**Afterword: Alderney, The Channel Islands, and the Study of History[[1]](#footnote-1)**

‘On its own, the history of these communities or island republics is of only modest, local interest, whilst its significance expands and takes on a brilliant radiance under the bright light of the histories of France and of England’.[[2]](#footnote-2) So claimed the French writer and intellectual, Eugène Pégot-Ogier, who was among Victor Hugo’s circle during his exile on the Channel Islands, in his lengthy *Histoire des isles de la Manche* of 1881. As if to confirm the truth of this observation, the contributors to the present volume have directed the spotlight of international history onto the islands and uncovered the richness of their history as it played out on the stage of centuries of nearly permanent Anglo-French rivalry. Yet, by portraying the islands as the passive objects of insight and meaning in this way, Pégot-Ogier arguably underestimated the value of the history of his temporary home. Situated between the two states, not just geographically but politically, economically, and culturally, the islands are more than just supporting actors to be brought out of the shadows. They cast a certain light of their own into previously unseen corners of the stage. Paradoxically, perhaps, it is precisely because they defy easy categorisation and seem to stand aloof from familiar political trends that the history of the Channel Islands can be employed to illuminate that of their more powerful neighbours. Indeed, the very smallness, isolation, and exceptional nature of the islands, which has traditionally shielded them from the critical gaze of historians, can be usefully held up like a conceptual mirror to put even some of our most cherished expectations and common assumptions about international history to greater scrutiny. It seems certain, therefore, that the academic interest in the history of these beguiling islands which has been sparked by this volume of essays will continue to grow in the future, shaping our understanding, not only of the naval and political relations of France and Britain, but of the nature of the very international system in which they operated.

War is the common theme that runs throughout the entire history of these islands. This is best illustrated by the naval history offered here by Colin Partridge. The focus on Alderney, in particular, and the key role of its harbour, however, not only uncovers an essential feature of this military competition. It demonstrates the value to historians of distinguishing between the islands and of digging into their individual circumstances and particularities. At the same time, however, Jean de Préneuf reminds us that the study of war in and around the Channel Islands is also the study of global war, for the Anglo-French rivalry that unfolded there was, of course, what largely drove naval warfare globally. He demonstrates how Alderney’s proximity and its threatening influence on the key Channel port of Cherbourg makes it an ideal vantage point from which to evaluate the evolution of French strategic priorities. A largely defensive posture, traditionally pursued through dissuasion, was adopted by France in the Channel in order to protect the autonomy of its navy and create the freedom to confront threats or to pursue interests elsewhere. Eventually, de Preneuf reminds us, by the years leading up to the First World War, this same need took the form of a difficult cooperation with Britain. In this way, he demonstrates how a focus on the French preoccupation with the islands can help to reveal the broad contours of this evolving, national strategic outlook.

As Andrew Lambert has described it elsewhere, French interest in the islands had always been ‘negative’ like this. In contrast, he provides a study of British strategy in the nineteenth century that was more purposeful. For Britain, defence of the islands and of Alderney, in particular, was needed in the age of steam to maintain an offensive footing and control of the Channel in the event of war. Other ‘harbours of refuge’ were part of the same strategic ambition. Despite whatever else can be said about the need to provide protection for civilian shipping, William Allsop’s detailed study of the sheer magnitude, cost, and complexity of these port works and fortifications confirms this over-riding and very pressing military priority. In this respect, as Jean de Préneuf also reminds us, Alderney’s position offered Britain certain, clear strategic opportunities, functioning as ‘l’avant-garde britannique contre la France’. Thus, international tension inevitably drew attention to the islands, and the study of both the French and British perspectives together in the same volume reinforces how a pair of complementary, national outlooks developed and interacted to shape each other and the wider strategic context of the Channel. This dynamic was perhaps most clearly, and openly, expressed during that relatively rare period of naval co-operation between Britain and France during World War One. Yet, for all periods, the nature of this interaction is a precious key with which to unlock the workings of cross-Channel relations.

