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**The greening of aid: the political ecology of Japans bilateral international cooperation with the Philippines**

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**The ‘Greening’ of Aid:**  
**The Political Ecology of Japan’s Bilateral**  
**International Cooperation with the Philippines**

Thesis Submitted for the Ph.D.

by

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July 2006

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## Abstract

This thesis examines the possible ‘greening’ of the Japanese aid system in order to appreciate such change in a little studied yet important Northern donor. It considers how the policies and procedures of Japanese international cooperation may have been altered to account for environmental concerns in the 1990s. It does so with reference to two Philippine projects: a ‘traditional’ development project and a new environmental project. The theoretical framework combines a political ecology perspective with insights from the foreign aid and implementation literatures. The empirical research involved fieldwork in both Japan and the Philippines using qualitative methodologies, namely in-depth interviews (98 formal interviews), documentary analysis and direct observation.

Following the introduction, theoretical framework, and methodology (Chapters 1-3), Chapter 4 presents an overview of the Japanese aid system. Chapter 5 then examines a traditional development project (*kaihatsu-enjyo*): the San Roque Multipurpose Project involving the building of a large dam in Luzon. Here, the empirical analysis revealed *some* evidence of limited greening in aid procedures. Yet, the overall result was seen to be ‘business as usual’ – with environmental concerns peripheral to the evolution of this project. In contrast, Chapter 6 assesses a new environmental project (*kankyō enjyo*): the Sustainable Environmental Management Project embracing tourism and environmental conservation in Palawan. In this case, the empirical analysis highlighted a relatively higher level of project greening, as indeed was initially anticipated given its ‘environmental’ project status. Nonetheless, this thesis argued that both projects were riddled with political compromise and ambiguity such that a definitive assessment of the greening of Japanese aid is unlikely.

Chapter 7 summarises the empirical findings while also highlighting the conceptual contributions of the thesis. In this regard, the thesis has demonstrated the utility of an analytical approach to political ecology that stresses the contextual sources of environmental change – notably, in relation to the under-studied dynamics of North-South bilateral aid relations. It has also suggested the value of a ‘cultural politics’ perspective in political ecology, as the cultural politics of specific donor countries (here Japan) is related to unequal power relations between donor and recipient as well as between different types of actor, as aid flows crisscross national boundaries.

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## Glossary

### Japanese terms

<i>anken-hakkutsu</i>	project excavation
<i>bakufu</i>	feudal government or shogunate
<i>chōsadan</i>	research team
<i>daitōa-kyōei-ken</i>	co-prosperity sphere
<i>dokenkokka</i>	construction state
<i>enjyo</i>	aid
<i>gaiatsu</i>	external or foreign pressure
<i>jijyo-doryoku</i>	self-help effort
<i>kaihatsu-chōsa</i>	development study
<i>kaihatsu-enjyo</i>	development aid
<i>kankō</i>	tourism
<i>kankyō-enjyo</i>	environmental aid
<i>kankyō-hairyo</i>	environmental consideration
<i>kankyō-hairyo-kakunin</i>	verification of environmental consideration
<i>kankyō-hogo</i>	environmental protection
<i>kankyō-hozen</i>	environmental conservation
<i>kankyō-jissa</i>	field (or environmental) investigation
<i>kankyō-shinsa</i>	environmental appraisal
<i>kanyo</i>	(passive) involvement
<i>keiretsu</i>	Japanese business conglomerate
<i>keizai-kyōryoku</i>	economic cooperation
<i>kokueki</i>	self economic interest or national interest
<i>kokusai-kōken</i>	international contribution
<i>kokusai-kyōryoku</i>	international cooperation
<i>kōryū</i>	interaction
<i>kou to otsu no kankei</i>	the relations between the client and the contractor
<i>marukosu giwaku</i>	Marcos scandal
<i>meiwaku</i>	inconvenience or trouble to others
<i>minkatsu-jigyō</i>	privatisation project
<i>okami</i>	something or somebody high above
<i>oshitsuke-gamashī</i>	Intrusive
<i>purofai</i>	project finding
<i>sanka</i>	(active) participation
<i>sōgō-shōsha</i>	general trading company
<i>taiwa</i>	dialogue
<i>temiyage-anken</i>	gift project
<i>torikomi</i>	inclusion
<i>tōshi</i>	investment
<i>yen-shakkan</i>	bilateral yen loans
<i>yon-shoōchō-taisei</i>	four-ministry consultation
<i>yōsei-shugi</i>	Request-based approach
<i>zaibatsu</i>	big family-controlled banking and industrial combines of modern Japan
<i>zaikai-gaikō</i>	business diplomacy

## **Philippine Terms**

Barangay	the smallest administrative district in the Philippines
Ibaloi	an indigenous ethnic group found in the mountains of the Cordillera Central in the Northern Luzon, and their language
Ilocano	the dominant ethnic group in Northern Luzon, and their language
Luzon	the main island of the Philippines
Tagalog	the major language of the Philippines which a direct of Central and Southern Luzon including Manila, or the people who speak the language



## Acronym

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
BOT	Build-Operate-Transfer
CADC	Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim
CDO	Cease and Desist Order
CEC	Commission of European Communities
CI	Conservation International
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLUPs	Comprehensive Land Use Plans
CPA	Cordillera Peoples Alliance
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAO	Department Administrative Order
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Philippines
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DMB	Department of Budget and Management, the Philippines
DOT	Department of Tourism, the Philippines
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways, the Philippines
ECA	Export Credit Agency
ECAN	Environmentally Critical Area Network
ECAs	Environmentally Critical Areas
ECC	Environmental Compliance Certificate
ECPs	Environmentally Critical Projects
EEC	European Economic Community
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statements, the Philippines
EMB	Environmental Management Bureau, the Philippines
EO	Executive Order
EPA	Economic Planning Agency, Japan
EU	European Union
FOE	Friends of the Earth
FOEJ	Friends of the Earth Japan
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIS	Geographical Information System
I/A	Implementing Arrangements
IEE	Initial Environmental Examination
IIWMP	Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project
IIWMP-PMO	IIWMP Project Management Office
IPP	Independent Power Producer
IRN	International Rivers Network
JACSES	Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JEXIM	Export-Import Bank of Japan
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LGUs	Local Government Units
METI	Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry, Japan
MGB	Mines and Geosciences Bureau
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan

MLIT	Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, Japan
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOF	Ministry of Finance, Japan
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
MOT	Ministry of Transport Japan
MPS	Master Plan Study
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority, the Philippines
NEPC	National Environment Protection Council
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
NIA	National Irrigation Administration
NIPAS	National Integrated Protected Area System
NPC	National Power Corporation, the Philippines
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECF	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
OOF	Other Official Finance or Other Official Flow
PAFID	Philippine Association For Intercultural Development
PCI	Pacific Consultant International
PCIJ	Philippine Center of Investigative Journalism
PCSD	Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
PCSDS	Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff
PD	Presidential Decree
PGP	Provincial Government of Palawan
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
RA	Republic Act
REOL	Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd
RWESA	Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia
SAPROF	Special Assistance for Project Formation
SEMP	Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan
SEP	Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan
SRMP	San Roque Multipurpose Project
SRPC	San Roque Power Corporation
TIMMAWA	Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway ti Agno (Alliance of Peasants to Free the Agno)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UP	University of the Philippines
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WWF	World Wildlife Fund



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## Chapter 1. Introduction

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This thesis examines the possible nature and extent of greening in bilateral official finance by way of a case study of Japanese international cooperation to the Philippines in the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> The role of foreign aid as a key component of North-South relations in the contemporary era is well known (Keohane and Levy 1996; Raffer and Singer 1996; Wilkinson 2004). However, less well understood is the way in which this process may have been shaped by the growth of environmental concerns since the late 1980s. Even less is known about the shifting operation of Japanese international cooperation in this regard – despite Japan’s leading role as an aid provider in the 1990s. As such, this thesis aims to shed light on this important if little understood aspect of North-South relations.

The present chapter introduces the concerns of this thesis. It first presents the general background on the greening of aid by briefly looking at the key trends in the decade that is our main focus – the 1990s. The remainder of the chapter then addresses the main research aims and questions of this study, briefly introduces the political ecology perspective, and explains the structure of the thesis.

### 1.1. ‘Green’ Trends and Aid

The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development or the so-called Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) was a key impetus for the introduction of the concept of sustainable development into the global political arena (Redclift 1987; Hajer 1995; Victor 2006). This ‘green’ paradigm shift led in the 1990s to a proclaimed decade of ‘green development’ based on a new type of global environmentalism. Central here was the holding of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, at which 118 heads of state gathered to discuss how to tackle diverse global environmental crises. The

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<sup>1</sup> In this thesis, and in keeping with Japanese practice in particular, aid is used here interchangeably with ‘international cooperation’ and ‘official finance’ to denote a broad classification of foreign assistance encompassing various mixes of grants and loans (see Chapter 4).

upshot of the 1992 'Earth Summit' was a rush by nation-states to represent themselves as key environmental actors even as the outline of global environmental governance took shape (Miller 1995; Taylor 1999; Frank et al. 2000).

The Earth Summit thus kicked off a new era of 'sustainable development' in which policy-related objectives were to reconcile "human use of the environment with the latter's long-term conservation" (Bryant 1996: 341). This particular policy initiative was translated into an action plan, Agenda 21 (and its national-level versions), that emphasised the importance of protecting local and national natural environments. As climate change and ozone depletion were increasingly recognised, there was seen to be an urgent need to conserve the global commons from harm. In short, environmental problems rose to prominence in national and international environmental policy making to an unprecedented extent in the 1990s (Adams 2001; Adger et al 2001; Keely and Scoones 2003; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).

Just as the ideology-based concerns of the Cold War had a huge impact on foreign aid policy between the late 1940s and the end of the 1980s (Raffer and Singer 1996; Patterson 1997), so too the rise of the sustainable development paradigm in the 1990s would seem to have had a comparable impact (World Bank 1995, 1997; OECD 1997). Northern donors thus paid greater attention to the environmental aspects of their aid, commonly referred to as the 'greening' of aid (Conroy and Litinoff 1988; Buttel 1993; Wade 1997; Goldman 2004). 'Greening' is clearly a *political* process in that it requires existing policies and practices to be changed (even if only at the rhetorical level). Indeed, during the 1990s, most aid providers enthusiastically and unequivocally committed themselves to integrating the concept of sustainable development into policy and practice.

Although "the display of development agencies and environmental groups dancing to the 'sustainable development' tune in the 1990s is remarkable" (Adams 2001: 3), this 'green' trend was not built in a day. Rather, it had been pushed along due to persistent environmentalist pressure on aid



providers throughout the 1980s, in the full glare of politically influential media reporting. As official awareness was thereby promoted, aid agencies accordingly increased their budget allocation to ‘environment-friendly’ projects while providing stricter environmental guidelines and criteria for aid provision in general. Thus, for example, environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments were held to be critical to successful aid delivery because of a new sustainable development related set of norms in the aid deliberation process (JICA 1990, 1992; OECD 1992, 1997; World Bank 1992; UNCED 1993; Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation 1994; OECF 1997, 1999). Also, donors have increased environmental staff in order to strengthen institutional capacity for environment-related operations (World Bank 1995; JICA 1996b, 2001a; JBIC 2003c).

Evidence of the impact of the Rio-inspired agenda could also be seen in the increased percentage of ‘green’ aid as a proportion of total aid dispersed during the 1990s, even though total Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursement had started decreasing after the collapse of the USSR and the consequent end of the Cold War in the late 1980s (Katada 1997; Patterson 1997; Grant and Nijman 1998). Indeed, the latter declined considerably in comparison with the rate of world economic growth in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (UNDESA and UNCTAD 1999). Notwithstanding this situation, the percentage of total world ODA (including both bilateral and multilateral aid) allocated to projects for the conservation and ‘sustainable’ management of natural resources continued to rise; the share of funds allocated to ‘green’ aid thus rose from under 19 percent of total ODA in 1983 to about 26 percent in 1996 (Porter et al 2000; UNDESA 2001).<sup>2</sup>

Northern donors thereby recognised the role of the environment in their aid allocations, with environmental aspects being ‘mainstreamed’ from project formulation to implementation (JICA 1988, 1992, 2001a; World Bank 1995; OECD 1997, 2001, 2002a). However, there arises a fundamental question here – namely, were these green promises kept? After all, most global and

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<sup>2</sup> The share of funding to environmental ODA projects dropped to 20.8 percent in 1997 due to the financial crisis in East Asia and Russia – and yet, nonetheless stayed at an average of over 20 percent in the latter part of the 1990s (UNDESA 2001).

national environmental problems remain as uncompromising as ever today (U.S. Department of State 2002; Blair 2004). Indeed, a growing band of environmentalists and NGOs have loudly criticised the much heralded green commitment of the 1990s as being mere political rhetoric, also stressing how environmental degradation has become worse in the interim (e.g. WWF 2002; Bosshard 2004; Victor 2006). Reports by the NGO Friends of the Earth are typical here in as much as they point out that the 1990s was a decade lacking in ‘real’ action for sustainable development (FOE 2002a, 2002b).

## 1.2. Examining the Greening of Aid

The criticisms of environmentalists and NGOs trigger serious questions about the extent and significance of the greening of aid in the post-Rio world, and it is these questions that constitute the heart of this thesis. Despite these criticisms, ‘greening’ is still described in many official circles as one of the striking policy trends of the 1990s, and is seen, for example, to have been partially successful in multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (Watts and Peet 2004; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). In contrast to donor assessments (e.g. World Bank 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000a; OECD 1997; JICA 2001a; JBIC 2003b, 2003c), there has been relatively little independent scholarly study of this widely proclaimed process – particularly of its implications for the *quality* of aid via the careful assessment of donor compliance with ‘green’ policies in the form of project design and implementation (Greeley 1991; Davies 1992; Fox and Brown 1998; Horta 2000). This lacuna is particularly true in the case of bilateral aid which has benefited from fewer in-depth analyses than multilateral aid (especially the World Bank, see Goldman 2005). Thus, it is important to interrogate the possible greening of bilateral aid closely, in particular in relation to specific examples of the practices of the official aid industry set within the context of the broader political economy of donor interests.

This thesis pursues that aim by assessing Japanese international cooperation with the Philippines. It considers two central questions in doing so. First, to what extent and in what ways has Japan’s bilateral international cooperation



process become ‘greener’ in terms of the procedures formally adopted to guide such greening? Second, what specific devices and tools have been used to ‘mainstream’ the environment in aid projects and what effect have they had in terms of project delivery? To do this research, the study will focus on policy documents and other official statements associated with planning and implementation tools (such as environmental guidelines) as well as in-depth interviews with participants and direct observation (see Chapter 3).

The focus of this thesis on Northern donors in general, and Japan in particular, is key if we are to understand the shifting power dynamics of North-South environmental relations at a time when such relations are becoming even more critical to global environmental governance (Miller 1995; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Indeed, it is argued that since “...the ideas, norms, blueprints and personnel determining ‘development’ come in large part from the North, notably by a few donor(s) ... then one must indeed study those ... as closely as possible” (Gasper 1996: 165). It is, therefore, vital to understand the way Northern donors pursue and practice the possible greening of their aid and the way that they ‘conceptualise’ recipients in this process (Ferguson 1990; Goldman 2005).

Yet, Northern donors have different interests and political cultures – with likely knock-on effects in terms of how aid is conceptualised and delivered in the first place, let alone how ‘greening’ is anticipated and incorporated in the aid process. It is thus essential to understand *specific* donor political cultures (and relations with recipient countries) here. As such, this thesis examines the under-studied case of Japan’s international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*); the importance of this particular donor is attested by the fact that Japan was the world’s largest donor throughout the 1990s (Castellano 2000; MOFA 2004a). However, Japanese aid has always been an ambiguous process, especially given that the Japanese government integrates ODA with other official finance under the banner of ‘international cooperation’ (a key term moreover never defined by that government, see Chapter 4). Thus, this thesis needs to situate Japan’s bilateral international cooperation within the post-1945 context of its wider political and economic

relations with East and Southeast Asia – a region that has traditionally received the biggest share of Japanese aid. More specifically, the focus is on the Philippines, long a key recipient of Japanese assistance.

In this particular bilateral relationship, we will consider, in turn, two types of project in order to gauge to what extent and in what manner Japan's international cooperation process has been 'reoriented' (Nuscheler et al 2000) and 'greened'. One project is a mainstream development project (*kaihatsu-enjyo*) where it is plausible to expect at least *some* degree of 'greening' to have occurred, while the other project (*kankyō-enjyo*) is more centrally concerned with the environment, and is hence anticipated to show *substantial* greening.

The concerns of this thesis reflect the wider sentiment that environmental changes in the South must be appreciated in the context of North-South relations (Chambers 1988; Bryant and Parnwell 1996; Adams 2001). Indeed, it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to deal with ecology and international (as well as national) political economy as separate fields (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). It is essential therefore to situate the research questions of the present study in the context of a theoretical approach that recognises the inextricable linkages between ecological and political-economic dimensions in North-South dynamics.

To this end, a political ecology perspective is pursued in this thesis in order to shed light on and appreciate the possible greening of the aid process in Japan-Philippines bilateral relations. The political ecology perspective suggests that environmental changes not only reflect neo-liberal policy imperatives but, in broader terms, are manifestations of the political-economic forces of global capitalism (Bryant and Bailey 1997; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Research in this field (considered in more detail in Chapter 2) tends to stress how a series of highly unequal power relationships – upon which the present international system was founded and continues to operate – influences policy options and life chances in both North and South, among both rich and poor, and for ruler and ruled (Peet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). Such relations of



inequality are anticipated between donor and recipient in the context of Japan-Philippines relations (Ofreneo 1993; Dauvergne 1997; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; Bryant 2005).

