 14; there are the four passions of *gaudium*, *dolor*, *ira*, and *timor*; *gaudium* and *dolor* pertain to the concupiscible and *ira* and *timor* to the irascible. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M2, I.1, 444: *Secundum Damascenum, quod distinguantur secundum bonum et malum, ut concupiscibilis determinetur penes bonum, irascibilis penes malum: duae enim affectiones, scilicet concupiscentia et laetitia, sunt ipsius concupiscibilis secundum praesentiam boni vel absentiam vel expectationem; aliae vero duae, scilicet timor et tristitia, ipsius irascibilis secundum praesens malum vel futurum sive expectatum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1070)
1072. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M2, I.2, 444: *Vi concupiscibilitatis eligit et natura irascibilitatis reprobat; eligere autem et reprobare sunt respectu boni et mali.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1071)
1073. I.P. Bejczy, ‘John of La Rochelle and William Peraldus on the Virtues and Vices,’ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 97 (2004): 99-110. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, M2, Solutio 1, 445: *Ad quod dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis tripliciter accipiuntur et secundum hoc tripliciter distinguuntur: uno modo secundum appetitum boni et fugam mali, et secundum hoc bonum et malum distinguunt concupiscibilem et irascibilem; alio modo distinguuntur secundum differentem appetitum, ut concupiscibilis sit secundum appetitum delectabilis, irascibilis vero secundum appetitum ardui sive honorabilis; tertio modo secundum bonum in praesenti cum suo opposito et bonum in futuro cum suo opposito. Primo modo gaudium et concupiscentia, quae dicunt appetitum respectu boni in praesenti vel in futuro, ad concupiscibilem pertinent dolor autem et timor, qui consistunt in fuga mali in praesenti vel in futuro, ad irascibilem. Et hoc modo possunt accipi, cum quatuor affections distinguuntur a philosophis secundum voluntatem et noluntatem: hoc enim idem quod secundum appetitum et fugam. Secundo vero modo accipiuntur hae duae vires prout eis respondent cardinales virtutes, scilicet temperantia et fortitudo: nam temperantia est respectu delectabilium, fortitude vero in appetitu arduorum sive honorabilium, licet tristia vel indelectabilia reputentur. Tertio vero modo accipiuntur prout dolor et gaudium dicuntur esse in concupiscibili, spes vero et metus in irascibili. Hoc modo etiam distinguit Damascenus, delectationem et tristitiam dicens pertinere ad concupiscibilem, timorem vero et iram ad irascibilem.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1072)
1074. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T2, 464, citing DFO II.22: *Johannes Damascenus ponit divisionem per thelesis et boulesis, hoc est per voluntatem naturalem et electivam; nomine autem electivae voluntatis intelligit liberum arbitrium, sicut infra in suo tractatu determinat.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1073)
1075. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T2, 464, citing DSEA 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-1074)
1076. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T2, 464, citing Gregory the Great, *Super Ezechielem* l.7 (PL 25, 22). [↑](#footnote-ref-1075)
1077. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T2, 464, citing *De anima* III.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-1076)
1078. I am grateful to Riccardo Saccenti and Marcia Colish for comments on an earlier version of this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-1077)
1079. For example, Eugene TeSelle, ‘Background: Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy,’ in *Grace after Grace*, ed. Alexander Y. Hwang et al. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 1-13. John M. Rist, ‘Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,’ *Journal of Theological Studies* 20:2 (1969), 420. [↑](#footnote-ref-1078)
1080. Augustine, *Retractions* I.9; Eleonore Stump, ‘Augustine on Free Will,’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-1079)
1081. This work was finished before 395 according to Peter King (ed.), *Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xvii. It was followed by *On Grace and Free Choice* (426-7), *On Reprimand and Grace* (426-7), and *On the Gift of Perseverance* (428-9), works which were written primarily in relation to Pelagian controversy. [↑](#footnote-ref-1080)
1082. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.1 in *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Contra academicos; De beata vita; De ordine; De magistro; De libero arbitrio,* ed. Klaus Daur, William M. Green, CCSL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970). [↑](#footnote-ref-1081)
1083. See the related discussion of evil as a ‘deficient cause’ of action in Tobias Hoffman, *Free Will and the Rebel Angels* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-1082)
1084. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 14.42, trans. King, 222; 12.32, trans. King, 213; cf. 2.3, trans. King, 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-1083)
1085. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.19. [↑](#footnote-ref-1084)
1086. Ibid., 1.11, 3.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1085)
1087. Ibid., 1.16. [↑](#footnote-ref-1086)
1088. Ibid., 1.13. [↑](#footnote-ref-1087)
1089. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5.12, trans. King, 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-1088)
1090. Later Franciscans preferred some of Anselm’s later works on free will, which Marcia Colish takes as an attack on the later, anti-Pelagian views of Augustine. See ‘Free Will and Grace: Method and Model in Anselm's *De concordia*,’ in *Anselm of Canterbury: Nature, Order and the Divine,* ed. Ian Logan and Giles G. E. Gasper, Anselm Studies and Texts (Leiden: Brill, 2021).

      Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 1. See the excellent account of Augustine and Anselm on free will in Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L’atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013), 37-45. See also Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,* vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), 12-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-1089)
1091. Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 3 and 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-1090)
1092. Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 13; cf. Augustine *De Trinitate* 14.15. Robert Pouchet, *La ‘rectitudo’ chez Saint Anselme: Un itinéraire augustinien de l’âme à Dieu* (Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1964). K. Trego, *L’essence de la liberté. La refondation de l’éthique dans l’œuvre des. Anselme de Cantorbéry*, (Paris: Vrin, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-1091)
1093. Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 3.15. [↑](#footnote-ref-1092)
1094. John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* ch 41, 152: *Omne enim generabile et vertibile est*. See 152-4 more generally on free will. [↑](#footnote-ref-1093)
1095. John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* ch 40, 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-1094)
1096. Alexander of Hales, ‘De libero arbitrio,’ in *Magestri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’,* vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), qu 33, 566. [↑](#footnote-ref-1095)
1097. Denise Ryan, ‘An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind-Body Dichotomy: Jean de la Rochelle on the Soul and its Powers’ (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010), 173. [↑](#footnote-ref-1096)
1098. Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom,’ in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 63-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-1097)
1099. René A. Gauthier, ‘Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l’act humain,’ in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954): 51-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-1098)
1100. Bernard of Clairvaux, *On Grace and Free Choice,* ed. Daniel O'Donovan, intro. by Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-1099)
1101. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-1100)
1102. Bernard of Clairvaux, *The Treatise of St Bernard, Abbat of Clairvaux, Concerning Grace and Free Will*,trans. Watkin Wynn Williams (New York: MacMillan, 1920),ch 4, 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-1101)
1103. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Concerning Grace and Free Will*, ch 3, 14-17: three kinds of grace; 18-24: freedom from necessity, sin, and misery. The distinction that would become famous later on between *posse non pecarre* and *non posse peccare* is also found in chapter 7. See also Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* bk 2, d 25, ch 8 (160). [↑](#footnote-ref-1102)
1104. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-1103)
1105. Tobias Hoffman, *Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-1104)
1106. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 22: *Petri Abaelardi Introductio ad theologiam*, in *Petri Abaelardi Opera II*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris: A. Durand, 1859), 139; cf. PL 178, 1110a. This was also quoted in the *Sentences* bk 2, d 25 ch 1, n 2 (153). [↑](#footnote-ref-1105)
1107. L. Catalani, *I Porretani: Una scuola di pensiero tra alto e basso Medioevo* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). See also Marcia Colish, ‘Otto of Lucca: Author of the *Summa sententiarum?*’ in *Discovery and Distinction in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John J. Contreni*, ed. Cullen J. Chandler and Steven A. Sofferahn (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2013), 57-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-1106)
1108. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-1107)
1109. Ibid., 28. See also Lombard, *Sentences* bk 2, d 24, ch 3 (142), trans. Giulio Silano, in *The Sentences, Book 2: On Creation* (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008), 109. See also *Sentences* bk 2, d 24, ch 1 (140), trans. Giulio Silano, quoting Augustine’s *De corruptione et gratia* 11.32: ‘God gave a good will to man, indeed he made him upright in it; he gave him the help without which he could not remain steadfast in that will, if he so willed, and through which he could, but he left it to man’s choice to do this.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1108)
1110. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-1109)
1111. *Sentences* bk 2, d 25, ch 1 (153). [↑](#footnote-ref-1110)
1112. Ibid., d 24, ch 4 (156). [↑](#footnote-ref-1111)
1113. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-1112)
1114. Ibid., 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-1113)
1115. Ibid., 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-1114)
1116. John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*,ed. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, trans. Michael W. Dunne (London: British Academy, 2012), 213-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-1115)
