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
Shared social values

Rapid Evidence Assessment prepared for Dame Sara Khan's Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience, acting through the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

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Executive summary

UK legislation protects a wide range of rights and freedoms that have a bearing on how we relate to each other in a pluralistic and inclusive society, particularly the Human Rights Act 1998 and Equality Act 2010. These rights and freedoms not only help to determine what behaviours and activities are compatible with our democratic norms and principles, but also signal a broader set of social and democratic values that are important to life in Britain. Yet these values and freedoms can come into tension with one another. This is not necessarily a question of whether values are shared or not, but often rests on competing understandings of which values and freedoms should take precedence in a given situation.

This rapid review was commissioned by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities as part of [Dame Sara Khan's Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience](#) to identify and explore areas of shared values in Britain relevant to social cohesion and resilience, focusing in particular on the rights and freedoms protected in the Human Rights Act and Equality Act. The review was also tasked with identifying areas of consensus or disagreement, contexts where tensions arise as well as where the public believe the responsibility lies to uphold or protect shared values, and how they feel when they are undermined.


This report presents key findings from the review, which was undertaken across eight weeks in January–March 2023 and included sources from academic and grey literature as well as secondary data. Due to the broad scope of the commission and the limited timeframe and resource available, the findings presented here offer a snapshot of literature and key trends in secondary data. As such this report should not be read as an exhaustive account of all relevant literature, but as highlights of key trends in public attitudes research on the topic.

How strong are Britain's "shared values" around cohesion and resilience?

We explored three sets of values that featured prominently in the literature returned by our searches, or that have clear links into policies and legislation on social cohesion and resilience: tolerance, equality and individual liberty.

The research reviewed offers a compelling account of the UK becoming more committed to the value of tolerance, reflecting a growing liberalisation of social attitudes towards minority groups. In conceptualising tolerance as a value disposition towards difference, we find that:

- ♦ Britain is becoming ever more accepting of difference. Time series survey data reveals major shifts in people becoming more comfortable with the idea of interacting across lines of difference when it comes to who you live next door to, who you form friendships with or who you welcome into your family, particularly when it comes to race, ethnicity and sexuality. For example, the proportion of the population who view homosexuality as morally justifiable has gone from being a minority view in 1981 (12 per cent) to a view shared by two thirds of the population in 2022 (66 per cent).



- ♦ These trends do, however, vary by demographic factors such as age, religion and education. For example, older cohorts still show comparatively less comfort in accepting relationships between their child and some groups (eg a transgender or Roma partner, and to a lesser extent towards a homosexual or Muslim partner); yet there is very little to distinguish between cohorts when it comes to other religions, races and ethnicities, with less than one in ten expressing strong discomfort with these relationships across all age groups.
- ♦ Britain has also become more appreciative of difference. Over the past decade, we've seen a reversal of attitudes from majorities seeing immigration as something that undermines cultural life and harms the economy, to majorities celebrating the contribution of migrants to economic and cultural life in Britain. Similarly, in recent years factors such as where you were born, your religion or race have also taken on less importance in what the public think it means to be “British”.
- ♦ However, there are still many sensitivities when we drill down into these issues. For example, for many people the warming of views towards immigrants is still balanced with concerns about the need to address pressures of integration, and to preserve tradition and cultural homogeneity.
- ♦ And while many of the points above have become majority opinions, they are far from achieving consensus. Political identity remains a strong predictor of accepting difference relating to immigration, particularly through the lens of Brexit identities. Thus even with values that are widely supported, the idea of a consensus existing around a set of shared social and democratic values is clearly challenged by the sources we have reviewed.

Equality is also an important value underlying how people think about social cohesion and resilience, specifically in the increasing sensitivity to the existence of discrimination and inequities faced by minority groups:

- ♦ In general, people in Britain tend to see society as unfair, despite believing that equality and fairness are important democratic principles. Yet how you see the causes of inequalities tends to colour the extent to which you want to see something done about them, with clear disparities between the priorities of people who have more individualist mindsets to those who attribute inequalities to more structural factors.
- ♦ Discussion of equality surfaced in the literature through proxies such as attitudes towards discrimination and securing equal rights, as well as experiences and perceptions of unequal treatment and prejudice.
- ♦ These studies consistently show that people in Britain have become more attuned to the existence of discrimination and that as a society we are increasingly of the view that more needs to be done to secure equal rights, particularly for women, and black and Asian people – though these are still far from being views shared by a large majority of the population. Yet with fewer people now suggesting equal opportunities have gone too far than saying they are about right, or haven't gone far enough, there is a greater acknowledgement of social inequalities.

- ♦ This is also borne out in self-reporting of experiences of discrimination among particular groups in society, with large differences between levels of discrimination reported by ethnic minorities and white Britons, despite overwhelming support for anti-racist norms in the population overall.


While it was not prominent in the literature reviewed, people in Britain also hold a broad belief in the importance of individual liberty, which fundamentally informs a live and let live attitude towards difference, but this is limited in certain contexts. For example, the public strongly supports the freedom to protest, to speak without restraint and to be free from surveillance and monitoring of personal information in private, though there is a recognition that a degree of surveillance may be acceptable in public. Moreover, large majorities of people believe that they are free to express their views, reflecting the protections of freedom of expression in the UK, while balancing this with the need to protect people from discrimination or harm.

Where do shared values come into tension with one another?

When values are considered in isolation, there are clear trajectories of Britain growing more tolerant, of wanting to see more progress on equality, particularly for those who have historically faced discrimination, and in standing firm on the importance of individual liberty, even if we might place limits on this in some contexts.

However, we begin to see more nuance in the relative importance of these values in cases where they either come into tension with each other or with associated rights and freedoms, particularly protecting the rights of others. Indeed, which values, rights and freedoms we prioritise as being the most essential to protect varies substantially based on a wide range of situational and contextual factors:

- ♦ An interesting tension surfaces in the example of protests led by parents of children at a primary school in Birmingham to remove lessons on LGBT relationships, gender and sexual orientation, on the grounds that such content went against their faith. More specifically, this is manifest in the tension between what some people believe is a sin and their right to express or maintain those beliefs in civic life, versus the duty to teach about tolerance and relationships in schools and ensure freedom from discrimination for protected characteristics under the Equality Act.
- ♦ Tensions around tolerance do not just play out between minority and majority groups. Rather, relationships between minorities are just as important to acknowledge and address (as highlighted in the case of violent confrontations that occurred between groups of young men from Hindu and Muslim communities in the city of Leicester in 2022). Yet the power to study such dynamics is limited by the anecdotal nature of the evidence base, with limited power to generalise about whether we see distinct values dispositions among particular religious groups, or if instead factors such as education and age play a greater role in explaining values shifts over time.



- ♦ Tensions also arise around equality in cases where protecting the rights of one group can be perceived to limit the rights of another. The right to self-identification for transgender people has become a prominent example of this in recent years, as reflected in the debates in 2022-23 around how Scotland's Gender Recognition Bill interacts with the Equality Act. However, research into public attitudes on transgender rights suggests these kinds of tensions surrounding competing values and rights are far less present in the minds of the general public. People generally take a live and let live view to trans rights, though recognising that there are some situations that require more considered solutions.
- ♦ Tensions around individual liberty offered insight into situations where inhibiting one's own freedom of expression is felt necessary to prevent doing harm to others. While a majority of people in the UK believe that people should share their views more often, even if this might upset or offend others (68 per cent), around a third of people say that they personally tend to hold back on expressing their views in some circumstances. Consideration for others is an important explanatory factor here (among others), with three quarters of people agreeing it is important to learn when to keep an opinion silent around others to avoid causing offence – this being particularly salient when it comes to topics such as race and trans issues.
- ♦ Furthermore, people are more in favour of limiting personal liberties when they veer into expressing views that are threatening or abusive. Though a clear majority (64 per cent) draw the line at using violence to counter even the most extreme forms of expression, such as hate speech, with just 14 per cent of people supporting the use of violence in this context. This is mirrored in the general condemnation from the public of violent protests outside a hotel housing asylum seekers in Knowsley, Liverpool in 2023.
- ♦ Examples such as these are helpful in reflecting how values and freedoms are weighed up differently in particular contexts and circumstances. However, our searches identified limited literature directly addressing these tensions, so the evidence base we are drawing on here is highly anecdotal. Indeed, in many of the examples covered in this section, and particularly in the Knowsley and Leicester cases, the presence of violence means any tensions identified around restricting individual liberty are likely to be uncontentious. Generating new primary data that takes a more systematic approach to identifying and interrogating these tensions would be advisable if this is to become a major area of focus for the Independent Review.

Who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values?

The question of who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values is inherently complex, with a limited evidence base:

- ♦ The idea of upholding and protecting values was critiqued by roundtable participants as being simultaneously too vague and too narrow, as well as too abstract and context-dependent to be operationalised effectively in public attitudes research.

- ♦ The only explicit examples we found in the literature of how the public feels about those who undermine shared values tend to focus on those in positions of influence, such as politicians, the media and educators. Though in the case of politicians and the media this was in the context of a perceived failure to uphold shared values by acting in their own interests, rather than those of the public.
- ♦ The three professional groups that tend to be highlighted in the literature are also those who the public feel have a greater obligation to avoid causing offence over enjoying complete freedom of expression. On a list of 10 professional groups, school teachers, the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers in the UK Government ranked the highest among those who the public felt have a greater responsibility to be careful not to offend others, over being free to say what they want. Moreover, strong support exists for teachers promoting tolerance through teaching about diversity.
- ♦ While such data suggest that the public do, to an extent, differentiate between the roles of different actors in the responsibility to uphold values such as tolerance, equality and individual liberty, a deeper understanding of the accepted scope of these responsibilities and the extent to which they vary across different contexts is limited by a lack of data. It may be that this gap could be addressed through more targeted searches of specific events or case studies, but this was beyond the scope of this review.
- ♦ The question of responsibility for upholding values also highlights a disconnect between top-down promotion of particular values (as embodied in policies such as the teaching of Fundamental British values or the definition of extremism in contrast to a set of four core “British Values” in the Prevent strategy), and more bottom-up understandings of values, as is often the case in academic literature. That is, academic literature tends to treat values as something possessed by individuals, it’s up to people individually and collectively to hold on to old values or shift to some new ones.

