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Where is democracy? Explaining the uneven democratic state performance within Peru

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Where is democracy? Explaining the uneven
democratic state performance within Peru



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Table of contents

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	4
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	5
<i>List of tables and graphs</i>	7
<i>Chapter 1: Introduction</i>	10
1.1 Argument: rethinking modernisation theory	16
1.2 Overview of the dissertation	19
<i>Chapter 2: Literature review</i>	22
2.1 On (the quality of) democracy	22
2.2 On democratic unevenness	27
2.3 On state capacity	31
2.4 On the relation between state and democracy	36
2.5 Peru under subnational approach.....	42
2.6 Revisiting modernisation theory	45
<i>Chapter 3: Methodology and concept formation</i>	49
3.1 Case selection	49
3.2 Design	51
3.2.1 The quantitative approach	52
3.2.2 The qualitative approach	53
3.3 Concept formation	56
3.3.1 Defining democratic state performance	56
3.3.2 Operationalisation	64
3.3.3 Model fit	71
3.4 Conclusions	73
<i>Chapter 4: Uneven democratic state performance in Peru</i>	74
4.1 Historical background	74
4.2 Mapping democratic state performance	87
4.3 Different factors that affect performance	96
4.4 Testing hypotheses	111
4.5 Regression analysis	113
4.6 Discussion	121

4.7 Further theoretical insights into modernisation theory	128
4.8 Conclusions	132
<i>Chapter 5: Moquegua: a high-performance region.....</i>	134
5.1 Background	134
5.1.1 Brief history	136
5.1.2 Moquegua a high-performance democratic state.....	138
5.2 Explaining high-performance in Moquegua	154
5.2.1 Within-region variation: modernisation at a provincial level.....	171
5.3 Conclusion.....	174
<i>Chapter 6: Huánuco: a low-performance region.....</i>	177
6.1 Background	177
6.1.1 Brief history	180
6.1.2 Huánuco a low-performance democratic state.....	182
6.2 – Explaining low-performance in Huánuco.....	196
6.2.1 Within-region variation: modernisation at a provincial level.....	214
6.3 Conclusion.....	219
<i>Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions.....</i>	222
7.1 Contributions and limitations.....	227
7.2 Future research and policy implications	230
7.3 Final words	232
<i>Chapter 8: Epilogue – the impact of COVID19 in Peruvian regions.....</i>	234
<i>Annex 1.....</i>	243
<i>Annex 2.....</i>	244
<i>Annex 3.....</i>	245
<i>Bibliography.....</i>	260

Abstract

This study focuses on (uneven) democratic state performance across a territory. Using a single country study based in Peru, I will explore why regions have different levels of performance and why these disparities have been maintained over time. To explain this variation, I will use modernisation theory which highlights the role of socio-economic development as the explanatory variable that successfully explain this unevenness within the unitary state of Peru.

The overarching research question is what causes uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions? And why has this unevenness persisted over time? To address this question, I will focus the attention on modernisation theory. This process will mark the path that different regions took once democratisation and decentralisation were established. Those regions with higher levels of modernisation were those that after 16 years were still the ones with higher-level democratic state performance. The results will show that five from the top six regions were exactly the same in 2002 and 2018. To analyse the differences across space and time, I will consider a 16-year period starting in 2002 until 2018.

To address these questions this research will use a nested research analysis strategy. The first step is a quantitative approach. Confirmatory factor analysis will be performed to address the operationalisation of democratic state performance. Then a mapping of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions will be executed and this will establish the top/bottom regions. Following this mapping exercise an alternative hypothesis will be tested via a regression analysis to establish the main explanatory variable (modernisation). The second step would then be to use the qualitative approach. Here, a process tracing strategy will be implemented in the selected regions from the mapping exercise to uncover the mechanisms in play in the casual process to show how modernisation shaped democratic state performance.

In sum, the Peruvian case displays a *sui generis* situation where the political system went through two major processes – democratisation and decentralisation – that were in turn affected by previous modernisation and thus reshaped the state and the quality of its democracy at a subnational level.

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During my journey a common reference when reflecting on the PhD process was that it is like a marathon, a lonely journey that requires stamina, resilience, perseverance, passion and focus on the end goal. However, I would say this is only partially true. The journey rests upon the guidance, encouragement, camaraderie, and support of friends, supervisors, colleagues, family and loved ones. This dissertation has been possible thanks to their direct and indirect support along my (lonely) journey.

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List of tables and graphs

Graphs

- 1.1.- Territorial approach to modernisation theory
- 3.1.- Conceptual tree democratic state performance
- 3.2.- Bifactor model of democratic state performance
- 4.1.- Levels of trust in political institutions during authoritarian and democratic rule in Peru
- 4.2. - Percentage of votes in subnational elections by political party (1980-2018)
- 4.3.- Percentage of offices won by regional parties during the ERM (2002-2018)
- 4.4.- Voter preference: National vs Regional parties (2002-2018)
- 4.5.- Democratic state performance in Peru (2002 & 2018)
- 4.6.- Democratic state performance 2002 vs 2018
- 4.7.- Democratic state performance, 2002-2010 and 2011-2018
- 4.8.- State capacity and quality of democracy in all regions (2002-2018)
- 4.9.- Modernisation and democratic state performance (1993 & 2002)
- 4.10.- Exploratory model: Modernisation pathway
- 5.1.- Moquegua and its provinces
- 5.2.- Democratic state performance: Moquegua vs National
- 5.3.- Women's list allocation at district level elections in Moquegua (2002-2018)
- 5.4.- Women's list allocation at provincial level elections in Moquegua (2002-2018)
- 5.5.- Women regional candidates: Moquegua vs National
- 6.1.- Huánuco and its provinces
- 6.2.- Democratic state performance: Huánuco vs National
- 6.3.- Women's list allocation at district level elections in Huánuco (2002-2018)
- 6.4.- Women's list allocation at provincial level elections in Huánuco (2002-2018)
- 6.5.- Women regional candidates. Huánuco vs National average
- 8.1.- COVID19 deaths in Peruvian regions
- 8.2.- COVID19 deaths correlation matrix
- 8.3.- Urban and rural school enrolment in Peru, 2011-2021

Tables

- 3.1.- Descriptive statistics: Dependent variables for democratic state performance at regional level

- 3.2.- Two-factor confirmatory factor analysis of democratic state performance
- 3.3.- Bi-factor confirmatory factor analysis of democratic state performance
- 3.4.- Descriptive statistics: Dependent variables for democratic state performance at provincial level
- 4.1.- High/low democratic state performance
- 4.2.- Descriptive statistics of variables
- 4.3.- Democratic state regression model
- 4.4.- Democratic state and socio-economic variables
- 4.5.- Democratic state performance on a provincial level
- 4.6.- Informality in high- and low-performance regions (in 2019)
- 5.1.- Electoral turnout in regional and municipal elections: Moquegua vs National
- 5.2.- School and teachers in Moquegua
- 5.3.- Mining canon and royalties in Moquegua
- 5.4.- Canon transferred to the regions of Cajamarca, Ancash, Cusco and La Libertad
- 5.5.- Households in Moquegua with access to water
- 5.6.- Households in Moquegua that have electrification via public network
- 5.7.- Number of beds: Moquegua vs National
- 5.8.- Percentage structure of agriculture and industry for Moquegua's gross domestic product
- 5.9.- Gross domestic product of Moquegua in New Soles
- 5.10.- Migration patterns in Moquegua
- 5.11.- Moquegua's Rural & Urban population (percentage)
- 5.12.- Secondary school enrolment in Moquegua vs National
- 5.13.- Life expectancy and illiteracy in Moquegua versus national average
- 5.14.- Electoral turnout in subnational elections between 1980-1998
- 5.15.- Women's access to secondary school (or more) and media: Moquegua vs National
- 5.16.- People under poverty line: Moquegua vs National average
- 5.17.- Political parties winning Regional Government
- 5.18.- Primary school as highest educational attainment in Moquegua
- 5.19.- Mining canon for Mariscal Nieto, General Sanchez Cerro, 2014-2018 (in PEN)
- 6.1.- Households in Huánuco access to water
- 6.2.- Households in Huánuco that have electrification via public network
- 6.3.- Number of beds: Huánuco vs National
- 6.4.- Percentage of bureaucrats: Huánuco vs National

- 6.5.- Percentage of elected women in regional and municipal elections: Huánuco vs National
- 6.6.- Effective number of parties: Huánuco vs National
- 6.7.- Party volatility in Huánuco and Peru
- 6.8.- Percentage structure of agriculture and industry for Huánuco's gross domestic product
- 6.9.- Gross domestic product of Huánuco in New Soles
- 6.10.- Migration patterns in Huánuco
- 6.11.- Huánuco's Rural & Urban population (percentage)
- 6.12.- People under poverty line: Huánuco vs National average
- 6.13.- Secondary school enrolment in Huánuco vs National
- 6.14.- Life expectancy and illiteracy in Huánuco versus national average
- 6.15.- Women's access to secondary school (or more) and media: Huánuco vs National
- 6.16.- Huánuco: percentage of workforce in agriculture by provinces
- 6.17.- Huánuco: percentage of people whose highest educational attainment is primary school
- 8.1.- COVID19 impact on GDP and school enrolment in Peruvian regions

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study focuses on (uneven) democratic state performance across a territory. Using a single country study based in Peru, I will explore why different regions have different levels of performance and why these disparities have been maintained over time. To explain this variation, I will use modernisation theory which highlights the role of socio-economic development and demonstrates how it impacts the quality of democracy and state capacity.

Peru started the new millennium with two major political processes: democratisation and decentralisation. The process of democratisation started with Alberto Fujimori's resignation via fax in 2000 from Japan. After democratically winning his first Presidential election in 1990, Fujimori executed a *self-coup* the night of 5 April 1992. This coup became a symbol of the challenges that democratisation faced in Latin America (Kenney, 2004). He consolidated himself as an autocrat until his resignation. This was not accepted by the Congress, who instead decided to oust him out of office by declaring the permanent immoral capacity of Fujimori. After this, the Congress elected a new President of Congress that became the interim President of Peru. Valentin Paniagua was the President that led the transition process and called for general elections the next year in April 2001. During these national elections in Peru the process of decentralisation was one of the key policy issues. The winner of this electoral process, Alejandro Toledo, promised that he was going to implement a decentralisation process in Peru. In his inaugural speech he stated that "we will reorganise and decentralise the state to serve the marginalised people from Peru" (Toledo, 2001, p. 6). Furthermore, he stated that this decentralisation process would "invigorate our local government" (Toledo, 2001, p. 10) and thus, he announced that regional and municipal elections were going to be held the next year in 2002.

At the beginning of the democratisation period 2000-2001, the majority of Peruvians were in favour of decentralisation. In a national survey, 76.3% said they favoured this process (Apoyo Consultores, 2001). Furthermore, when asked what decentralisation implies, 61.8% said that this reform would mean "more attention to the demands of the citizens" (ENAHO, 2001). During the first six months of Toledo's government (July-December 2001), most sessions in Congress were focused on decentralisation and the importance of bringing closer the state to its citizens. During the Prime

Minister's presentation in Congress in 23th August 2001¹, the Premier Roberto Dañino stated that "*en esta tarea de servir a las personas y de transformarnos de solo habitantes en ciudadanos, cobra un papel decisivo y urgente la descentralización. El gobierno entiende la descentralización como una herramienta para generar desarrollo local [...] La cercanía de la población a sus municipalidades hace que éstas sean las instituciones más idóneas para administrar los recursos del Estado en materia de salud, educación, pequeñas obras públicas y otros servicios*" (in this duty to serve the people and transform them into citizens, the decentralisation has an urgent and decisive role. The government understands the decentralisation as a tool to generate local development [...] The population's closeness to their municipalities made these the ideal institutions to administer the state's resources in health, education, small public works and other services) (Dañino, 2001, p. 434). On 13 December the Congress approved the modification of the Constitution's Chapter XIV on decentralisation. With this constitutional reform the basis for further decentralisation laws was established. In the Congress' debate of that day, Congressman Henry Pease would say that this reform "*sirve para que podamos cambiar de modo decisivo la realidad de los gobiernos locales y construir gobiernos regionales que efectivamente tengan poder de decisión*" (serves to change in a decisive way the reality of local governments and builds regional government that will have effective decision power) (Pease, 2001, p. 3079). Once this constitutional reform (Law N° 27680) was approved on 6 March 2002 it opened the door for an electoral promise and a highly politicised issue: regional elections.

The population was a source of pressure for the official announcement of regional elections. This was a campaign promise of Alejandro Toledo. In Congress, however, although the Law was ready to be debated and approved, it suffered delays because the previous constitutional reform (Chapter XIV on decentralisation) was not approved yet. The approval of this reform required two rounds of votes in two congressional legislatures. During the debates of December and January, various Congressmen, like Luis Guerrero and Gustavo Pacheco, advocated for the approval of the Regional Elections Law. Congressman Gustavo Pacheco (from Puno), in the session on 17 January, said that "*es posible que, si usted, Presidente [del Congreso], no "nos pone las pilas" y hace que el Pleno asuma las responsabilidad de convocar a elecciones regionales, que éstas no se realicen*" (it is possible that, if you President [of Congress], don't "get our act together" and make the Congress assume its responsibility of calling the regional elections, that these might not occur) (Pacheco, 2002, p. 3616). That same day, President Toledo had publicly

¹ The Prime Minister's presentation in Congress happens within the first 30 days once the Premier and the Cabinet have been designated by the President. The Premier presents the main public policies to be followed by the Government. This presentation was the first of Toledo's government.

urged the Congress to approve this regional election law. This was constantly brought up during this Congress session. Furthermore, there was a clear division between the interests of the Parliamentarians from the provinces and the ones from Lima. For the formers, they constantly invoked their identity as *provincianos* and how the provinces needed to be heard with the urgency on this issue of calling for regional elections. The session concluded without a vote on the regional elections, but with the agreement that it was going to be discussed and passed right after the constitutional reform was approved. Thus, in the Congress session of 14 March, the law for regional elections was approved. As stated by Congressman Luis Guerrero (from Cajamarca), “*hoy es un día histórico y todos los pueblos del Perú nos están escuchando porque vamos a empezar a materializar la descentralización*” (today is an historic day and all the people from Perú are listening to us because we are starting to materialise the decentralisation) (Guerrero, 2002, p. 166). The Law N° 27683, Law of Regional Elections, became official. This would pave the way for the regional elections in October of 2002.

During the next couple of years, more laws were approved creating new authorities, institutions, bureaucracy, functions, and responsibilities for the regional, provincial and local levels. The Regional and Municipal Elections (ERM) of 2002 where new regional authorities were elected saw the emergence of a new type of political party: the regional party. The creation of new government structures that were superposed over the existing 25 regions/departments, was a decision that responded more to political pressure rather than the technical aspects of territorial planning (Castro, 2008). Toledo’s government lacked the capacity to simultaneously manage the democratisation and institutional building process, as well as the decentralisation process (Sabatini, 2003). Going through a technical analysis of the best way to move forward with decentralisation and the creation of the new authorities was going to be time consuming (Tanaka, 2004).

Today in 2022, after 20 years of this major political reform, what have been the consequences of this double decentralisation and democratisation process? Did it invigorate the subnational governments as it was promised? Were these more responsive to the citizens’ demands? By using the concept of democratic state performance, this dissertation will show how the overall regional performance has improved since 2002. However, disparities across the regions are stark and have been sustained over time. In fact, the regions with high performance in 2002 are still the same 16 years later. Meanwhile, the regions with low performance are also the same. Being born in Huánuco (central Andean region) means that you are more prone to be illiterate, poor, and a sufferer of chronic malnutrition than if you

were born in Moquegua (southern Coastal region). Furthermore, the quality of democracy is better in Moquegua with higher levels of voter turnout, more equality between the representation of women in public offices and a lesser fragmented political party system. At the same time, they have more state capacity with a larger territorial reach and more bureaucrats to enforce the decisions. On the other hand, regions like Cajamarca, Huánuco or Apurímac have lower levels of political participation, are less egalitarian and have a weak state capacity that has an uneven presence across the region with fewer resources to implement its public choices.

Consequentially, the overarching research question is what causes uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions? And why has this unevenness persisted over time? To address this question, I will focus the attention towards modernisation theory. Regions that show higher levels of its workforce in industrial/services jobs and have higher educational attainment are the ones with higher levels of performances. Modernisation relates to the overall socio-economic development of a society which is propelled by the transition from a mainly agricultural society towards a non-agricultural one (industrial/service), which is then linked to an improvement in human capital through increasing educational levels. It is an “encompassing process of massive social changes that, once set in motion, tends to penetrate all domains of life, from economic activities to social life to political institutions, in a self-reinforcing process” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 3071). This process will mark the path that different regions took once democratisation and decentralisation were established. Those regions with higher levels of modernisation were those that after 16 years still had higher levels of electoral turnout, established political parties, and higher levels of women representatives. Moreover, these were regions with stronger state capacity where the territorial reach of the state was more present throughout the region than in those with lower levels of modernisation. The results will show that five from the top six regions were exactly the same in 2002 and 2018.

This research’s contribution will satisfy the two criteria established by King et al. (1994): it deals with a significant real-world topic and is designed to contribute to a specific scholarly literature (p. 18). On the former, regional disparities within a country are a major issue of concern for national governments. First, there is the issue of equality amongst all citizens where all should enjoy the same opportunities and have the same living standards. It should not matter where one person is born and raised to enjoy these. However, uneven development within a country creates a situation where a person born in the capital has better education, will have longer life expectancy, and better access to public services,

among others, over a person that lives in another region. Without addressing these regional disparities, the national government perpetuates a system of inequality where people from within the same country are better or worse off only due to the arbitrary location of their birth. Second, the citizens in these areas have longstanding grievances and tend to feel neglected by the democratic state. These same citizens witnessing how people in other areas of the country enjoy a better life furthers this neglected and forgotten sensation. This situation can create problems of social unrest as a legitimate way to draw the national attention towards longstanding grievances and problems that afflict the community of these areas. Furthermore, a democratic state that has not been able to meet demands opens the door for the possibility of a systemic change. For these citizens, the democratic state has clearly failed them and, thus, another form of government might do a better job in addressing their issues. This could then be exploited by politicians who would bring solutions to their grievances potentially through authoritarian practices. The citizens might tolerate corrupt practices as long as some of their issues are resolved. This situation is encapsulated with the (unfortunate) political Peruvian opinion “*roba pero hace obras*” (steals, but get things done). Thus, regional disparities need to be addressed since they could lead to regional movements against the whole democratic state and institutional scaffolding. Third, this uneven performance across regions can lead to separatist movements, whether this is in the case of regions that are better off and feel that they should be independent and autonomous from the nation as a whole (as was the case of Barcelona in Spain mid 2010s, or Loreto in Peru during the caucho boom in early 1900s), or in the case of forgotten regions that have been constantly neglected (as in Colombia with the Caribe movement). Fourth, the design and implementation of public policies across a territory have always assumed that the field in which these are going to be enacted is even. However, this is not the case in middle- and low-income countries (and also in high-income ones). This study will contest this assumption by showing that reforms and public policies that do not consider this uneven scenario only perpetuate disparities across subnational units. Thus, it will contribute to the design of public policies that are sensible to this within-country variation.

On the contribution to the literature this dissertation will fill a gap on subnational politics. First, the analysis of within-nation variation in a unitary state where most literature have focused its attention on unevenness of performance or democratisation in federal system countries. Furthermore, the democracy-state nexus literature has mainly been study at a national level. These have tried to understand the role of democracy and state capacity, and how its relationship takes place under a

national perspective. This research is embedded within the literature of a state-democracy nexus, and more specifically with the dimensions of the quality of democracy and state capacity. There is no comprehensive subnational approach that deals with the democracy-state nexus within a unifying approach. Studies have researched democracy at a subnational level, sparking a rich debate on how to operationalise and conceptualise subnational units that are not democratic. On the other hand, the analysis of state capacity and its uneven presence across the territory has been researched, although most studies have been connected to a broader national perspective on the state building/formation. Thus, the theoretical contribution of this dissertation is an operationalisation that will provide a unifying theory that bridges both strands of study under the democratic state performance concept. This concept bridges the two literatures of quality of democracy and state capacity through the deconstruction of both concepts to its core elements, demonstrating their analytical differences and ontological coexistence. It is a different spin to the classic “no state, no democracy”. Literature has treated them as separate entities and this certainly has analytical advantages. Studying if a country is democratic or not, or how the process of democratisation unfolds without addressing the role of the state in these processes, can help to disentangle the specific democratic aspect that the researcher would like to highlight. On the other hand, analysing how a state building comes into place, the path divergency in history and its uneven territorial reach, leaving aside the role of democratic institutions in these state processes has its advantages. This was certainly the path followed during the third wave of democratisation and the “bringing the state back in” moment during the early 90s. However, this “parallel string” approach to the study of democracy and its quality in one side and state capacity on the other has reached its limitations. Democratic backsliding is happening in countries with well-oiled democratic institutions. Furthermore, this operationalisation will show the linkage with the modernisation process undergone by each Peruvian region. Modernisation and its impact on democracy have produced a vast literature. This dissertation’s theoretical contribution will elucidate this relation on a subnational level and show how the modernisation process in different regions in Peru shaped the democratic state performance in each political-administrative unit. Finally, an in-depth analysis and explanation of territorial variation across Peruvian regions over time has not been made yet. This study would fill this gap and contribute to the literature and the study of Peruvian politics by addressing the uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time and dealing with a real-life topic that afflicts millions of citizens.

In sum, the Peruvian case displays a *sui generis* situation where the political system went through two major processes – democratisation and decentralisation – that reshaped the state, the political parties and citizens’ life. General Velasco Alvarado’s military coup in 1968 interrupted the subnational electoral process (following the first subnational election in 1963) and eliminated any elections until democracy came back in 1980. From this year onwards, subnational elections were held in 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1989 under a democratic rule. However, the authoritarian regime of Fujimori during the 1990s would stop this subnational democratic process. After the democratic transition of 2000-2001, the subnational elections would be held again under a democratic rule every four years since 2002. The time period of 2002-2018 has historic significance since Peru celebrated for the first time in its history a fourth uninterrupted consecutive democratic national election in 2016 and four continuous subnational elections under a democratic regime. This continuity would exemplify that democracy has become “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996) in Peru. Nevertheless, this time period will also be characterised by a distinctive uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time, and this dissertation embarks on understanding its determinants.

1.1 Argument: rethinking modernisation theory

Modernisation here is understood as an overall socio-economic development that can be gauged by the transformation of the economic structure of a population within a territory when its labour workforce shifts from agricultural towards non-agricultural (industrial, services) economies and the improvement of human capital (Huntington, 1968; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Weber, 1978). This process encompasses two dimensions. I will refer to economic modernisation when highlighting the workforce structure, whilst referring to social modernisation when addressing human capital development via educational attainment. Modernisation triggers social and demographic processes, and transfigures the landscape of the area where these processes are unfolding. New job opportunities, better salaries, social mobility, access to public education, redefinition of gender roles, and the promise of better living standards are tied to this modernisation process. People from worse-off areas are drawn towards these opportunities, creating a distinctive pattern of migration from the rural areas to urban ones (Bradshaw, 1987; Rogers & Williamson, 1982). Leaving the agricultural activities (migration), the concentration of population, economic activities, and resources within an area (urbanisation), and higher productivity levels with occupational specialisation and higher gross domestic product (economic development) are ramifications of the transformative process where a

society shifts its economic structure from a mainly agricultural one towards an industrial/services one and improves its human capital (modernisation).


Now, this process unfolds within a territory under a political institutional framework. The state – a set of organisations that exercises dominion over its population, establishing social and political order, delivering expected or promised public goods, and uses the legitimate monopoly of violence to enforce its decisions (Centeno et al., 2017; Fukuyama, 2011; O'Donnell, 1993b; Tilly, 1992; Weber, 1978) – is faced with the pressure produced by the unleashed socioeconomic transformations that occur within its defined territory over which it claims control. Graph N°1.1 depicts how the processes unleashed by modernisation occurs within a territory over which the democratic state exercises its control. The area where the modernisation process is unleashed is the linkage with the democratic state and thus shapes the democratic response of it (Graph N° 1.1). This pressure is manifested in the public agenda that drives the public opinion towards the necessity of implementing the policies needed. The higher concentration of populations facilitates the organisation between different economic and social actors, reducing the cost of collective action and pressure over the state (Lipton, 1977; M. Moore, 1984). The ideas moved forward by these actors are the result of interactions creating a new chain of values, customs, needs and interests that are objectified in the political institutions (Hegel, 1991). This, however, creates an advantage for the state and its bureaucracy, since the concentration of a population reduces the costs of providing the public goods to a majority of its population. Providing electrification to an urbanised and industrial setting is cheaper than extending those lines to dispersed settlements (Enriquez et al., 2017; Varshney, 2005). Furthermore, with the concentration of voters in those areas, the politicians have an electoral incentive to prioritise those areas. Unfortunately, at the same time it creates a perverse incentive since it forgets areas with a lower density population, where the communities are more sparsely distributed, the economy is mostly agricultural with limited links to the market, and organisation is most difficult. These are highly costly areas for the state to reach, making the state effectively absent from these communities. Further, votes are more dispersed, reducing the interest for the politicians to prioritise these areas. Within regions this creates a subnational centralism where the centre (and main cities) of the region starts to concentrate all the human and capital resources.

The modernisation process that shapes the state response is able to incorporate a majority of its population in democratic processes. The pressure over the state to deliver public goods is

accompanied by the improvements of democratic channels through which these pressures can be exercised. Electoral turnout is augmented by reducing the cost of participation in electoral processes. Participation and engagement of the citizens in democratic life is enhanced when state reaches those deprived areas (Arévalo-Bencardino, 2018; Bratton & Chang, 2006; S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2014). State infrastructure, e.g public schools, where elections take place in Peru, is closer to the majority of its population and the cost of travelling is greatly reduced. At the same time, modernisation promotes the participation of women into politics by augmenting their access to public education, opening the opportunities of their participation in the labour market, and empowering them. They become professionals in the public realm. Furthermore, more women with access to education are able to become more autonomous and independent, making their transition towards a male dominated area like politics easier. Gender-roles change as part of this modernisation process. Although barriers are still present and women suffer from continuous political harassment, their political participation is facilitated by the modernisation process

Graph N° 1.1 – Territorial approach to modernisation theory

Territorial approach to modernisation



Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

To sum up, my argument can be divided in different stages. First, democratic state performance is explained by the modernisation process that unfolded in Peruvian regions. Those regions with a higher

industrialised/service economy experienced a positive balance of migration and a rapid urbanisation process that was accompanied with higher educational attainment, better socioeconomic indicators, and emergence of new social and economic actors. Second, these processes unfolded within a defined territory that pressured the political institutions which adapted to this new context. They reacted by prioritising resources to these same areas, creating a positive feedback loop that, nonetheless, neglected the more agricultural, deprived, and dispersed population. Third, this reaction fostered the development of state capacity and improvement of its democratic quality, resulting in high-performance regions.

1.2 Overview of the dissertation

The structure of this dissertation is as follow. In Chapter 2 I will revise the main academic literature on how performance is addressed and operationalised. This will be followed with a discussion on the implications of the quality of democracy and how democracy can be unevenly spread within a country. Furthermore, I will review the main explanations of within-nation variation of institutional performance, their contributions and limitations. I will also review key studies on the democracy-state nexus and go through the main arguments on modernisation theory. Finally, a revision of Peruvian literature with a subnational focus will be conducted. These reviews will help clarify where my research question is set and the contributions it will make.

Chapter 3 will be devoted to the methodology that will guide my research, as well as the operationalisation of democratic state performance. As a mix-method approach is the most suited, I will explore the benefits of nested research analysis, where a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques are used to address the research question. The idea behind nested analysis is that as a first step a quantitative approach is used to clarify and determine the explanatory factors, whilst the qualitative approach is used to conduct an in-depth study of the cases selected from the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, I will build the conceptual tree of a democratic state. Building upon the literature of quality of democracy, state capacity, and democracy-state nexus, I will bridge these strands of literature through a deconstruction of the core elements of each strand and unify them under my democratic state concept. This will be validated through a confirmatory factor analysis that will show the democratic state as the common factor of the deconstructed elements. Finally, this

operationalisation will be further tested in a second factor analysis at a provincial level, proving the conceptual validity of the democratic state.

After having defined and operationalised democratic state performance, in Chapter 4 a background of decentralisation and democratic state development will be laid out. Then a mapping of the democratic state performance will be done. This will show us that the democratic state is unevenly spread across the territory. This within-country variation shows high and low performance regions. Furthermore, this unevenness has been maintained over time since the top regions are exactly the same in 2002 and in 2018, and the same happens with the bottom ones as well. After showing the uneven democratic state performance, the chapter will explore the main arguments that can explain the unevenness across Peruvian regions. In this theory section, I will revise possible explanatory variables that explain the unevenness. These will include economic modernisation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Kurtz, 2013; Lipset, 1959; B. Moore, 1966), social modernisation (Barro, 1999; Benavot, 1996; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Glaeser et al., 2007; Lipset, 1981; Meyer, 1977; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008; Saint-Paul & Verdier, 1993; T. W. Schultz, 1993), social capital (Bernhard et al., 2015; Evans, 1997; Kawachi et al., 2008; Putnam et al., 1994), subnationalism (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017; Singh, 2016), inequality (Acemoglu, Naidu et al., 2015; Anderson & Beramendi, 2008; Boix, 2003; Cárdenas & Tuzemen, 2010; Dahl, 1973; Easterly, 2001; Goodin & Dryzek, 1980; Muller, 1995; H. D. Soifer, 2013; Solt, 2008), and political culture (Avritzer, 1995; Diamond et al., 1989; Heras, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Verba & Almond, 1963; Wiarda, 1989) as the main sources of the hypotheses that will be tested through a regression analysis. The persistence between high- and low-performance regions is an indicator that the variable that would explain this within-country variation has structural characteristics. The results from the regression analysis will show that modernisation is the main explanatory variable of a democratic state. Modernisation is considered as the transition from an agricultural society towards a non-agricultural one and the improvement of human capital. Thus, the impact of modernisation, measured through the percentage of the workforce on industrial/services jobs versus agricultural ones and educational attainment, has a positive effect on the performance of the democratic state at a subnational level.

Having defined the high- and low-performance regions, and the main explanatory variable of democratic state unevenness across Peruvian regions over time, Chapter 5 and 6 will be dedicated to

an in-depth analysis of cases of Moquegua (high-performance) and Huánuco (low-performance). Here, process-tracing will be used to identify the causal mechanism between modernisation and the democratic state. The positive case of Moquegua will exemplify how modernisation allowed the construction of a high-performance democratic state that fostered a better quality of democracy and a better state capacity. On the other hand, the cases of Huánuco will show how the persistence of an agricultural workforce, with its embedded isolation, lower educational attainment, fewer access to public goods and obstacles to participate in the democratic processes lowers the democratic state performance. The final chapter will be dedicated to the discussions, lessons learned from the research and conclusions.

Chapter 2: Literature review

The studies on institutional performance within a territory have grown over the last decades. Most of these have been focused on the uneven process of democratisation within a country and the heterogeneous state presence across the territory. Socio-political phenomena are rarely evenly distributed across the territory (Singh, 2016). Within-nation variation is frequently experienced by almost all the countries and this was the insight of O'Donnell when addressing the complexities of democratisation in Latin America (O'Donnell, 1993b). In this chapter I will go through the main arguments that have tried to analyse the subnational variation in democratic state performance. First, I will focus on the quality of democracy and its relationship with democratic theory followed by a revision of the uneven expansion of democratisation processes in a country. Thirdly, I will revise the literature on subnational state capacity and the scholarly studies of Peru at the subnational level. I will finish with a revision of modernisation theory. The main objective of this chapter is to clarify how the literature has treated the main concepts and explanations when addressing institutional performance on a subnational level.

2.1 On (the quality of) democracy

The concept of democracy is contested: “if we want to understand its condition, and control its practical and logical vagaries, the first step, I believe, is to recognised its essentially contested character” (Gallie, 1955, p. 183). Robert Dahl stated after a vast research that “we are still struggling with how to conceptualise and measure democracy” (cited in Munck & Snyder, 2007, p. 145). In all these debates a key element of them is “a lack of consensus on the meaning of democracy” (Diamond, 2003). These divergences are based on the properties encompassed by the concept. However, the overarching agreement is that democracy is an institutional arrangement that establishes the rules of access to power and procedures (constrains) in the exercise of this power. This arrangement is built upon certain principles and normative ideas like freedom, equality, pluralism, accountability, sovereignty of the people, and so on.

Within these debates there has been a division of two approaches when defining democracy: procedural and substantive (Gwiazda, 2016). The former explores democracy as a set of rules (procedures) to be followed that guarantee “that the democratic goals, such as representation,

accountability and legitimacy are achieved through a competitive electoral process” (Gwiazda, 2016, p. 14). A procedural (and minimalistic) view for democracy was pioneered by Joseph Schumpeter who defined it as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 2010, p. 269). However, an inventory on what democracy is “can be also faulted for its low ambitions and its omissions. The stress is overwhelmingly on *procedures* of public decision-making and accountability, to the disregard of outcomes and the near exclusion of *broader social values*” (Whitehead, 2002, p. 12). Thus, the substantive approach expands this definition by including conditions such as human rights protections, security, equity and social rights. These two approaches, each with different operationalisations according to the normative principles established, helped the scholars to assess if countries can be considered as democratic or not. It is not my intention to discuss here the implications of each approach, but just to shed light on how democracy has been addressed by the literature and why the debate has been so extensive on it.

However, after the third wave of democratisation that started with the Carnation Revolution in 1974 in Portugal (Huntington, 1993), there has been a shift on how democracy is studied. Within the political science literature, most of it during the 1980s focused on democratisation, trying to understand the determinants that moved a country from authoritarian regimes towards democratic ones (O’Donnell et al., 1986). This was in line with the current political processes at the time, the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1993), and the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989. It had a dichotomous approach and the focus was to establish the cut-off point that made a country democratic or non-democratic and to identify the triggers of this transition. After liberal representative democracy was consolidated across the countries and along the 1990s and early 2000s (Diamond, 1999; Fukuyama, 2006; Przeworski et al., 2000), the studies on democracy shifted their attention to the quality of democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; L. Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Lauth, 2013; Levine & Molina, 2011; Lijphart, 2012a; Munck, 2016). The focus is on how ‘good’ (or bad) a political regime is, rather than if it is democratic or not (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002). It is a shift from a dichotomous approach on democracy, towards addressing democracy within a spectrum, or a gradation approach.

A common element when addressing the quality of democracy is an initial baseline where the unit of analysis (country, region, province) is a democracy. When addressing the quality of democracy, the

unit must comply first with a definition of democracy. Borrowing on Dahl's definition of polyarchy, Altman and Perez-Liñan (2002) state that the "assumption underlying this view is that polyarchy is a necessary, yet not sufficient, condition for high quality of democracy" (Altman & Perez-Liñan 2002, p. 86). On the other hand, for Diamond and Morlino (2005), to discuss the quality of democracy a country must be a democracy, which means that it complies with a) universal, adult suffrage, b) recurring, free, competitive and fair elections, c) more than one serious political party, and d) alternative sources of information. Once it complies with these properties, it is possible to address its quality. Furthermore, Munck (2016) does an extensive overview of the different baseline concepts of democracy that have been treated so far by different authors when studying the quality of democracy. For the author, the baseline has varied from a minimal, electoral democracy to a stable democracy or polyarchy, depending on the different views. Nevertheless, whatever the baseline is, the quality of democracy expresses a degree in which the baseline is improved and can reach a perfect democracy (Lijphart, 1999), a high quality democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Dahl, 1973), a liberal and participatory democracy (Bühlmann et al., 2012), or a good democracy (Ringen, 2007). Shifting the focus towards the study of the quality of democracy in a country (or subnational unit) the assumption is that the unit of analysis has passed the cut-off point and it is a democracy. Hence, it is about to what extent the key features are being fulfilled. It is not about if a country has free and fair elections, but to know the actual electoral turnout in the elections.²

To address this gradation, Diamond and Morlino (2005) focus on what quality actually means. Based on literature from organisational theory and industrial sectors, quality can be divided into three categories: procedure, content and result (Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. 21). *Procedure* means that a "quality" product is the "result of an exact, controlled process carried out according to precise, recurring methods and timing"; *content* means that the quality is based on the "structural characteristics of a product"; and, *result* means that the quality is "indirectly indicated by the degree of customer satisfaction with it, regardless of how it is produced or its actual content" (Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. 21). Under this framework, a good democracy would be one where citizens are satisfied with government (quality of results), where citizens enjoy extensive liberty and political equality (quality of

² This shift is also present in public policies in the education sector. Most governments, including Peru, have changed the focus over the past 15 years from measuring if a child is literate or not to whether a child understands what he/she is reading. It is a change from a dichotomous approach (does the child know to read yes/no) towards a gradation approach (how much does the child understand what he/she is reading).

content), and where citizens have the means to judge government performance through diverse mechanisms, like elections (quality of procedure) (Diamond & Morlino, 2005, p. 22). Furthermore, since democracy is a contested normative concept, analysing the quality of democracy gives the researcher a “tool to be accepted by people with different normative positions” (Morlino, 2011, p. 196). An important feature of this division of quality is that allows the researcher to work on a specific part. For example, this would mean focusing on government performance (e.g. quality of content) rather than electoral rules (quality of procedures), and still being able to work under the realm of quality of democracy.

This is a valuable insight to address (and measure) the quality of democracy and opens the door to more dimensions that go beyond the procedural aspects. Socio-economic factors have an impact on the living standards of democratic citizens, and thus shape the experience of democracy between them. As stated by Rueschemeyer (2004), the “incidence of poverty and of social inclusion as well as of decidedly substandard education can be gauges of political inequality” (Rueschemeyer, 2004, p. 88). This is the perspective assumed by Munck (2016) when illustrating that the social environment of politics should be considered as a part of the components of the political system (democracy). For the author, democracy is a political concept that cannot be considered in isolation from social factors. Thus, a pure procedural definition or pure substantive one has deficiencies and thus a “contextualised procedural conception of democracy that addresses the social environment of politics” should be adopted (Munck, 2016, p. 19). Within this line of thought is Dacombe’s recognition of the “significance of social structure in shaping democratic life” (Dacombe, 2017, p. 17). For the author, civic participation and the level of associational life is closely linked to poverty and to the physical area where democratic life happens: the neighbourhood effect (Dacombe, 2017). The practice of democracy is “positioned in the particular context of social life” (Dacombe, 2017, p. 111). This is also recognised by Lauth (2015) when he constructs his matrix of quality of democracy. Within this matrix – divided in three dimensions of liberty, equality and control – he stresses that political equality requires the recognition of conditions that enable all citizens to “participate in a fair and effective way in all formal institutions needed for the democratic process” (Lauth, 2015, p. 9). In other words, socio-economic factors should be included as part of the definition of the quality of democracy since these have an impact on government decision-making and access to government offices (key components for democracy).

The quality of democracy is an analytical step further that looks at how democracy is being experienced by the citizens and realised through its institutional scaffolding. Democracy is an institutional arrangement that defines the rules to access power and, as such, assumes the universal participation of the whole adult population (S. L. Mazzuca, 2010). Access to power to government offices is an essential part of democracy (Munck, 2016). Participation, whether through elections or other decision-making processes, becomes a undeniable dimension of democracy (Dahl, 1973). Participation is beneficial to democratic life and its activities goes “beyond the realm of elections and formal politics” (Dacombe, 2017, p. 38). The participation “of citizens in binding decisions is mainly done through elections [...] and political scientist agree on the validity of this criterion” (Lauth, 2015, p. 14). Nonetheless, when addressing the quality of democracy and going further on how this dimension has its empirical counterpart, the inclusion of participation is not about the right to participate but on the rate of participation (Altman & Perez-Liñan, 2002). This rate can be taken from the citizen’s perspective (how many citizens participate in decision making processes like elections), or from the institutional perspective (how the institution enables civic participation in the decision-making process).

Another key dimension embedded in the quality of democracy is the constraint that the ruler has on its exercise of power. The division of powers and power constrains of the incumbent becomes an essential feature for any civil democratic government (Locke, [1689] 2014; Montesquieu, [1750] 1989). These constraints have materialised throughout history in different institutions. Going through all the mechanisms established to limit the power of the ruler since Locke’s reply to Hobbes’ Leviathan and absolute power (Hobbes, [1651] 1998) goes beyond the scope of this study. The main idea consists of “the control of political power (government and parliament) through means of political and judicial control” (Lauth, 2015, p. 10). Suffice here to say that since the second half of the twentieth century the key feature to limit the power has been a fixed-term mandate and alternation in power (Przewroski et al., 2000), paired with spaces and processes where the incumbent has to give public explanations on governmental progress and future policies (e.g. public audiences). The latter have also historic roots that can be traced back to the Queen’s speech in the UK, the State of the Union in USA, or the *Mensaje a la Nación* in Perú, and so on.

In sum, democracy is a contested concept that has been largely debated since its inception. Furthermore, these debates have evolved from the studies of democratic or non-democratic countries,

towards the quality of democracy. This shift is still rooted in features of democracy and tries to address the quality of the political regime by encompassing more elements previously disregarded (e.g. citizen perception, government outcomes and outputs, quality of government, or even socio-economic conditions). The importance of addressing the quality of democracy is that it goes beyond listing the elements that a country (or subnational unit) needs to fulfil to become democratic, but studies how these elements are actually being realised. It is not if a region has free and fair elections, but is rather related to the level of electoral participation and whether citizens have an equal opportunity to participate. It is not related to multiparty elections, but rather if the party system is stable or volatile. It is not if there is an accountability mechanism, but whether this has an effect on how power is exercised. It is about understanding the quality of the features that makes a regime democratic. Opening democratic theory to address the quality of it and explore other dimensions allows us to understand more fully, for example, backlash and backsliding against democracy. Third wave democracies face constant challenges on the delivery of democratic promises, and these are related not to the procedural scaffolding but to the quality of it. To foster engagement in democratic processes, it is necessary to see under which socio-economic conditions these are realised.

2.2 On democratic unevenness

Now, is it possible to bring to a subnational level these discussions on the quality of democracy? This section will review the main arguments on how democracy and its quality expands itself (unevenly) across the territory. At a subnational level, studies have shown that the regions/states/provinces were showing non-democratic patterns. Local incumbents were using political-economical resources at their disposal to constrain competition, to persecute their opposition, to coerce citizen's votes, buy justice and local media, and so on. A prime example of this uneven experience of democratisation can be seen in the United States of America (USA) during the civil rights movements in the 1960s. Being an Afro-American in the Northern states was a very different experience than in the Southern states. The latter had in place voter suppression and civil-political rights were non-existent to this community. Democracy was complete absent in the south of the USA (Gibson & King, 2016).

The unevenness of rule of law and democracy within the territory sparked the study of subnational democratic variation across the literature in Latin America (Behrend, 2011; Behrend & Whitehead, 2016a, 2017; Borges, 2007; Gervasoni, 2010; Gibson, 2013; Giraudy, 2015; Giraudy & Pribble, 2018;

Snyder, 2001). These discussions have nurtured new approaches on democratic and authoritarian theory. This subnational approach moves forward new ways of understanding what democracy entails and when is it possible to define a regime as democratic or authoritarian. However, a new debate is how to categorise these new sub-national territories. It is not the scope of this research to dwell into these different conceptualisations, but to point out that there are different ways to address these, as follows: hybrid regimes (Behrend, 2011), regimes with illiberal practices (Behrend & Whitehead, 2016a), subnational authoritarian enclaves (Benton, 2012), subnational undemocratic regimes (Giraudy, 2015), and subnational authoritarianism (Gibson, 2013). Much of the conceptual definitions of these will depend, however, on the type of country being studied (mostly federal ones), since each of them have different electoral rules and government entities that must observe these. For example, if electoral rules are enforced only at the subnational level by the respective government that is also in charge of the electoral logistics, authors are more inclined to use “regime” as part of their definition, but this is not the case when those same rules are enforced at a national level.

One of these authors that has brought national democratic theory to a subnational level is Gervasoni (2010) with his rentier theory approach to Argentine provinces. For the author, the Argentinian federal arrangement created a perfect scenario for the emergence of authoritarian practices in the provinces (Gervasoni, 2010). In his study he shows how a higher level of fiscal transfer from central government to a province increases the emergence of authoritarianism. Furthermore, “the origin and size of a subnational unit’s fiscal resources have significant regime consequences” (Gervasoni, 2010, p. 330). Since the incumbent does not need to rely on the citizens for their income, they use their financial power to “minimize their constituent’s economic autonomy and, ultimately, to weaken democratic contestation and institutional constraints on their power” (Gervasoni, 2010, p. 330).

Focusing also in Argentina, Behrend studies what she calls “hybrid subnational regimes” (Behrend, 2011). For the author, the existence of uneven democratic presence within the territory can be explained by understanding that the provinces can act as closed games. These refer to when a family or small group “dominates politics in a province, controlling access to top government positions, the provincial state, the media and business opportunities” (Behrend, 2011, p. 153). Provinces with a limited economic structure, small population and limited business opportunities are characteristic of places where close games appear. For both authors, Gervasoni and Behrend, the main factor that explains the emergence of authoritarian practices is the economic structure of each subnational unit.

Nevertheless, although the citizens are economically dependent on the political-economic elite, both authors do not address how this dependence translates into electoral dependence. This unevenness has also been present in other countries such as Mexico. After a survey to experts, Loza and Mendez (2012) found that after the decentralisation process the Mexican states showed irregularities – vote buying and coercion - during the governor elections of 2000-2012 (Loza & Méndez, 2013). The authors do not engage if these irregularities entail a change in the regime type at a subnational level but how the presence of these influence (in a bad way) the quality of the subnational political system.

Now, let us shift the focus of uneven democratic presence across the territory to a relational scale between subnational units and national government. For the authors Behrend & Whitehead (2017), the illiberal subnational practices and structure allow us to understand how subnational political systems can “stay below the democratic standards that prevail in the rest of the country and challenge the national democracy without becoming authoritarian regimes” (p. 23). In his book, Gibson (2012) analyses Argentinian provinces through a territorial approach. To explain subnational authoritarianism, the author explains that the incumbent builds a territorial boundary control over his/her jurisdiction. This strategy allows the incumbent to maintain the conflict on a local level and, thus, prevail in power. To sustain this control, the incumbent will use not only local resources, but also national ones (judicial or congressional alliances). Nevertheless, if this boundary control is broken, the subnational conflict has national resonance and the status quo is endangered. For the author, when the incumbent has control over its territory there will coexist a juxtaposition of regimes, in which on a national scale you will have democracy, whilst an authoritarian regime will be present at the local level. Another author that follows this path of subnational regime change is Agustina Giraudy (2015). In her work, she studies the cases of Argentina and Mexico to understand the relation between (national) democrats and (subnational) autocrats. For the author, if a national democrat receives support from the subnational autocrat, the former will help the latter to strengthen their subnational undemocratic regime (Giraudy, 2015). This relational approach to the phenomenon of regime juxtaposition is suggestive, although it is restricted (as the previous authors) to federal type of governments.

Ward et al. (2010) study the impact of decentralisation on sub-national government and changes in democratic practices. Using Brazil, Mexico and United States (federal countries) as case studies, they are able to see how the process of decentralisation became a pendulum movement. Regions and

localities were not prepared for this process. Moreover, when analysing the democratic practices, they discovered that “local oligarchs and bosses, far from being excluded from the subnational stage forever, have found new opportunities to sustain themselves in power” (Ward et al., 2010, p. 60). Within this idea of local bosses and their absolute use of power, Borges (2007) addresses the Brazilian case in which the competition over social policies between national and subnational elites have worked as a constraint to them and their machine building-strategies (Borges, 2007). The author shows how the Brazilian states show differences in non-democratic practices and low competitiveness, since “democratisation did not occur as a linear, homogenous process across the Brazilian territory” (Borges, 2007, p. 110). Federal and subnational governments had to compete for the same “pool” of voters. This competition was made clear through the implementation of social policies. In order to win more voters, the federal government tried to implement the social policies themselves, weakening the position of local bosses. In some cases, this was possible; in others it was more difficult to do. Thus, “the Brazilian experience of subnational democratisation supports the view that the performance and workings of democratic institutions will more often than not vary significantly within a federation” (Borges, 2017, p. 131). This work sheds light on how the national-subnational approach can shape the democratisation process and the way it expands itself across the territory. Furthermore, in her case study of Bahia, Brazil, Souza (2016) showed that the continuity of the local political elite after the democratisation process created the conditions for this group through “informal control of the government, the legislature, local politics, and institutions providing checks and balances through a political party” (p. 224).

This uneven feature of democracy across its territory might be better understandable if we accept that democratisation is a “long-term process of social construction” (Whitehead, 2002, p. 2). Furthermore, “subnational democratisation should be understood as a convergence toward the democratic standards” (Behrend and Whitehead, 2016b, p. 162). As with the analysis on the uneven provision of public goods, most of the studies focused on subnational variation have used federal countries as examples, neglecting the studies of unitary government. Nevertheless, this unevenness is also present in unitary governments (Arévalo & Sosa Villagarcia, 2016; Cueva et al., 2016). They focus their attention on (mainly) how competition is limited within a subnational unit, leaving aside other aspects to be considered when analysing the quality of democracy on this level (party institutionalisation, political participation, accountability processes, government performance, and so on). Building on these blocks, this research will contribute with an overlooked aspect on this dual relationship. As

shown in this section, most studies have focused on the negative side (e.g. a worsening of the democratic quality). However, the contrary also coexists, where subnational units have better quality than the national level. Regions have better democratic processes in place, participate more, and are more egalitarian, more representative, and less fragmented, and so on. This will be exemplified with the case study of Moquegua.

2.3 On state capacity

In this subsection I will analyse the different arguments regarding the uneven state capacity within a territory. Much of this literature is influenced by Mann's distinction between two state powers: *despotic power* and *infrastructural power*. Studies have used this distinction to explain the uneven reach of the state. Whilst despotic power is related to the elite's capacity to impose their particular interests and political domination to the whole of society; the infrastructural power is the capacity of the state to penetrate in the civil society, coordinating in a centralised way the activities of it through its own infrastructure and implementing its decisions over the territory (Mann, 1993). Thus, the idea of infrastructural power has been used as a cornerstone to address the heterogeneous presence and performance of the state across the territory. Studies will consider political participation (Cleary, 2007), national officials versus territorial challengers (Giraudy and Luna, 2017), social capital (Putnam, 1994), subnationalism (Singh, 2016), party system configuration (Chhibber and Noorudding, 2004), economic concentration (Stoner-Weiss, 2002), political alignments and attribution (Niedzwiecki, 2018), political leadership (McNulty, 2011), regionalist parties (Vampa, 2017), local government officials (Ziblatt, 2008), or geography (Herbst, 2017), to explain within-country variation.

In Latin America, there has been expanding research on how performance varies within a country. One of these studies is from Cleary (2007) where he shows that political participation has a positive correlation with local government performance. Municipalities that showed more political participation (voter turnout, literacy and poverty rate as proxies) have shown better results on public provision of potable water and sanitary sewerage. Whilst he considers the electoral competition (margin of victory and alternation) as a factor, the results showed that electoral competition did not have any correlation with government performance. Nevertheless, the sum of electoral competition and political participation does improve the performance of Mexican municipalities (Cleary, 2007). The use of literacy and poverty rate as proxies of political participation is less than ideal, since these

are usually used to measure government performance (the phenomenon he tries to explain). On the other hand, the study of Weitz-Shapiro (2008) illustrates the relationship between local government performance and citizen satisfaction with democracy. Decentralisation processes have devolved political, fiscal and administrative power to subnational governments. By analysing the Argentinian provinces, one of the most decentralised countries in Latin America, the author shows a link “between local government performance and citizen system support” (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008, p. 301). From its performance evaluation, the author discovers that the process of decentralisation should be more carefully addressed by politicians, since an unprepared local government (that receives more budget, more responsibilities, and has not the capabilities to manage them) might hinder public support towards democracy.

Giraudy and Luna’s work (2017) analyse the heterogenous territorial reach of the state in Latin America. For them, the uneven state presence (infrastructural power) is an “intrinsically political and distributive outcome that results from clashes and negotiations between national-level state officials and territorial challengers over the control of territory” (Giraudy & Luna, 2017, p. 93). This means that the power the state wields over a territory is not absolute, but relative. The variation will depend on the incentives and resources the state officials have against the ones from the territorial challengers (subnational non-state actors). Thus, the heterogenous territorial reach can be explained by the clash between these two groups. If state officials have high incentives and resources whilst territorial challenger’s incentives are low, the former will possess unrestricted power over territory. Nevertheless, if it is vice versa, the state territorial reach will be restricted. The contribution of this approach is the recognition that state presence is relative and relational, rather than absolute and static. However, one of the limitations of this perspective is that this heterogeneity is based on extreme cases of subnational challengers (drug cartels, insurgents, warlords) and thus, although it might explain why there is no control over specific territories of a country, it would naturally assume that the non-challenged parts are homogenous in the state’s reach, where this is not the case. A similar relational approach is assumed by Niedzwiecki (2018) in the study of the provision of social care in Argentina and Brazil. By studying the coverage of social policies – conditional cash transfers and health policies – the author states that the political attribution (i.e. whether national or subnational authorities are responsible for public policy) and the alignment of the level of government will determine the success of its implementation (Niedzwiecki, 2018). If the attribution is clearly national, then the subnational unit and authority needs to be political aligned for the implementation of social policy to be successful. If the attribution is not

clear, then the subnational level will compete, create barriers or simply abstain from implementation of such policies. Thus, state presence across territory is a result of the relationship between the national and subnational level.

Shifting the focus towards Europe and Italy, Robert Putnam (1994) studies the democratic institutional performance of Italy.³ Under a neo-institutional approach, the author analyses the process of decentralisation in Italy and its heterogeneous effect across the country. He discovers that the “Italian regional experiment” during the 1970-1980s provides an opportunity to better understand the conditions to build responsive and effective democratic institutions (Putnam, 1994). After exploring an Italian map of institutional performance, he discovers that northern regions of Italy have better results than the southern ones. The author explains that the uneven performance of democratic institutions is related to civic traditions. The more social capital a region has the better the quality of its democratic government institutions. In order to explain the origins of these disparities in civic traditions, Putnam relies on a historic approach during the fourteenth century. Republican governments (in the north) would foster a more civic community, while absolute governments (in the south) would have limited this civic practice. For the author, a vibrant civic community would be one where every individual fully exercises their citizenship, creating a community where there is political equality and high political participation, solidarity, trust and tolerance to guide the interactions between the community members, and where the norms and values of the civic community are embodied in associations (Putnam, 1994, p. 106). Therefore, the more social capital a region has the better institutional performance it shows. Putnam’s contribution to the understanding of democracy, institutional performance and civic culture is important. Nevertheless, its analysis of civic community felt short in some respects. First, the construction of citizenship is not a mono-linear process but a relational process with government. Following on Inglehart (1977), a person that has not covered their basic needs will have difficulty relying on (built) values like solidarity or common good. Hence, citizenship would be dependent on socioeconomic development (one of the causes that Putnam discards). Moreover, if we assume that the republican government allows the emergence of civic traditions, we are assuming a circular explanation, since this type of government can only be sustained with an already civic community. Second, although it is undeniable that an institution is shaped by the historic process in which it is created, Putnam conveniently leaves aside more than 500 years of history

³ Putnam’s operationalisation of institutional performance and the difference between regions he wants to study falls under the realm of state capacity rather than quality of democracy.

in Italy. Finally, the concept of institutional performance, built on the output dimension of democracy, leaves aside how it is related with civic community. More importantly, its concept of institutional performance could be easily used to measure authoritarian regimes on a subnational level. His concept falls short of any subcomponent than can be traced to democracy as a concept.