This thesis provides one of the first in-depth studies of the political ecology of the bilateral aid industry. While work has been done on multilateral aid (e.g. Rich 1994; Fox and Brown 1998; Bosshard 2004; Goldman 2005) as well as on global aid discourses (Adger et al. 2001), the bilateral aspect has tended to receive far less attention. Yet, bilateral aid is of immense importance to the shaping of ‘politicised environments’ and, indeed, is seen to depict donor interests more clearly than multilateral aid ever does (Arase 1995). In other words, through analysis of the specific Japan-Philippines aid relationship, wider issues in political ecology as well as debates on sustainable development in particular are taken into account.

Above all, political ecology puts the spotlight on the role of politics (including policy) in environmental change. Thus, it is asserted that “the substance of politics - decisions and commands, compliance and enforcement ...- (are) inescapably implied in almost every ecosocial problem” (Deutsch 1977: 359). Since this research considers the environmental aspect of Japanese bilateral cooperation with the Philippines as a politicised ‘ecosocial problem’, the greening of Japanese aid can be studied most fruitfully by examining the cohesion (or not) between aid *policy* – that involves ‘decisions and commands’ – and aid *projects* on the ground, which will assist assessment of the ‘compliance and enforcement’ capacity of the former. As Gasper (1996: 160) correctly claims: “policies cannot be judged primarily by their good intentions or supposed inherent worthiness regardless of actual performance”. In short, policy reform, including the ‘greening’ of aid, is best studied via actual performance (Rondinelli 1993) and the transmission belt between decision makers and practice, that is, the *policy process*.

This study will therefore trace the policy process of Japan’s bilateral aid, including its administration, organisation and policy procedures, by analysing criteria, guidelines, rules and specifications for projects while

relating this analysis to the assessment of two particular types of projects. As mentioned briefly above, these types of projects are *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) and *kankyō-enjyo* (environmental aid), and they are considered in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

The first of these relates to an ‘old style’ development project that was claimed by the Japanese government to have been subject to greening in the 1990s. This, the San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam (in Northern Luzon), will be investigated to assess how the greening process may have taken place in a development assistance (*kaihatsu-enjyo*) project. Mega-dam projects like this one have displaced millions of people and damaged countless ecosystems around the world, leading some to describe them as ‘lethal aid’ (Erler cited in Raffer and Singer 1996: 4). Given this dubious social and ecological reputation both internationally and in the Philippines, our first case study project is notably concerned with the following questions: First, to what extent and how has Japan’s policy on development aid changed as a result of post-Rio ‘green’ trends surrounding sustainable development and biodiversity conservation? Second, to what extent and in what ways has Japan’s traditional aid project applied ‘fortified’ environmental guidelines from ‘green’ aid policy at the implementation level? Third, how well has the project conducted environmental assessment as a key procedure? Finally, how has the politics surrounding decision-making in both Tokyo and Manila affected the life of this project in relation to environmental issues?

The second project, the Sustainable Environmental Conservation Project in Northern Palawan, will be assessed as a specific environmental aid (*kankyō-enjyo*) project. The degree of ‘greenness’ of this environmental aid will be analysed and assessed at different stages of the project. This second case study project will be used to investigate various questions. First, how is the precise nature of Japan’s environmental aid as well as post-Rio ‘green’ trends manifested in the contours of this project? Second, what are the objectives of environmental aid, what tools and procedures are used to realise them, and how coherent is this effort? Third, to what extent does project design and delivery mean that the conservation objective is achievable? Finally, what specifically environmental concerns and



objectives, as opposed to standard development assistance interests, are addressed in the project?

This thesis thus constitutes a study that is designed to interrogate the possible impact of greening trends in the 1990s on the aid sector, using a case study of Japan's international cooperation with the Philippines delivered through two types of aid project. The structure of the study is as follows.

In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework is established in relation to a selective assessment of relevant literatures including political ecology, foreign aid, implementation and environmental assessment studies, which in turn inform the empirical portions of this thesis. The first theoretical element addresses the political ecology perspective and provides an appropriate way in which to frame the aid process in terms of 'contextual sources' of environmental change and unequal power relations. The second theoretical element that is considered relates to a critical assessment of the foreign aid literature linked to the possible 'greening' of aid in the 1990s. Finally, the third theoretical element that is addressed encompasses work on policy implementation, with a particular focus on the role of projects in aid delivery.

This discussion is followed in Chapter 3 by an explanation of the methodology used in this thesis. In particular, the chapter considers qualitative methodologies, a case study approach, and data collection techniques including in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and direct observation. This chapter also discusses difficulties that were encountered in conducting the research as well as matters pertaining to research ethics and translation.

Chapter 4 then provides the necessary empirical context by setting out the key elements of the Japanese aid sector in general through a brief historical analysis of international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*). This overview of the Japanese aid policy is linked to the possible 'greening' of policy, especially in relation to the three key agencies involved – namely Japan

International Cooperation Agency, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and Export-Import Bank of Japan. Finally, this chapter considers Japanese aid in relation to the Philippines in particular, thereby highlighting how that relationship is shaped by political and economic interests in both countries.

Chapter 5 analyses the *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) type of project, namely the San Roque Multipurpose Project. In order to evaluate the degree of greening in the project in terms of the procedural framework, this chapter follows the three stages of the environmental assessment procedure (namely, environmental consideration, verification of environmental consideration, and monitoring) where both the donor and the recipient are supposed to make efforts to ensure that environmental concerns are appropriately incorporated into the project. This chapter also investigates how the aid project and its environmental assessment process have been influenced by the political and economic decisions of successive Philippine leaders in a manner that contradicts any notion of ‘rational’ development.

Chapter 6 assesses the *kankyō-enjyo* type of scheme, that is the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan. This chapter will investigate how the greening process may have differed from that of a traditional development aid project by highlighting tools and procedures used in this *first* Japanese environmental aid project in the Philippines. This case study unfolds a complex picture that is one shaped by such things as global environmental discourse, fragmented aid delivery and donors and recipient interests, which again underscores the importance of political economy in the bilateral relationship involved.

Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis findings and assesses their wider implications for future research. By revisiting the two projects considered in Chapters 5 and 6, this final chapter summarises the key findings – the three key stages of the environmental assessment process are thereby evaluated in order to gauge the degree of commitment of the main Japanese aid agencies to project greening. Then the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of a future research agenda related to the topic of the greening of aid in the light of the thesis findings.



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## Chapter 2. Theorising the ‘Greening’ of Aid

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Chapter 2 presents the relevant theories and concepts that serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis. Through the theoretical framework, this chapter brings together various literatures from the fields of political ecology, foreign aid, and policy implementation in order to facilitate examination of the main concerns of this study – namely, to assess to what extent and in what ways the ‘greening’ of aid occurred in the 1990s using a Japanese case study.

The history of aid-linked development has certainly been controversial. Thus, Bill Adams (2001: 381) has pointed out that development is “what is done to [human communities] by states and their ‘bankers’ and ‘expert’ agents, in the name of ... national integration, economic growth or thousands of other slogans”. With foreign aid, Northern states and their allies (such as international financial institutions and Northern banks) are seen to have directed development ‘in the name of progress.’ Yet, such aid has been frequently criticised by a variety of scholars and activists as being nothing more than an instrument designed to plunder both natural environments and poor people in the South rather than being something that provides meaningful help (Adams and Solomon 1985; Escobar 1995; FOEJ 2002b). Hence, foreign aid is undoubtedly a subject fit for political ecology analysis as it demonstrates unequal power relations between North and South notably through adverse social and environmental impacts on the latter.

This thesis represents one of the first in-depth studies of the political ecology of bilateral aid. In so doing, it draws on a diverse set of literatures encompassing political ecology, foreign aid and policy implementation that are selectively considered here. Specifically, the chapter begins with an assessment of the political ecology perspective and considers in particular how the discussion of aid flows illustrates aspects of the ‘contextual sources’ of environmental change that have hitherto gone under-explored. The second theoretical element of the thesis is then explored by way of a critical assessment of foreign aid literature and the possible ‘greening’ of aid

in the 1990s. Here, the multiple dimensions of greening are considered in relation to the aid process. The third aspect to the theoretical framework relates to processes of aid policy implementation – implementation theory, project implementation and environmental assessment processes in particular are highlighted. In aggregate, the framework underscores the complex and ambiguous nature of the ‘greening’ of the aid process when understood in terms of the unequal power relations and institutional interests that comprise that process.

## **2.1. A Political Ecology Perspective**

As a research field that gained momentum in the 1980s, political ecology has sought to provide a multi-faceted understanding of human-environmental interaction. In particular, in its most well known text, it was defined as combining “the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy ...encompass[ing] the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 17). “Land-based” resources were later widened to “environment” in order to provide a fuller account of “the political sources, conditions and ramification of environmental change” (Bryant 1992: 13).

Political ecology developed originally in reaction to the apolitical approach that was seen to be characteristic of mainstream development and environmental studies during the 1970s and 1980s (Peet and Watts 2004; Neumann 2005). To consider political questions seriously, political ecologists understood environmental change as a manifestation of the unequal power relations in which environmental costs and benefits are unequally distributed (Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). As a critical research project, attention was focused on unsustainable and inequitable resource use and ecological conditions mostly in the South, and that were caused by a complex political economy linking state predations and capitalist profiteering (e.g. Blaikie 1985; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Peluso 1992; Dauvergne 1997). This situation was seen to be a decidedly grim one that derived from both colonial and post-colonial practices (Guha 1989; Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). Bryant and Bailey (1997: 7-8) thus observed that “a



colonial legacy of integration in a global capitalist economy, natural resource dependency, environmental degradation and centralised political control have conditioned environmental use and conflict in postcolonial times. That legacy in turn continues to distinguish the Third World from elsewhere”. Indeed, and as Escobar (1995) notably shows, in spite of a half century of ‘development’, the vast majority of people there are still living in relative poverty and face intractable livelihood-based environmental conflicts (see Peet and Watts 2004).

For political ecologists, politics and environment are therefore everywhere thoroughly intertwined; environmental issues need to be studied in the context of unequal power structures, as well as institutional dynamics and discourses<sup>1</sup> (Escobar 1995; Harvey 1996; Bryant 2002; Neumann 2005). Recognising the importance of the *political* in political ecology reflects an attempt to appreciate Southern environmental changes and problems within the multi-scale political and economic contexts in which they arise. There is then, a ‘politicised environment’, a concept that recognises “the complex ways in which actors interact at the material and discursive levels over environmental questions” (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 47). Such an emphasis formed part of a ‘post-structural turn’ in political ecology in the 1990s that involved a move away from the class-focused structuralism of Marxist political ecology in the 1980s (Bryant 2001; Neumann 2005).

As the field of political ecology has matured, new issues and debates have emerged in recent years. One such debate in political ecology has been over the relative emphasis on politics as opposed to ecology in the analytical concerns of the field (Zimmer and Bassett 2003; Robbins 2004). Thus, while Peet and Watts (1996: 8) asserted that there was still “very little *politics*” in political ecology, Vayda and Walters (1999: 168) complained that too much stress was placed on political influences thereby ‘missing out’ non-political factors (like ecology; see Walker 2005) let alone “the complex

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<sup>1</sup> Discourse in general is defined as a shared meaning of a social phenomenon at various scales (local, national, international), which is (re)produced and transformed in forms of written or verbal statements (Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001). Discourse often involves shared myths and blueprints of the world. This thesis defines discourse as a set of ideas, concepts, and particular word patterns used notably in policy statements as well as knowledge upon which ideas and statements are based (see Adger et al. 2001; Bryant 1998, 2002).

and contingent interactions of factors whereby environmental changes often are produced.” Yet, the response has been to argue that the field attempts to understand diverse social and environmental changes in their political and economic contexts – and not simply those reflecting political influence (Watts and Peet 2004; Neumann 2005).

The practical political and ethical implications of political ecology have also been scrutinised. For example, the need for work on the contours of an ‘alternative’ political economy (Horta 2000), a better understanding of the relationship between environmental science and politics (Forsyth 2003), and a more complex sense of the ethics of scholarship and teaching (Bryant and Jarosz 2004) have been stressed. Meanwhile, one scholar worries that “disassociation from the instruments of policy” is making political ecologists “less effective in actually informing policy and mobilizing their conceptual insights for real-world change” (Robbins 2003: 644). Finally debate has erupted over the framing of political ecology in terms of a First/Third World dichotomy. Thus, Walker (2003: 7) labels this practice “problematic” in so far as it leaves the field “poorly positioned to address ... broad-scale comparative questions”. Instead, he asserts the need for a ‘regional approach’ to present ‘a scale of analysis’ that examines the commonalities as well as the particularities of environmental politics across the First and Third World divide (Walker 2003). Here, there is an echo of the ‘regional political ecology’ proposed by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987).

Indeed, Walker’s claim here is exaggerated since a regional multi-scale approach has been embedded in the field from the start – an approach that has always addressed the inter-linkages of North and South in both past and present (e.g. Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Dauvergne 1997; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Rocheleau et al. 1996; see also Zimmer 2006). ‘Chains of explanation’ have bound together North and South in the research (Blaikie 1995), with much insight thereby provided on multi-scale power dynamics and environmental interaction.

That said, there certainly *is* room for further in-depth study of *specific* North-South connections, given that this remains an under-developed aspect



to political ecology, especially ‘rich thick description’ of the aid process. Indeed, that is a key aim of this thesis as it explores the specific mechanism of bilateral aid between Japan and the Philippines in order to gauge whether the ‘greening’ of Japan’s international cooperation has occurred.

## **2. 1. 1. Conceptualising Aid as a Source of Environmental Change**

Detailed work on the impact of Northern states on Southern states and their environments has been patchy. While some overall assessments have been attempted (e.g. Maul 1992; Dauvergne 1997; Taylor 1999), the sheer complexity of the task has been off-putting and has meant that most political ecology work focuses largely on ‘local’ impacts and dynamics (Brown and Purcell 2005; Robbins 2004; see Turner 2004; Warren et al. 2001). Yet, and given the importance of bilateral flows across North and South (see below), it is vital to study how a particular (Northern) state is linked through its aid policies to specific environmental interactions beyond its boundary in another (Southern) country setting .

There is certainly a longstanding call for the study of “contextual sources of environmental change” as a key referent in political ecology, since it identifies “... the state policies, interstate relations, and global capitalism reflecting the growing impact of national and transnational forces on the environment in a world of increased political and economic interdependence” (Bryant 1992: 15; see also William 2000; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). Compared with the amount of work done on the environmental performance of the state in domestic contexts, *interstate* sources of environmental change have been less explored in the political ecology literature (Bryant 1992; Robbins 2004; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Saying this, some attention has been paid to interstate warfare and its ecological impacts (Harwell 1985; Westing 1988; Pittock 1989; Plant 1992; Thomas 1995; UNEP 1999; Austin 2000). Recent international crises in the Middle East encompassing notably the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the Iraq war in 2003 (Hoskins 1997; Bird Life International 2003a, 2003b; FOE 2003a, 2003b) have underscored links between state-linked violence, resource struggles and environmental devastation (see also Le Billon 2001;

Global Witness 2003; Unruh et al. 2003).

However, environmental change has been caused not only by such violent interstate practices. Indeed, non-violent interactions between states may even be a more important ‘contextual source’ of environmental change. Trade and bilateral aid are key examples here. For the trade and environment interface, a great deal of attention has been paid to the multifaceted and usually adverse environmental impacts of diverse natural resource based trading relations such as logging, mining or pulp and paper (e.g. Casson 2000; Dauvergne 2001; Emberson-Bain 1994; Gedicks 2001; Goldsmith 1997; Karliner 1997; Lohmann 1996; Marchak 1995). In contrast, for the bilateral aid and environment interface, there is only a modest literature available, most of which has pinpointed the devastating socio-ecological consequences of aid for Southern recipients (e.g. Forrest 1991; FOEJ 200b; Hayter 1989; Sumi 2004). The relative lack of attention to the environmental implications of bilateral aid is nonetheless surprising given that interaction between donor and recipient can result in adverse impacts on a scale that possibly even rivals those that arise from war (Sumi 2004; The Reality of Aid Network 2004).

One of the more interesting studies in this regard has been produced by Dauvergne (1997) who detailed some of the harmful direct and indirect environmental impacts of North-South bilateral state (and corporate) interaction. Using the concepts of ‘shadow ecology’<sup>2</sup> and ‘patron-client politics’, Dauvergne (1997) assessed foreign aid alongside others flows (corporate investment, technological transfer, trade) in order to show how Japanese bilateral relations adversely affected timber supplies and management in Southeast Asia. By focusing on the “largely unexplored terrain of the environmental impact of bilateral state relations” and identifying “political relations as a key force driving environmental degradation”, Dauvergne (1997:10) usefully marked out a terrain for further

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<sup>2</sup> Natural resources in the developing countries are, out of economic necessity, often over-exploited to the advantage of the more powerful (i.e. richer) market players (as well as developing country economic and political elites); in most cases ecological capital is consumed in (or to the benefit of) developed countries, thousands of miles away from its country of origin. MacNeill et al. (1991) have referred to this phenomenon as the ‘shadow ecology’ of an economy (see also Dauvergne 1997).



political ecology inquiry. Despite this, Dauvergne's study barely scratches the surface of the complex institutional dynamics at play.

Foreign aid, as one element of a given donor state's external policy, reflects some of a state's priorities and practices, and at the same time, may precipitate environment change in recipient countries in the 'South'. It is therefore a subject ripe for political ecology analysis. Nevertheless, this significant interstate source of environmental change must be situated in the broader context of global environmental politics and international political economy so as to underscore the complex history and links between global/regional political economy and environmental change in the South.