The background features a dark blue field with intricate, flowing patterns of thin yellow lines. These lines form a series of overlapping, wavy shapes that create a sense of depth and movement, resembling a stylized, abstract landscape or a complex data visualization. The lines are most concentrated in the upper right and lower right areas, with some extending towards the left.

Introduction

Introduction


UK legislation protects a wide range of rights and freedoms that have a bearing on how we relate to each other in a pluralistic and inclusive society, particularly the Human Rights Act 1998 and Equality Act 2010. These rights and freedoms not only help to determine what behaviours and activities are compatible with our democratic norms and principles, but also signal a broader set of social and democratic values that are important to life in Britain. Yet these values and freedoms can come into tension with one another. This is not necessarily a question of whether values are shared or not, but often rests on competing understandings of which values and freedoms should take precedence in a given situation.

The intersection of personal values with rights and freedoms as protected in legislation creates a complicated picture for understanding how such tensions should be accounted for in policies around social cohesion and resilience. For this reason, King's College London was commissioned by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities as part of [Dame Sara Khan's Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience](#) to conduct this review to identify areas of shared values in Britain that are relevant to social cohesion and resilience, focusing in particular on the rights and freedoms protected in the Human Rights Act and Equality Act. The review was also tasked with identifying contexts where tensions arise as well as where the public believe the responsibility lies to uphold and protect shared values, and how they feel when they are undermined. Specifically, we were guided by the following questions:

- ♦ According to research and polling, what are the social and democratic values that appear to be the most important in relation to the rights and freedoms outlined in the Human Rights Act/Equality Act? To what extent is there consensus or disagreement among the British public on these social and democratic values?
- ♦ Does support for these values change in different socio-political and/or socio-economic contexts, where social and democratic values come into tension with each other?
- ♦ Who do the British public believe is responsible in upholding and protecting these values and freedoms if they are undermined or threatened? How do the British public feel about fellow citizens who undermine these social values and how do they think such individuals or groups should be responded to?

Rapid review approach

This report presents key findings from a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA), undertaken over eight weeks in January–March 2023. REAs seek to balance two competing pressures: the need to review a large body of evidence thoroughly to reach robust conclusions, and the need to do this in a compressed timescale (Thomas et al., 2013). However, in order to be completed quickly, they involve less comprehensive searching and less in-depth assessment of the evidence than systematic reviews. That said, REAs are of particular value to policy communities, where there is often a need to gather evidence quickly and cost-effectively to inform policy development (Collins et al., 2015).



Details of the search and screening approach can be found in the Appendix, which outlines our approach to identifying relevant literature and secondary data sources. Beyond this structured search approach, we also conducted additional searches in newspapers relating to case studies where “shared values” come into tension with each other, with examples identified on the basis of our reading and discussions with experts (see below). Secondary data analysis was also conducted in parallel with the review of literature. We analysed select variables from the European and World Values Surveys, European Social Survey, British Election Study and British Social Attitudes. Moreover, to identify further sources of relevant secondary data, we consulted with individuals from the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) and Pew Research Center, who generously supported us in supplying data.

Early findings were also tested with a panel of experts from think tanks, academia, polling companies and civil society organisations in a roundtable held on 20 February 2023. This provided us with the opportunity to subject our findings to scrutiny and challenge, identify case studies that illustrated values tensions, and helped us to refine the scope of the review to a smaller subset of values, rights and freedoms (specifically tolerance, equality and individual liberty) that are more tightly focused on the overall aims of the Independent Review (see Acknowledgements for list of participants).

It should, however, be recognised that REAs conducted on this kind of timescale cannot be expected to incorporate every relevant study, and may therefore be at risk of bias. The very broad nature of the questions that were commissioned also mean that we had to prioritise and limit the number of studies that we could read in depth to c. 50 of the most relevant sources. In doing so, we prioritised breadth of topic coverage from high quality studies over comprehensiveness on a particular topic area. Being selective in this way increases the risk of bias as well as the risk that relevant evidence may have been missed. As such, this report should not be read as an exhaustive account of all relevant literature, but as highlights of key trends in public attitudes research on the topic.

Further, designing search strings to reflect this breadth of evidence was challenging, given the large variation in how the term “values” is understood and applied both between subject areas as well as between academic and grey literature. While we try to signpost this in the sections that follow, we often found conceptual slippage in how the language of values was applied, particularly in the conflation of values with attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. We also recognise the broader limitations of using attitudinal data to explore topics related to social cohesion, where the likely presence of social desirability bias means we may only be seeing a partial view of people’s dispositions towards values such as tolerance, equality and individual liberty. Moreover, some studies highlight conceptual stretching when exploring values like tolerance, where different (and potentially incongruous) measures are used to capture tolerance. For example, Kromczyk et al. (2021: 176) note that race and racialisation, in particular, are under-conceptualised, despite them being “deeply embedded in any operationalization of tolerance”. In general, this leaves us with a limited understanding of the various and intersecting impacts of race, ethnicity, citizenship and experiences of migrating on tolerance and experiences of intolerance.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Richard Brown and Dr Victoria Ratti from NatCen, and Laura Silver from Pew Research Center, for their generous assistance in helping to identify secondary data of relevance to the review, and giving access to data that isn't in the public domain.

We are also grateful to the attendees of the roundtable for taking the time to reflect on and critique the emergent findings from the review. The participants included: Prof. David Voas (Professor of Social Science, UCL), Gideon Skinner (Head of Politics, Public Affairs, Ipsos), Prof. James Dennison (Professor at the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute), Sir John Curtice (Professor Of Practice, Politics, University of Strathclyde), Prof. John Denham (Professor, University of Southampton), Luke Tryl (UK Director, More in Common), The Migration Observatory (University of Oxford), Prof. Paula Surridge (Professor of Political Sociology, University of Bristol), Richard Brown (Director of Society Views, NatCen), Sophie Stowers (Research Assistant, UK in a Changing Europe) and Sunder Katwala (Director, British Future).



1 How strong are Britain's “shared values” around cohesion and resilience?


1 How strong are Britain’s “shared values” around cohesion and resilience?

The Human Rights Act 1998 and Equality Act 2010 protect a wide range of rights and freedoms that underpin policy on social cohesion and resilience – from the freedom to express your views openly, to practice whichever religion you choose and live your life without interference, to the right to be protected from discrimination or harm. These rights and freedoms do not exist in a vacuum, but broadly aim to reflect values held in society. Our search strategy aimed to identify research that connects the study of values with terms that are relevant to the scope of the Independent Review (as specified by the commissioning group). The studies returned touched upon a wide range of values, attitudes and beliefs, speaking to dispositions towards difference and discrimination, community mindedness and integration, the importance of personal freedoms and the protection of tradition, and beliefs about the role of the state in supporting the most vulnerable, along with democratic values more broadly.

In this section, we explore three specific sets of values: 1) tolerance; 2) equality; and 3) individual liberty. These values sets were not only chosen on the basis of emerging organically from the literature returned, but also because they have the strongest link to research on human values, while also having clear links into policies and legislation relating to social cohesion and resilience. In addition to aligning with the rights and freedoms protected by the Human Rights Act and Equality Act, the values of tolerance and liberty are explicitly mentioned in the Prevent strategy, which defines extremism in active opposition to four “fundamental British values” – specifically, “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” (UK Government, 2011). Since 2014, schools have also been required to teach these same values, as part of a push to “promote fundamental British values” (UK Government, 2014).

Ideas of tolerance and equality can be associated more broadly with values relating to how individuals view out-groups and difference. Relating to Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Human Values (2012), we see how attitudes of tolerance and equality can be discussed more broadly around values of “universalism” and “self-transcendence”, characterised through: understanding, appreciation and tolerance towards others; the protection for the welfare of all people; and an ability or desire to emphasise concern for the welfare and interests of others (Schwartz, 2012). Similarly, in a recent revision of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT-2), equality is defined as a distinct moral foundation, as a disposition towards “enforcing even balance and in-kind reciprocity in social relations”, requiring “equal treatment, equal say, equal opportunity, equal chance, and identical shares” (Atari et al., 2022). Through both framings, we see how tolerance and equality are situated within moral judgements focused on empathy, understanding of others and reciprocity between groups in society.

Individual liberty, on the other hand, ties in with attitudes toward democratic values and wider liberalism. Rather than a focus on individuals or groups within society, liberty pertains to the rights and freedoms of individuals in liberal western democratic societies to live as they choose, albeit constrained in certain circumstances – such as freedoms of expression, assembly and association outlined within the Human Rights Act.




In framing the discussion around understanding the types of attitudes and indicators of tolerance, equality and individual liberty, we hope to use these attitudes to discuss the deeper social and democratic values they express, and to understand where values have grown closer to consensus over time, as well as areas of disagreement to consider.

1.1 Britain has a clear commitment to the value of tolerance, reflecting a growing liberalisation of social attitudes towards minority groups

As outlined above, tolerance can be understood through individuals displaying inclusive attitudes towards minoritised or “othered” groups, who are potentially the object of discrimination, hostility or exclusion (Janmaat and Keating, 2019: 46). Prominent areas of enquiry are around different religions, cultures, ethnicities, sexualities and gender identities, among other factors. Yet some scholars observe distinct phases in how researchers and policymakers have understood tolerance, as well as different degrees to which tolerance manifests in public values.


Verkuyten (2022), for example, distinguishes between two conceptions of tolerance: “classical tolerance”, where protection of individual autonomy and personal freedoms such as freedom of religion are central, and “modern tolerance”, which focuses on civic values like inclusion, acceptance and appreciation of difference. In accordance with Verkuyten’s account of modern tolerance, Hjerem et al. (2020) conceptualise tolerance as “a value orientation towards difference”, manifest in “how one responds to the existence of diversity”. The authors highlight a three-level hierarchy at which tolerance is expressed, falling on a continuum from basic “acceptance of difference” through to “respect for difference”, and “appreciation of difference” at the other end of the spectrum. The authors note that this conceptualisation of tolerance is hierarchical in nature, with each level building on the previous (as visualised in Figure 1) – ie those who are respectful of diversity are also likely to be accepting of diversity too, just as those who appreciate diversity are likely to respect and accept difference, whereas for others tolerance may be limited to acceptance of diversity.