When analysing the performance of state policies, the work of Singh (2016) focuses on social solidarity to explain uneven levels of social welfare outcomes across different regions in India. For the author, the higher the degree of social solidarity within a subnational unit, the stronger the commitments from the elite for social development in this unit (Singh, 2016, p. 33). She reaches this conclusion after analysing different regions from India and focusing on social development. The literacy rate, infant mortality and education and health expenditures are the variables used by her to measure performance between regions. To explain this variation, she focuses on subnationalism, a sense of belonging to a specific community, that will allow for the creation of social solidarity needed to implement welfare policies. For Singh, this subnationalism precedes any social expenditure and thus explains the different outcomes. This valuable insight is, nevertheless, limited to a federal system. The creation of subnationalism and social solidarity within a subnational unit might be difficult to address in a unitary government. On the other hand, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) focus on the party system to explain the uneven delivery of public goods. For the authors, the more fragmented a party system is (the more parties exist) the fewer public goods are delivered. The authors stress that the party system is the key variable to explain this variation and that a two-party system is more likely to deliver public goods (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004). By using India as a case study, the authors showed how this system encourages the parties to reach across different social groups, broader their coalitions and, thus, respond to them through the provision of public goods. On the other hand, a multiparty system can segment their vote share and lack this overarching incentive. The measurement of public goods is related to the “proportion of total budgetary expenditures a state devotes to development and the proportion of villages electrified in a state” (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004, p. 155). Although this is a great insight on the impact a party system has on subnational government, the first measure they used (proportion of expenditure on development) might be related to the argument they use, since it is a political decision. Nevertheless, the second variable is related to the actual state capacity and is thus related to bureaucratic quality rather than political-social coalition building.

Following on Mann's infrastructural state power, Enriquez et al. (2017) address subnational variation in terms of service provision in three different countries (India, Peru and Ukraine). For them, the higher outcomes in public goods within a country is related to the differential state capacity. After using a minimal definition of state capacity as the "ability of the state to provide basic services uniformly throughout its territory and to each member of the society" (Enriquez et al., 2017, p. 411), they test this ability by using the provision of sanitation, electricity, and drinking water. Their findings show that the state is not a monolithic entity and that the reach of it varies not only across regions but across public goods as well. Their findings are well aligned with the purpose of this research. Nonetheless, their shortcomings include the absence of an explanation of this variation. They are able to point out the heterogeneity of state capacity within a territory and public goods, but are unable to offer why this heterogeneity happens.

Authors like Boone (2012) have centred this discussion in African countries explaining an existing "unevenness by design" of the state power projection, where the heterogeneity of scale and scope is often an artefact of state-building (Boone, 2012). Meanwhile, geographical perspectives on state-building (Herbst, 2000, Green, 2012) do not explain why regions with the same geographical characteristics have a different presence of the state. Within this approach the trade-off between cost and benefit of power-projection – from centre to periphery - would result in a similar state presence within regions with similar geographic and demographic properties. However, this is not the case in Peru. Loreto, a tropical rainforest region located more than one thousand kilometres away from the capital city, only accessible after passing the Andes, has more state presence than Huánuco, an Andean region only 250 kilometres away from Lima. Another alternative explanation regarding geography is the rural/urban divide. The more urban a city (or region) is, the more public goods can be provided since the population is not scattered. The Peruvian case shows a close relation between levels of urbanity and better performance. Nonetheless, although this is a compelling explanation it is insufficient to explain why some regions are able to outperform others or have a worsened performance. Performance of the regions move between high, middle and low levels, and the rural/urban divide is not able to explain this movement.

In sum, I have outlined the main arguments that explain why there is territorial variation in state capacity. As seen in this chapter, the explanation for this unevenness goes from political participation in local elections to the heritage of republicanism in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the main

studies have focused on federal systems and have failed to recognise that this heterogeneous state reach is also possible and present in unitary systems. Thus, the conceptual framework proposed in this study will recognise these contributions but will breach the gap by making it applicable to unitary systems, where the relation between national government and sub-national units has a completely different way of unveiling itself.

2.4 On the relation between state and democracy

Until here, I have gone through the literature that has dealt with democracy and state capacity, but as separate spheres. Whilst the literature on subnational democracy focused on the way local incumbents use their political-economic power to maintain themselves in power by limiting the political competition and vote coercion, the literature on state capacity focuses on its heterogeneity within a territory. Nevertheless, there is scarce dialogue between both schools (Andersen et al., 2014; Fukuyama, 2014b; Mazzuca & Munck, 2020). Although analytical/normative differences can be drawn between both, they ontologically co-exist together. Why is then relevant to put forward this union? It is because it is possible to think of a state without democracy, but not to think of democracy without a state. Democracy is a “form of government of the state” (Mazzuca & Munck, 2014, p. 1221). It is the institutional arrangement that limits, constrains and shapes the deployment of state power across its territory. Democracy (and its quality) is, hence, intertwined with the state. In this subsection I will address some scholarly discussions around the nexus between democracy and state. The idea is to put forward the importance of addressing the interrelation between these two.

The state is the set of institutions that exercises power over a delimited territory and claims the legitimate monopoly of violence to enforce this power (O’Donnell, 2010; Weber, 1978). Bureaucracy is the arrangement of these institutions. It is characterised by hierarchical social relations of obedience based on rules (O’Donnell, 2010), with a clear division of labour and activities (Weber, 1978) and an overarching purpose that creates unity and coherence to those rules and actions. A fundamental contribution of Weber when addressing bureaucracy (and the state) is its rational or patrimonial characteristic. A rational bureaucracy is one that has a clear division between office and office holder; each office has clearly defined objectives, and the recruitment of the civil servants is based on

meritocracy.⁴ A patrimonial bureaucracy is the opposite of a rational one, where there is no clear division between office and office holder, the objectives of the office are blurred, and the recruitment of civil servants is not based on meritocracy but rather through other means like venality, nepotism, political connections, among others. Now, one key issue to consider here is the legitimacy of this power. For Weber, the type of legitimacy could be traditional (e.g. monarchy), charismatic (e.g. *caudillo*), or rational (e.g. rule of law). The rationality of the state legitimacy relies then on the institutional arrangement that settles the use of its power and who can use it. Thus, a state becomes a democratic state when its legitimacy relies upon the democratic principles and rules to access power and constrain it.

One of the first authors to realise the importance of subnational politics – specially on the state democracy nexus – was Guillermo O’Donnell. For the author the state presence is unevenly distributed across its own territory and this heterogeneity has an undeniable impact on democratic practices within a country (O’Donnell, 1993a). More importantly, he argues that state and democratic theory have usually assumed that there is a “high degree of homogeneity” when analysing the scope and functions of these. Furthermore, by considering the state under two dimensions – set of effective bureaucracies and effectiveness of properly sanctioned legality – he distinguishes areas in a country in which the absence of these dimensions would compromise the emergence of democratic practices. To illustrate this example, he uses three different colours: blue, green and brown. Blue areas are where there is a high territorial presence of state and the effectiveness of law, green areas have a high territorial state presence but ineffective law, and brown areas have low or null level in both dimensions (O’Donnell 1993). Within this idea, O’Donnell suggests that the map of United States would show a combination of blue and green areas, Peru and Brazil would be dominated by brown and “in Argentina the extensiveness of brown would be smaller” (O’Donnell, 1993, p. 1359). Therefore, in brown areas far from the territorial and functional control of central government, the emergence of authoritarian practices was more likely.

Within this idea is centred the discussion that Munck (2016) has on quality of democracy. His argument is that a reconceptualisation of the concept of democracy (or quality of democracy) is needed. It must move beyond procedural aspects and include certain substantive assumptions. The

⁴ There are around ten characteristics of the rational bureaucracy, but it is not necessary to dwell on all the characteristics here.

definition of democracy should include “political institutions that enable a majority of citizens to change the status quo, and a social context that does not turn the principles of political freedom and equality into mere formalities” (Munck, 2016, p. 2). For the author, next to an electoral minimal definition of democracy, two spheres should be added: government decision-making and the social environment of politics. Thus, whilst access to government offices is related to “electoral democracy”, these two spheres are related to the quality of democracy. And, although the environment of politics does not contribute directly to democracy, they “affect democracy through their impact on access to government offices and government decision-making” (Munck, 2016, p. 17). The author makes a compelling case on the importance of adding more elements to the concept of the quality of democracy; nonetheless, he inhibits himself exploring the variables that can be considered for that social environment of politics. Furthermore, his analysis is still based on a national perspective and leaves further challenges for this addition to be addressed on a subnational perspective. However, by moving forward with his argument, the inclusion of socio-economic conditions and civil rights as part of democracy, it opens the door to the realm of state (bureaucratic) capacity to deliver those public goods. This is also the intention of Diamond and Morlino (2005) when adding to the quality of democracy the *content* component related to achievement of political equality. Within this line of thought is Dacombe’s recognition of the “significance of social structure in shaping democratic life” (Dacombe, 2017, p.17). For the author, civic participation and the level of associational life is closely linked to poverty and to the physical area where democratic life happens: the neighbourhood effect (Dacombe, 2017). The practice of democracy is “positioned in the particular context of social life” (Dacombe, 2017, p. 111).

The findings from Andersen and Krishnarajan (2018) between the relation of levels of bureaucratic quality and democratic breakdown when countries face economic crises also goes in this direction. The authors illustrate how the quality of bureaucracy is able to decrease a democratic breakdown. Whilst “experiencing an economic crises increases the risk of democratic breakdown, [...] having a higher quality bureaucracy decreases a country’s risk of breakdown” (Andersen & Krishnarajan, 2018, p. 15). Most importantly, these findings show an inevitable nexus between state and democracy, and for young democracies “the performance of state bureaucracy is an important stabilizing device” (Andersen & Krishnarajan, 2018, p. 25). Others authors have illustrated how a qualified and meritocratic bureaucracy has a positive impact for democratic stability (Cornell & Lapuente, 2014). These authors shift their focus towards the way a meritocratic public administration constrains the

incumbent's misuse of public resources. Thus, the opposition reduces its intentions to overthrow the incumbent. By analysing the cases of Spain and Venezuela, Cornell and Lapuente (2014) demonstrate how the merit-based public administration gives public employees more autonomy, reducing their dependence to the political master and serving as a "safeguard for the stability of democratic regime" (Cornell & Lapuente, 2014, p. 1297). This idea of the bureaucracy as a way to minimise the capricious use of public resources by the incumbent is at the centre of Guy Peters' research (Peters, 2010). For the author, the linkage between bureaucracy and democracy have lately become more evident and the apparent inefficiency of bureaucracy (formal procedures) secures an equal and fair treatment of the citizens (Peters, 2010). Thus, bureaucracy becomes the locus of democratic activity and the "values of a formalised bureaucracy are important for a democracy to function well" (Peters, 2010, p. 210). Another way to address the relation between democracy and bureaucracy is the one established by Boix (2001). In this paper, the author shows how within a period of economic growth (economic modernisation) a democracy has to satisfy the demands of its citizens. This pressure creates an increase in the size of the public sector. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes do not experience this pressure and there is no need for the implementation of distributive programmes. Although the main focus of this research is to see the impact of modernisation and the increase of public sector to respond to citizens' demands within a democratic regime, it shows the interrelation between bureaucracy and democracy.

Although these authors focus on democratic stability, democratic breakdown, or the increase of the public sector within democratic regimes, there are other studies that show how state capacity has a positive impact on democracy (Arévalo-Bencardino, 2018). The focus of Arevalo's study is to analyse the support for democratic principles and regime performance in Colombia in relation to state capacity. His research shows that "low assessments of state capacity by the citizenry are associated to low levels of support for democratic principles and a less favourable evaluation of democracy in Colombia" (Arévalo-Bencardino, 2018, p. 16). The intention of this dissertation is not focused on citizen perceptions; nonetheless it serves as an example to point out the relation between state and democracy.

As mentioned by Mazzuca and Munck (2014), the "state is a definitional aspect of democracy" since it has to secure and enforce "basic political rights, such as the right to vote and run for office throughout its territory" (Mazzuca and Munck, 2014, p. 1221). After distinguishing three key aspects of the state – territorial state, national state, and administrative state – they will explore the relationship

with democracy (under a minimalist view). Without getting into the details of each of these nexuses, these authors illustrate that the thesis “no state, no democracy”, as stated by Linz and Stepan, is at most partially true. This debate was fostered by the State-first thesis. Under this thesis the chronological sequence of state capacity and democracy (i.e. which comes first) has great consequences. Those countries that democratise before a state are capable of channelling this openness, pluralism and major participation. This creates instability and endangers the political order (Huntington, 1968). This thesis would have highly undemocratic consequences for Latin America (S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2020). On the other hand, these authors recognised that in the twentieth century, “no democracy, no state” has gained more plausibility as the democracy has been established as a key basis for the legitimacy of the state (Mazzuca and Munck, 2014: p. 1238). This idea is shared by Peters as well (2010). For him there has been a shift in democracy where people will be more “concerned with accountability and with ex post judgements on performance of the public sector than on attempting to control the initial policy choices” (Peters, 2010, p. 218).

Now, there are authors that have directly dealt with the state-democracy nexus by making them part of their research (Ertman, 1997; Fukuyama, 2011, 2014a; S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2020; Norris, 2012; Tilly, 2007). In his study of the modern states in Europe, Ertman (1997) traces four types of political developments from the eleventh until the eighteenth century based on the characteristic of the state (patrimonial or bureaucratic) and its regime (constitutionalist or absolutist). Depending on the onset of geopolitical military competition, the type of representative bodies in place at the time of this, and the path-dependence of the dark age state building that fostered organisation of the local government, each country would fall under any of the four categories: bureaucratic constitutionalism (Sweden, Britain), bureaucratic absolutism (Germany, Denmark), patrimonial constitutionalism (Hungary, Poland), and patrimonial absolutism (France, Spain). Although he does not specifically discuss democracy (which would be historically difficult based on the period he studies), he shows the interaction between state, its infrastructure, and representative bodies. The interrelation between the two creates a distinct type of state. Ten years later, Charles Tilly built an analytical framework explicitly on the relationship between state capacity and democracy (2007). By using these two dimensions he analysed how countries are located in this continuum between undemocratic-democratic and high-low state capacity (Tilly, 2007, p.19). However, he focuses on the democratisation process and de-democratisation process, and how this transition happens within this democracy-state nexus.

Within this line of thought is the work of Norris (2012) when using the concept of democratic governance (Norris, 2012). The author countries that have achieved higher levels of human security (understood as higher levels of welfare, peace and prosperity) are those that have managed to consolidate a liberal democracy with a higher state-capacity (Norris, 2012). These are countries with the most effective performance and are labelled as ‘Bureaucratic democracies’ (e.g. Chile, Ireland). On the other spectrum, those countries with a limited state capacity and restricted democracy are called ‘Patronage autocracies’ (e.g. Somalia, Iraq). This is the most comprehensive attempt to bridge together these two main concepts under one unifying theory. The translation of the operationalisation of this theory into a subnational approach is an unfortunate limitation. The indicators used for the measurement are too difficult to be studied on a subnational level. It is clear that it is not developed (nor intended) as a multilevel theory. Furthermore, in some cases, the state-building and state-capacity literature uses different indicators than the ones used by Norris when measuring state-building and state-capacity. Her dependent variable of peace (number of armed conflicts in a country) would be used rather as an indicator of state-capacity and state presence by other authors (Giraudy & Luna, 2017). Nonetheless, to build upon the democratic state performance concept, the spirit of the theory – the importance of studying democracy and state as complementary realms rather than different ones – will be used. Meanwhile, in their study of the middle-quality institutional trap, Mazzuca & Munck (2020) follow exactly the same dimensions of state capacity and democracy as Tilly (2007). For the authors, Latin American countries have not become high-capacity democracies (a country with high state capacity and high quality of democracy) even though they have followed the same path that some high-capacity democratic Western countries have. For them, the state-democracy interaction in Latin America “has not generated a virtuous circle. Rather, it has generated a self-perpetuating arrangement that provides microfoundations to the region’s middle-quality institutional trap. State failures leave the power of undemocratic social elites intact and grant power to state actors who undermine the quality of democracy. In turn, problems of democracy dampen the incentive for politicians competing in a democratic regime to reform the state” (Mazzuca & Munck, 2020, p. 63). Their approach will be used in the next chapter when defining democratic state performance.

In sum, this section has illustrated the interrelation between state and democracy. The literature has showed that the state-first thesis is not necessarily empirical consistent, whilst the “no democracy, no state” has also some shortfalls. Although these are two analytical separate dimensions, they are nevertheless ontologically intertwined. The contribution of these authors that explicitly deal with the

state-democracy nexus as analytical tools to study cross-country comparison is valuable. The next step within this literature, that has not been studied yet, is to see if this nexus and interrelation can be scaled down to a subnational level. Thus, in the next chapters, I will be moving forward my explanation by recognising this nexus and building the democratic state performance concept from these two currents to test them across Peruvian regions.

2.5 Peru under subnational approach

The decentralisation process in Peru resulted in a renewed interest in subnational politics. The creation of regional governments and regional parties fostered new research agendas. A first focus has been the impact of the decentralisation reforms on political parties. In her article, Remy (2010) exhibits how the number of candidates lists has been growing in 2002, 2006 and 2010, creating a higher fragmentation, and that most lists were from regional parties. Analysing the same period of regional and municipal elections, Seifert (2014) shows how the regional parties became hegemonic electoral-political actors at the subnational level. The elections of 2002 were mostly won by national parties at the three levels of government, but by the elections of 2010, the regional parties were the winners in all regional, provincial and district levels. This complete shift revealed the absence of roots of national political parties at the subnational level, and the accounts that celebrated the national parties' comeback in 2002 were overestimated. This is picked up by Incio & Gil (2016), where they showed how regional parties have become more relevant during the regional and municipal elections from 2002-2014. They exhibit that in each election the regional parties are able to gain better territorial roots by winning more seats. In the same line of thought is Panfichi and Dolores (2019) when addressing the vertical integration of political parties – considered as the number of offices won by the two main political parties at the regional election – in each election, although they found less integration in each election. Nonetheless, this higher territorial penetration is based in one election and does not translate to the next one. On the contrary, between elections there is a high party volatility revealing that the regional parties suffered from the same deficiencies as the national parties (Seifert, 2016). For Zavaleta (2014), these deficiencies were related to the scarcity of organisational structure of the regional parties, and the way the candidates participated in politics and elections resembled coalitions rather than parties. Another approach to subnational politics from the perspective of national parties are the studies of Barnechea (2014) and Vergara and Meléndez (2020). The former studies how the national

party *Alianza para el Progreso* (Alliance for Progress)⁵ uses scholarships to gain votes at the subnational level, whilst the latter studies how *Fuerza Popular* (Popular Force) – the *fujimorismo* national party that won the regional governorships of Ica, San Martín and Pasco – also has organisational deficiencies and is unable to take roots in these regions.

Other studies within the realm of subnational democratic politics, researches on subnational politicians (Cordova & Incio, 2013), their careers (Aragon & Incio, 2014), recall referendums (Welp, 2016), internal democracy (Seifert, 2020), and clientelist practices during elections (Muñoz, 2016). According to Aragon and Incio (2014) the re-election percentage has decreased from an already low number in 2006 of 8% Regional Governors, 22% Provincial Mayors, and 35% District Mayors, to 10% Regional Governors, 16% Provincial Majors, and 17% District Mayors in 2014. Within this scenario political career and progression seems more difficult to achieve. Another element that adds to this challenge is the the *revocatoria* (recall) mechanism. This has gained interest at the subnational level, since this accountability mechanism affects the subnational arena and mostly at the district level. The studies of Holland and Incio (2019) and Artiles et al. (2021) showed that these democratic tools created to improve democratic accountability have been used for political purposes, rather than improving the office performance (Holland & Incio, 2019), and that they create a negative selection of candidates, as well as less representation of indigenous groups (Artiles et al., 2021). Moreover, the study from Welp (2016) on recall referendums underscores how the institutional design and the incentive structure of political actors activated 5303 times this mechanism between 1997-2013 in 45.5% of the Peruvian municipalities. The rules to activate the recall and the degree of party system institutionalisation creates an incentive for political losers to gain power beyond regular elections (Welp 2017, p. 1174). These studies shed new lights on the dynamics of subnational politics, and how specific institutions shape the incentives of the political actors at this level. This behaviour has led to some actors to use their power for non-democratic purposes as well. In their study of Ancash and Loreto, Arévalo and Sosa (2016) showed how Cesar Alvarez, Governor of Ancash for two periods (2006-2014), and Yvan Vasquez, Governor of Loreto (2006-2014), used non-democratic practices during their incumbency. From 2010, Vasquez would resource to hire local radio and TV time to attack opposition.⁶ In Ancash, more illiberal practices were implemented. Opposition leaders were

⁵ The name refers to the John F. Kennedy aid programme for Latin America.

⁶ In the midst of his reelection campaign in 2014, Yvan Vasquez was underground and hiding from the police. He would later voluntarily turn himself in to the National Police. He was being persecuted by corruption charges.

being persecuted, and even murdered. This was the case of Ezequiel Nolasco, an ex-regional councillor that was murdered by a hitman in 2014, whilst Jose Luis Sanchez Milla, a vice-governor, died after receiving a bullet in his leg back in 2010.⁷ Furthermore, Melgar (2017) shows how the network of corruption that linked businessman, policemen, civil servants, civil organisations, and *sicarios* (hitmen) operated in the region under the Alvarez government. They created a specialised intelligence office “*La Centralita*” to spy on opposition figures, tap into telephone conversation, and pay bribes (Arévalo & Sosa Villagarcia, 2016; Melgar, 2017). On a district level, Došek (2019) studies the cases of Los Olivos and Chorrillos (districts in Lima), where the majors stayed in power for almost two decades. This was possible thanks to a proper electoral base, the control of local opposition and neutralisation of other actors like the media (Došek, 2019). These studies of illiberal practices in Peru shed light on how democracy and its quality is experienced and undermined at the subnational level. These, however, are specific case studies where a systematic comparison between regions is absent.

Other studies that have focused on the subnational level in Perú have been related to corruption cases (Jaramillo, 2019), regional economic elite (Muñoz et al., 2016), economic growth (Escobal & Torero, 2005), civil conflict (Albertus, 2020), national-subnational relations (Nugent, 1994), subnational economic nationalism (Eaton, 2010), resistance to neoliberal mining policies (Eaton, 2015), and extractive industries (Arellano-Yanguas, 2019; Dargent et al., 2017; Gustafsson & Scurrah, 2019; Hoyos, 2019; Irrarrazaval, 2020; Orihuela & Gamarra Echenique, 2019). On uneven state capacity, Aragon et al. (2017) showed that on policy outcomes there was no difference if the political party that won the office was from a national or regional party. Thus, the scope of political parties has no incidence on how the state infrastructural power expands across the territory. If political parties have no incidence, the difference might be related to political leadership. This is the approach used by McNulty (2011) when researching the successful cases of establishment of participatory budgets and regional deconcentrated development plans (PDRC). The role of political leadership from the Regional President in the regions of Lambayeque and Cusco made the budget alignment to compromise from the participatory budgets more likely to happen. At the same time, their involvement on the meetings for the PDRC created a more robust participation of civil society, more meetings, and more power gains for the Regional Government that went beyond the letter of the law (McNulty, 2011). Certainly, the author sheds light to the common saying “where there is a will, there

⁷ The prosecution against Alvarez would include the murder of Nolasco as part of their case against him.

is a way”. The political will of the Regional President would have been the determinants that shaped the success stories of participatory budget and PDRC in Lambayeque and Cusco, whilst the absence of them in Ayacucho and Loreto made these experiences unsuccessful. On the other hand, the work from Augusto Meléndez et al. (2017) places the civil society as a determinant of the heterogeneous state capacity in Peru. The authors showed that in the regions of San Martín and Cusco, the civil society actors with expertise and a network at the national and international level “used the decentralization space to promote the implementation and development of better national laws” (Augusto Meléndez et al., 2017, p. 102). The civil society coalition in San Martín, interested in environment issues and local development, fostered a higher level of effective institutional implementation of national environmental law, whilst Cusco lacked such a strong civil society and their implementation on environmental issues lagged behind San Martín.

In sum, scholarship on Peruvian politics is less vast in comparison to other Latin American countries, although this has certainly been changing over the last decade. The valuable literature on politics has been limited to specific conjunctural events, and this has had a national perspective with a *limeño* bias (Crabtree, 2010). The study of Peruvian regions has been certainly overlooked in this scholarship. However, there is an increase on the study of subnational political processes, institutions and actors. Most of the focus has been on the quality of democracy, whilst studies on state capacity are definitively minor in comparison. These studies have certainly increased the available knowledge on subnational politics in Peru and have also contributed to broader discussions. Nonetheless, most of the studies have focused on specific cases whether at the regional or district level, or on a specific institutional effect (recall, incumbent advantage, resource curse). At the same time, there is an insufficient systematic within-country comparison between regions. Thus, my research will contribute to fill this gap in the Peruvian politics literature by bringing back to the front regionalisation through a comparative study of state capacity and quality of democracy under the democratic state concept between regions since the beginning of the decentralisation process of 2002.

2.6 Revisiting modernisation theory

Modernisation theory rests upon the idea that human history is in a perpetual stage of progress. That history goes through different stages was posited by Hegel (1980, 1999). For him the driver of human development was the idea of freedom. History has gone through different stages as result of the

pursuit for human freedom (Oriental realm, Greek realm, Roman realm, German realm). This is the force that pushes for changes at the social, economic, political and cultural level, and the institutional development of each nation is the objectification of this ideal. In Hegelian terms, this institutional development would be the modern state as the “objective spirit” (Hegel [1821], 1991). History is, nonetheless, teleological and would reach an ultimate stage of development. This idea inspired Karl Marx who would be exponent of the most influential version of modernisation theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Nonetheless, for Marx the driver of human history was not the pursuit for freedom. He had a materialistic approach on human relations and thus on the force behind human progress across history (Marx, 2010; Marx & Engels, 1970). He would reckon that technological innovation on the production of material goods would have socioeconomic consequences, and class struggle would be at the centre of this process (Marx [1848], 2021). This socioeconomic development (and its social relations) would later have an effect on the culture, politics, laws, art, and religion of the society. In Marxist lingo the socioeconomic basis of a nation is the “structure” over which an ideological “super structure” is built, to maintain, control and perpetuate the “structure”. Marx would have a deterministic view of history, ingrained with laws, where each country would follow a specific set of steps and would thus posit that the last stage in history would be a communist society (Marx & Engels, 2021). History would show that the teleological Marxist approach to history where each country follows a similar path of development was incorrect. Whether different patterns of class struggle during economic modernisation (Moore, [1966] 1993) or religious values (Weber [1905], 2002), different variables would intervene in each nation creating different trajectories and outcomes. However, Marx’s contribution that economic modernisation (transition from agricultural towards industrial/service economy) shapes the social, political, cultural realms still prevailed.

Nonetheless, the boom of modernisation theory came during the 1950s and 1960s (Black, 1977; Gwynne et al., 2008; Kay, 2010). Four seminal works would mark modernisation as a key variable to be studied. These would be *Some Social Requisites of Democracy* by Lipset (1959), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* by Moore (1966), *Political Order in Changing Societies* by Huntington (1968), and *Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism* by O’Donnell (1973). Modernisation incorporates a shift from an agrarian to an industrial/service-based economy, and its social changes showed a positive relationship with democracy (Lipset, 1959). Here modernisation process was seen as an overarching process of economic growth, education, and urbanisation that created the social conditions for a democratic regime. Other studies showed that political factors – bourgeois revolution, revolution from

above or peasant revolution – would intervene in this modernisation process creating divergent trajectories for the countries (B. Moore, 1966). Democracy would not be the natural outcome of economic modernisation, but one of other regimes possible. On the other hand, the modernisation process was seen as the key variable that would explain political violence and instability (Huntington, 1968). Modernisation opened new forms of political participation that, without the due institutions to channel these new political expressions, would lead the countries to instability. To address this instability produced by modernisation some countries would actually become authoritarian (O’Donnell, 1973). The 1970s and 1980s saw an emergence of critiques towards modernisation theory and the policy adoption of this by international organisations and high-income countries as a recipe to be followed by low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This was clearly specified by the stages of economic growth posited by Rostow (1960). The core idea was that LMICs should follow the same path as capitalist countries to achieve prosperity. Furthermore, the extent to which this had to be followed was then intertwined with cultural values, political institutions, and traditions that were alien to these countries. This created a backlash from Latin American scholars that saw this as a new form of intellectual colonialism and tried to understand the regional processes from within this experience, rather than import concepts from the Anglo-Saxon world (Cardoso & Faletto, 1969). A response to this was the dependency theory and at its cornerstone the centre-periphery relation within the world system (Kay, 2010). The *dependentistas* would argue that the underdevelopment in Latin America is a result of its position within the world capitalist system, rather than the result of being “stuck” within one of the economic growth stages.

However, the third wave of democracy and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 brought a new strand of studies regarding the impact of modernisation on political regimes. A key distinction in this new current on the modernisation and democracy relationship is that a new level on this relationship was unlocked. It was not only about the emergence of democracy as a result of economic development, but also about the survival of democracy. In their article, *Modernisation: Theories and Facts*, Przeworski & Limongi (1997) would cast doubt on the causal relationship between economic development and democracy. For them “only once it is established do economic constraints play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer” (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 177). The key contribution for these authors would entail that for whatever reason democracy emerges in a country, once it has passed a specific income per capita threshold (\$4,115) it will never backslide and become a non-democratic regime (Przeworski et al., 2000). However, the works from Boix &

Stokes (2003) and Boix (2011) would shed light on the shortcomings of these findings. For them, once accounted for a longer time period, including the pre-1950 era, the results would show a positive relationship between economic development and democracy. Meanwhile, Acemoglu et al. (2008) would argue that in an extended period of over 500 years there is a positive relationship between economic development and democracy when analysing former European colonies. Nonetheless, the emergence of democracy can be traced back to specific country effects regarding critical junctures that put the countries on specific trajectories. Thus, it would be specific factors from these countries (e.g. population density) that would incentive colonisers whether to establish institutions that would foster future democratic practices. This compelling historic approach would later be refuted by Cheibub and Vreeland (2016), who considered that the methodology of fixed effects in the regression analysis of Acemoglu overestimates the coefficients of income from the transitions. By focusing only on those countries that transition to/away from democracy, it leaves out actually those countries that are rich and democratic, or poor and a dictatorship (Cheibub & Vreeland, 2016).

It was Lipset's work that put forward the relationship between modernisation and democracy and how the former shapes the latter. Much has been written in social science literature regarding this relationship. This literature focuses mainly on how modernisation and economic development is created and consolidates democracy. However, the argument in this research is not about a dichotomic approach regarding modernisation as a driver of democracy versus non-democracy, but rather over the quality of democracy itself. On the impact of modernisation on democratic quality the literature is still in early stages. Furthermore, most of the literature on modernisation has been concentrated at the national level, and the modernisation hypothesis has been barely tested at the subnational level. Further, they have forgotten the territorial aspect where modernisation unfolds. At the same time the literature between modernisation and state capacity is also scarce. The former has mostly been analysed through the development lenses, where it focuses mostly on outcomes rather than state presence and infrastructural power. Thus, this research will contribute to fill this gap on the consequences of modernisation at the subnational level.

Chapter 3: Methodology and concept formation

In this chapter I will lay out the methodology that will be used to analyse the uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time. I will begin with an explanation of the overall design of the research, the rationale for the case selection and the sources being used. Moreover, I will lay out the theoretical foundations of the democratic state and its operationalisation. Finally, using a deductive research approach I will test the concept by scaling it down further to a lower level of subnational unit.

3.1 Case selection

Peru has historically been a hub of civilisation, including the Caral-Supe civilisation (3500BC) and multiple other cultures that followed (Moche, Paracas, Tiahuanaco, among others). It was then home to the largest empire in Latin America: the Inca empire. Modern-day Peru is the fourth largest country in Latin America, and the fifth most populous. Why Peru? In the onset of the new millennium Peruvian politics experienced two major political processes: democratisation and decentralisation. No other country in Latin America has gone through a double process of democratisation and decentralisation at the same time. Mexico started a decentralisation process in the 1980s that continued during the 1990s before its democratisation in the 2000s, while Argentina and Colombia started their decentralisation process well after they regained their democracy.

After an authoritarian regime, Peru had its first fully democratic elections in 2001. Within this democratisation process, a decentralisation process was enacted creating new subnational governments and over which administrative responsibilities were transferred. It created a new political-administrative unit. At the same time, it created a new political actor as well: regional parties. These simultaneous political processes created a *sui generis* and ideal scenario to compare, prove and test existing theories on institutional performance at a subnational level. This double political process of democratisation and decentralisation in Peru is one in a kind scenario since it opens the possibility to see how the democracy and state capacity unfolds across its regions. Furthermore, most of the studies that analysed unevenness across the territory, whether on democratisation or state capacity, have focused mainly on federal type of countries. Here the subnational units have more power and autonomy and, thus, it is expected that more disparities emerge between them. However, unitary

countries that have gone through decentralisation processes are subject to this heterogeneity as well. In some cases, gaps between subnational units in unitary countries can be even more pressing than in federal systems. Around 80% of countries of Latin America are unitary countries and yet this unevenness has not been thoroughly studied. Therefore, focusing on Peru, the biggest and most populated unitary country in the region (the fourth overall), will give us a good understanding of this phenomenon.

Subnational research can be used to analyse jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional units (H. Soifer, 2019). The latter can include terrain-demarcated divisions (jungle versus mountains versus coast), or villages, or ethnic communities (whose location goes beyond boundaries). The jurisdictional units can include “units of government administration and legal jurisdiction such as federal states, provinces or districts” (Soifer, 2019, p. 96). For this research, the unit of analysis will be the Peruvian regions. These are political-administrative units created as part of the decentralisation process. Here a caveat is in order. This regional level was built upon the pre-existing administrative division of the 25 departments in Peru. Thus, regions became to be synonymous of department. However, regions were supposed to be the union between two or more departments, according to the spirit of the Decentralization Law N° 27783. In a referendum in 2005 this idea of regionalisation (union of two or more departments) failed and has since been forgotten (Muñoz, 2014). The use of regions as a common reference to the Peruvian departments is present in the scholarly literature, electoral laws, state-structure, authorities, the media, as well as everyday day use. Therefore, I will follow this common practice and use the concept of Peruvian regions.⁸

One of the advantages of assuming a subnational perspective to analyse diverse phenomena is that it helps to overcome the “many variables, small N” problem (Lijphart, 1971). As stated by Snyder (2001), a “focus on subnational units can make it easier to construct controlled comparisons that increase the probability of obtaining valid causal inferences in small-N research” (Snyder, 2001, p. 94). Furthermore, national averages tend to hide subnational disparities and if these disparities are taken into consideration it can distort the national averages of the same phenomenon (Giraudy & Pribble, 2018). Thus, a subnational analysis of democratic state performance will show how it unfolds unevenly creating “greater sensitivity to within-nation variation” (Snyder, 2001, p. 94).

⁸ In case a reference of the union of two or more regions is needed, I will use the macro-region denominator.

3.2 Design

This single country case-study based in Peru will focus on the subnational variation of the democratic state performance its regions. Most of subnational research has focused on either democratisation or state capacity (Giraudy & Pribble, 2018), but none has integrated both currents under one theoretical framework. Although it is a single case-study, it is also comparative in its nature, since comparisons between regions and across time will be drawn. The overarching question of this research is to understand why democratic state performance is heterogeneous within a country and what explains this unevenness. In order to pursue its answer, this study will use a mix-method approach under a “nested research design”. A nested analysis “combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436). It is a causal inference that “draws on both data-set-observations and causal-process observations, sometimes at different levels of analysis” (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 340). This approach has benefits since it deploys both analytical tools simultaneously emphasising “the benefits of distinct complementarities” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436).

This dissertation will begin with the quantitative approach. First, I will build the democratic state performance index and create a score for each Peruvian region. The second step will be mapping the democratic state performance across the territory over time. As a result of this mapping, some regions will be categorised as high-performance whilst others as low-performance. Then, based on these results I will exhibit if the regions maintain their high/low performance over time. Following the different scholarly literature on subnational performance and its within-nation variation, I will build specific hypotheses to be tested via a regression analysis. Once the explanatory variable has been proven, I will come back to those regions with higher and lower performance for a finer analysis. Here I will use the qualitative approach. This strategy will be used to unfold the processes from the explanatory variables for an in-depth analysis of the regions. Thus, using mix-methods under the nested analysis approach will allow the dissertation to a collect richer and stronger array of evidence, than if a single method alone is used (Yin, 2017, p. 63).

3.2.1 The quantitative approach

The first step is to build the democratic state performance concept. Once the operationalisation and conceptual grounds of this concept have been built, I will use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to ensure that the variables are in fact measuring democratic state performance. This is a type of structural equation modelling that deals with “the relationships between observed measures or indicators and latent variables or factors” (Brown, 2015, p. 1). Here, the researcher has already “in mind some correlated manifest variables that would be grouped to a latent construct (factor) of interest” (Lee, 2007, p. 19). Furthermore, I will test the validity of the concept on a territorial basis by performing a CFA at a lower level of aggregation from the regional to the provincial level.

Once the democratic state performance concept has been tested, and mapped across Peruvian regions over time, I will run a multivariate regression analysis following the hypotheses established in the Chapter 4. Since I am using a comparison across time, my data set has a multi-level nature. In cross-sectional time series it is important to account for the assumption in regression analysis, i.e. that the observations are independent from each other. In my dataset, for example, Moquegua (or any region) is more likely to resemble itself at the next point in time compared to two random observations in the dataset. Thus, to account for the multi-level nature of the dataset I add a fixed effect, on the regions and years of observations, and this will capture the differences between states that are fixed in time as well as the linear trend of the dependant variable.

I have built a novel data set using primary sources to perform the CFA and regression analysis. These will entail the National Census of Population and Houses from 1993, 2007 and 2017; the National Household Survey (*Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - ENAHO*) from 1997-2018; the Regional and Municipal Elections (ERM) results from 2002-2006-2010-2014-2018 from the National Jury of Elections (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones – JNE*); and the infoMIDIS data from 2011-2018 from the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion. Following King et al.’s (1994) guidelines on data, these are public sources that are reliable and can be replicable.

The National Census is a general census meant to be taken every 10 years in Peru. It is the most comprehensive tool to collect data on the Peruvian population and it is used to establish the main public policies. The ENAHO is a household survey of national scope in rural and urban areas in all

Peruvian regions, and the sample is “probabilistic, of areas, stratified, multietapic and independent in each region of study” (ENAHO, 2018, p. 4). The sizes of the sample vary each year but is above 31,000 houses and the conglomerate sample is above 4,000. The survey is divided in the following themes: Household characteristics; Characteristics of the House members; Education; Health; Employment and income; Household expenditure; Social programmes; Income of the independent worker; Income of the agricultural worker; Governance, democracy and transparency module. On the other hand, the ERM elections results from the JNE have all the information regarding the results on the three subnational levels: political parties’ participation, electoral turnout, elected officials, and so on. These sources will be used to build the index of democratic state performance as well as to address the hypothesis to be tested in the regression analysis.

Since the data being used has different ranges a process of standardisation will be enacted. To achieve this, I will use the following formula (1), to rescale them to run from 0 to 1, where X_i will be the observation, X_{min} will be lowest number from the series and X_{max} the highest value of the series. This standardisation process will allow me to have all the values under a specific range and aggregate them in to build the democratic state performance measure. Furthermore, this approach to standardisation is the most appropriate to the research question in hand, since I am interested in establishing the highest performance of Peruvian regions. With this information I will be able to create an ordinal index of democratic institutional performance that will show a low-high performance continuum, as well as a high-low quality continuum for bureaucratic capacity.

$$(1) \frac{X_i - X_{min}}{X_{max} - X_{min}}$$

In sum, I will be using primary data from the National Census, household surveys and National Registries to build the measure of democratic state performance (dependent variable) and test the model in the confirmatory factor analysis. Furthermore, these sources will also be used to test the explanatory variables that explain the democratic state performance across Peruvian regions.

3.2.2 The qualitative approach

Following the nested research approach, after mapping the democratic state performance through quantitative means and performing the regression analysis to test rival explanations, a number of

regions will be selected to proceed with a more in-depth analysis. By using qualitative methods and a comparative approach, the analysis will allow me to explore in-depth the causal mechanisms. The advantage of qualitative methods is that it will allow me to surpass the quantitative limitations and have a more in-depth analysis of my cases. This qualitative approach is the best path since “it tends to focus on one or a small number of cases” (King et al., 1994, p.4).

The use of comparative methodology to compare the political units within nations is “invaluable in the concept formation and in formulating explanatory ideas” (Brady and Collier, 2010, p. 10). This method usually involves the comparison of small-N analysis that given the “inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a superficial statistical analysis of many cases” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 658). Moreover, by selecting a few cases I will be able to deploy process-tracing tools to examine diagnostic pieces of evidence in a “specific temporal sequence” and causal-process observations to arrive at causal inferences (Brady & Collier, 2010; Mahoney, 2010). This strategy will allow me to better comprehend the causal mechanisms that led to an uneven democratic state performance that has been maintained across time between the Peruvian regions.

The regions that will be chosen for process tracing are Huanuco (low-performance) and Moquegua (high-performance). In order to build a robust process tracing technique it is important to be descriptive and be able to take “good snapshots at a series of specific moments” (Collier, 2011, p. 823). As seen in Chapter 2, most literature is able to explain subnational unevenness across time, but it is a static approach. Most importantly, literature that has worked with modernisation as an explanatory variable has relied on a quantitative approach. In this research, modernisation is the variable that explains unevenness across Peruvian regions; nonetheless the qualitative approach in the selected regions will allow me to unfold in more detail how industrialisation has become an explanatory variable for the democratic state performance.

The qualitative data that has been collected and analysed is based on primary and secondary sources. The information gathered from these sources will served as “diagnostic evidence that provides the basis for descriptive and causal inference” (Collier 2011, p. 824). Causal process observation requires the assembly of multiple materials, as mentioned by Lieberman (2005) “within-case analysis generally entails the scrutiny of a heterogeneous set of materials, including printed documents, interviews” (pp.

440-441). These provide a “more fine-grained measurements of a host of events and behaviours, at both micro- and macrolevels” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 441). Thus, the primary source documents are all in their original language – Spanish. I have done all the translation from these sources and their details are as follows:

- Regional Concerted Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Concertado Regional - PDRC*): It is a multilevel policy instrument. This regional plan is the result of the concerted efforts and agreements between all the political, economic and social actors from the region. It establishes the main policies, development plans and objectives to be achieved by the region in a long-term vision, usually around 10-15 years (thus avoiding it to become just a government plan of the incumbent).⁹ It is presided by the Regional Government and Provincial and District Mayors participate in their elaboration, as well as members of the Civil Society (Regional Chamber of Commerce, NGOs, among others). Each region has its own PDRC.
- Regional Compendiums (*Compendios regionales*): These are documents produced by the National Institute of Statistics (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INEI*) which gathers information on different social, political, economic, industrial, agricultural, tourism, and other dimensions.
- The Central Bank of Treasury (*Banco Central de Reserva - BCR*) also creates this type of documents, complementing the information from the INEI.
- Regional and local official documents: These will include subnational laws, memorandums, official diagnostic situation of their localities, reports from the regional and local governments, among others.
- Political parties’ manifestos (*Planes de gobierno*): Each political party in every election in every level of government has to present a government plan when they present candidates to a specific office.
- Regional newspaper: Each region has a regional newspaper, and these are usually most read by the locals since they treat specific regional issues. Furthermore, each newspaper conducts interviews with politicians from the regions (mostly neglected in the nationwide newspaper). These include *La Región* and *Prensa Regional* (Moquegua), and *Ahora* and *El Siglo* (Huánuco).

⁹ Although it aims to go beyond government and politics, this does not necessarily happen. Some regional governments assume this as the work of their predecessors and thus re-structure the PDRC. In other cases, there are minor updates to the policies. Hence, there are regions that can have as much as five PDRC (Ayacucho) or just two (Tumbes).

- Demographic and Family Health Survey: The *Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar* (ENDES) has gathered social, demographic, education and health data on the Peruvian population since 1988. In some years this data is divided at the regional level.
- Peruvian Congress sessions: In the Congress of the Republic they have Commissions where they discuss issues relevant to decentralisation in general, as well as region specific topics. In some cases, the Regional President, or another high-level civil servant of the region, appears in one of these commissions. Furthermore, in the general sessions the Parliamentarians discuss decentralisation issues when introducing new laws and reforms.

Secondary sources will be mostly books or articles specific to the region that would shed qualitative details on how the process of modernisation shaped the performance of the democratic state in each region. These sources, primary and secondary, will allow me to perform a “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence” (Collier, 2011, p. 823) needed to gain the in-depth knowledge to evaluate the causal claims. The subnational nature of this research imposes certain limitations regarding data availability. National reliable data on multiple variables is hard to obtain in Peru, and to get this information at a subnational level is challenging. Yearly data for each of the variables and documents revised is hard to obtain, and sometimes some variables might not be picked up in a specific year. Thus, the combination of both approaches will overcome any shortcomings of using statistical or qualitative analysis alone to address the main the research question of this study.

3.3 Concept formation

In this subsection I will explain the definition of democratic state performance. First, I will go through the conceptual clarification of what this concept entails and its implications. Afterwards I will go into the details on how it will be operationalised. With the conceptual clarification and its operationalisation in order, I will perform a confirmatory factor analysis to validate that the democratic state is a construct factor of the observed measures.

3.3.1 Defining democratic state performance

Democratic state performance is the outcome achieved by a set of institutions and organisations that hold the monopoly of force, legitimately exercise power, and deliver public goods over a defined

territory and its population. There are two key features in this definition. The first is the territorial aspect of it. The democratic state requires the capacity to expand its presence across the space that it commands. The second is the legitimacy of its actions. To expand this power, it needs the acquiescence of its the population and this acceptance is achieved through the rules that establishes the access to and constraint of this power. Thus, democratic state performance encompasses two dimensions: state capacity and quality of democracy. These dimensions will be divided in subdimensions of territorial reach, enforcement, equality, pluralism, representation. The conceptual tree can be seen in Graph N° 3.1.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, this research starts from the assumption that quality of democracy and state capacity can be analytical different and, at the same time, be ontological intertwined. This interrelation has been pointed out by different scholars (Fukuyama, 2011; Linz et al., 1996; S. L. Mazzuca, 2010; S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2020; Norris, 2012; O'Donnell, 1993b; Tilly, 2007). Nonetheless, most of them have focused on countries at the national level and not on subnational units, and when evaluating any of these concepts they have treated them as separated spheres. In her work, Norris (2012) tries to unify both dimensions under the democratic governance umbrella. Her regime typology is the result of the interrelation between democracy and governance where she created four distinctive types: Bureaucratic democracies, Bureaucratic autocracies, Patronage democracies, and Patronage autocracies (Norris, 2012, p. 39). The first one belongs to countries with expanded state capacity and inclusive voice and accountability (Germany, Portugal, Chile), whilst the latter to countries with limited state capacity and restricted voice and accountability (Somalia, Sudan, Guatemala). In this way, democratic governance would be the result of the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and democracy. This is the same line established by Tilly (2007) where he addresses the path divergency in different countries by analysing the relationship between state capacity and democracy. For him, the regime is “the relations between state and citizens” (Tilly, 2007, p. 12), and the regime can be divided in four typologies: High-capacity democratic, High-capacity undemocratic, Low-capacity democratic, and Low-capacity undemocratic. Although the author's focus in on the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation, its insight on the interrelation between democracy and state capacity are valuable for this research. Finally, Mazzuca & Munck (2020) study the middle-quality institutional trap in Latin America. It is the story on how the countries in these regions have never been able to achieve a high-capacity democracy. This is “high-quality democracies combined with states that are capable of delivering public goods - e.g. peace, justice,

social welfare” (S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2020). These studies have advanced the research on the democracy-state nexus, and while this dissertation will embrace their contributions, it will diverge from them. First, it will study the nexus at a sub-national level, whilst all previous studies have focused on a national level. Second, I will build upon the unifying efforts by analysing the state and democracy as separate entities under a common factor with the single concept of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time. Third, although the concept of high-capacity democracy would be closely aligned with my democratic state performance concept, the difference relies on the fact that Tilly, Munck and Mazzuca solely place democracy as the encompassing concept. This is a shortfall in the sense that democracy requires the ontological existence of the state. The state is a necessary condition for democracy to exist; it is its pre-requisite, and democracy pre-supposes the existence of a state. Without the state, there cannot be democracy since this is a form to conduct and govern the state power. To paraphrase Aristotle’s belief of the relation between the polis and the individual, the state is prior in nature than democracy (Aristoteles, 1988, 1253a).

First, I will detail some conceptual considerations on how to embark in the study of the democratic state performance. The state exercises legitimate power over a delimitate territory and its population, and claims the monopoly of violence within this territory (Fukuyama, 2011; Tilly, 1992; Weber, 1978). Democracy is an institutional arrangement that establishes the access to power (S. L. Mazzuca, 2010) and constrains the exercise of this power. A key element on which O’Donnell (1993) stepped on, but did not explore further, was that legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for this exercise of power. This is picked up by Soifer and vom Hau (2008) where “supporting beliefs that represent state organisations as bearers of legitimate authority facilitate the actual exercise of state infrastructural power” (p. 227). Here is where democracy becomes intertwined with the state, since the latter builds upon the former to legitimately exercise its power over the population in a delimitate territory. Furthermore, democracy serves the state as the ideal through which all its citizens recognise each other as equals within the territory. The modern state is an impersonal authority where the state’s power was separated from the office holder (Skinner, 1989). One of the key problems that it had to resolve was the succession issue (Hobbes, 1998) and how to limit the arbitrary use of its power and protect the individuals’ fundamental rights and freedom (Hamilton et al., 2008). The conquest of freedom, and the realisation and objectification of this ideal, required the creation of the social and political institutions that would allow this freedom to be achieved (Hegel, 1991). The open, pluralistic and constraining character of the modern state came as a result of democratisation, and it was the consequence of social and political

pressures and revolutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Fukuyama, 2011; B. Moore, 1966; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012). Thus, democracy was embedded in the state to solve these problems and grant its legitimacy.

Now, concept formation is a step-by-step process and “stands prior to quantification” (Sartori, 1970, p. 1038). A first consideration is that the concept has to avoid “conceptual stretching” by being too abstract and universal in such a way that loses its empirical connection (Sartori, 1970). The concepts are “data containers [...] which are sufficiently precise to be meaningfully comparable” (Sartori, 1970, p. 1039). This approach to conceptual formation is data driven and relies mostly on the possibility of the concepts to become taxonomies. Nonetheless, concept formation is also about ontology. It is a process through which the researcher arrives at attributes of the concept that are ontologically linked with it (Goertz, 2012, p. 27). Although Goertz criticises Sartori’s approach as a classification that disregards the concept ontology, focusing on the ontological aspect could render the comparative analysis futile. A bridge between these two authors can be found through Immanuel Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. In concept formation the researcher needs to consider if the “predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A ; or B lies entirely outside the concept A , though to be sure it stands in connection with it” (Kant, 1998, p. 128). The former is an analytic judgement (or judgement of clarification) where the concept is “set out and made intelligible to me”, whilst the latter is a synthetic judgement (or judgements of amplification) where “in addition to the concept of the subject something else (X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it” (Kant, 1998, p. 130). Following these synthetic judgments, if I say e.g. “all democracies involve *free and fair* elections” though I do not include free and fair in the concept of democracy in general, the “concept nevertheless designates the complete experience through a part of it” (Kant, 1998, p. 131). Since this research is embedded in the comparative politics literature, the concepts to be employed have empirical realities, and they do not belong in the realm of pure (political) reason. Thus, the synthetic judgement approach from Kant is a bridge between Sartori’s and Goertz’s insights to concept formation. Although the concept’s attributes might not lie within the concept itself (as a necessity), they do belong to it.

With these clarifications in order, I have established that democratic state performance has two dimensions: quality of democracy and state capacity. The latter refers to the state’s ability to exercise

control, fulfil its functions, provide basic services, and develop and implement policy choices throughout its territory (Augusto Meléndez et al., 2017; Centeno et al., 2017; Mazzuca, 2021; Soifer, 2015; Soifer & vom Hau, 2008; Ziblatt, 2008); whilst the former refers to the extent to which democracy and its elements are being realised, the degree of fulfilment of its attributes to which it approximates the ideal (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Bühlmann et al., 2012; Dahl, 1973; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Lauth, 2015; Lijphart, 2012; Munck, 2016). Furthermore, since I am assessing performance between regions, the main interest is the extent to which these characteristics are achieved (e.g. level of electoral turnout, or percentage of households with electricity), rather than if they have a specific attributes or properties (e.g. universal suffrage, or department of energy).

Quality of democracy is a concept whose existence lies also outside the theoretical life as well. This was Alexis de Tocqueville's approach when studying democracy in America. For him, democracy was a revolutionary force of the "gradual development of equality of conditions", and this was "a providential fact" that goes beyond a generation (De Tocqueville, 2015, p. 81). Furthermore, he recognised democracy as principles that govern the life of the people and are embedded in state institutions and society. So, a "democratic state constituted in this manner, society will not be immobile" (De Tocqueville, 2015, p. 83). Building upon previous work on the quality of democracy, two guiding principles emerge from it: equality and pluralism. Equality assumes the belief system that all individuals are created equal, and legal apparatus can embed this belief to ensure all individuals are treated the same way by the state. The value of democracy "can be strongly promoted in a context that also highly emphasizes the value of equality" (Whitehead, 2002, p.15.). All individuals have the same civil, political and social rights. Now, within a good democracy "the political right *par excellence*, that is, the right to vote, can be strengthened and extended if the electoral mechanisms are such that the voter gains the possibility or right to elect the government" (Morlino, 2004, p. 19). Universal suffrage thus becomes a fundamental characteristic of equality within a democracy. The right to participate derives from the equality subdimension when thinking about democracy and democratisation (Dahl, 1973). Through political participation the citizens have the possibility to choose their leaders and influence public affairs (Gwiazda, 2016). Participation is a cornerstone in most evaluations of how well a democracy is doing. From a procedural approach, participation can be considered as a dimension of democracy (Gwiazda, 2016, p. 21). It is not possible to devise democracy without the participation of a state's citizens. The composition of participants in a democratic state has evolved across time since male Athenian citizens with property who were able to go to war

participated in the demos. This was astonishingly direct and participatory, although extremely constricted by contemporaneous standards (Pitkin, 2004). The importance of participation has been present in political philosophy since the time of great Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Even Socrates (a critic of Greek democracy) in his Apologies established how important participation is for a democracy (Cooper, 2002). Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is an ethic preparation for the individual that was going to participate in the polis (Aristoteles, 1993). The cultivation of virtues, like moderation, were realised only in the *polis* and, hence, ethics was a formation towards participation in public life.

Afterwards, political theorists like Hobbes ([1652] 2006), Locke ([1689] 2014), Rousseau ([1762] 2018), and Tocqueville ([1835] 2015) understood the importance of participation in public affairs. Even the creation of (political) order through the Leviathan (modern state) required the equal participation of all individuals in the contract (Hobbes, 2006). Locke created constraints to the Hobbesian absolute state with a two-level social contract which also had as a pre-requisite the equal participation of all individuals (Locke, 2014). This two-step approach allowed the individuals to protect their life, freedoms and property from absolute state power. Nevertheless, contractualist philosophers believe it is Rousseau who puts individual participation at the centre of his theory. This participation was nuclear since only through it can a person be free. In *The Social Contract*, the construction of the general will require the presence of all parties and only through the general can an individual become free as they are an inalienable part of it (Rousseau, 2018). If not, "he will be forced to be free" (Rousseau, 2018, p. 58). More contemporaries authors have considered participation as a part of their conceptual tree of the quality of democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Bühlmann et al., 2008; Lauth, 2013; Lijphart, 2012a; Munck, 2016). As stated by Altman & Perez-Liñán (2002) the "health of a democratic regime is particularly weak when some citizens are effectively disenfranchised as a consequence of poverty, lack of basic education or sheer apathy" (Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002, p. 88). This can be seen in Peruvian regions where voting is mandatory and the differences in electoral turnout between regions can be above 20%.