### **2.1.2. Constructing Needs: Donor Interests and a Politicised Environment in the South**

It is often proclaimed, usually by Northern states themselves, that "donors expect no economic gain or political strategy advancement through foreign aid" (Patterson 1997: xx). Yet, this claim is simply not tenable. Indeed, foreign aid has always been highly political even when the immediate purpose of that aid has been to facilitate economic growth in a recipient country (Ferguson 1990; Arase 1995; Escobar 1995). Aid is constantly politicised and careful analysis reveals the firmly calculated behaviour of donors in pursuit of their national interests (Gounder 1994; Arase 1995; Fairman and Ross 1996; FOEJ 1997; Katada 1997; Adger et al. 2003). To appreciate this situation, and to set the scene for our consideration of the 'greening' of aid as an integral element in the politicisation of Southern environments, we need to next provide a brief overview of the historical political economy of the aid industry.

Much research has documented how foreign aid allocations have usually been determined by the economic/commercial interests and political or 'strategic considerations' of donors rather than by recipients' needs (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Pronk 2001; Tujan Jr. 2001). Factors such as former colonial ties and ongoing political alliances have been major determinants of aid flows.<sup>3</sup> So long as donors' political and economic

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<sup>3</sup> Among the big three bilateral donors (1970-1994), the U.S. has targeted about one third

interests shape aid flows, the donor-recipient relationship can never be one based on equality or mutual respect (although, the extent to which aid relations might *ever* be based upon donor-recipient equality is open to question). Indeed, foreign aid is often seen to represent an “extension of highly exploitative North-South relationships that either preserve or widen economic disparities between wealthy states and Third World countries” (Schraeder et al. 1998: 298-299). This sort of view has been important among neo-Marxists in particular who consider aid to be simply “another instrument of domination” by the North (Raffer and Singer 1996: 62). Foreign aid may have been formally set up to achieve economic development of the ‘underdeveloped Third World’, yet it has been Southern recipients as well as their biophysical environments that have been politicised in order to serve donor interests (Escobar 1995).

There is a long historical process at work here. The formation of capitalism in Western Europe (linked to the world economic system, see Wallerstein 1974) necessitated plentiful raw materials for industrial development drawn from Asia, Africa and Latin America, notably in the guise of colonial role. Colonialism thus had a profound effect on the political, economic as well as socio-cultural features of the South. Of particular relevance to this thesis, colonialism caused “a series of political and administrative transformations that have conditioned resource exploitation” (Bryant and Parnwell 1996: 6) – with attendant significant environmental consequences in the South.

After World War II, foreign assistance or ‘aid’ to the decolonised ‘Third World’ came in the form of loans and grants from former colonial powers keen to continue their hegemonic influence (Hayter 1989; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Thus, for example, between 1970 and 1994, over 70 percent of British aid was spent in the ‘poorest countries’ who happened to be former British colonies, and France disbursed 60 percent of its aid contribution to its former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Much of this money was spent on building infrastructure in Southern

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of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel; France has given overwhelmingly to its former colonies and allies in the UN; and in the case of Japan, countries that vote along with it in the UN and other international bodies (such as the International Whaling Commission) receive assistance and Japan’s strategic alliances are notably built around investment and trade relationships (Alesina and Dollar 2000: 55-56; and see Chapter 4).



countries in aid of national economic development. Yet, most of these efforts benefited mainly powerful elite groups in control of the recipient state as well as Northern businesses commissioned for project work (for a contrasting view, see Hanabusa 1991; World Bank 1993; Franco-Rodriguez et al. 1998; Kosack 2003; McGillivraya and Ouattara 2005). At the same time, the provision of aid played a key role in profoundly disrupting and degrading Southern environments: as Northern donors defined ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ planning for Southern countries, the latter were “being incorporated into the world capitalist economy, even (as the most remote communities) ... [were] torn apart from their local context and redefined as ‘resources’” (Escobar 1995: 194). Indeed, as the resource-based identity of most Southeast Asian countries even today illustrates,<sup>4</sup> post-colonial aid entrenched the role of Southern states as raw material supply centres for Northern consumption (Dauvergne 1997; Hurst 2003).

The Cold War also played a great role in shaping donor interest in aid. In January 1949, American President Truman’s inauguration speech strongly advocated pro-capitalist developmentalism and used a “geographical imagination [that] transformed the post-War world into ‘undeveloped’ and ‘prosperous’ areas” (Dodds 2002: 3; see also Patterson 1997). Newly styled ‘Third World’ recipients were politicised as an object of development and democratisation under a U.S.-led containment policy. Aid was thus seen to be an effective new ‘tool of statecraft’ (Brown 2001) “to influence the recipients, to stabilise ‘friendly’ governments ... and to keep countries within the ‘Free World’” (Raffer and Singer 1996: 58).

The political and economic interest of donors is clearly demonstrated in aid flow during the Cold War. Foreign aid was allocated to resource abundant ‘independent’ Third World countries to keep them as allies of the Western ‘Free World’ rather than allies of the Eastern Communist block or ‘Second World’ (Raffer and Singer 1996; Patterson 1997). The Clay Report in 1963 clearly demonstrated America’s interests: “72 percent of total (military and

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<sup>4</sup> The identification of countries by the former colonial rulers was based on the large-scale production of selected natural resources, such as Burma and Thailand with rice and teak, Java with coffee and sugar, Malaysia with palm oil and rubber, and the Philippines with sugar and coconuts (Bryant and Parnwell 1996).

economic) assistance” was disbursed to “allies and other countries on the Sino-Soviet border” (Ohlin 1966: 21). Indeed, as Wolf (1960: 283-284) highlighted, political and economic motives were paramount even as “humanitarian objectives are not, nor do they appear likely to be, prominent among the continuing objectives of US foreign aid”. Therefore, “their importance in donors’ *realpolitik* was minute at best” (Raffer and Singer 1996: 62).

It was not only the United States that mixed political interests with aid in this way. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) gave aid only to countries accepting the Hallstein Doctrine that specified that recipients were not to recognize the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Berlin Clause that only allowed them to accept the West German view on divided Berlin (Raffer and Singer 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). These requirements underpinned bilateral German aid (as well as multilateral European Economic Community aid) throughout the 1980s (Raffer and Singer 1996). At the same time it is important to note that the manifestation of the Cold War in the South was not simply a ‘blueprint’ imposed through superpower rivalries; instead, Third World leaders would often manipulate Cold War tensions, playing East and West off of each other, to achieve maximum gains in their own domestic political and/or economic interests (Gaddis 1996).

Aid policies required a new justification among the electorates of donor countries with the end of the Cold War. The rationale for post-Cold War aid notably took on a green hue. On the one hand, the concept of sustainable development was popularised by the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), while on the other hand the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 officially affirmed the importance of sustainable development as the basis for a global partnership to combat global environmental threats (Grubb et al. 1993; Middleton et al 1993; Sachs 1993; Hajer 1995). As a global environmental management system was needed to regulate endangered global commons such as the oceans and the



atmosphere, the Third World or the ‘South’ as it has increasingly been called, became the renewed focus of a (sustainable) development agenda (Escobar 1995).

As such, successive waves of political intervention have constantly reinforced unequal power relations between the North and the South, notably in the sphere of foreign aid. Such intervention has been complemented and often reinforced by sweeping changes in the international political economy. Thus, a globalising capitalist economy has further intensified the uneven relations between ‘developed’ North and ‘less developed’ South. Indeed, as neo-liberalism has ‘triumphed’, inequalities have continued to prevail in a contemporary system based on resource exploitation, a highly inequitable international division of labour, mass consumerism in the North (as well as among the affluent in the South), and enhanced environmental degradation in the South (Escobar 1995; Peet and Watts 2004). This “expropriation process ... lies at the core of environmental destruction and continued poverty in developing countries” (Turner 1991: 168). The shifting nature of foreign aid policy over the years thus demonstrates not only the shifting way Northern donors have conceptualised recipients, but also the way they have constructed and politicised their interests and Southern recipients’ needs.

## **2. 2. ‘Greening’ of Aid**

This chapter has so far highlighted the political ecology perspective in general and how that perspective can accommodate the aid process as a ‘contextual’ source that links the political economy of aid and affected Southern politicised environments in particular. The second element in the theoretical framework of the thesis extends this discussion by addressing in a selective manner the literature on the possible greening of aid in the post-Cold War 1990s.

By the late 1980s research had already begun to criticise the environmental impact of mega-development aid projects. Thus, investigative journalists, nongovernmental organisation (NGO) activists, environmentalists, and academics related their findings on environmental destruction directly to aid

projects (Adams and Solomon 1985; Adams 1990; Forrest 1991; Sumi 1992; Wilks and Hildyard 1994). Meanwhile, the proclaimed greening of aid had begun to emerge as a trend at the same time. However, the greening process during the 1990s was discussed by some writers as a set of “striking trends ... with limited success” (Watts and Peet 2004: 4). There is indeed some dispute here – as considered in the following discussion.

### 2.2.1. Definition

There is, to begin with, debate over what ‘greening’ itself has meant. The term ‘green’ since the mid-1980s has increasingly been “used in politics, and then spreading as a ...friendly alternative to environment ... particularly in media discussion of development issues” (Barrow 1995: 285). In the field of foreign aid, it became closely related to the practical application of the sustainable development concept through aid programmes and projects (WCED 1987; OECD 1992, 1997). The World Bank, for example, put greater emphasis on the ‘greening’ of aid, which led other aid donors to act in concert with the global ‘greening’ process (Wade 1997; William 2000; Goldman 2004, 2005).

As with ‘sustainable development’, however, the term ‘greening’ has meant many things to many people. As Hajer (1995: 13) pointed out, “the various actors have rather different social and cognitive commitments” over environmental issues. For example, World Bank professionals and ‘radical’ academics are unlikely to share the same view (Potter 1994; cf. World Bank 1995 and Escobar 1995), thus, while the former insist on ‘weak sustainability’ as the correct path, the latter propose ‘strong sustainability’ as the only solution (Pearce 1993; Neumayer 1999).<sup>5</sup>

Given that the term ‘green’ does not have one straightforward definition, ‘green’ can be (and has been) appropriated in different ways to serve the

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<sup>5</sup> There is much debate over ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability as a mechanism by which the present generation can compensate the future one through the transfer of capital (Pearce 1993; Blowers and Glasbergen 1995). Weak sustainability believes human-made capital can substitute natural capital that is often non-renewable, while strong sustainability asserts there is a limit to the ability to substitute between ecological capital and human-made capital because of uncertainty and the irreversibility of natural capital (Pearce 1993; Neumayer 1999; for discussion of aid and sustainable development, see below).



interests of diverse actors (such as states, transnational corporations, NGOs, and grassroots actors) in the sphere of global environmental politics (Hajer 1995). Due to the inter-subjectivity and multi-facetedness of its nature, the term ‘green’ thus connotes several “changeable, associative meanings” (Hall 1993: 96) and encompasses a wide range of the issues involved in the development and environment fields (Carter 2001). Before looking at the ‘greening’ of aid in the 1990s in more detail, it is important to examine further possible meanings of ‘greening’ as this bears on our later discussion of changes in aid.

As discussed by many scholars, the word ‘greening’ is often defined in relation to various green social movements as a process by which environment-related symbols have become increasingly significant in the mainstream political and social arena (e.g. Barrow 1995; Buttel 1993; Merchant 1992; Porritt 1984; Spretnak and Capra 1985). Buttel’s understanding is most pertinent here, though, as we relate the notion of greening to the process of foreign aid – especially since this thesis sees ‘greening’ as a political process that is purportedly about how existing policies, institutions and practices are reformed (see Chapter 1). Thus, Buttel (1993: 12) specifies that “the greening of institutions and institutional practices [is] the trend towards environmental considerations being increasingly brought to bear in political and economic decisions, in ... scientific research institutions, in geopolitics, and so on” (see also Frank et al. 2000). This sort of basic definition is used in relation to the practices and policies of diverse international actors including, for instance, the European Union (Lenschow 2002a, 200b), the United Nations (Mensah 1996; Timoshenko and Berman 1996), the World Bank (Horta 1996; Wade 1997) and the World Trade Organisation (Weinstein and Charnovitz 2001). Indeed, it meshes well with developments in the 1990s (our main temporal focus in this thesis) when the sustainable development concept became increasingly popular with states around the world as well as leading international organisations as a possible basis for policy change (UNCED 1993; Victor 2006; see below).

This definition of the greening process is also somewhat akin to a parallel

discussion that surrounds the concept of ecological modernization (Adams 2001). Ecological modernisation is defined as the discourse that “recognizes the structural character of the environmental problematique [but] nonetheless assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalise care for the environment” (Hajer 1995: 25). Both ecological modernization and greening further relate to discursive and institutional dynamics whereby environmental considerations are internalised in *existing* political, economic, and social institutions (Fairman and Ross 1996; McAfee 1999; Peet and Watts 2004).

However, there are debates over the extent to which the push to go ‘green’ is internally or externally generated – of which discussion in turn links to reflexive modernisation (Beck et al 1994; Peet and Watts 2004). Reflexive modernization focuses on “the self-reflexive qualities of modernization and on the ways in which the ecological costs and consequences of capitalist modernity are built reflexively into modernity itself” (Peet and Watts 2004: 21). It is important to acknowledge those arguments saying that ‘greening’ is not merely a product of symbolic events such as the Rio Earth Summit or of external pressure from NGOs since the late 1980s – although these have been undeniably significant (Fox and Brown 1998; William 2000; Maeda, interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004).<sup>6</sup> It is true that externally driven factors accelerated the ‘greening’ process. Yet, ‘green’ shifts in institutional orientation have also “evolved over time” by being reflexive about the success and failure of past practices (Ondrik, interview, 2004).<sup>7</sup> In this view, the greening process – internalising sustainable development as a key element – has proceeded as a result of donors being reflexive about donors’ past experiences while being adaptive to externally driven criticism and pressure (William 2000; Maeda, interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004).

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<sup>6</sup> The relation between ‘greening’ and reflexive modernisation was observed in my own research during an interview with ADB Philippines chief country officer Richard Ondrik on 6 May 2004. He stressed the greening of aid in the 1990s was “not just (a product of) the Rio (Summit) which obviously had a great impact in many aspects (but also the ADB’s learning from the success and failure of past projects changed the policy.” (Ondrik, interview, 2004; see also William 2000).

<sup>7</sup> Most studies of the World Bank concluded that it was a simple ‘adaptation’ rather than institutional ‘learning’, which would be argued by many World Bank staff that their institutional greening process was “driven primarily by internal learning” (Fox and Brown 1998: 11).



For most Northern donors, such reflexive behaviour is also linked to shifts in domestic environmental perceptions and politics. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Canada, Germany, Netherlands and the UK, (Lenschow 2002a, 2002b; OECD 2002b). However, in the case of Japan, it has been a slightly different story due to its culturally unique aid system (see Chapter 4). While a fuller discussion of Japan's 'green' background, especially vis-à-vis aid, is given in Chapter 4, here we will discuss the Japanese domestic environmental perceptions and politics in general and its relation to its aid practice. Japan's domestic greening thus started in the early 1970s with an emphasis by government on brown issues and industrial pollution in particular (Ui 1992; Evans 1999; Schreurs 2002). This shift was due to the outbreak of pollution related diseases beginning in the late 1960s<sup>8</sup> that had led to a special session of the National Diet (Japan's parliament) in 1971 called "*kōgai kokkai* (pollution session of National Diet)" (Ui 1992; Broadbent 1998).<sup>9</sup> This series of events produced strict pollution regulations and also brought about major advances in Japan's environmental technology capacity (JBIC 2002d; Revell 2003). Along with these events, many 'green' related terms emerged such as *kankyō-ni yasashī* (environmentally friendly), *chikyū-ni yasashī* (earth-friendly), *eko* (ecological), which are frequently used by Japanese industries in describing their products or production processes (Toyota Motor Corporation 1992; Marubeni 1998; Honda Motor 2002; see also Sugiyama and Imura 1999; Revell 2003).<sup>10</sup>

This aspect of Japan's domestic 'greening' process is reflected on Japan's aid priority in brown issues with a particular focus on industrial pollution (Evans 1999; Wong 2001). There are two pragmatic reasons for this tendency. The first reason relates to Japan's development of technology on industrial pollution/waste management from the 1980s that was then seen to

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<sup>8</sup> Rapid industrialisation resulted in the four major pollution diseases: organic mercury poisoning in Nīgata, *Minamata byō* (mercury poisoning) in Minamata, *Itai-itai byō* (cadmium-poisoning) in Toyama, and *Yokkaichi zensoku* (asthma) in Yokkaich (Ui 1992; Mason 1999).

<sup>9</sup> It is interesting to note that the Japanese term '*kōgai*' (pollution in English) literally means 'harm to the public' (or public domain), which clearly has stronger moral implications associated with it than its English counter-part. Considering there is an exact word for environmental pollution '*kankyō-osen*', the use of the term '*kōgai*' reflects a broader link to Japanese philosophy on nature and pollution (Ui 1992; see also Asquith and Kalland 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Toyota and Honda's advertisements use these terms and simultaneously emphasise their roles as global citizens that act on environmental conservation and sustainable development issues (Toyota Motor Corporation 1992; Honda Motor 2002)



be readily transferable to developing countries (Evans 1999; Mason 1999; Takayanagi 2003). The second concerns rapidly escalating environmental pollution in Japan's top recipient countries in East and Southeast Asia that also directly affects Japan, such as the increased frequency and intensity of yellow sand storms (*kousa*) originating from China (Evans 1999; JBIC 2000b; 2002c; Takayanagi, interview, 2003).