1117. John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*,223. [↑](#footnote-ref-1116)
1118. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 1: *Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1117)
1119. John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*,217. [↑](#footnote-ref-1118)
1120. On William and other early thirteenth-century theologians’ views on whether free will consists in reason or will, see Irene Zavattero, ‘*Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntarios et raionis*: Sulla definizione de libero arbitrio all’inizio del Duecento,’ in *Libertà e determinismo: Riflessioni medievali,* ed. Marialucrezia Leone, Luisa Valente (Venice: Gioacchino Onorati), 143-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-1119)
1121. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 1, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 17, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris: Grottaferrata, 1982), 274-309; see also Bk 2, Tome 2, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 18 (1982), 470-510. See a fuller account of William’s doctrine of free will in Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 116-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-1120)
1122. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 1, 276. Peter Lombard, *Libri sententiarum*: *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2 vols, 3rd ed (Grottaferrata, Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81)*,* Bk. 1, d. 24, c. 3, 453. [↑](#footnote-ref-1121)
1123. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 1, 276: *Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente; malum vero gratia desistente.* Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* 11.31, trans. Peter King, *Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will*,212: ‘Free choice is sufficient for evil, but hardly for good, unless it is assisted by the omnipotent Good One.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1122)
1124. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 67; William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 1, 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-1123)
1125. See an excellent discussion by Tobias Hoffman which focusses on questions of the relationship between necessity and freedom in Auxerre, the Chancellor, Hugh of St Cher and others, ‘Freedom without Choice: Medieval Theories of the Essence of Freedom,’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics*,ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 196-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-1124)
1126. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 1, 275: *Mali non est causa efficiens sed deficiens.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1125)
1127. Ibid., 1, 489. [↑](#footnote-ref-1126)
1128. 2 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*,Bk 2, Tome 2, 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-1127)
1129. Ibid., 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-1128)
1130. *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*,vol. 1, 129-30: Philip the Chancellor created the formal tract on the topic and most subsequent thinkers simply answered questions in the order he listed them, including Hales, Odo Rigaldus, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, according to Michael Bertram Crow, ‘Fresh Lineaments of the Natural Law,’ in *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 111-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-1129)
1131. *Summa de bono*, 155-231. [↑](#footnote-ref-1130)
1132. Ibid., cf. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 91-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-1131)
1133. *Summa de bono*, 165-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1132)
1134. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 73-4. *Summa de bono*, 173: *Libertas autem principaliter residet apud illam potentiam in quantum est voluntas* (liberty principally resides in the power of the will); cf. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-1133)
1135. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 79-80. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*,135. *Summa de bono*,162. However, Hoffman points out in *Free Will and Rebel Angels,* 201*,* that angels according to Philip can choose between good and evil. [↑](#footnote-ref-1134)
1136. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 137-8. *Summa de bono*, 184-5: *Similiter dicit esse in libertate arbitrii quod nichil prohibet libertatem arbi­trii esse quantum ad hoc quod est potestas conservandi rectitudinem non existente rectitudine, quamdiu ratio est in nobis, qua eam valeamus cognoscere et voluntas qua illam tenere possumus.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1135)
1137. The *Quaestiones* of Stephen Langton identify free will with the rational faculty, holding that this embraces reason and will. [↑](#footnote-ref-1136)
1138. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 96-103. [↑](#footnote-ref-1137)
1139. See the edition at Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 230-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1138)