FIGURE 1: LEVELS OF TOLERANCE (ADAPTED FROM HJERM ET AL., 2020)




Time-series survey data suggests that Britain is increasingly becoming a more tolerant country on the basic level of “accepting difference”. For example, in the early 1980s, when people in Britain were asked who they would not like to have as neighbours, around one in ten respondents said they would not like to live next to people of a different race (10 per cent) or immigrants or foreign workers (13 per cent) – and in 1990, as many as three in ten (31 per cent) said they would not like to have homosexuals as neighbours. Moving forwards to 2022, these are now views held by small minorities, with 1 per cent mentioning people of a different race, 5 per cent immigrants/foreign workers and 4 per cent homosexuals. We also see high levels of acceptance towards living next to people of a different religion (1 per cent) and people who speak a different language (4 per cent) (Duffy et al., forthcoming, reproduced in Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: UNDESIRABLE NEIGHBOURS (WORLD VALUES SURVEY/ EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEY)



However, it should also be acknowledged that a trend of increased social desirability bias is likely to run in parallel with these trends, as expressions of intolerant attitudes have come to be seen as more socially undesirable (see Krumpal, 2013). Accordingly, tolerant attitudes may be overestimated in the data – particularly in the World Values Survey and European Values Study, which are primarily administered face-to-face in respondents’ homes. Though, in contrast, it should also be recognised that social desirability also demands some of the same behaviours as real tolerance. The expression of intolerant views becoming socially unacceptable can resemble the acceptance of difference, even if the person continues to be prejudiced.

Yet the sheer scale of change on other measures in the World Values Survey / European Values Study suggest that increasing acceptance of difference on survey measures represents a genuine attitudinal shift in Britain, notwithstanding social acceptability biases. For example, in 1981, only 12 per cent of people in Britain agreed that homosexuality is “justifiable”¹. However, over the course of the last forty years, this has become a majority view, with two thirds of respondents (66 per cent) now agreeing that homosexuality is morally justifiable (Duffy et al., 2023).



Important differences do, however, exist between attitudes held by different social and demographic groups: for example, three quarters (74 per cent) of non-religious respondents² agree that homosexuality is morally justifiable compared to just over half (55 per cent) of religious respondents³ – though it should be recognised that this is still a majority view among this group, and that part of the reason for this difference is that older people, who are more likely to be morally conservative, are also more likely to be religious.

There has also been a substantial increase in acceptance of difference on measures that aim to capture whether respondents would be open to forming friendships or welcoming people into their family across lines of difference. For example, in 2020, 70 per cent of people in Britain strongly agreed that they would be “happy for my child to marry someone from another ethnic group”, compared to 41 per cent of responses in a 2008 poll (Ipsos, 2020).

Cohort analysis by Janmaat and Keating (2019) suggests that generational replacement is an important factor in what drives these trends. For example, the proportion of 18-34 year-olds who say that they would “mind a lot” if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of black or West Indian origins fell from one in five (21 per cent) in 1983 to a view held by a small minority in 2013 (6 per cent). But there have been big attitudinal shifts among older cohorts too: in 1983, this form of racial intolerance was a majority view held by those over the age of 65 (53 per cent), whereas in 2013 it had fallen to around one in five respondents of this same age group (19 per cent). Janmaat and Keating (2019) observe that this is related, at least in part, to increasing education levels, which they find to be positively associated with cultural and racial tolerance as well as tolerance towards people identifying as LGBTQ+.⁴


As of 2019, there remained some differences between age groups on acceptance of people from different religious or ethnic backgrounds, as well as LGBTQ+ relationships. As shown in UK data from Eurobarometer 91.4 (see Figure 3), older age groups still show comparatively less comfort in accepting relationships between their child and a transgender or Roma person, with roughly twice as many people aged 65+ saying this compared to other age groups – and to a lesser extent towards a homosexual or Muslim partner, where there is slightly more differentiation between those aged 65-74 and 75+. Yet even within these older cohorts, strong discomfort with their child having a relationship with a trans, Roma, same-sex or Muslim partner is now a minority view. Moreover, there is very little to distinguish between cohorts when it comes to other religions and ethnicities, with less than one in ten expressing strong discomfort with these relationships – with the same patterns seen for Muslim partners among those aged 15-64.


Britain has also become more tolerant at the other end of the continuum identified by Hjerm et al. (2020), in showing a growing appreciation of difference. Even prior to the Brexit vote in 2016, there has been a general warming of attitudes towards the value immigrants bring to the UK, both culturally and economically. Over the past decade, the proportion of people who believe that immigration “enriches cultural life” in Britain has roughly doubled (26 per cent in 2011 vs 48 per cent in 2021). In fact, there has been a clear reversal in the balance of people who believe that immigration

FIGURE 3: DISCOMFORT WITH YOUR CHILD HAVING RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS LINES OF DIFFERENCE (EUROBAROMETER 91.4, 2019)

Regardless of whether you have children or not, please tell me, using a scale from 1 to 10, how comfortable you would feel if one of your children was in a love relationship with a person from one of the following groups. (% who say not comfortable (ranking 1-3))

■ 15-24 years ■ 25-34 years ■ 35-44 years ■ 45-54 years ■ 55-64 years ■ 65-74 years ■ 75 years and older






undermines cultural life versus enriches it, with the proportion of people saying that immigration undermines cultural life falling by half between 2011 (40 per cent) and 2021 (21 per cent) (Curtice and Ratti, 2022: 11).

Similar trends have been observed on economic measures too. In 2012, only a quarter of people in Britain (24 per cent) agreed that “immigrants’ skills and labour are necessary to help Britain’s economic recovery”, whereas more than twice as many people (55 per cent) believed immigration to Britain would “damage economic recovery by taking away jobs from people already living here”. A decade later, these views have reversed, with 53 per cent of respondents in 2022 appreciating the economic contribution of migrants, compared to 23 per cent of people who see them as a threat to economic recovery (Ballinger, Katwala & Rolfe, 2022). European Social Survey data, which trends back to the early 2000s, highlights 2014 as an important turning point. The proportion of respondents who say that people coming to live in Britain from other countries has made Britain a better place to live more than doubled between 2014-18, along with sharp rises in the proportion of people who believe immigrants benefit Britain’s economic and cultural life (see Figure 4).

FIGURE 4: AGREEMENT WITH IMMIGRATION AS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON LIFE IN BRITAIN⁵ (EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY)




Yet recent research by More in Common finds that this greater recognition of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration is still balanced with concerns about the integration of migrants, particularly the strain placed on public services and community infrastructure (Juan-Torres, Dixon & Kimaram, 2020). Likewise, celebration of cultural diversity and openness tends to be balanced with concern about the preservation of tradition and cultural homogeneity. Which side people prioritise varies depending on their underlying values and core beliefs, with a tension between groups that prioritise openness and those who prioritise “unity and homogeneity of the in-group” (Juan-Torres, Dixon & Kimaram, 2020). Consistent with this research, citizens’ panels conducted by British Future in Wolverhampton and the West Midlands revealed different levels of commitment to anti-prejudice norms when it comes to immigration, as compared to race, where there exists strong common ground in opposing prejudice (Ballinger, 2018).


Perspectives on immigration also remain strongly tied to political identity – and particularly Brexit identity. In 2020, those who said they would vote to remain in the EU if they were given the chance to vote again were overwhelmingly positive about immigration. Two-thirds of Remainers perceiving that the impact of migrants who come to Britain from other countries is good for the economy (68 per cent ranking 7-10 on an 11-point scale, where 0 is “Bad for the economy” and 10 “Good for the economy”) and enriches Britain’s cultural life (65 per cent ranking 7-10), compared to just 7 and 9 per cent who say that it is bad for the economy or undermines cultural life (ranking 0-3). There is no dominant position among Leave voters on this question, though attitudes are skewed towards seeing immigration in a negative light (see Figure 5; Curtice and Ratti 2022: 19).

FIGURE 5: BELIEFS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON LIFE IN BRITAIN, BY BREXIT ID (BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 2020)


On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely good, would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries?



And on a scale of 0 to 10, would you say that Britain's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries?



Sobolewska & Ford (2020) frame these differences in dispositions that were expressed through Brexit identities as a “moment of awakening” rather than creation, revealing responses to social and political processes that did not have a clear expression in political identity prior to the referendum. These identities, they argue, signalled different experiences of and dispositions towards longstanding changes in educational expansion, mass immigration and ethnic change. In *Brexitland*, they identify and explore three groups that structure this identity politics divide, specifically:



- ♦ Conviction liberals: typically graduates who prize individual freedoms, have little attachment to tradition, are cosmopolitan, pro-migration and embrace diversity, and are prepared to defend it.
- ♦ Necessity identity liberals: typically ethnic minorities who subscribe to anti-racism and pro-diversity social norms, and favour defending diversity and prohibit expressions of prejudice and discrimination, although are ambivalent on gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights.
- ♦ Identity conservatives: typically white school leavers, who feel they are “rapidly losing cultural and political influence” and ignored by politicians, and see social and political tensions as zero sum

Nevertheless, based on successive waves of ESS data from 2012-18, Kromczyk et al. (2021) find attitudes of majorities toward minorities were likely to be more tolerant⁶ post-Brexit than before the referendum (113 per cent more likely). The authors highlight unskilled workers with fewer educational qualifications, who find themselves in a precarious economic position, as the least likely to be accepting of people of a different racial or ethnic group living in the UK, as well as observing less tolerance among older cohorts and those living in rural areas (Kromczyk et al., 2021). This suggests experiences of economic instability can be felt to play a role in shaping how different sections of the British population feel towards minority groups.

Since the Brexit vote in 2016, factors such as where you were born, your religion or race have also taken on less importance in what the public think it means to be “British”. While in 2016, a majority of people (56 per cent) thought having been born in the UK was either very or somewhat important for being “truly British”, in 2020 this was a view shared by just three in ten (31 per cent). Similarly, being Christian was viewed as very or somewhat important by just one in five people in 2020 (20 per cent), falling by 17 percentage points since 2016 (37 per cent) (Silver et al., 2021). Similar trends have also been observed on race by Ipsos over a longer period. In 2020, a large majority of respondents (84 per cent) strongly disagreed with the idea of having to be white to be truly British – 29 percentage points higher than in 2006 (Ipsos, 2020).