Now, the equal right for every citizen to participate is linked with the equal right for every citizen to get elected, and many of the current arguments over democracy "revolve around what we might call demands for political presence: demands for the equal representation of women with men" (Phillips, 1998, p. 9). Representation becomes a feature of the modern state and democracy due to natural territorial expansion and the level of a population under control. This was envisioned by Hobbes when

making the distinction between a natural person (“whose words or actions are considered as his own”) and an artificial person (“representing the words and actions of another”) (Hobbes, 1998, p. 106). The Leviathan (modern state) would become that artificial person that represents the multitude of individuals. This same issue was raised by The Federalist when considering the representative government as a solution to the extension of territory, and ways to refine the true interest of the country (Hamilton et al., 2008). Following these considerations, representation means “the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact [...] in representation something not literally present is considered as present in a nonliteral sense” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 9). For Pitkin (1967), representation can be divided in four types – formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and substantive – although contemporary research has focused on descriptive and substantive representation. The former refers to the ‘standing for’ others, the “making present of something absent by resemblance or reflection, as in a mirror or in art” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 10); whilst the latter refers to ‘acting for’ others, “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). In this case I am interested in descriptive representation since this encompasses a “selective” form where “institutional design gives selected groups greater descriptive representation than they would achieve in existing electoral system in order to bring the proportions of those groups in the legislature closer to their percentages in the population” (Mansbridge, 1999). Thus, a way to measure if this equal access to power is being fulfilled is to measure the level of exclusion/marginalisation of different groups in those elected positions. This exclusion can be related to ethnic minorities, but also to women. This latter can be more troublesome since usually half of the population are women, but the percentage of women representatives is far behind. The problem of “the underrepresentation of women and other social groups is that of democratic justice” (Gwiazda, 2016, p. 20). Being part of specific social group can be considered as “second-class citizenship” and this is almost always the case “when at some point in the polity’s history the group has been legally excluded from the vote” (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 648). This is apprehended by Lijphart as a performance measure for his definition of consensus democracy (Lijphart, 2012a). Within a representative terrain the absence of women in elected positions can create a disenfranchisement with political power. The difference between women representatives is also stark between regions even though they have the exact same electoral quotas. For example, in Cajamarca only 14% of its elected officials are women, whilst in Moquegua it is 32%.

Another subdimension that comes as a conceptual necessity of quality of democracy is pluralism. Even Hobbes, the political theorist of absolutism, recognised pluralism as a key element of democracy by stating that the sovereign “is an assembly of all that will come together (popular commonwealth)” (Hobbes, 1998, p.123). This pluralism comes through competition. The absence of competition and alternation can be regarded as a non-democratic feature of a regime (Przeworski et al., 2000). This competition is present through political parties. These are essential to any democratic process and their institutionalisation strengthens the quality of democracy (Diamond et al., 1997; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). As stated by Casal, “focusing on party systems must remain a basic if not the central theme of examining the survival of liberal democracy” (Casal, 2017, p. 421). The effective number of political parties gauges the level of pluralism through party system institutionalisations (Mainwaring, 2006, Gwiazda, 2016, Casal, 2017).

As seen in Chapter 2, the well accepted definition of the state is based on Weber’s conceptualisation as a set of institutions that successfully exercises power over a delimited territory and claims the legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber, 1978). This definition has been accepted by most scholars working on state theory (Centeno et al., 2017; Fukuyama, 2011; Mann, 1993; Skocpol et al., 1985; H. Soifer, 2015; Tilly, 1992). At the same time, the ultimate measure of state effectiveness “is its contribution to the wellbeing and flourishing of the people that it governs” (Evans et al., 2017, p. 380). The state needs capacity to exercise control and implement its policies over the territory and its population. This is what Mann conceptualised as *infrastructural power* (Mann, 1993). It refers to the state’s capacity to penetrate civil society, coordinating in a centralised way the activities of it through its own infrastructure and implementing its decision over the territory (Mann, 1993). For Soifer (2008), this infrastructural definition carries a territorial reach dimension and relates to a subnational variation within a country. To measure this state presence the literature has used doctors, schools, electrification, and sanitation (Just Quiles, 2017; Kurtz, 2013; H. Soifer, 2015; Vom Hau, 2008; Ziblatt, 2008), as well as number of bureaucrats and state institutions in a territory (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno et al., 2015). A key to be considered is that the state needs the capability to enforce those decisions across the territory, a step which requires human resources. Bureaucrats are the ones that put the state in motion working for the common good and were thus, as considered by Hegel, the universal class.


Furthermore, state capacity can be measured by the absence of their territorial presence, for example, at the borders. For Herbst (2014) the problems that African states faced were very different than the

ones faced by the European elites. In Africa, the projection of the authority over inhospitable territories with a lower population density was the key problem to be solved (Herbst, 2014). The cost of expanding the power over territory, mixed with movable boundaries and population, made it very costly to expand the infrastructural power. It showed the logistic problems between centre and periphery that required the construction of offices at the boundaries. For Centeno, the ultimate competences of the state can be divided in three areas: order and reach, economic development, and inclusion and equity (Centeno et al., 2017). Pre-conditions for improving the livelihoods of the people include the access to basic public services, for example, water, sanitation, and electricity within the household. Access to drinkable water is related to public health issues, where unsafe drinking water or lack of access to sanitation contribute to about 88% of deaths from diarrheal diseases (Pruss-Ustun, 2008). In Apurímac, Perú in the early 00s, only 19% of households had electricity whilst 75% of households in Ica had access to electricity. Meanwhile, the disparities in the access to water and sanitation were also high. About 19% of households in Cajamarca had access, against 71% in Lima.

3.3.2 Operationalisation

Now that I have explained the democratic state performance, Graph N° 3.1 shows a three-level concept tree of it. The basic level shows the democratic state performance concept, the secondary level has an ontological relationship with the basic level, and the indicator level has a substitutability relation with the secondary level. Based on the cross-sectional and time-series nature of the dissertation and data to be analysed, I followed Goertz's (2012) recommendation where “in comparative cross-national or cross-temporal research there are powerful reasons that push the researcher to adopt substitutability as the dominant framework for building concepts at the indicator level” (p. 63).

Graph N° 3.1 – Conceptual tree democratic state performance



The selection of these components has a rationale. First, government institutions (and the state) have multiply competences that are assumed towards society (Fukuyama, 2017). Choosing only one dimension (Niedzwiecki, 2018; Pribble, 2013; Singh, 2016) is limited in the sense that assumes the state as a monolithic and homogenous entity, leaving behind a key aspect of the state’s polythetic nature. Furthermore, core state functions can contain multiple dimensions, thus a “single indicator measures of state capacity are also inappropriate for attempts to capture the overall concept” (Soifer, 2015, p. 9). Hence, when analysing performance, the operationalisation should pick up this polythetic characteristic. Second, democracy can be understood as the historic process towards a society in which the equality of conditions reigns among its citizens (De Tocqueville, 2015). This requires the building of an institutional setting and minimum conditions where the individual is able to build capabilities to participate in social life (Sen, 1997). In this same line of thought are Diamond and Morlino (2005) and Munck (2016) when addressing the quality of democracy. For the latter, “excluding socio-economic conditions from a definition of democracy is more problematic than including these conditions” (Munck, 2016: 20). Civil rights and socio-economic conditions are part of what the author calls “the social environment of politics” (the social context in which democracy exist) that affect democracy through the impact on the access to government offices and government decision-making.

As shown in Graph N°3.1, democratic state performance entails the sub-dimensions of state capacity and the quality of democracy. The former refers to the state's ability to provide public goods and enforce its decision over its population and territory in an evenly fashion. This conceptualisation of state capacity underscores two key components: territorial reach and enforcement. A capable state is one that makes itself present through the provision of public goods to its citizens and their households. Within these public goods, infrastructure projects are one of the means through which the state expands its presence across the territory under its domain. These can be the construction of a network of roads, hospitals, a water supply network, electrification, among others. Whether they improve the living standards of the citizens or facilitate the extraction of resources, their aim is to ensure the territorial reach of the state. The presence of public infrastructure has been widely used as a proxy to measure state capacity and its territorial reach (Hanson & Sigman, 2021; Just Quiles, 2017; Kurtz, 2013; Mazzuca & Munck, 2020; Slater, 2008; Soifer, 2015; Soifer & vom Hau, 2008; Ziblatt, 2008). The implementation of public infrastructure relates to the capability of the state to deploy its power across the territory. The construction of roads or water supply networks exemplifies the state's ability to make a decision, design a public policy and implement it. It shows that it is able to align its fiscal and human resources to achieve a specified goal, and it is capable of reaching a specified territory within its boundaries. Furthermore, it is fulfilling its competences through the provision of public goods. Following these considerations, access to a water supply network and electricity within a household are suitable indicators to measure the territorial reach of a state and its capacity to uniformly provide them within its boundaries. At a theoretical level, these are appropriate indicators because they measure the state's penetration in society to the household level itself. For example, the presence of a road or hospital in a region can still be far away of certain segments of the population. Meanwhile, access to a water supply network and electrification within a household is a closer approximation of the state's presence to its population and territorial reach. It is a more accurate reflection on the state capacity and its influence within its boundaries. At an empirical level within the Peruvian context, both are considered competences of the state both nationally and sub-nationally. These competences are planned and executed as public investment projects in all government levels.

Now, the capacity of a state is also measured by the organisational and managerial skills it uses to enforce its decisions. It requires human resources to design and implement public policies, and this is the primary role of the bureaucracy. The bureaucrat is a civil servant whose aim and duty is to fulfil the state's objective and decisions. The role is circumscribed by the office in which the bureaucrat is

placed. The bureaucrats are central to the state and to its conceptual definition. The state lives through the everyday action of bureaucrats, whether high-level or street-level (Lipsky, 2010). The central role of bureaucrats has a long history of recognition in political theory. The perfect Republic for Plato was ruled by its guardians (bureaucrats), trained and educated for this matter (Plato, 2000). Furthermore, the central role of them was highlighted by Hegel, where he called the bureaucracy the universal class since their objective was the fulfilment of the common good of the state (Hegel, 1991). It was Weber who saw the bureaucracy and its professionalisation as a core feature of the rational modern state (Weber, 1978). A professional rational bureaucracy was characterised by a list of attributes that included a clear division of labour, hierarchical structure, meritocratic career, no venal offices, among others. The presence of a capable bureaucracy within a territory facilitates the implementation of the state policies. The level of enforcement of a state's decision is a translation of its capacity. A state that is unable to carry out its objectives, whether the execution of public infrastructure or administering the rule of law, is a state with weak capacity (or even a failed state). Enforcement requires the presence of bureaucracy across the territory to ensure state decisions are carried out in an even fashion (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno et al., 2015). Thus, the number of bureaucrats per 1000 people is a fitting indicator to gauge the level of enforcement of the state's decision, and thus, its capacity to reach its population.

The other sub-dimension of democratic state performance is quality of democracy. This refers to the degree of fulfilment of democratic attributes (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Munck, 2016). Once democracy has been achieved, the idea is to understand the extent to which its features are being realised. It is about the performance of the variables that make a democracy democratic. A first attribute to consider is political participation. Democracy is built upon the fundamental idea that its citizens participate in public affairs. Without participation there is no democracy, since it constitutes one of its pillars (Dahl, 1973). Political participation in the public affairs can take different expressions, whether participating in town halls, in electoral processes, or citizen mobilisations. Within these various expressions, participation in electoral processes is at the core of democracy. Democracy is an institutional arrangement that determines the legitimate way of access to power (L. Diamond, 2003). Thus, the indicator of electoral turnout is a suitable proxy to gauge the extent to which citizens exercise their political participation within a region. Electoral turnout is also used by other authors to measure the quality of democracy (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Bühlmann et al., 2012; Levine & Molina, 2011; Lijphart, 2012b). Participation in elections denotes a key process within democracy and its quality

(Munck, 2016), and addressing the extent to which a population in a specific constituency participates in this process sheds light on how democracy is being fulfilled. When most of the population is absent and does not engage with this minimum democratic process, the legitimacy of the regime can be undermined, feeding a vicious circle where people feel that the political system does not solve their grievances and thus reduces their intention to participate in electoral process, opening the door to non-democratic systems. Research has shown that electoral turnout can vary significantly between countries (Remmer, 2010) and, thus serves as a good variable to address regional differences across Peruvian regions. Empirically, this is a good indicator for Peru since voting is mandatory. All citizens are required to vote in any elections, whether national or subnational ones. Furthermore, since Peru is a unitary government, all regions are bound by the same electoral laws, and voting rights are not subject to subnational authorities or dependent on regional legislation. This creates a clean sheet to address the difference of voting behaviour between regions.

The second attribute to consider within the quality of democracy subdimension is representation. A higher quality of democracy is achieved when the majority of its population is equally represented in government. As with political participation, the idea is to address the level at which the attribute of representation is being fulfilled. As previously discussed, representation means making something present that is nonetheless not literally present (Pitkin, 1967). In representative democracy this is translated by elected officials that represent their constituencies in government. They make present the voices of their electorate in government decisions where these are not literally present in those discussions. Now, there are different types of representation, although a salient one refers to descriptive representation. This refers to the resemblance between elected officials and the electorate, and it can be studied by assessing the percentage of male and female politicians. Countries and regions have a more or less equal demographic distribution of women and men, however, the presence in the public arena is highly tilted towards men. There is a clear gap between elected men and women politicians, where the majority of elected officials are men. There is still a long way for gender parity (Reingold, 2008). When a large proportion of the population is excluded from effective participation of the government decisions, it can create disenfranchisement with the political system. It can even foster a situation where they are considered second class citizens (Mansbridge, 1999). Women's rights to participate in politics does not conclude with a formal recognition of these rights, enshrined in laws and constitutions, but by addressing the barriers that hinder their effective participation. Thus, a first step to is assess women's political participation, and this can be done by looking into the percentage

of women candidates or the percentage of women elected. The latter option is a more suitable indicator to measure effective female political participation. This reflects on how representative democracy is and the degree of its quality. Now, for the Peruvian case, there are electoral laws that are uniformly applied to all regions. Within these, there are electoral quotas that established that at least 30% of candidates within the political party list must be men or women. These are closed lists, and the higher one is placed on the list, the higher the probability is of being elected. Focusing only on women candidates as an indicator is thus limited by this electoral quota, whilst their effective participation is better represented by actual women elected. This already assumes they were candidates, and it better reflects on descriptive representation (unelected women cannot make present their electorate) and speaks to the consideration of women in politics within the region (higher spots on the list).

The development of democracy is intertwined with the expansion of the territory it governs and the pluralistic diversification of its societies. The existence of small, homogenous and unitary city-states that characterised most of the medieval period were in extinction by 1800. The heterogeneity of views and interests became a pluralistic feature of democracy (Hamilton et al., 2008). Political parties would become the vehicles to channel this pluralism. Multiple parties exist because there are multiple interests within society that require to be (legally) channelled to avoid any violent resolution between opposing views (L. Diamond, 1999). Political parties are an essential part of democratic scaffolding since these are the only legal organisations that are able to present candidates to the electorate, and through their elected officials they will manage the use of state resources.¹⁰ They are the vehicles through which the divergent interests are addressed, represented by their candidates and manifestos over which voters choose their preference. Thus, to assess the quality of democracy we need to turn toward how pluralism is being achieved, and political parties are the main exponents of these pluralism. The ruled-based interaction and life of political parties is grasped by the party systems. These are the cornerstones of liberal democracy (Casal, 2017), and their level of institutionalisation improve the probability of consolidation (Mainwaring, 2006). In Peru, characterised by high party volatility, the effective number of parties is a suitable indicator to address the multi-party level of the regional party systems. A more fragmented party system can reduce the representation of specific voices and interest in government,

¹⁰ The level of input from the political party through the newly elected official will depend on the strength of the political party itself. In democracies where most of the candidates have been invited to participate in elections through the political party, this input is minimal. In some cases, once elected the politicians tend to distant themselves from the party that took them to power, thus reducing the overall party's power over the state resources.

and limit the amount of information a voter can process (S. Coleman, 1995). The more parties, the more information to be processed, fostering misinformation and shortcuts to select a preference. It also fragments the opposition, which is instead channelled through other means that could disrupt the government functioning (Best, 2013). Thus, the effective number of parties is an adequate variable to measure our quality of democracy dimension.

Table N° 3.1 – Descriptive statistics: Dependent variables for democratic state performance at a regional level

Statistic / indicators	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Territorial reach					
(% of households with electricity)	225	81.87	14.85	30.38	99.78
(% of households with access public water)	225	67.79	16.78	28.63	96.24
Enforcement					
(% of bureaucrats per population)	225	23.54	8.31	0.24	47.50
Political participation					
(% of electoral turnout)	225	83.40	4.35	69.63	91.24
Representation					
(% of women elected)	225	23.41	4.43	14.18	32.58
Pluralism					
(Effective number of parties)	225	5.7	1.70	1.91	10.32

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2002-2018, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018. // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Table N° 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics from the indicators that comprise the democratic state performance. The results exhibit great differences. In the case of electrification, the gap between the minimum and maximum value is around 69%. This means that whilst only 30% of the households in Cajamarca had electricity, almost all houses in Callao had electricity. This gap is also stark in the household access to public water, where in the region of Ucayali only 28% of them had access to a water supply. This is significantly below the national average of 67%. On the quality of democracy variables, the data shows that the average of women elected is around 23%. This should be highlighted because according to electoral laws and gender quota, at least 30% of the political parties' candidates list has to be from one of the genders (male or female). Even with a gender quota in place during the regional and municipal elections the selection of women candidates is below that which is expected.

And, in some cases, it is even lower (as the 14% shows). This suggests that women's political participation is linked to other factors than electoral rules and gender quotas.

3.3.3 Model fit

Now, to test if these indicators are in fact measuring democratic state performance, I turn to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This is a theory-driven approach where the researcher has an *a priori* sense of the concept and the variables that it entails and uses this analysis to test operationalisation (Brown, 2015). It “allows one to directly explore the extent to which items reflect a common target trait [e.g. *Democratic state performance*] and the extent to which they reflect a primary subtrait [e.g. *Quality of Democracy and State capacity*]” (italics mine) (Reise et al., 2010, 12). There are four measures/indices to corroborate if the model has a good fit or has goodness-of-fit (Brown, 2015; Suhr 2006).¹¹ If the four indices are met the model proposed has a good fit, meaning that the observed measures are in fact influenced by a common factor.

Table N°3.2 shows the results of the CFA conducted to corroborate if the observed measures correspond to my democratic state performance concept and its dimensions.¹² From these results we can be sure that the model proposed is consistent and has a goodness-of-fit. All measures used to evaluate if a CFA model has a good fit have been met. Hence, the indicators proposed to capture the dimensions of democratic state performance, state capacity, and quality of democracy confirm that the conceptualisation of democratic state performance is empirically correct.¹³

Now, after corroborating the operationalisation of democratic state performance at a regional level, I tested it at a provincial level as well. A problem when working on territorial units is that it is vulnerable to the modifiable areal unit problem (H. Soifer, 2019). This means that a statistical result can differ depending on the level of aggregation. Thus, following the scaling-down approach I will use its

¹¹ These are the Tucker-Lewis Index, Comparative Index, Standardised Root Mean Square (SRMS), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). A model that has a good fit should exhibit a score above 0.9 in the Tucker-Lewis and Comparative Index, and a score below 0.1 in SRMS and RMSEA (Brown, 2015, p. 74).

¹² A key assumption under which the CFA operates is that the data has multivariate normality. Since the data showed some multivariate nonnormality due to its multilevel nature a bootstrap technique was applied (Bollen & Stine, 1992) and the CFA was run using a robust maximum-likelihood estimator (Brown, 2015).

¹³ The time-series nature of the data made it necessary to corroborate these results controlling for the year. I run another CFA with a control on the years, and the results showed that the four indices passed the goodness-to-fit indexes (Appendix).

advantage to test the validity of the concept on a lower level of aggregation. This will assure the validity of the concept since it would solve the modifiable areal unit problem.

Table N° 3.2 – Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Democratic State Performance¹⁴

Index	Democratic State Performance CFA results*	Range**
Tucker-Lewis Index	0.981	$X > 0.9$ is a good fit
Comparative Index	0.990	$X > 0.9$ is a good fit
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)	0.043	$X < 0.1$ is a good fit
Standardised Root Mean Square (SRMS)	0.039	$X < 0.1$ is a good fit

*Number of observations: 225

**These figures are the accepted benchmarks to evaluate the goodness-of-fit (Brown 2015).

Table N° 3.4 – Descriptive statistics: Dependent variables for democratic state performance at provincial level

Statistic / indicators	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Territorial reach					
(% of households with electricity)	195	56.33	20.03	9.55	94.77
(% of households with access public water)	195	46.58	21.90	1.05	93.55
Enforcement					
(Ratio of population/bureaucrats)	195	0.91	0.57	0.15	3.17
Political participation					
(% of electoral turnout)	195	86.20	3.13	76.85	94.67
Representation					
(% of women elected)	195	24.13	14.36	5.00	83.33
Pluralism					
(Effective number of parties)	195	5.34	1.56	2.44	10.91

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2006, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2006, National Census 2007.

Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

¹⁴ The graphs of the confirmatory factor analysis model are shown in the Appendix.

Using the 2007 National Census, the ENAHO of 2006, and the 2006 Regional and Municipal elections, I have created the same dataset used for the regional analysis but at a provincial level. Following the same steps as with the regional level analysis, I performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with the information from 195 Peruvian provinces using the same indicators from the regional level. Fortunately, the same variables were available for this level of analysis avoiding the problem of studying the same concept with different data. The goodness-to-fit indexes established by Brown (2015) show that the operationalisation of democratic state performance, as a crystallisation of the quality of democracy and state capacity subdimensions, also stands at a provincial level (CFI: 0.990, TLI: 0.981, RMSEA: 0.03, SRMR: 0.046). This means that democratic state performance is a valid construct that can be used to measure it across the provincial level as well. Furthermore, it corroborates that the conceptualisation of democratic state performance can be used to bridge the democracy-state nexus literature. Further, as mentioned before, it can foster a new line of thought where democracy and the state are treated as equally important dimensions that affect the livelihoods of the citizen living under these arrangements.

3.4 Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown that although quality of democracy and the state are analytically different concepts, they are nonetheless ontologically intertwined. This intersection can be seen in my democratic state concept, and from there it is possible to evaluate its performance across Peruvian regions. After careful conceptual considerations of the subdimensions and indicators that comprise the democratic state concept, the next step was to reassure that it had an empirical correlation. Since democratic state performance cannot be directly observed as it is a latent variable (construct), I ran a confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate if the observed measure has a common factor. This type of factor analysis is theory-driven and was most appropriate for our task in hand. The results from this CFA confirmed that democratic state performance is a common factor of the observed variables. All four main measures and indexes used to evaluate a model's good fit or goodness-to-fit were met (CFI, TLI, RMSEA and SRMR). This certainly is a good finding since it empirically corroborates that the bridge between the quality of democracy and state theory literature can be done. Furthermore, the validity of the concept was improved by testing its goodness-to-fit at a provincial level and passing the threshold of those indexes. Therefore, democratic state has an internal and external consistency, it exists as a factor, and can be used to evaluate performance across Peruvian regions.

Chapter 4: Uneven democratic state performance in Peru

This chapter will outline the argument that explains the (uneven) democratic state performance across Peruvian regions. First, I will go through the historical background of the decentralisation and democratisation processes. Then following the operationalisation of democratic state performance in the previous chapter, I will map it across the regions and over the years. Third, I will examine a number of hypotheses that explain the uneven performance of political institutions drawing from the scholarly literature. The main arguments to be analysed are if economic and social modernisation, social capital, subnationalism, inequality or political culture can be considered as explanatory variables of democratic state performance. Finally, a regression analysis will be performed to test the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable.


4.1 Historical background

Peru's relationship with democracy is fairly new. Since its theocratic government under the Incas in the twelfth century, followed by colonial rule from the sixteenth century until independence in 1821, military rule until the first civilian won the Presidency in 1872, and then a continuous pendulum between democracy and military/authoritarian rule until 2001, Peru has historically been governed by non-democratic states and leaders. This has been accompanied by a state that has been mostly captured by economic elites (Crabtree & Durand, 2017), without autonomy from social groups, limited despotic power (Mann, 1993), and characterised by weak capacity (H. Soifer, 2015) and institutional atrophy (Kurtz, 2013).

This scenario has created general discontent and apathy on Peruvians regarding political issues. The Latinobarometro since the last two decades has followed the citizens across the countries. Peru has consistently polled with the lowest score on trust in political institutions. Since the Latinobarometro starting polling in Peru in 1995, the percentage of citizens that have on average little/no trust in government is 60%, in congress is 79% and in political parties is 83%. In 2020 the distrust towards political parties, congress and government was 91%, 91% and 81% respectively. With these levels of distrust, the possibility of backsliding towards a non-democratic state is more real than in Latin American counterparts. In fact, following Graph N° 4.1, the trust in political institution has worsened since Peru transitioned towards democracy and implemented the decentralisation reforms. During the second half of Fujimori's authoritarian regime people had more trust in political parties, congress and

government, than when it became a democracy. This certainly speaks to the inherent difficulty of governing Peru, creating an uphill battle for reformers and citizens that are committed to improve democratic quality and state capacity.

Graph N° 4.1 - Levels of trust in political institutions during authoritarian and democratic rule in Peru



Source: Latinobarometro 1995-2020 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the new millennium Peru implemented two major political processes: democratisation and decentralisation. Democratisation was achieved after the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori came to an end in 2000 and national elections took place the following year. Decentralisation followed the national elections and in the next year, 2002, the first Regional and Municipal elections (ERM) were held.¹⁵

Decentralisation is a process, a “set of policies, electoral reforms, or constitutional reforms that transfer responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government” (Falleti, 2010, p. 34). From this definition, Falleti (2010) decomposes decentralisation under three dimensions:

¹⁵ It is important to underscore here that the Peruvian decentralisation that started in 2002 was a cumulative process of different laws that were passed and approved by the legislative and executive powers. Nonetheless, the most important package of laws were approved during the 2002-2003 period, starting with the approval of Law N° 27863 – Law of Regional Elections – in March 2002. For a more detailed account on the sequence please refer to Contraloria General (2014).

administrative, political and fiscal. *Administrative decentralisation* refers to the transfer of policies related to the dispensation of public goods (e.g. social services, education, housing); *political decentralisation* refers to devolution of political authority to subnational actors and open spaces for representation at a subnational level; and *fiscal decentralisation* refers to policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal authority of subnational governments (Falleti, 2010, p. 36).

The decentralisation process that unfolded in 2002 was not the first Peruvian experience with devolution of authority to subnational levels. The first election of subnational authorities, at a municipal level, was in 1963. This was the first time provincial and district mayors were elected in Peruvian history since Independence in 1821. The election of subnational authorities stopped in 1968 after the military coup of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. During the military government from 1968 until 1980, subnational elected authorities were substituted by national appointments from the military government. This re-centralisation and appointment of deputies to subnational units was based on the need to break and dissolve the landowners' reign in Peruvian regions.¹⁶ Most of rural Peru was still managed in a neo-feudal way, where the landowners had political, judicial, and economic power over their land. They treated the non-landowners (mostly members of peasant communities) as second-class citizens. The appointment of national deputies broke the landowners' power in the regions, but did not eliminate a patrimonial approach to state affairs. As shown in the case of Chachapoyas (Nugent, 1994), the prefect (state appointee) was free to govern the region under his own prerogative without any constraint and used the position as a "means of personal enrichment" (p. 352).

Subnational elections would return in 1980 under a democratic regime and, for the first time, with universal suffrage. The Constitution of 1979, created under a Constituent Assembly of 1978 (*Asamblea Constituyente*), enabled for the first time after Peruvian independence the universal suffrage. All previous Constitutions required a person to be literate in order to exercise their political right to vote (Paniagua, 2003). This meant that the historical subnational elections of 1980 saw a massive expansion

¹⁶ This was just part of the major Agrarian Reform process (*Reforma Agraria*) implemented by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Landownership was highly unequal in Peru and landowners (*gamonales, hacendados*) treated the people living within its borders as their property. Land reform was a key topic in Peruvian politics during the 1960s. It was pushed by the Junta Militar (1962-1963) and then by the democratic government of Fernando Belaunde (1963-1968). The latter tried to have an Agrarian Reform approved by the Congress. This was proposed as a necessary measure since in the southern parts of Peru there were strong peasant movements (*movimientos campesinos*) like the ones led by Hugo Blanco. These movements started during the late 1950s and had a guerrilla-style of fighting with an aim for land reform. However, the opposition alliance between APRA and UNO during Belaunde's government made political instability the cornerstone of this period and blocked any attempt to move forward with an Agrarian Reform.


of the electoral base from 2.3 million in 1966 to 6.5 million in 1980. This massive expansion came with pressure to introduce decentralisation policies. This, however, was put in hold since in the early 1980s the internal armed conflict started in Peru. The terrorist group Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso*), and later the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*), launched an attack towards the Peruvian state. This period lasted from 1980 until 2000, although its peak confrontation and attack period was during the 1980s and early 1990s. It took the lives of almost seventy thousand Peruvians, and most of them were from the rural parts of Peru (CVR, 2004b).¹⁷

During the 1980s the scholarly debate agreed that Peru had finally reached a stable party system. Four main parties – *Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)*, *Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP)*, *Izquierda Unida (IU)* and *Acción Popular (AP)* – dominated the political and electoral arena during that decade. This was mostly seen through a national lens, where the main national political parties dominated the general elections and Lima's election as well. By the end of the decade this system would start to collapse. There were different factors that led to this situation (Lopez, 1998; Lynch, 1999; Tanaka, 1998). However, the crisis of the political parties and the political system occurred during the 1989 and 1993 period. It started with the election of Ricardo Belmont as the Mayor of Lima. He was a businessman without any ties to political parties; an *outsider* to the political system. The general elections of 1990 would see the election of another outsider, this time from the academic realm, as the President of Peru. Alberto Fujimori would two years later execute a *self-coup*, call for a National Assembly, and this Assembly would redact a new Political Constitution. The approval of this Constitution in 1993 would mark the end of the political crisis in Peru and would mark the commencement of a new way of politics that has perdured since. A 'new' Peru would emerge under Fujimori's populist authoritarian regime (Crabtree, 2000). Graph N° 4.2 I shows the percentage of votes in subnational elections since 1980 that were obtained by the main political parties during the 1980s decade. Here it is clear how these four parties – PAP, IU, PPC and AP – dominated the electoral arena. However, it also unmistakably depicts that the political crisis was between 1989-1993, and from that year onwards a new political era started in Peru would be considered as a democracy without parties (Crabtree, 2010; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Tanaka, 2005). However, this depiction would be misleading since Peru is, on the contrary, a democracy with too many political parties. The idea that Peru has no parties is based on a

¹⁷ An interesting study from Albertus (2020) showed that those districts where the *Reforma Agraria* was successfully implemented were the districts that had lower casualties and were able to resist the terrorist attacks.

notion of political parties rooted in different historical conditions. The ties between political parties and citizens have deteriorated since the 1990s and citizen engagement is scarce in Peru, Latin America, and Europe. The latter has seen a steadily decline of party membership (Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Whiteley, 2011). Peru was at the vanguard when it opened the door to a new way of democratic politics being organised with parties being more alike to political recruitment agencies by recruiting candidates and offering them to the electorate. The most successful are the ones that get more of their candidates hired (elected) by the citizenry. This higher number of political parties with new parties gaining terrain over old traditional ones is a phenomenon that has been since replicated in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Europe.

Graph N° 4.2 – Percentage of votes in subnational elections by political party (1980-2018)



Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Now, just before this political crisis started there was an attempt of decentralisation through the creation of micro-regions (Law N° 24650 and Law N° 24792) by the unification of two or more departments together in 1988. Twelve regions were created. Each had a Regional Assembly composed by members that were directly elected by Provincial and District Mayors, and delegates from other representative institutions (Contraloria, 2014). Responsibilities, offices, personnel, and funds were transferred to these regions in 1990, but the self-coup of Alberto Fujimori on 5 April 1992 erased

these regionalisation processes and institutions.¹⁸ On their behalf, the authoritarian government created the Transitory Councils of Regional Administration (*Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional – CTAR*). These were superposed over the existing Peruvian departments creating a total of 24 CTARs.¹⁹ The head of the CTAR for each department was appointed by the Ministry of the Presidency (the Ministry under direct control of Alberto Fujimori). These CTARs became a permanent institution in charge of the development and infrastructure planning for each department.²⁰ A key element in this process was the new Political Constitution of Peru of 1993 and treatment of provincial and district municipalities. The Magna Carta eliminated the distinction of competencies between these two levels of government and competencies were not clearly defined. As stated by Muñoz (2005) all the municipalities “had the same mission and competencies, showing a highly level of institutional superposition in the territory” (p. 37). Fujimori’s authoritarian regime centralised the regional development through the CTARs, and dissolved the differences and hierarchy between municipalities. This latter point was fundamental because it created a dependency with the central government. If the hierarchy of local government was erased, the district mayor could go directly to the central government to ask for funds to implement projects for education, health, communication, and so on. Fujimori negotiated directly with the mayors for their adherence or, at least, the absence of any political opinion in exchange for the execution of public goods in their constituency (Remy, 2011). There was no need to coordinate or negotiate with the provincial mayor, and in this way a clientelist relationship between subnational and national governments was created. The unitary character of the Peruvian political system makes this type of relationship still commonplace in Peru, although now within a democratic context. District and provincial mayors still go to Lima, especially to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), to lobby for their projects and funds for their municipalities. Parliamentarians during the Public Budget discussions for each year try to negotiate with the MEF the inclusion of specific projects for their preferred localities.

¹⁸ The regionalisation process that started in 1988 was not necessarily a smooth process. Citizens did not understand why they were grouped in those regions and even the department of San Martín pushed its independence from the micro-region where it was grouped by the regionalisation process. Furthermore, the micro-region authorities became the main political opposition to the economic reforms implemented by Fujimori (Contraloría General, 2014), making it indispensable to abolish them in the authoritarian and centralising practices pursued by Fujimori.

¹⁹ Lima and Callao were under the administration of one CTAR.

²⁰ As previously mentioned, here is the moment where the departments started to be called regions as well, and the equivalence between departments and regions became part of everyday language and were translated to future laws.

This decentralised state re-structure was accompanied with a fundamental change in how the state would develop and expand its reach across its territory. The National Institute of Planification was eliminated under Fujimor's regime. This Institute was created in 1962 through the Law N° 14220. Its purpose was to “*acelerar el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida del pueblo peruano, mediante la ejecución de planes sistemáticos de educación económica y social*” (accelerate the improvement of the living conditions of the Peruvian people, through the execution of systemic plans of social and economic development) (Law N°14420). The importance given to this organisation is stated in Article 3 where it establishes that the Head of this Institution was going to have the level of a Ministry and would respond directly to the President of Peru. However, in 1992 after 30 years of its creation, Fujimori dissolved this institution through Law N° 25548, and the personnel that survived were subsumed under the MEF. At the same time, Fujimori created the Ministry of Presidency under his direct supervision that would preside over the budget towards multi-sectorial entities and decentralised public organisations. Thus, the whole social and economic development of Peru was in practice left to Fujimori's will, market forces and private investment, without any state planning. At the subnational level this translated into a political development led individually by each province or district, without the possibility of putting forward a territorial approach to the region as a whole. This creates an imbalance of power when multinational companies want to invest in Peru, with activities at the local level where district municipalities, authorities and populations are unable to counter-balance the private interests. In some cases, these situations can result in social conflicts. The radical consequence of this *laissez faire* development is that by 2014 around 25% of the national territory was given in concession to mining companies. According to Crabtree & Durand (2017), in some regions these concessions were 23% in Cusco, 27% in Junín, 32% in Piura, 45% in Cajamarca, and in 64% of regions with a high proportion of rural and indigenous population (p. 92). The creation of an independent development organisation within the Peruvian state appeared only in 2008, with the creation of the National Centre of Strategic Planning (CEPLAN). This would, however, be subsumed under the *Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros* (PCM) the Prime Minister's Office, and would lack the autonomy and political power of the former INP. This absence facilitates the capture of the state by the interest of different economic, social or illegal groups.

After the democratisation process of 2000 and the democratic national elections of 2001, the decentralisation process started in 2002 with the regional and municipal elections. Voters elected for

the first time a Regional President²¹ that would be the highest executive authority in that region (department).²² Nonetheless, the creation of a new level of government with a new regional authority and a new type of political party came as well with a decentralisation of state functions and responsibilities. Following Falletti's approach, Peru simultaneously enacted a political and administrative decentralisation. This had consequences on the democratic state in each of those regions. For the first time each region had more decision-making power as to the development path it would follow, and it was not going to be restricted to a clientelist relationship with an authoritarian national government. At the same time, the voter was finally given the power to hold accountable those regional authorities. Participatory institutions were created specifically to improve citizens' involvement in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the regions were going to have their own political parties with closer ties to the region. A few years later, in 2004, Peru would approve the Legislative Decree N° 995, Fiscal Decentralisation, that established how resources would be assigned to regional and local governments. After this, specific laws would be modified (e.g. *Ley de Canon*) that would have an impact on the financial side of the regions. Overall, this fiscal decentralisation would entail mostly the intergovernmental transfer of resources (from the national to subnational level) and decentralised spending. Subnational governments would be responsible for spending most of the resources for the provision of public goods and have the discretion for this expenditure. Meanwhile, the central government would collect the taxes and transfer the resources back to the regions. However, other fiscal attributes (e.g. taxation) would remain centralised, and the central government could still control (or stop) the transfer of resources to regions.

The subnational government's reliance on transfers from the central government limits the extent of the fiscal decentralisation and can even freeze the accounts from local governments. For example, during the Ollanta Humala government (2011-2016), the Ministry of Economy (MEF) under Miguel Castilla withheld the transfer of resources to the Regional Government of Cajamarca. This happened at the same time when the population of Cajamarca, under the Governor Gregorio Santos, was against the expansion of a new mining project of Yanacocha (operated by Newmont since the 90s). The project was called Conga and was going to be located at the *cabecera de cuenca* (top of the drainage basin

²¹ This name was later changed to Regional Governor in 2015, when a Constitutional amendment was introduced that changed the name from Regional President to Regional Governor. But, most importantly, this Law N° 30305 also eliminated the immediate reelection of subnational representatives.

²² As mentioned before, department and region became synonyms. These are interchangeable terms, as seen in the Decentralisation Laws when mentioning Regional Presidents referring to the highest authority in the department/region.

in the mountain), an area that receives and retains the water. This was a complicated issue, since Humala himself during a campaign tour in Cajamarca asked the crowd *¿que es más importante, el agua o el oro?* (what is more important, water or gold?) (Humala, 2011). The crowd replied the water, and Humala compromised himself to respect the will of the people from Hualgayoc and Bambamarca. Now, as a President, Humala was facing multiple protests in the region and the people from Cajamarca wanted to stop the Conga project. To deal with this unrest, Humala's government declared a state of emergency in the provinces of Cajamarca, Celendin, Hualgayoc and Contumazá (Decreto Supremo N° 093-2011-PCM). This Decree would then be used by the MEF to freeze the accounts of the regional government of Cajamarca, and stopped any operation from these accounts (C. GORE, 2011; La Republica, 2011). Although these decisions followed the rule of law, they were interpreted by subnational governments as an interference in regional issues. The freeze on Cajamarca's account was felt as a way of twisting Santos' arm to reduce his public opposition to Conga's project.²³ On a wider scope, it underscored the lack of autonomy that regions had despite the political and administrative decentralisation.²⁴

However, the decentralisation process did not undo much of the problems mentioned before. These were carried forward in this new process. In terms of interinstitutional relationship, coordination among the three levels of government is still problematic (Muñoz, 2014) and there is still not a clear delimitation of functions and responsibilities between these (Contraloria General, 2014, Comision Descentralizacion, 2013). Policy articulation across the three levels of government is still complex. Territorial development was already difficult between the provincial and district levels, and now the regional level made it more complicated (Muñoz, 2014). A way to overcome this obstacle was designed in the Decentralisation Law through the creation of Regional Coordination Councils (CCR). This institution was a space in which regional, provincial and district authorities, as well as members of civil society, got together to discuss regional development projects. Nonetheless, these were not as successful as planned. On the one hand, the Regional President did not participate in these councils to avoid compromising to specific policies in those meetings. On the other hand, the regional government institution did not have the capacity (or interest) to organise these councils on time

²³ Santos would later face multiple investigations and was jailed under corruption charges.


²⁴ Also, in other occasions the *Contraloria General de la República* issued a statement to the MEF asking to freeze the accounts of subnational governments where they detected corruption cases (Contraloria General de la Republica, 2014b, 2014c). In other instances, Regional Governors have continued to have issues with the delay of public resources transfer to the regions, whether for specific projects or usually at the beginning of the fiscal year.

(Defensoria, 2007). In her study, McNulty (2011) makes an assessment of the result of participatory institutions brought by the decentralisation process in Peru, and focuses her study in the CCR in six Peruvian regions. The results of these CCR were mixed in the regions: some did not even meet the legal minimum number of meetings per year (Ayacucho, Loreto) whilst others were able to successfully function during the years of her study (Lambayeque). Most importantly, she considered that the role of the regional leadership was a key factor to determine the successful implementation of a CCR and the outcomes derived from it (McNulty, 2011).²⁵ The decentralisation process was unable to foster an organised territorial development, a concerted effort to expand the state reach across the region under new regional institutional arrangement.

On the democratic dimension, the participation of the citizenry in the decision-making process can be shown in the participatory budget (*presupuesto participativo*) or public audiences (*audiencias públicas*). The former is a mechanism through which citizens, members of civil society and subnational authorities can jointly agree and prioritise which projects should be present in the next fiscal year's budget. It was one of many other participatory reforms implemented that year (McNulty, 2011). However, this process had its difficulties. One of them was that participatory budget became an elitist experience, in which only a small group of people actually had the know-how on the process (Grompone, 2005). Even within this elitist experience, the same municipal organisations and offices did not have the capabilities to implement successfully this type of citizen participation, and not all relevant stakeholders were included (or invited) to the process (Acosta, 2018). This situation was a direct result of the simultaneous twofold decentralisation process (political and administrative) undertaken by the central government. The *audiencias públicas* was a space of accountability, where the Regional Governor (or its representative) would present the advancements on policies within the region and receive feedback from the citizens. These had to happen twice a year. However, not all regions fulfilled this expectation. Furthermore, it became mostly a space to comply formally with the legal requirement, but its content was mostly presented by each regional office on the things they have achieved (whether or not these were related to citizens' needs).

²⁵ The author suggests that the leadership of the Regional President, Yehude Simon, and his energetic involvement in the CCR made Lambayeque a successful case.

Graph N° 4.3 – Percentage of offices won by regional parties during the ERM (2002-2018)



Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert


A key element of decentralisation was the creation of a new type of political party: the regional party. This new political organisation was labelled by different laws, including the Law of Political Parties (Law N° 28094) as a regional movement (*movimiento regional*). The idea behind this distinction is that only political parties (*partidos políticos*) were the ones that could present authorities to all level of governments (national, regional, provincial, and district) whilst the remaining political organisations could not be called political parties but rather regional movements or organisations of a local scope (*organizaciones políticas de alcance local*). This was an absurd nomenclature distinction since all of these were political parties; the only difference was their territorial/jurisdictional reach.²⁶ Whilst a national party could present candidates in all 25 Peruvian regions, a regional party could only present candidates in its region. Thus, a regional party from Cajamarca was not allowed to present candidates in the region of Ayacucho, or elsewhere). It was, however, able to present candidates in all of the provinces and districts of Cajamarca. The same rules applied to provincial or district parties: they could only present

²⁶ Following this idea, I will use the terminology national parties, regional parties, and local parties (provincial and district parties), instead of the one established by the Peruvian legislature.

candidates within their jurisdiction (e.g. the provincial party of Cutervo could not present candidates for the province of Bambamarca). Nonetheless, this absurd nomenclature distinction created an unequal playing field between the political parties at the subnational level. A national party had to fulfil more requisites to present its candidates. It had to follow internal democracy, present funding sources, and other requisites that the regional and local parties were exempt from (Seifert, 2014; Tanaka, 2010).

These issues are minor in relation to the impact on the configuration of the political party system in Peru at a subnational level. The creation of these parties entailed a denationalisation of the subnational political party system. Furthermore, it created 25 different subnational party systems. Peru has a political party system at a national level, and 25 different parties at a subnational level. This is mostly related to the fact that regional parties became the main political-electoral force, and, as mentioned before, regional parties can only participate in their own region. They have continuously won more offices since the Regional and Municipal Elections of 2002. In the ERM 2002, regional parties won 28% of Regional Presidencies, 16% of Provincial Municipalities and 12% of District Municipalities; in the ERM 2014 they won 72% of Regional Presidencies, 72% of Provincial Municipalities and 61% of District Municipalities (Seifert, 2016). As seen in Table N° 5.1, the regional parties have won the majority of representative offices disputed in the regional and municipal areas since 2010 (in 2006 they already had won the vast majority of regional governments – 18 out of 25). This predominance of the regional parties at the subnational level has not come with a stable political party system in each region. Most of the regional parties have a short life span, and do not endure more than two consecutive elections. As shown by Seifert (2014), there is a high party volatility in Peruvian regions of around 65% between elections. This means that from election to election, on average, 65% of the parties did not participate (nor existed) in the previous election (Seifert, 2014). In some cases, this number can reach even 80%, as in the case of Madre de Dios between the ERM of 2006 and 2010, where eight out of 10 parties were completely new and did not participate in the previous election. This high party volatility is the norm in Peruvian subnational elections. Thus, decentralisation denationalised the subnational political party system where the main electoral-political actor became the regional party, and, at the same time, 25 sub-systems with higher party volatility were also created.

Graph N° 4.4 – Voter preference: National vs Regional parties (2002-2018)



Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Furthermore, decentralisation created a clear preference from the voter towards regional parties. In Graph N° 4.2, I show the voter's preference according to the type of political parties. Each regional and municipal election year is represented in the x column, and the y column shows the percentage of votes that each type of party got in that election. The percentage is an average of the votes obtained by regional and national parties at every level of election (regional, provincial, and district). Thus, in the 2002 ERM, we see that 65% of citizens across all subnational levels voted for a national party, whilst only 18% voted for a regional party. This scenario would complete change by the 2010, where 61% of the votes were for regional parties and 35% of the votes went towards national parties. The regional parties would continue to be the preferred option until the 2018 ERM. Here there would be a tie, since 50% voted for national parties, whilst 49% voted for regional parties. This electoral loss for the regional parties is due to the introduction of Law N° 30305 that was approved in 2015. The dotted line in Graph N° 4.4 depicts the moment when this Law was introduced. This Law eliminated the immediate re-election for subnational authorities. This meant that incumbents at the three levels of government, were unable to run for re-election in the next elections. They would need to sit down in the next election, and then run again for the same office. As seen previously between 2011-2014, a

lot of Regional Governors²⁷ were involved in corruption scandals or illegal activities. These were the cases of Yvan Vasquez (Loreto), Cesar Alvarez (Ancash), Felix Moreno (Callao), Wilfredo Ocorima (Ayacucho), among others. The confluency of these cases at the national level was used by the Congress to approve very quickly the law that eliminated the immediate re-election for subnational authorities for the same office. No proper investigation was put forward by Congress to study the consequences of this law. It was motivated by political interest from the national parties. The introduction of this constraint was used by the national parties to regain political-electoral control at the subnational level. They lost political-electoral control over the regions and, without the possibility of regaining this through elections, decided to introduce this law to disincentivise the participation of regional parties.

4.2 Mapping democratic state performance


In this subsection I will show the map of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions. Peru has four levels of government: national, regional, provincial and district. The last three levels are considered the subnational levels, which are politically and administratively divided in 25 regions, 195 provinces, and 1842 districts. I will use the operationalisation previously discussed (Chapter 3) to build a map that traces the differences between regions over time.

As seen in the Methodology section, the concept of democratic state performance is the outcomes achieved by a set of institutions that exercise legitimate power over a delimitate territory. By deconstructing this concept, the idea of power is related to the subdimension of state capacity and its legitimacy relates to the quality of democracy. The former is composed by its territorial reach and the enforcement of its decisions, whilst the latter is related to the participation, pluralism and representation principles. Following the results of the confirmatory factor analysis I present here the mapping of the democratic state performance across the regions based on the scores for each of them. In order to compare the regions, the scores were normalised between 0 (lowest performance) and 1 (highest performance).

²⁷ This was the same law that changed the name from Regional President to Regional Governor.

When mapping the democratic state performance of 2002 across Peruvian regions, the first result I saw is that there are high-performance regions and low-performance regions. This means that quality of democracy is spread unevenly across the Peruvian territory. Some regions have better electoral turnout, have better levels of representation and their political system is less fragmented. By the same token, the state's capacity has a patchy presence, and some regions enjoy higher provision of public good/services whilst others are still forgotten. The political development in those high-performance regions creates a differentiated experience for its citizens to those in the low performance regions. Now, by mapping the same construct in 2018, I see that the unevenness still persists. Democratic state performance is higher in some regions, whilst in others it is still lower. However, during this 16-year period (2002-2018) there is consistency between those at the top and those at the bottom. Table N° 4.1 shows the top 25% of the regions and the bottom 25%. Five out of six regions have maintained their top position (Moquegua, Ica, Tacna, Callao, Arequipa) whilst four out the six lowest performing regions are the same in 2002 and 2018 (Huánuco, Cusco, Huancavelica, Amazonas). The other two that improved their performance are, nonetheless, the following two after the cut-off point. This close relationship between top-bottom 25% regions in 2002 and 2018, can also be seen in Graph N° 4.5. Here it is possible to see all the regions and compare them across time. The high-performance and low-performance regions can be easily spotted for grouping.

Graph N° 4.5 – Democratic State performance in Peru (2002 & 2018)




Source: Own calculation based on data from INEI – ENAHO 2002 and ENAHO 2018.

Table N° 4.1 – High/low democratic state performance

Top-Bottom 5	2002	2018
High performance	Callao	Ica
	Lima	Arequipa
	Tacna	Callao
	Moquegua	Lambayeque
	Ica	Moquegua
Low performance	Arequipa	Arequipa
	Ayacucho	Huánuco
	Cajamarca	Ayacucho
	Huánuco	Cusco
	Cusco	Cajamarca
	Huancavelica	Huancavelica
	Amazonas	

Graph N° 4.6 – Democratic state performance 2002 vs 2018




Correlation $r = .72$

These results show that the political development undergone by each region has been different. Even within a unitary state, the quality of democracy spreads unequally within nations, and the state capacity is unevenly distributed across the territory. At the same time, I test the democratic state performance concept across different time periods at the first year and last year of analysis in 2002 and 2018 (Graph N° 4.6), as well as with two periods, 2002-2010 and 2011-2018 (Graph N° 4.7). The Pearson correlation between the first year and the last year is 0.72. The results from these graphs show the stability of the democratic state performance concept. The decentralisation process created the same institutional design for each region. The same political institutions were created (regional government, regional parties), the same democratic processes were implemented (public audiences, participatory budget), and the same government instrument were installed (Regional Concerted Plans) across all regions. This institutional blueprint was imposed from the national to the subnational level equally

across the territory. Thus, this performance stability between regions shows that that despite the equal institutional design and arrangement within a unitary state, each has followed a different political development path across the years.

Graph N° 4.7 – Democratic state performance, 2002-2010 and 2011-2018




Correlation $r = .84$

This stability is more striking when comparing the two time periods (correlation goes up to 0.84). The division of periods serves a twofold purpose. First, it is a mid-point in temporal times. This way it is possible to compare two distinct time periods and see if there is a difference between these. Second, and more interestingly, it has a political and electoral division as well. The first period 2002-2010 is the time where the national political parties won the majority of public offices. Most regions and public offices at the subnational level were under the control of national political parties. This meant that these had the decision-making power over the political development of each region. Improvements


on state capacity and democracy fall under their scope of action. These parties lost their electoral and political hegemony from 2010 onwards at the subnational level. From this point, it was the regional parties who controlled most offices and made the decisions over the development of the regions. As mentioned before, regional parties are circumscribed to their region, thus are mostly focused on their territory without the distraction of events at the national level, nor with neighbouring regions. Furthermore, the creation of regional parties and their relative short life spans created the impression that those regions under the control of these parties would suffer with politicians with lesser experience. However, the consistency of the results between time periods would suggest that there is no difference if the region is under the control of national or regional parties.

The democratic state performance trajectory over the years is different for each region. Graph N° 4.8 displays from 2002 to 2018 how each dimension has panned out. The performance has been plotted over a continuum between 0 and 1, where 0 is lowest performance and 1 the highest. In most cases, the trajectories of democratic state performance are smooth without any major spikes. As with the previous results, most of the regions stayed within a similar level of performance along the years. Some notable exceptions are Ayacucho and Huancavelica that have consistently improved their democratic state performance since 2002. However, there are cases like Loreto, Tacna and Tumbes where it is possible to see more sudden movements on their performance across the years. Thus, a closer look on how the dimensions of state capacity and quality of democracy individually behaved across the years are shown in Graph N° 4.9.

Graph N° 4.8.- Democratic state performance across regions over time (2002-2018)



Graph N° 4.9 – State capacity and quality of democracy in all regions (2002-2018)



Here it is possible to see that the state capacity dimension is stable and has no major variation across the years. This would be in line of what it is expected. State infrastructure and its formation across the territory is something that slowly changes over the time. It is very difficult to build state capacity within a four-year period. However, there are cases like Amazonas where state capacity had a steep decrease in its performance but would then later quickly recuperate to previous levels. Nonetheless, it is the quality of democracy dimensions that is more irregular in comparison to state capacity. This irregularity can be seen in the previously mentioned cases of Loreto and Tumbes. In these regions, the quality of democracy has been all but stable. Loreto had better quality at the beginning of the millennia but suffered a stark decrease by the year 2010. It would later recover its quality but not at the previous level. This decline in democratic quality is aligned with the period where Loreto was under the government of Yvan Vasquez. This Regional Governor, from 2006 until 2014, would constantly attack the opposition and buy all local radio and TVs for their own political purposes.

This same decline, although not as steep as Loreto, can be found in Ancash as well. During the 2010-2014 period, Ancash's quality of democracy starkly decreases. Within this timeframe, Cesar Alvarez was in his second mandate as a Regional Governor, and this was the period in which the opposition were persecuted, and even murdered. This was the case of Ezequiel Nolasco, an ex-regional councillor that was murdered by a hitman man in 2014,²⁸ whilst Jose Luis Sanchez Milla, a vice-governor, died after receiving a bullet in his leg back in 2010. Furthermore, there was an informal intelligence office, *La Centralita*, that was dedicated to tap into the opposition leaders or journalist phones, and was used to pay bribes. Alvarez was able to deter any investigation during his mandate since he created a number of interinstitutional collaboration agreements with the Judicial Power, the Public Prosecutor, and the *Consejo Nacional de Magistratura* (the institution that elected the judges), where the regional government of Ancash paid for capacity building opportunities for the members of these organisations or built proper state infrastructure (offices) for them. The assassination of Ezequiel Nolasco would be the last straw and would break the boundary control that Alvarez had over its region. The news would become national, focusing all the attention on his government. He would later be arrested and was persecuted by the *Ministerio Público* for being the leader of a criminal organisation. Interestingly enough, whilst its quality of democracy was declining, its state capacity was improving. This is mostly related to the fact

²⁸ In January 2021 he was found guilty and sentenced to 35 years in prison for this murder. Cesar Alvarez would be involved in six more murder cases (Congreso de la Republica, 2015).

that during that period, Ancash was the region that received more *canon minero* than other regions. This money was used to build infrastructure, and the civil construction mafia was part of Alvarez's criminal organisation (Melgar, 2017). As mentioned before, Alvarez used the construction of public infrastructure as a medium to extend his network and control over the region.

The results in Graph N° 4.9 allows for a granularity on how the dimensions of democratic state performance are experienced in each region. First, there are some regions that display consistently better performance on one of the dimensions. This is the case of Cajamarca, Ica, Loreto, Puno, San Martin and Ucayali. In these cases, quality of democracy is always higher than state capacity, and the same happens the other way around. In the regions of Ancash, Lima, Madre de Dios and Moquegua, state capacity is better. As an analytical dimension, it is expected that one dimension could outperform the other in some regions, whilst underperform in others. Second, the nature of these dimensions means that state capacity fluctuates less over time since building capacity takes longer to be accomplished (or to be diminished). On the other hand, quality of democracy is more prone to the conjunctural vicissitudes of the electoral-political arena. Nonetheless, except for specific cases like Loreto, Madre de Dios, or Tacna, these dimensions have not presented across the regions a seismographic fluctuation, but rather consistency along the years.

In sum, I have mapped out the democratic state performance concept discussed in the previous chapter in each Peruvian region over time. The results of this mapping and bi-variate analysis show i) uneven performance of democratic state across Peruvian territory, with ii) high and low performance regions that iii) persist over time. The regions that had better performance at the beginning are still the top performing regions years after the decentralisation process began. In the next subsection I will approach the different factors that could explain this unevenness.