1140. Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà*, 142-51. See also also Magdalena Bieniak, ‘Contents of Hugh of St Cher’s Commentary on the *Sentences*, Books I-II,’ *Przeglad Tomistyczny* 19 (2013): 76. See also her ‘The *Sentences* Commentary of Hugh of St Cher,’ in *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,* vol. 2, ed, Philipp Rosemann, 139-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-1139)
1141. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 103-8. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*,ed. Aloysio Cortesi and Humberto Midali (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2016), 144: citing Augustine’s *De Trinitate* 12.7.12; cf. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-1140)
1142. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*,237-8: There is flexibility to choose between different objects of desire but not between good and evil (*Liberi arbitrii est potestas sed flexibilitas ad id quod vult habens liberum arbitrium*). [↑](#footnote-ref-1141)
1143. *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P., Liber Secundus*,234. [↑](#footnote-ref-1142)
1144. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*,vol. 1, 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-1143)
1145. *Tractatus*, 98: *Sicut enim habemus vim intellectiuam ordinatam ad verum, sic habemus vim intellectiuam motiuam ordinatam ad bonum. Notandum ergo quod est vis motiua ut natura et est vis motiua ut ratio.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1144)
1146. *Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, ed. Peter King(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-1145)
1147. I am grateful to Marcia Colish for making this point to me. [↑](#footnote-ref-1146)
1148. DFO 36.12. [↑](#footnote-ref-1147)
1149. *Tractatus*, 121: *Nota quod liberum arbitrium non dicitur liberum, quia flexibile sit ad bonum et ad malum, sed quia potest facere et non facere, quod consulit et instigat synderesis, vel suggerit sensualitas, et decernit ratio, et voluntas appetit naturalis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1148)
1150. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-1149)
1151. [*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’*](http://solo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/primo_library/libweb/action/display.do?tabs=detailsTab&ct=display&fn=search&doc=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&indx=1&recIds=UkOxUUkOxUb11156311&recIdxs=0&elementId=0&renderMode=poppedOut&displayMode=full&frbrVersion=&dscnt=1&scp.scps=scope%3A(%22OX%22)&frbg=&tab=local&dstmp=1298799544709&vl(217121274UI0)=any&srt=rank&vl(204862243UI1)=all_items&mode=Basic&dum=true&tb=t&vl(1UIStartWith0)=contains&vl(freeText0)=Magistri%20Alexandri%20de%20Hales%20&vid=OXVU1) (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1960), Tome 1, q. 33, memb. 3, dist. 3, 592: Alexander says free will is the same as *prohaeresis* and contrasts it with *synderesis* which innately moves the will to the good. [↑](#footnote-ref-1150)
1152. *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1952), vol. 2, 181-421; 1-15, reason of creation; 15-116, angels; 116-145, the seven days of creation; 145-181, the creation of Adam and Eve; 181-421, sin, grace, and free will. [↑](#footnote-ref-1151)
1153. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, memb. 1, 566-608, quoting DFO II.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-1152)
1154. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa,* vol. 2, 209b. [↑](#footnote-ref-1153)
1155. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 1, memb. 1, contra 9, 569. [↑](#footnote-ref-1154)
1156. Ibid., disp. 1, memb. 1, contra 10, 569. [↑](#footnote-ref-1155)
1157. Ibid., disp. 1, memb. 1, no. 16, 572; see also the Glossa, vol. 2, 209b, on the idea that humans are changeable between good and evil because they are not like God. [↑](#footnote-ref-1156)
1158. Ibid., disp. 1, memb. 1, no. 20, 573. [↑](#footnote-ref-1157)
1159. Ibid., disp. 2, memb. 1, Respondeo 33, 576. [↑](#footnote-ref-1158)
1160. Ibid., disp. 3, Respondeo, 587, citing Lombard’s *Sentences*, Bk. 2, dist. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-1159)
1161. Ibid., disp. 3, Respondeo, 587: *Secundo modo libera voluntas in bono et in malo* [↑](#footnote-ref-1160)
1162. Ibid., disp. 3, Respondeo 60, 587: *Et sic est libertas quia potest in hoc vel in illud consentire.* See also 588, Ad 63: *liberum arbitrium potest facere quodlibet*; cf. Ibid., disp. 1, memb. 2, no. 24, 574. [↑](#footnote-ref-1161)
1163. On this, see Irene Zavattero, ‘Scienza teologica, dottrina dell’anama, libero arbitrio: Il pensiero francescano all’università di Parigi nella prima metà del XIII secolo,’ in *Trilogia Bonaventuriana,* ed. Carmelo Pandolfi and Rafael Pascual (Rome: Ateneo Pontificio, 2020), 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-1162)
1164. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, memb. 2, 581. [↑](#footnote-ref-1163)
1165. Ibid., disp. 2, memb. 1, no. 50, 583. [↑](#footnote-ref-1164)
1166. Ibid., disp. 2, memb. 1, no. 51, 584. [↑](#footnote-ref-1165)
1167. Ibid., disp. 2, memb. 1, no. 54, 584. [↑](#footnote-ref-1166)