Qualitative research conducted by Jarvis et al. (2020) with Muslim, non-Muslim and mixed groups in East Anglia found that people generally felt uncomfortable with the term “British values”. Across a series of focus groups, participants described the term as not only being conceptually ambiguous, ideological and tarnished by associations with colonialism and politics, but also exclusionary – and even xenophobic – to some minority groups such as Muslims, given the implication that some values are distinctively British, rather than just generally promoted in Britain. Some participants disassociated the term “British Values” with progress on racism, gender equality, gay marriage and loosening of taboos around public displays of affection, highlighting the centrality of tolerance to the values that people see as important in Britain today.


1.2 Britain has become more attuned to issues of discrimination, and is increasingly sensitive to inequities faced by minority groups

In general, people in Britain tend to see their society as unfair. Data from the European Social Survey reveals that a majority of people in Britain believe that wealth differences are unfairly large, while just one in five believe that justice prevails over injustice or that people get what they deserve (Morgan & Taylor, 2019). And polling from November 2022 finds that an overwhelming majority of the public (82 per cent) expect that the cost-of-living crisis will exacerbate these gaps – almost twice as many as those who believed the coronavirus crisis would widen inequalities in 2020 (44 per cent) (Hewlett et al., forthcoming).

Yet equality is still understood to be an important democratic principle. When asked what defines democracy in an open-ended survey question, “equality and fairness” ranked fourth among respondents in the UK (14 per cent), after “having a voice in government” (34 per cent), “freedom and human rights” (30 per cent) and “elections and procedures” (27 per cent) (Wike et al., 2021). However, there tends to be a less clear view among the public of how inequalities should be responded to, particularly when it comes to more interventionist approaches (Duffy et al., 2021: 58-62).

The degree to which people support action on inequalities is strongly associated with how they are believed to arise – be it through individual effort or wider structural advantages or disadvantages. Research conducted as part of the Deaton Review found that people in Britain are generally comfortable with inequalities that arise due to merit or effort, but there is greater difference of opinion when it comes to bad luck or structural factors. People with a “structuralist” mindset (32 per cent of people in Britain) tend to recognise characteristics outside the individual’s control (eg coming from a wealthy family) as being important for getting ahead in life, with strong majorities in this group attributing economic differences between black and white people to discrimination and unequal educational opportunities. Whereas those with a more “individualist” mindset (29 per cent) tend to see factors such as coming from a wealthy family, race and religion as having little relevance to whether or not someone is successful (Benson et al., 2021). These differences in mindset have a strong bearing on the degree to which people recognise inequalities and whether they see particular instances of unequal outcomes as fair or unfair.

Values dispositions towards equality specifically surfaced in the literature through proxies such as attitudes towards discrimination and securing equal rights, as well as experiences and perceptions of unequal treatment and prejudice. These studies consistently show that people in Britain have become more attuned to the existence of discrimination and that as a society we are increasingly of the view that more needs to be done to secure equal rights – though this is still far from a view shared by a large majority of the population. For example, British Social Attitudes data detects a general increase in the proportion of people who believe that attempts to give equal opportunities have “not gone far enough” – especially for women, and black and Asian people, which are now almost majority views. Indeed, these shifts have been particularly dramatic in reference to black and Asian people, with the proportion of




people who say more should be done to give equal opportunities to this group almost doubling since 2014 (see Figure 6).

FIGURE 6: BELIEFS ABOUT PROGRESS ON EQUAL RIGHTS (BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 1994/2021)

Don't knows not shown

Do you think attempts to give equal opportunities to [] have gone too far or not gone far enough?



Yet there is a greater split of opinion on whether more should be done to give equal opportunities to transgender people, with roughly equal proportions of the population saying attempts have gone too far, are about right or have not gone far enough – a tension that is explored in more detail in Section 2.2. Rights for sexual minorities attract the least public attention, as attitudes towards equalising efforts are now considered “about right” by 43 per cent of people – though this is notably a similar proportion to those who, in 1994, believed that rights for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals had gone too far (46 per cent) (Curtice and Ratti, 2022).

In general, with fewer people now suggesting equal opportunities have gone too far than saying they are about right, or haven’t gone far enough, there is a greater acknowledgement of social inequalities. Moreover, agreeing that opportunities “have not gone far enough” for certain groups implies a recognition that there is more to be accomplished in terms of social inclusion.

Research suggests that there are still wide disparities in experiences of tolerance and inclusivity when we consider the prevalence of discrimination towards particular groups within society. 64 per cent of people from ethnic minority backgrounds reported having suffered discrimination in 2022, compared to 22 per cent of white Britons (Minhas et al., 2022). Similarly, half of black and Asian people experienced discrimination when accessing local services during the pandemic, in contrast to 19 per cent among white respondents (Burbidge et al., 2021). Compared to white Britons, people from ethnic minority groups perceive that racism and discrimination

are more common in the UK, and that this is likely to come from subconscious acts rather than from intentional discrimination and in a context of racist beliefs that are not openly talked about (Minhas et al., 2022). Such findings again signal the potential presence social acceptability biases in attitudinal data on this topic, given the inconsistencies between self-reported experiences of racism and racial discrimination among minorities, and the overwhelming support for anti-racist norms in the population overall (see, for example, Juan Torres, 2020; Ballinger, 2018).

Analysis of European Social Survey data collected between 2012-18 also revealed that younger people from a minority ethnic background (aged 15 to 24) are more likely to report that they have been on the receiving end of racial and/or ethnic intolerance than their older counterparts. Additionally, this study also identified a statistically significant increase in experiences of racial and/or ethnic intolerance after the June 2016 Brexit referendum, with people from a minority background being 82 per cent more likely to be part of a group that experienced discrimination, compared to the pre-Brexit period (Kromczyk et al., 2021).

1.3 People in Britain hold a broad belief in the importance of individual liberty, but this is limited in certain contexts


Of the three values sets we are exploring in this report, individual liberty was the least prominent in the literature reviewed, though its prominence in human rights legislation makes it an interesting case for consideration as part of the review.


A majority of people in the UK believe that the government respects their freedoms (68 per cent) – broadly comparable to similar Western European nations such as Belgium (60 per cent) Germany (69 per cent) and the Netherlands (73 per cent) (Silver, 2021b). Yet contrary to this, public attitudes have been observed to move in an illiberal direction in response to increased threats from terrorism and criminality, with more public support for intervention from the government to address these trends (Clery & Mead, 2017)

A wide range of survey data attests to individual liberty being an important value in Britain. For example, the British Election Study (BES, 2018) finds large majority

FIGURE 7: ATTITUDES TO LEVELS OF STATE SURVEILLANCE (WORLD VALUES SURVEY, 2022)

Do you think that the UK government should or should not have the right to do the following:






agreement (76 per cent) that people should be allowed to organise public protests against the government – yet one in ten (9 per cent) disagree that this should be the case. Moreover, the importance of individual liberty is reflected in attitudes towards surveillance and monitoring of personal information. As shown in Figure 7, roughly three quarters of people in the UK agree that the government should not have the right to monitor emails (75 per cent) or collect information about people living in the UK without their knowledge (72 per cent) (World Values Survey, 2022). However, 75 percent of people do agree that the government should have the right to keep people under video surveillance in public areas, suggesting that while collection of information understood to be private is seen as wrong, there is a recognition that a degree of surveillance may be acceptable in public. The differences are mostly about whether the value of the protection offsets the cost in privacy.

There are, however, differences between those born in the UK and those born abroad when it comes to the government collecting information about anyone living the UK without their knowledge. As a net figure (ie those who believe the government should have the right minus those who believe they should not), 43 per cent of those born in the UK believed they should not be able to collect information without somebody’s knowledge, compared to a net of 60 per cent for immigrants to the UK. Similarly, we see differences between people born in the UK and those born outside of it when it comes to video surveillance in public areas, with acceptance from those born abroad 11 percentage points lower than people born in the UK (77 per cent). Yet overall attitudes towards these issues demonstrate a high level of importance regarding values of personal liberty.

Freedom of expression is also strongly protected in the UK. The Human Rights Act defines freedom of expression as the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers” (Human Rights Act, 1998). Residents within the UK are considered to hold a high degree of personal liberty, with Freedom House classifying the UK as one of the most “free” countries in the world with a score of 93/100 (Freedom House, 2023), and with strong levels of protection around individual freedoms of expression and civil liberties. Though some concerns have, however, been raised recently regarding academic freedom (Freedom House, 2022).

Freedom of expression is also something that a majority of the British public perceive they have. Recent survey data shows that in the UK, seven in ten people (70 per cent) agree that they are “free to express their views in UK society”, while 74 per cent agree that they are “free to protest issues on which they want to see change” (Malcolm et al., forthcoming). However, there remain discussions and debates as to the extent to which freedom of expression is constrained by protecting people from discrimination, harm or offense, as explored in the following section.



2 Where do shared values come into tension with one another?

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
Section 1 outlined a clear narrative of Britain coming together in its acceptance and appreciation of pluralism, in its desire to see more progress on equality, particularly for groups that have historically faced discrimination, and belief in everyone's right to individual liberty, even if we might place limits in some contexts. However, when these values are placed in competition with one another, we begin to see more nuance compared to the broader picture of consensus when these values are considered in isolation. Even if we believe all values are important, we have different priorities as to which rights and freedoms are the most essential to protect, informed by a wide range of contextual factors.

For example, in the roundtable, one participant noted that while you see high levels of agreement for people's right to "live and let live", this is often bounded by greater value being placed on the importance of the rule of law: "if there's a rule, then they want people to follow it". Another participant observed how this is often a question of prioritisation rather than denying values positions in the first place:

"It's very rarely an issue of there not being shared values. ... Typically, there are conflicts of rights or of values, but both sides actually accept the core values or attitudes in the debate. ... I think you can get different people, all of whom accept the basic values that are at stake, they just recognise there's a conflict and they might prioritise one or the other differently. So it's not so much an issue of whether they are shared values – there are shared values – it's just what the ranking of them is." (Roundtable participant)

This complexity is reflected in legislation, in the recognition that some rights and freedoms protected in the Human Rights Act are "qualified rights" – specifically, the right to respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association. Qualified rights may be limited in certain contexts, so long as there is a "legitimate aim". These aims are set out in each article, and include protecting national security, public health or safety, preventing crime and protecting the rights of others (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2014), with tensions around the latter raising particularly interesting questions for the theme of the Independent Review.