4.3 Different factors that affect performance

I have revised the main arguments presented in the scholarly literature that can explain the uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions. Based on these arguments I have built five different hypotheses to be tested.

H1: Regions with higher levels of economic modernisation will show higher democratic state performance

Modernisation is an encompassing process of massive changes that tends to “penetrate all domains of life, from economic activities to social life to political institutions” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 3071). It is a process that has been related to the transition from an agricultural society towards an industrialised one. The concept of modernisation²⁹ can be traced back to Karl Marx’s analysis of society where he puts forward the argument that the economic structure, its workforce and social relations have an impact on others aspects like society, religion, culture and the state (Marx & Engels, 2021). For the author the economy was the structure, and society, state, culture and religion formed a super-structure that was built upon the structure to sustain the interest of the dominant class (Marx & Engels, 2021). In other words, this is how a society organises the production of goods and creates social relations (of domination) that consequently shape other aspects of human life, like culture and politics.

The concept was later on embraced by Weber where he discusses the transition from traditional to modern societies (Weber, 1978), where the development of the modern state as a rational structure of bureaucracies built upon the division of labour and specialisation of work is intertwined with capitalism that also requires division of labour and specialisation to promote growth. The author underscored that societies subject to the forces of modernisation might have different trajectories, and these are related to cultural heritage such as religious beliefs (Weber, 2002). Afterwards, Parsons through his functional approach pushed the idea that traditional values in societies are barriers for progress and modernisation (Parsons, 1964). Modernisation is seen by these authors as the process and transition from an agricultural society to an industrialised one.

²⁹ It is important to note here that the notion of a progression in history, a key element in modernisation theory, comes from the Enlightenment era. Authors such as Edmund Burke, Thomas Malthus or Adam Smith conceptualised the idea of human progress. Nonetheless, it is Hegel in *Philosophy of World History* (1980) and *Philosophy of Right* (1991) where he lays out a teleological interpretation of history. History is a dialectic process with different stages (Oriental, Greek, Christian, and Germanic) where each *Volk* (the people) has objectified in institutions the conquest of freedom. This conquest of freedom becomes thus the common thread across all these historical stages. It is from this teleological interpretation of world history that Karl Marx builds his philosophy and how the modernisation process unfolds in industrialised economies. Although he would put at the centre stage the class struggles as the engine of historical teleological process, this struggle had as a cornerstone the Hegelian approach of the conquest of freedom.

The impact of modernisation on democracy was established by Lipset (1959). For the author there was a relationship with the level of economic development – industrialisation, urbanization, wealth and education – and the presence of democracy. As clearly stated by him “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 75). This line of thought was also followed by Moore in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1993). In his study of Great Britain, USA, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and China, he discusses three political outcomes that result from economic modernisation undergone by agrarian states. The three possible political outcomes were Western democracies (Great Britain, USA, France), fascism (Germany, Japan) and Communism (Russia, China). Here he stated that the result from the transition of agricultural to industrialised society, and from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones, was the result of a middle class (Moore, 1966). Succinctly, he said “no bourgeois, no democracy” (Moore, 1993, p. 418). This view was confirmed by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) where they addressed how industrialisation (and the organised labour that it produces) promotes democracy, whilst the landowning class acts as blockers of democratisation.

A critic of the thesis that economic development brings democracy (endogenous hypothesis) is the work from Przeworski et al. (2000). The authors suggest that democracy happens for no specific reason, but once achieved it is maintained and consolidated if the country passes a specific GDP per capita threshold. Nonetheless, this argument was debunked by Boix and Stokes (2003) by pointing out key methodological and statistical omissions from these authors. Furthermore, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) will follow this path by pointing out that Przeworski et al. (2000) misinterpreted their data and results, and according to these authors the data they used actually reinforces the endogenous hypothesis and confirms that industrialisation (and its subsequent economic development) brings democracy. Using Przeworski’s data they showed that “socioeconomic development does contribute to the emergence of democracy and it does so dramatically” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 169). For Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Przeworski’s theory does not ask the right question; the relevant question “is whether economic development produces more changes toward democracy than toward autocracy. Modernization theory implies that economic development does exactly this” (p. 168).

For Boix & Stokes (2003) the emphasis should be on income inequality as a trigger of democratisation. For them, development as a result of modernisation reduces the incentives that actors faced when choosing dictatorship by introducing income equality. Thus, this is not related to income per se but

that “income equality causes countries to democratised and to sustain democracy” (Boix & Stokes, 2003, p. 544). For Wucherpfennig & Deutsch (2009), this argument provides a general framework that focuses on structural conditions integrating class relations and elite choices (p. 4). Within this economic line of argument is the work of Acemoglu & Robinson (2006), when they consider that democratisation occurs when the elite open the participation to a wider public in order to avoid the threats of a revolution from below. Thus, democratisation is the struggle through which *de facto* power becomes *de jure* power via the creation of political institutions that crystallise this re-alignment of power. For example, middle class can push for broader participation and access to power and this re-alignment happens usually under specific conjunctures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006).³⁰ Meanwhile, in her pursuit to find a relationship between social capital and democracy, Paxton (2002) actually found in her structural equation model that “there is a positive effect of industrialisation on democracy” (p. 266).

The changes produced by modernisation had an impact on the state capacity as well. As mentioned by Weber, industrialisation brought the specialisation of labour where each individual produced a specific task in the production of goods. The creation of a rational modern state with its bureaucracies followed this same pattern (Weber, 1978). Bureaucracies acquired the same principles of division of labour, each office (and bureaucrat) performing a specific duty in production and implementation of state policies. The concentration of a broader mass of human resources impacted the state services and its taxable base, fostering even more the need for capacity building and specialisation. A caveat to introduce here is that I am not assuming that industrialisation created the main characteristic of a centralised state with bureaucracies. The emergence of a centralised state with bureaucracies, a standing army that enforces the law across the territory and collects taxes, can be found in China back in the Qin dynasty around 221 B.C. China was the first country to create a centralised state with meritocratic recruitment for the bureaucrats. Nonetheless, this type of centralised power and bureaucracies was not impersonal. The division between Emperor (person) and state (institution) was not present yet. The key feature of the rational modern state, as Weber saw it, is an impersonal

³⁰ The influence of Aristotle’s *Politics* can be seen in this depiction. He saw the role of middle-class as catalyser for democratic government. Although he certainly did not class democracy as understood in the twentieth century, the Greek Philosopher saw the necessity of the middle class to avoid the arbitrary use of power by the King (Aristoteles, 1988). Furthermore, he saw the political regime as the result of the balance of power between social forces. This same idea was going to be followed by Tilly in his conceptualisation of regimes as the result of the political contention between the actors involved (Tilly, 2010)

character and a division of bureaucracies based upon a common set of rules, where the bureaucrat was not the owner of the office but rather followed the rules established for/by that office. This impersonal division of labour at the state level was the common thread with industrialisation. Furthermore, the impact of industrialisation on state formation can be seen in how the European modern states have emerged and the differences between them can be explained by the timing of the industrial revolution (Ertman, 1997; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012). Thus, the diversification of state services and widening of state capacities is another concomitant of modernisation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007).

In the Latin American case Kurtz (2013) analysed the impact of the type of labour on state building and development during the post-independence era. The author finds that those countries with an absent labour-repressive relations of productions (as found mostly in agricultural societies) are able to have a long-term state building resulting in states with higher capacity. With a slight difference, Soifer (2015) explains the importance of ideals for the onset of state building project. For him, the reasons for the failure of the modern state formation in Latin America start with a previous premise: why do state formation projects even start. The creation of industrialised metropolitan cities, where the elite can apprehend such an ideal of state formation, would be the stepping stone to start this project. Thus, industrialisation created conditions for the elite to discuss and consent to a state building project.

H2: Democratic state performance will be higher in subnational units with higher levels of social modernisation

Modernisation theory considers also the social determinants of democratic state. This current of social modernisation considers the role of education in the development process of society and its impact on the transition and consolidation of democracy has gathered much attention (Barro, 1999; Benavot, 1996; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Glaeser et al., 2007; Lipset, 1981; Meyer, 1977; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008; Saint-Paul & Verdier, 1993). The expansion of mass education creates citizens that are aware of their rights, builds a sense of common national culture, fortifies social interactions, and creates a civic culture that improves its political participation. Democracy serves as an institutional arrangement to resolve conflicts and a more educated population will change the swords for words. Education serves to support the democratic state as it enables a population “to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic

doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices” (Lipset, 1959, p. 79). Thus, access to education is central to the construction of a citizen that would support democracy.

A society where the majority of its population is educated has a positive relationship with democracy. In his sample of 104 countries between 1965 and 2000, Castelló-Climent (2008) finds that an equal distribution of education (mass education) is a better predictor of democracy. Educational attainment by the majority of the society is a relevant variable when stimulating democracy. On the other hand, the concentration of education in few individuals does not promote democracy (p. 186). These findings are aligned with the model presented by Bourguignon & Verdier (2000) on the relationship between oligarchy, education and democracy. For the authors, political participation depends on the level of education that is promoted by the oligarchy to gain from the economic externalities from the subsequent economic growth and would deter the danger of future expropriation. Furthermore, as stated by Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008), democracy is more likely to emerge and consolidate in educated countries. Using modernisation theory as the core for their analysis, they use a sample from 1960 until 2005, with a special focus on the third wave democracy period (from 1990-2005). The authors find that there is a “significant correlation between the level of education and democracy” (p. 374). Economic development, measured as GDP, has also a positive relationship with democracy, although it is more pronounced with education. They even found that education not only affects the likelihood of democratisation, but “also how fast and deep democratic reforms will be” (p. 374). For the authors, these results support the modernisation theory on the probability of democracy on more educated (and economic developed) countries.

Studies have considered that the democracy is achieved in countries as a result of the relationship between education and economic growth. Human capital would foster economic productivity and development, that would then later improve the institutional quality and restraint on government. In their cross-national study from 1960-2000, Glaeser et al.'s (2004) results showed that the initial level of education has an impact on subsequent economic growth. The accumulation of higher human capital and economic growth would shape institutional improvement. Countries with higher education are stable democracies and have grown faster than less educated ones. Those countries with largest primary school enrolments in 1900 had the greatest economic development a century later. For the authors, evidence shows the primacy of human capital (education) for both growth and democratisation. This idea that more prosperous and educated societies are more democratic is also

aligned with the study of Barro (1999). In his panel study of over 100 countries in the period 1960-1995, his results showed that the propensity of democracy increases with GDP per capita and education (primary schooling). An interesting find in this paper is that those countries that have a wider gap between men and women in education are less democratic. Thus, equitable access to education is a cornerstone for democracy. The idea of equitable access to education is also present in Saint-Paul & Verdier (1993), where they stressed the positive effect of redistribution of public education on democratisation and economic growth. In their model public education is provided in an egalitarian way, increasing intergenerational human capital, which fosters economic growth. This is aligned with the results from Webb (2013), where higher educational attainments showed a positive and significant relationship with higher productivity levels in Peru.

Other studies have focused on the relationship between education, political participation, civic culture and democracy. Mass education expands the social meaning of citizenship, personhood and individuality (Meyer, 1977). Education helps to shape a common ground between its individuals and creates an assumption of national culture and language over which civic order can be built. The schools help to construct a common reality that can be shared between members. Mass education builds a nation and helps to bring a citizen to the public realm (Meyer, 1977) with awareness of their rights as a member of a larger community. An educated individual is more prone to political participation creating civic culture, and the emergence of a democratic state (Glaeser et al., 2007). For these authors, education and democracy are highly correlated since the latter raises the benefits of political activity. School teaches the students that political participation is good: it lowers the costs of social interactions and facilitates the seamless exchange of information (Glaeser et al., 2007). It socialises the young people and promotes civic engagement. By raising the benefits of political participation, education “encourages democracy, both by increasing its stability and by increasing the probability of transition to democracy” (Glaeser et al., 2007, p. 85). Thus, a better educated nation will preserve and protect its democracy more. These results are aligned with the study of Benavot (1996). Participation in national educational systems heightens the awareness of political institutions, where better educated and high skill workers are more inclined to organise themselves and make political demands to the state. The author focuses on the effects of education on the emergence and consolidation of democracy between 1965 and 1998, and he finds that higher education has a strong, positive and statistically significant relationship effect on democratisation (p. 400).

Furthermore, research has shown the interrelation between education, democracy and state capacity. In their natural experiment in the early nineteenth century city of New York, USA, Paulsen et al. (2022) found that state investment in public education had a positive effect on income as well as electoral turnout. Those areas that had more public education funds created a more participatory democratic culture and were favourable to democracy (p. 17). In a similar line, the work of Ansell & Lindvall (2020) showed how the expansion of public education as major public service fostered state capacity through a process of disputes with the church. In their study of nineteen countries between 1800-1939, public education was mostly given at the local level by the church or community-run schools, and by the end of the period it was the main public service centralised at the state national level. During the early twentieth century it became intertwined with democratic politics as a major issue on mass education. This dispute between church and the state on the control of education is highlighted by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as a major cleavage, and its role in their defined era of democratic revolution post 1789. The work of Dittmar & Meisenzahl (2016) exhibits how the Reformation era in Germany change the provision of public goods from church towards the state. The new role adopted by municipalities to deliver education fostered the state capacity and improved economic growth. This interrelation between education and state capacity is also found by Uslaner & Rothstein (2016). Although their focus is on how higher levels of education are more important to diminish corruption (than wealth or democracy), their study between 1870 and 2010 showed that state capacity “depends upon citizens who are more educated and more loyal to the state” (p. 240).

In sum, social modernisation theory puts forward the social determinants for the emergence and consolidation of the democratic state. It focuses on how education (human capital) influences democratisation, as well as economic growth, institutional quality, political participation, civic culture, that help to sustain the democratic political institutions. Following this approach, I would expect that higher educational attainment within a subnational unit leads to a higher performance of its democratic state.

H3: Democratic state performance will be higher in subnational units with higher levels of social capital

Social capital refers to the ability of people to work together in groups (J. S. Coleman, 1988), to any instance “in which people cooperate for common ends on the basis of shared informational norms

and values” (Fukuyama, 2002, p.23). For Fukuyama (2002), social capital is “critical for successful democracy” (p. 26) and for development as it is a vital underpinning of democracy which “is the source of legitimacy for the political framework in which development increasingly takes place” (p. 27).

This was the main concept used by Putnam et al. (1994) to explain why different regions in Italy had higher levels of institutional performance (quality of government). According to Putnam, better institutional performance was shown by the northern regions of Italy due to their higher level of social capital, measured through the density of the civil society networks (or civic community) and participation (Putnam et al., 1994). The southern regions had lower levels of social capital and thus, a worse institutional performance. For the authors, social capital creates trust, reciprocity, shared values, among others that improve the quality of government institutions. Now, the impact of social capital on democracy has been studied by Paxton (2002) as well. Using a structural equation model approach, she found that there was a reciprocal relationship between social capital and democracy. She operationalised social capital with two variables: trust and membership to associations. In her model she found out that the type of association can have an impact on democracy, where more connected associations (versus isolated type of associations) are more beneficial to democracy. Thus, she concludes by pointing out that “social capital was found to promote democracy while a return effect from democracy to social capital was also established. The analysis also confirms that certain types of associations do better in promoting democracy” (p. 272).

Nonetheless, the compelling argument from Putnam cannot be translated to a Latin American scenario (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Evans, 1997) mainly because its explanatory variable (civic community) has its roots in the specific historical context of Italy, the creation of republics and the fostering of civic virtues in these republics (Putnam et al., 1994). Latin American political development over the last 500 years is marked by the impact of colonial rule over pre-existing civilisations in modern Peru and Mexico (Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012). Furthermore, Evans (1997) points out that one of the problems in Third World countries is the “scaling up” micro-level social capital “to generate solidarity ties and social actions on a scale that is politically and economically efficacious” (p. 191). However, he does recognise the importance of social capital in the synergy between state and society, and how this can improve developmental goals. This insight can be corroborated in public health studies where they measure how social capital has been positively correlated to better health outcomes.

As stated by Kawachi et al. (2008) social capital can influence health at different levels of action (p. 15).

On the other hand, the importance of social capital and a vibrant civil society as a condition for democracy to flourish can be traced back to Tocqueville (2015). This idea is also followed by Diamond (1997), where a democracy requires a “public that is organised for democracy, socialised to its norms and values [...] Such a civic public is only possible with a vibrant ‘civil society’” (p. 5). Furthermore, the role of civil society as an area for democratic survival has been tested by Bernhard et al. (2015). The authors showed that a higher developed civil society shapes the survival of democracy by influencing the “ability of actors to hold each other accountable for attempted defection from democratic norms and practices” (Bernhard et al., 2015). This is also present in the role of local network when fostering political participation, as shown in Remmer’s (2010) study where these had an important role in mobilising voters in local elections. The idea that a vibrant civil society is necessary for democracy to flourish is also present in John Locke (2014). For the author, the creation of a civil society was necessary to restrict and constrain the arbitrary use of state power.³¹ Following these studies, it would be expected that regions with a strong civil society and social capital would have higher levels of democratic state performance.

H4: Democratic state performance will be higher in regions with higher levels of subnationalism

Social solidarity was one of the main focuses in Durkheim’s work. For the author, social solidarity emerges through social interaction and the role of social institutions (Durkheim, 1972). Within this idea, all society implies a “cohesion between individuals as well as between individuals and society” (Gofman, 2014). Furthermore, social solidarity can explain attitudes towards welfare state and redistribution policies taken by countries (Rodger, 2003). It is a set of attitudes “of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017, p. 3). A key component

³¹ This is Locke’s main critic to Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. To constrain the arbitrary power of the Leviathan, it was necessary to create first a social contract between the individuals that would serve as a constraint to a second social contract with the state (Leviathan). This way the individual was going to be protected and was going to be able to defend his life, property and freedom against the state actions. The state (and government) was thus created to protect these elements and, thus, since its inception was naturally constrained (Locke, 2014). This two-step process is not present in Hobbes’ theory of state, rendering the individuals defenseless to the state.

in this last view is that a lower social solidarity can be understood as the hegemony of markets and individualism (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).

Building upon this concept, Singh (2016) explains uneven social development across the territory through the presence of social solidarity between the elites and its constituents within Indian states. The different levels on education and health outcomes can be explained by the presence of a cohesive subnational identity in different Indian states (Singh, 2016). The author puts forward an identity politics argument, where regions with higher levels of subnationalism – a sense of belonging to the same community – have better outcomes in health and education. Subnationalism is fostered by the subnational elite and spreads through socio-political movements. This explains why the elite in an Indian state invest in development projects that will benefit the majority of the population, instead of following the narrow interest of them. Thus, Indian states that show a lower level of subnationalism, where subnational solidarity is not triggered, the elite implements fewer development policies beneficial for the population in that state.

Furthermore, the concept of subnationalism would resolve the problem of collective action making it easier to implement policies for the majority of the people. A country (or subnational unit) with higher levels of solidarity would make it easier to foster democratic outcomes and/or redistributive policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2017), and it is a “necessary, even if not sufficient, condition of a just or fair society” (p. 7). Nonetheless, national or societal solidarity does remain bounded.

H5: Democratic state performance will be higher in regions with higher democratic political culture

It was Verba and Almond's (1963) seminal work on political culture that fostered studies on the relation between culture and democracy. Political culture is understood as “attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. [...] It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes” (Verba & Almond, 1963, p. 12). For the authors the patterns of attitudes, values and beliefs about politics can explain the presence of democracy in a particular country, like the cases of Britain and United States.

The impact of culture on political institutions can be traced back to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* where he stated that the state and its institutions were the crystallisation of the rational consciousness of a population (Hegel, 1991). Thus, a society that has gone through a process of consciousness where it realised that to conquer its freedom it needs to build the democratic values, attitudes and culture, in the institutions that will foster their freedom. Or, from another perspective, democratic values and principles cannot be exported and implemented in those countries that have not gone through this rational process of consciousness that unfolds those values. This latter approach is what Norris (2012) called *democratic promotion* that is promoted by the international community. Nonetheless, it is important that the belief in the democratic process is shared by the population and political actors to ensure the consolidation of democracy. It must be considered as the “only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

A similar view is held by Inglehart & Welzel (2005) when they consider that the self-expression values that emerge in a post-industrial society are the main explanatory factor for the emergence of democracy. Furthermore, they consider that democratic stability is due to these self-expression values. For the authors, Latin American countries should have higher levels of effective democracy considering their public values, but to achieve this they would need a stronger state (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). On the importance of culture, shared values and belief systems it was Max Weber (2002) who pushed forward the cultural explanation to the centre of his argument when tracing the ideas of ascetic Protestantism as a force that shaped the capitalist spirit in the world and higher levels of development of the countries that embraced it.

The effect of political culture on democracy can be seen in Latin America. Heras (2004) states that a full democratisation has not been reached due to cultural factors. Based on the Latinobarometro, she shows that still there is a considerable percentage of people that do not fully embrace democracy as the best form of government. The colonial heritage and the values it impregnated in Latin American culture (intolerance, social differentiation, Catholicism, semi-feudal orientation) would be the main reason why the democratisation process has not been fully achieved. This same line of thought is followed by Wiarda (1989) when stating that “the political culture, inherited from Spain, has been absolutist, elitist, hierarchical, corporatist, and authoritarian” and has constrained the democratic development of Dominican Republic (p. 450). The importance of a democratic culture as a fundamental aspect to consolidate the democratic transition is pointed out by Avritzer (1995) when studying the Brazilian case. For the author, democratisation occurs when actors' values are compatible

with those needed for implemented democratic practices (Avritez, 1995, p.8). This apprehension is underscored by Diamond et al. (1989) for specific Latin American countries when stating that “the development and maintenance of democracy is greatly facilitated by values and behavioural dispositions (particularly at the elite level) of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (p. 13). Following these arguments on the association of political culture on democracy I would expect that the higher a democratic political culture in a region, the higher the democratic state performance of that region.

H6: Democratic state performance will be higher in subnational units that have lower levels of inequality

The relationship between inequality and the democratic state has been a main topic in political science. In his work, Dahl (1973) stated that inequality had an impact on the decision-making process that underpinned the democratisation process. In a country with a “hegemonic regime, extreme inequalities in the distribution of key values reduce the chances that a stable system of public contestation will develop” (Dahl, 1973, p. 103). Economic inequality undermines the emergence and consolidation of democracy.

The positive effects of economic development on democracy can be counteracted by the levels of inequality. For Muller (1995), explaining the positive relationship between economic development and democracy is limited because it cannot account for those countries with higher income that were non-democratic or those whose democracy levels declined during the 1960s and 1970s. Focusing on the 1965 and 1980 period, the author shows that the countries that experienced a process of economic development exacerbated income inequality and this explains the “declines in levels of democracy in moderately developed countries” (p. 971). Inequality has an inverted-U function with economic development that hinders the emergence of democracy in countries that are experiencing economic growth. However, once the breakpoint is reached, inequality reduces, economic development continues and the emergence and stability of a democratic political system is possible. In a similar vein, Houle (2016) shows that the effect of inequality on democratisation is contingent to the level of economic development. Inequality is unrelated to poor authoritarian regimes, but those in the middle level of development inequality can foster democratisation.

Following this line of thought, Boix (2003) considers inequality as a determinant of democracy. In countries with low levels of inequalities, the elite has little to fear regarding redistribution policies, and thus, are more willing to tolerate democracy. However, where higher inequality exists the median voter will pursue policies that would redistribute the wealth of the economic elite. Inequality becomes a trigger of the democratisation process. This is later followed in his work with Stokes, where they studied the endogenous theory of democratisation and stated that it is not income per se but rather that “income equality causes countries to [be] democratised and sustain democracy” (Boix & Stokes 2003, p. 544). Furthermore, some studies have shown that inequality has an impact on political participation, where citizens living in unequal societies tend to participate less in electoral processes (Anderson & Beramendi, 2008; Goodin & Dryzek, 1980; Solt, 2008). However, these have been mostly focused on Western countries, and the work from Stockemer and Scruggs (2012) shows that this association does not hold up when accounting for non-Western countries.

A more equal distribution of wealth would entail a larger middle-class proportion, which would promote democratic institutions and infrastructure capital. In his work, Easterly (2001) shows that the middle class consensus, low inequality and low ethnic divisions, are associated with more social modernisation and more democracy. Middle class consensus reduces the incentive for polarisation and decreased suppression of civil liberties, reaching a consensus on public goods and overall economic development. Further, it is associated with higher levels of infrastructure capital accumulation (Easterly, 2001).

Nonetheless, there are some authors that have questioned the linear positive relationship between inequality and democracy. In this instance more democracy can lead to more inequality, and only after a specific breakpoint does more democracy come with less equality. In his study between 1960-1997, Chong (2004) found that the relationship between these two is non-monotonic, where more democracy in the Polity IV measure increases the Gini coefficient. However, after a breakpoint, more democracy means lower inequality. On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2015) believed that this topic is far from having reached a consensus. They did not find any effect between democracy and inequality. However, in those countries with powerful landed elites, democratisation might increase inequality. The type of assets over which the elite relies for their wealth accumulation is echoed in Robinson’s model (2006). For the author “democracy is more likely when the elite are industrialist than when they are landowners. Democratization will be more likely in a more industrialized society,

where the elite own significant physical and human capital, than in a more agricultural society, where the elite are mainly invested in land” (p. 510).

Other studies have highlighted the relationship between inequality and state capacity and their link with democracy. In their work, Cárdenas & Tuzemen (2010) find that the presence of political instability (internal wars) and income inequality (Gini coefficient) leads to lower investment in state capacity. Furthermore, inequality has a significant negative correlation with “all of the measures of state capacity” (p. 31). On the other hand, Soifer (2013) shows that the relationship of inequality and state capacity is as a mediator to democratisation. Boix (2003) shows that income inequality would foster the emergence of democracy but only on those countries that have a strong state capacity. Inequality and democracy have a conditional relationship, since a weak state cannot extract wealth and thus would not pose a threat to the economic elite. Thus, the predicted “effect of inequality on democracy is only significant where the state is strong” (p.19).

Finally, although the relationship between inequality and democratic state is still contested, it is clear that the relationship still holds for those countries that experience economic development and are going through a modernisation process, changing the characteristic of its economic workforce. Thus, the economic and social development undergone by the region as a process of modernisation would be characterised by an increase of inequality. I would expect that a region with higher levels of inequality has a low-performance democratic state.

To sum up, the H1 says that economic modernisation would explain the level of democratic state performance. Regions that are more industrialised, have higher levels in their workforce in non-agricultural jobs, and are less agrarian would have higher performance. The H2 states that social modernisation crystallised via public education reaffirms that those regions with higher levels of educational attainments have higher democratic state performance. Inversely, those with lower levels of education would be low-performance regions. On the other hand, H3 states that, actually, it is social capital that would explain the (uneven) democratic state performance. The stronger the civil society and its network among citizens, the higher its democratic state performance. In a similar vein, H4 establishes that the sense of belonging to a region – subnationalism – would explain this unevenness. Higher subnationalism entails a higher level of social solidarity, where elites and non-elites push

forward to a common good for the region, resulting in better democratic and state results. Political culture as stated in H5 would suggest that the more engrained the democratic values are in a region, the better results on a democratic state would be shown. Finally, H6 states that it is the level of inequality that explains the level of performance in each region. Inequality has been considered a determinant of democratisation and state capacity, so those regions with higher inequality would show lower levels of democratic state performance.

4.4 Testing hypotheses

In this subsection I will show the results from the regression analysis that test the hypotheses between the independent variables – economic modernisation, social modernisation, political culture, social capital, subnationalism, and inequality – and the dependent variable – democratic state performance.

The dependent variable for this research is democratic state performance from the 25 Peruvian regions from 2002 until 2018. The data is based on National Census, Regional and Municipal Elections, and National Survey of Household.³² Now, for the first independent variable, modernisation, this has been operationalised in different ways. Since modernisation is the transition from agrarian societies towards industrialised ones, it has been operationalised as the characteristic of a country's workforce, e.g. the percentage of the population that works in industry/services versus agriculture (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Another way modernisation has been operationalised is according to economic development, e.g. GDP per capita (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Putnam, 1994; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012). Furthermore, modernisation has also been measured via its socio-economic consequences like illiteracy rates or percentage of people below the poverty line (Lipset, 1959). Nonetheless, since modernisation is considered as the transition from an agricultural societal structure towards an industrial one, the most appropriate measure of modernisation is the one followed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the characteristics of the workforce of a population, and it is the one I will use. The data that I will use is the percentage of labour workforce in non-agricultural activities. This is aligned with the H1 and the information is gathered from the National Census from 1993, 2007 and 2017, and the ENAHO survey.

³² The sources have been explained in the Methodology section, Chapter 3.

The second variable, public education, speaks specifically to the social elements and changes that occurred in the modernisation process. These elements are highlighted by Lipset (1959) when he considers the rate of illiteracy and school enrolment in the countries as a social variable for this process. Educational attainment is embedded in this process and established how public education is part of the dimensions when considering social modernisation. Following Lipset (1959), Easterly (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) who measured public education, I will use the educational achievement per region. This is measured by the percentage of people whose last educational level is primary school. This variable is an indicator of educational attainment by countries and international organisations (OECD, World Bank). This information is gathered from the National Census and ENAHO survey.

The second variable, social capital, is a measure of the strength of interpersonal networks and trust to your fellow citizens and neighbours, and facilitates certain actions of individuals who are within the structures (Coleman, 1990). It can be measured by the membership to civil, social or even political associations (Putnam, 1994, Paxton 2002) by the resources an individual has embedded in its social networks (Lin, 1999), or by surveys directly addressing the elements of trust and support within an individual's community.³³ In this research, I will use the percentage of people with membership to associations and this data is gathered from the ENAHO household survey. This survey directly asks if the people from the household are members of an association, e.g. sport clubs, cultural groups, neighbourhood associations, workers associations, parents associations, peasant community, among others.

Social solidarity, the third variable to be considered, is a sense of belonging that can explain the cohesion between individuals and their society. It is closely linked to identity politics, in which there is a strong sense of belonging to your group. This sense can foster the implementation of policies that can benefit the majority of a population, like redistributive policies (Rodger, 2003), or implement developmental policies like health and education for the vast majority of your social group to which you identify with (Singh, 2016). Thus, a variable that can be used to measure the level of social solidarity is the sense of belonging to your region. To gather this information, I will use the ENAHO household survey in which they asked the household members to which group they more closely

³³ For a more detailed view if social capital is an individual or group attribute, please refer to Kawachi (2014).

identify with: their region, their religion, their ethnicity or race, their peasant or indigenous community, or other. Here I will consider the percentage of people that identify with their region, since this has an impact on the breath and scope that policies will have on a broader population. Those regions whose population have stronger identification to the region rather than the other factors would be considered as having higher subnationalism.

Another variable that could have an impact on democratic state performance is related to political culture. As previously mentioned, political culture is the attitude toward the political system, a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes (Verba & Almond, 1963). Within this conceptualisation, support for democracy is considered as a variable to address political culture. The Latinobarometro uses the statement “a democratic government is always preferable to an authoritarian one” to measure support for democracy. Nonetheless, this statement assumes that the participant knows what democracy is. Furthermore, Ananda & Bol (2020) in a survey experiment in Indonesia found that the support of democracy changed once people were faced with a definition of democracy. Considering that the question of democratic support can be affected by the participant’s knowledge on what democracy is, I will use democratic knowledge as a variable to measure political culture. This question is explicitly asked in the ENAHO household survey. Members are asked if they know what democracy is and provide a Yes/No answer. Thus, I will calculate the percentage of population in each region that knows what democracy is as a proxy for political culture.

Finally, a more equitable society is more likely to foster and sustain democracy. Following the work of Muller (1995), Boix & Stokes (2003), Boix (2003) and Soifer (2013) on the positive relationship between income and democratisation, a key variable to consider is not higher income but income inequality as the driver of democratic transition and its consolidation. Thus, the variable I will use to test H6 is the GINI coefficient. This is the standard tool to measure income inequality in different countries. The data is sourced from the ENAHO household survey.

4.5 Regression analysis

I have run a multivariate regression analysis following the hypotheses established in the previous section. Since I am using a comparison across time, my data set has a multi-level nature. In cross-sectional time-series data it is important to account for the assumption in regression analysis, i.e. that

the observations are independent from each other. In my dataset, for example, Moquegua (or any region) is more likely to resemble itself at the next point in time compared to two random observations in the dataset. Thus, to account for the multi-level nature of the dataset I add fixed effects at the geographical units (regions) to capture the differences between states that are fixed in time, and also fixed effects to the year of observation to capture the linear trend of the dependent variable and better isolate the effect of the independent variables. The descriptive statistics of them can be seen in Table N°4.2.

Table N° 4.2 – Descriptive statistics of variables

Statistic / indicators	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Economic modernisation (% of workforce in industrial/services jobs)	125	80.67	11.78	55.30	69.82	89.46	99.45
Social modernisation (% people with primary school as highest level)	125	39.25	13.26	18.26	29.53	48.80	70.60
SocialCapital (% membership to associations)	125	56.41	21.10	14.35	38.44	77.61	91.83
Subnationalism (% of identification with the region)	125	58.55	9.79	33.69	51.50	66.27	75.20
Political Culture (% people know what democracy is)	125	42.68	12.01	19.76	33.12	52.56	70.26
Inequality (Gini coefficient)	125	0.40	0.06	0.25	0.35	0.44	0.53

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2002-2018, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018, National Census 1993-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The results of the regression analysis (Table N° 4.3) shows that economic and social modernisation have a positive significant association with democratic state performance. The first two columns (Model 1 and 2) show that the economic workforce structure and public education shape the performance of a region regarding their democratic state. In contrast to Model 1, Model 2 shows that the effect of public education on democratic state performance is stronger than workforce structure when the former is taken into account in the analysis. Models 3 and 4 shows the results with the fixed effects on the region (M3), and the fixed effects on the years of observation (M4). Each model exhibits that an increase in non-agricultural workforce and public education is associated with an increase in democratic state performance. The association between economic modernisation and democratic state

performance is higher than social modernisation when the differences between regions are fixed in time (Model 3), whilst public education has a higher association with democratic state performance when controlled by years of observation producing a linear trend over time within each region (Model 4). In other words, these results suggest that the unevenness between Peruvian regions is better explained by economic workforce in specific time points. For example, whether in 2006 or 2010, the economic workforce structure of La Libertad and Cajamarca would explain better the difference of democratic state performance between these two regions (rather than public education). Meanwhile, when we focus on the region of Cajamarca itself over the years, it is rather public education and the improvement of human capital that has a stronger association with democratic state performance than its economic workforce structure. Educational attainments explains better the level of performance achieved by a region over the course of the years. Modernisation in its economic and social variant would be the main explanatory variable for the unevenness of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time.

The other variables – social capital, subnationalism, political culture and inequality – are contrary to what would have been expected and did not have any significant impact on democratic state performance in Peruvian regions. A region with a population with higher levels of membership to associations (social capital), with a higher sense of belonging to the region (subnationalism), with lower levels of economic inequality, or with higher knowledge on what democracy is (political culture) has no positive relationship with its democratic state performance. However, although these variables did not show a significant relationship with the dependant variable, they expressed the hypothesised relationships. For example, higher inequality has a negative relationship with democratic state performance, or subnationalism has a positive relationship, although non-significant. These findings would suggest that political development in Peruvian regions over time is unrelated to these factors.

Table ° 4.3 – Democratic State regression model³⁴

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	(DemState)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic modernisation	0.397*** (0.037)	0.229*** (0.037)	0.508*** (0.135)	0.202*** (0.063)
Social modernisation		0.303*** (0.038)	0.166** (0.067)	0.309*** (0.049)
Social Capital			0.067 (0.049)	0.025 (0.047)
Subnationalism			0.067 (0.046)	0.056 (0.044)
Political culture			0.057 (0.064)	0.063 (0.059)
Inequality			0.080 (0.080)	-0.045 (0.058)
Constant	0.288*** (0.023)	0.203*** (0.021)	0.120* (0.068)	0.120** (0.057)
Observations	125	125	125	125
R ²	0.481	0.661	0.875	0.666
Adjusted R ²	0.477	0.655	0.821	0.632
Residual Std. Error	0.120 (df = 123)	0.097 (df = 122)	0.068 (df = 69)	0.098 (df = 90)
F Statistic	114.024*** (df = 1; 123)	118.835*** (df = 2; 122)	16.120*** (df = 30; 69)	19.908*** (df = 9; 90)

Note:


*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Furthermore, the levels of labour workforce in agriculture in 1993 would shape the level of performance of the region when the decentralisation process started in 2002 (Graph N° 4.8). Those regions whose labour was mainly agricultural in 1993 would have a worse performance at the start of the millennium. These regions would then continue to be at the bottom across the years, perpetuating their ranking. On the other hand, those regions whose economy was more diversified with a smaller


³⁴A variance inflation factor (VIF) was performed to assess if there were any multicollinearity problems. Following James et al. (2013), none of the variables exceeded the VIF value of 5 and are below the rule of thumb of 10 (Forthofer et al., 2006; Franke, 2010; Hair Jr et al., 1995; Micheal & Abiodun, 2014). Results in the Appendix section.

agricultural workforce saw themselves better off at the beginning of 2002 and would continue to be top regions in the subsequent years. This speaks to how modernisation has an impact on democratic state performance. Regions like Ica, Lima, Callao or Moquegua have highly diversified economies with a large labour workforce in non-agricultural sectors. On the other hand, regions like Cajamarca, Huánuco, Huancavelica and Apurímac are highly agricultural economies where social ties are based on their peasant communities, have a larger percentage of labour workforce in the agricultural sector, and are more sparsely populated making it difficult for the democratic state to reach them evenly across the region. The former regions are, as a result, high-performance regions, whilst the latter are low-performance democratic states. This is then also replicated with social modernisation via public education (Graph N° 4.11). Those regions with higher levels of educational attainment in 1993 would have better democratic state performance at the onset of the decentralisation process. A difference with economic modernisation is that public education shows a starker gap between the top regions and those in the middle and lower spectrum. Tumbes, Lambayeque or La Libertad (middle-performance) are farther away than Ica, Moquegua, Arequipa or Tacna (high-performance). This would be aligned with the findings in Model 4 (fixed-effect results on year), where public education had a stronger positive relationship with democratic state performance than economic modernisation.

Graph N° 4.10 – Economic modernisation and democratic state performance (1993 & 2002)



Graph N° 4.11 – Social modernisation and democratic state performance (1993 & 2002)



Now, coming back to the impact of modernisation on democratic state performance, previous literature has embedded within the concept of modernisation a myriad of socio-economic development variables like poverty, life expectancy, degree of formal economy, or gross domestic product per capita (GDP). This is certainly the case of Lipset's seminal work where he included as part of modernisation other socioeconomic variables as part of this overall process (Lipset, 1959), as well as Putnam's approach when addressing institutional performance in the Italian regions (Putnam et al., 1994), or Huntington's consideration for addressing political order (Huntington, 1968). Considering that the literature has used various of these variables as synonyms/proxies of modernisation, I have performed another regression with region- and year-fixed effects to delimitate the impact of modernisation to the characteristic of the economic workforce structure and public education. As shown in Table N° 4.4, a non-agricultural workforce and public education still have a higher impact on democratic state performance and, next to GDP per capita, are the only ones with a significant impact on it. The other variables (life expectancy, poverty, formal economy) have no discernible association with democratic state performance. The fact that the economic workforce structure and GDP per capita both have positive associations with democratic state performance is expected, since the more a region has an industrial/service economy the higher the income generated by it and, thus, the higher the GDP per capita.

The advantages of a subnational approach is that it allows the researcher to scale down the theory and analysis, and see if these yield the same results at lower levels. Under this line of thought, I run a regression analysis at the provincial level as well, albeit limited since not all the data for the independent variables was available at this subnational level. The data is based on the results from the National Census of 2007 and the regional and municipal elections of 2006, and I use the exact same indicators (as in Table N°4.3) for economic and social modernisation at the provincial level to avoid any proxies and make sure that the analysis at a lower subnational level remains as reliable as the upper-level analysis.³⁵

³⁵ The table with the descriptive of these variables are available in the Appendix section.

Table N° 4.4.- Democratic state and socio-economic variables

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	(DemState)
Economic modernisation	0.449*** (0.140)
Social modernisation	0.229*** (0.072)
GDP	0.111** (0.050)
Formal economy	0.077 (0.089)
Life expectancy	0.004 (0.069)
Poverty	0.117 (0.086)
Constant	0.193*** (0.058)
Observations	100
R ²	0.881
Adjusted R ²	0.830
Residual Std. Error	0.066 (df = 69)
F Statistic	17.104*** (df = 30; 69)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table N° 4.5 shows that economic and social modernisation have a positive association with democratic state performance, and thus can be considered as the main explanatory variables for unevenness across Peruvian provinces as well. Those provinces with higher agricultural workforce have a lower performance, whilst those with a lower non-agricultural workforce have better democratic state performance. Furthermore, those provinces that have lower levels of educational attainment exhibit lower levels of democratic state performance. As with the results in Table N°4.3 Model 4, public education has a stronger association with democratic state performance. These results at the provincial level reinforce the general argument of the research at the regional level.

Modernisation, the process through which a society transitions from a mainly agricultural workforce towards other economic sectors (industry, services, among others), and improves its educational attainment as part of this unfolding process, shapes the levels of performance of a democratic state in Peru. The combination of a more educated population, embedded with a sense of their political and civil rights as citizens of a political community, within a non-agricultural economy characterised by the division of labour that requires specialised knowledge for each function improving economic growth and productivity, are the building blocks that shape the quality of democracy and the state capacity within a province (and region). This analysis serves as a territorial robustness check on the regional level analysis.

Table N°4.5 – Democratic state performance at a provincial level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	(DemoState)
Economic Modernisation	0.124*** (0.045)
Social Modernisation	0.200*** (0.044)
Constant	0.242*** (0.014)
Observations	195
R ²	0.463
Adjusted R ²	0.457
Residual Std. Error	0.078 (df = 192)
F Statistic	82.613*** (df = 2; 192)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.6 Discussion

The results from these analyses would support the theory that modernisation has a positive and significant relationship with democratic state performance. The data suggests that the structure of the

economic workforce and the level of educational attainment are the main variables that explain the unevenness of performance across Peruvian regions and over time.

Going back to H1, I stated that the higher the levels of economic modernisation the higher the level of democratic state performance of a region. Following the results of the regression analysis this has been confirmed. Let us explore why this is possible. Economic modernisation was considered as the transition from an agricultural to an industrial/service society. The transition has an impact on geography. Agricultural work and its workforce are geographically more dispersed. The dispersion of agricultural workforce translates into a more isolated situation for those communities. Most farmers start early their day by going away to their *chacras* (lands) to work during and only come back at night. The people (in their communities) are more sparsely populated making it more costly for the state to reach those population with public goods. This dispersion also creates barriers for the commercialisation of agricultural products (Webb, 2013). The democratic state has a harder time to expand evenly across a territory dominated by agricultural activities. In Peruvian regions this isolation makes it more difficult to participate in elections, to organise around political parties, and the access of women to public offices and participate in the public arena is more limited since they are more involved in the activities of this subsistence type of economy. For example, as a requisite to participate in elections, vote, and to become an elected representative, you need a DNI (National Identification Document). However, highly agrarian societies in Peruvian regions have less access to DNI, and it is particularly women in those societies that have even more limited access. This dispersion and isolation of the agricultural workforce makes it more expensive for the state to reach those places and have a presence. As mentioned by Gitlitz (2013) the emergence of *rondas campesinas* (local patrol system of peasants) in Cajamarca during the mid 1970s was a result of the daily night robberies of cattle that the farmers were suffering from. The *rondas* became a way to protect the cattle, but most importantly it became a way of imparting justice where the state was absent (Gitlitz, 2013). Furthermore, since the region is mostly agricultural, the income generated by these economic activities is much lower than those regions with a higher diversified economy. This creates a vicious circle where the population, working mostly on agricultural activities, works in their land and are sparsely populated, making it more costly to the democratic state to reach them via public investment projects (e.g. electricity network, water supply, health systems). Furthermore, this dispersed workforce reduces their political weight that hinders their power to demand higher state presence (Webb, 2013). However, at the same time, the income produced by those agricultural economic activities are lower than an

industrial/service-based economy, thus generating less income for the democratic state to implement those public investment projects to reach evenly across the territory.

In line with H2, public education had a positive relationship with democratic state performance. A region with higher level of educational attainment would be expected to have a greater sense of citizenship that fosters political participation. Education serves as a process where the individual acquires a specific set of knowledge, skills and, transforms herself to a citizen and member of the community. Active citizens that are aware of their rights have the capabilities to ensure this are enforced and respected by the political institutions they interact. This accountability process between the citizenry and the state improves the performance of the latter. For the Peruvian regions the self-knowledge as *beings* of the community improves the citizen participation in elections, political parties, and assume as their right to hold the government accountable. This, in turn, translates to a better democratic state performance. Following social cognitive theory, a person is able to be self-efficacious and have an impact to the social and political system once they have the knowledge about it (Bandura, 1997). This would explain public education and schooling, places where a person learns how to be self-efficacious and exhibit a positive relationship with democratic state performance. The knowledge fosters the citizens' participation in state activities and in public life. Improving the quality of democracy in turn.

Education also improves the human capital of the region that propels economic productivity. This results are aligned with the ones from Webb (2013), in which educational attainment had a positive effect on productivity. The interrelation between human capital and higher productivity from the modernisation process undergone by the region would improve the political institutions and their stability in the upcoming years. This can be seen in the results from Model 4, within region variation over time, where public education yields a stronger association with democratic state performance. Finally, a key aspect in this social modernisation is the equalising effect (albeit limited) between men and women. All children are required by the norm to attend school. A gap persists in the access to public education and the educational attainment between men and women, however, the principle that all children have to attend improves the possibility of women to acquire the necessary skills for work outside the immediate household and, thus, their presence in the labour market increases. This higher presence of women in the public realm shapes the image of them as full citizens with all their rights to participate in political affairs, and they are considered professionals able to participate in any

economic activity. A gap remains, in terms of political participation as well labour market participation (and roles occupied in the professional arena). Despite this gap, those regions with a lower agricultural workforce and higher public education should experience more women in both political and economic realms.

A consequence of this modernisation process is the migration of people to the industrialised sites. The massive migration created a strain towards public funding and services that the state was not prepared to deal with (Matos Mar, 1986). Unable to deal with this situation the state has been, in many occasions, neglected to a reactive role where instead of leading development project it react to the processes unfolding within its territory. Under this scenario, decentralisation was conceived as an institutional design that could amend the modernisation processes pitfalls. However, as seen in the mapping of the democratic state performance across Peruvian regions, most of the top and bottom regions have maintained the same position over the past 16 years. This migration also created a concentration of voters in the city and/or capital of the region, provinces and districts. Most of the electorate is concentrated in the capital of the region and main cities across the region, which have a greater proportion of its population working in non-agricultural jobs. This creates a vicious circle where the candidates need to mostly campaign in the cities, leaving behind the countryside since there is not enough voters over this dispersed population. Furthermore, political parties lack the organisational capacity to go door-to-door in highly agricultural regions relying mostly on radios to reach voters across sparsely populated areas (Seifert, 2014; Zavaleta, 2014). When scaling-down this argument, those provinces that are the capital of the region share most of the non-agricultural workforce, and consequently have higher levels of electoral turnout. State agencies and public schools are concentrated in these areas, and is easier to get than in the agricultural and rural areas far away from the provincial capitals.

The modernisation process propelled an industrial and services class that required the necessary conditions to foster their own economic growth and success. To achieve this, they build a coalition that put pressure on the state to enhance its capacity. At the same time, the expansion of the territorial reach of the state integrated and promoted the democratic participation of its citizens. As mentioned by Robinson and Acemoglu (2012), even inclusive institutions require the presence of a capable state to secure these institutions and the pluralism that comes with it. Thus, the modernisation process unfolded the conditions to improve the democratic state performance during the years following the

implementation of decentralisation. On the other hand, regions with an agricultural workforce and economy are more dispersed and are on the periphery of the state's reach. This diminishes its opportunities to pressure for more state presence, disconnects it from the national state and its policy agenda, and democratic participation is met with more obstacles. Furthermore, informal economy is more prominent in the agricultural sector in Peru. Most productive units in agriculture belong to the informal sector, where workers lack any benefits, rights or are non-paid family workers. Informality becomes a way through which individuals and families are able to produce earnings that help them to make a living in areas where the demand side for work is insufficient or there is an absence of formal salaried jobs that meet the expectations. The predominance of informal productive units speaks to the inability of the democratic state to monitor and enforce its own laws. Informality appears where the state lacks the capacity to enforce its rules (De Soto et al., 1987). In Perú, the informal economy is present in all economic activities and those with more informal employment are agricultural (23.2%), commerce (13.9%), transport and communication (6.8%), restaurants and amenities (6.3%), other services (11.4%), among others (INEI 2020). A low-performance democratic state that is unable to penetrate its territory will witness the emergence of informal economy under its jurisdiction. The state has insufficient capacity and resources to enforce its norms. Moreover, considering that the majority of production units (82.3%) in the informal economy tend to be very small (between 1-5 people), this makes it even harder for a weak state to oversee the activities of this sector. This relationship between low performance and high informality can be seen in Table N°4. Here the regions with higher levels of democratic state performance have lower levels of informal employment, whilst low-performance regions have above higher levels of informality. This is the case of Cajamarca, Huánuco, or Huancavelica (low-performance regions) where 87.9%, 86.6% and 92.0% respectively of their labour workforce is informal, whilst the informal employment in Moquegua, Ica or Arequipa (high-performance) is 65.4%, 61.4% and 66.2% respectively (INEI, 2020). As expected, high-performance regions have a more capable state, with more bureaucratic resources and extended territorial reach, that would be able to enforce its rules over the population and economic activities. On the other hand, those low-performance regions have limited territorial reach, fewer bureaucratic resources, and thus are unable to oversee and control the economic activities of the productive units. Furthermore, the overall figures also showed that informal employment is higher in the agricultural sector and these regions are characterised by having a high percentage of its workforce on agricultural activities, which shapes the performance of its democratic state.

Table N° 4.6.- Informality in high- and low-performance regions (in 2019)

Democratic state	Regions	Informal employment	National average
High performance	Ica	61.4%	72.7%
	Arequipa	66.2%	
	Callao	60.0%	
	Moquegua	65.4%	
	Arequipa	66.2%	
Low performance	Huánuco	86.6%	
	Ayacucho	87.3%	
	Cusco	81.7%	
	Cajamarca	87.9%	
	Huancavelica	92.0%	

Source: INEI 2020 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Social capital has been regarded as a predictor of higher institutional performance (Putnam, 1993), nonetheless this model suggests that there is no association with the Peruvian case. Regions with higher levels of social capital do not have a significant relationship with democratic state performance. This would be aligned with Altman & Pérez-Liñán (2002) when they mentioned that Putnam's argument cannot be exported to Latin America. A difference to be considered here is that Putnam measured social capital against the performance of regional Italian governments and not necessarily against democratic institutions *per se*. In this case, social capital has been tested against democratic state that encompasses both state capacity and quality of democracy, making the assessment of social capital (and its effects) more comprehensive. However, despite the fact that his theory is based on a subnational approach and was tested against modernisation as well (although he uses GDP per capita as a proxy for modernisation), social capital has no significant effect with democratic state performance in Peruvian regions. As stated by Lopez (2000), the democratisation process in Peru had to deal more with the gains of social citizenship (Marshall, 1950), rather than political. Thus, the social capital displayed by the Peruvian regions could have their strength not on a political arena (state and democracy) but rather on a social dimension. Those linkages to social networks and communities would foster support on a social dimension, and its effect would be seen in this area rather than the political one.

Close to social capital is subnationalism. Both certainly tackle a similar phenomenon, the linkage of an individual with either i) its social networks or) its political identification. Subnationalism measures the sense of belonging of the individual to its region (Singh, 2015) and is based on a republican assumption where the individual that identifies with their region will certainly operate under the common good approach and would have social solidarity towards their fellow members. This means that their actions will put the common good (of the region) before than their individual interest. It would have been expected that the higher the levels of belonging to a region, the higher the democratic state performance. Nonetheless, the results from this model suggest that there is no significant relationship between both variables. An insight to be taken from this approach is the large debate in Peru about the existence of a 'republicanism' ideal (McEvoy, 1997; Vergara, 2018). But, fundamentally, it would be the contradiction between the presence of this Ideal and the everyday action from Peruvians. In other words, to follow a republican ideal of common good requires the individual to disregard their immediate benefits for a long-term benefit within a higher order. However, Peruvian politics is regarded as short-term game (Seifert 2014) and this is closely related to the informal characteristic of Peruvian society and economy (Loayza, 2007).

Contrary to the hypothesised association between inequality and the democratic state, the unevenness across Peruvian regions is not shaped by inequality. One factor that can explain this is the overall national trend experienced by Peru over the period under study regarding the reduction of inequality. Based on the data from the World Bank, Peru had a Gini coefficient of 0.53 in 2002 and this has steadily decreased over the years reaching 0.42 by 2018. The economic growth experienced by Peru improved the financial transfer from central to local government and improved the salaries in most regions reducing the levels of inequality at the subnational level as well. This would be aligned with Bollen & Jackman (1985), where the Peruvian democratisation process of 2000-2001 and subsequent democratic period would have eased the inequalities by voters who preferred redistribution policies. However, this would suggest that the causality direction goes from political institutions towards inequality rather than the other way around (Boix & Stokes, 2003). Furthermore, these results would suggest that the effect of inequality might be on the democratic and non-democratic transition, rather than on the quality of the democratic state per se. Overall, these results would be more aligned with the study from Acemoglu et al. (2015) where they did not find any effect between democracy and inequality, stating that the topic on this linkage is still far from a consensus.

In sum, the results from the multilevel regression analysis with region and year fixed effects shows that modernisation can be considered as an explanatory variable for the level of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time. The structure of the labour workforce and the educational attainment of a region shapes this performance. A fine grain analysis in the in-depth analysis will unfold how modernisation became the explanatory variable of democratic state performance.

4.7 Further theoretical insights into modernisation theory

Now, before going into the case studies of Moquegua (high-performance) and Huánuco (low-performance), I will elucidate the modernisation process that created the determinants of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions.

The explanatory model shows the process that each region went through (Graph N° 4.11). The contribution of this model is that it identifies the causal mechanisms and processes through which modernisation shapes state capacity and quality of democracy. Modernisation here is understood as the transformation of the economic structure of a population within a territory when its labour workforce shifts from agricultural towards non-agricultural (industrial, services) economies and mass education and subsequent educational attainment gained by its population (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959; Marx, 2010; Weber, 1978). Thus, we have economic modernisation (workforce structure) and social modernisation (public education). This process triggers social and demographic processes, and transfigures the landscape of the area where these processes are unfolding. A region that starts the modernisation process will show how its economic structure and the labour workforce shifts towards non-agricultural activities, like industrial and/or services. These new economic activities require high levels of labour and human resources. The need from these will open new opportunities and new jobs that will attract more people towards these activities fostering a pattern of migration towards these areas where these are taking place. These jobs will also increase the level of remuneration for the workers creating further incentives for the people to move towards these economic areas, reaching in some cases six times the salary from a person that stays in agriculture (De Soto et al., 1987). This migration will have a twofold process. On the one hand, the region will be a witness of migration from within the region itself. In this case, the population from different provinces migrate towards those where the modernisation process is unfolding with new jobs and new opportunities of a brighter

future. This translates into augmenting the concentration of the population in specific areas, whilst there is a reduction of the population in other provinces. On the other hand, the region is also subject to migration from outside the region and becomes a new home for citizens of other neighbouring (in the majority of cases) regions.

The nature of the modernised economic activities in the region augments the concentration of the population in these areas. Access to public services is expanded but not as a result of expansion on the supply side, but rather on the demand side. This creates pressure on the existing public services in these areas, and one of these is public education. More people (boys and girls) are able to access schools and achieve higher levels of educational attainment. This will improve the human capital of the region, foster the capabilities of the students and the building blocks for an active citizenry in their political community. This higher population density is characteristic of the urbanisation process. Here, it is important to note, as the case studies will exemplify, that the nature of the modernisation process in Latin American countries followed a different path than the ones from the European and western counterparts during the 1800s. The urban centre will suffer an influx of migration that will not be able to integrate in an orderly fashion. Thus, this process creates a peri-urban scenario that the later waves of migrants will occupy. In much of these cases this occupation will take place in informal settings that, after continuous occupation, will become part of the communities and later individualised lots. Furthermore, in the Peruvian case, this process was combined with the creation of an informal economic sector. However, most of the informal sector still carries out agricultural economic activities. Despite the informal consequences of the modernisation process, the region experiences economic growth as a result of this transformation. This creates a virtuous cycle where the more the economy grows, the more job opportunities are generated, and the more migration occurs. In this case, citizens from forgotten regions (or provinces) could achieve higher living standards and aspire for social mobility.