1168. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, 212, 8a, 8c: *Dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est primo ipsius voluntatis et secundum voluntatem est omnium actuum aliorum* (It is said that free will is first of the will and all other acts are according to the will). See also page 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-1167)
1169. Ibid., dist. 39, no. 4, 378. Augustine also said this in *De duabus animabus* 10.12: *Nusquam scilicet nisi in voluntate esse peccatum.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1168)
1170. As Anselm notes, this becomes a matter of slavery precisely because things other than God are finite and fleeting. To pursue them above all is else to put our happiness at the mercy of circumstances that are out of our control. [↑](#footnote-ref-1169)
1171. This is demonstrated by A. San Cristóbal Sebastián, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270-1300* (Madrid: 1958), 111. On 98, Sebastián also shows that medieval writers discussed *liberum arbitrium* until 1270; after this time, they frequently spoke in terms *voluntas libera—*freedom of the will and more occasionally, *liberum arbitrium*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1170)
1172. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, dist. 3, memb. 4, 593: *Dico ergo quod meritum penes voluntatem attenditur et penes liberum arbitrium, quoniam duo ad hoc exiguntur, scilicet separare appetendum a non appetendo, et hoc est liberi arbitrii; et adhaerere illi, et hoc voluntatis est; unde penes liberum arbitrium initiabitur, penes voluntatem consummabitur.* See also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*,vol. 2, dist. 25, 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-1171)
1173. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, dist. 3, memb. 4, 592-3; see also Alexander of Hales, *Glossa*, vol. 2, Respondeo 7, 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-1172)
1174. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, dist. 3, memb. 5, no. 77, 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-1173)
1175. Ibid., disp. 5, memb. 1, Respondeo 104, 601. [↑](#footnote-ref-1174)
1176. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M1, 466-7. See translation of this section by Oleg Bychkov in *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology: The Summa Halensis: A Reader*, trans. Lydia Schumacher and Oleg Bychkov (New York: Fordham University Press, 2021), 228-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1175)
1177. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C2, Ad 1, 480, citing DFO II.26: *Liberi arbitrii est moveri vel non moveri, impetum facere et non facere, appetere et non appetere.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1176)
1178. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M5, C2, Ad a, 487: *Liberum enim arbitrium est potestas ad opposita.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1177)
1179. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti3, M3, C5, Ad 2, 483: *Liberum arbitrium est quo homo potest peccare et recte agere.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-1178)
1180. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, a, 475. [↑](#footnote-ref-1179)
1181. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, a, 475: *Creatura rationalis vertibilis est secundum electionem*,quoting DFO II.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-1180)
1182. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, a, 475: *Creatura rationalis vertibilis est secundum electionem, ex hoc enim liberum arbitrium est, quod eligere potest vel recusare. Cum ergo eligere sit indifferenter inter utrumque, et recusare similiter, ergo liberum arbitrium indifferenter dicitur boni et mali.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1181)
1183. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Contra 1, 475, citing Anselm’s *De libero arbitrio* 1, Contra 2, citing Bernard’s *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1182)
1184. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Contra 4, 475, citing Augustine’s *De civitiate Dei* 14.11.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1183)
1185. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Respondeo, 476. [↑](#footnote-ref-1184)
1186. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Respondeo, 476, citing *De libero arbitrio* 1 and 3: *Posse facere malum non est pars libertatis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1185)
1187. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M3, C4, Respondeo, 482. [↑](#footnote-ref-1186)
1188. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M3, C4, Ad objecta 2, 482. [↑](#footnote-ref-1187)
1189. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C2, 471. [↑](#footnote-ref-1188)
1190. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr1, ad 1, 472: *Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1189)
1191. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr1, Ad 2, 472. [↑](#footnote-ref-1190)
1192. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, dist. 2, memb. 1, Respondeo 34, 577. [↑](#footnote-ref-1191)