However, and as diverse scholars point out, for the most part the greening of Japan's international cooperation policy was greatly influenced by the global greening process itself (JACSES 1996; Potter 1996; Imura and Schreurs 2005; see Chapter 4). This situation can be explained by two main factors. The first is that, by the very nature of aid, Japan's international cooperation policy is an external matter not a domestic one, not least as it is used as a foreign policy tool (Kusano 1993, 1997; Orr and Koppel 1993; Komori 2002). Due to its peace constitution – stating the country's renunciation of war – Japanese aid has been regarded as a means to exert its influence on the international political arena (Auer 1990; Keddell 1993; Iokibe 2003). By way of pursuing its political and economic interests, post-war Japanese aid policy has been described as promoting exports via tied aid, fostering resource diplomacy by way of securing oil and natural resources for Japan's industry, and developing and deepening strategic alliances in international politics (Potter 1996; Alesina and Dollar 2000). In addition to this, public awareness (or understanding) of Japanese aid in Japan has remained relatively low compared with other Northern donor countries (see also Dalton 2005; Dunlap et al. 1993),<sup>11</sup> although the series of ODA scandals since the mid-1980s investigated in the National Diet certainly raised *some* consciousness of the issue (see Chapters 4 and 5). Therefore, in the Japanese context, the permeation of *domestic* green terminologies in international cooperation policy is of far less significance

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<sup>11</sup> For example, in the UK the influence of domestic politics on the international sphere can be illustrated through popular events such as Band Aid in 1984, Live Aid in 1986 and Live 8 in 2005. Also the sheer number of officially recognised NGOs working on international development can suggest the British public awareness as there are now 290 NGOs officially recognised by the UK Government's Department for International Development (BOND 2006a, 2006b). In contrast, in Japan, no such official recognition or registration exists for NGOs. Even though there were 368 NGOs in operation in 1996 (Hirata 2002), there was no dialogue between the Japanese government and NGOs over aid policy until 1996 (Murai 2003, MOFA 2006). The first MOFA consultation with NGOs was held in 1996 and that of JBIC was only held in 2001 (JBIC 2001a, 2001e).

to that policy than the role played by a global aid discourse that is shared with other major Northern donors (JICA 2001a; FOEJ 2002b; Hori 2003; Matsumoto 2004; Murai 2004).

The second factor explaining the great influence of global greening dynamics on Japanese international cooperation relates to Japan's own weak environmental assessment system (Imura 1997; McCormack 1998; Huber 2000; Revell 2003). In the 1990s, the greening of aid emphasised the role of the environmental assessment process in project implementation, of which Japan had not been able until then to develop an appropriate regulatory system (Barrett and Therivel 1991; Imura and Schreurs 2005).<sup>12</sup> Policy recommendations by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1985, 1992), arising from Rio Summit (UNCED 1993), and linked to the seventh goal on environmental sustainability of the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2005) thus played a greater role in influencing the 'greening' of Japan's international cooperation than they did for other leading Northern donors.<sup>13</sup> For Japanese aid, external pressure (*gaiatsu*) was in turn, more prominent and influential on this matter than was the case for domestic environmental issues.<sup>14</sup>

The greening of aid in the 1990s was thus a phenomenon that sought to transform institutional practices through the application of sustainable development ideals to aid projects (MOFA 1992; World Bank 1997) and at the same time as a political process that required existing policies to be reformed through the incorporation of environmental considerations into decision-making (OECD 1992; and see below). Therefore, the 'greening' of

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<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Japan only enacted the environmental impact assessment law in 1997 (GOJ 1997), which is the latest EIA law among the 29 OECD member countries (Harashina 1997).

<sup>13</sup> A Japanese government official admitted that Japan was particularly sensitive to criticism from the US and Europe (Potter 1994).

<sup>14</sup> It cannot be denied that domestic and international NGOs played a part in greening Japan's international cooperation to a certain degree. For example, Friends of the Earth Japan approached National Diet members to raise issues with the San Roque Multipurpose Dam during National Diet sessions and have appealed to the public via media campaigning (FOEJ 1997; JEXIM 1999b; National Diet 2000). However, there was no regular dialogue channel arranged between aid agencies and NGOs or room for NGOs to make policy recommendations during the 1990s, the first 'NGO-JBIC Regular Consultation' took place in April 2001 (JBIC 2001a, 2001e). Such lack of public participation in turn indicated that Japan's domestic green movements (both social and political) have been unsuccessful to become institutionalised while those in the Western donor countries have played an integral role in environmental policy making (Schreurs 1996: 1; see also Broadbent 1998).



aid was indeed linked to both internally and externally driven shifts in donor perception of institutional practice, ecological modernisation and reflexive modernization dynamics.

### 2.2.2. A 'Green' Shift in the Aid Paradigm

The 'greening' of aid in the 1990s entailed a process that required important policy changes and some level of institutional transformation. An important impetus for the push of the green paradigm shift in global environmental politics was the report, *Our Common Future* (WCED 1987). This report suggested a promising role for 'green' aid by means of a strong call for a global 'greening' agenda. Linking environment issues with development has a long history. However, regarding foreign aid, "it was only with the publication of the Brundtland ... report in 1987 that this problem was seriously placed on the agenda" (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 15). This can be seen as one of the reports that created a so-called paradigm shift in aid policy (Hajer 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003). The Brundtland Report provided a new rationale for aid initiatives in the post-Cold War era. It certainly eased the need for painful cuts in aid flows as donor interests shifted from Cold War concerns to environmental issues. At the same time, however, it reflected the considerable pressure that environmentalists and NGOs put on aid providers in the 1980s that had been amplified by much media coverage (Fisher 1993; Wapner 1995, 1996; Wade 1997; William 2000; Desai 2002).

As with the Cold War itself, the US played a key role in this shift. In the early 1990s, the US aid discourse thus moved from a Cold War linked geopolitical strategy to one based on sustainable development and democratisation that soon acquired global recognition. Accordingly, the Clinton administration announced some important changes in 1994 that included the release of a major new aid policy statement entitled *Strategies for Sustainable Development* (USAID 1994) as well as a proposal for a new foreign aid law 'Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act (PPDA)' (JACSES 1996; Grant et al. 1997).<sup>15</sup> These documents suggested that sustainable

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<sup>15</sup> The PPDA was presented to the Congress in 1994. However, the bill was not passed due to the Republican opposition that was then in majority in the Congress (Grant et al. 1997).

development was indeed now a top priority in US policy even as such development was linked firmly to the multifaceted advancement of US national interests in an American-dominated post-Cold War era (Gore 1992; Grant et al. 1997; Hopgood 1998; Harris 2001). This policy shift was seemingly demonstrated in practice when the US government refused to fund the controversial Three Gorges Dam in China (IRN 1995b).<sup>16</sup> As US foreign aid policy was thus readjusted, other Northern donors also began to ‘mainstream’ environmental concerns and promote sustainable development strategies (Maull 1992; Adams 2001; Goldman 2004).

From the late 1980s, Japan also started emphasising the importance of environmental conservation driven both by the emergence of environmental issues in international relations and its own achievement of the status of the world’s largest donor in 1989 (Potter 1994; see also Chapter 4). Japan expressed its determination to take environmental factors into account in its activities and promised increasing environmental aid – some US \$300 million at the G7 Summit of 1989 and a further \$700 million at the Rio Summit in 1992 (MOFA 1997a; JICA 2001a). The Japanese government introduced its first Official Development Assistance environmental guidelines in 1989, and announced a fully fledged *kankyō-enjyo* (environmental aid) policy in 1991 (MOFA 1991). These efforts continued when the ODA charter was finally adopted by the Japanese Cabinet in June 1992, which clearly recognised and prioritised environmental problems as a global issue (MOFA 1992, 2003a). Thus, while Japan’s aid policy reorientation was not as dramatic as that of the US, dramatic increases in environmental aid combined with formal recognition in ODA principles of green concerns were significant policy changes (Nuscheler and Warkentin 2000; see also Chapter 4).

These sorts of green policy pronouncements by Northern aid providers were usually welcomed by NGOs and Southern recipients as a response to

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<sup>16</sup> Due to Clinton administration pressure, the US Export-Import Bank refused its financial assistance to US companies linked to the Three Gorges Dam, one of the world’s most socially and environmentally controversial dams (IRN 1995b). A memo dated 22 September 1995 from the White House to the Ex-Im Bank stated “we think it would be unwise for the US Government to align itself with a project that raises environmental and human rights concerns on the scale of the Three Gorges” (IRN 1995b Online).



worsening global environmental problems in the 1990s. However, some environmentalists and other activists continued to challenge donors on the nature and pace of their reforms in order to draw attention to the still adverse environmental impact of aid projects (JACSES 1996; FOEJ 1997, 2002b; William 2000). As the literature thus highlights, greening was firmly in the official agenda, but with contestation still present.

### **2.2.3. Aid and Sustainable Development**

Above all the ‘greening’ of aid offered new opportunities for Northern donors to reformulate and reorganise their development assistance to developing countries through the concept of sustainable development (Davis 1992; Keohane and Levy 1996; World Bank 2000a; OECD 2002a). Accordingly, Northern donors related ‘greening’ issues in their aid to fostering the concept of ‘sustainable development’ in policy initiatives (Escobar 1998). However, the utility of the sustainable development concept has been widely disputed by scholars (see below). Since tensions in the sustainable development concept, in turn, have very important implications for the greening of aid, this topic, requires therefore further assessment.

As noted above, ‘greening’ shares a range of concerns with the concept of sustainable development. The latter was famously defined as: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43). While sustainable development was the concept that “a wide range of nongovernmental as well as governmental organizations ... embraced ... as the new paradigm of development” in the 1990s (Lélé 1991: 607), it had its own contradictions and weaknesses (Redclift 1987, 1992, 2002; Daly 1996; Harvey 1998). Therefore, it is seen by a number of scholars to focus ultimately more on the effects of environmental degradation on economic growth and the potential for growth rather than focusing on the harmful environmental consequences of development. It is about “... keeping those capitalistic activities going” (Harvey 1998: 331), which results in “... a supine surrender to the agendas of neoliberal capital” (Middleton and O’Keefe 2003: 9; see also McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Other terms used – such as ‘green developmentalism’ (McAfee 1999) and ‘green

neoliberalism' (Goldman 2004) reinforce this sense of 'business as usual' vis-à-vis the environment (Gupta 1998).

Sustainable development is also linked to "several different discourses ... some of which are mutually exclusive", and those discourses can be used to "justify, or embellish" actions taken by any actor in the sphere of global environmental politics (Redclift 2002: 275, see also Hajer 1995; Watts and Peet 2004). The all-in-one nature of the concept may have provided it with political strength, but at the same time that strength discloses significant weaknesses. This double-edged quality stemmed, it was argued, from its incomplete understanding of interlinked poverty and environmental issues as well as its indecisive views on the role of economic growth, sustainability and stakeholder participation in sustainable development (Fergus and Rowney 2005; Lélé 1991; Mog 2004). The ambiguous nature of sustainable development matters in particular as a now global economy further intensifies the unequal power relations, resource and wealth distribution between North and South (Adams 2001; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992). Even though sustainable development did not overcome its own contradictions and weaknesses, it has been argued that it has "served as a concept, a policy prescription and a moral imperative" (Redclift 2002: 275). Moreover, it continues to serve as the main concept in the process of the 'greening' of aid in the early twenty first century – for example, as the goal seven (on environmental sustainability) of the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2005). Hence, and in so far as the 'greening' of foreign aid involves incorporating sustainable development into policy, those same contradictions and weaknesses are simply replayed in the greening process.

At the same time, the 'greening' of foreign aid is conditioned by the way in which aid has been delivered from the start. As noted, given that foreign aid has its origin in the post-war reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan and was later reshaped as ODA for economic development (Raffer and Singer 1996; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003), it was never intended as a means to conserve the environment or tackle global environmental threats. As Adams noted (1990: 167) "the 'greening' of



development is bizarre theoretically in the context of the established disciplines of development planning, troublesome in terms of policy, and highly inconvenient administratively”. Foreign aid, as well as being intrinsically about economic development, may in turn thus cause conflict with the process of ‘greening’ which attempts to mainstream the environment in the policy process. As such, and noting that sustainable development has not yet been able to overcome its own contradictions, the ‘greening’ of foreign aid cannot escape from the same dilemmas that the popular adoption of the concept of sustainable development has seemingly entailed.

#### **2.2.4. Global Environmental Agenda**

In all of the ambiguity and contradictions of these green concepts, there was therefore ample scope for the continuation of unequal North-South power relations in the 1990s, notably concerning the setting of the global environmental agenda. At the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, there were broadly two contrasting perspectives adopted by donors and recipients. Southern countries notably requested Northern counterparts to provide aid to help them out of *their* dilemma concerning development and environmental issues – that is, the need to boost economic growth while conserving the environment (Grubb et al. 1993). However, this request failed to draw much support from Northern donors keen to reshape the global environmental agenda to suit their own interests. Thus, Northern environmental concerns focused on ‘green’ issues such as biodiversity protection and ozone depletion that threatened a perceived global commons, while Southern environmental concern tended to focus on ‘brown’ issues such as water pollution and land degradation (Forsyth 2002; Lewis 2003). Not surprisingly, then, the outcome of Rio was a global environmental governance system that was predisposed to Northern interests. Thus, the four global priorities of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (biodiversity, climate change, international waters, and ozone depletion) clearly epitomise this outcome, as does the GEF’s policy aphorism – “protecting the global commons for the heritage of humanity” (Lewis 2003: 147). Indeed, the ‘green’ agenda itself is a product of global environmental politics that clearly depicts contrasting interests of North and South (Forsyth

2002). Nonetheless, and given that ‘greening’ is a political process that requires existing policy and development practices to be reassessed, there is no mention of the need for both Northern consumers and Southern elites to change their consumption patterns, nor of the need to question the increasingly destructive effects of global economic structures, processes and institutions on local-level environments and communities (Chatterjee and Finger 1994).

The ‘capture’ of the global governance agenda in this way has had knock on effects in Southern countries too. Sustainable development strategies (including National Conservation Strategies and Environmental Action Plans) in recipient countries were often “required (or inspired) by an external agency, and connected to financial conditionalities” (OECD 2001: 16). ‘Green conditionality’ thus promotes the ‘greening’ of Southern policies as the importance of environmental interests in aid flows and financial transfers from the North mount, but in keeping with the *latter’s* environmental agenda (Blaikie 1995; Fairman and Ross 1996). Since attaching a ‘green’ label to an aid proposal often enhances the chance of a positive outcome (Keohane 1996), there is an automatic incentive that drives prospective aid recipients to please donors with ‘green’ policies reflective of ‘sustainable development’ (Davies 1992; Keohane and Levy 1996; Ross 1996; Lewis 2003). Indeed, conservation planning in Southern countries is often led directly by aid agencies, international conservation organisations, NGOs, and international agreements (Bryant 2000; Zimmerer 2000; Lawrence 2002). By imposing Northern priorities on ‘wild’ park development through ‘green conditionality’ (Neumann 1998), for instance, the provision of ‘green’ aid typifies the donors’ endeavours to influence Southern countries to accept their priorities, rather than simply to provide resources in keeping with recipient countries’ priorities (Connolly 1996; Lewis 2003; Carmin and Vandever 2004). Unequal power relations between donor and recipient are clear. As the literature highlights, this inequality manifests itself even in the very provision of ‘green’ aid as well as the way in which donors distribute it (Adams 2001).

For some, though, the apparent gap between Northern aid objectives and Southern recipient needs is an unintended outcome of the process (Kusano



1993, 1997; McGillivraya and Ouattara 2005). However, there are also possible faults of long-distance aid policy making at play here too. As the donor's policy-making institutions are physically remote from the recipient, they are usually detached from the local contexts in which distinctive dynamics, different manifestations of environmental problems and livelihood imperatives prevail (Adger et al. 2001). What is clear from this assessment is that there is no satisfactory recipient participation in Northern aid decision-making even where donors sometimes solicit recipient views (BOND 2003; CEC 2001, 2002; see also Chapter 6). Without appropriate recipient participation, moreover, it is unlikely that Northern donors will effectively manage socio-economic and cultural-ecological changes stemming from aid in a way satisfactory to diverse groups in the recipient countries (Adams 2001).

### **2.2.5. 'Greening' of Procedures**

The method for assessing the purported greening of aid is itself debated in the literature. Crucial here were the procedures put in place to monitor and ensure any greening. In the foreign aid arena, such procedures were noticeable by their absence until quite recently. Various studies thus point out that aid practices prior to the 1990s tended to neglect or downplay the environment (Adams 1990; Forrest 1991; Sumi 1991). Environmental consideration as a procedural commitment was not considered important. However, in the 1990s, donors increasingly established environmental guidelines that put a significant emphasis on environmental impact assessment (or EIA; see OECD 1992; JICA 1992; World Bank 1992; OECF 1997). Hence, it is critical to consider the link between the possible greening of aid policy procedure and overall environmental consideration in aid projects.

As scholars have noted, project design rarely included environmental considerations such as EIA and monitoring before the 1990s, even though a series of long-term evaluations made of past projects indicated a fairly high occurrence of associated environmental damage (Hughes 1983; Adams 1990; Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992). Not only did donors pay inadequate attention to recipient's weak environmental institutional capacity, but there

was little change made in selecting and designing project procedures that might account for environmental issues (Turner 1991). Recipient governments have received their share of the blame for the disasters created by aid projects – mainly, because they were seen to be corrupt, institutionally incapable or indifferent to the socio-environmental impact of foreign aid projects (Adams 1990; Ross 1994). However, such ‘local’ factors should have been identified, and taken into account by donors themselves during the formulation and implementation of projects (OECD 1992; FOEJ 2002b).