Now, the economic modernisation that transformed social structures, migration patterns, urbanisation processes, and economic growth occurs within a territory under a political-administrative unit. This is a fundamental consideration that has been overlooked by the literature: this process does not occur in a vacuum. It has an intrinsic territorial feature to it: it happens within a territory, with territorial consequences (Graph N° 1.1). Its economic activities, migration processes, and urbanisation processes unfold in a territory. Further, this is the same space over which the democratic state exercises its

control and the population within it. The state presence expands its reach over the territory through what Mann called the infrastructural power, which relates to the state's capacity to implement its political decisions through the realm (Mann, 1993). This territorial reach is achieved through the creation of public infrastructure (e.g. public schools, hospitals, electrification, water supply, among others) and the expansion of bureaucratic capacity and resources (e.g. bureaucrats, armed forces, organisations) (Boone, 2012; Centeno et al., 2017; O'Donnell, 1973; H. Soifer, 2008; Tilly, 1992; Ziblatt, 2008). Thus, when forces disrupt the socio-demographic dynamics in the territory over which it claims a legitimate control, it reacts to augment its presence in these areas. The expansion of a public sector is shaped by the economic modernisation (Boix, 2001). Now, within a democratic state the scope for arbitrary decision from the state is limited and constrained. Democratic elected politicians will have discretion on where to allocate the state resources. Since it is within the politician's interest to get re-elected, achieving this goal requires the majority of votes. In this case, the politician will focus the provision of public services in areas with higher levels of voters improving their living standards. The democratic state will then see the prioritisation of its reach to those areas with higher population density to those urban areas. These areas will see the improvement of the democratic state presence with more public services, more public infrastructure, and more bureaucrats to attend to citizens' demands. At the same time, those areas that are more dispersed, where it is more expensive for the state to reach and exercise control, will be less prioritised and neglected. In this scenario it is possible to see how modernisation process shapes democratic state, since the former creates the socio-economic transformation of the region over which the democratic state will exercise control. The transformation creates higher concentration of population in specific areas (urbanisation) that will create the incentive for the democratic state to prioritise its strength over this territory.


This greater state presence translates in a greater state reach over its population, with more schools, more children school enrolment and, equally important, a greater expansion to women's education. A higher number of women enrolled in schools reduces the gender gap in relation to education achievement. Furthermore, it improves the prospect of women in high-skill jobs (Goldin, 1994). Economic modernisation comes with a diversification of activities. The structural changes of industrial and service-based economy sees the increase of women's participation in these new sectors (Gaddis & Klasen, 2014). Women participate in different professional positions reducing the gender

gap and differences.³⁶ This augments the percentage of women in different professions and positions within the labour market. The higher the economic development, the higher the women empowerment, and this translates into political empowerment. Whilst low levels of female labour force participation have contributed to female underrepresentation in democratic politics, a higher labour workforce increases their representation (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008). Women are seen as part of the public sphere and thus have more opportunities in the political realm. Women that have a job outside the home tend to increase their political participation (K. Andersen, 1975; Desposato & Norrander, 2009). Thus, the economic modernisation creates structural changes that increases the female labour workforce participation. Furthermore, gender differences are reduced by having a higher number of women enrolled in schools, whose education will facilitate for them a greater share in high-skill jobs, augmenting women's empowerment and their political participation (Desposato & Norrander, 2009). Previous gender-roles are challenged and reshaped as part of this process. The higher their empowerment, the higher their political participation. The public realm is no longer male dominated, but women are taking part of it as well. This greater involvement in the public sphere and political life increases their chances of being candidates, participate in elections and get elected.

The modernisation process and economic development are positively correlated with political participation (Ades, 1995; Boix & Stokes, 2003). The modernisation process that shapes the state response is able to incorporate a majority of its population in democratic processes. The pressure over the state to deliver public goods is accompanied by the improvements of democratic channels through which this pressure can be exercised. Electoral turnout is augmented by reducing the cost of participation in electoral processes. Participation and engagement of the citizens in democratic life is enhanced when state reaches those deprived areas (Arévalo-Bencardino, 2018; Bratton & Chang, 2006; S. L. Mazzuca & Munck, 2014). State infrastructure, e.g. public schools, where elections take place in Peru, are closer to the majority of the population and the cost of travelling is greatly reduced. Furthermore, the structural change of modernisation fosters the urbanisation process in the areas where this change is unfolding, and urbanisation also increases political participation (Lerner, 1958).

³⁶ It is important to note here that in Latin America and particularly in Peru, the economy is highly informal. This informality creates vulnerable employment and, within this, it is most likely that women's positions are more vulnerable and associated with inadequate and volatile earnings.

Graph N° 4.12 – Exploratory model: Modernisation pathway



To sum up, democratic state performance is explained by the modernisation process that unfolds in Peruvian regions. Those regions with a higher industrialised/service economy experience a positive balance of migration, a rapid urbanisation process, better socioeconomic indicators, and the emergence of new social and economic actors. Public education expanded in these areas builds the human capital needed to sustain the improvements in productivity, economic growth, the public sector, and challenges previous gender-roles. Second, these processes unfolded within a defined territory and population over which the democratic state legitimately claims control over. Resources are prioritised in these same areas, creating a positive feedback loop. However, this still neglects the more agricultural, deprived, and dispersed population. Third, this reaction fostered the development of state capacity and the improvement of its democratic quality, resulting in high-performance regions.

4.8 Conclusions

This chapter has focused on the quantitative analysis. First, I presented the historical background by going through the processes of decentralisation that Peru has experienced since 1960s. These processes channelled the main decentralisation process of 2002 and acted as the starting point of this research. Having built my democratic state performance concept, I mapped it across the Peruvian

regions. Here, I was able to determine that democratic state performance spreads unevenly across the territory, and that there is clear within-country variation. After establishing this unevenness, I proceeded to rank the top and bottom regions in terms of performance and executed a comparison between them over time. The high/low performance regions in 2018 were the same as 16 years before. This result illustrates that unevenness is perpetuated over time. Five out of the six top regions were exactly the same in 2002 and 2018, and four out of the bottom six were also the same in this period of time. To unveil the determinants of this unevenness that persisted over the years, a fixed-effect regression analysis was performed to test the main hypotheses. The main explanatory variables were economic and social modernisation. The results showed that the economic workforce structure and educational attainment had a positive significant relationship with democratic state performance. A region with high levels of agricultural workforce and low educational attainment has a lower democratic state performance. On the other hand, the higher the level of labour workforce in industrial/service-based economy and educational attainment, the higher the democratic state performance of the region. The fixed-effects analysis also sheds light to the fact that the difference in performance between regions in a specific time point is stronger when explained by labour workforce than public education. Nonetheless, the difference in performance within a region overtime shifts, and public education is more strongly associated with it than its economic workforce structure. After the initial economic modernisation, it is social modernisation via education that continues to foster and improve the performance of the political institutions within a region. I tested other hypotheses and variables – subnationalism, inequality, social capital, and political culture. These did not have a significant relationship with our dependant variable. Thus, the results suggest that modernisation is the main force that shapes democratic state performance across Peruvian regions and over time. The next chapters will focus on Moquegua and Huánuco to disentangle the causal mechanism via a process-tracing to see how modernisation affected their democratic state performance.

Chapter 5: Moquegua: a high-performance region

The results from the previous chapter showed that democratic state performance is uneven across Peruvian regions. It displayed that those performing high in 2018 were the same in 2002. In this chapter, I will show how the modernisation process shaped the processes that explain the high-performance democratic state of Moquegua. In this region, the transformation of the labour workforce from an agricultural towards an industrialised and serviced-based one had an impact on the political development of the region.

5.1 Background

Moquegua is a southern region in the coast of Peru. Its territory also expands to the Andes, making it a coastal as well as Andean region. Many coastal regions in Peru, like Arequipa, Ancash, La Libertad or even Piura share this geographic duality. As seen in Chapter 2, the decentralisation process in Peru was characterised by a constant reorganisation of the territorial boundaries, as well as the administrative faculties over these territories. Regions were created and its boundaries rewritten. Decentralised development offices were established, although authorities were appointed by the central government (Soifer, 2015). More importantly, these were not stable institutions nor were they properly decentralised. It was a centralised decentralisation, where focus was given to regions but decision-making power was maintained at the central level. Under this scenario, the political and administrative boundaries of current Moquegua were created in 1936, and only in 2002 with the decentralisation process did Moquegua have a proper regional authority and institution to govern the region as a whole.

The region of Moquegua is administratively divided by three provinces – Mariscal Nieto, Ilo and General Sanchez Cerro (Graph N° 5.1) – and twenty districts. In every subnational election the voters choose a total of 141 officials (11 at the regional level, 28 at the provincial level, and 102 at the district level). It is situated in the south-west region of Peru, and the altitude goes from 10 meters above sea level up to 5,596 meters in the *Nevalo de Hipocapac* in Mariscal Nieto. Moquegua has a total population of 174,863. The majority of the population lives in urban areas and almost half live in Mariscal Nieto (Census 2017). Between the last two censuses (2007 vs 2017), the urban population increased at a 2% annual rate whilst the rural one decreased at a negative rate of 4.7%. Two thirds of the population

reside in the place where they were born whilst the remaining third migrated from other regions to Moquegua. Furthermore, the pyramid population of Moquegua shows an aged population, where the base is more reduced (lower numbers of births) and the centre is widened (more people in working age).

Graph N° 5.1 – Moquegua and its provinces



MSN: Mariscal Nieto 135educen’s capital dotted) / ILO: Ilo / GSC: General Sanchez Cerro

On the social dimension, Moquegua is highly educated and only 3.8% of its population is illiterate. Although there is gap between men (1.5%) and women (6%), it enjoys some of the highest life expectancy of Peru with an average of 75.7 years and is the second region with lowest infant mortality rate at 13.8 per thousand live births (ENDES, 2017).³⁷ It also enjoys one of the lowest percentages of

³⁷ Callao has the highest life expectancy with 79.9 years, whilst Lima has the lowest infant mortality rate with 12 per thousand live births.

population living under the poverty (9.2%) mixed with a GINI coefficient of 41.5% . Most of the population has Spanish as their first language (77%), followed by Aimara with 13.2%, and half of the population self-identified themselves as *mestizos* whilst 21% as *aimara* and 14% as *quechua*. The catholic population of Moquegua has steadily declined from 95.6% in 1981 to 80.6% in 2017, Whilst the evangelical population has increased from 3.8% in 1993 to 7.3% in 2017.

The main economic activity in Moquegua is industrial, representing two thirds of their economy (BCRP 2020b), and is mostly related to manufacture and mining processing. The main mining minerals are copper and molybdenum. Its regional economic output supports around 1.6% of the national GDP, and situates Moquegua as the fifteenth regional economy (out of 25). Most of the formal enterprises are small and micro businesses. These represent a total of 99% of all formal businesses, and only 0.2% are medium and large size businesses (BCRP, 2020b). The economically active population is around 110 thousand people (0.6% of the national total).

5.1.1 Brief history

On 23 April 1936, Moquegua was granted the status of Department with Law N°8230, under the military government of Oscar R. Benavides. This was the political and administrative origin of modern Moquegua. However, this creation was not accompanied by an institutional arrangement to organise the political, social, economic and cultural development of Moquegua. There were multiple projects of regionalisation, under which the various national governments tried to organise different departments under bigger macro-regions. The last one was established in the Constitution of 1979 where macro-regions were stipulated as key elements of development. These would have administrative and economic autonomy (Art. n° 261), and would have policy competence on health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, mining, among others (Art. n° 262). These regions would be stipulated in a *Plan Nacional de Regionalización* (National Plan of Regionalisation) that was created and approved by Law N° 23878 in 1984. In this National Plan, Peru was divided in twelve regions (12) and Moquegua was part of the José C. Mariategui Region (with Tacna and Puno).

From this Plan it is important to rescue three features. The first was to diagnose the development situation of the Peruvian departments. The Plan recognised from the onset that the rationale behind it was to promote the “*desarrollo equilibrado al interior del país [y] Superar las desigualdades y desequilibrios*

existentes entre las regiones del país” (balanced development within the country [and] overcome the existing inequalities and unbalance between the regions of the country) (Ley N° 23878, 1984, Art. 1). Furthermore, the Plan’s objective was to avoid the “atrophied and unequal growth” of the regions that had been the development pattern since Independence (Art. 3). This is a key admission that the development within Peru, in each region, has been marked by the economic forces rather than as a result of a planned development strategy from the state.

The necessity of this Regionalisation Plan lies in the need of having a planning instrument that can guide the development of the regions. Without it, each region and subnational unit will march under their own beat and will be subject to economic forces. This was the main pattern of regional development across Peruvian regions. State planning, at the national and local level, was absent so each region developed as a result of economic modernisation. Now, the regions were graded within a continuum that went from high to low levels of developments, and were divided in four groups going from hegemonic, high level, medium and low-level development. Moquegua was considered in the zone of Relative Medium Development (Ley N° 23878, 1984). The second was the explicit recognition that the regions were an intermediate level of government between the national and local level. As stated by the plan the region is a “*unidad intermedia para hacer operative el desarrollo y organización del territorio, entre el nivel nacional y el ámbito local, así como de administración entre el gobierno central y municipal*” (the region is an intermediate unit to make operative the development and organisation of the territory, between the national and local level, as well as administration between central and municipal government) (Law N° 23878, 1984: Art. 1.2). The third was the creation of two political institutions: a legislative and an executive body. The former was the Regional Assembly, comprised by the provincial mayors from Moquegua, representatives of civil society and popular elected members. The latter would be made of the Presidency of the Regional Council and its Regional Council. The President would be the same as the one from the Regional Assembly. The first regional election for the members of the Regional Assembly was in 1990. This was a new form of decentralisation with a regional government with decision-making power. Administrative functions and a budget were established.

However, this regionalisation process was put to an end during Fujimori’s authoritarian regime. Under this government, centralisation was fundamental and the elected representatives of the regions were eliminated. To fill out the void, Fujimori created the *Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional – CTAR* (Transitory Councils of Regional Administration). These bodies followed the department

boundaries and, thus, 24 CTARs were established. However, these were bodies without decision making powers over their departments, and the head of these were appointed by the central government. It continued to serve as a bridge between Provincial and Local Government and the National Government, although this bridge was at the mercy of the authoritarian discretion of the central government. The social, economic, and political development of the departments was actually pushed down towards the Provincial and District Municipalities. This had a twofold intention. On the one hand, Fujimori eliminated the possibility of the emergence of subnational opposition. This followed the pattern of debilitating any institutional arrangement that could serve as a constrain to Fujimori's power. One of the measures in the new Political Constitution of 1993 was the elimination of the Senate. The only representative body was the Congress. The number of representatives was reduced from 180 to 120, and most importantly, subnational territorial representation was diluted by making the election of members of parliament under a single district system. On the other hand, it helped to centralise the power under Fujimori. The head of every CTAR for each department was appointed by the Prime Minister and the Ministry of the Presidency. The latter was a Ministry used by Fujimori as an *organo ejecutor* (executive organ) to easily execute public infrastructure projects (e.g. schools, healthcare centres) to the districts he visited. After the process of decentralisation in 2002 and the return to democracy in 2001, the CTARs were eliminated.

5.1.2 Moquegua a high-performance democratic state


During the period under study in this research (2002-2018), Moquegua has been a high-performance democratic state. This means that it has high levels of state capacity and good quality of democracy. The region saw higher levels of political participation in regional and municipal elections, more women participating as candidates and getting elected, and a lesser fragmented political system. It achieved the democratic principles of equality and pluralism. On the other hand, the state's territorial reach expanded evenly across the territory, with a growing number of housing with access to water and sanitation, electrification, and a larger number of bureaucrats to enforce the state's will across the region. As seen in Graph N 5.2, Moquegua started the millennia as a high-performance democratic state. This level of performance has been maintained across the years studied here, and has always been above the national average. This difference is, however, slightly more pronounced in the state capacity area than in the quality of democracy.

5.1.2.1 Moquegua's quality of democracy

A high-performance democratic state is characterised by achieving better levels of equality between its members and pluralistic characteristics. A region with a good quality of democracy is a territory that has low levels of political fragmentation that reduces government instability (Valentim & Dinas, 2020). All its members have high levels of political participation and traditionally vulnerable and minority groups have greater chances to engage with the public (Lijphart, 2012a; Powell, 1982). Within normative democratic theory political equality is a cornerstone. All members of the polity should have the same public presence, and their participation should not be hindered by any condition (e.g. race, gender, age). Within this theory the role and space occupied by women in the public sphere and decision-making process can be used to assess if political equality is achieved (Tremblay, 2007). This is related to the idea of representation and to make present something that is nonetheless not present literally (Pitkin 1967). A good quality of democracy will be one that promotes the presence of vulnerable groups that would otherwise not be present, allowing for the shared experience (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1998). Now, focusing on the presence of women in sub-national elections, Moquegua has had more women candidates during the regional and municipal elections. Furthermore, the women are positioned on better spots on the lists, giving them more chances to get elected.

The subnational electoral system is a majoritarian system. This means that the political party that wins the municipality gets more than fifty plus one percent of the councillors' seats. The rest of the seats are distributed proportionally between the parties until the councillors' seats are full. The way the list is organised has a major impact on the chances of women to be elected, since it is a closed list. The party chooses the position of the candidates on the list. If the majority of the women candidates are at the bottom of the list, the probabilities of being elected are minimal. Thus, to improve their presence the political parties would need to alternate them or include them in the top of the list. The graphs N°5.3 and N° 5.4 shows the spot in the list where women have been allocated in average during the local and provincial elections. The x-axis is the number allocated in the list (starting with the mayor position in number 1, then first council in number 2, and so on), and the y-axis represents the percentage of total women allocated to that number.


Graph N° 5.2 – Democratic state performance: Moquegua vs National



Source: ENAHO 2002-2018, Infogob 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert


It is evident from these graphs that the majority of women tend to occupy the last spots on those lists. Moquegua is slightly better than the national average and tends to have more women candidates in the first spots of the list, augmenting their chances of being elected. It is a minimal difference with huge impact for women representation. Nonetheless, in comparison to the national average, it also puts more women in the bottom of the list. This separation can be seen with the blue line that cuts across in what would be the middle of the list of candidates. The percentage of women on the left side of the blue line have a higher chance to get elected. At the district level, Moquegua does not deviate itself much from the national average. The provincial arena shows a different scenario, where the difference is bigger, and Moquegua does a better job at putting more women at the top of the list.

Graph N° 5.3 – Women’s list allocation at district level elections in Moquegua (2002-2018)




Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Graph N° 5.4 – Women’s list allocation at provincial level elections in Moquegua (2002-2018)



Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Graph N° 5.5 – Women regional candidates. Moquegua vs National average



Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The electoral system is different for regional candidates. Although in the elections from 2002 and 2006 the political parties had to present a close list for the election of regional councillors, this changed in 2010. After this year, each party had to present a list for each of the provinces for the region. Thus, since 2010 it is not possible to see the women’s allocation on these close lists for regional councillors. Nonetheless, it is possible to compare Moquegua’s performance against the national average on the percentage of women integrating the list. As shown in Graph N° 5.5, in overall terms, Moquegua has a better performance than the national average. A key element to highlight is that in 2002, the female candidate Cristala Constantinidis with the national party Somos Peru won the regional elections of Moquegua. Defying the highly male dominated political arenas of regional and local elections, Moquegua elected her as their highest authority.

Overall, Moquegua has presented more than the national average of female candidates during the regional and municipal elections. Furthermore, their spot in the close list is higher up than in most regions. Although the difference is not stark, it nonetheless creates more opportunities for female candidates to get elected since they have better positions. All regions and political parties have to

follow the same institutional rules on quotas. However, these parties differ in each region on how they allocate the women on those lists. These parties are mostly regional parties and thus their political participation in elections is circumscribed only to the region. This gives more prominence to the local characteristics that affect regional party decision-making process when building the list, rather than national parties participating in regional and local elections following national guidelines. Thus, the way regional parties create their list and the subsequent allocation of women on those lists responds to the overall social, economic, cultural and political factors of those regions.

Political participation is the cornerstone of democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Dahl, 1973; Schumpeter, 2010) and the more citizens are engaged with democratic institutions and participate in electoral process the better its quality (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; L. Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Lauth, 2013; Putnam et al., 1994). During the 2002-2018 period five regional and municipal elections were held and in all of these processes Moquegua had higher levels of electoral turnout than the other regions. As shown in Table N° 5.1, since the 2002 ERM, Moquegua has had an average of 88% political participation in elections, whilst the national average has been around 77%. This higher participation was channelled through a less fragmented party system. The region's party system showed less fragmentation than the others. A higher fragmented party system can have a detrimental effects on the quality of democracy (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004; Downs, 1957; Henderson & McEwen, 2010; Powell, 1982). Moquegua began the regional and municipal elections in 2002 with a higher fragmented party system than the national average. However, in the upcoming elections the region reverted this, improved the consolidation of its party system by decreasing the effective number of political parties in each elections, and recorded the lowest fragmentation in 2010.

Table N° 5.1 Electoral turnout in regional and municipal elections: Moquegua vs National

Election year	Moquegua	National
2002	88.9%	82.4%
2006	90.2%	86.9%
2010	89.3%	85.4%
2014	87.4%	83.1%
2018	84.0%	79.0%

Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (infogob) 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

During the 2002-2018 period Moquegua showed a good quality of democracy. In the regional and municipal elections political parties had more women candidates, were located in better positions in the party's list, and thus more women were elected as public authorities. It improved the descriptive representation of a minority group. It had higher political participation in each of the elections with a less fragmented political party system.

5.1.2.2 Moquegua's state capacity

The state capacity in a high-performance democratic state is achieved by being effective in its provision of public goods, expanding its territorial reach across the region and having the manpower to oversee the implementation of state policies (Bersch et al., 2017; Fukuyama, 2011; Mann, 1993; H. Soifer, 2008). The political development of the region shows a state that is evenly distributed across the geography with citizens able to access public goods and more bureaucrats to enforce government decisions and to be responsive to citizen's demands. This organisational, bureaucratic and infrastructure presence of the state is a condition for the population within its reach to become citizens. The state precedes the individual (Aristoteles, 1988) and without this organisational scaffolding the individual lacks the stepping stone to be free (Hegel, 1991) and thus be an effective member in a democratic state.

Through the construction of schools, roads, hospitals, water and sanitation, the state expanded its presence across the region. Over this period, Moquegua filed 850 public investment projects to the Ministry of Economy and Finance for its approval. This expansion on public works in the region created a demand for public sector workers. Although the public works were not done solely by the regional government per se, but by private companies as well, the state structure had to expand its offices, directorates, and pool of workers to have an oversight over the projects. They had to be present in the design, implementation, and evaluation of these public projects and policies. This expansion of the public sector created new job opportunities. Whilst analysing the urbanisation process in the region, the *Plan de Desarrollo Regional Concertado – PDRC*³⁸ of Moquegua states that this

³⁸ This is a key territorial government document that was established as part of the decentralisation process of 2002. Every region was required to create this document. It sets out the main development goals of the whole region for a medium to long-term vision. These are ingrained between the regional and local goals, and the national development goals. It has a diagnosis of the different sectors in the region, since it will serve as a territorial governance document. It is coordinated and developed by the Regional Government in conjunction with the active participation of provincial and district mayors

process was a result of “the attractiveness of public sector as a generator of jobs, since it executes public works through direct administration, originated by the significant transfer of mining canon from 2007 onwards” (PDRC, 2015, p. 23). This expansion can be traced in the ENAHO survey. In this, they traced the percentage of households who work on the public sector or private. In 2004, around 29% of households worked in public administration, and by 2016 this figure increased to 36%.

This expansion was also present in the educational sector. From the beginning of the decentralisation process Moquegua increased its schools by 29%, and its pool of teachers by 64% (Table N°5.2). This was above the national average as well. Furthermore, this expansion of state oversight was an explicit objective of Martin Vizcarra, Regional Governor (2011-2014). For him, “even with the risk of receiving a sanction [from the national government] we hired more teachers with the budget for investments in order to expand the oversight and follow up of educational goals” (M. Vizcarra, interview, 2012).

Table N°5.2 – Schools and teachers in Moquegua

	2000	2017
Schools	561	729
Teachers	2474	4072

Source: Regional compendium – INEI // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

As part of the overall decentralisation process, the Peruvian state implemented a set of laws that devolved fiscal resources to the region. However, it is not fully a fiscal decentralisation since the resources still go first towards the central government and later these are transferred back to the subnational governments. A key piece in this fiscal decentralisation is the Canon Law (Ley N° 27506), which specified the economic transfers from national to subnational government as a result of the exploitation of natural resources (mining, gas, petroleum, fishing, among others). How much each subnational government received and how this is distributed depends on the type of natural resource being exploited. The mining canon is the share received by Regional and Local Governments from the income and rents obtained by the exploitation of mineral, metal and non-metal resources. From this canon 25% goes to Regional Government, 40% goes to Municipalities from the Region where the natural resources are being exploited, 25% goes to the Municipalities of the Province where the

as well as members of the civil society (social, economic, cultural). These members approve the document giving it political legitimacy that goes beyond party lines and lasts longer than the time in office for the authorities that approve it.

natural resources are being exploited, and 10% goes to District Municipalities where the resources are being exploited. The Budget for the Fiscal Exercise of 2006 established that regional and local governments would use the resources derived from the mining canon in “financing or co-financing public investment projects that are oriented to provided public services of universal access and that generates community benefits” (Law N° 28652). During this period there was an international boom on mineral prices along the first decade of the 2000s which created increased budgets for subnational governments. This expansion coincided with the extra income generated from mining production in Moquegua. Mining became the most important activity. Its production is mostly centred around copper, although it also has silver, gold and molybdenum. Since 2004 until 2018 Moquegua had a yearly average income from mining canon and royalties of about S/. 310 million. As seen in Table N°5.3, considering the year 2004 and the year 2007, we can see how in just three years the income from this canon expanded and royalties from mining increased twelvefold. The year 2007 was certainly one of the highest in terms of collection but it never went down back to the 2004 levels. The expansion of mining exploitation, the international boom on mineral prices, the increase in mining canon and the stipulations on how to invest and use the mining canon expanded the state presence and its capacity within the Moquegua region. Over this period, the region as a whole received a total of 4,6 billion PEN.

However, the increase of canon does not immediately translate in this expansion but rather provides the resources needed to respond to the modernisation processes undergone by the region. The pressure built by the changes on economic structure, migration and urbanisation transformation can be channelled using these resources. The subsequent improvements in public education would then sustain these further improvements in democratic state performance. This was the path followed by Moquegua, but not Cajamarca. The latter was a region that received more canon than Moquegua during this period (Table N° 5.4). However, Cajamarca remain a low performance region with lower levels of quality of democracy and state capacity. Modernisation had a timid presence in Cajamarca and did not fully activate the subsequent economic and social processes that pushed forward the need for improvement in state territorial reach, political participation, among others. Despite being within the top fourth regions that received canon (2004-2018) it was the poorest region in 2017 (47% population under poverty line), with one of the highest levels of illiteracy (17%) at the same level of Huánuco, and a below the national average for water supply network, electricity, political participation and equal representation. The financial resources from the mining canon did not produce a high-

democratic state performance. However, during this period of 2002-2018, it maintained a high level of agricultural workforce (36%) as well as low levels of educational attainments (41% had primary school as their highest educational achievement) (Census 2017). Other regions like Ancash, Cusco and La Libertad received more canon than Moquegua during this period (Table N° 5.4). Although these regions were not low-performance regions as Cajamarca, they stayed at the medium level performance range. La Libertad was closer to being a high-performance region, whilst Ancash and Cusco were more on the lower spectrum in this dimension. The cases of Ancash and Cusco are worth noting since these two regions have received the highest incomes during this period. Ancash received a total of 9.6 billion PEN and Cusco 22.2 billion PEN; this is more than twice and fourth times the amount received by Moquegua.

Table N° 5.3 – Mining canon and royalties in Moquegua (in Million PEN)

Year	Canon	Royalties	Concession rights	TOTAL
2004	29,808,608			29,808,608
2005	148,509,742	65,154,174		213,663,916
2006	270,592,656	100,216,716		370,809,372
2007	355,486,279	95,313,610		450,799,889
2008	211,435,193	122,593,320		334,028,513
2009	307,245,982	42,939,980	3,087,269	353,273,231
2010	245,490,011	98,814,857	5,803,970	350,108,838
2011	392,507,455	107,966,113	4,989,188	505,462,756
2012	341,936,190	93,490,997	6,999,875	442,427,062
2013	312,554,018	61,682,631	6,054,684	380,291,333
2014	262,004,316	51,820,043	5,107,572	318,931,931
2015	245,222,084	52,833,395	4,032,215	302,087,694
2016	198,883,021	32,647,280	5,506,225	237,036,526
2017	91,760,837	37,020,008	6,759,179	135,540,024
2018	170,429,856	51,038,112	6,022,473	227,490,441

Source: INGEMMET – Ministry of Energy and Mining // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Despite this massive income received by the regions, most underlying conditions remained: the state was far away from its population, had low quality of public services, uneven access to these same services, and a democratic elected government that did not meet the demands of the population. Spending capacity at the subnational level has remained an issue since the onset of decentralisation. Most local government officials and politicians were quick to point out that the administrative decentralisation was not accompanied by support and building capacity at this level. In a very rapid

process, local officials had to be in charge of designing and implementing public policies on a myriad of issues for which they had no previous experience. In the education sector alone, subnational governments had to improve public school infrastructure, arrange payment of teachers, designing and purchasing educational materials, among others, while managing most of the education budget. The national government was still present, but now the vast majority of the budget for a region was controlled by subnational governments. At the same time, with the mining canon Moquegua increased its budget from 29 million to 213 million in just one year. Subnational governments were not prepared to handle these responsibilities and financial resources in such a short time. Furthermore, this municipalisation of the budget made it harder for all three levels for government to articulate development projects for the region as a whole. As stated by Gregorio Santos, Regional Governor of Cajamarca, “*el presupuesto se fragmenta, se deja de pensar en obras de impacto regional para las cuales las regiones han sido diseñadas. Se atomizan los proyectos, y no se podrán combatir o cerrar las brechas sociales que tenemos*” (the budget gets fragmented, [and] thinking about works with regional impact for which the regions were designed for gets stopped. The projects get atomized, and it won’t be possible to fight or close the social gaps that we have) (Santos, 2013). This is replicated by the Society of Foreign Trade’s (COMEX in Spanish) analysis of the mining canon where they stressed that the major issues are the quality of the budget expenditure from the subnational government, and the absence of articulation between them for bigger public investment projects (COMEX, 2021).

Within this scenario, the national government, through the Ministry of Economy, had the National System of Public Investment (SNIP in Spanish). The SNIP was created in 2000 as a mandatory instrument to manage investment projects. It is an administrative system guided by principles, methods, procedures, and technical norms to certify the quality of the public investment projects. The idea behind the system is that each project achieves efficiency, sustainability and has a major socio-economic impact. All projects from the national and subnational government had to use the SNIP process to get the project approved and funded. This created a management and political bottleneck in the decentralisation process. First, any public investment project needed to get approved through the SNIP system. Technical reports from subnational government were constantly revised and needed the approval from different national sectors (e.g. approval from Ministry of Education for public school infrastructure, or Ministry of Transport for interprovincial highways). Most importantly, it required the approval of the MEF. Subnational governments were in charge of spending the money, but decision making and approval for even minor projects still relied on the national government.

The SNIP process itself was heavily complex, with multiple steps to be filled out, stages to follow, elaboration of different reports (*Estudio de Perfil, Estudio de Prefactibilidad, Estudio de Factibilidad*), among others. Subnational governments with limited capacity struggled to get their SNIP approved without any revision. Furthermore, they could only use the money for public infrastructure, but not for capacity building. This created delays for the implementation of any future project. The regional governor from Ica, Romulo Triveño, in his presentation at the Accountability Commission from Congress, mentioned that the processes that guide the SNIP had to be simplified to accelerate the approval of investment projects (Comisión Fiscalización, 2009). Second, the approvals needed from the national government created frictions with the subnational government. They were required to spend the money and build public infrastructure, but at the same time, they could not do it without the national government's approval. Furthermore, they had the money to spend, but could not use it without this approval. Thus, the SNIP became a thorn in the national and subnational relations. Third, an unintended consequence of the complexity of the SNIP, with the need to spend the allocated budget, was the design of public investment projects that could easily be approved through the SNIP, but did not address the grievances of the population. For example, the Municipal Province of Espinar in Cusco build a sport centre, a new city hall and a temperate Olympic pool, whilst the majority of its population had limited access to potable water and water supply network (El Peruano, 2016). Furthermore, the National Assembly of Regional Governments (*Asamblea Nacional de Gobiernos Regionales – ANGR*) called for a restructure of the administrative system of the state. The ANGR is an organisation that gathers all Regional Governors of Perú to discuss and coordinate policies to promote regional integration and decentralisation, and its President is one of the regional governors. In one of their public announcement they required that the administrative and functional systems of the Peruvian state to be adequated to “*las necesidades de los gobiernos regionales y locales, de modo tal que responda a la diversidad de las entidades públicas. Es prioridad revisar y reformar los sistemas administrativos que estén relacionados a la inversión pública*” (the necessities of regional and local governments, so it responds to the diversity of public entities. It is a priority to revise and reform the administrative systems that are related to public investment) (ANGR, 2016).

Subnational authorities were facing challenges to implement public investment projects in their territory due to the SNIP. These challenges were addressed by Ollanta Humala in his speech on 28 July 2012. Here Humala stated that “*recogiendo las demandas y sugerencias de las autoridades regionales y locales, hemos introducido dos mejoras significativas que permitirán primero incluir en la inversión pública aspectos como*

capacitación, asistencia técnica, asesoría de gestión y adopción de tecnologías; y segundo, reducir a la mitad del tiempo el proceso de aprobación de los proyectos” (acknowledging the demands and suggestions from the regional and local authorities, we have introduced two significant improvements that will, first, include in public investment areas such as capacity building technical assistance, consultancy and adoption of technologies; and, second, reduce by half the amount of time the approval process for projects) (Humala, 2012). The SNIP would continue to create challenges to subnational authorities until President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski eliminated the system entirely in his first year of government. This was a campaign promise and part of his party manifesto to simplify the public administration. The Prime Minister at the time, Fernando Zavala, expressed in his first Congressional speech that one of the key issues with the SNIP was that it did not identify nor prioritise projects that closed the social and economic gaps. During this government, they would create “*un nuevo sistema que sustituirá al SNIP para enfocarlo en el logro de niveles de servicio y cumplimiento de objetivos de retorno social, y menos en trámites y formalismos administrativo*.” (have a new system replacing the SNIP that will be focused on achievements of levels of services and fulfilment of social return objectives, with less bureaucracy and administrative formalities) (Zavala, 2016).³⁹

The resources from the canon augmented the subnational government’s budget in each region. This rapid extra income was met with subnational governments with limited capacity to process the new administrative responsibilities and an (unnecessary) complex public investment project system that created administrative and political bottlenecks. Spending money from the canon was not a straightforward process. Building new schools, augmenting the water supply network in a community, providing electricity to households or improving the region’s communication signals was a lengthy process that had to go through numerous hurdles. Subnational governments had to overcome these challenges to use their budget, and in some cases, the public investment projects did not address the population’s grievances. In fact, the demise of the SNIP showed that the system was unfit to address the socio-economic disparities within each region.

³⁹ This would later be replaced by the programme INVIERTE.

Table N° 5.4 – Canon transferred to the regions of Cajamarca, Ancash, Cusco and La Libertad*

Year	Cajamarca	Ancash	Cusco	La Libertad
2004	168,105,651	62,967,329	70,728,433	14,635,612
2005	290,398,239	61,558,353	322,521,447	28,484,118
2006	361,710,186	365,658,887	465,682,318	61,422,395
2007	595,177,994	42,660,862	645,935,340	18,478,809
2008	192,084,259	1,343,373,155	977,983,988	289,537,423
2009	263,047,091	877,759,262	922,187,859	409,503,734
2010	490,677,733	803,834,805	1,359,235,275	477,100,492
2011	532,587,541	777,524,851	1,980,279,249	536,659,902
2012	637,675,657	1,069,377,591	2,794,788,538	621,364,471
2013	666,773,970	1,082,552,964	2,559,148,845	616,194,080
2014	437,722,130	796,814,415	2,777,666,432	418,406,210
2015	280,027,465	478,935,625	2,061,400,434	352,765,988
2016	301,934,229	442,927,792	1,541,988,679	317,874,207
2017	260,375,922	809,187,019	1,603,681,875	386,703,478
2018	117,724,239	900,420,698	2,139,828,434	328,369,652
TOTAL	5,596,022,306	9,915,553,608	22,223,057,146	4,877,500,571

Source: INGEMMET – Ministry of Energy and Mining // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

*Includes all type of canon (mining, gas, petroleum, fishing, forest). This depends on the region, e.g. whilst Cajamarca receives mostly mining canon, Cusco receives canon from gas.

Now, despite these challenges, the influx of the mining canon in Moquegua was accompanied by Law N° 29230, approved in 2008, that aimed to foster public investment through a mechanism called *Obras por impuestos* (public works by taxes). This process allowed companies to invest directly on public works and use the amount invested to claim back taxes. It benefits the company because it improves its image within the communities it works, improves the efficiency of its corporate responsibility programmes, knows exactly how its taxes are being invested, and can accelerate public works that can improve competitiveness of the region and the company. Through this process Southern Peru Copper has invested a total of 198 million PEN on public works related to transport, education, sanitation, and management. From this figure, more than half (101 million PEN) has been used for water and sanitation works in the region. These works benefited more than 74 thousand families. In 1993, 57% of households had access to water and sanitation through the water supply network, and by 2017 it was 77% of households. Moquegua became the region with most households having access to the water supply network. This close collaboration with the private sector to support access with water

was highlighted by Martin Vizcarra where “we worked with an alliance with the private sector in order for them to support the region in education and to have more water resources” (Vizcarra, 2014).

Table N°5.5 – Households in Moquegua with access to water

Year	% Households with access to water through public network
1993	57.9
2007	70.4
2017	77.3

Source: National Census 1993-2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The even expansion of the state’s territorial reach can be seen through the electrification process. Houses without electricity (access to electricity lines) are outside the state scope, not only in terms of their dependency on this source of power but also in the broader sense of their immediate connection with the nation through communication devices that requires electricity (TVs, radios, or internet). The wingspan of investment required for the provision of this public good rests within the public sector’s interest. Electrification has thus been used as a measure of state capacity (Enriquez et al., 2017; Koren & Sarbahi, 2018). As seen in Table N°5.6 Moquegua’s state reach on houses with electrification expanded to almost all the households in the region within 20 years from two thirds in 1993 to more than 93% in 2018. During this period, the region filed to the Ministry of Economy and Finance 32 public investment projects for an amount of over 85 million PEN. The focus of these projects was on amplifying the electric supply to rural areas. It connected the rural areas to major electrification supply lines. Half of these projects were funded through the mining canon.

Table N°5.6 – Households in Moquegua that have electrification via public network

Year	% Households with electrification via public network
1993	61.7
2007	75.7
2017	93.7

Source: National Census 1993-2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The existing literature also underscores the impact of state capacity on health systems and its resources (hospital beds, doctors, equipment). The provision of public health has become part of the modern state since the nineteenth century (Ansell & Lindvall, 2020). If the state has a lower capacity to provide this public service, it can have disastrous consequences for its population. As shown by Serikbayeva et al. (2021) a government that has lower levels of state capacity and, thus, government effectiveness has a higher COVID-19 death level. Furthermore, when the resources the hospital uses are reduced (e.g. beds), it has negative results on health outcomes for patients (Eriksson et al., 2017). Thus, the number of beds per population in a region can be considered as a measure of the state capacity and effectiveness to attend to its citizens. Table N° 5.7 exhibits how Moquegua has a stronger health system (measure by the number of beds per population) than the national average. More beds put the region in a better position to treat its population if an emergency would arise. This is consistent with the argument put forward by this research, where Moquegua as a high-performance democratic state presents better outcomes in terms of state capacity than the rest of its regional counterparts, and also with other health outcomes like life expectancy.

Table N°5.7 – Number of beds: Moquegua vs National

Year	Moquegua-- Number of beds (per 10 thousand)	National-- Number of beds (per 10 thousand)
2003	20.5	14.8
2010	18.5	14.5
2018	24.4	15.8

Source: Ministry of Health – Repositorio Único Nacional de Información en Salud // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In sum, the region of Moquegua has a long history. It was part of the Inca Empire and then later a wine production area during the Spanish colonisation period with a peripheric relationship with the world market. After the Peruvian independence in 1821 Moquegua was part of the region of Arequipa and became an autonomous region in 1936. This autonomy however did not come with regional authority and an institutional arrangement to govern the region as a whole. It was still a sum of district and provincial level municipalities until 2002. The decentralisation process in 2002 gave Moquegua a regional authority with power over the whole territory and administrative, political and financial responsibilities were devolved to regional and local authorities. Since the decentralisation in 2002

Moquegua has achieved greater levels of democratic equality, pluralism, state effectiveness and infrastructure. It has greater political participation of the population, better access to information by vulnerable population, and more women candidates and authorities, putting Moquegua with a good quality of democracy. At the same time, its state capacity is greater once accounting for the territorial reach across the region, with more bureaucrats, schools, hospitals, water access and electrification. The higher quality of democracy and better state capacity during the 2002-2018 period puts Moquegua as a high-performance democratic state.

5.2 Explaining high-performance in Moquegua

How did Moquegua become a high-performance democratic state? In this section I will lay out how the change in the economic structure of the region, the process through which the economic labour force shifted from agricultural towards industry and services, started before the decentralisation process in 2002. This process gave the socio-economic building grounds for the region to develop a democratic state where its citizens have greater equality to be part of the public arena, participate in elections, and have access to public services that will allow them to fulfil their daily activities.

As seen in the previous section, Moquegua was after Peruvian independence. It was a hacienda-based economy mostly dedicated to grape cultivation and wine production but was decimated by the Pacific War of 1879. After the war, the region was unable to bounce back from the economic decline and its population emigrated towards other regions (e.g. Arequipa). Only in 1940 did the whole region of Moquegua reach the same population that it had one hundred years ago. The capital was hit the hardest though, and the 10,950 habitants in 1853 was reduced to 5,568 in 1940 (Brandis, 2004, 261). According to the Historic and Geographic Atlas (1970)⁴⁰, Moquegua had the lowest population density and this was due to “the lack of natural resources”. The principal activity for the population was agriculture (INP, 1970, p. 529).

However, from the 1960s onwards the region of Moquegua underwent a rapid economic modernisation, from agriculture towards industry, services and commerce. This is the first step in the

⁴⁰ This Atlas was commissioned by the National Institute of Planning to multiple academics. It was developed and researched over six years from 1963 until 1970. It was the most comprehensive diagnosis of all political, economic, cultural and social activities in the Peruvian regions. It was going to serve as a stepping point for regional development according to the main features of the territory.

explanatory model (Graph N° 4.11): the transformation of the labour workforce and structural change of the economy. Following the argument of this dissertation, Moquegua's economy would change its structure, transforming the character of its labour workforce, and clearly shift towards a non-agricultural economy. The new industrial/service-based economy creates new economic activities, new businesses flourish, and new opportunities and jobs attract the population from outside the region. This first moment is what Moquegua shows when during the 1970s decade it goes through an inflection point in the way it was structured. At the beginning of the decade, around 11% of the gross domestic product came from agricultural activities, whilst industry was about 12% of the economy (Table N° 5.8). However, by the late 1990s the figures changed completely. Only 1.6% was agricultural output, whilst 64.9% of the regional GDP came from industry. This was a result of the industrialisation process undergone by the region. As mentioned before, the main industries were metallurgical and food and beverage industries. These were mostly located in two provinces in Moquegua: Ilo and Mariscal Nieto. The Ilo province was a district within Mariscal Nieto before 1970. However, the economic importance of Ilo, the region's port, its commerce and the location of the main fish flour factories pushed the military government of Velasco Alvarado to separate it from Mariscal Nieto and upgrade its status from district to province.

Furthermore, the gross domestic product for Moquegua in terms of Peruvian soles shows that the output of agriculture and industry had almost the same fate. Naturally, industrial goods tend to have a higher value and thus their impact, based on the currency, tend to be higher as well. However, the difference between these two sectors was at a ratio of around 3:1 at the beginning of the decade of 1970. Agriculture in 1973 generated 1,638 New Soles, whilst Industry 2,373. This ratio showed a greater gap by mid 1990s (Table N°5.9). For this period the ratio changed 11:1, where agriculture had an output of 1,583 and industry 17,803 New Soles.

Table N°5.8 – Percentage structure of agriculture and industry for Moquegua's gross domestic product

	1973	1974	1995	1996
Agriculture	8.1	10.9	1.6	1.6
Industry	11.8	29.4	67.9	64.9

Source: Compendio Regional Moquegua – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Table N°5.9 – Gross domestic product of Moquegua in New Soles

	1973	1974	1995	1996
Agriculture	1,638	1,789	1,500	1,583
Industry	2,373	4,850	12,479	17,803

Source: Compendio Regional Moquegua – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

These figures show a stagnation of agriculture and a rise of industrialisation in Moquegua. This industrialisation was pushed forward by the food industry and metallurgic industry and created link chains with other sectors like services and commerce to cater these industries. The fish flour boom during the 60s and 70s expanded massively in Ilo, and in 1975 the Coper Refinery of Ilo (*Refineria de Cobre de Ilo*) started production. The latter was a state-owned company that sold the refinement of copper to blister to the Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC). Once in production, it built houses for its workers and a hospital. During the privatisation era of the 1990s, under the authoritarian government of Fujimori, the refinery was privatised to SPCC. This privatisation, according to the Congress Committee presided by Congressman Rafael Rey Rey, was in charge of investigating if there was corruption in the privatisation processes under Fujimori's regime (1990-2000). On this topic, the Committee found that the privatisation had a real benefit on the development and dynamisation of the economy of Ilo and the region of Moquegua (Rey Rey, 2003). This privatisation allowed for SPCC to be more efficient, generating more taxes for Ilo and Moquegua, and that 75% of the goods and services are locally sourced. This “*originó un mayor ingreso per capita de estas poblaciones, mayor nivel de vida, crecimiento de la población y un mayor PBI del País*” (originated more income per capita for this population, better quality of life, demographic expansion and higher GDP for Peru) (Rey Rey, 2003, art.13). The fish flour boom started in Ilo with EPISA, *Empresa Pesquera Ilo SA*, and as with the Copper Refinery, it also changed the urban area by building houses for their workers and hospital. Another industry that impacted Ilo and the region was the International Petroleum Company that used the region to unload, stock and distribute different type of fuels to the region and Tacna. These main industries fostered services and commerce to flourish in the region.

According to the explanatory model presented in section 4.7, the economic modernisation in a region and the transformation of its labour workforce from agricultural towards non-agricultural activities would trigger socio-demographic changes in the territory. The change in the economic structure creates new jobs and new opportunities that are at the same time concentrated in specific areas. This

economic growth attracts the population that wants to improve their living standards. As theorised, this process is triggered by economic modernisation. Table N°6.3 shows the migration patterns in Moquegua with a positive balance. Furthermore, the population was concentrated in the two main economic provinces. Between 1973 and 1981, Ilo and Mariscal Nieto increased their population by 43% and 48% respectively. These were drawn by the boom of the fish flour industry and metallurgic industry. Meanwhile, the less industrialised province of Sanchez Cerro reduced its population by 8%. This trend continued between 1981 and 1993, with Ilo augmenting its population by 32% and Mariscal Nieto by 27%. Thus, in 1971 Ilo and Mariscal Nieto had 74% of the overall Moqueguan population, and by 1993 these industrialised and urbanised provinces contained 85% of the population. This modernisation process created mass immigration from peasants towards the urban areas and the cities were reaching their limits. This process created an overflow of people that were concentrated in the urban areas of the region. However, the urban areas and municipalities were not ready for this massive migration from the rural areas to urban ones. This was highlighted by Moquegua’s Regional Development Concerted Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Regional Concertado – PDRC*). The 2003 PDRC of Moquegua stated that during the past decades “Moquegua had a positive and growing migration” and this was a result of “specific successive modern investments in the region during the last decades” (PDRC, 2003). In Moquegua’s 2015 PDRC they recognised that the urban expansion “*es explicado por la migración del campo hacia los dos centros de mayor expectativa de Desarrollo y concentración urbana en el interior de la región, como son las ciudades de Ilo y Moquegua*” (is explained by the migration from the countryside towards the expected main centres of development and urban concentration within the Region, like the cities of Ilo and Moquegua) (PDRC, 2015, p. 23). As seen in Table N°5.10 the migration patterns in Moquegua do show a positive balance.

Table N°5.10 Migration patterns in Moquegua

Years	Immigration	Emigration
1976-1981	17278	14587
1988-1993	19939	15556
2002-2007	14986	11712
2012-2017	14155	11864

Source: National Census – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In the explanatory model I posited that the modernisation process, the change of the labour workforce from agricultural towards non-agricultural sectors, the economic activities, and economic growth that would follow would trigger a positive migration balance to the region. This demographic change meant that the region would receive more migrants than the ones that would leave the region. However, this process would be concentrated in specific areas, concentrating and expanding the population of the urban areas. As seen in Table N 5.11, this positive balance of migration towards Moquegua was accompanied by the change from the rural towards urban settings. However, the urban landscape was not designed for such a rapid influx of people. Most migrants settled at the periphery of the urban areas. The results from the National Census showed that in the 1970s Moquegua started to have more of an urban population than rural. From that decade onwards it has been mostly an urban region. As mentioned before, Moquegua was one of the less densely populated regions of Peru. The change of the economic structure, the population shift from rural to urban settings, and the migration fostered by new opportunities in the region augmented its population density. The population density in 1940 was 2.3 habitants per km², and by 2015 this was 11.6hab/km².

Table N°5.11 – Moquegua’s Rural & Urban population (percentage)

Years	Rural	Urban	Density (Hab per km)
1940	75	25	2.3
1961	52	48	3.4
1972	30	70	5.0
1981	22	78	6.6
1993	17	83	8.3
2007	22	78	10.5
2017	13	87	11.5

Source: INEI National Census – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The structural changes triggered by the modernisation process unfolded within a territory over which the democratic state claimed to exercise control and extended its reach. Under this scenario the democratic state reacted to these different pressures produced by the economic structure and populational changes. This subnational state reaction can be traced on how it dealt with the new peri-

urban areas created as a result of this modernisation process. The migration that settled on the peripheries of the urban areas were denominated *barriadas* or *pueblos jóvenes*. These human settlements (*asentamientos humanos*) illegally occupied those lands from the 1960s onwards. The countryside continued to come to the urban areas where opportunities for jobs arose, but they stayed there after public investment projects (mostly in construction) ended. Instead of returning to the countryside, these workers stayed in these areas. The people living in these settlements were massive and in 1993 almost half of the population lived in these settlements (Brandis, 2004). However, this was unevenly spread: Ilo had 55% of its population living in occupied settlements whilst Sanchez Cerro only 0.1%. The settlers formed themselves in different associations. In 1973 the SINAMOS (National System of Social Movilization), a newly created office from the military government, recognised these settlements as *pueblos jóvenes*. This was part of a government initiative to try to control and avoid illegal occupied anarchy across the nation. This status allowed the settlers to receive formal property on the lands from the Municipality. Before the people were granted individual property rights, they were formed in association and had to fulfil a minimum requirement: land to be even (to avoid any future glides) and spatially distributed in blocks. On other cases, the state bought land, divided it in different blocks and tried to reallocate them in these areas. These lands had easy connection to water and sanitation system, electricity networks, closer to main roads, and so on. Once a family were able to process their property rights, it was easier for them to gain access to main public services. Thus, the national and local governments reacted to the overflow of population that settled in the peripheries of the urban areas. It was mostly migrants from the countryside that came to be part of the economic transformation of Moquegua that was centred in and around the urban areas.

Now, economic modernisation requires skilled workers to foster innovation, improve productivity, and economic growth. A region with better access to public education and higher educational attainment will be able to provide the human capital needed for economic development. This social modernisation will propel higher institutional quality and the building blocks for a democratic society. In Perú, education has been addressed in a process through which a person becomes a citizen, an individual that knows his/her civil, political and social rights, and someone who will strengthen the democratic practices through the use of public reason and tolerance. This was clearly stated in Law N° 2338 – *Ley General de Educación* – from 1982 where one of the objectives of education is “*la contribución a la construcción y vigencia permanente de la democracia, para que todos gocen the iguales derechos políticos, sociales y económicos*” (contribute to the construction and permanent validity of democracy, so everyone

enjoys equal political, social and economic rights) (Art. 3 d). Access to education is not limited to reading comprehension or mathematical solving problems, but a decisive way to form a future citizen that will coexist in a democratic society. Education is a view through an Aristotelian perspective where an individual goes through education, where she learns about virtues, *techne* and *episteme*, not to become a wise person in itself, but to become a valued member of the *polis* where his/her work will contribute to the common good and sustain a harmonious coexistence. This view of education as a pillar for democratic citizenship is later reaffirmed in the new Law N°28044 – Ley General de Educación – from 2003, where the aim of Peruvian education is to “*contribuir a formar una sociedad democrática, solidaria, justa, inclusiva, y forjadora de una cultura de paz ...*” (contribute to form a democratic, solidarity, fair, inclusive society, and build a culture of peace) (Art. 9). Furthermore, its curriculum must “create positive attitudes of social coexistence, societal democratization and a responsible exercise of citizenship” (Art. 34). Peruvian education is thus understood as a cornerstone for the development and consolidation of the democratic state. The whole educational journey of the student is seen as a process through which they will develop the attitudes, social interactions, a sense of common identity, and a civic culture that will enhance the democratic realm through their political participation as a full citizen. Behind this lies the assumption that the student will finish the whole process, from primary education to secondary education. An unfinished process would see the development of this aim truncated.

At the onset of the decentralisation process, Moquegua’s social modernisation was above much of the regions. Table N° 5.12 exhibits the percentage of secondary school enrolment in Moquegua. The region exhibits higher levels of enrolment than the national average, and places itself in the highest quintile. As with the nation as a whole, it will continuously improve its records although not necessarily at the same pace. Nonetheless, the ranking as one of the regions with highest educational attainments in the highest quintile is going to be maintained during the years. Moquegua’s economic and social modernisation during the previous years had created the conditions for a better democratic state. Most students were able to finish the educational process that would prepare them to become full citizen and strengthen any democratic process. In Table N° 5.13 it is possible to see how this region had a higher life expectancy than the rest of the regions. In 1970, Moquegua’s life expectancy was 55 years, whilst the national average was 52 years and the low-performing region of Huánuco was 40 years. This shows the difference in social conditions that would shape the quality of democracy in future years to come. Another indicator that exemplifies the improvements achieved by Moquegua is its levels of

literacy. As with life expectancy, Moquegua’s illiteracy rate has been lower than the national average. During the 1980s and 1990s it outperformed the national average. After this period the gap closed. This is mostly due to the fact that the closer you get to 0 the more difficult is to eliminate illiteracy. As seen with these two examples of social conditions, Moquegua falls under Lipset’s premise where a higher level of social conditions “does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition [for democracy] in the modern world” (Lipset, 1959, p. 80). These higher levels of literacy in the region would have an impact with the expansion of universal suffrage during the 1980s and the quality of democracy expanded unevenly across the regions.

Before 1979, only literate Peruvians were allowed to vote. The last democratic elections in Peru were the subnational elections of 1966 (before the 1968 military coup of General Velasco Alvarado). According to the figures at that time, an average of one third of Peruvians were not allowed to participate in elections. In 1977 the General Morales Bermudez called for the elections. This was for the election of the members of the Constitutional Assembly in order to transition towards democracy. The elections were held in June 1978 and the Constitutional Assembly started its work on 28 July 1978. This Assembly discussed for the first time the universal suffrage in the session on 8 September 1978. During this session, the political participation of a Peruvian older than 18 was brought as a part of the debate regarding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). This international agreement was signed by Peru in 1977, ratified in 1978 and came into force on 28 July of the same year. The discussion regarding universal suffrage continued in future sessions, and the chapters of the Political Constitution of 1979 related to Citizenship and Voting was approved on 21 May 1979. Furthermore, the voting age was also reduced from 21 years old to 18 years. Thus, in the national elections of 1980, for the first time in Peruvian history, all adults were allowed to vote.