In the following sections, we explore incidences of where the values explored in Section 1 come into tension with one another or with associated rights and freedoms, illustrated by case studies that were either identified in the roundtable, in consultations with experts or uncovered in our review of the literature. To offer case studies that are of most relevance to the theme of the Independent Review, we focus on examples that play out in everyday life, in the civic or public domain, and that relate to manifestations of rights and freedoms that are legal. As such, we do not cover examples relating to topics such as hate speech or extremism.



2.1 Tolerance vs freedom of thought, conscience and religion

A wide range of factors are highlighted in the literature as to how and where tensions relating to tolerance arise. Schumann et al. (2022) argue that “trigger events” can play an important role, particularly in prompting acts of a discriminatory nature. The authors define trigger events as incidents that immediately present a clear threat to the in-group (eg terror attacks), resulting in decreasing tolerance towards particular groups. These perceived threats might refer to aspects of one’s physical security or livelihood, or more broadly to values, cultural norms or a group’s “way of living” (Schumann and Moore., 2022).

We can observe examples of trigger events in cases such as the substantial increase in reports of Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic incidents in the UK in the week following the terror attacks in Christchurch (Tell Mama, 2020). Additionally, in 2021 the Jewish support charity Community Security Trust recorded 2,261 anti-Jewish hate incidents in the UK, their highest annual figure to date, which they attribute to the escalation of violence in Israel and Palestine in May and June 2021 (Gordon-Teller, 2022).

Yet trigger events can work in the opposite direction too, with political conflicts and wars seeming to increase tolerance towards groups such as refugees. For example, research by Pickard et al. (2023) suggests that those who hold strong nationalist views or scepticism towards immigration are likely to veer away from expressing them in the aftermath of far-right terrorist attacks. They argue that given the public tends to have moral issues with violent tactics, citizens are less likely (after the attacks) to support or identify with the goals of the perpetrator. Thus, “the use of violent tactics can erode the popular support for the ideology associated with the perpetrator of violence” (Pickard et al., 2023).

Similarly, while striking the right balance between control and compassion in managing refugees and asylum seekers remains a divisive issue in the eyes of the public (Rolfe et al., 2022), political conflicts that displace people do seem to elicit greater openness to accepting more asylum seekers into the country. For example, research by More in Common finds that support for taking refugees from areas of conflict is high, shared by roughly three quarters of the public (74 per cent), though slightly higher in the case of the conflict in Ukraine (78 per cent) (Tryl & Surmon, 2022). Further examples of exceptions made in specific political contexts can also be observed in YouGov data from 2020, which shows high levels of support for giving British National Overseas Passport holders in Hong Kong a permanent right to live in the UK (64 per cent of people in Britain supported this) (Jennings, 2020), as well as similar proportions of people in 2013 (60 per cent) in support of offering asylum to Afghan interpreters who worked for British troops (Katwala, 2013).

What is interesting about responses to trigger events is that they reveal an implicit flexibility around the relative weight given to some values over others in certain circumstances. The types of examples highlighted by Schumann and Moore. (2022) as trigger events tend to engage values around harm or risks to personal security, whereas in the case of political conflicts, values of injustice and fairness are engaged.


To explore these types of trade-offs further, we focus on tensions around Article 9 of the Human Rights Act – freedom of thought, conscience and religion – as a qualified right that speaks to tolerance through supporting pluralism of thought and beliefs. This freedom is defined in the Human Rights Act as encompassing both the freedom to change religion or belief, and the freedom “either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”.⁷ The right to education (First Protocol, Article 2) also includes provision for rights related to religion and beliefs, in that “the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”.

An interesting tension highlighted in the literature relates to where the line between private and civic life becomes blurred. More specifically, this is manifest in the tension between what some people believe is a sin and their right to express or maintain those beliefs in civic life, versus the duty to ensure freedom from discrimination for protected characteristics under the Equality Act. As illustrated in Case Study 1, 2019 saw protests mounted by predominantly Muslim parents in a primary school in Birmingham to remove LGBT-inclusive content from the syllabus on the grounds that it contravened their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and their right to teach their children in accordance with this belief. The protests were ultimately ordered by judicial sentence to cease, citing students’ rights to education in an appropriate environment, avoiding a position on the controversy itself.

A number of qualitative studies highlight that stereotypes of Muslim values as conformist and repressive (Marsden et al., 2022), homophobic, socially separate and anti-modern (Mac an Ghaill and Haywood, 2021) still endure in the UK. Yet these perceptions do not reflect the actual diversity of views that exist within faith groups on issues such as homosexuality, equal rights and religious difference, which evidence indicates have greater intra-faith group nuance than the type of binaries that incidents like Case study 1 convey. While studies into Muslim attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community appear to be few and far between, research reviewed here generally finds young Muslims, in particular, to be as tolerant, if not more so than a number of other groups. Yet this is not reflected in public perceptions or their representation in the public domain (Sinclair, 2019; Iversen, 2020; McKenna and Francis, 2019).⁸

In the roundtable, there was also discussion around the importance of recognising the complexity and diversity within religious groups as well as between them when it comes to understanding tensions around tolerance. For example, one participant highlighted that “one of the issues around anti-Semitism is the extent to which it’s, to some extent, localised in other minority groups” (roundtable participant). Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that tensions around tolerance do not just play out between minority and majority groups, but in a multicultural society such as the UK, tensions between minorities are just as important to acknowledge and address.

We find an example of this in the violent confrontations that occurred between groups of young men from Hindu and Muslim communities in the city of Leicester during August and September 2022 – a city that has otherwise been a site of positive relations between ethnic and faith groups for decades. Tension arose in the city after India’s win against Pakistan in a cricket match. During the celebrations, a large



Case study 1: Protests in Birmingham about teaching of LGBT rights and equality (2019)

Context: Following the introduction of lessons on LGBT relationships, gender and sexual orientation to the curriculum at Anderton Park primary school in Birmingham, a series of protests took place outside the school gates by predominantly Muslim parents, who considered these lessons to be inappropriate for children of primary school age and argued that the content was not in accordance with their faith. Over at least eight weeks, there were protests outside the school which disrupted its normal functions (eg some students dropped out or broke off friendships, children were not able to use the playground, and staff members reported higher levels of stress). A judicial ruling eventually banned protesting in the school's perimeters, yet the programme was ultimately suspended (see Ferguson, 2019; BBC, 2019a; Ryan, 2020), despite it being deemed "outstanding" by Ofsted (Perraudin and Parveen, 2019). This case study occurs against a backdrop of the introduction of teaching "Fundamental British Values" in schools in 2014 (DfE, 2014), and the Children and Social Work Act (2017), which makes relationships education (including LGBT relationships) compulsory in all primary schools by September 2020 (Vincent, 2019).

Reaction to the story: The case received national attention. Both LGBT organisations and Muslim Imams became involved, and the story prompted letters to be sent opposing similar lessons to other schools in Birmingham as well as in cities such as Bradford, Bristol, Croydon, Ealing, Manchester, Northampton and Nottingham, including from Christian parents (BBC News, 2019). Meanwhile, the police reported an increase in anti-LGBT hate crimes in Birmingham (Busby, 2019), after news coverage focused in on protesters who openly made homophobic, false allegations regarding pederasty in the school. Yet a common thread in the commentary focused on the impact of the protests on the students and their learning environment, criticising the fact that children were being brought into a controversy that was well beyond their understanding and control. This representation of Muslim values was also contested by Muslim parents who believe it is important to teach their kids to respect everyone (Ferguson, 2019), who reject these tactics and warn they could be used against Muslim students (Ferguson 2019), as well as by people who identify both as Muslim and LGBT and condemn all kinds of violence and prejudice (BBC, 2019a).

Underlying freedoms being contested: Sexual orientation and religion or beliefs are both protected characteristics in the Equality Act, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion are protected under Articles 9 and 11 of the Human Rights Act. In this case, the protestors appealed explicitly to their right to freedom of religion to oppose the teaching of content that they felt runs counter to their beliefs. But the resolution of the case ultimately came down to the right to education (First protocol, Article 2), with the court ruling that the protests and attention they attracted had impeded a constructive learning environment for students.

group gathered and in videos posted on social media appeared to chant “Pakistan Murdabad” (“death to Pakistan”). In the following weeks, videos emerged of vandalism and violent fights between Hindus and Muslims across the city. Tensions peaked on 17 September when a large group of Hindu men marched towards a Muslim-majority neighbourhood chanting “Jai Shri Ram” (“glory to Hindu’s Lord Rama”, a phrase used by far-right Hindu nationalists in India) and graffitied a mosque. A group of Muslims vandalised a Hindu temple the following night in retaliation. Police struggled to control violence between the communities across the two days, though ultimately arrested 47 people (see Abdul, 2022; Lynn, 2022).


Yet the ability to study such dynamics systematically – particularly understanding the degree of values heterogeneity within and between religious groups – was seen by some roundtable participants to be limited by the anecdotal nature of the evidence base. As things stand, there is limited power to generalise about whether we see distinct values dispositions among particular religious groups or if we observe similar effects to those explored in Section 1, of factors such as education and age playing a greater role in explaining values shifts over time:

“After a decade in which we’ve established that education and age are really, really important drivers [of values], we don’t then say what do we know within Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Jewish communities about the different dynamics of it – or just parallel dynamics. ... We have an incredibly anecdotal debate about what, say, Hindu–Muslim relationships are like in Leicester ... and I think that’s an enormous gap in this area. ... We’ve probably got the richest base of attitudes evidence outside America of any country in the world, and yet we actually know incredibly little about some of the [religious] groups. There’s a reasonably large number of studies on Muslim attitudes, in particular, but there are very few studies that go across minorities.” (Roundtable participant)

2.2 Equality vs protection from discrimination

Values of equality and protection from discrimination are directly linked in legislation. The Equality Act 2010 places a duty on authorities to act in a way that is “designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage” in strategic decision making, in prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nine protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. Article 14 of the Human Rights Act similarly sets out that the rights and freedoms covered by the Act “shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political, or other opinions, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. Yet tensions can arise when protecting the rights of one group is perceived to limit the rights of another.