From the late 1980s, however, both bilateral and multilateral donors began to address the issue of the environmental consequences of their aid more seriously (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Donors admitted the possibly significant environmental impact of aid projects “because of their nature, size and/or location” (OECD 1992: 6) and committed themselves to an improvement in aid *quality* (JICA 1988, 1990; CIDA 1991, 1992). Similarly, the World Bank began to screen its project lending to establish the environmental component in its sectoral programmes such as agriculture and forestry projects (World Bank 1992, 2002). Through the ‘greening’ of aid, Northern donors thus made efforts to introduce more ‘environmentally friendly’ project activities as well as policy initiatives.

Clearly, the design of appropriate procedures was key here. Thus, development aid projects and programmes that could have significant impacts on environment “*should be assessed at as early a stage as possible and to an appropriate degree from an environmental standpoint*” (OECD 1992: 6, emphasis added). OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)<sup>17</sup> members further acknowledged, “environmental aspects must be fully integrated in project selection, design and implementation and *the administrative responsibilities for the environmental aspects of assisted projects should be clearly determined*” (OECD 1992: 6, emphasis added).

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<sup>17</sup> The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a key consultation forum of major bilateral donors (OECD 1996)



Such solemn and official ODA pronouncements rather fly in the face of ongoing environmental problems linked to aid projects in the South. Thus, a wide literature relates how there are still thousands of people being displaced and many environments being despoiled by dam and other ‘development’ projects (Rich 1994; World Commission on Dams 2000; FOEJ 2002b; Kurita 2004a). This ongoing reality of aid raises questions as to whether administrative responsibilities have been in fact (to cite the OECD again) ‘clearly determined’ as well as how systemically the environmental aspect has been ‘fully integrated’ in project selection. And yet, such criticism does not tell the whole story on donor ‘greening’, at least in so far as aid providers have indeed increasingly recognised the significance of environmental assessment procedures (UNCED 1993; Scholten and Post 1999; Adams 2001).

More ‘efficient’ environmental assessment has incorporated such technical approaches as ecosystem-based approaches, land-use planning and management, strategic environment assessment (SEA), project-level environmental impact assessment (EIA), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), and integrated capacity development (OECD 2002a: 17-18; see also Adams 2001; Glasson et al. 2005). Among those approaches, EIA stands out and is internationally recognised “as a national instrument, [that] shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority” (Rio Declaration, Principle 17 in UNCED 1993: 11). EIA is used at the project level as “a decision-making tool to predict and evaluate the environmental, and social consequences of a proposed (usually large-scale) development project from the formulation to the implementation and, where applicable, decommissioning stages” (OECD 2002a: 18; see also Glasson et al. 2005).

Yet, delivery of EIA as an integral part of an environmental assessment process<sup>18</sup> is seen by some writers to be problematic. Horta (2000), for instance, identifies a lack of independent researchers monitoring from the

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<sup>18</sup> Environmental Assessment (EA) is a common policy tool to reduce the harmful environmental impacts of development projects along with promoting sustainable development (Lee and George 2000; see below).

formulation to the implementation of EIA-linked projects as a major flaw in schemes funded by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. However, this perceived problem is not confined to international financial institutions (Asahi-shinbunsha-shuzaihan 1985; FOEJ 2002b; Sumi 2004). The powerful influence of the donor as well as recipient country elites has not been removed from selecting and commissioning the project appraisal team that assesses the environmental impact of projects in bilateral aid (Glassen et al. 2005).

In the case of Japanese aid, for example, there has been strong criticism directed towards the problematic nature of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)'s *kaihatsu-chōsa* (development study). In Chapters 4 and 5, this matter is returned to in some detail. Here, however, it is the general sense of debate surrounding bilateral aid that is of main interest. First of all, the JICA assists recipient governments' project environmental consideration. However, the JICA delegates this particular activity in turn to private consulting companies that carry out research on behalf of JICA while the latter ultimately assesses their report (Murai et al. 1989; FOEJ 1997; JACSES 2004; see Sumi 2004). What makes this process 'partial', critics allege, is the fact that consulting companies are subject to intense criticism and censorship from parent corporations eager for contracts with aid agencies. Since Japanese aid is based on requests from the recipient government, it is even easier for both the donor and recipient's elite group to hire or influence a research body that will produce a favourable report for them (FOEJ 1997; JACSES 2004; Kimura\* 2004).

This situation is, once again, to be considered further in the empirical portion of this thesis. However, and in general, it is striking how few projects have in fact been decommissioned, suspended or eventually stopped world wide due to a negative EIA.<sup>19</sup> While criticising aid donors and recipient governments for poor EIA performance, O'Riordan (2000: 14) proposes "the vital ingredients for a successful EIA have to come from the people on the ground whose interests are directly affected" Here again, it is

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<sup>19</sup> It is true that the World Bank did withdraw from financing the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) dam in India in March 1993 (IRN 1995a; Dunne 1998; Bosshard 2004). Yet, this case is more the exception that proves the rule.



emphasised that local community participation is crucial for successful aid delivery (Rondinelli 1993).

### 2.2.6. Global Environmental Governance

At the heart of the new ‘green’ agenda put forward since the early 1990s, there has been an emphasis on the importance of global environmental governance notably through the discursive framing of knowledge transfer between the North and South. Central here is what Adger et al. (2001) call the spread of ‘a global environmental management discourse’ into policy and practice throughout the world.

Most Southern states since Rio have deployed elements of sustainable development and global ‘green’ discourses in their official agendas on national and local environmental management. A key mechanism here has been local Agenda 21. For example, in the Philippines, President Fidel Ramos signed Executive Order No.15 of September 15, 1992 that created a national council called the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) (GOP 1992c; Vitug 1993). This new agency thereafter produced a Philippine Agenda 21 in 1996 that was based on Rio commitments and which carefully reflected the ideas and language of those international commitments (GOP 1996a, 1996b; Vitug 1993).

Indeed, Agenda 21, which was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) together with the so called ‘Rio Conventions’,<sup>20</sup> is one of the best examples of how the global ‘green’ discourse has been advanced by states as a basis for a global environmental governance (World Bank 2000a; OECD 2002a). The specific elements here are “the quality of life on earth, the efficient use of the earth’s natural resources, sustainable economic growth, the protection of our global commons, the management of human settlements and chemicals, and the management of waste” (Chatterjee and Finger 1994: 53-57).

These themes of Agenda 21 nonetheless represent a technocentric ‘global

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<sup>20</sup> The Rio Conventions are the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (OECD 2002a: 9).

environmental discourse' that emphasises external policy interventions that would solve global environmental crises (Adger et al. 2001). This technocentric view of global environmental discourse has been heavily criticised by scholars. Hence, Escobar (1995: 194) describes Northern "environmental managerialism ... [which] embod[ies] the belief that social change can be engineered and directed, produced at will ... and poor countries can more or less smoothly move along the path of progress through planning ... no other concept has been so insidious." Harvey (1996) has also argued that the Northern states' calls for global environmental management are, in fact, designed to collect Southern state environmental resources under their control. Escobar further criticised that the "planning of management" discourses have persistently portrayed Northern developers as "rational and objective" and the Southern poor as a "half-human, half-cultured benchmark against which the Euro-American world measures its achievements" (1995: 194; see also Ferguson 1990; Rossi 2004). Global environmental managerialism thereby seemingly justifies Northern intervention in terms of the setting of agendas and governance priorities regarding global environmental issues on behalf of 'grateful' Southern recipients.

As various scholars note, Northern donors have organised additional financial resources for 'green' solutions to tackle environmental problems which have been at the centre of global environmental politics since the early 1990s (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Connolly 1996; Lewis 2003; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Such resources have been linked to the two major activities: the debt-for-nature programme that combined international debt relief with conservation initiatives and the establishment of a World Bank-linked Global Environmental Facility that organises, supports and implements conservation programmes (Thacher 1992). Environmental aid was therefore from the beginning greatly influenced by specific Northern donor interests, notably in relation to conservation.<sup>21</sup>

Indeed, even though environmental aid was set up with contrasting formal

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<sup>21</sup> It should also be noted here that Northern NGOs have been active notably over debt-for-nature swaps (see, for example, Jakobeit 1996; Meyer 1995).



objectives from mainstream development assistance, the same power dynamic between the Northern donor and the Southern recipient is manifested in the flow of environmental aid in the context of new global environmental governance mechanism (Keohane and Levy 1996; Brown 2001). Lewis's (2003: 153) findings on USAID, for instance, showed that environmental aid patterns parallel traditional development aid allocations in as much as the latter ended up being the 'gateway' for environmental aid. 'Traditional' interests here linked to political, economic and security ties are to a great degree still reflected in the distribution of US environmental aid. Further, donors are inclined to favour "nations with unexploited natural resources" (Lewis 2003: 144). Environmental aid may thereby even contribute to a widening gap between countries that are 'environmentally rich' and those that are environmentally poor with decisions on aid allocation here, once again, shaped by Northern interests and preferences..

In order for the greening of aid to be successful, it is usually noted that the recipients' commitment is very important (Connolly 1996; Fairman and Ross 1996; Conyers and Mellors 2005). However, as the DAC acknowledged, Northern donors "administrative responsibilities for the environmental aspects of assisted projects" are a large factor in whatever success these programmes enjoy (OECD 1992: 6). Yet, although the 'greening' of aid is unprecedented in terms of such indicators as the number of staff working on environment related issues, the availability of funding, and policy commitments to conservation, these indicators do not necessarily represent *actual* operations by the institutions (Wade 1997). Thus, it is important next to consider the 'greening' of foreign aid in terms of the *implementation* process.

### **2.3. 'Greening' of Implementation**

So far, this chapter has set the concerns of this thesis within a theoretical framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as key themes in the 'greening' of foreign aid. Here, in contrast, the focus is on the policy implementation process – a stage where green elements ought to be clearly manifested. By discussing work addressing aid policy implementation and environmental assessment procedures, this section thereby introduces the

third element of the theoretical framework for this study's assessment of the 'greening' of Japan's international cooperation with reference to the Philippines.

### **2.3.1. Implementation**

The policy process includes the phases from agenda setting and policy formulation to implementation and evaluation. However, there have been important debates in the policy studies literature over how implementation should be analysed. Since the 1970s, some writers began to face criticism over their approach to a policy process that often neglected the implementation stage (Hargrove 1975; Gunn 1978; Ham and Hill 1993; Junti 2002). Indeed, so-called 'implementation studies' even argued that the implementation phase deserves particular attention precisely because public policy processes are not simple and straightforward as often assumed but rather are prone to discrepancies or even breakdown as a given policy moves from formulation to output (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Ham and Hill 1993; Turner 2002).

The 'ignored' implementation phase was notably emphasised initially in the work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Since then, a growing literature on implementation has made important advances in policy analysis (Ham and Hill 1993; Junti 2002). Implementation itself is understood as a process of "interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them" (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: xxiii; see also Younis 1990). Therefore, a study of implementation is essentially about "how it occurs, ... how organisations outside and inside the political system conduct their affairs and interact with each other" (Jenkins 1978: 203). For our purposes, studying the implementation phase is an effective way in which to assess how greening of aid policy may be translated into action because the discrepancy between aspiration and reality on the ground is most likely to be demonstrated therein (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, 1984; Levitt 1980; Hogwood and Gunn 1981; Turner 2002).

Like other public policies, foreign aid policy confronts the interrelated issues of policy and action compliance. In this regard, it is relevant to note



that, although the aid policy discourse has changed, there has been very little change in the nature of development planning and administration itself (Rondinelli 1993; Keen and Sullivan 2005). Hence, the aid policy process has been criticised for the disjuncture between the nature and aims of the development process and the methods of project planning and management used by Northern aid practitioners (Duelfer 1974; Escobar 1996; Gasper 1996; O'Riordan 2000). Indeed, this process has generally been divided in practice between policy formulation done by the donor and policy implementation undertaken by the recipient. This internationalisation of the formulation and implementation gap is distinctive – and that is possibly why, in part, the aid policy process has faced greater problems in achieving policy goals at the implementation phase than ‘conventional’ domestic policy process (O'Riordan 2000; Adger et al. 2001). The discrepancy here is often attributed to ‘policy failure’ in foreign aid – and is a basis for ongoing debates over the efficiency of traditional methods of development assistance (Rondinelli 1993; Raffer and Singer 1996; Wade 1997; Horta 2001).

In order to reduce this disjuncture or gap and to translate policy effectively into practice, *project-based* programmes were considered an essential unit for the delivery (and hence possible ‘greening’) of foreign aid policy. In development assistance, projects have long been playing a central role in translating broad development plans into more narrowly focused design and implementation practices (Rondinelli 1993; Scholten and Post 1999). During the 1960 and 1970s, they were acknowledged as “privileged particles of the development process” (Hirschman 1967: 1), and the ‘cutting edge’ of development administration (Gittinger 1972). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, Northern donors began to put more emphasis on sectoral and programme loans than on projects per se (Rondinelli 1993). Yet, those loans were still ‘projectized’ because no effective alternative emerged as a means for translating abstract policies into concrete action (Rondinelli 1993; Scholten and Post 1999; see also Cernea 1991).

Indeed, projects have been at the core of aid policy implementation and still are deployed in an era of post-Rio ‘greening’ as a key means to implement policy as per donor wishes (Adams 2001; World Bank 2003; Keen and

Sullivan 2005). They have also thereby played a practical role in incorporating sustainable development concepts into project procedures (from formulation to monitoring), and have been guided by various operational guidelines and manuals to ensure environmental consideration (JICA 1992; OECD 1992; JBIC 1999c; Scholten and Post 1999). However, it is observed that policies are often inadequately translated via those guidelines into appropriate practices by project officers or field staff (Keen and Sullivan 2005; see also Chapters 5 and 6).

Therefore, following the project and its procedures will enable us in this thesis to examine how well projects have abided by the donor's own environmental guidelines and criteria stated in their policy. This will provide in turn some indication as to what extent the project implementation process has been 'greened', at least in relation to the Japanese case.

### **2.3.2. Environmental Assessment**

In general terms, the structure of implementation has revolved around the use of environmental assessment procedures as a key tool. The thesis returns to this tool at various stages of the analysis. Here, brief consideration is given to its role and assessment in the literature.

In order to achieve the 'greening' of aid projects, donors have made an effort to integrate environmental assessment into all phases of the aid project cycle. However, in practice, an aid project's environmental assessment mainly involves three stages that are directly linked to an Environmental Impact Assessment – because it is adopted as *the key* decision-making tool (Glassson et al. 2005; Lee and George 2000; OECD 2002a). First is the project planning stage where an actual EIA is carried out by the recipient (Lee 2000; see also Chapter 4). Second is the appraisal stage where the donor or the financier reviews the submitted EIA report and makes a funding decision based upon it. Last is the monitoring stage whereby the donor checks compliance between project implementation and environmental consideration as stated in the EIA report

These three stages involve different types of decision-making at different



stages of a project cycle. As a result, it engages various decision-makers as well as other non-state stakeholders in both the donor and recipient countries, each struggling to reflect their own interests and motivations during the process (Lee 2000; Glasson et al. 2005). For example, a private corporation is motivated primarily by profits and therefore may only be interested in satisfying minimum environmental requirements (Lee 2000; Glasson et al. 2005). In contrast, NGOs often seek to use the EIA process in order to push for stricter environmental consideration measures (Feld 1999; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999; FOEJ 2002b; JACSES 2004). Also, when the decision-making authority's responsibility lies in such sectors as energy or transportation, its priorities (e.g. building hydropower dams and concrete roads) can often overlook or downplay environmental considerations in relation to other higher priority concerns (Adams 2001; Murphy 1994; Glasson et al. 2005; see also Chapter 5). Such wider interests may reduce EIA practices to nothing more than a simple bureaucratic requirement – with the result, critics have claimed, that it becomes a detached and subordinate exercise rather than being an integral and key part of all phases of the project cycle (Ross 1994; Smith and van der Wansen 1995; Sánchez and Hacking 2002). The literature also suggests that there can be an inadequately established link between EIA findings and decision-making at all stages – which also inevitably contributes to poor environmental consideration (Mwalyosi and Hughes 1998; World Bank 1997; Sánchez and Hacking 2002; Glasson et al. 2005).

Although environmental assessment is often principally seen to be a technical process requiring nothing more than the professional expertise of the environmental scientist, it is at the same time inevitably a highly *political* process as political ecologists have noted (Blaikie 1985; Forsyth 2003; Blaikie and Muldavin 2004; Robbins 2004). An EIA report thus contains only what the EIA client wants decision-makers to see – therefore, the environmental consequences can be perceived quite differently according to the stakeholders involved (for e.g., national power corporations and environmental NGOs; see Chapter 5). Science is not separated from politics here, as the latter “underlies the formulation, dissemination, and insitutionalization of scientific knowledge and networks” (Forsyth 2003:

xiii; see also Hajer 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Therefore, a political ecology perspective enables us to see the political economy aspect of this scientific assessment process as utilised in the EIA process (Stott and Sullivan 2000). Thus, this study addresses the ‘greening’ of two Japanese bilateral international cooperation projects in the Philippines by focusing on three stages of environmental assessment, thereby probing the linkages between science, politics, implementation, discourse and environment.