Inevitably, each power’s relations with the islands themselves also shaped the long history of this international tension. The Channel Islands reaffirmed their allegiance to the English crown in 1204, despite the loss to France of the rest of Normandy and other Angevin lands confirmed by the defeat at the Battle of Bouvines ten years later. Thereafter, they remained a particular source of royal pride and a tangible, legal expression of the English monarchy’s lingering, extensive claims to French territory. The influence of the crown on the islands grew notably, however, when the unprecedented threat to the international order posed by Louis XIV in the seventeenth century elevated them to the status of key strategic assets. In order to take advantage, in 1689 William III formally ended the Bull of Neutrality of 1483 that had been allowing the islands to trade freely with France. The aim was to exploit the islands as a privateering base with which to attack French trade and disrupt their navy. According to Richard Harding, the islands became vital forward ‘outposts’ in the eighteenth century. In addition to privateering, they offered opportunities for intelligence gathering, precious contacts, and a source of local expertise in pilotage, for example. Yet the very real and growing danger of French invasion made providing effective defences a serious challenge. This imperative not only shaped British strategic thought but inevitably also affected the islands themselves, physically and politically. As Harding points out, more balanced land and sea defences were needed, and this required greater acceptance of a British presence more generally by the islanders, however reluctant they might have been. This insight into the pressures that drove the evolution of the relationship between the islands and Britain is an important reminder of a central theme of the history of the Channel Islands. It was always conditioned by the careful management and negotiation of a distinct political distance from Britain and by a mutually defining tension. The close study of the islands, then, not only illuminates the complementary strategic outlooks driving Anglo-French relations but the key role the islands themselves played in the different symbiotic relationships and tensions that shaped the broader diplomatic and military context of the Channel.

Victor Hugo famously described the Channel Islands as ‘little pieces of France fallen into the sea and scooped up by England’.[[3]](#footnote-3) This is potentially misleading, however. In her description of the attempt to harness and to direct privateering from the islands in the mid-eighteenth century, Anna Brinkman exposes some of the limits of British political influence and this centrifugal tendency that shaped the islands’ dealings with Britain. Not just a potential force that could be unleashed at will, British interests at times required attempts to impose restrictions and to curtail the islanders’ activity. This sense that the islands were considered an asset to be managed, and one that posed unique challenges because of their own agency, reminds us that we cannot think of them simply as strategic assets or as a contested prize. War and direct competition may well have been the principal drivers of their history, but this history was marked by many ambiguities and uncertain relationships. It is far more accurate to describe the islands as a constantly contested, negotiated space. This complexity is captured by the many papers in this volume that address another, related theme: the competitive pursuit from both sides of the Channel of intelligence and hydrographical knowledge.

From at least as early as the sixteenth century, when French Huguenots used the islands as a refuge and a staging post in international intrigue, they remained an active stage for spies and a conduit for the exchange of information.[[4]](#footnote-4) This was not a minor, secondary issue. For both France and Britain, intelligence was a key aspect of coastal defence, sitting right alongside such priorities as fortifications, harbour works, shipbuilding, recruitment, and so on. In their own ways, then, the islands were essential to the interests of both states. Work on the different means by which they pursued these interests is needed, therefore, such as an assessment of the Channel Islands that was undertaken in the eighteenth century by the French navy and engineering corps, for example. This would provide an important complement to Richard Harding’s study of more direct British involvement on the islands.[[5]](#footnote-5) Yet, all of the studies collected here that touch on competitive intelligence gathering feed the sense that the Channel Islands have always been quite distant, resistant, and difficult to govern, protect, or exploit and that this, too, shaped the wider history of the region.

Frédéric Saffroy provides a very clear warning against over-estimating the role of the British or French state in his detailed coverage of the legal complexities of the notion of sovereignty, or ownership, as it applied over the ages to the islands and to formal influence at sea. Although he argues that contested sovereignty was not an especially problematic issue for the two monarchies until the nineteenth century, it became so with rising tension over fishing rights and, particularly, oyster beds. The very clear implication is that the difficult legal ambiguities and complications that have largely come to define the islands were not initially all that unusual. Thus, far from some lingering medieval relic, the constitutional complexities we commonly associate with the Channel Islands grew with time, an idea that is supported by the contested boundary between Guernsey and France that exists still in the twenty-first century. Indeed, Isabelle Delumeau’s discussion of the growing French obsession with hydrography in the nineteenth century, particularly around the Minquiers in the 1880s, shows that this was linked not just to the evolving needs of coastal defence but more widely to competing claims of sovereignty. Yet this growing competition was not straightforward, as is also borne out by Michael Barritt’s complementary study. The dangerous, difficult, and determined pursuit of hydrographical knowledge is revealed by the two papers from both the French and British perspectives respectively, and similar imperatives and fears applied. The civil relations between Beautemps-Beaupré and Martin White, for example, which was described in both, is itself an illustration of an important idea. We see co-operation at the personal level, a shared human interest in charting and navigation, at the same time that they each advanced the competitive political and military interests of their respective states.