Table N° 5.12 – Secondary school enrolment in Moquegua

Years	Moquegua	National	Highest quintile
2002	87.5	68.6	80.8
2006	88.6	75.8	86.2
2010	86.5	77.6	83.9
2014	91.3	82.6	87.7
2018	91.8	84.7	88.8

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

This expanded the electoral base in unprecedented ways. For Del Aguila (2009) this electoral expansion created a new popular overflow. Following the author's figures, Moquegua during this period augmented its electoral base by 117%. Moquegua was one of the regions that expanded its voters least, just after Ica, Arequipa, Tumbes and Lima. This is explained by the fact that the higher levels of socio-economic conditions in the region allowed for most of its population to participate in previous elections. With a higher literate population, more citizens were able to exercise their political right of voting and participate in elections as candidates for public office. Thus, when universal suffrage was introduced in the 1979 Constitution the electoral expansion of Moquegua was not as great as other regions, since most of their citizens already were participating in elections due to their higher socio-economic positions that were the result of the modernisation process undergone in the region.

Table N°5.13 – Life expectancy and illiteracy in Moquegua versus national average

Years	Life expectancy (Moquegua)	Life expectancy (National)	Illiteracy (Moquegua)	Illiteracy (National)
1970	55.1	52.1	30.4	33.4
1980	60.5	55.5	13.3	23.3
1990	71.2	65.9	---	---
1995	72.5	67.7	9.97	17.5
2000	73.6	69.2	5.6	12.4
2005	74.7	70.6	8.7	11.3
2010	75.7	71.7	5.4	8.9
2015	76.7	74.1	7.8	10.6

Source: National Census and Demographic and Health Survey (Peru) – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Unfortunately, the expansion of voters and newly acquired political rights by millions of Peruvians were met with the beginning of the internal armed conflict. A terrorist group called the *Partido Comunista del Peru – Sendero Luminoso* (Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path), started its violent actions by setting on fire the polling booth and ballots during the national elections of 1980 in the district of Chuschi, Ayacucho. This internal armed conflict, that also included the terrorist group *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru – MRTA* (Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru), would last 20 years until 2000. According to the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation the indiscriminate

violent actions of these terrorist groups, as well as the excessive use of force by the Peruvian armed forces in some cases, would cause the death of over sixty nine thousand Peruvians during this period (CVR, 2004b). This internal armed conflict had its peak during the decade of the 1980s and consequently impacted the political participation of Peruvians across the territory. However, this impact was stronger on mostly rural and poor regions. As seen in Table N°5.14 the electoral turnout suffered a major hit between the subnational elections of 1980 and 1983. Only by the year 1995 would the electoral turnout surpass the electoral turnout of the first subnational elections with universal suffrage. This unfortunate period of violence had an impact on Moquegua, but not as stark as the other regions. As mentioned before, Shining Path and most of the violent actions during this period were located in rural areas, and most of the victims were poor, with lower levels of education, and were excluded citizens. Around 79% of the victims were peasants and 56% worked in agriculture (CVR, 2004b). By this time, Moquegua had mostly urbanised due to the industrialisation process. Political participation in subnational elections was reduced between 1980 and 1983 (from 72.5% to 60.6% respectively). However, the subnational elections of 1989 had a higher electoral turnout than 1980, and by the end of the 90s it was above 80%.

Now, social modernisation in a region cultivates the political participation of women in two key interconnected domains: education and work. The theory proposed in this dissertation is that the modernisation process unfolding within the democratic state's territory resulted in better infrastructure for public schools, better access to public education and higher levels of school attendance by women. The more access women have to education, the higher their empowerment and their opportunities to access the labour force outside their household (Duflo, 2012; Jaumotte, 2004). More educated women have also higher chances of getting high-skill jobs. The development brought by the modernisation process is a key determinant to reduce inequalities between men and women, and access to education is central to this process. They are able to confront and overcome the traditional roles that are imposed over them in pre-industrialised societies. As stated by Shetty and Hans (2015), when assessing the impact of education in Indian women it is "the golden door of freedom for development" (p. 1). Thus, education has an impact on the opportunities women have to access the labour force, but this extends as well to other public spheres like politics (Verba & Almond, 1963). Furthermore, whilst low levels of female labour force participation has contributed to female underrepresentation in democratic politics, a higher labour workforce increases their

representation and tends to increase their political participation (Andersen, 1975; Desposato & Norrander, 2009; Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008).

Table N° 5.14 – Electoral turnout in subnational elections between 1980-1998

Department	Turnout80	Turnout83	Turnout89	Turnout93	Turnout95	Turnout98
Amazonas	52.4	50	41	59.3	59.2	74.7
Ancash	63.2	60.2	60.8	59.6	70.2	78.7
Apurimac	50.3	55.2	61.1	52.9	65.6	72.3
Arequipa	73	68	80.6	73.6	78.3	84.6
Ayacucho	47.8	25.2	44.2	35.8	52.5	66.2
Cajamarca	54.5	50.2	61.4	58.4	64.1	76.5
Callao	77.9	73.9	84.2	75.5	80.6	83.5
Cusco	55	54.9	55.5	59.7	62.7	73.4
Huancavelica	52.2	36.6	54.1	39.6	59.8	69.2
Huánuco	56.2	52	45.5	42	58.2	65.9
Ica	62.7	65.4	78	72.9	81.9	85.4
Junín	65.1	58	35.6	47.1	70.4	75.5
La Libertad	66.5	65	73.1	67.3	74.5	77.8
Lambayeque	70.7	66.9	77.3	72.2	76.6	81.7
Lima	75.8	73.7	77	73.9	80.6	82.4
Loreto	64.5	63.8	70.2	66.4	69.5	74.2
Madre de Dios	64.9	61.5	62.9	52.9	64.2	67.8
Moquegua	72.5	60.6	77.5	64.8	82.5	86.7
Pasco	59.5	75.4	58.4	52.1	68.2	75.6
Piura	72.5	45.6	68.7	67.8	76.2	80.6
Puno	75.2	66.2	52.3	59.4	73.9	80.4
San Martin	71.3	57.2	50.1	51.5	71.4	75.8
Tacna	78.4	64.7	81	78.5	85.4	87.8
Tumbes	71.5	60.5	59.5	78.7	78.2	84.1
Ucayali	65.9	63.8	59.5	62	67.3	70.8
National average	64.78	58.98	62.78	60.956	70.88	77.264

Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales and Fernando Tuesta // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In Moquegua, the modernisation process shows exactly the pathway described by the explanatory model of this dissertation. The number of schools and teachers in the region increased (Table N° 5.2). This was at the same time accompanied by higher educational attainment and higher access of women to education. This would translate in the future to more women in the labour workforce. The result of this process is exhibited in a comparison between the National Census of 2007 and 2017, where the number of women that worked in their household decreased. In 2007 around 4.6% of women worked in their household, and by 2017 this was reduced to 0.9%. This presence is accompanied with higher levels of access to education for women, higher levels of literacy, and higher access to information. Table N° 5.15 shows that women in Moquegua have more years of education, with the majority of them having finished secondary school and pursuing more education afterwards. In comparison to the national average, they have more years of education. The difference with the national average is more than ten percental points.

On the other hand, access to information is built within democratic theory. In liberal representative democracies the voter elects a candidate based on the information available for them. Furthermore, the shortage of information or the denial of access to government information is considered as a sign of a non-democratic government. The greater access to information, the greater education a citizen has, and the better opportunities they have to shape the government and participate in public debates (Rueschemeyer, 2004). Furthermore, in territories where the gender differences are greater and access to education and information is steeper, women's access to media can be considered as a proxy for the level of information the population has on public affairs. For this end, the ENDES collects information on the access of women to media. It considers media as the sum of newspapers, radio and television. A woman can have access to three forms of media, just two or one, or no access at all to any of these three. As with levels of education achieved by women, Moquegua shows that more women have access to media. This higher level of education and higher access to information via media supports the high-performance of Moquegua. These conditions were suitable for candidates, like Cristala Constantinidis, to win the Regional Governor position in 2002. As seen in the previous section, this region has presented more female candidates than the national average. All regions and political parties have to follow the same institutional rules on quotas and have the same experience with democracy on a national level (Tremblay, 2007). Thus, the explanation on this variation has to go outside these factors. This is aligned with the results from Lovenduski and Norris (1993). They focus on the supply side of candidates to study why some countries have fewer women candidates

and, thus, authorities. For them, the better the socio-economic factors the higher the possibility of women candidates and authorities. Following on the authors, the socio-economic conditions of Moquegua explain this variation within the nation. A more modernised Moquegua shaped the political development of the region towards a more egalitarian society improving the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable populations like women. As a result of that process, women stayed longer in schools, had higher levels of literacy, more access to information, and were able to reduce their work on household and domestic chores. The expansion of the female workforce outside the family is a result of this process that fostered their public presence and, thus, improved their own political participation.

Table N° 5.15 – Women’s access to secondary school (or more) and media: Moquegua vs National.

Years	Secondary School or more		No access to media	
	Moquegua	National	Moquegua	National
2000	79.1	66.2	11.3	17.3
2004-2006	82.1	71.6	8.4	13.6
2014	90.1	79.2	5.2	11.7
2018	91.1	82.5	8.9	16.9

Source: ENDES 2000-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

This process also had an impact on political participation in general. Since the 2002 ERM, the Moquegua region has had an average of 88% political participation in elections, whilst the national average has been around 83%. Elections in Peru and the polling stations take place in educational institutions (from primary schools to universities). The workforce change and subsequent urbanisation fostered the creation of public schools and universities in the urban areas. These are more connected and closer to voters, facilitating the voters’ political participation. In rural areas, the distances to schools are far greater, creating an access gap for students and their educational attainment (Frenette, 2006; Mehretu & Mutambirwa, 1992; Siddhu, 2011). This means that the voter has to travel a greater length in rural areas to cast their votes. The cost of voting is higher for rural Moquegua than for urban Moquegua.

Furthermore, studies on the relationship between education and democracy have shown a correlation between these two, from Lipset’s input where “if we cannot say that “high” level of education is a

sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary conditions” (Lipset, 1959, 80), to studies that show a causal relationship where education has a positive effect on democratisation (Glaeser et al., 2004). This causal relationship was challenged by Acemoglu et al. (2005), where they did not find this positive causal effect. For these authors the dataset used by Glaeser et al., 2004 did not control for a country-specific effect, and if this is taken into consideration then the positive relationship disappears. For them, the “cross-sectional relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors influencing both education and democracy rather than a causal relationship” (Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 48). Nonetheless, the work from Castelló-Climent (2008), revising the previous results, shows that by addressing key econometric problems in estimating the effect of education on democracy, the author finds that “education stimulates democratic institutions”. Furthermore, it goes beyond these findings and discovers that “a more equal distribution of education is what matters for democracy, that is, the implementation and sustainability of democracies need the support of the majority of the society” (Castelló-Climent, 2008, p. 189).

The social conditions are relevant to develop and maintain a competitive political regime (Dahl, 1973, 1989). In his work on civic participation, Dacombe shows that the social conditions of deprived neighbourhoods have an effect on local life, the political participation of resident and thus, an effect on democracy. For the author, “it is clear that social conditions matter for the conduct of democracy” (Dacombe, 2018, p. 175). The level of poverty and inequalities within a society are among these conditions. Moquegua’s economic transformation, accompanied with migration and urbanisation patterns, improved the levels of poverty. During the 1980s and 1990s the way of measuring poverty in Peru was with the unsatisfied needs. This was later changed by adopting the World Bank methodology. However, for the amount of people under poverty line during the 1990s, the National Institute of Statistics made a ranking from the poorest to the wealthiest region in Peru. In this analysis Moquegua was ranked between the Top 5 regions with fewer poor people. With the new methodology adopted, in the year 2000, Moquegua was the second region (after Callao) that had lower levels of poverty with 29.6%. As with the previous indicators, Moquegua was above national average again. This is acknowledged by the regional party Kausachun, who won the regional Presidency in 2014. In Kausachun’s political party manifesto the party recognised that “*no hay mayores problemas de genero, etnicidad o grupos sociales, considerando que no hay grandes diferencias económicas entre estos*” (there are not any major problems of gender, nor ethnicities nor social groups, considering that there are not big

economic differences between them) (Kausachun, 2014). As shown in Table N° 5.16, Moquegua had fewer people under poverty line at the beginning of the century and then over the past decades after the decentralisation process.

Table N°5.16 – People under poverty line: Moquegua vs National average

Years	Moquegua	National
2000	29.6	58.8
2002	35.8	59.4
2006	27.4	49.1
2010	15.7	35.2
2014	11.8	26.3
2018	9.2	23.6

Source: INEI National Census – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The structural argument put forward by this research shows that the impact of other factors on the regional political development is minor. One of these factors is political agency and party politics. More competitive party systems (Gottlieb & Kosec, 2019), a lesser fragmented party system (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004), type of political regional/national party (Vampa, 2017), and party ideology (Pribble, 2013) have been addressed as explanations for subnational variation. The continuity of high-performance levels in Moquegua have occurred despite the political changes, alternation in power, type of political party, party ideology and lack of political control over the territory by the winning party at the regional level. Since 2002, the regional government has been won by different political parties in each election. All but one have been regional parties (Table N° 6.7). The high-performance at the regional level and the absence of re-election by the incumbent would be aligned with studies on government performance and the incumbent's advantage (O. James & John, 2007). The authors showed that although poor local performance is punished, it is equally strong that excellent performance is not rewarded. Thus, the higher-performance conditions of Moquegua do not create an advantage for the incumbent party.

Next to the absence of continuity by a political party in regional government, a more striking aspect is the minimum political power that waters down when winning the highest possible office in the region. All political parties, whether regional or national, have almost close to no political territorial presence

in terms of authorities at the provincial and local level. Table N° 5.17 shows the high level of political fragmentation where the winning political party is unable to gain more than 15% of the disputed seats at the subnational level (between mayor and councillors). These are electoral results but have implementation consequences. The regional governor has the main responsibility to oversee the development of the region as a whole. Furthermore, public works needs to be coordinated between different authorities. This lack of unity in terms of political power across the subnational units makes the implementation harder, since coordination and willingness to implement policies are subject to political alignments. In her study, Niedzwiecki (2018) shows that when social policies have clear attribution the alignment of government will determine the success of implementation. A paucity of alignment with clear attribution policies will create incentive for local authorities to compete against such policy, create barriers or simply abstain from implementing them (Niedzwiecki, 2018). In Moquegua’s case, the shortage of political alignment is evident. Regional governors have an uphill battle when implementing regional public works since these will have to be coordinated with local authorities that are not from their party. In its manifesto, the regional party FIRME (*Frente de Integración Regional Moquegua Emprendedora Firme*) also considered the lack of coordination between levels of government in the region as a problem. For the party “*la desarticulación de planeamiento entre los gobiernos regionales y locales, impide los mejores resultados de los objetivos de desarrollo*” (the disarticulation of the planning function between the regional and local levels of government hinders a better achievements of the development goals) (FIRME, 2014, p. 22).

Table N° 5.17 – Political parties winning Regional Government

Year	Political party	Type	Regional*	Provincial*	District*
2002	Partido Democratico Somos Peru	National	7 (9)	1 (26)	0 (102)
2006	Movimiento Independiente nuestro Ilo-Moquegua	Regional	7 (9)	7 (28)	6 (102)
2010	Integracion Regional Por Ti	Regional	6 (11)	2 (26)	24 (102)
2014	Kausachun	Regional	7 (11)	6 (28)	23 (102)
2018	Frente de Integracion Regional Moquegua Emprendedora Firme	Regional	6 (11)	1 (28)	39 (102)

Source: Infogob // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert *Number of seats obtained by the party that won the regional government. In brackets is the total of seats disputed in the election.

In their study, Aragon and Pique (2015) analysed how incumbency has an impact on policy outcomes and government performance in Peruvian municipalities. They found there was a small effect on composition and coverage of some public services. However, there was no significant effect on other policy outcomes. Furthermore, as time passed this small effect difference decreased. This led the authors to suggest that “on-the-job experience does matter, [since] there is evidence of quick learning by new mayors” (Aragón & Pique, 2015, p. 18). Thus, following their findings the low levels of re-election and authorities from the winning party would not have a major impact on the continuity of Moquegua’s high-performance.

In sum, Moquegua went through a modernisation process during the 1960s and 1970s. This changed its economic structure, reducing the agricultural workforce and augmenting the industrial, manufacturing and services labour. This created new job opportunities that were sought after from within the region, as well as from outside the region. As expected with the theory, this generated a massive overflow of population towards these areas that fostered the urbanisation process. Nonetheless, at this same time, the democratic state was unable to cope with the magnitude of the changes and a great number of migrants settled in the periphery of the urban areas. The continued migration and demographic boom in these human settlements reached peaks where half of the population in some districts lived in these settlements. The state reacted to this massive social change produced by the economic transformation of the region by trying to make the illegal occupation legal. In its attempts to claim control over its governed territory where modernisation was unfolding through state companies like EMADI and ENACE, it legalised occupied territories and promoted the construction of houses and public services in urban areas. The democratic state thus expanded its capacity, with more schools, more teachers, and increased water supply and electricity for the household. This was accompanied with social modernisation trumpeted by access to education and high educational attainment. The region displayed consistently better levels of literacy and secondary school enrolment than the national average. It has been always above the upper quintile in this dimension. Overall, the population became more urban, more educated, healthier, had higher incomes, and their overall well-being was improved. Furthermore, the social modernisation process opened the door to augment the female workforce participation. Women in Moquegua had more school years, more access to media information, and therefore participated more in the labour workforce. As expected according to the argument put forward in this dissertation, the higher access to education and labour workforce participation empowered women and augmented their participation in the

public sphere. This translated in Moquegua having higher levels of women political participation as candidates and as elected officials than other regions. Finally, higher levels of electoral turnout were present in Moquegua due to the economic modernisation undergone by the region.

5.2.1 Within-region variation: modernisation at a provincial level

The political development of Moquegua is explained by the modernisation process undergone by the region making it a high-performance democratic state. Now, as with the national average, the regional approach can also disguise within-region variation. I have showed the transformation of the workforce in the region as a whole; however, a closer look shows that some provinces did not fully undergo this process and thus, their political development was limited.

Moquegua has three provinces: Ilo, Mariscal Nieto, and Sanchez Cerro. The economic structure of the first two provinces followed the modernisation path, whilst the latter maintained a highly agricultural workforce. In 2007, Ilo and Mariscal Nieto had 7% and 11% of their population in agricultural activities, whilst Sanchez Cerro around 29%. The rest of the activities are mainly industrial, manufacturing and services in the former provinces. Furthermore, in 2011, 9712 companies in Moquegua focused on services, commerce, tourism, and manufacturing. A total of 51.5% were concentrated in the Mariscal Nieto province, 46.1% were in Ilo, and only 2.4% were in Sanchez Cerro (PRODUCE, 2011b). These activities shaped the territorial landscape and pushed forward urbanisation and the concentration of the areas' populations. In this sense, Ica and Mariscal Nieto are highly urbanised provinces with 99% and 85% of the populations living in urban areas. On the other hand, Sanchez Cerro is completely the opposite and 62% of its population lives in rural areas. At the same time, educational attainment in Sanchez Cerro is below the level obtained in Ilo and Mariscal Nieto (Table N°5.18). It is the province that has a higher percentage of its population with primary school as the ultimate educational level. Thus, Sanchez Cerro not only has a higher percentage of its workforce in agricultural activities but also the lowest educational attainment of the provinces. It lags behind in economic and social modernisation. This resulted in lower levels of literacy for Sanchez Cerro, higher levels of people living under poverty, and lower life expectancy for its citizens in comparison to Ilo and Mariscal Nieto.

Now, how has economic and social modernisation affected the political development of these provinces? On state capacity, the provinces with a higher capacity are Ilo and Mariscal Nieto. In 2007,

the percentage of direct access to water and sanitation in households in Ilo and Mariscal Nieto was 93% and 70%, respectively, whilst only 17% citizens of Sanchez Cerro had this access. The same results can be seen in relation to households with access to electrification. Although not as stark, Ilo has 95% houses with electricity, Mariscal Nieto 78% and Sanchez Cerro 56%. From these figures, the gap between the provinces of Ilo and Mariscal Nieto and Sanchez Cerro is clear. The state capacity for the former two is higher, whilst lower for the latter.

Table N° 5.18 - Primary school as highest educational attainment in Moquegua

Provinces	2007	2017
Ilo	21.1%	19.6%
General Sanchez Cerro	31.7%	33.1%
Mariscal Nieto	23.0%	20.7%

Source INEI – National Census 2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

On the quality of democracy, Sanchez Cerro shows lower levels of quality. This, however, is not as profound as with state capacity. During the local elections from 2002-2018, the political parties in Sanchez Cerro have only presented in total only one female candidate to the position of Provincial Mayor. Meanwhile, in Ilo and Mariscal Nieto, in every single election there was at least one female candidate for the Provincial Mayor position in each province. In some cases, there were two or three female candidates in these provinces. Sanchez Cerro has also presented fewer female candidates to the provincial council positions. Whilst the list of provincial councils in Ilo and Mariscal Nieto had 38% of female candidates, in Sanchez Cerro this was 35%. At the district level, female candidates are less likely to participate in elections in Sanchez Cerro. On average, between 2002 and 2018, 36% of the candidates in Sanchez Cerro were female, whilst in Ilo and Mariscal Nieto the figures were 43% and 38%, respectively. Even though Sanchez Cerro has more districts (10) and more political parties participating in elections than Ilo and Mariscal Nieto together (two and five respectively), it had fewer female candidates applying for District Mayor positions. On political participation, the results are mixed. In 2002 and 2018 it was the province with lowest political participation (84% and 82% respectively), but in 2006 it was the province with highest participation (91%).

Regarding fiscal decentralisation, the province of Mariscal Nieto is home of the main mining sites of Moquegua (Cuajone and Quellaveco). According to the canon law, this means that this province and its districts are the main beneficiaries of the mining canon budget. However, despite the vast amount of income generated by canon, it still lagged behind Ilo. Ilo had a higher democratic state performance, even though it received less income from the mining canon. Between 2014 and 2018, Mariscal Nieto received over S/. 480 million, whilst during the same period Ilo received S/.90 million (Table N° 5.19). Even General Sanchez (the worst off province) received more canon than Ilo. Between these three provinces, Mariscal Nieto received 70% of the canon from 2014 and 2018. The extra income by canon still needs to be spent in public investment projects. The SNIP financial system with its long process and stages, coupled with the limited resources and capacity from local officials, meant that this extra income did not immediately translate into the provision of public goods that could improve the strength of the democratic state. Thus, the mining canon falls short to explain the variance in democratic state performance. On the other hand, Ilo’s modernisation process was more advanced than Mariscal Nieto, with a higher educational attainment and a non-agricultural workforce that resulted in a better democratic state performance.

Table N° 5.19 – Mining canon for Mariscal Nieto, General Sanchez Cerro, 2014-2018 (in PEN)

Provinces	Canon
Mariscal Nieto	486,016,421
General Sanchez Cerro	114,658,753
Ilo	90,109,147

Source: INGEMMET – Ministry of Energy and Mining // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In sum, I have shown that the modernisation process can be scaled down to the local level whilst studying within-region variation. The economic and social structural changes suffered by Ilo and Mariscal Nieto are accompanied with better socio-economic conditions (higher life expectancy, lower levels of people living under poverty) that fostered higher performance on state capacity and quality of democracy. On the other hand, Sanchez Cerro had a greater percentage of its workforce in agricultural activities and lower levels of educational attainment. Almost none of the companies in industry, services and manufacture are based in this province. The socio-economic conditions were lower in this province, and this had an impact on the state capacity and its quality of democracy spheres. Its population had less access to water, sanitation and electricity, fewer women candidates,

and higher political fragmentation. Thus, the modernisation argument helps to explain the high-performance of Moquegua as a whole, and it also serves to explain the within-region variation regarding the Moqueguan provinces.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how Moquegua became a high-performance democratic state. When Moquegua started the decentralisation process of 2002, it had accomplished good levels of socio-economic conditions. Its population was less poor, better educated, and healthier than the majority of the regions in Peru. This had an impact on its quality of democracy and state capacity. Furthermore, during this period the political development of the region shows that it expanded the state presence and improved the quality of its democracy.

The modernisation process undergone by Moquegua since the 1960s built the path towards its high-performance status. This region shifted from a highly agricultural workforce towards an industrial and service-based one. This was accompanied by migration patterns where people from within the region moved away from rural areas towards industrial and urban areas. At the same time, people from other regions migrated towards Moquegua, and also settled in industrial and urban areas like Ilo and Mariscal Nieto. However, the urban areas were not prepared for the influx of new people. Those migrating settled in and (illegally) occupied the peripheric areas of the cities. By 1993, in some cities half of the population was living in these settlements. This created pressure on the district and provincial municipalities who instead of planning in advance, were overflowed by these economic and social transformations. Furthermore, an encompassing political development was limited in that there was no authority to govern Moquegua as a whole. Most (re)action was restricted to provincial and district boundaries, and consequently limited to local budgets as well. The national government tried to control the waves of migration and passed a law that recognised them as *pueblos juvenes* (young hamlets). With this status, organised associations in the settlements were able to get, as long as they fulfilled some requirements, property rights to these occupied lands. National state and local municipalities had to provide basic services to these new settlements.

This rapid transformation, however, was pushed forward by job opportunities and allowed for economic growth increasing people's economic resources and reducing poverty levels. It also came

with rising levels of education that improved the human capital and propelled innovation, productivity and economic growth, laying the foundations for future citizens that would strengthen their democratic attitudes. It expanded mass communication with higher levels of women accessing news and better health outcomes. The local government was able to use their resources efficiently during this economic growth process, investing in schools, health care establishments, and reaching more citizens that it was concentrated in the new expanded urban areas. It could now foster further state infrastructure to support this process. This Moqueguan process fits with Inglehart's approach where "socioeconomic development is seen as a broad syndrome of changes in people's living conditions, involving the reduction of poverty, rising educational levels, and the diversification of social relations, all of which tend to make people more autonomous in their daily activities" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 160).

Furthermore, I have shown that this process can be traced through within-region variation as well. The provinces of Ilo and Mariscal Nieto went through a modernisation process that changed its economic structure and access to public education, creating migration towards new job opportunities. This wave of migration from the countryside towards the city settled on the periphery of the urban areas, pressuring national and local governments to react. Whilst these provinces augmented their demographic, Sanchez Cerro, the more agricultural province of the region, saw a decline in its population. This was accompanied by lower socioeconomic conditions which impacted its quality of democracy and state capacity.

This continued modernisation process of Moquegua intertwined itself with the democratisation in 2001 and the decentralisation reforms of 2002. The political and administrative decentralisation created for the first time an elected authority that would govern over the whole region with regional parties bounded to this circumscription (political decentralisation), and created the regional government institution with responsibilities, capabilities and resources (administrative decentralisation). The political development experienced by Moquegua from 2002 onwards was built upon the previous modernisation legacy and continued until 2018. As seen in this chapter, the quality of democracy during this period was higher than the national average. The political development of the region as a democratic state proved to be more equal, more plural, more effective and with better infrastructure. The region had more political participation, more women candidates, more women elected authorities in the three levels of government, a more vulnerable population with access to

media, and a less fragmented political party system. Although the political parties were weak in terms of gaining representatives across all levels of government, this did not affect government efficiency. At the same time, the state capacity was also above the national average. The higher number of bureaucrats across the region, more teachers, more schools, and the implementation of water sanitation projects augmented the state's territorial reach.

Chapter 6: Huánuco: a low-performance region


In the previous chapter, I showed how the modernisation process in Moquegua created the building blocks that shaped the high-performance democratic state of the region. In this chapter, I will show how the low-performance democratic state of Huánuco is explained by the fact that the modernisation process was absent in the region and it maintained the same level of workforce in agricultural activities. This stagnation limited the development of the social, cultural, demographic aspects of the region and its impact on democracy and state capacity.

6.1 Background

The decentralisation process of 2002, as with all Peruvian regions, created for the first time the institution of a regional Government, a regional elected authority (Regional Governor), and regional parties. The political development of the region was mostly the result of the interaction of local processes at the provincial and district level, but it never had an authority and institutional arrangement that could govern the region as a whole. Nonetheless, the region of Huánuco has a long history that dates back before the pre-Inca period.

Huánuco is located in the central part of the country between the occidental Andean range and the Ucayali River. It has a strategic geographic position since it is considered as the gateway to the Peruvian Amazonia. This means that its topography ranges from the *selva baja* (lowland jungle) at 80 m.a.s.l. to the *janca*, an area that rises from 4,800 m.a.s.l to 6,632 m.a.s.l at the Yerupaja crest. Huánuco city, the capital, is at 1,850 m.a.s.l and connects to the capital via two main highways. The soil fertility of the region and great access to water sources made the area prone to human settlements. These conditions are building blocks for the settlement of future civilisations (Scott, 2017). The region is divided in 11 provinces and 84 districts (Graph N° 6.1). In each subnational election the total of public offices up for election are 569 – 21 at the regional level, 104 at provincial level and 444 at district level.

Graph N° 6.1 – Huánuco and its provinces



HCO: Huánuco (region's capital dotted) / AMB: Ambo / MAY: Dos de Mayo / HYC: Huacaybamba / HML: Huamalíes / LRC: Lauricocha / LPR: Leoncio Prado / MRN: Marañón / PCT: Pachitea / PTI: Puerto Inca / YRW: Yarowilca

It has 2.5% of the national population with 721,047 habitants (Census 2017), and 48% of its population live in rural areas. In the last 10 years, the urban population has grown at a 3.4% annual rate, whilst the rural population has declined at a similar pace (3.5%). However, there is a stark contrast between provinces on the distribution of people living in urban and rural areas. Whilst Huánuco has a 71% urban population, Lauricocha has a 12% urban population. Furthermore, Yarowilca has a 100% rural population, and its population has drastically reduced from 32,380 in 2007 to 19,897 in 2017. In terms of demographic distribution, the province of Huánuco concentrates the majority of its population with 40.7% of the region's total. The pyramid population of Huánuco shows a perfect triangle shape with a wider base and gets narrower the older it gets. Nonetheless, when compared

between 2007 and 2017, the base has reduced a bit and the centre has gotten wider. The region is characterised by the immobility of its population. Around 90% of the people reside in the same region they were born (Huánuco), whilst 10% were born in other regions.

On the social dimension, 12% of Huánuco's population is illiterate, with a big gap between illiterate women (18%) and men (7%). Further, the rate of attendance at any educational institution (school, university or institute) for its population between three and 24 years old is 71%. In terms of health variables, Huánuco has a life expectancy of 70.1 years and an infant mortality rate of 21 per thousand live births.⁴¹ One third of its population lives in poverty (34.3%) and has an inequality of 46.9% (Castillo 2020). The majority of its population has Spanish as their first language (68.5%) and 28.4% of the population has Quechua as their first language. However, there is a contrast between provinces like Huánuco and Leoncio Prado, where around 85% of the population had Spanish as their first language, whilst around 77% of the population of Yarowilca and Huaycabamba had Quechua as their first language. The self-identification is more evenly distributed with 44% identifying as *mestizo* and 42% as *quechua*. The Catholic population has also steadily declined in Huánuco over the past decades. In 1980, around 85% of *huanuqueños* were Catholic, and by 2017 only 67% considered themselves as Catholic. On the other hand, the evangelicals augmented their presence in the region from 15% in 1993 to 26% in 2017.

Over the period studied in this research, the region of Huánuco contributed on average 1.1% to the national Gross Domestic Product, occupying the seventeenth position in the last year. The main economic activity that contributed to this GDP was agriculture with 21% of the gross value added followed by commerce with 10.5% (BCRP, 2020a). Agriculture exerts a major economic influence in the region since it employed 61.8% of the economically active population in the region in 2020. The main agricultural products are white and yellow potato, papaya, beef, cacao, coffee, among others. In term of business, almost all enterprises are small and micro businesses (99.8%).

⁴¹ Puno has the highest infant mortality rate at 43 per thousand live births, and Huancavelica has the lowest life expectancy with 63.6 years (ENDES 2017).

6.1.1 Brief history

After Peruvian independence in 1821, Huánuco was part of the Junín region with a population of 13,172 according to the National Census of 1827 (Gootenberg, 1995). It was under President Balta, on 24 January 1869, that Huánuco was separated from Junín and became an independent region. It is important to stress that although it was separated from Junín this was mostly a boundary issue. There was no authority nor institutional arrangement that would govern the region as a whole. It continued to be a sum of provinces and districts with local authorities. The social organisation of the region continued, unfortunately, with the same political, economic and social problems of the colonial era. The *criollos* and Spanish descendants took the place of the previous Spanish authorities, and the system remained unchanged. The Indians continued to be under an exploitative relationship under haciendas and latifundios. The problem of land ownership would rise as the pressing issue in Peru and in the Huánuco region (Mariátegui, 2011). Indigenous communities lost their communal ownership of the land where they lived and worked, and this was given to the latifundistas (hacendados or gamonales). This secured the exploitative relationship between local population and *gamonales*, where the latter continued with the colonial practices. These controlled the political, social and economic relationships of their lands. Within this land the local population were under complete control of what the *gamonal*⁴² decided.

This absolute control of the *gamonales* continued the misery of the peasants and indigenous population, where abuses were part of their daily lives. It was a feudal system that co-existed with a republican rule of law. This serfdom was broken by the military government in 1969, when the *Reforma Agraria* (Agrarian Reform) was passed and expropriated all the lands from the *hacendados* and *gamonales*, breaking the social, political and economic control they had over the population, reverting these lands back to the peasant communities. The situation under which the peasant lived and the aim that this reform had can be summed up by the final words of the national message delivered by General Juan Velasco Alvarado: *Campesino, el patron ya no comerá más de tu pobreza* (Peasant, the bosses will no longer feed off of your poverty) (Velasco Alvarado, 1969). This affected the haciendas in Huánuco and now

⁴² The *gamonal* refers to the owner of the land, but it goes beyond landownership. It is intertwined with ethnic-cultural differentiation, with a “privileged participation in a hierarchized power system, with a capacity of disposition and control over a specific peasant population situated in an inferior estate, and an ideological lordly (*señorial*) attitude that prescribes tutelary obligations with the peasants and legitimizes the establish order by conserving an expression of divine or natural The region order” (Caballero, 1981, p. 239). For a more detailed approach on gamonal and gamonalismo Caballero (1981), Macera (1971).

the communities and peasants were given ownership of their parcels. These were however small parcels and created subsequent limitations when trying to improve the productivity of them.

The 1970s and 1980s were tumultuous decades for Huánuco. This was the result of two main forces that brought havoc to the region: drug trafficking and terrorism. The Huallaga Valley is known as an area in the *ceja de selva* geography and has a river that crosses Huanuco's boundaries with San Martin. This area has produced coca leaf since pre-Hispanic time. Its prominence as a coca cultivation area (and cocaine producer) in the national and international sphere started in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Gootenberg, 2008; Paredes & Manrique, 2021).⁴³ However, it was during the 1970s that it became a drug hub, with linkages to the Colombian cartels and *narco*s, and in the 1980s “the Huallaga supplied over half of the world's illicit coca crop and coca paste” (Gootenberg, 2008, p. 292). The main antidrug policy implemented by the Peruvian state with international support (mainly the USA) to fight drug trafficking was the eradication of coca leaf cultivation. This, however, put the (poor) peasants in the middle of a fight between drug lords and armed forces, who were affected as a result of this. In this tumultuous period with harassed cocalero peasantry, the Huallaga became a “major breeding ground and haven for brutal *Sendero Luminoso* guerrillas and their rival Tupac Amaru Army” (Gootenberg, 2008). According to the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), the region of Huánuco suffered the loss/disappearance of 2,350 people during the 1980-2000 period of internal conflict. These were pinned down to *Sendero Luminoso* (55%) and State Agents (33%) actions, and most deaths/disappearances occurred during the 1984-1994 period. Most of the terrorist activity was focused in the Leoncio Prado province, in the Alto Huallaga Valley area that collides with San Martin.⁴⁴

Within this period of drug trafficking and terrorism, the *Plan Nacional de Regionalización* from 1984 made a development diagnostic on all Peruvian regions. For Moquegua, the region was considered to have Relative Medium Development. This same Plan considered that, overall, the Huánuco region was a zone of Relative Low Development. However, this characteristic was subdivided in four sub-groups:

⁴³ Huánuco had half of the national cocaine factories and was one of the richest regions in Peru in the early 1900s. For further information on the role that Huánuco played in the cocaine production during this period please see Gootenberg (2008).


⁴⁴ Only recently in 2012, Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, known as ‘Artemio’, was captured in Tocache, San Martin. He was a high command of Shining Path that led their main activities in the Alto Huallaga region over the last 28 years before its capture. He was the last member of the central committee of Sendero Luminoso from the 1980s

i) with agricultural resources and relative integration to the national market, ii) with economic expansion, iii) with none or scarce development, and iv) in stagnation. According to this, Huánuco's territory was divided under two of these sub-groups (ii and iv). The areas with economic expansion (ii) were characterised by having deficient public services, low demographic density, scarce articulation with the rest of the country. Although it had “good potential of natural resources [...] the adequate technology for its exploitation is still unknown” (Art. 2.2). The areas in stagnation (iv) have the lowest levels of development, have a majority of their population settled, are disarticulated from the regional or national market, and have a dispersed population with a subsistence economy.

6.1.2 Huánuco a low-performance democratic state

From 2002-2018 Huánuco has been a low-performance democratic state. At the start of the millennium the region saw the lowest state territorial reach. It is possible to travel across the region without encountering major public infrastructure that could testify for the state presence in the region. Most of the houses did not have access to a public water supply network, nor were they electrified. These elements are mostly dispersed, and their lives are marked by stronger identification with their indigenous communities. The region is characterised by having fewer bureaucrats to implement and oversee public policy interventions across the region. This is accompanied with a society that participates less in democratic processes and has a more distant relationship with what democracy entails. Although there are some noteworthy cases of women participating in elections, they are still seen as *relleno* (filling) to meet the legal electoral quota. Political fragmentation is present, making it difficult to coordinate across different levels of government. As seen in Graph N° 6.2, Huánuco has been a low-performance region during the whole period under study, way below the national average.

Graph N° 6.2 – Democratic state performance: Huánuco vs National



Source: ENAHO 2002-2018, Infogob 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

6.1.2.1 Huánuco's state capacity

Huánuco is a region characterised by a low state capacity. This translates to a region in which the state presence is limited, uneven across the territory, and with few resources to implement any decision and policy output. The results from the region show that the provision of public services is below the national average, where most households have very limited (or no) access to a public water supply network, or electricity. Under this situation, any decision to implement public investment projects for

infrastructure and expand the state's territorial reach is, nonetheless, met with a small number of bureaucrats. The reduced pool of civil servants would need to go through the whole procedural chain of design, approvals, open competition, contract agreement, that a state infrastructure project needs before getting the go ahead. Furthermore, they would then need to oversee its execution. Furthermore, this patchy state presence creates pockets where the democratic state is unable to exercise control over the territory and thus, these areas are filled with illegal economies (e.g. drug trafficking and illegal mining).

This low state capacity has an impact on living standards of its population. This is underscored by the *Plan de Desarrollo Departamental Concertado Huánuco 2003-2021*. In this government document Huánuco is characterised by the “*heterogeneidad de su estructura presenta contornos más agudos, con bolsones de pobreza extrema que colocan a segmentos muy importantes de sus habitantes, tanto rurales como urbanos, en situación vulnerable*” (structure heterogeneity of acute contours, with pockets of extreme poverty that puts important segments of its population, rural and urban, in a vulnerable situation) (CTAR, 2002, p. 59). Access to a water supply network is essential for the good health of the population. A lack of access to a safe, reliable and easily accessible water supply has a deteriorating impact on health (Hunter et al., 2010). This is an acute problem in Huánuco. Only recently in 1993, not even 20% of its population had access to a water supply network (Table N° 6.1). This figure improved along the years and by 2017 58% of the households now had access to a public network. Nonetheless, this still meant that almost half of its population does not have a safe, reliable and accessible water supply. A poor water supply can impact health by causing diarrhoea (Hunter et al., 2010) that can affect the nutritional status of the children creating a vicious circle that leads to chronic malnutrition (Guerrant et al., 1992). According to the *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares* of 1996, Huánuco was one of the highest regions with the prevalence of these diseases. This persisted in 2017 where 19.6% of its children below five years suffered from chronic malnutrition (versus a 13% national average). This issue is raised by the political party *Alianza para el Progreso* (Alliance for Progress - APP) in its manifesto for the Regional Elections of 2014. For the national political party, the shortfall of access to a water supply network is an “*causa importante para la transmisión de las enfermedades prevalentes de la infancia y consecuentemente de la desnutrición crónica infantil*” (important cause for the transmission of prevalent diseases of the infants and consequently of chronic child malnutrition) (Alianza para el Progreso, 2014, p. 29).

Table N°6.1 – Households in Huánuco with access to water

Year	% Households with access to water through public network	National
1993	19.12	46.70
2007	34.10	63.65
2017	58.78	78.32

Source: National Census 1993-2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Energy consumption is fundamental for all human activities and development, and electricity as a source of power is intertwined with most of our daily endeavours (Singh et al., 2015). It is impossible to envision the improvement of socio-economic conditions without the use of electricity. Without electricity a child is limited in their access to information, or the possibility to study for longer periods. As shown by Zhang et al. (2019), access to electricity is positively related to education, economic development, infrastructure, and industrialization. The more access a house, community, and society have to electricity the higher levels of socio-economic development it will have. The authors don't show a causality between these factors, but a positive relationship between these. As shown in Table N° 6.2, most of Huanuco's household have had little access to electrification. Only one quarter of the households in 1993 had electricity, which improved to 43% in 2007 and 72% by 2017. Although this is an improvement, it is ingrained within the overall national expansion of household access to electrification. The region continued to be one of the regions with the lowest access to electricity. Furthermore, if compared with Moquegua, our high-performance case study, Huánuco has not even reached in 2017 the level of electrification that Moquegua had in 2007. Just on this metric, Huánuco is ten years behind Moquegua, and this has an impact on the living standards of its population. This limited access to electricity affects the level of productivity of agriculture. This is underscored by the political party manifesto of Acción Popular, in which *“menos del 1% de las unidades agropecuarias emplea energía eléctrica en sus labores frente a un 10% en promedio en las demás regiones. Situaciones que generan baja productividad y competitividad en el mercado nacional, lo que limita la capitalización del sector”* (less than 1% of the agricultural units use electric energy on their works against a 10% on average in the other regions. This situation generates low productivity and competitiveness in the national market, limiting the capitalization of the sector) (Acción Popular 2018, p5). This highlights the limitations the region faces due to its low level of electrification, how the national political party sees the region in comparison with the others and the disadvantaged position in which Huánuco is.

Table N°6.2 – Households in Huánuco that have electrification via public network

Year	% Households with electrification via public network
1993	25.34
2007	43.14
2017	72.13

Source: National Census 1993-2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The extension of public health infrastructure across a territory is fundamental for it to reach its population. The limited presence of hospitals, health care facilities, as well as human resources like doctors and nurses has detrimental effects on a population living standards. The inability of the state to reach its population and provide it with this public service is related to its low capacity. Within the Peruvian case, as written in its Political Constitution, the state is responsible to “facilitate an equitable access to health services” (Constitución, 1993, Art. 9). The uneven provision of public health services, considering it is within its scope of activities (Fukuyama, 2004), is another way to address Huánuco’s low state capacity. As shown in Table N° 6.3 the number of beds provided in Huánuco are below the national average. This low number of beds is coupled with within-region inequality, in which most of these beds are concentrated in the urban areas. According to the Regional Health Directorate of Huánuco out of the eleven provinces that the region has, only two of them have one hospital each (DIRESA, 2017). These provinces are Huánuco and Leoncio Prado. This shows that there are areas within the region where citizens would be unable to get hospital level health care.

Table N° 6.3 – Number of beds: Huánuco vs National

Year	Huánuco - Number of beds (per 10 thousand)	National - Number of beds (per 10 thousand)
2003	10.3	14.8
2010	11	14.5
2018	11.2	15.8

Source: Ministry of Health – Repositorio Único Nacional de Información en Salud // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Bureaucrats are the universal class (Hegel, 1991) and their organisational capacity is part of the equation in state performance (Centeno et al., 2017). A more competent bureaucracy is one that is

guided by professionalism and meritocracy, where there is a separation between office and officeholder, and each office has a set of rules and objectives (Fukuyama, 2013; Weber, 1978). A civil service that is guided by patrimonial practices, venal offices, has a detrimental effect on society as a whole (Ertman, 1997). The presence of bureaucrats across the territory and their sphere of action can determine the expansion of the state’s power and its presence (Herbst, 2014). Next to the state’s territorial reach (e.g. electrification, water supply, hospitals and beds), the number of bureaucrats within a region allows us to foresee the level to which each territory would potentially be capable to implement the state’s will and enforce its decisions. Here I am not trying to equate that a higher number of bureaucrats equals to a higher quality of public services. I am pointing out the fact that a state’s territorial reach, and its capacity to implement its decision across the territory it governs, requires infrastructure and equally importantly the bureaucrats that will make that intervention possible. Thus, the fewer civil servants a region has, the more barriers it would have to implement any government decisions. As with the previous indicators, Huánuco has a lower presence of civil servants across its territory (Table N° 6.4). The National Census collects as part of its information the percentage of people that are employed within different activities (Public Sector, Private Sector, Independent, among others). The results of the last three National Censuses shows that Huánuco has consistently had a lower percentage of its population working as civil servants. Although it is not the region with a lowest number of bureaucrats (Huancavelica is), it is one of the regions that has a smaller civil servants’ presence within its territory.

Table N°6.4 – Percentage of bureaucrats: Huánuco vs National

Year	Huánuco	National
1993	0.37	0.69
2007	0.17	0.25
2017	0.25	0.34

Source: National Census 1993-2007-2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In sum, the level of state presence across the Huánuco region is limited. Although it shows signs of progress in access to water supply network and electrification when compared to itself across the years, it still lagged well behind the national average. In 2017, the state’s territorial reach in the region had not reached the same level as regions like Moquegua in 2007, Arequipa in 2002, or even Ica in

1993. Following O'Donnell's (1993) criteria this region would qualify as a 'brown area' where there is a low degree of territorial penetration. These figures speak about a state that lacks the infrastructural power to "implement political decisions through the realm" (Mann, 1984). In 1993, not even one fifth of Huánuco's households had access to a water supply network and just one quarter of them had electrification. Whilst the world was starting the digital revolution, houses in the region had no electricity nor water. This certainly improved across the following years, however, it maintained its low position within the national scope.

6.1.2.2 Huánuco's quality of democracy

The results from Huánuco show that the region has a low quality of democracy. Political participation is low in the region, with citizens that are disenfranchised and an electoral turnout that is below the national average. Equality does not breed within its territory, female candidates are relegated, and political fragmentation is rampant.

Voting in Peru is mandatory and most regions have higher levels of electoral turnout (if compared with other countries where voting is not compulsory but voluntary). If a person does not cast their vote during an election the person will be subject to a monetary penalty and might have some of their state services restricted. The person who does not vote in an election, whether national or subnational, will face civil, commercial, administrative and judicial constraints (Julcarima et al., 2019). Since voting is compulsory, this gives the opportunity to better address the disenfranchisement of the population within each region in Peru. In Table N° 6.5, Huánuco shows lower levels of electoral turnout when compared to the national average. As mentioned in the previous chapter, political participation is the cornerstone of democracy and the more a population participates in electoral processes the better its quality. Lower turnout can be problematic because it can create a bias against less well-to-do citizens and can promote unequal political influence (Lijphart, 1997). The *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2003*, surveyed households on the reasons why they did not vote in the last elections. The main reasons for not voting were that they lacked their national ID and that the polling station was too far away. In Huánuco these two variables explained two thirds of the reasons why people did not vote in the last elections. In a later ENAHO survey in 2007 and 2011, these two reasons continued to be the main reasons for not voting with 67% and 70% respectively. These two reasons are related to the state's

uneven presence in the territory, since the state is responsible for giving their national ID and the public schools in which voting takes place.

Table N° 6.5 - Electoral turnout in regional and municipal elections: Huánuco vs National

Election year	Huánuco	National
2002	75.3%	82.4%
2006	83.1%	86.9%
2010	82.6%	85.4%
2014	79.2%	83.1%
2018	75.2%	79.0%

Source: Infogob 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

As with the lower levels of electoral turnout, women’s political participation in the region is lower as well. The representation of women in public office “is an important measure of the quality of democratic representation in their own right, and it can also serve as an indirect proxy of how well minorities are represented generally” (Lijphart, 2012, p. 280). A region has better quality of democracy if it has more women elected to public offices. This is based on the principle of representation where those in the assembly should reflect those who they govern, not as a microcosm, but “by virtue of shared experience” (Mansbridge, 1999). Without it, the principal of political equality is broken, since “when those charged with making political decisions are predominantly drawn from one the two sexes [...] this puts the others in the category of political minors” (Phillips, 1998, p. 45). Thus, the presence of women in political positions is a sign of democratic quality. However, before being elected they have to be candidates and the possibility of election is conditioned by the place they occupy in the political party’s list. Here I focus on the position women occupied within their list to see if they would have more chances to get elected. Peruvian legislation introduced the electoral gender quota in 1997 (Law 26859 – Organic Law of Elections) where it stipulated that all political party candidates lists, whether for National or Sub-national elections, had to be composed by at least 30% of men or women.⁴⁵


⁴⁵ Other electoral quotas were introduced in different legislations. These aimed to promote the young population and indigenous/native population as well. It improved the presence of these politically marginalised groups. However, it also created a perverse incentive since these quotas could be added up, meaning that a young female indigenous candidate would tick all the boxes and the party would comply with the regulation. Political parties had an incentive to look for these types of candidates and created, in some cases, problems of political harassment (for young women candidates). For

Graphs N° 6.3 and 6.4 I show the distribution of women in political parties' lists in all provincial and district elections from 2002-2018. I collected the information from all the political parties that participated in every election between 2002-2018, in all 84 districts and 11 provinces from Huánuco.⁴⁶ Each graph represents the average position that women are allocated in district and provincial level lists. The list starts with the councillor number 1, then councillor number 2, and so on. As a majoritarian system the local elections favours the formation of government above representation, hence every political party that wins the election gets at the same time the majority of councillors. Depending on the winning percentage gap, the second or third party might be able to get at least one of its councillors elected and be part of the municipal council. This is usually the number 1 from the list of the losing parties. The graphs show that on average, women in Huánuco tend to occupy the last spots in the list, above the national average. The cut-off point in each graph shows the number of councillors that the winning party would minimally gain. At the district level this means that if you are within the numbers 1, 2, or 3 on the list (left side) you will have more probability of getting elected as part of the municipal council. On the other hand, if you are occupying positions 4, 5, or 6 (right side) you will have less chance to be part of the municipal council. As seen in the district level graph, most women occupy the right side of the cut-off point. This immediately reduces their chances to get elected. The same situation happens at the provincial level. Most women in Huánuco tend to occupy the last spots on the list, reducing their possibility to get elected to public offices. Although the provincial level graph shows a spike around number 3 on the list, it then goes back to below the national average.

example, in the 2006 district elections there were 17,803 young candidates, where 11,136 were women and 6,667 were men. This means that the young quota was predominantly women (62%). In 2010 it was 19,280 young candidates of which 12,556 were women (65%). This disproportion is present in all provincial and district levels in each of the sub-national elections. It strengthens the argument that women are used as *relleno* (filling) in the political parties' list just to comply with regulation, rather than with an honest intention to promote their public presence.


⁴⁶ This information is available at the National Jury of Elections (JNE) website, in infogob.

Graph N° 6.3 – Women’s list allocation in district level elections



Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Graph N° 6.4 – Women’s list allocation in provincial level elections




Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The regional elections show a more mixed distribution when it comes to women candidates (Graph N° 6.5). The results follow the same average participation of women in governor, vice-governor and regional councillor positions. These mixed results can be analysed by the fact that the Governor and Vice-Governor are not subject to the gender quotas. However, there is case noteworthy in Huánuco. Luzmila Templo Condeso won the Regional Governorship in the regional elections of 2002. With the regional party “Luchemos por Huánuco” she was elected with 25% of the votes. Born in 1929 she was a businesswoman that grew up in the countryside of the Huánuco province, in the Centro Poblado Jancao. She would migrate to the capital of Huánuco and became a businesswoman and the President of the football club “Los Leones de Huánuco”. She became the Provincial Major of Huánuco in 1995 with the “Lista Independiente N°9”, and lost the re-election in the Provincial Elections 1998 when she ran as a candidate with Fujimori’s political party “Vamos Vecino”. Now, the higher number of female regional governor candidates is because Luzmila ran as a candidate again in 2006, 2010 and 2014 for the governor position. She lost in the following elections. Although based in Huánuco, Luzmila’s case reinforces the argument put forward in this dissertation where the impact of modernisation improves women’s empowerment towards political participation as a result of their presence in the labour workforce and extended years of school enrolment and future studies.

Now, did this unfavourable position in the political parties’ list actually had an effect on women being elected in Huánuco? The immediate response is yes, it did. Table N° 6.5 shows the average of women elected in every single public office at the district, provincial and regional level. Here Huánuco shows a lower percentage of women elected to public offices than the national average. Being allocated to the last spots in the lists has a detrimental effect on the possibility of getting elected. There was certainly a peak in 2014 (and this is reflected in the Graph N°6.1 on the quality of democracy line), where Huánuco got the same percentage of women elected as the national average. However, this reverted back in the 2018 elections.

Graph N°6.5 – Women regional candidates. Huánuco vs National average



Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

The political party system in Huánuco is characterised by fragmentation and volatility. A fragmented political party system creates government instability (Valentim & Dinas, 2020), and in presidential systems this can be even more toxic and unstable (Linz, 1990). This has an impact on the provision of public services (Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004), and shapes democratic consolidation (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). The importance of political parties is that, until now, they are the main vehicles through which citizens can participate in elections and gain access to public offices. The effective number of political parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) has been widely used to measure the fragmentation of a political party system. The idea behind this measure is that it takes into account the weight of each party (considered by the percentage of votes or seats taken), rather than just the number of parties. As shown by Table N° 6.6 for Huánuco, each regional and local elections show two different figures when taking into account the total number of parties that participate in each election and the effective number of parties (ENP) based on their vote share. The results exhibit a party system more fragmented in Huánuco than the other regions (taken as the national average). I considered all the political parties that participated in each election at the regional, provincial and local

level for each region including Huánuco. Then I calculated the ENP for each election and each region. In almost all the regional and local elections Huánuco has a more effective number of parties. The only election year that Huánuco shows a lower fragmentation in is 2010. However, the difference is not as large as with the previous years.