## **2.4. Conclusion**

This chapter has established the theoretical framework of this thesis that examines the possible ‘greening’ of Japanese bilateral international cooperation with reference to the Philippines. The first theoretical element introduced the political ecology perspective and was seen to provide an appropriate prism through which to frame the aid process in terms of ‘contextual sources’, in particular, thereby connecting Southern environmental change and unequal North-South power relations. The second theoretical element provided a critical and selective assessment of the foreign aid literature, with a focus on the so-called greening of aid in the 1990s. Finally, the third theoretical element considered policy implementation with a particular focus on the role of projects in foreign aid delivery. In aggregate, these three elements suitably inform and frame the empirical portions of this thesis. The next chapter will introduce the methodologies and data collection techniques used for this research. It presents qualitative research methods linked to a case study approach as well as a discussion of interviews, documentation and observation techniques applied to the two projects that form our case studies. Chapter 3 finally also addresses problems encountered during the research as well as how the researcher sought to overcome them. This methodological discussion then sets the scene for the detailed empirical work that follows in Chapters 4 to 6.



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## Chapter 3. Methodology

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This thesis has so far suggested that, to assess the ‘greening’ of aid during the 1990s, a theoretical framework shaped by a political ecology perspective and combining insights from the foreign aid and implementation literatures is appropriate. For the empirical part of this thesis, a methodological approach has also been selected that is most suited to the research aims of the study. This chapter elaborates that methodology explaining how and why it was chosen as well as the ways in which the data were selected, collected, and assessed. The reasoning behind the choice of Japan’s bilateral international cooperation with the Philippines as well as the specific case study projects that are featured in Chapters 5 and 6 is discussed here too (with the two projects receiving a fuller introduction in Chapter 4).

### 3.1. Selecting a Donor and a Recipient

In order to examine Northern donor ‘greening’ in relation to Southern recipient environmental change, I have chosen Japan as the aid donor and the Philippines as the aid recipient. This section briefly discusses why this pair was chosen for study as part of the empirical investigation of the political ecology of the ‘greening’ of aid.

As a donor, Japan was a good choice for various reasons. First, I am very familiar with the Japanese case having lived there for 7 years – therefore being fluent in Japanese and having various contacts and networks already built in the country. Second, Japan was the largest overall donor from 1989 to 2000 when the greening of aid was a major international effort. Third, this country has promoted itself as a ‘global environmental leader’ since the early 1990s (Taylor 1999). Finally, traditional Japanese aid has been widely criticised for its environmentally damaging impact (Forrest 1991; Maull 1992; Sumi 1992; Rix 1993; Potter 1994; Dauvergne 1997; Taylor 1999). This combination of personal experience and knowledge of Japan, official commitment, past ‘malpractice’, and sheer importance make for a potentially fascinating study of Northern donor ‘greening’.

As a recipient, the Philippines was also chosen for several reasons. First, Japan has been the largest bilateral donor in this Southeast Asian country for decades and has a distinctive relationship with this country (Rix 1993; Takahashi 1993; NHK shuzaihan 1996; Dauvergne 1997; Potter 1996; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999). Second, the Philippines has been identified as one of the ‘hottest’ of the biodiversity hotspots (National Geographic 2002) – that is, a country among “the 25 richest and most threatened reservoirs of plant and animal life on earth” (Conservation International 2003). Indeed, there are serious threats in terms of biodiversity loss that, given the country’s longstanding reliance on aid inflows, might be alleviated to the extent that aid is actually ‘greened’ (Ross 1996; Bryant 2002; JBIC 2002a; Lawrence 2002).

This choice also reflects a wish to combine place and non-place based analysis as suggested in political ecology (Blaikie 1985). This research thus selected the Philippines as a specific place-based context in which to appreciate the ‘greening’ process of Japan’s international cooperation. At the same time, this thesis also focuses on the ‘non-place based’ forces, here foreign aid, to assess the role of ‘contextual sources’ of environmental change (Bryant 1992). Analytically, ‘place-based’ analysis is particularly useful in bringing to light the specific impacts of a political and economic process such as aid (Robbins 2003).

### **3.2. Issues of Validity, Reliability and Ethics**

This thesis is based on qualitative research. There are certainly concerns expressed by some social scientists over the reliability and validity of research done in this way (Silverman 2000; Bryman 2004). To ensure the quality of the research, the researcher should notably meet the characteristics of validity and reliability. Broadly, the former concerns the integrity of the conclusion while the latter concerns the replicability of the research (Bryman 2004). Here, these issues are considered. We also need to assess briefly the ethical aspects of this PhD research.

In general, the issue of validity arises in relation to both theory and practice (Kitchin and Tate 2000). In order to ensure the validity of research,



theoretical constructs and ideas should first of all have the integrity to support and present the basis for empirical research (Yin 2003). The research should also establish appropriate methods to collect and analyse data (Kitchin and Tate 2000). This thesis attempts to construct validity by employing appropriate methods to link the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 to an event situated in the real world. The validity of any specific finding or conclusion can meanwhile be achieved by using several different sources of information as corroboration (Yin 2003). Thus, qualitative research such as this study responds to the challenge of validity by using ‘triangulation’, that is, “the attempt to get a ‘true’ fix on a situation by combining different ways of looking at it or different findings” (Silverman 2000: 177). Further, by using multiple data collection techniques, the researcher can improve the validity of the research by drawing data from different contexts and different types of people. Triangulating evidence improves the ‘true’ state of events by intersecting evidence from different sources (Silverman 2000; Grix 2001; Yin 2003).

The question of reliability concerns the matter of whether data collection can be repeated in such a way as to produce consistent results under the same conditions (Kitchin and Tate 2000). However, consistent findings tend to be more difficult to achieve in the social sciences than in the natural sciences. Thus, for example, some conditions being studied may not recur since they are uncontrollable social phenomena rather than precisely controlled experiments.

Nonetheless, certain procedures can facilitate an increase in reliability. Careful documentation of the collected data was key here. For instance, tape recording was used when it was not considered intrusive and when interviewees allowed it. When tape recording was impossible, notes were taken during or immediately after the meeting. A field research diary was also kept to record the details of where the interviews and observations took place. Follow-up interviews with key informants were used to ensure that the fieldwork was on the right track. Above all, reliability was enhanced through use of multiple data collection techniques employed in relation to diverse stakeholders.

Finally, the ethical aspects of this PhD research require a brief mention. It is important not to dismiss the issue of research ethics because it is fundamental to the integrity of the research itself. Ethical concerns arise in any research – yet, they are mostly likely to occur in the following four main areas that are used as ethical principles: potential harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception (Bryman 2004). A research project with potential harm to participants is considered unacceptable, which can take the form of physical harm, psychological disturbance or stress, and confidentiality of the record and participant's identity. The ethical issues of my field research were mainly related to the issue of confidentiality of the records and identity. As I explained my research to them, some interviewees explicitly asked me not to quote particular information and/or not to reveal their identity.<sup>1</sup> In these cases, such data remained unused and the interviewees' identity also remained anonymous in order to respect their wishes. This point relates in turn to informed consent – as the above mentioned participants' requests including confidentiality of information and the interviewees' identity were made during the process of obtaining informed consent. Participants can therefore decide at this juncture whether they want to provide information or not.<sup>2</sup> Also by obtaining informed consent, informants' privacy is protected.

When I explained my research and the way in which interviews would be used, I either briefly described my research or emphasised a certain aspect of it over others in order to approach interviewees and arrange interviews more smoothly. For instance, in the case of interviews with a local community in areas affected by a project, I was not able to explain fully about my research due to the sheer number of interviewees and limited time available – therefore, I gave them brief descriptions only. In the case of interviews with San Roque Power Corporation employees, my questions emphasised the company's response to claims that the firm had perpetrated social and environmental damages – thereby giving them a 'fair' chance to

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<sup>1</sup> Some interviewees, often aid agency or consulting company insiders, are anonymous in this thesis in order to protect them from losing their jobs.

<sup>2</sup> After discovering my research was to study the environmental aspect of the San Roque Multipurpose Project, one interviewee (a San Roque Power Corporation employee), avoided my interview enquiry for almost two months, and then agreed to be interviewed.



explain the issues.<sup>3</sup> True, this tactic may raise the issue of deception. However, it is “rarely feasible to provide participants with a totally complete account of what [the] research is about” (Bryman 2004: 514). Nevertheless, no participant was provided with wrong or incorrect information about my identity and research.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.3. Case Study Approach

Amongst other research avenues, a case study approach was specifically chosen to explore contemporary events surrounding the possible greening of aid in a real time situation. This approach is particularly useful as this study poses ‘how’ questions and investigates a specific case in a contemporary ‘real-life context’ where events cannot be controlled (Yin 2003).

The approach, by focusing on a specific case, enables me to “identify, uncover ... specific contextual factors in which the event to study is embedded” (Grix 2001: 67). As this thesis examined two projects in Japan’s bilateral international cooperation with the Philippines implemented during the 1990s – a specific phenomenon in time and space – it was essential to emphasise the context in which those two projects were embedded (Kitchin and Tate 2000). In order to appreciate the multi-faceted context (both in Japan and in the Philippines) effectively, this thesis employed a case study approach that organised the data so as to preserve the holistic and meaningful character of the social object being studied (Grix 2001; Yin 2003).

However, there have been concerns voiced by some social scientists over this approach. The case study approach has thus been criticised for a lack of rigour in that it involves no systemic procedures. In order to reduce those potential problems, the use of multiple data collection techniques provided me with a specific procedure to be followed (Yin 2003). I also used data triangulation (multiple sources of evidence) and methodological

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<sup>3</sup> This was very important in terms of both triangulating data and managing interviews smoothly because it was never possible to speak to the company if any sign suggesting that I was from the NGOs involved (Friends of the Earth Japan or Cordillera Peoples Alliance).

<sup>4</sup> Indeed, interview avoidance from some at SRPC and reluctant data provision by JBIC both tend to confirm that my research was not deceptive.

triangulation (multiple data collection techniques) to overcome the discussed problems (Grix 2001; Yin 2003).

There is also a raised concern that case studies produce little basis for scientific generalisation. Random sampling, in theory, has a great strength (Babbie 1995). However, the selection of two projects is based on my judgement of the situation in light of the research questions that guide this thesis. In any event, the case study does not generalise to a large population but rather to the theoretical propositions being assessed (Babbie 1995; Yin 2003).

The principle analytical considerations guiding this thesis, then, related to how the greening of Japanese international cooperation may have taken place in the Philippines during the 1990s. In the context of official procedures set down initially in Tokyo, this concern was pursued by studying both institutional policy positions (reflected notably in public documents as well as revealed through interviews) and actual project practices in the Philippines (where documents, interviews and observations were used). Fieldwork itself involved dividing my time between the investigation of the Japan's international cooperation system in Japan (mostly in Tokyo) as well as its manifestation through two bilateral aid projects in the Philippines (involving work in various parts of Luzon and Palawan). A total of 9 months was spent conducting my field research. Thus, 5 months of fieldwork took place in Japan (Tokyo and Osaka) between October 2003 and February 2004, while 4 months of fieldwork took place in the Philippines (Manila, Baguio, Itogon, San Roque, San Manuel, San Nicholas, Puerto Princesa, Coron and El Nido) between March 2004 and June 2004.

### **3.3.1. Case Study Sites**

Care was taken to select appropriate project case studies that were both practically feasible to investigate and relevant to the research questions of this thesis. The two study sites chosen in the Philippines were thus: San Roque in Pangasinan (Central Luzon) and Puerto Princesa, Coron, El Nido



in Northern Palawan (See Figure 4.16). This field research looked at two distinct types of aid on the ground, which illustrated different facets of the ‘greening’ of Japan’s international cooperation in the Philippine context. Thus, two projects were investigated as a single embedded case study, each of which represented a seemingly typical project pattern of the two specific aid categories in question (Yin 2003).

Thus, the San Roque Multi-purpose Project was chosen to investigate development aid (*kaihatsu-enjyo*). Specifically, it enabled me to assess how a ‘traditional’ aid project became an object for possible greening in the shifting Japanese aid process of the 1990s. In contrast, the Sustainable Environmental Conservation Project in Northern Palawan was selected precisely to assess a new generation of environmental aid (*kankyō-enjyo*) that was seen to be the ‘cutting-edge’ of the effort to implement a green policy-shift in the Japanese system. One of the factors behind the selection of the three case study locations (Puerto Princesa, Coron, El Nido) was that SEMP offices are based there, which made them ideal locales for the investigation of project implementation. More detail on these two project case studies is provided in Chapter 4. The next task of this chapter, then, is to discuss the specific techniques of data collection that were used in the research.

### **3.4. Data Collection Techniques**

This section presents the techniques employed: interviews, documentation, and direct observation. At the same time, it considers the various difficulties encountered in undertaking the research, as well as the ways in which such difficulties were addressed.

#### **3.4.1. Interviews**

Along with documents and observations, a series of individual in-depth interviews were carried out during the fieldwork in both Japan and the Philippines. The total number of formal interviews conducted was 98 (see Appendix 4 for a complete list). The sources of interviews were as follows: policy-makers and project staff based in both Japan and the Philippines (26);

academics and journalists working on the issue of Japan's international cooperation with the Philippines (8); NGO employees working with and campaigning against Japanese aid projects (14); corporate employees (8); both central and local government officials in the Philippines (15); local community members in the Philippines (17); and others including other aid agency officials, NGO workers, etc (10).

Interviews were facilitated in two main ways: namely through my knowledge of and contacts in the Japanese bureaucratic system developed during my MA degree in Japan and my PhD-linked requests for interview arranged through the official route. Indeed, the position of visiting scholar offered at both Ferris University in Yokohama, Japan and the Third World Studies Center at the University of the Philippines, in Quezon City extended my research opportunities by allowing me to build on very important socio-political connections in Japan and the Philippines enjoyed by these two centres of learning. At Ferris University, for example, where academic staff focus specifically on development and environment issues in the Japan-Philippine context, I gained much useful information including invaluable insider's insights (notably from a former JICA employee and a consulting company employee).

Because of the sensitive nature of my research topic, two types of interview technique were used: the unstructured interview and the semi-structured open-ended interview (May 1997). The unstructured interview (or 'informal conversational interview') provided data of a very detailed and rich kind, especially when interviewees were otherwise quite guarded in their remarks. This technique indeed enables the interviewer to encourage two-way communication where interviewees feel at ease (Silverman 2000). The interviewer can act in response to the immediate conversation where non-predetermined interview questions possibly arise (Kitchin and Tate 2000). However, the interview does not flow naturally without the interviewer being sensitive to, and capable of acknowledging their personal views (Barton et al 1997).



The semi-structured open-ended interview meanwhile gave me the freedom and flexibility to investigate with predefined guide questions (May 1997). This so-called ‘interview guide approach’ (Kitchin and Tate 2000) probes beyond initial answers, and enables the researchers to understand both the context and content of the interview (May 1997). It also gives the interview a conversational feel, which will possibly lead interviewees to being more relaxed. Topics and issues to be covered are specified in advance but the interviewer can vary the wording of the questions and the sequence in which the questions are tackled (Kitchin and Tate 2000). A copy of the guide questionnaires used in the semi-structured interviews conducted for this thesis investigation is to be found in the Appendix 1.

The sensitive nature of my research topic often made it difficult for me to ask questions. For example, during my officially arranged interview with JBIC, a senior officer from this agency’s public relations office controlled the entire 50 minute interview. Indeed, he carefully managed time allocation by starting the session with overview presentations that I did not need or want. In this kind of situation, although the structured interview may reduce error with clearly defined questions, there is little or no chance to actually use the technique. Thanks to the flexibility of the qualitative interview techniques conducted with other respondents, however, I was able to allow interviewees more room to share their depth of knowledge and thereby bring out a variety of relevant information that they had but might not otherwise have revealed. Much depended on my interpersonal skills and sensitivity to facilitate the interviews (Kitchin and Tate 2000).<sup>5</sup> For example, I was fully aware of the characteristics of certain interviewees, particularly male Japanese aid officers who in general were not willing to share detailed information with me (a female researcher). Thus, I had to respond to each unique interview situation by switching back and forth between semi-structured and unstructured interviews, while keeping the guide questions in mind.

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<sup>5</sup> But interestingly, in fact, a high degree of interpersonal skill does not require sophisticated knowledge. On the one hand, it is more about listening to the interviewees’ personal stories. In order to reach an actual conversation stage, therefore, I resorted to trivial gossip and news in both countries. I often studied (by watching TV and reading newspapers) what were the most talked about issues- for example, two Japanese baseball players playing in the US major league, and Korean soap operas and dramas showing in the Philippines.

There were often potential obstacles in the interview process. For the most part, they arose in the case of interviews with Japanese government officials who showed minimal willingness to cooperate with a Korean female PhD student (Rubin and Rubin 1995; May 2002). White Western researchers from Europe and North America are typically more welcome to such officials than Asian researchers. Being a junior female researcher made it even more difficult to arrange interviews with male Japanese officials. Here, well-known chauvinism and patriarchal behaviour in Japanese government agencies were a recurrent problem, albeit one familiar to me from my prior years of residency in the country.

Another potential obstacle was that my research topic concerns the *environmental* aspects of Japanese aid. Some of the interviewees, particularly those who are working in the mainstream Japanese aid industry, became quickly offended – particularly as I was examining one of their ‘worst’ projects, the San Roque Multi-purpose Project. Such evasion also occurred in the Philippines. Thus, for example, the San Roque Power Corporation avoided my interview requests for almost two months, but in the end agreed to be interviewed. Compounding this standard reticence, wider political events encouraged evasive behaviour by some interviewees. In particular, at the time of my study, Sumatran villagers were seeking compensation via a well-publicised lawsuit filed against Japanese aid agencies and private corporations involved in the Kotopanjang Dam project in Indonesian Sumatra (*The Japan Times* 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Susilo 2002).