There is nothing new in highlighting the unique identity and the peculiar nature of the Channel Islands’ association with Britain and with France, of course. This is a key theme in traditional histories of the islands. As Richard Harding notes, the earliest history of Jersey by Philip Falle in 1694, for example, was an act of self-preservation in the face of Louis XIV’s menacing strength. It was an attempt to demonstrate the importance of the islands to England, to strengthen the association, and to enumerate to the islanders the privileges that it brought.[[6]](#footnote-6) Abraham Mourant expressed similar pride in the islands’ status as the oldest possessions of the English crown in the preface to his 1868 re-edition of the influential *Chroniques de Jersey,* originally compiled in 1585 from earlier manuscripts. In this case, Mourant marvels at the strength of French military might to fully justify his celebration of the steadfast loyalty of the islands to the British crown that protected them.[[7]](#footnote-7) Such histories were clear attempts to insist upon and to celebrate exceptionalism and thereby to cement this relationship. Thus, in all of them there is the unmistakable qualification that the enthusiasm for the crown depended upon Britain’s relatively limited authority, the lack of parliamentary jurisdiction, and the respect for their customs and traditions that the islands were able to command. In many ways, then, the relationship was never distorted or threatened by the many tensions and strains that were always in evidence, but defined by them. French-speaking, and very consciously not part of the machinery of the British state, the islands professed loyalty to the crown only due to its lingering claim to the duchy of Normandy and, crucially, only insofar as this would provide political and economic privileges and exemptions.

There were other political purposes to older histories of the islands. By 1904, in one of a number of travel accounts or general interest books that were appearing in French, Henri Boland recognised Alderney’s position as Britain’s ‘Gibraltar de la Manche’ and bemoaned what he saw as an increasing cultural and linguistic turn on the islands toward the English. The reasons for this were clear. According to Boland, earlier French attempts to reconquer the islands lingered there in the popular memory. Equally, all of the leading families had built their fortunes by attacking French shipping during the dangerous First Empire in France and had enjoyed British protection doing so. Although he insisted that the islanders remained culturally French, at least historically, he regretted that they were currently more likely to ‘fear’ France. [[8]](#footnote-8) What concerned them, according to Boland, was the prospect of the intrusive French system with their ‘gendarmes’ and their restrictive and costly customs and regulations. Nevertheless, although they saw the revolutionary ideas that emanated from France as threatening, Boland closed with the observation that there were storm clouds on the horizon. A ‘rebellious wind was blowing’ on the islands. There was a thirst for modern ideas, and the time was fast approaching when the people would rise against the oligarchs.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Pégot-Ogier’s much more substantial, academic history developed this idea. His was an open celebration of republican France and its potential influence. The distant relationship with Britain that the Channel Islands had long sustained simply confirmed that, from their earliest beginnings, the islands embodied the virtue of liberty. These culturally French people had always valiantly defended their autonomy. Regrettably, however, he claimed that by the nineteenth century this spirit had started to wane. The islands had fallen into torpor and indolence due to the unedifying pursuit of money, but also to their inwardness and the lack of any classical education. Pégot-Ogier’s call, therefore, was to let the light of France redeem the islands and allow them to reach their historical destiny. He was using history to this very clear purpose, to educate and to energise the islands toward revolutionary reform. They were to shake off their parochial isolation and embrace liberal progress of the sort begun by William III and which blossomed in the American and French Revolutions. Without such redemption, the lesson that seemed to emerge from the long history of the Channel Islands was that they risked irrelevance or, worse, the very serious danger of closer integration into the British state.