1193. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr2, ad 1, 472: *Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente et malum eadem desistente.* See also Augustine, *De corrept. et grat.* 11.32 (PL 44, 935); Peter Lombard, *II Sent.*, d. 24, c. 3, 421. [↑](#footnote-ref-1192)
1194. Citing Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* 2, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-1193)
1195. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 8.24: *Voluntas vero sicut in bono, ita etiam in malo aeque perdurat: aeque profecto et liberum arbitrium tam in malo, quam in bono integrum perseverat.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1194)
1196. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, memb. 1, Respondeo 38, 578-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1195)
1197. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr3, 473, citing Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 3.7 (PL 182, 1005): *Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1196)
1198. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar1, Pr3, ad 1, 473, citing Bernard of Clairvaux, *De grat. et lib. arbit.* 10.35: *Nemo putet ideo dictum liberum arbitrium quia inter bonum et malum potestate vel facultate versetur.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1197)
1199. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2, Solutio, 474. [↑](#footnote-ref-1198)
1200. Alexander of Hales, *Questiones disputatae* 33, disp. 2, memb. 1, Respondeo 39, 579; see also disp. 3, memb. 1, no. 63. 588. no. 77, 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-1199)
1201. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar4, Respondeo I, 478. [↑](#footnote-ref-1200)
1202. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 1, 140-9: the *Summa Halensis* on free will. [↑](#footnote-ref-1201)
1203. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2, 476. [↑](#footnote-ref-1202)
1204. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2, Ad a, 476, citing *De libero arbitrio* 3.3.7, 476. [↑](#footnote-ref-1203)
1205. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar3, Ad objecta 1-5, 471: *Ad illlas ergo auctoritates Sanctorum, quae videntur concludere quod liberum arbitrium sit voluntas, dicendum quod Sancti non intendunt dicere quod liberum arbitrium essentialiter sit voluntas, sed quod penes illam principaliter attenditur libertas; unde ob hanc solam rationem dicitur liberum arbitrium voluntas, quia penes illam principaliter attenditur libertas eius.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1204)
1206. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar4, ad c, 478: *Liberum arbitrium est potestas faciendi quodlibet aut potestas ad opposita.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1205)
1207. Oleg Bychkov, ‘*Decor ex praesentia mali*: Aesthetic Explanations of Evil in Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought,’ *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 68:1 (2001): 250-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1206)
1208. Oleg Bychkov, ‘Aesthetic Explanations of Evil,’ 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-1207)
1209. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q3, M1, C3, Respondeo, 11; cf. C5, Respondeo, 13: *Liberum arbitrium est principium omnis mali culpabilis* (Free will is the beginning of all culpable evil). [↑](#footnote-ref-1208)
1210. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q3, M2, Respondeo 1-2, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-1209)
1211. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q1, 1-10, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1210)
1212. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q1, Respondeo, 3: *Est enim esse rationis, secundum quem modum quaecumque veritatem habent, id est adaequationem rei et intellectus dicuntur entia: secunduni hunc modum malitia est, cum deformat illud in quo est.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1211)
1213. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q1, Respondeo, 3: *Est etiam esse naturae: et secundum hunc modum, ratione eius quod substernitur malitiae, dicitur malum esse aliquid, ut mala actio ratione actionis dicitur esse aliquid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1212)
1214. SH 2.2, In1, Tr1, Q1, Respondeo, 3: *Est iterum esse moris, prout esse est quod ordinem*

      *retinet servatque naturam.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1213)
1215. Theo Kobusch, ‘The *Summa Halensis*: Towards a New Concept of Person,’ in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*,ed. Lydia Schumacher(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 153-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-1214)
1216. # That said, medieval thinkers also had plenty to say about animals and their commonalities with humans, as Ian P. Wei shows in, *Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary Between Humans and Animals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 95-115 treat the account of animals in the *Summa Halensis*. See also Dominik Perler, ‘Intentionality and Action: Medieval Discussions on the Cognitive Capacities of Animals,’ in *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M.C. Pacheco and José Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 73-98.