I used two main strategies to reduce distortions in the data collection created by these potential obstacles. First, my aforementioned personal connections in Japan helped tackle one of those problems. One Japanese friend in particular is a high-ranking official in a Japanese government agency and thus helped me contact key aid officials. A ‘personal’ introduction has thereby built up ‘trust’ by guaranteeing my status as a researcher (Rubin and Rubin 1995). As for Japanese ‘discrimination’ towards being an Asian female researcher, I dealt with this by stressing the fact that I am studying at



one of the UK's leading academic institutions. As necessary, then, I presented myself as somebody who was 'closer' to the UK than to Korea.

### **3.4.2. Documentary Analysis**

Documentary evidence provides rich data in diverse forms – thus, for this research, government and quasi-government reports, minutes of official meetings, and unofficial reports of parties to be studied were considered (Kitchin and Tate 2000; Grix 2001). Documents are useful for the project case studies of this thesis as the following points illustrate (May 1997; Grix 2001; Yin 2003). First, it is a stable source of evidence which can be reviewed repeatedly. Second, since it is not produced by the case study results, it is unobtrusive. Third, it helps verify the exact names, references, and details of an event. Lastly, it covers an extended period of time, as well as many events and settings. However, it has also been criticised for several reasons. Since every document was produced for a particular purpose, it contains and reflects author bias. Therefore, documents should be studied bearing in mind what they leave out as well as what they include. Further, some documents may be less accessible and available than others. This patchy availability may lead to an incomplete collection of particular documents, thereby increasing the chance of bias in document selection.

Documentary analysis in this thesis contributes to the analysis of a core concern here: the possible shift in policy procedures under the auspices of greening of aid. It reveals institutional positions through public documents with all of their revealing language and images, even as it traces Japanese bilateral international cooperation through the process of administration, organisation, policy, and project implementation. As documents tend to leave out one particular fact at the same time that they contain another, it is particularly interesting to see what is emphasised and highlighted in terms of the 'greening' of Japanese aid. This research also examined in particular documents relating to criteria, rules and specification for projects and their funding (such as environmental checklists, guidelines and study reports) so as to see how environmental aspects of Japanese international cooperation have been framed and monitored. Also, by using other documentary sources

such as NGO reports and press releases, as well as media reports both in Japan and in the Philippines, I was able to gauge how non-Japanese aid players reacted to Japan's international cooperation activities. Documentation was analysed by looking into various actors' responses to the greening process that was supposed to have taken place via the two case study projects.

I obtained documents from a wide array of interested actors thereby enhancing the validity of the research. Clearly, the key Japanese aid agencies were prominent here. Thus, official documents were collected mostly from these major aid players involved in the two projects: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). They were acquired from agency websites and public relations offices, the JICA Library, and from the interviewees themselves. Documents were also obtained from the relevant Philippine government agencies: the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the National Power Corporation (NPC), the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD). Documentation of non-official aid players was mainly collected from Japanese NGOs (Friends of the Earth Japan, Mekong Watch, Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society and Conservation International Japan), international NGOs (International Rivers Network, Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia and the Environmental Defence Fund) and Philippine NGOs and community organisations (Conservation International Palawan, the Cordillera People's Alliance, Environmental Science for Social Change in the Philippines, the Haribon Foundation, the Ibon Foundation, the Philippine Center of Investigative Journalism, and the World Wildlife Fund Palawan).

It is likely that access to some documents have been deliberately blocked, thereby affecting the validity of data production (Yin 2003). However, this obstacle was overcome by approaching various actors that do not



necessarily share the same opinion regarding the research topic. For example, as expected, some crucial documents were deliberately blocked by Japanese aid agencies (see Chapter 5), but some of the ‘classified’ documents were acquired through NGOs, academics, and journalists. More interestingly, the most controversial and critical documents were in fact mentioned and revealed during detailed hearings in the Japanese Parliament (National Diet). Indeed, minutes of Diet proceedings provided crucial data for this research.

### **3.4.3. Observation**

Observation is the only methodology that studies “what people actually do rather than what they say may do” (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 224). Snapshots of empirical phenomena are recorded by observations (Grix 2001). It serves as another source of evidence, which is useful in two ways. It covers the event in a real time situation at the same time as it covers the context of the event (Yin 2003).

For this research, direct observation was used throughout field visits including during interviews. It was a technique used to scrutinise field events, and thereby served to independently assess what was said in official documents, reports, and guidelines. Data was collected through note taking, a field research diary and photographs. Photographs of the study sites in particular helped to explain the context and characteristics of each case. The evidence acquired by observation was useful as, without knowing details of the actual scenery or geographical location, it was all but impossible to appreciate local settings effectively. It also provided me with a new dimension in understanding the research topic (Yin 2003). For example, the physical condition of buildings and offices (including pictures, posters, and mottos) displayed the atmosphere or circumstances of each organisation. Further, the location or the furnishings of interviewees’ office suggested the status of the office (and its staff) within an organisation. In the case of JBIC, however, interviews were always set in special rooms for external visits, therefore, my opportunity was lost in this particular instance.

Observation was intended to be overt. Thus, I carried out the research as a detached and unobtrusive observer, but informed the people in the area about my research and what I was studying. However, in the Philippine study sites, my physical appearance as a foreigner distinguished me from the local people and sometimes caused problems. Within one day of my arrival in Dalupirip village near the San Roque Dam project site, for example, my presence there was already widely circulated and even the Itogon municipal mayor knew about me. This prominence was both an advantage and a disadvantage to my research. Due to the highly sensitive nature of the research topic, I introduced myself to the local people through Friends of the Earth Japan employees who were campaigning against the Dam project with local residents. In contrast, I approached the San Roque Power Corporation and other aid agency staff separately to emphasise my status as an independent researcher.

However, observation has been criticised for its selectivity and reflexivity. It is selective since there are limits in covering entire events (Yin 2003). Selectivity can be caused as observation is time-consuming at the same time as being sometimes difficult to instigate (Kitchin and Tate 2000). The issue of reflexivity has also been raised. Thus, those who are observed, by knowing that they are being studied, may act differently than usual, which will create errors in data collection. Further, there are doubts in terms of the observer's selective attention, encoding, and position (Kitchin and Tate 2000). To reduce any error in data collection using observation, triangulation was therefore used by intersecting the data collected with data gathered from other techniques, notably interviews and documents.

### **3.5. Translation**

By definition, this thesis involves a considerable amount of translation work – potentially involving movement between at least three major languages: Japanese, *Tagalog*, and English. Clearly, errors can crop up in this complex process (Temple 1997; Rossman and Rallis 1998; Birbili 2000; Temple and Edwards 2002). However, throughout the research, translation as well as my own extensive multi-lingual knowledge ensured that errors were kept to a minimum. I translated all of the documents and interviews used as primary



data in this thesis. Regarding Japanese fluency, I lived in Japan for 7 years in total and was brought up in Tokyo between the ages of 9 and 13. I studied for and obtained my Master's degree in Osaka with one additional year of a research studentship there. Further, since I am fluently bilingual (in Japanese and Korean), I have worked as a translator for 8 years in Korea with few problems encountered either in communicating with Japanese people or in understanding the cultural nuances of the Japanese language. However, in order to reduce further potential translator error, Japanese professors and friends crosschecked my translation of key texts and interviews.

In the Philippines, meanwhile, most of the research was carried out in English, while Japanese aid project employees were interviewed in Japanese by myself. For those I could not directly interview (*Tagalog, Ilocano, Ibaloi* speakers), Filipino research assistants (or guides) translated some of the interviews involving those local Filipino dialects into English.<sup>6</sup> There was certainly a possibility of translator bias being introduced into the translation process here (Temple 1997; Temple and Edwards 2002). Yet, this can be reduced by interviewing various sources who hold different perspectives on an issue, while also providing an explanation to the translator about the nature and purpose of my research. In practice, these steps were taken in the course of my research.

### 3.6. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the methodology used in this thesis while explaining how and why the data was selected, collected, and assessed. Qualitative research methods were used to study how and to what extent Japan's international cooperation was procedurally committed to the greening of its projects. This research also employed a case study approach to investigate two aid projects with a combination of qualitative techniques for primary data collection: interviews, documentation, and direct

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<sup>6</sup> Research assistants were involved on only two occasions – that is, during my visits to Tabu and Dalupirip, as some indigenous people interviewed there only spoke local dialects. Two research assistants (Ms. Norma Mooy from Tabu and Ms. Luisa Bestian from Dalupirip) translated and arranged interviews and also guided me throughout my visits. They were recruited via my contacts at Friends of the Earth Japan and Cordillera People's Alliance.

observation. Overall, this methodological strategy was seen to be most appropriate to the aims of this thesis.

The next chapter will provide a selective history and background of Japan's international cooperation. With the focus specifically on the Philippines as a recipient, Japanese aid will also be explored in the particular historical and politico-economic context of the Southeast Asia region.



## Chapter 4. Japan's Bilateral *Kokusai-kyōryoku* and the Philippines

This chapter studies Japan's bilateral international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) within the broad context of Japan's external relationship of 'aid' and economic cooperation (*keizai-kyōryoku*). This chapter examines the historical roots and development of Japanese international cooperation in the post-World War II era. In keeping with the focus of this thesis on the 'greening' of Japan's foreign aid, key Japanese agencies are described in relation to the greening process of the 1990s. In addition, as the Philippines is the recipient of Japanese aid that is studied here, then the relationship of that country with Japan over aid is also considered before concluding with an overview of the two case study projects featured in Chapters 5 and 6.

### 4.1. *Kokusai-Kyōryoku* and the History of Japanese Aid

Japan officially celebrates October 6<sup>th</sup> each year as *kokusai-kyōryoku no hi* (International cooperation day) commemorating Japan's participation in the Colombo Plan<sup>1</sup> in 1954 that aimed to promote socio-economic development in non-Communist Asia. However, *kokusai-kyōryoku* itself is an ambiguous process, given that the Japanese government has never provided a definitive interpretation of its role and nature (Orr and Koppel 1993; Dauvergne 1997).


*Kokusai-kyōryoku* is often used interchangeably with Official Development Assistance (ODA), *enryo* (aid)<sup>2</sup> and *keizai-kyōryoku* (economic cooperation) reflecting the complex and even ambiguous nature of the aid process. The Japanese government in 1999, for example, established the world's largest bilateral development finance agency, in the form of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (Motoyama 2000). Yet, JBIC merged the two different operations of ODA and so-called Other Official Finance (or Other Official Flow, OOF) together. The latter clearly does not satisfy ODA

<sup>1</sup> Such participation was expected to promote amity with Southeast Asian countries, economic and technical cooperation, export of machinery accompanied by technology transfer, and the securing of raw materials (JBIC 2003b: 8).

<sup>2</sup> In general, aid indicates ODA. However in this thesis, the term aid shares the same meaning as *enryo* and *keizai-kyōryoku* both of which included "yen loans, export credits, and private foreign direct investment" (Nagasu 1971: 356-357).

criteria set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)<sup>3</sup> since it includes private sector operations, such as export-import credit, overseas investment, and loan guarantees (See Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1. Flow Chart of Bilateral *Kokusai-Kyōryoku***



Source: Adapted from FOEJ (2002b: 15).

Unlike other Northern donors, Japan thus mixes two different types of development finance together under the label of *kokusai-kyōryoku*. The reason for this aid strategy lies in its historical roots. The year 1954, officially known as the origin of international cooperation, was also the year when the first post-war reparation agreement was made (with Burma, see Murai 1999b; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999). Reparation activities were nonetheless then labelled under the name of *keizai-kyōryoku* (economic cooperation), *enryo* (aid), or even *tōshi*<sup>4</sup> (investment) by the Japanese government. This tradition of economic cooperation, combining private

<sup>3</sup> Grants or loans to developing countries should meet the following conditions to qualify as ODA: first, it is undertaken by the official sector; second, it promotes economic development and welfare as the main objective; third in case of a loan, it must have a grant element of at least 25 per cent (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida once said, “our counter-parts disliked (*kiratta-node*) the term investment (*tōshi*), so, as per their wish, we used the term reparation. But, from our point of view, it is an investment” (Nishi 1970: 61 quoted in Murai 1999b: 210).



sector activities with public sector ODA, is still present in Japanese international cooperation, as the emergence of JBIC at the end of the twentieth century indicates (Orr and Koppel 1993; Arase 1995; see also below).

Without studying the significant role played by economic cooperation in the history of Japan's international cooperation, it is not possible to understand any 'greening'. Thus, this chapter first examines the origin of economic cooperation in order to see how Japan has conceptualised aid in the post-World War II era.

#### **4.1.1. *Keizai-Kyōryoku*: The Cradle of Japanese 'Aid'**

Japanese aid originates in the requirement that the country pay reparations for the damage done during World War II and in the wake of Japan's defeat in August 1945. Indeed, the post-war reparation process helped define economic cooperation as a unique blend of political, economic, and humanitarian assistance (Suzuki 1989).

The onset of the Cold War added impetus to the process. The rise of Communist China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought about an abrupt 'reverse course' in the US Occupation, which transformed the fortunes of Japan (Arase 1995; Schaller 1985, 2002). The US Occupation thus urgently prioritised Japanese development by easing its burden of reparation through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, (NHK shuzaihan 1996; Murai 1999b). Japan became a key ally of the West in countering the Communist threat to Southeast Asia while also helping to keep that region's abundant natural resources from falling into communist hands (Schaller 1985). At the same time, Japan thus re-established the link with its former 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' (*daitōa-kyōei-ken*) that provided both a strong trade position and raw materials for industrialisation.

Two factors in particular facilitated the elaboration of Japanese aid policy. First, due to the US-Japan security treaty of 1952, Japan was protected under the US nuclear umbrella even as it had passed a peace constitution

(Auer 1990),<sup>5</sup> meaning that there was no need for huge national defence expenditure (Arase 1995). Therefore, Japan could focus on economic development. Second, the ‘reverse course’ partially suspended the overhaul of a ‘tainted’ Japanese bureaucracy that meant that civilian economic bureaucracies in charge of aid policy were left untouched, giving them thereby unprecedented prestige within the Japanese government (Arase 1995). As such, Japanese economic bureaucrats could begin *keizai-kyōryoku* (economic cooperation) without serious challenge from other powerful parts of the bureaucracy (Nagano and Kondo 1999).

The rationale for reparations is to compensate for war damage perpetrated by the aggressor. However, in the case of Japanese reparations, the rationale was expressed as “economic recovery and development ... (and) the improvement of social welfare” rather than as something associated with war guilt (Arase 1995: 28). As such, *keizai kyōryoku* formed part of a wider geopolitical strategy to bolster pro-Western countries. This situation had an effect on *how* cooperation was defined. Reparations were thus based on an initial request from the recipient government (see below).<sup>6</sup> Each reparation case was identified and then negotiated with the recipient government by the Japanese private sector (Arase 1994, 1995; NHK shuzaihan 1996; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).<sup>7</sup> The preparation stage of reparation was mostly performed by *zaikai-gaikō* (business diplomacy)<sup>8</sup> (Ushiba and Hara 1979; NHK shuzaihan 1996; Murai 1999a). Japanese private corporations, approaching the recipient government with full knowledge about what was required for an application, ‘helped’ the recipient get through the complicated procedure. It not only encouraged the reparation recipients to make an official request for Japanese goods or services, but also worked to induce Japanese business activity (stewarded by the Japanese government)

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<sup>5</sup> Article 9 of Japan’s constitution declares the renunciation of war and military force, which many political parties and Diet members recently have been pressing for constitutional revision (Auer 1990; Kajimoto 2005; The Japan Times 2005a, 2005d; The Korea Times 2005).

<sup>6</sup> It is known as *yōsei-shugi* (request based approach), and became one of the main principles of Japanese aid.


<sup>7</sup> This is still present in the relationship between Japanese consulting companies and recipient governments (see below).

<sup>8</sup> This was further developed in Japan’s ODA which was later exemplified by the Marcos Rebate (Murai et al. 1989; Yokoyama 1994; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; see also Chapter 5).



into the recipient economy (Arase 1994, 1995). As Figure 4.2 thus shows, reparation, carried out through private sector initiative with government support as well as the request-based approach, resulted in the opening of markets for exports as well as the securing of raw materials imports (JBIC 2003a). Above all, it laid the basis of economic-oriented international cooperation.

**Figure 4.2. Reparation Payment Model**



Source: Arase (1995: 33).

#### 4.1.2. Reorienting *Keizai-Kyōryoku* and the Emergence of *Kokusai-Kyōryoku*

In the 1960s and 1970s, export promotion and resource diplomacy were the *raison d'être* of Japanese 'aid' (Orr and Koppel 1993; Dauvergne 1997). *Keizai-kyōryoku* (economic cooperation) was integral to Japan's international economic policies but was, in any event, the only credible diplomatic means Japan could use in its relations with developing countries given continuing anger incurred by World War II (Rix 1980; Yasutomo 1986, 1990).

As noted, '*enryo*' ('aid') differed significantly from its Western counterpart. Many official documents and reports stressed, for example, the importance of combining the government and private sector in economic cooperation (Yamamoto 1973). Indeed, economic cooperation was "promoted primarily ... [on a] private sector basis" (MITI 1958: 23-24 quoted in Arase 1995:

38). Yet, this practice of combining ODA and OOF was criticised as being incompatible with a Western notion of aid (Arase 1995; see also MOFA 2003a). For instance, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) called for more non-commercial and concessional Japanese ODA in the late 1960s (Rix 1980). Under external pressure, Japan made some alterations, such as an increase of aid volume<sup>9</sup> and concessionality, while separating the category of ODA from other economic cooperation activities. This process continued into the 1980s without any fundamental policy shift. The core of the existing economic cooperation system thus continued “to combine trade, private investment, and aid in a skilful manner” (Taigai-keizai-shingikai 1976: 5).