Again, however, it is clear that in this contest over their allegiance and identity, the islands themselves were key actors and not just political footballs in some sort of competition involving international league tables. In this respect, the islands embody Renaud Morieux’s vision in his magisterial study of 2008, *Une mer pour deux royaumes: la Manche, frontière franco-anglaise (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)*.[[10]](#footnote-10) In this important work, Morieux sets out to overturn the idea of the history of the Channel as an extension of Franco-British rivalry. In his hands, the Channel takes on a more shared and politically fluid character. Different, often competing, conceptions of what defines a ‘maritime frontier’ created a complex environment of varied, overlapping interests. He explores the commonalities across the water, the shared interests of maritime communities, and the economic and social ties or the conflicts that do not necessarily fit the neat, binary national boundaries that we often impose upon the past.[[11]](#footnote-11) Although Morieux’s study does not extend to World War One, arguably it is then that his notion of a shared yet contested sea is most apt. Thus, like some other contributors to this volume, Thomas Vaisset evokes Morieux in his description of the shared responsibility for the Channel between Britain and France during the war. More than ever before, the Channel had become a Franco-British lake of sorts, and the Channel Islands were at the heart of French naval efforts to protect crucial shipping, not least as bases for French seaplanes which sought out German submarines. In Alexander Howlett’s complementary study of the British perspective on operations, the islands are recognised as a French zone of influence. Taking a broader perspective of the command of operations in the Channel, he shows how they fit into a fully comprehensive and ultimately successful anti-submarine and trade defence system that was able to meet the German challenge.

For all periods of history, however, the Channel Islands could be held up in a similar way as a perfect illustration of Morieux’s view of the unsettled, subjective nature of the Channel. From his largely eighteenth-century perspective, Morieux describes the legal ambiguity of the islands in the context of a discussion of smuggling. Any advantage to Britain of holding the Channel Islands, he says, depended upon accepting and tolerating the illicit smuggling and contraband that was rife there and recognising the limits of its own authority. The islanders’ connections with France meant that their loyalty and co-operation was far from guaranteed. It was a relationship that was carefully managed, and largely by the islanders themselves. Naturally, they mostly professed their attachment to the British crown in unproblematic terms, referring to the greater good, a shared history and religion, and a common hatred of the French. Yet, there was a clear economic interest, and they knew how to play their unique position to their advantage. The case for exemption from fiscal regulation by the British or from any restrictions to their activity was built upon their insistence that they were not actually smugglers themselves. The islands were merely ‘entrepots’, they claimed. According to their mercantilist logic, this was not only lucrative but it protected the wider economy because bullion from England that was spent at the islands on French goods did not actually leave the kingdom. The richer the islands were allowed to become, in other words, the better it would be for Britain. Were they to be regulated more closely, the smuggling trade would simply go to other French ports with disastrous effects. Indeed, nearby Cherbourg, watching with interest the British attempt to regulate the islands from the 1760s, hoped to take advantage by becoming a free port itself or even by proposing a joint venture with the islands. This was a prospect that was taken seriously in Britain. As it happens, the British state backed down. In this case, it was better to tolerate almost unrestricted smuggling through the islands than to risk pushing them into the arms of the French, moving the trade elsewhere to French advantage, and losing the privateering and spying opportunities that came with this.[[12]](#footnote-12)

In this way, Morieux demonstrates how the islands capitalised on their unique constitutional position to deflect attention and to protect their privileges and their relative freedom of action. He quotes from petitions to the crown of 1766 against a plan to establish customs officers on the islands that reasserted this exceptional status. Their rights and freedoms, the islanders insisted, were the formal, legal, and just recompense for their long history of extraordinary fidelity and bravery in protecting British possessions and defending them against French attack at great cost to themselves.[[13]](#footnote-13) Elsewhere, Morieux reminds us that the Channel Islands had always been important remnants of England’s ongoing, tenuous claim to the French throne and a means of justifying a sovereignty of the Channel itself.[[14]](#footnote-14) Thus, it is striking that Morieux is otherwise largely silent about the islands. He takes few opportunities to discuss their agency or to employ them to develop his theme of contested boundaries and subjective, shifting jurisdictional ambiguities in the Channel. Indeed, the whole history of the Channel Islands was conditioned by the cultivation of their distinct legal position in this way which is significant not only for future research into the history of the islands themselves but more broadly. As Morieux acknowledges, declarations of this sort were actually a common refrain.[[15]](#footnote-15) Elsewhere, equivalent declarations of particular, local circumstances, of histories of loyal service, and of corresponding legal privileges and exemptions were a widely employed device by maritime communities. Far from making the Channel Islands peripheral or unrepresentative, their particularly obscure constitutional position and carefully crafted reputation for ‘uniqueness’, makes them an especially useful, rarefied embodiment of early modern maritime and naval history itself.