      [↑](#footnote-ref-1215)
1217. David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 16. Keck’s analysis focuses on Aquinas and Bonaventure, whom he sees as a follower of the Summa on this topic (94). [↑](#footnote-ref-1216)
1218. David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages*, 75; see also Marcia L. Colish, ‘Early Scholastic Angelology,’ *Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medieval* 62 (1995): 80-109. [↑](#footnote-ref-1217)
1219. Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (*SH*), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48), L2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, 149-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-1218)
1220. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Solutio, 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-1219)
1221. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Solutio, 151: *Dico autem intellectum cum ratione intellectum componentem et dividentem et ab extremo ad extremum per medium decurrentem, quo modo non est in intelligentia angelica: intelligit enim modo simplici sine decursu rationis.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1220)
1222. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Ad obiecta 6.b, 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-1221)
1223. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, 149: *Angelus est substantia separata a corpore, anima vero est unibilis corpori*. Cf. 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C1, Ar1, 238-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1222)
1224. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Ad obiecta 7, 152: *Angelus (…) non sit unitus corpori sicut forma vel perfectio cum perfectibili;* cf. 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar1, 1, 238: *Videtur quod angelus de natura sua sit substantia a corpore separata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1223)
1225. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, II Respondeo, 385: *Respondeo quod est regere corpus dupliciter: vel ut per illud moveatur, et sic etiam convenit angelo ut regat corpus: vel ut per illud vivificetur, et sic convenit animae.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1224)
1226. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C1, Ar3, 240; see also *Summa de anima* 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-1225)
1227. *SH* II, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3, a, 240: *Constat enim quod, quando spiritus angelicus assumit corpus, quod ei unitur; sed spiritus non videtur posse uniri corpori nisi aut sicut perfectio perfectibili aut sicut motor mobili: iis enim duobus modis unitur corpori; sed constat quod primo modo non unitur corpori; ergo secondo; et ita videtur quod pro tanto debeat dici quod angelus assumit corpus, quoniam unitur ei sicut motor mobili.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1226)
1228. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1-2, 245-6; 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C1, Ar6, b, 243. See also SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1-2, 245-6; 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C2, Ar2, 245. [↑](#footnote-ref-1227)
1229. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1-2, 245-6; 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C2, Ar1, 245. [↑](#footnote-ref-1228)
1230. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M2, C1, Ar1, 239-40. Franklin T. Harkins, ‘The Embodiment of Angels: A Debate in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Theology,’ *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 78:1 (2011): 25. See also Franklin T. Harkins, ‘The Magical Arts, Angelic Intercourse, and Giant Offspring: Echoes of Watchers Traditions in Medieval Scholastic Angelology,’ in *The Fallen Angels Traditions*, ed. Angela Kim Harkins, Kelley Coblentz Bautch, John C. Endres (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2014), 157-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-1229)
1231. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C2, Ar2, 134-6. This was not a view held or mentioned by Alexander of Hales in his *Glossa,* according to Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages,* 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-1230)
1232. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C2, Ar2, Contra a, 135. *In omni quod est citra Primum, differt quod est et quo est; sed angelus est citra Primum; ergo in eo differt quod est et quo est: sed omne in quo differt quod est et quo est, est compositum; ergo angelus est substantia composita.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1231)
1233. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C2, Ar2, Contra b, 135. *Angelus habet vires secundum quas attenditur quod est imago, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem: sed vires sive potentiae non sunt ipsa essentia: nulla enim essentia est sua potentia nisi in Deo; ergo essentia angeli non est suae vires; ergo angelus est substantia composita.* Cf. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, C1, 158-9; SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, C3, 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-1232)
1234. SH 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q1, Ar1, Contra a, 426: *Sicut ergo creatura differt a Creatore in hoc quod virtus in creatura non est omnino idem quod sua essentia, sic differet in hoc quod habet per pluralitatem virtutis quod habet Creator per virtutis indivisionem, ut Creator una virtute agat omne quod agit; creatura vero agat pluribus virtutibus differentia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1233)
1235. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Ar2, 155-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1234)
1236. David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages*, 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-1235)
1237. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1-2, 245-6; 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C1, Ar1, 229-31. Tiziana Suarez-Nani has undertaken a fascinating study of the individuation of angels in Thomas Aquinas and Thierry of Freiberg, in *Les anges et la philosophie: Subjectivité et function cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-1236)
1238. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C2, Ar1-2, 245-6; 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T2, M1, C2, Ar1, 233-34. David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages*, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-1237)