The right to self-identification for transgender people has become a prominent example of these types of conflicts in debates around equality in recent years, with perceived tensions around trade-offs in securing the rights of one group at the expense of another. In recent months, these tensions played out in the introduction of the



Gender Recognition Bill in Scotland, which was blocked from proceeding to Royal Assent by the Secretary of State for Scotland, who cited conflicts with the Equality Act 2010, among other factors, as the justification (see Case study 2). Cases where securing the rights of transgender people are perceived to infringe on the rights of others, particularly around the protected characteristic of sex, has also been a key line of tension in public debates around the acceptability of self-identification legislation – which have famously prompted heated exchanges on social media (see, for example, Muir, 2023; Blackall, 2020). However, research into public attitudes on transgender rights suggests these kinds of values tensions around competing rights are far less present in the minds of the general public.

Research by More in Common identifies that the instinct towards transgender people in Britain is to “live and let live”, and that trans issues should not be approached “from rigidly political, binary or ideological lenses” but should instead be seen as a “series of practical issues requiring practical solutions”. This belief is supported by findings on how people feel about the use of pronouns, with the same study finding that the British public felt people should be able to use their preferred pronouns, and were willing to call someone by these pronouns, so long as they were not obliged to display their own pronoun (Tryl et al., 2022: 6). Similarly, a 2019 BSA report on relationships and gender identity finds that four in five (82 per cent) Britons said they were “not prejudiced at all” towards transgender people. Yet this weakens when it comes to the prejudice of others, with roughly half of people surveyed (49 per cent) deeming prejudice against transgender people as “always wrong” (Albakri et al., 2019).

Tryl et al. (2022) observe that the “values-based divides” that infuse public debates on transgender rights do not run as deep when it comes to the general population. In part, this is because transgender rights is such a low salience issue. Just 2 per cent of Britons surveyed by More in Common put the debate as a top issue facing the country today – the last in a list of 16 options (Tryl et al, 2022: 6), and the issue does not register at all when this type of question is unprompted.⁹ Similarly, on the much debated question of “is a trans man a man / is a trans woman a woman”, More in Common find a broadly consistent picture in Britain, finding that people are more likely to agree than disagree with the proposition (46 per cent vs 32 per cent) across demographic groups (Tryl et al. 2022:17). As such, when engaging the public on gender identity issues, assuming values conflict as a starting point was seen to get in the way of constructive discussions:


“While Gen Z are the least likely to say they disagree that a trans man is a man and a trans woman a woman, with just 28 per cent disagreeing, even among Baby Boomers opposition only reaches 36 per cent. Instead, there is a sharp increase in ‘don’t knows’ by age – at just 10 per cent for Gen Z and 28 per cent among Baby Boomers. This suggests the starting point for consensus-building should be rooted in awareness-raising, rather than countering assumed hostility on gender identity issues.” (Tryl et al., 2022: 19)

Case study 2: Scotland's Gender Recognition Bill (2022–2023)

Context: On 2 March 2022, the Scottish Government introduced the Gender Recognition Reform Bill as an amendment to the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The new process to obtain a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) eliminates the need to have a “gender dysphoria” medical diagnosis, lowers the minimum age for applicants to 16, reduces the time people need to live in their acquired gender before submitting an application, and establishes a three-month period of reflection before the application can be determined (The Scottish Parliament, explanatory notes). A GRC is needed to modify the sex registered on the birth certificate, thus impacting on the legal recognition of transgender people (Scottish Trans, 2022). In December 2022, the Gender Recognition Reform Bill was approved by 86 votes to 39 in the Scottish Parliament. But in January 2023, the Secretary of State for Scotland made an order under Section 35 of the Scotland Act 1998 preventing the Bill from proceeding to Royal Assent. In a statement of reason for using Section 35, the Scottish Secretary stated his concern that the Act would have an “adverse effect” on different GRC regimes across the UK, the operation of the 2010 Equality Act and result in increasing use of fraudulent applications (Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, 2023).

Reaction to the story: Response to the use of Section 35 was mixed, highlighting the wider complexity of this case study in linking into debates around devolution and Scottish independence. Leaders of the devolved nations were critical of the UK government’s interference in Scottish parliamentary matters. Philippa Whitford, the SNP’s Scotland spokesperson, stated the use of Section 35 was “an unprecedented attack on the Scottish parliament,” while Nicola Sturgeon described the UK government as using transgender people as a “political weapon”. Mark Drakeford, the First Minister of Wales, also condemned the UK Government’s move as setting a “very dangerous precedent” for devolution (Torrance et al., 2023).

LGBTQ+ charity Stonewall accused the Prime Minister of using trans people’s lives as “a political football,” and stated that Scotland’s bill would align the country with leading international practice regarding gender recognition “endorsed by the United Nations and adopted by 30 countries, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and most of the United States of America” (Stonewall, 2023).



Polling by Ipsos Scotland found that 50 per cent of the Scottish public believed the UK Government was right to veto the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill, while 33 per cent thought they should not have done so. Yet there are clear partisan divides. While a large minority of SNP voters (31 per cent) agreed with the UK Government's use of a Section 35 order, over half (52 per cent) did not. By contrast, nearly 90 per cent of Conservative voters believed the Secretary of State was right to veto the Bill (Gray et al., 2023).

Underlying freedoms being contested: The UK Government has argued that the Gender Recognition Bill would adversely affect the operation of aspects of the Equality Act 2010, including clauses related to single-sex clubs and associations, application of the public sector equality duty across devolved nations, and use of the comparator test in equal pay claims. Additionally, it was felt the law is constitutionally incompatible with the UK Equality Act 2010 in regards with how unlawful discrimination on the grounds of "sex" is defined (Simmons & Simmons, 2022). The Equality and Human Rights Commission has stated that under the Equality Act it is generally against the law to discriminate against someone because of a protected characteristic. Protected characteristics include sex (being a man or a woman) and gender reassignment (being an individual who is "proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process or part of a process to reassign their sex"). A person does not need a GRC to be protected under the characteristic of gender reassignment. However, there are circumstances where a lawfully established separate or single-sex service provider can exclude, modify or limit access to their service for trans people. This is allowed under provisions relating to gender reassignment in the Act, which state "your approach must be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim" (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2022).

Supporters of the Gender Recognition Bill often deny these claims by citing clause 15A, which states that "For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act modifies the Equality Act 2010." However, others have challenged this interpretation of the clause, stating that the bill could never modify the Equality Act, because the Act is a reserved matter. Further, they note the issue is not about modification; rather, it is about the bill's effect on the interpretation of the Act. If that analysis is correct, then clause 15A would have little (if any) practical impact (Torrance et al., 2023).

2.3 Individual liberty vs respectful expression

The Human Rights Act sets out that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. But as a qualified right, the Act also stipulates a range of situations where the exercise of these freedoms can be limited, such as national security, public safety, for the protection of health, morals or the reputation or rights of others, among others (Human Rights Act, 1998). This means that some forms of expression are illegal when they are deemed to cause harm to others, as in the case of hate speech. But there are many other contexts in which people may curb their own freedom of expression, even if that runs counter to a belief in individual liberty, for reasons other than those that are legally mandated.

In a survey fielded in the UK in August 2022, two thirds of respondents (68 per cent) agreed that, in principle, people “should share their views more often, even though this might upset or offend others”. However, when it came to their own behaviours, sizeable minorities reported that at times they have personally “held back on expressing their views on certain topics for fear of what others might think of them” (Malcolm et al., forthcoming). The topics on which people said they tended to self-censor point to interesting tensions between the values of tolerance (as manifest in respect for difference) and individual liberty: roughly a third of respondents reported that they hold back on expressing their views on religion (36 per cent), race (35 per cent), immigration (35 per cent) and refugees (33 per cent) for fear of reprisals (Malcolm et al., forthcoming).¹⁰

What motivates this reticence requires further research, but this study identifies a wider set of social factors that lead people to hold back on expressing their views – from wanting to avoid an argument (53 per cent), concerns about the impact on their social life (25 per cent) or safety (18 per cent), or simply because people don’t feel they know enough about the topic (27 per cent) or are shy (21 per cent). Yet consideration for others was the most common factor, with large majorities agreeing it is “important to learn when to keep an opinion silent around others to avoid causing offence” (77 per cent), and that “there are times when not expressing an opinion is appropriate to build good social relations with others” (79 per cent) (Malcolm et al., forthcoming). Yet it should be recognised that what constitutes offence is highly subjective. This is why judges have ruled that freedom of expression includes the right to offend. In *Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions* (1999) the boundaries of free speech are laid out by Lord Justice Sedley where he states: “Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having”.

Caution about showing respect for difference is also indicated in expectations around whether people should be free to say what they want on particular topics. As shown in Figure 8, there is broad support for people speaking openly in relation to politics or issues such as climate change. However, when it comes to discussions on religion, immigration and refugees – and, to a lesser extent, sexuality and transgender issues – there is an almost equal split in attitudes between those who think that freedom of expression should take precedence over being careful not to cause offence, and vice versa. The only exception is race, where twice as many people support being careful






FIGURE 8: BALANCING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITH CAUSING OFFENCE / EXPRESSING VIEWS THAT ARE THREATENING OR ABUSIVE (DUFFY ET AL., 2022)

When thinking about each of the following issues, do you think people in general should feel free to say what they want about them or that people should be careful not to offend others when talking about these issues?



When thinking about each of the following issues, do you think people in general should feel free to say what they want about them or that people should be careful not to express views that are threatening or abusive?



not to offend others (50 per cent ranking 7-10) compared to those who believe people should be able to say whatever they want (24 per cent ranking 0-3).

Despite this, people are more in favour of limiting individual liberties when they veer into expressing views that are threatening or abusive. Compared to when this response scale was framed around offence, we see 12-15 percentage point increases in the proportion of respondents who say that people should be careful about what they say when it could be viewed as being threatening or abusive across all topics in Figure 8 except transgender issues and race/racism, which see slightly small increases (9 and 8 percentage points, respectively). However, for race/racism in particular, when the grounds for restraint were changed, there was little change in the proportion of those who believe people should be able to say whatever they want, dropping by just 4 percentage points.