Table N° 6.5 – Percentage of elected women in regional and municipal elections: Huánuco vs National

Electoral year	Huánuco	National
2002	15%	22%
2006	19%	24%
2010	20%	23%
2014	24%	24%
2018	17%	22%

Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Table N° 6.6 – Effective number of parties: Huánuco vs National

Election year	Total parties (in Huánuco)	ENP - Huánuco	ENP - National
2002	10	6.92	5.53
2006	13	6.66	5.27
2010	14	5.21	5.44
2014	14	5.93	5.82
2018	14	8.59	6.46

Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Now, Huánuco’s party system exhibits more fragmentation based on the effective number of parties, but it is also highly volatile. In my previous chapter, I showed that a better measurement to address political party system in Peru, and at a subnational level, is to consider party volatility (Seifert, 2014). This measure is different than the electoral volatility index (Pedersen, 1979). It is also methodologically, and most importantly, epistemologically different. Electoral volatility measures how a voter changes their preference from election to election as the “net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers” (Pedersen, 1979, p. 3). This measurement assumes

that the transfer of votes happens within the same political party from one election to another. It considers that political parties are stable actors from one election to another, and thus, the vote transfer is between Party A and Party B, both present in previous elections. However, new democracies like the Peruvian one lack this stability. Their political party system is actually characterised for highly party volatility (Seifert, 2016), where the parties that participate in one election, disappear, cease to exist, and do not present any candidates in the next election. In Peruvian subnational elections, around two thirds of political parties did not exist in the previous election (Seifert, 2016). Thus, volatility is not the view from the voter’s perspective (transferring their votes from one party to another) but from the political party’s perspective. Even if the voter would like to vote again for a political party, there is a high chance that the political party does not exist anymore, and hence will not participate in the next election. Its vote transfer happens without their will, it is forced upon him by the electoral supply side. From this party volatility perspective, the Huánuco region shows higher levels of volatility in two periods, and lower levels in other two periods. I calculate party volatility by comparing the political parties that participated in one election with the immediate previous one (e.g. the political parties that competed in the 2006 elections against the political parties in 2002). Then I can compare which of the political parties of the 2006 election were not present in the previous elections. These would be considered as new parties. These show how much the political party system renewed itself from one election to another. Between 2002-2006 and 2014-2018, Huánuco exhibits higher party volatility than the national average (Table N° 7.8). Nonetheless, in the 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 periods, Huánuco has lower volatility than the rest of regions. The mixed results of political party volatility in Huánuco are an indication that its party system is weak, with parties that do not have stable roots in the region, and voters who are faced with great uncertainty in each election. These shifts reinforce the lower quality of Huánuco’s democracy.

Table N° 6.7 – Party volatility in Huánuco and Perú

Electoral periods	Huánuco	National
2002-2006	69.23%	63.57%
2006-2010	28.57%	56.71%
2010-2014	50.00%	56.53%
2014-2018	57.14%	51.71%

Source: Infogob Regional and Municipal elections 2002-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In sum, the democratic development of Huánuco shows a region that is still weak in terms of political party consolidation and is fragmented in terms of effective number of political parties. This creates a political party system that is volatile, unstable, where the voters are unable to exercise the fundamental democratic principle of accountability (Boyne et al., 2009; Gwiazda, 2016; Powell, 2004). Holding the incumbent accountable for their actions and their political party reinforces the trust in the democratic institutional arrangement. However, if the party ceases to exist, the voter loses the possibility to hold the party and incumbent accountable. Furthermore, the unfavourable positions given to women candidates in the local elections reduces their possibility of being elected, weakening the democratic ideal of political equality and representation.

6.2 – Explaining low-performance in Huánuco

In this subsection I will explain how the economic and social modernisation in Huánuco did not advance at the same paced as other regions. With a higher level of agricultural workforce and lower levels of educational attainment, the region experienced a truncated modernisation process which made the region a low-performance democratic state.

The living standards of the region were between the worst in Peru. This stagnation created a migration pattern that expelled their population to other regions (mostly to Lima), with a lower urbanisation process and a lower population density that could pressure the state for the provision of public goods and services. At the same time, the population that did not migrate towards other areas stayed in those that already lack state presence, prioritising communal ties which reinforced specific household roles. Within these was the role of women. The absent of the modernisation process meant that there were no new economic activities in other sectors where women could participate in the workforce. Women also had fewer years of school enrolment, reducing their opportunities to participate in the labour market. This reduced female presence in the public sphere which translated to less female participation in politics. Huánuco showed lower levels of women's political participation, candidates and elected officials. Furthermore, the low level of educational attainment in the region translated in a population less involved in democratic processes, a less cohesive integrated regional civil society, and a limited human capital that handicapped the improvements of skills needed to increase productivity and economic development.

After independence the economic structure of the region has relied heavily on agriculture. This dependency has accompanied the region's history until the twentieth century and has impacted the life of its population on other realms. The mining activity of the region, strongly present during the colonial period, diminished greatly afterwards. In 2006, the regional government of Huánuco commissioned the elaboration of a geological inventory of its territory. In an agreement with the Geologic Mining and Metallurgic Institute (*Instituto Geológico Minero y Metalúrgico – IGEMMET*) they decided to move forward with this diagnostic on the presence of mineral resources in the region and to guide the exploration and possible exploitation of those resources. The results showed that the region had mineral resources to be exploited, however, there was a shortfall of interest to invest in mining activities. Most importantly they showed that in the region “*se encuentra muchas labores mineras paralizadas y varias desde la época colonial*” (a lot of mining activities are paralysed and most are from the colonial era) (IGEMMET, 2006, p. 123). Mining was important in the region, but after independence the exploration and exploitation of these faded away.

The industrialisation process that started in other regions, like Moquegua, Ica or Arequipa, was absent in Huánuco. In fact, during the 1960s its economic structure was mainly composed by agriculture, cattle raising, commerce and utilitarian crafts (INP, 1970). This economic framework remained and from this structure the following was stated: “we cannot derive another result but the impoverishment, unemployment and exodus” of the region (INP, 1970, p. 452). Furthermore, the region was in practice controlled as a feudal structure, where *gamonalismo* was the way economic, political and social life was controlled in the region (Espinoza Claudio, 2007; Ibarra, 2002; Manrique, 2000). The *Reforma Agraria* of 1969, under the military government of Velasco Alvarado, would break the control of the *haciendas*, *terratienientes* and *gamonales* in Peru, mainly in the rural areas of the country like Huánuco (Eguren, 2006b; Matos Mar & Mejía, 1980). The decomposition of the haciendas created the proliferation of small parcels for each peasant and peasant communities to work on their land. The spirit behind the land reform was that this would allow the peasants to modernise themselves and create a new class of rural peasants closer to a business capitalist class that would lift them out of poverty. This fragmentation of a small parcel created instead a vacuum that had to be later filled by state intervention and the creation of cooperatives that tried to push forward rural development (Eguren, 2006a). However, these failed attempts of state developmentalism in the Alto Huallaga area would create the (unintended) territorial conditions for the emergence of a drug hub (Paredes & Manrique, 2021). Furthermore, this proliferation of small parcels would hinder coherent, stable and profitable rural

development. The Regional Directorate of Agriculture in Huánuco considered that “*esta atomización de las unidades agropecuarias, es una de las principales causas para la baja rentabilidad de la agricultura regional*” (this atomisation of agricultural units is one of the main causes for the low rentability of the regional agriculture) (GORE Huánuco, 2008, p.8). This would obstruct the possibility to create scale economies and limit “*la capacidad de inserción real en las cadenas agroproductivas*” (the capacity of real insertion in agricultural production chains) (p.9).

The proliferation of small parcels with peasant families in lands with poor soil conditions was a product of the deforestation processes during the 1960s. This created socio-ecological conditions for the expansion of coca cultivation that would be used for cocaine production and made the Huallaga Valley a drug trafficking hot spot in the 1980s. Paredes and Manrique’s (2021) study showed that the failed state development policies during the 1960s and 1970s created the territorial and demographic conditions that would later incentive coca cultivation due to its higher economic return to peasants. The state tried to develop the valley by incentivising the migration of families and promoting the cultivation of maize, rice and livestock. It also constructed the *Carretera Marginal de la Selva* (Marginal highway of the Amazonia), that connected the Huallaga Valley with the country’s transport infrastructure.⁴⁷ This was coupled with deforestation plans that, however, had the unintended consequence of worsening the soil conditions for the crops cultivation the state wanted to promote. These worst soil conditions – erosion and acidity – are favourable for coca cultivations (Paredes & Manrique, 2021). The coca leaves produced in this area have a higher alkaloid concentration, resulting in fewer raw coca leaves for the production of cocaine. At the same time, this was met by an increasing demand for cocaine at the world stage. An absent state and the market for agricultural production was substituted by narcotraffic (CVR, 2004, p. 78). The Huallaga Valley became part of the drug trade connected with Colombian drug cartels and its exportation to USA.

Eradication of coca leaf plantations was the main policy implemented by the national government to fight the boom of cocaine production in the valley. Coca leaf eradication can be achieved manually where one worker manually removes the whole coca leaf plant, or it can be done mechanically through

⁴⁷ Parts of this highway would be later used as an impromptu airfield for illegal flights transporting cocaine out of the area. This would have been done by Demetrio Chavez, Vaticano, with the complacency of the national government of Fujimori and Montesinos (Sanchez Leon & Lerner, 2011).

manual or aerial fumigation.⁴⁸ These eradication campaigns started in the late 1970s when the *Decreto Ley N° 22095 - Ley de Represión de tráfico Ilícito de Drogas* (Law of Repression of Illicit drug trafficking) was approved in 1978, and it got institutionalised when the *Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción del Cultivo de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga* (CORAH) was created in 1982 (Decreto Supremo N°043-82-AG). This project arose as a result of the collaboration agreement between Peru and the United States of America. The latter was the main funder of the CORAH project. Its scope of action was mainly focused in the Alto Huallaga Valley, and in 1994 this would expand to the whole national territory. However, these eradication campaigns were usually contested and faced resistance from the peasant communities and *cocaleros*. Armed forces clashed with the peasants when trying to eradicate the coca leaf plants. The *cocaleros* felt that these eradication campaigns were attempts against their economic and labour stability. The *Confederación Campesina del Perú - CCP* (Peasant Confederate of Peru) show in their report from 1980 that their base in Huallaga (Federación Zonal de Campesinos del Valle de Monzón, Tingo Maria y Huallaga Central) demanded the suspension of the Law N°22095 and 229826 because it was against the “*estabilidad económica y laboral del campesino trabajador de la Hoja de Coca*” (economic and labour stability of the coca leaf working peasant), and demanded the authorisation of coca leaf cultivation and commercialisation. If these demands were not granted and public audiences with the National Government and Congress were not given, they would march towards Lima and start a hunger strike (CCP, 1980, Reports – First folder, p. 8). Thus, these eradication campaigns created an environment of constant clashes and harassment between the *cocaleros* and armed forces. Whilst the armed forces and CORAH project fought drug trafficking by reducing illegal coca leaf plantations, the *cocaleros* and peasant communities experienced these actions as threats to their own livelihood.

Despite the eradication efforts, coca leaf harvest and cocaine production mixed with presence of *narcos* and cartels in the area did not stop. Some peasants resisted the cultivation of coca leaves for drug use, however, other peasants were coerced by the *narcos* to harvest these. This created a situation where *cocaleros* found themselves between two issues: pressed by the armed forces to eradicate any coca leaf cultivation and pressed by the *narcos* to harvest coca plants. It is within this scenario that this boom in drug trafficking and illegal money attracted the terrorist groups of *Sendero Luminoso* and MRTA to the area. They saw the cash inflow produced by this boom during the 1980s as a way to finance their

⁴⁸ Aerial spraying was mostly used in Colombia.

fight against the state. *Sendero Luminoso* tried to link itself with different peasant cocalero sectors in the Huallaga Valley (CVR, 2004a). The harassment suffered by the cocaleros and peasants by the armed forces during the previous years, the strong eradication policies implemented by the Peruvian state without any crop alternative, and the *narco*s' need for increased cocaine production saw the presence of these terrorist group as a pragmatic solution. They tried to monopolise this illegal economy (Paredes & Pastor, 2021) and tried to impose a “social order” that regulated the relationship between drug dealers and coca peasants by “protecting the latter from state repression” (CVR, 2004, p. 91). However, in this function they would also strongly repress any local opposition, creating many casualties in the area. Drug trafficking and *senderismo* would built an alliance in in the Huallaga Valley (Tapia, 1995). Peasant communities would form resistance groups to protect themselves and avoid abuse by any of the other parties involved in this conflict. Nonetheless, it would be these communities that would suffer the most during this period. Both the provinces of Leoncio Prado (Huánuco) and Tocache (San Martín) would witness the consequence of these clashes.

Politics, terrorism and drug trafficking became intertwined in this area during this period. This would even reach national politics when Demetrio Limonier Chavez Pañaherrera (alias *Vaticano*), who operated in the Huallaga Valley after being captured, mentioned in an interview that he paid Vladimiro Montesinos in the early 1990s for illegal flights to transport cocaine (Sierra & Bermudez, 2021). This interlink is exhibited by the fact that *Vaticano*, when captured, was not charged for leading a drug trafficking network with the Colombian cartels but rather for treason to the nation and his links with terrorist groups (Constitutional Tribunal, Exp. N° 1136-97-AA/TC).

This aggressive eradication campaign implemented by the Peruvian state with the support of international actors would later create a balloon effect. This meant that the cultivation of coca leaves moved to new areas in response to these campaigns. Thus, the Huallaga Valley stopped being the main drug hub area in Peru in the early 2000s. Now, the VRAEM (*Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro*)⁴⁹ is the main epicentre for drug production. It is an area in centre-southern Peru that crosses the regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cusco and Junín.⁵⁰ Furthermore, most of the remaining

⁴⁹ Before 2012 it was referred to as VRAE. Only after a Supreme Decree from the Presidency of Ministry in 2012 did it change its name to VRAEM. This decree established that all districts in the area and a multisectoral commission would pacify and develop the VRAEM (Decreto Supremos N° 074-2012-PCM and 090-2012-PCM).

⁵⁰ The first eradication campaign of coca leaf cultivation in the VRAEM started in November 2019, and it was implemented by the CORAH. This first campaign was faced with resistance from the cocaleros who clashed with the armed forces.

activities of Shining Path over the last two decades have been concentrated in this area, showing that the emergence of this terrorist group in the Huallaga Valley in the 1980s was financially, not ideologically, motivated.

Could this tumultuous and violent period explain Huanuco's low performance? First, a closer look at these events reveals that most of the clashes between terrorist groups, state armed forces and drug dealers were heavily concentrated in the Huallaga Valley, a cross regional area between Huánuco and San Martín. It involved mostly the Leoncio Prado and Tocache provinces. The figures from the CVR show that 59% (1391) of the deaths/disappearances occurred in the Leoncio Prado province, and the second province that suffered the most in the region was Huánuco with 8.5% of the population being affected (201).⁵¹ On the other hand, provinces like Dos de Mayo, Huaycabamba, Pachitea, Puerto Inca or Yarowilca in the region had less than 50 deaths/disappearances during this same period. This indicates that the conflict was circumscribed to Leoncio Prado, rather than being a region-wide phenomenon. Second, the socio-economic and demographic conditions in Leoncio Prado were different than other provinces that suffered this violence. Most of the violence suffered in Ayacucho, Huancavelica or Junín happened in rural areas. For example, Satipo was the most affected province from Junín and suffered 1175 deaths/disappearances during the 1980-2000 period. This province was a mostly a rural province with 76.3% in 1981 and 70.9% in 1993 of its population living in rural areas (CENSUS 1981-1993). At the same time, Leoncio Prado was largely an urban province with 42% in 1981 and 62.1% in 1993 of its population living in urban areas. This province did not fall under the Maoist approach of a "peasant-centered version of revolution of semifeudal countries" pushed forward by Sendero Luminoso's doctrine (Degregori et al., 2012, p.106). It rather responded to a financial incentive, as it did for MRTA. These terrorist groups saw the drug trafficking network as an opportunity generate and increase their income, and used this connection with drug lords to allow them to get more and better arms (Degregori et al., 2012, p. 151). It was a financial decision, not an ideological one, that pushed their presence in this area. Third, those provinces in Huánuco that were not at the centre of this conflict between *narco*s, terrorist groups and state armed forces had worse results in the quality of democracy and state capacity during the period under study in this research.⁵² The modernisation process continued in Leoncio Prado, despite becoming an international drug hub

⁵¹ The province of Tocache had also one of the highest number of deaths/disappearances as a result of the convergence with the drug trafficking network in the Huallaga Valley, and in the region of San Martín as a whole.

⁵² To be discussed in more detail in the next sub section.

and the clashes of the actors within it. It continued to have one of the highest non-agricultural workforces in the region, as well as better educational attainments than the other provinces. The CVR underscores that the areas affected in Huánuco had no impact on the economic active population, as in Ayacucho or Huancavelica, that saw a decrease of this population (CVR, 2004, p. 386). Fourth, it was not areas devoid of state presence that allowed the illegal activities to flourish, but rather a “synergy between state presence and the production of these same illicit activities” (Paredes & Manrique 2021). This tumultuous period did impact local politics in Leoncio Prado (as shown by the murder of the Mayor of Tingo Maria, Tito Jaime Fernandez, in 1984). However, its effect on the overall modernisation process undergone by the region as a whole was minor, and in turn, its impact on political development was nominal as well.

Despite this concentrated conflict in the Huallaga Valley, the major social and land reform transformation did not change the way the region as a whole organised the production of its goods. The economic structure of the region has been largely the same from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The regional compendium of Huánuco shows that around a third of the regional GDP is based on agricultural activities (Table N° 6.8 and 6.9). The main products of the region are potatoes and cereals in the *sierra*, and coca, cacao and coffee in the *selva* area. These are harvested under the influence of traditional technology, low levels of productivity, and insufficient infrastructure, with small parcels where auto-consumption of products remains the principal outcome.⁵³ The families in rural areas are accustomed to familial productive systems for their subsistence, characterised by their low levels of productivity, small units of work (usually less than one hectare), limited resources, and higher risks to adverse climate conditions (Figuerola, 2009; Ortiz & Valdez, 1993; T. Schultz, 1964). Any unexpected event will derail these communities into even poorer conditions. The surplus of products is sold in markets. However, the poor condition of roads and the cost of transport creates a situation where the price paid to the peasant is sometimes lower than the cost of production. This perpetuates their impoverished conditions. The *Plan de Desarrollo Regional Concertado 2009* from Huánuco depicts this situation. Here “*el principal soporte de la economía es la agricultura que presenta condiciones poco favorables para su desarrollo*” (the main support of the economy is agriculture and this presents unfavourable conditions for its development) (GORE, 2009, p. 29). The great agricultural potential of the territory including its soils, fertility, and micro-climates are met with low-capacity levels with which

⁵³ The creation of the programme “Hakun Wiñay” (We will grow) had as a focus the empowerment of peasants in rural areas that had familial productive systems for their subsistence to help them to achieve economic autonomy.

to foster the development needed and to promote and integrate the economic autonomy of the farmers into the market.

Table N° 6.8 – Percentage structure of agriculture and industry for Huánuco’s gross domestic product

	1971	1972	1993	1995
Agriculture	32.0	30.0	39.4	41.7
Industry	10.5	11.7	11.7	9.5

Source: Regional Compendium *Conociendo Huánuco 2000* – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Table N° 6.9 – Gross domestic product of Huánuco in New Soles

	1975	1976	1995	1996
Agriculture	14,983	15,598	31,595	33,348
Industry	2,958	2,867	3,285	3,366

Source: Regional Compendium *Conociendo Huánuco 2000* – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Now, what type of agriculture is prominent in Huánuco? Is it highly specialised, capital intensive and industrialised, or mostly self-sustaining agriculture? A way to address these questions is to understand the technology involved in the production of goods and the energy source used for the agricultural activities as a proxy to measure the level of technification. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the energy input needed for agricultural production can be placed in a “energy ladder”. Here the lower levels use rudimentary types of energy (e.g. human or animal force), whilst the upper levels are more advanced and use mechanical or electricity (even renewable) sources of energy (FAO, 2000). In order to promote rural economic development, the idea is to move along the ladder. According to the National Agricultural Census (CENAGRO in Spanish) from 2012, Huánuco’s agriculture use of energy input for the production of food is rudimentary. From a total of 106,356 agricultural units in Huánuco, around 97% of the energy sources come from human and animal work (instead of mechanical, electric, or a combination of these). This is compared to Ica, a high-performance region with a strong agro-industrial economy, where only 50% of its energy source comes from human and animal work. This is also true in the medium-performance region of Cusco, where 68% of the energy comes from these sources (CENAGRO, 2012). This does not mean that the

region as a whole in Huánuco lacks any technological advancements in agriculture, since they do have some products (cacao and coffee) that are mostly exported and are linked to industry. However, it does show that most of the agriculture in Huánuco is not technologically advanced, but rather still relies on traditional methods and would be considered at the first steps of the “energy ladder” and rural development. It is closely aligned to Webb’s definition of the traditional rural sector where its population is mainly dedicated to “subsistence agriculture, where the income and aggregated value per worker is minimum” (Webb, 1975, p. 67). This low agricultural development of Huánuco is then accompanied with a shortfall of capital in its production. It is not a capital-intensive agricultural economy in the way other regions like Ica or Arequipa are. An indicator to measure if an agriculture is capital intensive or not can be gauged through the access to bank loans that producers have. In the CENAGRO 2012 survey it is possible to know how many producers applied for a bank loan. In Huánuco only 6.1% applied for a bank loan. In comparison, in the regions of Ica, Arequipa and San Martín, a total of 16.1%, 17.5% and 17% respectively applied for bank loans (CENAGRO, 2012). At the same time, in the low-performing region of Cajamarca, only 4.8% of the *agricultores* applied for bank loans. This shortfall of capital diminishes the potential for rural development. As pointed out by Figueroa, most of the factors that limits the peasant economy can be reduced to one: lack of finance (Figueroa, 2001, p. 120). This information exhibits that Huanuco’s agriculture is not capital intensive nor technologically advanced. It is marked by a high fragmentation of small parcels, where the majority still employs traditional mechanisms for harvest and production of goods and faces great obstacles to link itself with agricultural chains, and its limited access to capital hinders even further its rural development opportunities.

The composition of the economy changed slightly from the beginning of the year 2000 until 2018. It is still mostly agricultural and most of its citizens worked in agricultural activities, although the share of workforce on agriculture slightly decreased. This decline in agricultural workforce is aligned with the improvement in social conditions, as seen in the previous section, of their democratic state performance (although still below the national average). Most of the labour is in small parcels, where their immediate relations are based on their communities, and not with the greater region as a whole. As mentioned by Figueroa (2009), “the peasant family does not operate in isolation from the rest of the community. In the productive process the family abolishes relations with the rest of families of the community” (Figueroa, 2009, p. 21). This low productive small parcel agriculture also diminishes

the possibility to create an economic elite that could industrialise the production.⁵⁴ This territorial and also organisational fragmentation of the workers restrains the possibility of collective action that fosters development plans for their territory and has limited political pressure on the political apparatus. A more diversified economic structure, like in Piura and Arequipa, allowed the creation of an economic elite that was more organised and was able to articulate development plans with political elites (Muñoz et al., 2016). This possibility has not emerged in Huánuco.

This far I have showed that Huánuco has remained mostly an agricultural economy with a majority of its labour workforce in this sector. The main argument of this dissertation (Graph N° 4.11) states that the timid modernisation process in Huánuco – which remained mostly with a higher agricultural workforce – would not trigger the pathway towards a high-performance democratic state. One of the first consequences of this slow process is an expulsion of the population towards other areas. The agricultural economy, its subsistent character, lack of articulation with regional and national markets, and its workforce would perpetuate the impoverished conditions of the region. An already absent state and the absence of a unifying authority over the whole region fosters this isolation situation. The lack of an overarching authority over the region is crucial, since this would mean that any improvement in state capacity to expand its reach towards other areas is reactive rather than prospective. Its control is dispersed across a multiplicity of municipalities that tend to have few resources to expand its reach. Hence, the predominance in this type of economy with the complementary relationship with poor living standards and conditions, created a pattern of migration towards the centre where other sectors of the regional economy were developing. The region expelled its population towards other regions where modernisation was happening (Webb, 1979). The migrants were drawn by the promises of modernisation in terms of education, health, job opportunities, and the social mobility ideal adhered to this (Degregori et al., 2012; Matos Mar, 1986). These urbanised and modern areas represented the opportunity for younger generations to break the poverty cycle, and the tool through which this could be broken was through the education ladder. This is exemplified by the creation of the first higher education institution in 1964, the Universidad Nacional Hermilio Valdizan. On 21 February of the same year, President Fernando Belaunde Terry granted this institution the category of university through the Law N° 14915. It had previously worked as a subsidiary of the *Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú* (Huancayo), the first university of the central region of Perú. The migration patterns

⁵⁴ This happened with Ica, a high-performance region, where most of its economic activity revolves around agro-industrial products.

(Table N° 6.10) show that the region has suffered a negative migration flow from the 1980s onwards, where more people have left the region than stayed in it. The regional document PDRC 2014-2021 as part of its diagnose of the region reinforces this idea by affirming that “*Huánuco es un departamento expulsor*” (Huánuco is an expeller department) (GORE, 2014, p. 36). Most of the emigration of the region went to the provinces of Lima (Lima) and Coronel Portillo (Ucayali). For the former, this was fostered by the close historic migration patterns that Huánuco had with Cerro de Pasco (both were part of the same Intendencia), which were connected via the *Carretera Central* (Central Highway) with Lima. This road network was the main route through which most of the migrants left Huánuco for the modernisation promises in the national capital of Lima. Furthermore, as characterised by the Plan de Regionalización, a feature of Huánuco’s territory is that its disarticulation from the regional and national market does not impede the existence of “*una creciente absorción por otras regiones de su fuerza laboral y servicios*” (a growing absorption by other regions of its labour force and service) (LAW 23878, Art. 2.2).

Table N° 6.10 Migration patterns in Huánuco

Years	Immigration	Emigration
1976-1981	32,831	29,150
1988-1993	37,033	53,581
2002-2007	27,731	66,202
2012-2017	34,664	49,711

Source: National Census – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Centralism is considered as a process in which the capital of a country concentrates most of the resources. It is the political, social, cultural and economic centre of the territory, and the decision-making process is quasi-monopolised at the centre. This is common in unitary countries where subnational governments are dependent on national decision-making processes. Here, even though there is a decentralised system, the decision still needs to go to the centre to be approved after which it trickles down. This political arrangement creates a centripetal force on other spheres. The subnational centralism perpetuates the logic of centralism at a national level, but within sub-national units. Subnational centralism is a process that concentrates in the political, economic, social and cultural centre of the region more public goods and services, better living standards, better job opportunities, and a more diversified economy. The decisions are made to reinforce the importance

of the subnational centre, perpetuating a vicious circle where people from the rural areas with poorer living standards and conditions are forced to migrate to this centre due to a higher state presence. This in turns fosters the subnational centre to disregard any investment on the rural areas and periphery, and to continue to concentrate the opportunities in the centre and those areas connected to it.

As posited by the refined modernisation theory in this dissertation, the unfolding economic and territorial processes of this structural change triggers the expansion of the democratic state. In terms of state capacity, it will prioritise those demographically concentrated areas. In Huánuco this logic can be exemplified by the public policy decision of how to distribute public services within the territory. The majority of its population still lives in rural areas at the beginning of the 2010s (Table N° 6.11). Despite this fact, the migration patterns discussed previously increased and concentrated the population in the urban provinces. These provinces with a higher level of provision of public services and a more diversified economy were prioritised to get even more services. These were the provinces of Huánuco (regional capital) and Leoncio Prado. The *Planificación Estratégica Institucional* (PEI) is main management tool that defines the strategy and objectives of a government entity, and it links these objective with the specific sectorial budget. The PEI form the Regional Government of Huanuco, stated that “*las provincias con mayor población necesitan la priorización de saneamiento básico*” (the provinces with higher populations need to be prioritised for basic sanitation) (PEI, 2012, p. 15). This corroborates the pathway established by this dissertation where the democratic state reacts towards the unfolded structural changes created as a result of the modernisaton process. Furthermore, this creates a vicious circle where the influx of migrants from the countryside to urban and peri-urban areas to pursue better job opportunities and better living standards augments the population in those areas. Faced with this increase the government decides to prioritise those same sites with more state presence via sanitation projects. This then improves their living standards and creates an incentive for the people on the countryside to continue to abandon the rural areas towards the urban ones in the region; in other words, a centripetal force that creates a vicious circle.

Table N° 6.11 – Huánuco’s Rural & Urban population (percentage)

Years	Rural	Urban
1940	81.5	18.5
1961	78.8	21.2
1972	74.0	26.0
1981	68.0	32.0
1993	61.4	38.6
2007	64.9	35.1
2017	47.9	52.1

Source: INEI National Census – Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Huánuco as an expeller region can be understood when looking into its socioeconomic variables. For the regional political party *Movimiento Político Hechos no Palabras*, in their party manifesto they state that the region “*se encuentra en situación de atraso y postergación, y se ubica entre las regiones más pobres del país. El comportamiento histórico de los indicadores socioeconómicos y los niveles de vida alcanzados de la población, nos muestra la magnitud de limitaciones y deficiencias que son precisos superar con urgencia*” (is in a situation of backwardness and postponement and is one of the poorest regions of the country. The historic behaviour of the socio-economic indicators and the living standards achieved by the population show us the magnitude of the limitations and deficiencies that needs to be overcome urgency) (Hechos no Palabras, 2014). The political party’s manifesto is right in its historic appraisal of the socioeconomic conditions of the region. At the same time, when Luzmila Templo, Governor of Huánuco 2003-2006, said that when she started as governor “*las oficinas parecían un gallinero. Las luces eran un mecebro, y las calles de Huánuco parecían cualquier aldea, un pueblo joven*” (the regional government offices looked like a hen house. The lights were just lighters, and the streets looked like some random village, a shanty town) (Luzmila Templo interview, 2011). Huánuco started the millennia with around three quarters of its population living below the poverty line (Table N° 6.12). The effects of poverty on child development, academic achievement, or mental health have long been studied and show detrimental effects on the population (Aber et al., 1997; Lund et al., 2014).

Social modernisation has also lagged behind in the region and this has had consequences with other dimensions, e.g. women’s access to education, labour workforce and public offices. The results from the previous chapter indicated that the characteristic of the workforce composition was associated

with democratic state performance and this explained its variance between regions. At the same time, when the results were controlled by years it showed that educational attainment within each region had a higher association (than workforce structure) with performance, signalling that human capital plays an important role in improving the overall political development of a region. Huánuco has had a pronounced gap in terms of education when compared to national average. In 1970 around 49% of the population in Huánuco was illiterate, whilst 33% was the national average. This improved, and by 2015 (after 45 years) illiteracy went down to 17%. However, it still maintained its lower place in comparison with the other regions (Table N°6.14). This is also followed with a lower secondary school enrolment than the national average. The nation as a whole improved in this respect, and Huánuco marched in the same direction during this period. Despite this increase in educational attainment, the region has persistently been in the lowest quintile (Table N°6.13). Only in 2018 did the region achieve the national average from 2010. Furthermore, the Regional Directorate of Education of Huánuco in its Regional Education Project 2010-2021 stated that the main reason for the students' withdrawal from their school enrolment was to support their parents in agricultural activities (GORE, 2009b, p.50). This is aligned with the characteristic of the agricultural work in the region, with small parcels and highly manually intensive labour that requires the support of the family members to harvest all the crops.

Table N° 6.12 – People under poverty line: Huánuco vs National average

Years	Huánuco	National
2000	78.9	58.8
2002	83.2	59.4
2006	74.6	49.1
2010	58.5	35.2
2014	39.9	26.3
2018	34.2	23.6

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In terms of public infrastructure, the public schools in Huánuco have also a poorer quality when compared with other regions. Most of these schools in the region are far away from the UGEL. This means that they are located in areas of difficult access, and this translates into higher challenges for the teachers, students and educational materials to reach those schools. Furthermore, when analysing

the quality of the educational infrastructure the Ministry of Education considers three factors: drinking water, sewage system, and electrification. Based on these variables, around 31.5% of the public schools in Huánuco have all three, whilst at the national level the figure goes up to 41.5% (MINEDU, 2015). Thus, not only educational attainment but also public school infrastructure quality is below the national average and lags behind other regions. This is echoed in the MINEDU report where in its conclusion they state that “*Huánuco muestra una mejoría en los indicadores educativos. Sin embargo, los resultados de Huánuco son aun inferiores al promedio nacional y de otras regiones*” (Huánuco shows an improvement in educational indicators. However, the results are still inferior to the national average and other regions) (MINEDU, 2015, p. 34).⁵⁵ These results indicate that social modernisation in Huánuco has not been at the same level as high-performance regions. The endurance of these results is aligned to what Kurtz (2013) found when studying state building processes in Latin America. The stability and ranking of these states across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been remarkably the same. The social foundations of the state building process in Latin America created an institutional hierarchy that remained cross these two centuries (Kurtz, 2013).

Table N° 6.13 – Secondary school enrolment in Huánuco vs National

Years	Huánuco	National	Lowest quintile
2002	52.7	68.6	59.8
2006	57.8	75.8	67.02
2010	65.5	77.6	71.7
2014	74.1	82.6	77.7
2018	77.6	84.7	81.6

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

Huánuco’s poor position in terms of socio-economic indicators is echoed by the own regional government. Another socio-economic variable shaped by the economic structure of the region is public health. As expected, Huánuco has been always below the national average (Table N° 6.13). The life expectancy of Huánuco since 1970 has been lower, although the difference is not a stark one. In 2015, the government commissioned an analysis of the region’s performance in various metrics

⁵⁵ Other educational indicators included the PISA results from 2014 on reading comprehension and mathematics performance in Huánuco. In both dimensions the region was behind the national average in reading comprehension (26.4% vs 43.5%) and mathematics performance (16% vs 25.9%).

(including the ones shown here) and compared them with the other regions of Peru. This report was headed by the *Gerencia Regional de Planeamiento, Presupuesto y Acondicionamiento Territorial* (Regional Office of Planning, Budget and Territorial Landscape). After analysing, comparing and evaluating the outcomes in the 21st región, the *Gerencia* concluded that “*el departamento de Huánuco se sitúa en los últimos puestos en la mayoría de los indicadores, teniendo brechas amplias en relación al promedio nacional. En los sectores de salud y educación, seguimos en los niveles más bajos, como lo muestran las variables de rendimiento satisfactorio en lectura y matemática, población analfabeta, mortalidad infantil, desnutrición crónica infantil, y esperanza de vida. Asimismo la brecha por cubrir en el acceso a los servicios de saneamiento básico y energía, es bastante significativo*” (the department of Huánuco is placed among the last spots in the majority of indicators, having wide gaps in relation with the national average. In the health and education sector, we continue to be in the lowest levels, as shown in the variables of satisfactory performance in readership and mathematics, illiteracy population, infant mortality, chronic child malnutrition, and life expectancy. Furthermore, the gap to cover the access to public services of sanitation and electrification is highly significant) (GORE, 2015, p. 18). These results made the region less competitive, and even though they improved across the years, they are still “*por debajo del promedio nacional ocupando los últimos lugares*” (below the national average occupying the last positions).

Table N° 6.14 – Life expectancy and illiteracy in Huánuco versus national average

Years	Life expectancy (Huánuco)	Life expectancy (National)	Illiteracy (Huánuco)	Illiteracy (National)
1970	49.1	52.1	49.5	33.4
1980	53.4	55.5	35.8	23.3
1990	63.3	65.9	---	---
1995	65.1	67.7	26.7	17.5
2000	66.9	69.2	21	12.4
2005	68.5	70.6	20.5	11.3
2010	70.1	71.7	18.6	8.9
2015	72.6	74.1	17.2	10.6

Source: National Census 1970-2017, and Demographic and Health Survey 1996 – 2016 (Peru) – Elaboration: Manuel

Seifert

I have shown so far that the economic and social modernisation processes have consistently lagged behind in Huánuco compared to other regions. It maintained a mainly agricultural economy, characterised with weak links to regional and national markets, a high degree of subsistence, and low levels of production. Its labour workforce was also highly based on agricultural activities with no major structural change occurring. This was coupled with one of the lowest educational attainments. As such, I should expect that the conditions that foster women's political participation to be absent as well in Huánuco. Women in Huánuco would have fewer years of school attendance than the national average, a lower labour workforce participation, and lower access to media and information. These conditions would explain their lower levels of political participation, candidates and elected officials discussed in the previous section. Huánuco would follow this pathway. The poor socioeconomic results in Huánuco are more strongly felt in the vulnerable populations of the region. A poorer society with lower living standards and poorer outcomes on public health and education will have a greater gap between men and women. Women in these conditions tend to produce lower results as they have reduced access to key public services. In an agrarian society where most communities and families rely heavily on their harvested products with small parcels that bring them closer to a subsistence type of economy, women tend to specialise in home production and other works within the domestic sphere (Unte & Kemper, 2015). This is the case in peasant families in Peru. The local labour market is mainly for adult men "as the opportunities for women and children are much fewer" (Figueroa, 2009, p. 65). Women are responsible for to take care of the productive unit whilst the adult men are free to earn income elsewhere (Figueroa, 1987). Furthermore, if the women are able to get a job outside, the roles are usually limited to domestic chores or as domestic servants. The results in Table N° 7.15 show that women in the region of Huánuco have had lesser access to secondary school or higher studies. Just at the beginning of the twenty-first century, not even one third of the women (29%) had finished secondary school. This puts women in the region in a disadvantaged position when they interact in the public sphere, with lesser skills when engaging with the labour market that limits their scope to lower-paid jobs. This perpetuates the gender disparities in the region. According to the National Census, 63% of the illiterates in the region were women (in 1993), then 60% in 2007 and 62% in 2017. These shocking figures are a consequence of the low access of women to secondary school, with a state that is unable to expand its territorial reach to those dispersed communities.

Furthermore, the low access of women to secondary school and the subsequent higher level of women illiterates in the region is tied to their access to media. As mentioned before, democracy is sustained

by citizens and these need to be informed to make democracy work (Milner, 2002). Studies have shown that civic education fosters the support for democracy and reduced the attractiveness of authoritarian regimes (S. Finkel et al., 2020; S. E. Finkel, 2003; Smith, 2020). A citizen can be informed via school, family and friends, or by the media. The latter is fundamental for a well-functioning democracy. When the media are controlled by the state, and the citizen cannot access independent media content, as in Peru during 1990-2000, the regime is considered more authoritarian than democratic. Access to media is fundamental to construct a well-informed citizen who will in turn participate in the public debate and strengthen its democracy. Thus, when a considerable portion of the population do not have access to any type of media (whether radio, TV or newspaper), democracy is of a lower quality. In 2000, according to the *Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar*, around 45% women did not have any access to media (Table N° 6.15). At the same time, the national average access of women to any type of media was 17%. Following these figures, it is clear that a fully well-informed citizenry in Huánuco is absent. The shortfall of women’s access to media, a cornerstone for democracy and a fundamental piece to build opinions, preferences, interest in public affairs, severely constrains their relationship with democracy.

Table N° 6.15 – Women’s access to secondary school (or more) and media: Huánuco vs National.

Years	Secondary School or more		No access to media	
	Huánuco	National	Huánuco	National
2000	29.7	66.2	44.9	17.3
2004-2006	47.9	71.6	32.0	13.6
2014	60.9	79.2	24.2	11.7
2018	62.9	82.5	28.1	16.9

Source: Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar 2000-2018 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

In sum, Huánuco followed the pathway when modernisation process is minimal in a region. Although it improved in various measures during the years, its economic and social modernisation remained behind other regions. Its labour workforce continued to be mainly agricultural, and transformation towards an industrial/service-based economy did not occur. As a consequence, Huánuco became an expeller region, where most of their citizens migrated towards other regions (mainly Lima). The rapid transformation that unfolded within the territory was tenuous and, thus, the democratic state had no push to expands its state capacity to claim the control over its territory. On the contrary, it continued

to neglect its dispersed population in rural areas. This has been advantageous for illegal economies that require an absent state. The state had a limited reach, with fewer schools, teachers, bureaucrats to enforce its decisions, and fewer houses that had access to public water supply and electrification. This increased the costs for overall political participation, having lower levels of electoral turnout across elections. Furthermore, educational attainment in the region was consistently below the national average and within the worst between the regions. Although it improved during the years under study, it still lagged behind most of the regions whether it was school enrolment, years of schooling or public education infrastructure. Furthermore, the insufficient opportunities in other economic sector and education meant that there were fewer possibilities for women to access these jobs and augment their labour participation. This was compounded with a distinct gap where women had fewer years of school enrolment (than the national average) and less access to information. Thus, the conditions that fostered women's political participation was minimal in Huánuco, which explains the low levels of women candidates and elected officials.

6.2.1 Within-region variation: modernisation at a provincial level

Huánuco's low performance is explained by the timid presence of the modernisation process. The determinants that triggered this process in Moquegua were not sufficiently present in Huánuco. As a whole, the territory was still highly agricultural prior to the years under analysis, and with the one of the lowest educational attainments. Nonetheless, as with the national perspective, within-region differences occurred as well. Some provinces in Huánuco reduced their dependency on agricultural activities, transformed their economic structure, created new job opportunities, received internal migration concentrated in the urban areas, and improved their public service provision and political participation. The provinces of Huánuco (regional capital) and Leoncio Prado are the ones that went through this economic and social modernisation process, whilst the other provinces did not.

Huánuco's internal political and administrative delimitation changed during the 1990s. At the beginning of this decade it had nine provinces and then Fujimori passed a new law that created two more provinces: Yarowilca and Lauricocha. After 1995 the region would be composed of 11 provinces. In the national census, the agricultural workforces in the provinces of Huánuco and Leoncio Prado were 23% and 28% respectively, whilst the other provinces like Huaycabamba (64%), Marañón (69%), Pachitea (46%), and Ambo (46%) had the majority of their workforces in agricultural

activities. By 2017, the gap between these provinces has been maintained although most had reduced their agricultural workforce. For example, Huaycabamba reduced it by 20 points, and Marañon by 18 points. Now, since most of the economy in Huánuco and Leoncio Prado is not based on agriculture, one would expect that most of the companies working in other sectors like manufacturing, services or commerce to be located in these two provinces. The Ministry of Production assessed the economy of Huánuco. It found that of the total of (formal) enterprises in the region, 84.4% of these were concentrated in the provinces of Huánuco (63.8%) and Leoncio Prado (20.6%) (PRODUCE, 2011a). Most of these enterprises are micro and small enterprises (*micro y pequeñas empresas*, MYPES), and most of them are registered as natural rather than legal person.

Table N° 6.16 – Huánuco: percentage of workforce in agriculture by provinces

Provinces	1993	2017
Ambo	46.13	46.48
Dos de Mayo	45.02	33.72
Huaycabamba	64.34	44.31
Huamalies	48.97	50.96
Huánuco	23.86	18.50
Lauricocha*	---	41.72
Leoncio Prado	28.20	24.74
Marañon	69.23	51.03
Pachitea	46.92	59.35
Puerto Inca	53.19	45.07
Yarowilca*	---	58.28

Source: National Census 1993 & 2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert // *In 1993 these provinces were part of Dos de Mayo

Table N° 6.17 – Huánuco: percentage of people whose highest educational attainment is primary school

Provinces	1993	2017
Ambo	74.38	40.87
Dos de Mayo	71.92	41.32
Huaycabamba	76.15	39.28
Huamalies	75.26	43.91
Huánuco	53.39	28.38
Lauricocha*	---	36.24
Leoncio Prado	53.96	32.75
Marañon	76.65	44.68
Pachitea	85.99	48.41
Puerto Inca	74.42	47.21
Yarowilca*	---	39.82

Source: National Census 1993 & 2017 // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert // *In 1993 these provinces were part of Dos de Mayo

This legal situation of the enterprises of Huánuco replicates how Peruvian society as a whole is organised. Most of the enterprises are family owned and tend to have difficulties to move forward in the institutionalisation ladder to become legal. The constraints and limitations faced by the MYPES, where their members are unable (or unwilling) to push forward their institutionalisation process, is something that spills over to other spheres. Moving in this ladder usually requires acceptance of formal protocols that the enterprises do not wish to engage with. This is certainly the case in Peruvian politics, where political parties are unable to consolidate and institutionalise themselves. Most of these disappear once the leader of the organisation passes away (or retires). Since the creation of the National Jury of Election in 1931, Peru has had a total of 18,860 political parties (Seifert, 2016). Political parties, as with the micro-, small-, and medium- enterprises in Peru, are unable formalise their internal processes to give them continuity beyond the leader that created the organisation (political or economic). Thus, when looking into the failure of political parties in their inability to institutionalise, consolidate, have roots within society, and have formalised processes that go beyond the leader the answer needs to go beyond the political factors and explore why this inability is also present in other spheres like the Peruvian PYMES.

The economic activities of the provinces shape its territorial landscape, fostering the urbanisation process and concentration of population. In this sense, Huánuco and Leoncio Prado are mostly urban provinces (62% and 61% respectively), whilst the other provinces are mainly rural. Most provinces have above 72% of the population in rural areas. Following my argument these latter provinces have poorer living standards where the state presence does not reach these communities and population. In terms of electrification Huánuco and Leoncio Prado have 59% and 56% respectively of their households with electricity, whilst provinces like Puerto Inca (11%), Yarowilca (22%), Lauricocha (22%), and Ambo (46%) have fewer percentage of houses with electricity. Meanwhile access to a public water supply network shows a similar picture. In Huánuco and Leoncio Prado around 53% and 38% of households respectively have access to a public network of water. On the other hand, provinces like Puerto Inca (2%), Lauricocha (23%), Dos de Mayo (34%), or Ambo (7%) have lower access to a public network of water. This uneven state presence across the territory is explained by the proper state's decision to prioritise those urban areas over the rural ones. This has been seen in the *Presupuesto Estratégico Institucional* where the government clearly stated that these provinces needed to be prioritised. However, by completely neglecting the rural areas it creates a vicious circle where the living standards of the prioritised provinces improved and led to better infrastructure for business and a more competitive environment, creating more job opportunities, and, at the end, a vicious circle that attracts people from the rural areas (the areas that were not prioritised). Since the population gets concentrated in these prioritised areas, the government once again reacts by approving public investment projects improving the state presence in these areas.

At the same time, social modernisation followed the same path as economic modernisation in the provinces. Huánuco and Leoncio Prado were the provinces that had higher levels of educational attainment (Table N°6.17), whilst the other provinces like Pachitea, Marañon or Dos de Mayo stayed behind. Provinces with lower levels of social modernisation would experience a higher gap in women's access to education, and this would translate to a lower presence of women in the public realm and politics. This is exactly what happened when addressing the quality of democracy in the provinces. When considering women's participation in politics the results show that the most equal provinces in terms of women candidates for subnational positions, Major and Councillors, are Huánuco and Leoncio Prado. The electoral quota makes it mandatory that all lists must be composed at least 30% by one gender (usually women). If the political party does not comply, the inscription of the list to the National Jury of Election will be denied. Thus, all provinces must have at least this percentage of

women (or men) candidates. The results when focusing on the supply side of female candidates shows that the political parties in Huánuco presented on average 41% of women candidates, whilst Leoncio Prado 40%. The other provinces during the 2002-2018 elections presented on average 37% of women candidates.

On the other aspects of quality of democracy, the results are mix between Huánuco and Leoncio Prado. The former has the highest political participation in the regional and municipal elections, whilst the latter is among the provinces with lower electoral turnout. Other provinces, e.g. Ambo, had better results in terms of electoral turnout of the population in subnational elections. Following the theory outlined we should have expected a higher political participation in the Leoncio Prado. Higher educational attainments and access to public education expands the social meaning of citizenship (Marshall, 2006; Meyer, 1977), a civic culture that embraces democracy (Barro, 1999; Verba & Almond, 1963), an awareness of political institutions (Castelló-Climent, 2008), strengthens the norms of tolerance (Lipset, 1959), and improves social interactions needed for political participation (Glaeser et al., 2007). However, a caveat regarding the specifics of political participation in Leoncio Prado should be considered. This province suffered most of the deaths/disappearances during the internal conflict period of 1980-2000. Despite having suffered the terrible consequences of terrorism and drug trafficking, Leoncio Prado is, after the capital, the province with better overall results in state capacity and quality of democracy. Nonetheless, there is one indicator in which Leoncio Prado performed below Huanuco's average and that was electoral turnout. This can be explained by the confluence of these two illegal activities that created a state of emergency in the province. Furthermore, the citizens tended to avoid going to the polls to avoid any possible terrorist reprisal (Rebata Delgado, 2019). It is undeniable that this province suffered the consequences of this violence, and illegal economy is still a part of its social fabric. However, Leoncio Prado continued with the unleashed processes from economic and social modernisation that improved their overall democratic state performance. Its economic structure was less agricultural and had higher levels of educational attainment, conditions which improved the state's presence in the area and the human capital that fosters its democratic quality.

In sum, in this subsection I have shown that the economic and social modernisation of Huánuco that shaped the performance of its democratic state can be scaled down to the provinces as well. Out of the 11 provinces that make up the region, Huánuco and Leoncio Prado have a more diversified

economic structure, the lowest percentage of their workforce in agriculture, and the highest educational attainments. This was accompanied by a more urbanised province, that was the centre of internal migration. These forces were the building blocks over which the state presence reinforced and expanded its presence and fostered a more plural and equal democracy. This modernisation process was dimmer in the other provinces and, thus, their living standards were lower than Huánuco and Leoncio Prado, with a state that lacked territorial presence. Although political participation in these agricultural provinces had better results than Leoncio Prado, this democratic characteristic was not translated to a more equal participation. Women in these provinces barely covered the electoral quota.

6.3 Conclusion

The timid modernisation process of Huánuco made the region a low-performance democratic state. Its territory is characterised by an uneven state presence, where most of the households have insufficient access to a public water supply network, have no electricity, and lack the human resource capital to implement and oversee the implementation of public policies. At the same time, its political party system is fragmented, where the list of candidates is marked by the use of women as a *relleno* occupying the last positions in the political parties' list making it almost impossible for them to get elected and have a lower electoral turnout. This is explained by the fact that the region did not unleash the modernisation process prior the decentralisation reforms in 2002.

Peru was heavily reliant on extractive resources for their economic development. Since independence, it relied on the guano, then rubber, and mining. From the 1960s Peru started an industrialisation process that would change the regional disparities across the nation. Then, in 1969 the government of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, under General Velasco Alvarado, implemented the Agrarian Reform. This broke the big haciendas and vanished the power of the *gamonales* across the territory. Peasants and communities were given back ownership over the land. Now farmers were owners although this created a division of the land on small parcels limiting the productivity. During this process, Huánuco did not unfold the modernisation process at the same pace as other regions and continued to be a strong agriculture economy. The main agricultural products of the region continued to be potatoes, coca leaves, *selva* coffee, and cacao. However, the production of these goods was very limited, creating a subsistence economy. At the same time, the surplus of these products was so

cheaply sold that the production cost was higher than the selling price. The living standards for this population were poor. Access to education was limited, illiteracy was rampant, educational attainment was among the worst at a national level, and women had even less access and years of schooling. The state did not reach these areas, and democracy was restricted only to literate citizens and disenfranchising of effectively two thirds of the population. This was accompanied with an exodus of its population towards other regions and provinces (mostly Lima and Callao) that were highly diversified economies, based on industry and services, with most of its population living in urban areas.

In 1980 democracy came fully to Peru after a military government of 12 years and, equally important, by the introduction of universal suffrage. This democratic overflow was felt differently across the nation. Due to the poor living standards with an absent state across the provinces and low socio-economic indicators (e.g. illiteracy rate), Huánuco was one of the regions that had most incremented its electoral base between 1978-1993. In this 15-year period the region had an increase of 260% of its electoral base. Just between 1978-1980, the democratic transition period and the introduction of universal suffrage was incremented by 71%. It was one of the top regions in terms of electoral base expansion. This democratic shock was met unfortunately with a state that neglected the rural areas of the region and, thus, was subject to the effects of terrorist attacks from *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path). Although it was not the main region where *Sendero Luminoso* deployed its attack, the province of Leoncio Prado was certainly hit by this period. Only in the provincial elections of 1995 was the region going to recover the same level of electoral turnout of 1980. Furthermore, the uneven state presence across the territory, mixed with the historic cultivation of coca leaves in the region, opened the door for drug trafficking in the area. This locked the communities and provinces within their productive agricultural practices and disabled the possibility of a more diversified economy, unlocking linked socio-economic transformation of modernisation. The democratic state during the 1980s and 1990 was limited due to these ongoing processes.

These were the structural processes undergone by the region when the democratisation process of 2000-2001 and the decentralisation reforms of 2002 saw the opportunity of political development as a whole in the region. New regional authorities were created, new regional governments were installed, and new regional political parties were formed. Huánuco started this process as a low-performance democratic state. However, it has not been able to improve its situation in comparison with the other

regions. It was the worst-off region in 2002 and it is still in 2018. The territory is characterised by a low state capacity where its state presence is patchy and is unable to implement public policies evenly across the land. Most households lack access to a public water supply network and electricity and there is a reduced number of bureaucrats present in the region. At the same time, its quality of democracy is low since it does not fully reach the ideals of being an equal and plural polity. Although some provinces have better electoral turnout than others, it has overall a low turnout compared with the national average. The shortfall of access of women to secondary school, their higher levels of illiteracy and low access to any media (TV, newspaper, radio) reduces their equal opportunities to participate in the public sphere. This is confirmed by the last spots they occupied in the political parties' list of candidates. (Young) women are used as *relleno* in these lists, significantly reducing their chances of getting elected. Finally, the region is marked with high political party volatility and a fragmented party system.

In sum, the economic and social transformation brought by the modernisation process did not develop at the same pace in Huánuco as with other regions. It has a higher agricultural workforce, where agriculture is characterised by small parcels, low technological development, minimal capital investment, and with fewer links to agricultural chains. The majority of the rural population had closer ties to their local communities and social relationships were marked by this economic structure. This is coupled with lower educational attainments and a lower quality of public infrastructure that limits the full benefits of human capital on innovation, productivity, economic growth, and the overall democratic state. The political development of the region was built upon these circumstances and limited its scope of action to those provinces already close to the centre. This subnational centralism concentrated its resources to those areas where the democratic state was already present, creating a vicious circle that pushed even more the population from the rural areas towards the urban areas, to which the democratic state devoted more resources due to the pressure of this concentration of population. Thus, the low-performing democratic state of Huánuco was as a result of economic and social modernisation.

Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions

During 2000-2002 Peru started the millennium with two major political processes: democratisation and decentralisation. Democracy came back after an authoritarian regime and decentralisation was finally implemented after numerous failed attempts. New regional political institutions were created, new regional actors emerged, and new functions were devolved to the regions to bring closer the democratic state to its people. Despite the identical institutional layout over the Peruvian regions, these showed drastically different results. Thus, the overarching question of this dissertation is what causes the uneven democratic state performance across Peruvian regions? And why has this unevenness persisted over time? Based on a combination of comparative case studies and regression analysis, I have sought to delineate the ways in which the structure of the labour workforce and the level of educational attainment in a region shapes its level of democratic state performance over time.

This research is embedded within the literature of state-democracy nexus, and the nature of the question required a mix-method approach as the most suitable path. To address the unevenness across Peruvian regions, I used a novel approach and built a concept called democratic state performance. This concept bridges the two kinds of literature of quality of democracy and state capacity through the deconstruction of both concepts to their core elements and by demonstrating both their analytical differences and ontological coexistence. Democracy cannot exist without the state, whilst the legitimacy of the state's authority relies on democracy. Furthermore, the citizens' experience is marked by the democratic state performance. Global dissatisfaction with democracy has increased in the past 25 years (Foa et al., 2020). According to these authors, the majority of the population in North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Australasia are now dissatisfied with democracy (57.5%). In Latin America this goes up to three in every four citizens being discontent with the performance of democracy (Foa et al., 2020, p. 28). Here, over the past 20 years citizens have been able to participate in free and fair elections, place themselves in political organisations, speak up against the government without fear of persecution, and have witnessed the expansion of a middle class and an engaged civil society. However, at the same time, high inequalities continued, the expansion of a middle class only strengthened pre-existing gaps between the rich and poor, racial discrimination was still part of everyday life, social mobility was still determined by one's place of birth, corruption saw the loss of millions from the public treasury, the informal economy grew, public services were still way below bar and were only accessible for those with the means to pay for them,

a lack of security was rampant, and law enforcement was absent. This situation created a malaise towards democracy, since the citizens felt that the state was failing its promises of improving their well-being, instead making them live with limited freedom. This is dangerous territory since it opens the door for democratic backsliding and the exploitation of the grievances by would-be autocrats.

The shortcomings of assessing democracy across Latin America without considering its coexistence with the state and its capacity to fulfil its functions and implement its decision effectively across the territory needs to be overcome. Focusing only on the analysis of democracy to examine if a country has good or bad quality misses the point on the citizen's experience. For them, it is not just about having free, fair elections, level of political participation, or be able to be a member of a political party, but the delivery of promises that are related to state capacity, its ability to evenly enforce its policy choices across the territory, to solve grievances and have the opportunities to fulfil wellbeing. Thus, this dissertation contributes to overcome these shortcomings with the concept of democratic state performance. This decision stresses the interrelation between state and democracy. Literature on the quality of democracy included state capacity as one of the dimensions (Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Lauth, 2015; Munck, 2016). However, this defeats the purpose of highlighting the interrelation of the state and democracy. Both are entwined and this should be cleared from the onset. Democracy, at its core, cannot not be discussed without reference to the state. The state is a set of institutions that exercise legitimate power over a territory and its population within it, provide public goods, and has the monopoly of violence. Democracy is an institutional arrangement that establishes the access to power and legitimises and controls (restrains) the use of this power. Without the reference to the state, it is not possible to think about democracy. The state is embedded within the definition of democracy. Historically, democracy emerged as a form and route of participation in public (state) affairs. Its concept was nourished with values of freedom (from and within the state), equality (under the rule of law), accountability (from state actions), among others, and its operationalisation in contemporaneous times has an implicit reference to the state and its power.