Much recent naval history highlights the agency of coastal communities and independent actors. Naval power, on both sides of the Channel, was as much as anything else the outcome of constant constitutional negotiation and management of the tension between the aims of central government and local interests. Indeed, in many ways, the countless formal declarations of loyalty to the crown, which often contained equally strident claims to immunity from it, became the very currency of exchange in the political economy of early modern maritime government. In ports and harbours of early modern France, in particular, royal authority was often very distant or only notionally recognised. The maritime periphery of the realm was an astonishingly intricate pattern of entrenched medieval traditions. Indeed, among the greatest challenges France faced as a naval power was penetrating this dense patchwork of competing, overlapping, even contradictory, claims to countless different local privileges and exemptions. Virtually every community held dearly to its own constitutional traditions, and any major operations at sea or initiatives to build French naval power were necessarily accompanied by a flurry of legislation that attempted, often mostly in vain, to make the authority of the king and the admiral of France felt. The findings of a comprehensive survey of all the ports and harbours of France by Cardinal de Richelieu of 1631, for example, revealed the full extent of the constitutional challenge that the crown then faced.[[16]](#footnote-16) There was only a notional system of admiralty courts in place. The right to raise anchorage fees and other harbour dues, salvage rights, authority over coastal militias, or the right to distribute ‘congés’ or passports, all such privileges, it was reported, were so widely contested and dispersed amongst a bewildering number of claimants that plans to expand the navy had to be restricted to ports and to provinces over which Richelieu could exert personal authority in his own right as a local governor. Though every port and every province claimed to be honouring legal traditions as loyal servants of the king, they defended their privileges tenaciously and resisted any royal incursions.

The Channel Islands, therefore, are more generally representative than their reputation as constitutional outliers would suggest. The way they played their status and negotiated their place within the wider maritime or naval strategy of the British state to their own advantage whilst maintaining active links with France has echoes everywhere, in all aspects of early modern life. Indeed, their declaration of fealty and devotion to the crown in their petitions of 1766 evoke the plea of virtually every rebellious noble whose loyalty was ever questioned, every petition by a beleaguered Huguenot community in the sixteenth century, every municipality facing increased taxation or billeting in wartime. All such protests were accompanied by earnest promises of undying devotion to the crown, illustrated with a claim of exemplary, usually military, service in the past, and an assertion of the legality of their special status on this basis. Historians, therefore, have many opportunities to reassess these and other patterns by exploring, not just what makes the Channel Islands exceptional, but what they have in common with other communities and the interactions and relationships between them as part of a genuinely comparative and regional history.

Anna Brinkman has demonstrated the value of the Channel Islands as a laboratory in which to study privateering and the challenges of distance, both political and geographical, that all powers faced directing naval power. Yet Michel Aumont’s study of nearby Granville raises many interesting parallels. Granville was also integrated into trading networks in the Channel and subject to the capricious effect of international tensions, and there was a range of motivations for participating in privateering, just as there was on the islands. In times of war, Aumont argues, when the French monarchy tried to direct a *guerre de course,* only the most daring, or those in a position to gamble on a windfall prize, put to sea on behalf of the state. Otherwise, it appears, many there preferred to wait until peace could allow them to return to their main commercial activity, smuggling. This hints at strained and distant relations with Paris that recall those between the Channel Islands and the English crown. It also raises the possibility of some routine cooperation with the islands and the idea that, for citizens of Granville, conducting a war against their neighbours off the coast was simply not considered to be as profitable or welcome as colluding with them in the contraband trade. Of course, more work would be needed on these and other relationships to draw any firm conclusions. Yet, it is clear that privateering was not just an instrument of the state nor an economic necessity created by war. There was a broader, more complex, but still regional, picture that Anglo-French competition complicated but did not entirely define.