This tendency to accept limits on freedom of expression when it comes into tension with protecting freedom from discrimination and harm can be seen in the public's reaction to violent protests outside a hotel housing asylum seekers in Knowsley, Liverpool. On 10 February 2023, several hundred protestors, including those from the far right, attacked a hotel housing asylum seekers. The protestors were reported as intimidating other groups present to support the asylum seekers, throwing missiles at the hotel and chanting "get them out" and "this is our city". A police van and its equipment were set on fire (Taylor, 2023) and thirteen people were arrested. The attack was largely met with condemnation from the government and members of the public. The Labour MP for Knowsley, Sir George Howarth, issued a statement saying: "The people of Knowsley are not bigots and are welcoming to people escaping from some of the most dangerous places in the world in search of a place of safety" (Taylor, 2023; see also Dearden, 2023; Novak, 2023).

Examples such as those covered in this section are helpful in reflecting how values and freedoms are weighed up differently in particular contexts and circumstances. However, the evidence base here is highly anecdotal. More work is needed to capture and systematically analyse how the public feel about more nuanced cases, where there is greater contestation about which values and freedoms should be prioritised or protected. Indeed, in many of the examples covered in this section, and particularly in the Knowsley case, the presence of violence means that making exceptions for restricting individual liberty is likely to be uncontested. Recent research into far-right extremism, which frames the moral dimension of violence as being "incompatible with the values and needs of the general population", finds that violent tactics are perceived as being "unreasonable" and exposure to them turns people away from related ideologies (Pickard et al., 2023).

3 Who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values?

3 Who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values?

The final aim of this review was to identify evidence on who the British public believe is responsible for “upholding and protecting” the types of values and freedoms identified in earlier chapters, in cases where they are “undermined or threatened”. To dig deeper into this question, we were also tasked with assessing the evidence base on how the British public feel about “fellow citizens who undermine these social values” and how such individuals or groups should be responded to.

This was the area of the review with the most limited evidence base. The studies reviewed tended to focus more on the responsibilities of people in the public eye or positions of power, particularly politicians, journalists, educators and community leaders, rather than relations between citizens. In the sections that follow, we draw on discussions from the roundtable to reflect on these evidence gaps.


3.1 Who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values is a complex question, with a limited evidence base

Our review encountered scant evidence that clearly identified who the public consider to be responsible for upholding and protecting the types of social and democratic values defined in Section 1, particularly at a citizen level. We asked participants from the roundtable to reflect on this ostensible evidence gap, and to critique whether this is likely to be a search error or a genuine gap in the evidence base.

There was broad consensus among the roundtable participants that public perceptions of who is responsible for upholding and protecting shared values are unlikely to have been studied in depth. In part, this was seen to be because this is something that the public are unlikely to hold strong views on, as a relatively abstract concept. Another participant highlighted that the phrase “upholding and protecting values” was too vague to uncover the range of actions that we would expect to discuss under this heading. The group reflected that multiple different actors, from politicians to school teachers, carry out actions that could be considered as upholding and protecting Britain’s social and democratic values, even if not in a literal sense:

“Do you mean who is responsible for ‘upholding’ values, which is likely to be the state and police?... Is it ‘promoting’ values, ‘policing’ values, ‘nurturing’ values? How you talk about that is going to give you completely different responses as to which groups are going to be responsible for it. So I think if you start off from ‘upholding’, you’re pushing it in one direction to begin with.” (Roundtable participant)

It was also pointed out that the public’s view of who is responsible for upholding social and democratic values often depends on the scenario in which values are felt to be undermined. One participant observed that the public may consider it important for teachers to promote particular social and democratic values, but equally think that teachers should not be expected to protect these values in circumstances that require intervention from law enforcement. Another participant made reference to the events previously discussed in Case study 1 to support this view:




“I think if you ask about enforcement in general, you’re likely to get quite superficial answers. I think where you’re more likely to get good answers – and differentiated answers – is looking again at specific incidents and where those values weren’t perceived to have been upheld. ... You know, if you ask people about who should be inculcating British values to start with, schools get quite a strong response. ... I don’t think, though, that they are saying that schools should be responsible for being on the front line of defending them in the same way. ... So with something like the Birmingham schools and what happened there, people will say that the Government should have been stepping in to back the teachers in those schools.” (Roundtable participant)

The notion that public views on how and when it is appropriate to act to uphold or protect values is context dependent is apparent in survey data collected by the Policy Institute in January 2022, reproduced in Figure 9. Here, individual liberty is placed in tension with protecting others from discrimination, harm and offence. Freedom from discrimination was generally favoured as a scenario in which inhibiting freedom of expression was justified, both when it comes to football clubs banning

FIGURE 9: SUPPORT FOR INHIBITING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SPECIFIC CASES (DUFFY ET AL., 2022)

When thinking about the following situations, to what extent do you support or oppose the actions described?

■ Strongly support ■ Tend to support ■ Neither support nor oppose ■ Tend to oppose ■ Strongly oppose



supporters who boo players who take the knee (46 per cent of people support this) as well as employers terminating the contract for a co-worker who makes sexist jokes about women (41 per cent support). However, other scenarios – such as broadcasters cancelling content that is offensive to minority groups or employers firing those affiliated with parties that express offensive views – are slightly more divisive, with roughly equal splits of people who support and oppose them. Indeed, overall there was not a strong appetite for intervening across multiple scenarios, with only one in five people supporting intervention in a majority of the actions impinging on free speech that were asked about – but very few supporting all or nearly all the actions (Duffy et al., 2022). Though a clear majority of people (64 per cent) again drew the line at using violence to counter even the most extreme forms of expression, such as hate speech (Duffy et al., 2022).

In the roundtable, preferences for action were also observed to vary based on whether the scenario occurs in real life or online, with one participant observing a much weaker tendency for citizens to intervene in cases where individuals face harassment or intimidation online:

“I think there is a distinction that people think that bystanders do have a real responsibility if something really bad happens, you know, in the street, on a bus, etc, but they don’t think that’s the case online. But then they do think it shouldn’t be happening. So that adds to some real significant concern actually, as well as about free speech, about behaviour online being let go, because you’d be mad to step in if it’s online, whereas you’d be sort of wrong not to step in if it was on the bus.” (Roundtable participant)

3.2 The literature tends to focus on responsibilities of people in a position of influence, rather than of citizens – yet mostly in the context of a perceived failure to uphold shared values

The question of who is responsible for upholding shared values is often implicit in the populations studied. The research we identified at a community or citizen level instead tended to focus on perceptions of outgroups among particular subgroups of society as part of commentary on perceptions of integration. For example, views of social conservatives towards the integration of migrants (Silver et al., 2020) or public conceptions of “British values” as being in antithesis to those of Muslims and Islam (Marsden, Jarvis & Atakav, 2022). The only explicit examples we found of how the public feels about those who they perceive to undermine shared values focus instead on those in positions of influence, such as politicians, the media and educators.

Broadly, this reflects the belief that integrity matters for those who hold public office. When asked to trade-off qualities in politicians, those relating to integrity, such as being honest, owning up to making mistakes and being in touch with ordinary people, ranked much higher than matters of delivery, such as working hard and getting things done (Renwick et al., 2022).

Research by More in Common from 2021, for example, reveals an underlying discontent with politicians and others in influential government positions to uphold





FIGURE 10: SUPPORT FOR TEACHING DIVERSITY IN SCHOOLS (EUROBAROMETER 91.4, 2019)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? School lessons and material should include information about diversity in terms of...
 (% totally agree/tend to agree)

■ 15-24 years ■ 25-34 years ■ 35-44 years ■ 45-54 years ■ 55-64 years ■ 65-74 years ■ 75+



equality. A large majority (84 per cent) agreed that politicians don't care what people like them think, while around three in five (62 per cent) believe that Britain is rigged to serve the rich and influential (Tryl et al., 2021:7). This research also shows that these dispositions are situated in the context of a broader feeling of distrust towards the state, with the top three responses to the question of the challenges facing British democracy emerging as politicians not being "accountable for keeping their promises", "bad political leadership", and "a system run by elites who just look after themselves" (Tryl et al., 2021:7).

There is also a large literature on the introduction of the legal duty of schools to promote British values in 2014. This has been excluded from our review on the grounds that it tends to focus on pedagogy rather than matters of relevance to social cohesion, but its existence signals a responsibility endorsed by Government for educators to nurture tolerance and ideas around individual liberty; though the policy has been critiqued for its potential negative impact on social cohesion (Lockley-Scott, 2019).

Data from Eurobarometer 91.4 (see Figure 10) suggests that the public, too, broadly support the idea of educators having a responsibility to teach students about diversity, though there is again a clear age gradient in what topics are seen as more or less acceptable to teach. Whereas topics such as disability, religion/beliefs and ethnic origin/skin colour attract large majority support across all cohorts (though with a 20-24 percentage point gap between the oldest and youngest age groups) there are significant differences by age when it comes to teaching topics such as being transgender or intersex, and sexual orientation. In these cases, both those aged 15-24 and 75+, and to a lesser extent those aged 65-74, stand out as being notably distinct from the clustering of attitudes around 75-80 per cent agreement among those aged 25-64.

The groups that tend to be highlighted in the sources we reviewed as having a responsibility for upholding or protecting shared values are also those who the public feel have a greater obligation to be careful not to offend others, over enjoying complete freedom of expression. In survey data from 2022, respondents were asked, in general, whether particular people or groups should be free to say what they want in public, or be careful not to offend others. On a list of 10 professional groups, school teachers, the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers in the UK Government ranked the highest among those who the public felt should be careful not to offend others. By contrast, at the opposite end of the scale are comedians, who roughly half as many people felt should restrict what they say so as not to cause offence (24 per cent ranking 7-10), followed by university academics and newspaper journalists (both 34 per cent) (Duffy et al., 2022).

While such data suggest that the public does, to an extent, differentiate between the roles of different actors in the responsibility to uphold values such as tolerance, equality and individual liberty, learnings from these data are limited in their generality. For the purposes of this review, bespoke data that looks at the public's expectations of particular actors in specific cases – particularly where values come into tension with one another – would substantially enhance our understanding of how the public sees these responsibilities.







FIGURE 11: BALANCING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITH CAUSING OFFENCE, BY GROUP (DUFFY ET AL., 2022)

Thinking about the following people or groups of people, to what degree do you think they should feel free to say what they want in public, or they should be careful not to offend others?