1239. David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages*, 99: Whereas early Franciscans understood matter in a metaphysical sense, Aquinas thought of it exclusively in physical terms as the property corporeal bodies. [↑](#footnote-ref-1238)
1240. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,’ *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19(1952): 156-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-1239)
1241. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Solutio, 151: *Secundum esse vero metaphysicum differunt essentialiter per intellectum possibilem ad species in phantasmatibus et intellectum abstractum ab hac possibilitate; intelligentia enim angelica habet intellectum abstractum ab hac possibilitate.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1240)
1242. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti1, C2, Ar1, Solutio, 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-1241)
1243. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T1, C1, Solutio, 162: *Ad quod dicendum quod in angelo non est potentia sensitiva distincta ab intellectiva per illum modum per quem sensitiva in homine distinguitur ab intellectiva.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1242)
1244. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3, Respondeo 1, 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-1243)
1245. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, Ti2, M2, C1, Ar3, Respondeo 1, 240: Angels take on a body, *Ad manifestationem ipsius creaturae spiritualis vel ad demonstrationem divinam (…) quoniam angeli ad suum corpus non est unio sicut perfectionis ad suum perfectibile, sed sicut motoris ad mobile.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1244)
1246. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T1, C3, Solutio, 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-1245)
1247. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, M2, C7, Ar1, Solutio, 184-5; 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, Ti1, C2, Ar2, Ad obiecta 2, 452: *Haec enim quae est in angelo, separata est a parte sensibili: unde non habet possibilem nisi dicatur possibilis, id est receptibilis illuminationum a Summo, sed habet partem sibi sufficientem ad cognoscendum ea quae nondum sunt cognita ab ea.* John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*,71: *Angelus ab inicio sue condicionis habet formas impressas ad intelligendas rerum naturas; quo vero anima humana est racionalis non facit ipsam deiformem nisi potencia ut in ipsa prima condicione sit quasi tabula nuda in qua est possibilitas ad formas et non actus (…) intellectus angelicus prima relacione suscipit illuminacionem a Primo humanus autem secunda relacione.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1246)
1248. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, M1, C1, 167-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-1247)
1249. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, M1, C3, 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-1248)
1250. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, C4, 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-1249)
1251. SH 2.1, In2, Tr2, Q1, C5, Ad obiecta 6.a, 152: ‘Angelus substantia intellectualis, illuminationum, quae sunt a Primo, prima relatione perceptiva, anima vero, ultima relatione perceptiva.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1250)
1252. See Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome* (Paris: Vrin, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-1251)
1253. James Daniel Collins, *The Thomistic Philosophy of Angels* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1947). [↑](#footnote-ref-1252)
1254. Dominik Perler, ‘Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology,’ in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*,ed. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 153 in 143-53: Thought experiments abstract ‘from normal conditions and thereby create an environment in which the most basic features become visible.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1253)
1255. Dominik Perler, ‘Thought Experiments,’ 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-1254)
1256. Ibid., 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-1255)
1257. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, M2, C8, Solutio, 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-1256)
1258. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, M2, C7, Ar3, Solutio, 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-1257)
1259. SH 3, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, Di3, M4, C1, 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-1258)
1260. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T1, M2, C1, Ar1, 202-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-1259)
1261. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T1, M2, C1, Ar3, 5, 205. *Sed homo plus vertibilis [est] quam angelus, quia homo potest verti a bono in malum et inde rursus in bonum; non sic angelus, immo solum semel vertitur vel in bonum vel in malum sine regressu ad alterum; plus ergo homo est vertibilis… propter hoc enim: conceditur quod liberior est homo quam daemon, quia scilicet homo potest regredi post casum, daemon autem non.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1260)
1262. SH 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q2, T1, M2, C1, Ar3, Solutio, 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-1261)
1263. James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron—A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism,’ in *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays*,ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-1262)
1264. Ibid., 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-1263)
1265. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-1264)
1266. Ibid., 260. [↑](#footnote-ref-1265)
1267. Gilbert Dahan, ‘Une introduction à l’étude de la philosophie: Ut ait Tullius,’ in *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du Guide de l’étudiant du ms. Ripoll 109*, ed. Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 31 in 3-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-1266)
1268. Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Dublin: Maes Duffey, 1950), 207, citing Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d’après ses oeuvres inédites, Tome II: Siger dans l’histoire de l’aristotelésme* (Louvain, Editions de l’Institut supérieur de Philosophie, 1942), 444. [↑](#footnote-ref-1267)
1269. For more on the Franciscan ethos referred to here, see the chapter on ‘The Franciscan Context’ in Lydia Schumacher, *Authority and Innovation in Early Franciscan Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-1268)