It would appear from the essays gathered together in this volume, therefore, that the Channel Islands have a bright future as the object of further historical research. The many complementary studies offered here demonstrate the explanatory power the islands hold as a common focus for the exploration of both French and British perspectives on the long history of their competition at sea. A fuller picture emerges of how the two powers influenced each other and, together, shaped the wider strategic environment in which they competed. In this sense, not only is the contested history of the Channel Islands brought to life by the study of Anglo-French relations, but the deeper study of the islands themselves has been shown to be equally illuminating. Indeed, the particular constitutional status and tensions that governed relations between the islands and the two great powers provide a model of local maritime governance. This presents more than just an opportunity to revisit traditional, state-centred debates about the long historical struggle between powerful political centres and declining maritime peripheries. In many ways, the Channel Islands allow us to transcend such debates altogether and to step out from the long conceptual shadow of the notion of the rising, nation state which has dominated the field of international history since its foundations in the nineteenth century. A similarly transcendent potential of the islands was identified by Victor Hugo over a century ago. ‘Let us admire them, and let us venerate them’, he said. ‘These microcosms reveal in miniature, in all its stages, the very formation of humanity. Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney; former dens for bandits, now workshops; former navigational hazards, now safe ports’.[[17]](#footnote-17) For him, their transformation from their lawless, piratical beginnings to lawful and industrious citizenship embodied progress itself and inspired hope for the future of civilisation. As historians, we do not have to embrace with the same enthusiasm this nineteenth-century faith in human progress in order to share some of Hugo’s optimism. The continued study of the shifting political, commercial, and cultural relations of the islands with each other and with their powerful neighbours as well as of their wider regional and long-distance trading networks promises a great deal.[[18]](#footnote-18) Indeed, in many respects, the Channel Islands provide an elevated platform with an unobstructed view from which we may survey the future direction of maritime and naval history itself.

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1. I would like to thank Dr Eric Barré, Université de Caen, Normandie, for generously sharing with me his considerable knowledge and the fruits of his extensive research into the islands and the Channel. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. 'Isolée, l’histoire des bailliages ou républiques insulaires n’offre qu’un médiocre intérêt local, tandis qu’elle se généralise et brille d’un éclat réel sous la vive lumière de l’histoire de France et d’Angleterre', Eugène Pégot-Ogier, *Histoire des isles de la Manche* (Paris: E. Plon, 1881), v. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. ‘Les îles de la Manche sont des morceaux de France tombés dans la mer et ramassés par l’Angleterre’. From 'L'Archipel de la Manche' which was intended to be a preface to his 1866 novel, *Les Travailleurs de la mer*, but was first published on its own in 1883 and in later editions published with the novel. Victor Hugo, "L'archipel de la mer," in *Les travailleurs de la mer, Vol. 1*, Oeuvres Complètes. Roman. X. (Paris: Émile Testard, 1891), 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Alain Landurant, *Montgommery le régicide* (Paris: Tallandier, 1988), 61, 216-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. There is important work being done on this by Sylviane Llinarès and Edern Olivier-Jégat. See also Sylviane Llinares, Benjamin Égasse, and Katherine Dana, *De L'estran à la digue: histoire des aménagements portuaires et littoraux, XVIe-XXe siècle*, Histoire (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Philip Falle, *An Account of the Island of Jersey* (London: John Newton, 1694). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Abraham Mourant, ed. *Chroniques de Jersey* (Jersey: Philippe Falle, 1868), iii. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Henri Boland, *Les îles de la Manche* (Paris: Hachette, 1904), 56, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. 'Un vent de fronde souffle'. Ibid., 278-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Renaud Morieux, *Une mer pour deux royaumes : la Manche, frontière franco-anglaise XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008). Also available in English translation; *The Channel: England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Border in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See also, André Lespagnol, ‘Les îles Anglo-Normandes et la France de l’Ouest : une relation particulière’, in Frédéric Chauvaud and Jacques Péret, eds *Terres marines : études en hommage à Dominique Guillemet* (Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006), 85-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Une mer pour deux royaumes : la Manche, frontière franco-anglaise XVIIe-XVIIIe Siècles*, 244-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid., 248-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid., 114-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Alan James, "Voyage et inspection maritime de M. D'infreville sur les côtes françaises de l'océan, 1631," *French History* 15, no. 4 (2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. ‘Ces espèces de petites nations-là font la preuve de la civilisation. Aimons-les, et vénérons-les. Ces microcosmes reflètent en petit, dans toutes ses phases, la grande formation humaine. Jersey, Guernesey, Aurigny ; anciens repaires, ateliers à présent. Anciens écueils, ports maintenant’. Hugo, "L'archipel de la mer," 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. On the vibrant activity and reach of the Guernsey merchants, see Gregory Stevens Cox, *The Guernsey Merchants and Their World in the Georgian Era* (Guernsey: Toucan Press, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)