4 Conclusions



4 Conclusions

In this review, we have focused on three sets of values that the literature suggests are important in the context of social cohesion and resilience: tolerance, equality and individual liberty. Time-series survey data offers a compelling picture of how the UK as a whole has become more committed to these values over time, though with areas of complexity when we look at different population subgroups, as well as in situations where these values are placed in tension with one another. Thus even with values that are widely supported, the idea of a consensus existing around a set of “shared social and democratic values” is clearly challenged by the sources we have reviewed.

In this paper, we have focused on examples of where these values come into tension either with each other or with rights and freedoms protected in UK legislation, specifically in the Human Rights Act 1998 and Equality Act 2010. However, there is limited literature directly addressing these tensions. The evidence and case studies summarised in this report should therefore be treated as anecdotal in nature. Generating new primary data that takes a more systematic approach to identifying and interrogating these tensions would be advisable if this is to become a major area of focus for the Independent Review.

There is even more limited evidence on who the public see as being responsible for upholding and protecting values, particularly among citizens. This may partly be due to complexities in measurement, but it also reflects the reality that who people think is responsible for acting to uphold or protect shared values, what action is proportionate and when to intervene are all context specific. There is also a disconnect between top-down views of values, as endorsed in some areas of policy such as the teaching of Fundamental British Values or the Prevent strategy, where values are seen as something that can be taught or violated, and more bottom-up understandings of values, which are generally put forward in academic literature. That is, values are generally considered to be something developed and held by individuals. That being so, it’s ultimately a matter for people to decide on what they value: it’s up to people individually and collectively to hold on to old values or shift to some new ones.

The small number of studies that did speak to responsibility for upholding and protecting values focused on those in positions of power or in the public eye – typically through the lens of them failing to uphold values that are important to the public. There was a clearly perceived role here for educators, politicians and the media, yet our understanding of how the public see the scope and limits of these responsibilities is inhibited by a lack of data on how they apply across different contexts. It may be that this gap could be addressed through more targeted searches of specific events or case studies, but this was beyond the scope of this review. Yet what the evidence does signal is that there is no one view on what values should be upheld, how and who is responsible for doing so. Rather context and motivation matter, as does the relationship with how values are changing at a grassroots level.

The background features a dark blue field with intricate, flowing patterns of thin yellow lines. These lines form a series of overlapping, wavy shapes that create a sense of depth and movement, resembling a stylized topographical map or a complex data visualization. The overall aesthetic is modern and technical.

Appendix: Search strategy

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The aim of this review was to identify a set of shared democratic and social values in Britain related to aspects of social cohesion and resilience, and how these values relate to rights and freedoms as expressed in legislation such as the Human Rights Act and Equality Act. We were also tasked to explore contexts and avenues for action when these values and freedoms come into tension with each other.

The intended outcomes of the review were to:

- ♦ Identify a set of shared social and democratic values and freedoms that are important to the British public, which are relevant to social cohesion and resilience (and related concepts);
- ♦ Highlight any areas of consensus or disagreement around these values, and the direction of travel over time;
- ♦ Explore whether support for particular social and democratic values come into tension with one another in particular socio-political and/or socio-economic contexts; and
- ♦ Establish whether there is evidence on who the public thinks is responsible for upholding or protecting these values and freedoms if they are undermined or threatened, how they feel about those who undermine or threaten them, and what they believe should be done about it.

Search & screening approach

Databases


Searches were conducted in databases of both academic and grey literature, with equal balance given to each in terms of the number of items reviewed in depth. Selective ‘snowball’ searching of references cited in all papers reviewed was also carried out.

1. Searching academic databases

Searches were conducted in the ProQuest Social Science Database, Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar and the KCL Library Search. Screening of the results from each search was capped at the first 200 hits, unless saturation was reached before then. A second round of targeted searches for a small number of specific phrases was undertaken to address gaps identified in the initial round of searches, capped at the first 200 hits.

2. Searching grey literature

Searches were conducted in Google (typically capped at the first 100 results, depending on the sensitivity of search), the gov.uk publications database and the House of Commons Library. Through this, a shortlist of ten organisations working in related areas was compiled and targeted searches of their websites



undertaken. This included: British Future, Ipsos, Migration Observatory, More in Common, NatCen, Opinium, Pew Research Center, Policy Exchange, Royal Society of Arts, Together Coalition.

3. Targeted searches of secondary survey data

Trends of select variables from the European Values Study, World Values Survey, European Social Survey, British Election Study and British Social Attitudes were produced, using variables identified through the process of screening literature as being relevant to the topic.

Search terms

Our initial search terms were defined based on an initial test conducted in ProQuest and Google Scholar, drawing on the language specified in the invitation to tender. These searches focused on concepts of “shared values” and “democratic values” in the UK, Britain and England, as well as appending terms specifically relating to social cohesion and resilience, the Human Rights Act and Equality Act:


- ♦ “shared values” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “democratic values” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “British values” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “cohesion” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “multicultural*” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “tolerance” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “equality” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “human rights” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “freedom*” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “pluralism” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “democra*” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “cultural diversity” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”

Further searches were later undertaken to attempt to identify further sources that specifically focused on tensions between competing values (outcome 3) and who the public sees as being responsible for upholding values (outcome 4):

- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “tensions” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” OR “attitudes” AND “conflict” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “shared values” OR “attitudes” AND “out group” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “values” AND “protect*” OR “maintain” OR “preserve” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “attitudes” AND “racial prejudice” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “attitudes” AND “undermining democratic values” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”
- ♦ “attitudes” AND “undermining individual liberty, rights and freedoms” AND “UK” OR “Britain” OR “England”

Screening

Results returned by the searches were screened twice by the research team – a first sift for relevance based on title, and a second, more thorough screen of title, abstract and, where required, full text, to assess whether the source met the inclusion and exclusion criteria specified below. Any instances of uncertainty over whether a study met the inclusion criteria were resolved through review by a second reviewer.



	INCLUDE	EXCLUDE
Source Type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Academic and grey literature drawing on empirical evidence of a robust quality, including reviews of empirical studies (eg systematic reviews, narrative reviews and meta-analyses) News articles and comment pieces, only where they provide reliable evidence for case studies Both quantitative and qualitative evidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comment pieces or theoretical studies, except where they relate to case studies Studies with insufficient samples or power to generalise about the population studied Studies with weak or unclear methodologies
Topic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social and democratic values or freedoms that are directly linked to social cohesion and resilience, or related concepts (eg pluralism, equity, multiculturalism, tolerance, protection from harm) Studies that capture attitudes, beliefs, behaviours and values Areas of tension between rights and freedoms that are permitted in UK legislation Areas of tension that are displayed in the civic, public realm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social and democratic values or freedoms that are not linked to social cohesion and resilience, or related concepts Studies that capture identity or that seek to explain complete mindsets, eg “British values”, “European values” or “human values” Areas of tension between rights and freedoms that are illegal (eg hate speech, extremism) Areas of tension that are displayed in the private realm The teaching of “Fundamental British Values” or the impact of that policy on teaching/particular schools or subjects
Population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies conducted in the UK, Great Britain or England Studies conducted at national, regional or local levels will be included. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK nations outside of England, unless considered as part of the UK or Great Britain Studies conducted in contexts outside of the UK, unless the UK is included as a country of focus. Even then, we are only interested in the UK results, not comparative findings. Organisations, professional groups or specific sectors
Time Frame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies published in the last five years (ie since 2018) Fieldwork conducted since 2016. Longitudinal studies should have at least one wave of fieldwork within this timeframe, but we will consider older data as part of a longitudinal study. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies published over five years ago Most recent fieldwork conducted prior to 2016
Language and Accessibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies published in English Only studies for which the full text can be retrieved electronically 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies not published in English

Extraction approach

The full list of eligible sources were prioritised to ensure an equal balance of academic and grey literature, and breath of topic coverage. The fifty most relevant sources were then reviewed in depth and analysed using a Framework approach in Excel.

Framework Analysis utilises a matrix approach. In the matrix, the rows represent the source, and the columns the themes or key information to extract. The cell of the matrix is then used to summarise findings, allowing for analysis both within and across individual sources. A framework approach necessitates five stages: familiarisation with the data; identification of themes; indexing or coding of the data; charting and summarising; and interpretation of the key findings. The value of this approach is that it means a consistent set of information will be extracted from each source, enabling the identification of themes that apply across the results of various studies.

Information that was extracted was as follows: abstract and hypotheses tested; details of method, data source, geography, population type and timeframe of fieldwork; value(s) or freedom(s) studied; outcomes observed; degree of consensus and disagreement; contexts where some subgroups differ from the norm; who is seen as being responsible for upholding these values (in the eyes of the British public); and views about those who undermine these shared values and what to do about it.

Narrative synthesis of the results was then carried out to produce the final report.

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
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
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
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
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
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1. We classify 'justifiable' as anyone who gave a score of between 8-10 on a 10 point scale, where 1 means "never justifiable" and 10 means "always justifiable".
 2. 'Religious respondents' are classified as respondents who specify a religious denomination (including 'other'). 'Non-religious' respondents are classified as respondents who chose 'Do not belong to a denomination'.
 3. Unfortunately, within the constraints of the sample, it is not possible to drill down into variation within and between different religious groups on this measure.
 4. This study does not meet the inclusion criteria for fieldwork period, but has been treated as an exception, given that the cohort analysis helps to interpret trends.
 5. These trends come from three separate questions in the ESS. The question stems are as follows: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Responses were measured on an 11-point scale: the trend lines here indicate responses of 7-10.
 6. Tolerance among majority groups was observed through the following two questions relating to immigration: "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most of [country]'s people to come and live here?" and "How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?".
 7. This freedom is limited only "in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".
 8. These studies do not meet the inclusion criteria for fieldwork period, but has been treated as an exception due to their relevance.
 9. Between 2019-2023, there is no mention of trans rights in verbatim responses to the British Election Study open response question asking what is "the single most important issue facing the country at the present time".
 10. Data is currently unpublished, but is drawn from a survey conducted online by Savanta: ComRes on behalf of the Policy Institute, King's College London with 2,293 UK adults aged 18+, interviewed 26-28 Aug 2022. Data were weighted to be representative of the UK population by age, gender, region and social grade.



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