Now, following the works on this nexus by Tilly (2007), Norris (2012), Ertman (1997), Fukuyama (2014), Andersen et al. (2014), and Mazzuca and Munck (2020), I constructed the democratic state performance concept via a confirmatory factor analysis, where the dimensions of state capacity and quality of democracy, as well as the level of each of these (strong/weak capacity, good/bad quality), were measured. The advantage of this approach is that it allowed me to address these two dimensions

as analytical separate ones, that are nonetheless part of the overall construct, reclaiming their unity as a key concept.

I mapped democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time. The start of the decentralisation process of 2002 gave a natural start date for the analysis. The results showed its uneven spread across the political-administrative units. Some regions in Peru are high-performing (Moquegua, Ica, Tacna, Arequipa), whilst others are low-performing (Huánuco, Cajamarca, Ayacucho). This within-nation variation opened the door to explore if this unevenness was constant over time. Thus, I continuously measured this in different points in time between 2002-2018. The findings of this exhibit that the disparities between regions on democratic state performance is sustained over time. Those high-performance regions in 2002 were the same in 2018. On the other hand, those low-performance regions were also the same after 16 years. This reveals that democratic state performance is unevenly spread across space and time. The persistent unevenness is aligned with the literature on state capacity and democracy. Strong state capacity tends to be maintained over time, whilst literature supports the legacy of democracy as a condition for countries to remain democratic. Furthermore, a detailed analysis on each of the dimensions exhibit that some regions have consistently better performance in one of these. This is the case of Cajamarca, Ica, Loreto, Puno, San Martín and Ucayali. In these cases, quality of democracy is always higher than state capacity. The same happens the other way around. In the regions of Ancash, Lima, Madre de Dios and Moquegua, state capacity is always better. Analytically, it is expected that one dimension could outperform the other in some regions whilst showing a lower performance in others. This persistence in the level of performance was steadier in the state capacity dimension than on the quality of democracy. This is also expected since the components of the former are less subject to conjunctural factors as the latter. Nonetheless, this fluctuation was mostly restricted to the specific regions of Loreto, Madre de Dios and Tacna.

To address this unevenness, I performed a regression analysis to test different hypotheses on subnational variation. Based on the literature of within-nation variation, these were political culture (Verba & Almond, 1963), social solidarity and identity politics (Singh, 2016), social capital and civic community (Putnam et al., 1994), income inequality (Boix, 2003; Dahl, 1973), and economic and social modernisation (Barro, 1999; Castelló-Climent, 2008; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959). Using a multilevel dataset from 2002-2018 the results showed that modernisation shapes democratic state performance. The higher the percentage of the non-agricultural labour workforce (industrial/services)

and better educational attainment, the higher the performance of the region. On the other hand, those regions with a higher labour workforce on agriculture and lower levels of educational levels were low-performance regions. Both workforce structure and education levels shaped the overall regional performance across Peruvian regions over time. Furthermore, the impact of these on democratic state performance varied depending on the control variables fixed on the regions and the years of observation. Workforce structure had a stronger association than social modernisation when the analysis was fixed on the regions, whilst educational attainment had a stronger association than economic modernisation when it was fixed on the years. This meant that the workforce structure explains better the variation between regions in specific points in time, whilst educational attainment explains better the performance over time within a region itself capturing the linear trend of the variable. The improvement of a region over time is linked more to their rising educational levels, than to their economic structure. However, when compared to other regions in specific points in time, the labour force composition is more relevant when accounting for democratic state performance. Thus, at the onset of the decentralisation process in 2002, the unevenness between regions was shaped by their economic structure (and to a lesser degree by the educational attainment). Later over the years it would be the rising educational levels as a major force in shaping the regional performance from within, and the workforce structure would reduce its impact on performance. These results are aligned with the modernisation theory posited in this research, and with Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) vision on the relationship of modernisation and democracy.

To address this within-country variation, I put forward the argument that the modernisation process shaped the level of democratic state performance. It draws on a refined modernisation theory to add a causal link between the transition of an agricultural workforce towards an industrial/service coupled with rising educational levels that foster the economic growth of the region, its migration patterns, a higher population density, an established gender-role value system, and urbanisation processes. These would consequently put pressure on the provision of public goods and state resources would be prioritised in these areas, creating a pattern of subnational centralism whilst incorporating the majority of the population in democratic processes. Electoral turnout is augmented by reducing the cost of participation, and more women are able to participate in the public sphere as a consequence of their higher levels of school enrolment, increased access to media information, higher participation in the labour workforce, and ability to compete for public office. Before the 2002 decentralisation process, Moquegua (high-performance) showed better socio-economic conditions. In 1970 Moquegua's life

expectancy was 55 years, whilst the national average was 52 years. It is an extra three years of life. However, if this comparison is done against the worst region with the lowest life expectancy the difference becomes abysmal. Huánuco (low-performance) in 1970 had a life expectancy of 40 years. That means that a person born and raised in Huánuco had a 15-year shorter life than a person of Moquegua. And this gets worse in 1980 when the life expectancy of these two regions was 18 years. This shows the difference in social conditions that would shape the quality of democracy in the future years to come. And, at the same time, it showed the absence of the state in that region and its low capacity to evenly provide health care across the territory. Another indicator that exemplifies the improvements achieved by Moquegua is the levels of illiteracy. As with life expectancy, Moquegua's illiteracy rate has been lower than the national average. During the 1980s and 1990s it outperformed the national average. After this period the gap closed. This is mostly due to the fact that the closer you get to 0 the more difficult is to eliminate illiteracy. Once again, the comparison with Huánuco shows the abysmal differences between these two regions. For this region 44% of its population was illiterate in 1970 against 30% of Moquegua. By 1995, the difference grew higher with 32% of Huánuco population being illiterate and 9% of Moquegua.

The period under study showed that, overall, the Peruvian regions improved their democratic state performance over time. However, the level of modernisation in each region at the onset of decentralisation would put them on specific rankings that over the years the regions would not be able to overcome. The case study of Huánuco would show that, despite improving their socio-economic conditions, they were still well behind other regions like Moquegua, Cusco, La Libertad or Arequipa. Their economic and social modernisation was always below the national average. They had one of the highest labour workforce in agriculture and one of the lowest educational attainments. Its agriculture is characterised by small parcels, low levels of technology, with little finance capital, and difficulties to link itself with major productive chains. Educational levels are one of the lowest in Perú, and women have lower access to education, to media information, and gender-role are less challenged and their participation in the labour force and public realm is more limited. In many of the indicators (e.g. water supply network or electricity) households in Huánuco in 2017 would have the same access as Arequipa, Ica or Moquegua had 20 years ago. And its limited state presence is linked to a higher informal economy. The impact of terrorism and drug trafficking in Huánuco was bound to the province of Leoncio Prado and, as the within-region analysis showed, it would be minor on the political development of the region as a whole. On the other hand, Moquegua enjoyed a highly non-agricultural

workforce with better educational attainment than Huánuco (and other regions). This resulted in a high-performance region. Fiscal decentralisation and mining canon would give an extra income to the region to strengthen its democratic state. However, other regions received more from canon and had worst performance than Moquegua (e.g. Cusco, Cajamarca, Ancash or La Libertad), and the extra income did not translate immediately in expenditure in public goods, since financial systems in place (e.g. SNIP) were a challenge to most subnational officials that had limited capacity to deal with the acquired responsibilities from decentralisation. Furthermore, the within-region analysis showed that the province that received 70% of the canon (Mariscal Nieto) had worst performance than the province that received the least (Ilo). Nonetheless, Ilo enjoyed higher levels of education levels coupled with a more non-agricultural workforce.

7.1 Contributions and limitations

Since its inception, modernisation theory has always been thought of and tested at a national level. Although most of the social, economic and political processes are felt at a local level, the literature focused on national averages and tendencies. This left a gap on how modernisation, its economic transformation and development, and its socio-political factors unfold at a subnational level. Does the modernisation process undergone by a country spread equally across its territory? Are all its subnational units going through the same process? Or are some regions able to integrate themselves within this national process, whilst others are unable to articulate themselves with this macro-process? What are the consequences when some regions fall behind in this process? This research contributes to the scholarly debate by addressing these questions and filling this gap by testing modernisation theory at a subnational level, and showing how the economic transformation of the labour workforce and educational attainment triggers and sustains a succession of processes that shape democratic state performance across Peruvian regions over time.

Most of the literature that has addressed the state–democracy nexus have done it at a national level, studying and comparing between countries but not within-country variation. Those studies with a subnational approach to these elements have focused only on state capacity on one side (Alves, 2015; Bersch et al., 2017; Borges, 2007; Giraudy & Luna, 2017; Herbst, 2014; Just Quiles, 2017; Kale & Mazaheri, 2019; Niedzwiecki, 2018; P. Singh, 2015; Stoner-Weiss, 2002) and on democracy and its quality on the other side (Beer, 2019; Behrend & Whitehead, 2016a; Benton, 2012; Bilev, 2019;

Gervasoni, 2010; Gibson, 2013; Giraudy, 2015; Harbers et al., 2019; Ward et al., 2010). The contribution of this dissertation was to bridge these two strands of literature through the unified concept of democratic state performance and put it to test on a subnational level. The subnational approach has the advantage of controlling for other factors that are difficult to assess when the units of comparison are countries since these have different historic legacies, different political institutions, diversity of values, and so on (Harbers & Ingram, 2015; Singh, 2017; Snyder, 2001; Soifer, 2019). Thus, the subnational approach gives, in principle, a homogenous canvas to address within-country variation. Furthermore, the selection of Peru responded to an interest to address within-nation disparities in a unitary system of government. At the subnational level, most studies that have addressed state capacity or democracy and its quality have focused on federal types of countries (USA, Brazil, India, Argentina, Mexico, Russia, among others). Within the federal system, the subnational units tend to have greater autonomy and independence from the central government, and thus have more probabilities to differ in the levels of political development. The findings of this research on the uneven democratic performance in Peru contribute to this literature by revealing that within-country variation is also present in a unitary system of government.

On the methodological contributions this research relied on the use of the mixed methods approach to address the main questions. Whilst the quantitative analysis allowed me to pin down the main determinant of democratic state performance across Peruvian regions, the qualitative research and process tracing enabled me to address the causal mechanism that explained how the modernisation process shaped this performance. Thus, this research contributed to the literature on mix methods by enhancing the power of this approach that elucidates the complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative analysis. Furthermore, a novel approach was implemented that contributed to subnational theory. Most subnational research has focused on translating and testing concepts built at a national perspective to a subnational level. This research took this approach a step further and tested a subnationally built concept and theory on a lower subnational level by scaling-down even further. The democratic state performance concept, the regression analysis and the theory were tested at the regional and provincial level as well. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis were subject to this territorial robustness checks by continuously being tested on lower levels. The confirmatory factor analysis performed at the regional level for the democratic state performance was also performed at the provincial level, confirming that this concept was able to travel to different levels of government. The regression analysis that established that modernisation shaped the level of performance across

Peruvian regions was then scaled down at the provincial level as well and confirmed the results obtained at the regional level. And finally, process tracing on how modernisation unfolded in the regions of Moquegua and Huánuco was tested at the provincial level. Here, I showed how this process also occurred at this level where provinces that shifted their economic structures and had higher educational attainment showed better results in their democratic state performance. This territorial robustness check corroborated the main findings of this dissertation.

All research inevitably faces some limitations. A limitation faced by this research is an assumption made from the onset, where to address the quality of democracy I assume that those regions meet the minimum requirement baseline definition of democracy. However, in the regions the use of state power by the subnational officials can limit some of the civil and political liberties necessary for the citizen to fully engage in democratic practices. This was the case of Cesar Alvarez (Ancash) and Yvan Vasquez (Loreto). My democratic state performance concept was able to register this fluctuation (both regions reduced their quality of democracy during this period), although it could be expanded to include more subtleties on illiberal practices. Furthermore, I took the deliberative decision to address low- and high-performance regions across the years 2002-2018. This came at a cost to set aside the medium-performance regions for analysis. The experience of these regions certainly merits further research. This is the case of Amazonas, Ayacucho and Cusco, regions which improved their performance from low to medium. These regions saw a higher transition of the labour workforce from agricultural towards industrial/services. Cusco saw a spike in extractive economy, mostly gas and mining, that shifted the labour workforce of its economy between 2002-2018, augmenting the urbanisation speed in the region, and pushing the migration patterns from the countryside to the urban and peri-urban areas. Finally, this research uses the modernisation process undergone by the regions as the main explanatory factor of democratic state performance. Nonetheless, the research keeps open the question of why the modernisation process started in some regions. What were the factors that enabled this in Moquegua and not Huánuco? Were the determinants of modernisation national or local? Are there conditions of possibilities for modernisation process to start? This research studies the effect of modernisation as a given, but it does not dwell on the conditions that enabled this process to start, nor the speed of it.

7.2 Future research and policy implications

Further research should investigate how uneven state capacity opens the possibility for other actors to control territories without state presence. This is the case with illegal economies like drug trafficking, illegal mining, and illegal logging. The interaction between these economies, their control over the territory and their relations with the democratic state should be further studied. This research mentioned how in Huánuco (a low-performance region) there is presence of drug trafficking within its borders, and how this can be related to the absence of democratic state in those areas. This is in line with Giraudy and Luna's (2017) approach on territorial challengers of state presence. Thus, further research on this relationship and the dynamics between democratic state and illegal economies within the region should be explored. On a similar strand, fine-grained analysis on the organisational capacity of the state could have been considered. This is usually measured through the levels of professionalism of the civil service and the difference between a patrimonial and rational bureaucracy (Weber, 1978). This research focused more on the state's territorial reach and its capabilities to implement public policy, rather than on the quality per se of the subnational bureaucracy (organisational capacity as defined by Centeno et al. (2017)). As shown in this research, regions have high levels of party volatility, party system fragmentation and low levels of party consolidation (poor quality of democracy). Were political parties and their elected candidates the ones that appointed their staff, and could this affect the quality of the civil service? Or is the civil service quality hermetic to this scenario? Finally, further research on the enablers of the modernisation process at a subnational level should be explored.

A lesson learned from this study of policy implementation is that decentralisation reforms aimed at improving the livelihoods of citizens and bringing the government closer to the grievances and needs of the population are not implemented on a blank canvass. These have to be sensible to show existing differences between the regions. A one size fits all approach only exacerbates pre-existing inequalities and disparities. The reforms from 2002 were implemented under very different social contexts, and these shaped the democratic state performance of the regions. The Peruvian case exemplifies that decentralisation *per se* does not equally improve the well-being of its citizens. Regions with lower living standards continued to be below the national average. The devolution of power and responsibilities to subnational units, without acknowledging pre-conditions, has the risk to perpetuate unevenness across the territory.

Furthermore, formal institutions shape the subnational political arena. The creation of new political actors, regional parties, resulted unwillingly in a two-tier party system with a proliferation of subnational party systems, one for each region. Decentralisation is meant to foster democratic participation, practices and institutions at a subnational level (Fagueta, 2014; Falletti, 2010; Taylor, 2007). However, unplanned reforms can backfire, creating more instability and more fragmentation, impeding democratic governance. For the first time in Peruvian history, the regions had authority with decision-making powers over the development of each region as a whole. Under the umbrella of the regional government, the Regional Governor, and government instruments like the PDRC, the political development could have differed under the vision and ideas of the political parties in charge. The Peruvian experience reveals that party politics are unable to overcome structural factors already at play in the regions.

This dissertation has exposed that there are stark regional disparities within Peru that can augment the problems to govern an already complicated country to run. For the democratic state to survive some key reforms are needed. First, at the national level Congress should break its representation per region and make it into smaller electoral circumscriptions. This would avoid the subnational centralism that this study has shown. Second, a civil servant career has specific incentives to go to disadvantaged regions and local municipalities. Decentralisation came alone to the regions without a process of capacity building to those subnational bureaucrats. Incentives for the best cadres to go to these areas would be needed, since just the implementation of a career that does not take into account the disparities will only foster these further. As shown by Weitz-Shapiro (2008), capable bureaucrats that are able to use the resources efficiently and effectively improve local support for democracy. Third, there are focalised multisectoral interventions in the regions. In the past these type of interventions have focused only on the provision of specific public services. This is certainly recommendable but incomplete. This dissertation has shown that economic modernisation is a key variable that shapes the performance of the democratic state. Thus, these policies should be accompanied with economic interventions. Fourth, these should be region-specific. A blank canvas to be implemented equally across all regions would be unproductive. These interventions need to be region-specific in order to foster the best conditions in each region as well as attend to the specific grievances that each region has. Fifth, these would then be articulated in macro regional clusters to improve the linkages from local to regional, and then to the macroregional and national levels. Sixth, the alternation of candidates for the political party's candidates would be the best option to improve women's representation at a

subnational level. Seventh, for those regions with a lower electoral turnout, the electoral calendar should be extended. Currently, citizens can only vote in one specific day. However, for those areas that are more dispersed, extending the period of voting could improve their participation. Eight, specialised interventions to improve educational attainments and public education infrastructure in those regions that are still way below national average. Finally, although this is more on the utopian side of the spectrum, a full territorial state restructure with macro-regions should be considered. Peru has shown over the past decade clear voting territorial cleavages that are related to the specific grievances, values and the role of the state. If these cleavages are not attended to, barriers to a fully integrated nation may be created.

7.3 Final words

In this study I have attempted to understand uneven democratic state performance through a revised theory of modernisation at the subnational level. Most studies addressing subnational variation have focused on social capital, strength of civil society, identity politics, political culture, and inequality as the main explanatory variables. I hypothesise that the level of variation across Peruvian's regions over time can be traced to the economic structure of its workforce (economic modernisation) and the level of education of its population (social modernisation). Through a comparative historical analysis of Moquegua and Huánuco and a regression analysis of all Peruvian regions from 2002 until 2018, I have shown that the democratic state performance of the political-administrative units is shaped by the structure of its labour workforce (agricultural vs non-agricultural) and the level of educational attainment. When introducing fixed effects on region and years of observation, the results showed that economic modernisation has a stronger association (than social) when it is controlled by the region, whilst social modernisation has a stronger impact when it is controlled by year. This means that labour workforce better explains the variation when regions are compared between each other in specific points in time, whilst educational attainment gains more traction as an explanatory variable when the analysis is focus within the region itself over time. Finally, most studies on subnational politics have focused either on the study of quality of democracy or state capacity, and the majority have been on federal systems. This dissertation has endeavoured to exhibit the relevance of studying the interrelation of these two dimensions in a single case study on the unitary system of government of Peru.

This dissertation is rooted in the conviction that political science has to reclaim the study of quality of democracy and state capacity as interconnected dimensions. Democratic backsliding, in countries that had higher levels of democratic quality speaks to the fact that focusing only on democratic institutions has its limits which can be dangerous for democracy itself. The social conditions over which democracy stands cannot be overlooked. Inequality, poor living conditions, and areas without access to public services have an impact on how people perceive their relationship with the political system as a whole. Here is where state capacity intervenes. Studies in Peru, US, UK, or Europe have shown that those areas that have voted strongly for authoritarian types of parties and politicians are those that have been neglected and forgotten by the state. These are territories that are characterised by a present democracy and absent state. This opens the door for democratic backsliding. This can be more pressing in Latin America where these social conditions and poor living standards are the seed for insecurity and violence, and the expansion of illegal economies. As shown in Arévalo-Bencardino's study (2018), a low assessment of state capacity by the citizens is associated with low levels of support for democratic principles. This situation fosters the possibility of the emergence of would-be authoritarianism under a message of *mano dura* (firm hand) against crime. Paraphrasing Skocpol, this study has put forward the importance of bringing the state back in to democracy.

This dissertation starts with the question, where is democracy? Existing regional disparities and inequalities in Peru shows democracy is entwined with the state. Peru has a tense relationship with democracy that is accompanied with a state that is constantly being contested and has difficulties in enforcing its decisions. The legitimacy of the democratic state supports itself on quicksand. Nonetheless, despite the barriers and limitations faced by Peruvians in their everyday life, Peru has something in its favour: its belief that through a democratic state the full conquest of freedom will be possible.

Chapter 8: Epilogue – the impact of COVID19 in Peruvian regions

On 6 March 2020, the first confirmed case of COVID-19 was recorded in Lima, Perú. Almost two weeks after, with 234 confirmed cases, the first person to die from COVID19 would be a 78-year-old man (Cáceres-Bernaola et al., 2020). The pandemic would later claim the death of over 200 thousand people over the next two years. Did COVID19 affect all regions equally, or were its consequences felt differently in each region? Following the spirit of this dissertation, the subnational approach to this disease would show that its consequences have been unevenly spread across the regions. To address how COVID19 impacted Peruvian regions, I will focus on three dimensions: public health, economy and education.

As an infectious disease that spreads through an infected person's mouth or nose in small liquid particles (WHO), COVID19 can easily spread in highly concentrated areas. This would mean that urban areas would be more affected by this disease than rural ones. Based on the figures from the Peruvian regions, Graph N° 8.1 shows that there is a clear urban/rural divide on the effect of COVID19. This graph shows the total deaths from 2020 until 2022 as percentage of the population in each region and the level of urban population from each region. Overall, highly urban regions like Lima, Ica or Callao (above 90% urban) have seen more than one percent of their population die because of COVID19, whilst regions like Cajamarca, Amazonas or Huancavelica (below 40% urban) have seen around 0.3 of their population die. Other highly urban regions like Arequipa, Tacna or Tumbes (above 90%) did not suffer the same loss of population as the others, they and are closer to those around the 80% urbanity regions like Piura or Lambayeque. Furthermore, the Graph N° would suggest that a higher impact of COVID19 deaths is felt when a certain urban threshold is passed. Most of the regions that have lower than 70% of their population in urban areas have lost around 0.4 of their population. However, once this threshold is passed, the percentage of deaths rises sharply. This shows that in terms of deaths the urban areas have been hit harder by COVID19 than rural areas.


In order to avoid the spread of the virus and being infected by it, there was a migration from urban to rural areas. However, once the initial shock of COVID19 passed, the rural/urban divide in Peruvian regions became less prominent and the strength of the democratic state in each region became more relevant. Table N° shows the correlation between the total deaths from COVID19 with the urban population, democratic state performance (Year 2018), state capacity (Year 2018), and the COVID19

death isolated by year (2020, 2021 and 2022). Following the results from the correlation matrix, the urban population has a very strong association (0.87) with the overall deaths from COVID19. At the same time, the democratic state and its subdimension of state capacity has a strong association with it (0.67 and 0.60 respectively), albeit smaller than urban population. However, when considering the deaths by year, it shows that the rural/urban divide diminishes its strength whilst the democratic state and state capacity increases its positive association. Urban population decreased to a 0.61 correlation with COVID19 deaths in 2022, whilst democratic state and state capacity increased it to 0.71 and 0.78 respectively. This would mean that once the pandemic settled in Peruvian regions and the initial shock has passed, the institutional scaffolding had a higher relevance. The disease becomes a “normal” public health issue in which the quality of the democratic state plays a prominent role in providing public services needed to reduce any risks of its population within a region. This can be related to the pace of vaccinations in each region with the territorial reach of the state itself, trust in political institutions to get vaccinated, commitment of public authorities with the COVID19 implications,⁵⁶ among others. Further research on this topic could shed light on this variance.

The effects of COVID19 can also be seen in the economy. Here, as with the health implications, the effects were differently felt by the regions. Peruvian GDP as a whole shrunk by 11 points in 2020. This is, however, the average across all regions. Two regions that suffered the most in terms of GDP were Madre de Dios and Pasco, with a reduction of 24.2 and 18.5 respectively. The Pasco region has, however, shown resilience and in 2021 was able to grow by 18.6. This resilience was not shared with Madre de Dios, which only grew by 7.9 in 2021. As shown in Table N°, the only region that grew in 2020 was Moquegua. This was mostly due to the ongoing mining production of Quellaveco. Although it slowed its copper production, it did not fully stop their activities during this year. It would continue to grow in 2021. Other mining regions like Ancash and Cajamarca have been able to recover after the initial hit from COVID19 in 2020. Both shrunk in 6.4 and 10.1 points respectively in 2020, and grew 13.4 and 11.1 the next year. Ica is the region that has been to recover the fastest in this period, passing from a reduction of 11.6 in 2020 to an expansion of 24.5 in 2021. Borrowing from the psychology literature, Ica seems to have a resilience 2.0 or an antifragility economy. Not only is it able to bounce back to its previous shape but actually grows and expands beyond its previous state.

⁵⁶ Public authorities at a local level started to promote the use of dioxide as a cure for COVID19, whilst at a national level mistrust on specific type of vaccines was promoted in the media.

Graph N° 8.1.- COVID19 deaths in Peruvian regions




Source: Plataforma Nacional de Datos Abiertos – MINSA. COVID19 deaths 2020-2022// Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

On the education dimension, the consequences of the pandemic have been felt differently by the regions as well. Whilst there was an overall school desertion and attendance (245,152 in 2020 and 124,533 in 2021 students interrupted their studies), the rural areas saw an uprising on school enrollment. Peru’s approach to COVID19 was to declare a nationwide Sanitary State of Emergency for 90 days (Decreto Supremo N°008-2020-SA) in which most public spaces were closed off.⁵⁷ The Ministry of Education had to establish public education guidelines to continue to provide educational services using virtual means (TV, radio, or internet using tablets or laptops). The “*Aprendo en casa*” (Learning from home) strategy was implemented and was based on providing classes via TV, radio or tablets. This strategy favoured regions with higher state territorial reach, whilst neglecting those where a majority of the households did not have any IT equipment or electricity in their homes. In terms of access to internet, Peru (49% households) has one of the lowest in comparison to its Latin America

⁵⁷ This state of emergency was extended in future Supreme Decrees.

peers (67% region average) (UNDP, 2022). However, this disparity grows even starker when looking into the within-nation variation in Peru. In regions like Moquegua, Tacna, Callao, Lima, or Arequipa more than 50% of the households had access to internet in 2020, whilst Cusco, Huancavelica, Cajamarca, or Ayacucho this figure was not more than 15% (ENAHO, 2020). According to the Ombudsman report, around 581,199 students did not have any IT equipment (Defensoría, 2022).⁵⁸ The same disparity can be found when addressing households with a TV or radio. Regions with a high-performance democratic state were better equipped to handle the educational shift towards non-presential classes as a consequence of the pandemic, than those low-performing ones.

Graph N° 8.2.- COVID19 deaths correlation matrix



Source: Plataforma Nacional de Datos Abiertos – MINSA. COVID19 deaths 2020-2022. ENAHO 2018, Infogob 2018

// Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

⁵⁸ The Ministry of Education decided to buy tablets and deliver them to the public schools to reduce this gap. The delivery of these started on January 2021, and it has continued in 2022.

Despite this strategy, there was still desertion and school enrolment fall in overall terms. However, a closer look in school enrolment shows two stories. Whilst urban school enrolment fell by 10% in 2020 and 2021, the rural school enrolment grew by 60% (Graph). As previously seen, as part of the modernisation process a lot of people migrated towards urban areas. The pandemic created a reverse migration towards the rural areas. Urban centers were hit harder when the pandemic started, and this is being picked up by rural school enrolment. This reversal is a consequence of the pandemic, since from 2011 onwards rural school enrolment had been declining and had plateaued in the last few years. On the other hand, urban school enrolment had been steadily growing until the pandemic hit Peru. Regions like Amazonas, Ancash, Cusco, Huánuco, La Libertad or Puno saw an increase between 2019 and 2020 of over 65% in rural school enrolment (Table N°). This increase in rural school enrolment as a consequence of COVID19 should be taken with caution. Most rural schools in Peru lack some of the basic public services (electricity, potable water, etc.), are far away from the homes, teachers work under poor conditions and have higher absence from their classrooms, experience delays with the reception of educational materials, and are characterised by being multi-grade schools. These type of schools are very common in rural areas of Peru and have been characterised by poor quality issues and unequal education. Furthermore, once classes were open again, schools struggled to be fully operative with the measures needed, and thus, students experienced delays in their return to classes. The Ombudsman's report in Huánuco showed that 190 public schools were in poor conditions and even uninhabitable, putting the safety of the students at risk (Defensoria, 2022). How these consequences on public education will affect the specific educational quality, like reading comprehension or math problem solving, remains to be seen. However, from these figures it seems clear that the pre-pandemic regional disparities might have been widened as a result.


Table N° 8.1.- COVID19 impact on GDP and school enrolment in Peruvian regions

Regions	GDP		Rural school enrolment*			Urban school enrolment*		
	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021
Amazonas	-4.3	3.3	67.3	99.2	102.2	78.1	47.6	48.9
Ancash	-6.4	13.4	68.0	111.7	113.4	253.1	211.8	211.5
Apurimac	-10.1	2.1	35.3	64.5	65.9	98.6	73.0	72.1
Arequipa	-15.7	12.9	10.8	35.6	37.0	379.3	348.1	353.9
Ayacucho	-13.0	10.8	44.7	81.3	84.3	158.8	124.9	124.0
Cajamarca	-10.1	11.1	167.7	255.6	258.5	272.8	184.9	190.1
Callao	-16.0	17.7	---	---	---	262.6	269.8	266.6
Cusco	-12.4	6.4	87.5	141.2	142.7	307.6	265.4	250.6
Huancavelica	-6.9	6.1	44.8	80.3	81.9	74.0	41.7	41.4
Huanuco	-11.0	9.3	71.0	116.9	122.2	165.6	124.1	124.3
Ica	-11.6	24.5	7.8	18.5	20.0	256.4	248.6	248.2
Junin	-9.5	14.9	58.6	98.2	102.1	318.6	292.2	289.4
La Libertad	-6.2	10.2	87.4	135.1	138.5	446.8	406.9	403.3
Lambayeque	-6.3	15.1	35.6	60.7	63.5	315.0	296.3	300.0
Lima	-8.8	11.4	23.6	54.8	57.6	2702.1	2624.7	2612.9
Loreto	-13.9	10.5	113.5	156.3	161.3	274.4	229.6	235.4
Madre de Dios	-24.2	7.9	8.0	15.4	16.8	47.1	42.8	43.2
Moquegua	2.0	5.0	2.7	7.9	8.1	47.8	45.2	44.2
Pasco	-18.5	18.6	23.3	37.0	38.3	58.4	48.3	49.4
Piura	-9.4	11.6	88.0	153.5	155.4	497.4	438.3	446.4
Puno	-11.2	11.4	67.1	111.2	112.0	259.3	213.9	215.4
San Martin	-3.6	7.6	64.8	118.8	123.2	216.9	163.7	167.0
Tacna	-2.7	4.1	3.6	8.8	8.9	91.0	85.9	85.8
Tumbes	-13.7	9.0	2.9	9.5	10.2	75.3	71.1	71.4
Ucayali	-13.0	13.6	42.3	51.2	55.4	155.6	155.8	155.4

Source: ENAHO 2019-2021, INEI, Ministry of Education // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

*Figures in thousands of students

Graph N° 8.3.- Urban and rural school enrolment in Peru, 2011-2021



Source: ENAHO 2019-2021, INEI, Ministry of Education // Elaboration: Manuel Seifert

At a national political level, the pandemic hit Peru in the midst of a continuously escalating political tension between the legislative and executive powers. Martin Vizcarra, elected as Vice President in 2016, became President after Pedro Pablo Kuczynski resigned in March 2018. He would be later impeached by the Congress in November 2020. The President of the Congress at the time, Manuel Merino, would fill Vizcarra’s position, triggering massive protests at a national level. Two people would die as a result in the clash between civilians and armed forces, Merino would step down, and Francisco Sagasti would become the President until the 2021 National Elections. The Vizcarra impeachment would be the end of the Executive-Congress relationship. Since 2016, Congress had ongoing clashes with the Executive Power. The former was mostly composed by Fuerza Popular (73 out of 130 seats) whose leader, Keiko Fujimori, lost in the second round against Kuczynski. During this period, Fuerza Popular pushed the limits of congressional work to restrain the executive role and establish the Congress as the first power of the Peruvian state. Fujimori itself, in a message on 28 July 2016, said that Fuerza Popular was going to “*convertir las propuestas de nuestro plan de gobierno en leyes*” (convert our political party manifesto proposals in laws) (Fujimori, 2021). Even though there is no

constitutional hierarchy between state powers, Fuerza Popular pushed forward the idea that the Congress (under their control) was the main political power representing all views, and thus, the true sovereign. In public appearances, Fuerza Popular members started to repeat the political message that *el Congreso es el primer poder del Estado* (the Congress is the first state power).⁵⁹ This would later trickle down to the other parties in the Congress.⁶⁰ Despite being used by Fuerza Popular as a way to restrain the Executive and control the overall direction of government, this misconception has surpassed this intention and has now crystallised the ongoing clash between Congress and Executive. The new members of parliament of the 2021-2026 cohort have (willfully) continued to express this misconception of the Congress role, as well as political analysts in the media.⁶¹ This perpetual conflict between both powers creates political instability (six Presidents in six years), puts the current Peruvian political system under pressure, and only a reshaping of the rules between Congress and Executive will solve this deadlock. Within this political turmoil, the COVID19 pandemic tested even further the whole political system.

In sum, COVID19 had an uneven impact on the Peruvian regions. On public health, the overall count of deaths shows that it unequivocally hit stronger the most urban regions. Regions like Lima, Ica or Callao saw more than 1% of its population die from COVID19. However, once the disease moved from a pandemic shock towards a more endemic type of disease as the years passed, the rural/urban divide decreased its association with COVID19 deaths. The strength of the democratic state and its capacity became a more relevant factor, exhibiting that the underlying quality of the subnational political institutions shaped public health outcomes. The impact on economy was also uneven across the regions. Some regions showed resilience and have been able to bounce back (Ica, Ancash, Lambayeque), while others continued to grow despite the pandemic (Moquegua), or are still trying to

⁵⁹ In a famous public intervention, Daniel Salaverry, spokesperson of Fuerza Popular, would suggest and recommend the President Kuczynski to have “*más respeto con el primer poder del Estado*” when referring to Congress (Salaverry, 2016). This would later be contested by De Belaunde (Peruanos por el Cambio) stating that there is no first power in the Peruvian Constitution (de Belaunde, 2016). Other members like Karina Beteta, Luis Galarreta, Pedro Spadarrow, among others, would continue with this political message.

⁶⁰Members of Parliament, Justiniano Apaza (Democracia Directa) and Martin Belaunde (Solidaridad Nacional) would express the role of the Congress as *el primer poder del Estado*.

⁶¹ Maria del Carmen Alva, President of the Congress, mentioned in a press conference in October 2021 that “*El Congreso es el primer poder del Estado*” (Alva, 2021). Lady Camones, First Vice President of the Congress, also mentioned on her Twitter account that “*desde el primer Poder del Estado ...*” (Camones, 2022). Members of Parliament like Jorge Montoya and Norma Yarrow have also expressed this exact line (Montoya, 2022; Yarrow, 2022); whilst others like Alejandro Cavero have indirectly mentioned that the Congress is the main political power by saying that it unites all political forces (Cavero, 2021). In the media, Jaime de Althaus, political analyst and former TV anchor, has expressed this misconception as well (de Althaus, 2022).

recover (Madre de Dios, Tumbes, Cusco). Finally, the impact on education shows that those regions with higher democratic state performance will be better off widening the gap between those low-performing regions. The *Aprendo en Casa* strategy was less favourable for the latter, since it required infrastructure and equipment that was less available in households. Further, even though the overall school enrolment fell during the pandemic, it greatly expanded in rural public schools. However, the conditions in these schools are suboptimal (e.g. Ombudman's report on Huánuco) and, thus, the overall educational quality still remains to be seen.

Annex 1

Abbreviations

REGION	ABREVIATION
Amazonas	AMA
Ancash	ANC
Apurimac	APU
Arequipa	ARE
Ayacucho	AYA
Cajamarca	CAJ
Callao	CAL
Cusco	CUS
Huancavelica	HVL
Huánuco	HUA
Ica	ICA
Junín	JUN
La Libertad	LIB
Lambayeque	LAM
Lima	LIM
Loreto	LOR
Madre De Dios	MAD
Moquegua	MOQ
Pasco	PAS
Piura	PIU
Puno	PUN
San Martin	SMA
Tacna	TAC
Tumbes	TUM
Ucayali	UCA

Annex 2

Peruvian map



Annex 3

Quantitative analysis

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

lavaan 0.6-11 ended normally after 49 iterations

Estimator	ML
Optimization method	NLMINB
Number of model parameters	13

Number of observations	225
------------------------	-----

Model Test User Model:

Test statistic	11.390
Degrees of freedom	8
P-value (Chi-square)	0.181

Model Test Baseline Model:

Test statistic	341.624
Degrees of freedom	15
P-value	0.000

User Model versus Baseline Model:

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.990
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.981

Loglikelihood and Information Criteria:

Loglikelihood user model (H0)	-16.160
Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)	-10.465
Akaike (AIC)	58.320
Bayesian (BIC)	102.729
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)	61.529

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:

RMSEA	0.043
90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.000
90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.096
P-value RMSEA \leq 0.05	0.519

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual:

SRMR 0.039

Parameter Estimates:

Standard errors	Standard
Information	Expected
Information saturated (h1) model	Structured

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.235	0.016	15.137	0.000	0.235	0.888
Sanitation	0.218	0.018	11.976	0.000	0.218	0.735
Bureaucracy	0.042	0.018	2.320	0.020	0.042	0.165
f2 =~						
Participation	0.220	0.021	10.506	0.000	0.220	0.757
Representation	0.141	0.020	7.004	0.000	0.141	0.483
NEP	-0.007	0.019	-0.361	0.718	-0.007	-0.026

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	1.007	0.063	15.895	0.000	1.007	1.007

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.015	0.004	4.009	0.000	0.015	0.211
.Sanitation	0.041	0.005	8.388	0.000	0.041	0.460
.Bureaucracy	0.064	0.006	10.562	0.000	0.064	0.973
.Participation	0.036	0.007	5.382	0.000	0.036	0.426
.Representation	0.066	0.007	9.903	0.000	0.066	0.767
.NEP	0.069	0.006	10.606	0.000	0.069	0.999
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Bifactor model

lavaan 0.6-11 ended normally after 73 iterations

Estimator	ML
Optimization method	NLMINB
Number of model parameters	18

Number of observations	225
------------------------	-----

Model Test User Model:

Test statistic	3.726
Degrees of freedom	3
P-value (Chi-square)	0.293

Model Test Baseline Model:

Test statistic	341.624
Degrees of freedom	15
P-value	0.000

User Model versus Baseline Model:

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.998
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.989

Loglikelihood and Information Criteria:

Loglikelihood user model (H0)	-12.328
Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)	-10.465
Akaike (AIC)	60.656
Bayesian (BIC)	122.146
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)	65.100

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:

RMSEA	0.033
90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.000
90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.122
P-value RMSEA \leq 0.05	0.515

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual:

SRMR	0.024
------	-------

Parameter Estimates:

Standard errors
Information
Observed information based on

Standard
Observed
Hessian

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
DemState =~						
Electrification	0.163	12.197	0.013	0.989	0.163	0.614
Sanitation	0.151	11.311	0.013	0.989	0.151	0.507
Bureaucracy	0.036	2.664	0.013	0.989	0.036	0.139
Participation	0.320	23.999	0.013	0.989	0.320	1.100
Representation	0.208	15.612	0.013	0.989	0.208	0.711
NEP	-0.002	0.142	-0.013	0.990	-0.002	-0.007
Statecapacity =~						
Electrification	0.162	13.001	0.012	0.990	0.162	0.613
Sanitation	0.166	9.361	0.018	0.986	0.166	0.558
Bureaucracy	0.021	3.649	0.006	0.995	0.021	0.082
QoD =~						
Participation	-0.199	25.846	-0.008	0.994	-0.199	-0.683
Representation	0.179	26.966	0.007	0.995	0.179	0.611
NEP	0.038	5.338	0.007	0.994	0.038	0.143


Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
DemState ~~						
Statecapacity	0.000				0.000	0.000
QoD	0.000				0.000	0.000
Statecapacity ~~						
QoD	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.017	0.255	0.068	0.946	0.017	0.246
.Sanitation	0.038	0.304	0.126	0.900	0.038	0.431
.Bureaucracy	0.064	0.036	1.777	0.076	0.064	0.974
.Participation	-0.057	25.625	-0.002	0.998	-0.057	-0.676
.Representation	0.010	16.152	0.001	0.999	0.010	0.121
.NEP	0.067	0.401	0.168	0.867	0.067	0.979
DemState	1.000				1.000	1.000
Statecapacity	1.000				1.000	1.000
QoD	1.000				1.000	1.000

Bifactor model of democratic state performance



DmS: Democratic state (common factor),
Stt: State capacity (sub-dimension),
QoD: Quality of democracy (sub-dimension).
Elc: Electrification,
Snt: Sanitation,
X41: Bureaucrats,
Prt: Participation,
Rpr: Representation,
X16: Effective number of parties.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis grouping per year

lavaan 0.6-11 ended normally after 210 iterations

Estimator	ML
Optimization method	NLMINB
Number of model parameters	171

Number of observations per group:

2002	25
2006	25
2007	25
2008	25
2009	25
2010	25
2014	25
2017	25
2018	25

Model Test User Model:

Test statistic	59.424
Degrees of freedom	72
P-value (Chi-square)	0.855

Test statistic for each group:

2005	7.092
2006	6.859
2007	6.632
2008	6.044
2009	7.619
2010	9.774
2014	8.204
2017	3.600
2018	3.600

Model Test Baseline Model:

Test statistic	454.427
Degrees of freedom	135
P-value	0.000

User Model versus Baseline Model:

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	1.000
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	1.074

Loglikelihood and Information Criteria:

Loglikelihood user model (H0)	51.441
Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)	81.152
Akaike (AIC)	239.119
Bayesian (BIC)	823.272
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)	281.338

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:

RMSEA	0.000
90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.000
90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.066
P-value RMSEA <= 0.05	0.919

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual:

SRMR	0.066
------	-------

Parameter Estimates:

Standard errors	Standard
Information	Expected
Information saturated (h1) model	Structured

Group 1 [2005]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.289	0.049	5.939	0.000	0.289	1.028
Sanitation	0.170	0.051	3.305	0.001	0.170	0.629
Bureaucracy	0.042	0.048	0.869	0.385	0.042	0.168
f2 =~						
Participation	0.195	0.063	3.099	0.002	0.195	0.631
Representation	0.177	0.062	2.851	0.004	0.177	0.579
NEP	0.048	0.045	1.059	0.289	0.048	0.207

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	1.000	0.191	5.249	0.000	1.000	1.000

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.558	0.056	9.923	0.000	0.558	1.985
.Sanitation	0.595	0.054	11.013	0.000	0.595	2.203
.Bureaucracy	0.197	0.050	3.953	0.000	0.197	0.791

.Participation	0.477	0.062	7.723	0.000	0.477	1.545
.Representation	0.471	0.061	7.694	0.000	0.471	1.539
.NEP	0.417	0.046	9.034	0.000	0.417	1.807
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	-0.005	0.017	-0.264	0.791	-0.005	-0.058
.Sanitation	0.044	0.014	3.199	0.001	0.044	0.605
.Bureaucracy	0.060	0.017	3.541	0.000	0.060	0.972
.Participation	0.057	0.020	2.867	0.004	0.057	0.601
.Representation	0.062	0.020	3.102	0.002	0.062	0.665
.NEP	0.051	0.014	3.540	0.000	0.051	0.957
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 2 [2006]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.261	0.048	5.422	0.000	0.261	0.974
Sanitation	0.176	0.052	3.411	0.001	0.176	0.652
Bureaucracy	0.050	0.051	0.984	0.325	0.050	0.200
f2 =~						
Participation	0.163	0.066	2.486	0.013	0.163	0.539
Representation	0.135	0.063	2.128	0.033	0.135	0.446
NEP	0.077	0.046	1.683	0.092	0.077	0.337

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	1.106	0.266	4.162	0.000	1.106	1.106

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.557	0.054	10.381	0.000	0.557	2.076
.Sanitation	0.595	0.054	11.013	0.000	0.595	2.203
.Bureaucracy	0.197	0.050	3.953	0.000	0.197	0.791
.Participation	0.478	0.061	7.876	0.000	0.478	1.575
.Representation	0.452	0.061	7.451	0.000	0.452	1.490
.NEP	0.535	0.046	11.673	0.000	0.535	2.335
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.004	0.015	0.252	0.801	0.004	0.052
.Sanitation	0.042	0.014	3.068	0.002	0.042	0.574
.Bureaucracy	0.059	0.017	3.527	0.000	0.059	0.960
.Participation	0.065	0.022	3.024	0.002	0.065	0.710
.Representation	0.074	0.022	3.338	0.001	0.074	0.801
.NEP	0.047	0.013	3.506	0.000	0.047	0.886
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 3 [2007]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.265	0.043	6.172	0.000	0.265	0.991
Sanitation	0.245	0.055	4.452	0.000	0.245	0.785
Bureaucracy	0.061	0.055	1.099	0.272	0.061	0.220
f2 =~						
Participation	0.189	0.064	2.964	0.003	0.189	0.624
Representation	0.163	0.063	2.588	0.010	0.163	0.539
NEP	0.058	0.047	1.235	0.217	0.058	0.251

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	0.997	0.189	5.268	0.000	0.997	0.997

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.582	0.053	10.886	0.000	0.582	2.177
.Sanitation	0.517	0.062	8.301	0.000	0.517	1.660
.Bureaucracy	0.231	0.055	4.178	0.000	0.231	0.836
.Participation	0.478	0.061	7.876	0.000	0.478	1.575
.Representation	0.452	0.061	7.451	0.000	0.452	1.490
.NEP	0.535	0.046	11.673	0.000	0.535	2.335
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.001	0.010	0.120	0.904	0.001	0.018
.Sanitation	0.037	0.014	2.700	0.007	0.037	0.384
.Bureaucracy	0.073	0.021	3.531	0.000	0.073	0.952
.Participation	0.056	0.020	2.764	0.006	0.056	0.610
.Representation	0.065	0.021	3.147	0.002	0.065	0.710
.NEP	0.049	0.014	3.519	0.000	0.049	0.937

f1	1.000			1.000	1.000
f2	1.000			1.000	1.000

Group 4 [2008]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.240	0.041	5.837	0.000	0.240	0.970
Sanitation	0.236	0.056	4.194	0.000	0.236	0.756
Bureaucracy	0.058	0.056	1.039	0.299	0.058	0.211
f2 =~						
Participation	0.198	0.063	3.131	0.002	0.198	0.652
Representation	0.172	0.063	2.742	0.006	0.172	0.566
NEP	0.046	0.047	0.971	0.332	0.046	0.201

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	0.989	0.179	5.521	0.000	0.989	0.989

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.616	0.049	12.473	0.000	0.616	2.495
.Sanitation	0.517	0.062	8.301	0.000	0.517	1.660
.Bureaucracy	0.224	0.055	4.094	0.000	0.224	0.819
.Participation	0.478	0.061	7.876	0.000	0.478	1.575
.Representation	0.452	0.061	7.451	0.000	0.452	1.490
.NEP	0.535	0.046	11.673	0.000	0.535	2.335
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000			0.000	0.000	

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.004	0.010	0.378	0.705	0.004	0.059
.Sanitation	0.042	0.015	2.783	0.005	0.042	0.428
.Bureaucracy	0.072	0.020	3.526	0.000	0.072	0.955
.Participation	0.053	0.020	2.661	0.008	0.053	0.575
.Representation	0.062	0.020	3.084	0.002	0.062	0.679
.NEP	0.050	0.014	3.522	0.000	0.050	0.960
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 5 [2009]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.205	0.044	4.695	0.000	0.205	0.821
Sanitation	0.271	0.054	5.013	0.000	0.271	0.862
Bureaucracy	0.033	0.054	0.614	0.539	0.033	0.131
f2 =~						
Participation	0.211	0.058	3.616	0.000	0.211	0.696
Representation	0.202	0.053	3.823	0.000	0.202	0.733
NEP	-0.007	0.054	-0.129	0.898	-0.007	-0.028

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	0.983	0.124	7.916	0.000	0.983	0.983

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.645	0.050	12.897	0.000	0.645	2.579
.Sanitation	0.537	0.063	8.548	0.000	0.537	1.710
.Bureaucracy	0.211	0.051	4.142	0.000	0.211	0.828
.Participation	0.525	0.061	8.650	0.000	0.525	1.730
.Representation	0.524	0.055	9.522	0.000	0.524	1.904
.NEP	0.569	0.050	11.395	0.000	0.569	2.279
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.020	0.009	2.340	0.019	0.020	0.326
.Sanitation	0.025	0.013	1.885	0.059	0.025	0.257
.Bureaucracy	0.064	0.018	3.527	0.000	0.064	0.983
.Participation	0.047	0.017	2.785	0.005	0.047	0.516
.Representation	0.035	0.014	2.545	0.011	0.035	0.463
.NEP	0.062	0.018	3.535	0.000	0.062	0.999
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 6 [2010]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.230	0.045	5.107	0.000	0.230	0.856
Sanitation	0.246	0.048	5.107	0.000	0.246	0.856
Bureaucracy	0.038	0.050	0.752	0.452	0.038	0.158

f2 =~						
Participation	0.217	0.057	3.826	0.000	0.217	0.717
Representation	0.196	0.052	3.800	0.000	0.196	0.712
NEP	-0.008	0.051	-0.153	0.878	-0.008	-0.031

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	1.052	0.113	9.333	0.000	1.052	1.052

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.598	0.054	11.110	0.000	0.598	2.222
.Sanitation	0.554	0.057	9.631	0.000	0.554	1.926
.Bureaucracy	0.194	0.048	4.036	0.000	0.194	0.807
.Participation	0.525	0.061	8.650	0.000	0.525	1.730
.Representation	0.524	0.055	9.522	0.000	0.524	1.904
.NEP	0.569	0.050	11.395	0.000	0.569	2.279
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.019	0.008	2.277	0.023	0.019	0.267
.Sanitation	0.022	0.010	2.277	0.023	0.022	0.267
.Bureaucracy	0.056	0.016	3.525	0.000	0.056	0.975
.Participation	0.045	0.016	2.809	0.005	0.045	0.486
.Representation	0.037	0.013	2.834	0.005	0.037	0.492
.NEP	0.062	0.018	3.535	0.000	0.062	0.999
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 7 [2014]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.257	0.051	5.081	0.000	0.257	0.900
Sanitation	0.172	0.048	3.562	0.000	0.172	0.669
Bureaucracy	0.018	0.050	0.367	0.713	0.018	0.078
f2 =~						
Participation	-0.214	0.060	-3.594	0.000	-0.214	-0.849
Representation	0.021	0.058	0.360	0.719	0.021	0.077
NEP	0.098	0.056	1.758	0.079	0.098	0.365

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
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f1 ~~						
f2	-0.972	0.214	-4.547	0.000	-0.972	-0.972

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.607	0.057	10.627	0.000	0.607	2.125
.Sanitation	0.743	0.051	14.464	0.000	0.743	2.893
.Bureaucracy	0.212	0.047	4.526	0.000	0.212	0.905
.Participation	0.586	0.050	11.606	0.000	0.586	2.321
.Representation	0.471	0.054	8.723	0.000	0.471	1.745
.NEP	0.527	0.054	9.826	0.000	0.527	1.965
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.016	0.014	1.147	0.251	0.016	0.190
.Sanitation	0.036	0.012	3.091	0.002	0.036	0.553
.Bureaucracy	0.055	0.015	3.533	0.000	0.055	0.994
.Participation	0.018	0.019	0.913	0.361	0.018	0.279
.Representation	0.072	0.021	3.532	0.000	0.072	0.994
.NEP	0.062	0.018	3.448	0.001	0.062	0.867
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 8 [2017]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.239	0.039	6.151	0.000	0.239	0.978
Sanitation	0.162	0.044	3.697	0.000	0.162	0.672
Bureaucracy	-0.004	0.052	-0.086	0.932	-0.004	-0.017
f2 =~						
Participation	0.186	0.050	3.695	0.000	0.186	0.769
Representation	0.091	0.056	1.617	0.106	0.091	0.314
NEP	-0.085	0.059	-1.442	0.149	-0.085	-0.276

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~						
f2	1.105	0.195	5.672	0.000	1.105	1.105

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.647	0.049	13.229	0.000	0.647	2.646
.Sanitation	0.768	0.048	15.962	0.000	0.768	3.192

.Bureaucracy	0.240	0.052	4.664	0.000	0.240	0.933
.Participation	0.607	0.048	12.585	0.000	0.607	2.517
.Representation	0.534	0.058	9.264	0.000	0.534	1.853
.NEP	0.582	0.062	9.408	0.000	0.582	1.882
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.003	0.008	0.340	0.734	0.003	0.044
.Sanitation	0.032	0.010	3.289	0.001	0.032	0.548
.Bureaucracy	0.066	0.019	3.535	0.000	0.066	1.000
.Participation	0.024	0.013	1.839	0.066	0.024	0.408
.Representation	0.075	0.021	3.538	0.000	0.075	0.901
.NEP	0.088	0.025	3.550	0.000	0.088	0.924
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Group 9 [2018]:

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 =~						
Electrification	0.239	0.039	6.151	0.000	0.239	0.978
Sanitation	0.162	0.044	3.697	0.000	0.162	0.672
Bureaucracy	-0.004	0.052	-0.086	0.932	-0.004	-0.017
f2 =~						
Participation	0.186	0.050	3.695	0.000	0.186	0.769
Representation	0.091	0.056	1.617	0.106	0.091	0.314
NEP	-0.085	0.059	-1.442	0.149	-0.085	-0.276

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
f1 ~~~						
f2	1.105	0.195	5.672	0.000	1.105	1.105

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.647	0.049	13.229	0.000	0.647	2.646
.Sanitation	0.768	0.048	15.962	0.000	0.768	3.192
.Bureaucracy	0.240	0.052	4.664	0.000	0.240	0.933
.Participation	0.607	0.048	12.585	0.000	0.607	2.517
.Representation	0.534	0.058	9.264	0.000	0.534	1.853
.NEP	0.582	0.062	9.408	0.000	0.582	1.882
f1	0.000				0.000	0.000
f2	0.000				0.000	0.000

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Electrification	0.003	0.008	0.340	0.734	0.003	0.044
.Sanitation	0.032	0.010	3.289	0.001	0.032	0.548
.Bureaucracy	0.066	0.019	3.535	0.000	0.066	1.000
.Participation	0.024	0.013	1.839	0.066	0.024	0.408
.Representation	0.075	0.021	3.538	0.000	0.075	0.901
.NEP	0.088	0.025	3.550	0.000	0.088	0.924
f1	1.000				1.000	1.000
f2	1.000				1.000	1.000

Variance Inflation factor results:

	GVIF	Df	GVIF ^{1/(2*Df)}
Economic modernisation	3.545385	1	1.882919
Social modernisation	1.813953	1	1.346831
Social Capital	1.862617	1	1.364777
Subnationalism	1.619126	1	1.272449
Political culture	1.855782	1	1.362271
Inequality	2.011529	1	1.418284
factor(Year)	1.179646	4	1.027918

	GVIF	Df	GVIF ^{1/(2*Df)}
Economic modernisation	3.741595e+01	1	6.116858
Social modernisation	1.385522e+02	1	11.770819
Social Capital	4.408898e+00	1	2.099738
Subnationalism	3.745779e+00	1	1.935402
Political culture	4.696038e+00	1	2.167034
Inequality	1.149479e+02	1	10.721376
factor(Dep)	2.218099e+05	24	1.292334

	GVIF	Df	GVIF ^{1/(2*Df)}
Economic modernisation	6.132326	1	2.476353
Social modernisation	1.850918	1	1.360484
GDP	3.628011	1	1.904734
Formal economy	7.107950	1	2.666074
Life expectancy	4.456329	1	2.111002
Poverty	3.974789	1	1.993687
factor(Year)	3.092969	3	1.207061

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