Unlike in previous decades, however, the 1980s was a prelude to major change involving ODA renovation in the early 1990s. The call for ODA reform was driven by both domestic and international factors, such as public criticism triggered by the Marcos Scandal (see Chapter 5) as well as environmental and human rights issues raised by both international and domestic NGOs. Indeed, international cooperation was more prominent in the media, as well as in NGO reports and official documents, than ever before.<sup>10</sup> Moreover with an increase in its volume and use as a tool of foreign policy, Japanese ‘aid’ became a hot subject in a series of debates on the country’s overall international contribution (Orr and Koppel 1993; Kusano 1997; Fujibayashi and Nagase et al. 2002).<sup>11</sup> This pressure led to the first ODA reforms in 1991 and culminated in the ODA Charter in June 1992.

As this brief history of *keizai-kyōryoku* and the emergence of *kokusai-kyōryoku* shows, Japanese aid has been reoriented while retaining its

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<sup>9</sup> In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced US\$ 10 billion aid to ASEAN, which followed the *tōnan-ajia-gaikō-sangensoku* (Fukuda Doctrine) (JBIC 2003b). In 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda again pledged to triple Japanese ODA (Rix 1980; JBIC 2003b).

<sup>10</sup> The search result of JICA library shows that publication titles with *kokusai-kyōryoku* has 246 hits in the 1980s and 356 hits in the 1990s with only 74 hits in the 1970s. Although a somewhat crude indicator, it still gives some sense of the changes.

<sup>11</sup> Total 13 billion US dollar ‘cash-contribution’ to the first Gulf war in 1991 sparked the debates (*kokusai-kōken-ron*) (Takatsuji 1994; Murai 1999). However, again, this term *kokusai-kōken* (international contribution) has been often interchangeably used with *kokusai-kyōryoku*, ODA, ‘enjoyo’, and also UN Peacekeeping Operations (Kusano 1997).



original objective. Economic cooperation has indeed been pre-eminent and has sought to serve Japan's "*kokueki*" (self economic interest) (Hasegawa 1975: 7).

## 4.2. *Kokusai Kyōryoku*: Structure and Players

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 1990s Northern donors took environmental issues more seriously than in the past. In the case of Japan's international cooperation, this 'greening' process started in the late 1980s in step with other Northern donors. Having become the world's largest donor after 1989, Japan was under greater international pressure to promote environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyō*) and environmental aid (*kankyō-enjyō*) (Potter 1994). As a result, environmental guidelines were revised and environmental aid was increased (see below). In order to examine this 'greening' trend in *kokusai-kyōryoku*, the next section briefly sets out the basic structure and key players in Japanese international cooperation including both ODA and OOF. Fuller consideration of these agencies is given later in this chapter in the context of a discussion of the greening issue.

### 4.2.1. Implementing Agencies


There were three agencies that performed ODA and Other Official Finance (OOF) operations until the establishment of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation in 1999. As this research focuses mainly on the 1990s, it considers those agencies that operated in the pre-JBIC system in relation to the ODA and OOF categories (Figure 4.3; see below).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> As a new focus in Prime Minister Koizumi's reform initiative, since November 2005 the Japanese government has been considering abolition of the JBIC by transferring the JBIC's functions of providing yen-loans to the JICA – while the export credit agency function is being considered to be transferred to other national banks or completely privatised (Kyodo-tsushin 2005; The Japan Times 2005b, 2005c). However, in spite of its significance to present Japan's international cooperation, this event is beyond the remit of this study due to the focus on the 1990s – and therefore, is not investigated.



Figure 4.3. Structure of Japanese *kokusai-kyōryoku*



Note: MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; EPA – Economic Planning Agency; MOF – Ministry of Finance; MITI – Ministry of International Trade and Industry; MOT – Ministry of Transport; MOHW – Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Source: FOEJ (1997: 12- 13)



In the period under investigation in this thesis, ODA was implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), while the Export and Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) performed OOF operations. Despite its public image as an ODA agency, some OECF operations overlapped with JEXIM's OOF operations (JBIC 2003a). However, in this thesis, OECF is mainly studied as an ODA implementing agency while JEXIM is examined as an OOF executing agency. For ODA, JICA has dealt with bilateral grants providing technical assistance (e.g. development studies, technical cooperation) and grant aid (e.g. disaster relief, food aid). OECF has mainly dealt with *yen-shakkan* (bilateral yen loans), such as project and non-project loans as well as debt rescheduling. As for OOF, JEXIM has carried out export-import credits, overseas investment loans, untied loans, and guarantees as an export credit agency (ECA), which mainly "supports Japanese corporations" (Hama 2005: 39). Each agency has been overseen by different government ministries (for instance, JICA by MOFA, OECF by EPA and JEXIM by MOF) and aid decision has been made by 19 government bodies. This suggests fragmentation and the power struggle within its aid mechanism (see below).

This initial outline of the implementing agencies underscores the need to investigate both ODA and OOF as Japanese international cooperation since the distinction between the two has always been rather ambiguous (Rix 1980; Potter 1996). The next section further investigates the unique features of Japan's international cooperation including the request-based approach (*yōsei-shugi*), self-help effort (*jijyo-doryoku*) and structure.

#### **4.2.2. *Yōsei-shugi* (Request-based Approach)**

The request-based approach (*yōsei-shugi*) has also made Japanese aid distinctive among Northern donors. Indeed, it is claimed that it is openly welcomed by developing countries (Yamamoto, interview, 2002). To the extent that this is true, the reason may partly reside in the fact that Japan waits for the formal request from recipients, thereby differing from other Northern donors who impose 'intrusive' (*oshitsuke-gamashī*) conditionality

on recipients. Being 'not intrusive' is indeed one of the most important cultural codes in Japanese society along with not causing inconvenience or trouble to others (*meiwaku*), while being indirect too in making any sensitive remarks (Tobin, Wu and Davidson 1988; Lee 1994). As the request-based approach fits these cultural codes, it thereby also gains legitimacy in Japan.

This practice that is historically rooted as noted above as well as culturally based is important in the general evolution of the global aid process. Consider, for example, the practice of other Northern donors like the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and the World Bank which have their own well-defined funding priorities and objectives (see Potter 1996; Ellerman et al. 2001; Weaver 2003). As such, both donors therefore conduct project identification in a proactive manner, and also formally and overtly shape the nature and conditions of the projects they fund. As a result, projects are already well formulated even before the recipients' implementing agencies step into the aid process (Potter 1996; Ellerman et al. 2001; Weaver 2003).

In contrast, in the Japanese aid programme, recipient implementing agencies play a formal and key role by starting the project request process. Here, the recipient itself prioritises the projects to be requested. However, from project identification to implementation, Japanese aid bureaucrats also depend heavily on Japanese private firms for advice and support (Arase 1994). The individual interests of these firms are thus incorporated into the aid project from the start, which makes the Japanese aid programme quite fragmented. As Japanese private corporations act as the 'middlemen', they wield great influence over political leaders and aid bureaucrats – resorting even to bribery where necessary (NHK shuzaihan 1996; Kerr 2001; Komori 2002).

Japanese aid programmes, meanwhile, are very attractive to political leaders in developing countries. Above all, these leaders attempt to adapt such aid to



suit their own political agendas.<sup>13</sup> Since recipient aid negotiators are often political appointees, their work can be easily guided by their bosses, albeit, subject to occasional disruption due to NGO or media exposure (see below and Chapter 5).

Clearly, then, the request-based approach does not work only in Japan's favour, as it requires recipient government involvement from the start. Even when the recipient's request and Japan's interests match, scholars argue that there is often 'slippage' between the donor's conditionality and the actual performance of recipient governments (Connolly 1996; Potter 1996; Villanger 2006). The 'slippage' here can be due to different priorities, but in some cases, it is the recipient government that deliberately plans it so (Potter 1996).<sup>14</sup>

The discussion here of the request-based approach confirms that, in investigating the implementation level of Japanese aid projects, it is essential to consider the role of aid players in the *recipient* country as integral parts of the Japanese aid system.

### **4.2.3. *Jijyo-doryoku* (Self-help efforts)**

In addition to the request-based approach, there is also a unique philosophy that contributes to the distinctive nature of Japanese aid giving manners – that is, self-help efforts (*jijyo-doryoku*). Japanese aid has been widely criticised for emphasising loans over grants (Potter 1996; Söderberg 1996). According to the Japanese government, however, providing loans is essential because it helps promote self-help efforts by recipients in terms of economic development because, unlike grants, loans must be repaid (MOFA 2003a).

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<sup>13</sup> In the Philippines, it is well-known that presidents often make use of those aid programmes for their own political agendas. For example, President Arroyo's face is put on all of the MRT (monorail in Metro Manila) stations and tickets, which is built with Japanese aid money (Direct Observation 2004).

<sup>14</sup> This is discussed in Chapter 6 with the El Nido-Tay Tay coastal road rehabilitation project.

Indeed, key top-level policy pronouncements confirm this stance. Both the ODA Charter (MOFA 1992) and Medium-term Policy on Official Development Assistance (MOFA 1999) thus emphasise that it is important to support self-help efforts and associated initiatives of developing countries for economic development.<sup>15</sup> This philosophy is seen mainly to derive from how the Japanese evaluate the success of their own economic development. It is thus widely perceived among the Japanese public that, for example, Japan's post-war economic 'miracle' has been achieved, above all, through their self-help (Arase 1995; Söderberg 1996; MOFA 2003a, 2003d, 2003e).

Yet, once loans are disbursed, there is often little room for the Japanese government to actually influence how the recipient uses the loans, mostly due to bilateral diplomatic sensitivity (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986; Direct observation of JBIC's testimony at the Kotopanjang Court hearing 13 November 2003). Moreover, since the money is borrowed (rather than being a grant), recipient governments are more reluctant than usual to be instructed about how to use the money. That said, recently, the term self-help is being increasingly replaced by the word 'ownership' (Gotou 2003). Since the mid 1990s, the Japanese government uses both English words to describe *jijyo-doryoku* (MOFA 1997a, 1997b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e). Ownership, like self-help, emphasises still the role of the recipient in successful aid delivery and economic development including implementation of appropriate environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo*) (MOFA 2002b; Usui, interview, 2004). However, it nonetheless supports a subtle re-positioning of the terms of engagement between donor and recipient.

#### **4.2.4. The General Pattern for the Aid Decision-making Process**

As noted under the request-based approach, Japan cannot act without a formal request from a recipient government through official diplomatic channels.<sup>16</sup> However, preparing a request is not an easy matter because

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<sup>15</sup> Some scholars praise this as an effective aid policy which has been vindicated by the successful economic development in Southeast Asia (Hanabusa 1991; Söderberg 1996).

<sup>16</sup> A request can also be made either during the state visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to a



recipients often do not understand the complicated procedures – therefore, expert assistance is required (Arase 1995; Potter 1996). Just like each reparation case was prepared by the Japanese private sector, so too there has been participation by Japanese consulting companies and powerful *sōgō-shōsha* (general trading company) in all stages of the aid process (Dauvergne 1997; see below).

When a recipient government finally makes an official request, assessment by the relevant Japanese government agencies starts. This process is not open to public view with much of the work carried on through a process known as *yon-shoōchō-taisei* or four-ministry consultation (see Figure 4.3).<sup>17</sup> Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery and Ministry of Transportation are consulted when necessary (Hama 2005). After a decision is made as a result of this process, an offer is conveyed to a recipient government with a draft agreement. Then, the agreement leads to an exchange of formal papers between the two governments, which is the last stage of the aid decision-making process.

#### 4.2.5. Power Structure and the Aid Bureaucracy

To appreciate the evolution of Japanese aid policymaking, it is important to recognise that the process is not only “fragmented” but also “centralized” (Potter 1996: x; see also Orr 1990; Rix 1993). As a senior officer from MOFA (Kazuo Sunaga in MOFA 2003b Online) admitted “decision-making of Japanese ODA has been, to a large extent, done in Tokyo.” It is thus a centralised and bureaucratic exercise in Tokyo without much non-governmental player involvement (Forrest 1991; Hama 2005). As Figure 4.4 illustrates, it is simultaneously quite fragmented in the sense that these are many official agencies potentially involved – therefore, giving room for

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
recipient country or vice versa. They are often called ‘*temiyage-anken*’ (gift project) (Sumi 1991). The Japanese government usually announces the aid provision to the most wanted project by the recipient government during those state visits. This is also true in the case of the San Roque Multipurpose Dam (see Chapter 5). Moreover, during President Aroyo’s state visit to Japan in December 2002, two projects worth 6.7 billion JPY were signed: (FOEJ 1997; MOFA 2002d, 2002e).

<sup>17</sup> This has consisted of MOFA, MOF, MITI and EPA who review project proposals and make decisions, particularly for loans, unlike other Northern aid agencies (Potter 1996; Söderberg 1996).



inconsistency and power struggle among these agencies (Orr 1990; Söderberg 1996). While the four key ministries are most influential, other government bodies have their own aid budget and hence retain a certain degree of power regarding policy (Potter 1996; FOEJ 1997; Hama 2005).<sup>18</sup> Due to this fragmentation, inter-ministry communication, coordination and cooperation is vital yet rarely occurs in an adequate manner – causing much confusion not only among Japanese aid agencies but also with the recipient governments as well (MOFA 2002a; Potter 1996).

**Figure.4.4. ODA Budget Allocation by Government Body**



Source: Adapted from FOEJ (1997: 16).

To a greater extent than in the case with many other Northern donors, therefore, there is intense politics that takes place *within* the aid bureaucracy

<sup>18</sup> Although MOF and MOFA are two major powers in aid bureaucracy, MOF is the most powerful player as it controls the budget (Söderberg 1996; FOEJ 1997). Indeed, the Financial Times (March 16 1995) reported the merger of OECF and JEXIM as a result of the Japanese government attempt to limit the power of MOF (Söderberg 1996) that was originally, according to one anonymous source, to abolish the JEXIM rather than merge with OECF (Hatake\*, interview, 2004). It is also worth noting that MOF officials are also well-known for their arrogance and authoritarianism, which is shown in their lack of effort (or even an superficial attempt) to make good public relations (Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003; see also Dauvergne 1997).



in Tokyo – especially, as Japan lacks one single lead aid agency, such as the USAID in the US, or the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK (see JACSES 1996; DFID 2001; USAID 2006). The fragmentation was accentuated by key aid agencies being controlled by different ministries: OECF in the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), JICA under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and JEXIM in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; see Figure 4.3). As a result, political support for aid tends to be dissipated due to the different interests of ministries, which amplifies inconsistency as well as weakness in Japan's international cooperation (Potter 1996). Such fragmentation is exacerbated by the request-based approach which also builds into the system a myriad of Japanese corporate and recipient country actors' interests. These two factors greatly contribute to the Japanese government being unable to control aid policy effectively.

Although key economic bureaucrats (in MOF, MITI and EPA) had been the dominant power at the beginning of economic cooperation, internal strife among ministries became more and more serious as the aid budget grew. The rivalry is particularly noticeable between economic bureaucrats and MOFA officials as the latter has increasingly relied on aid (economic sources) to win international prestige and influence since the 1980s (Arase 1995; see Alesina and Dollar 2000). In so doing, the MOFA amplified its role in aid decision-making, which intensified the tension between economic bureaucrats (Hirai, interview, 2003; Murai, interview, 2003). The augmented power of MOFA within Japan's aid bureaucratic system can be also noticed from more frequent use of term international cooperation that the MOFA has preferably employed (see above).

This section has considered the structure and key players of Japan's international cooperation in order to appreciate the overall practice of the system. The next section, in turn, examines the general greening process of Japan's international cooperation during the 1990s while focusing on the key agencies and policy shifts.

### 4.3. Strengthening Environmental Assessment

In step with other Northern donors who began to take environmental issues on board in their aid agenda, the Japanese cabinet adopted an ODA Charter in June 1992 – considered to be the first Japan’s ODA policy with basic principles and philosophy stated. The Charter notably emphasised the importance of sustainable development and environmental conservation as a global task, and also declared “[e]nvironmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem” (Section 2. 1 of MOFA 1992). This stance was reiterated in the 1999 Medium-term Policy on Official Development Assistance (MOFA 1999) which explicitly listed environmental issues (such as conservation and pollution) as a high priority. With such top-level ‘greening’ in place, individual agencies began their own ‘greening’ processes, as environmental issues were pushed up by the bureaucratic agenda.

This set of top-level policy pronouncements was quite a departure from the past. As the Japanese government lacked even a basic formal philosophy and set of guiding principles concerning aid operations before the end of the 1980s, there had never before been official guidelines to check or monitor the environmental impact of Japanese aid. However, with a series of recommendations and guidelines adopted by the OECD<sup>19</sup> and ‘green’ pronouncements emanating from the Japanese cabinet itself, the three key international cooperation agencies (JICA, OECF and JEXIM) began their own greening process by elaborating environmental guidelines as well as reorganising organisational structures (JICA 1992, 2001a, 2001b; JEXIM 1993, 1999a; JBIC 1999c, 1999d, 2003b, 2003c).

Like many other Northern aid agencies, the greening of Japanese agencies notably concerned the environmental assessment process in the aid project itself (JACSES 1996; JICA 1988, 1990; OECF 1997). As a policy

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<sup>19</sup> *Recommendations of the Directorate on Development Assistance Projects and Environmental Assessment of Projects* (1985), *Environment Checklist for Development Assistance* (1989), *Good Practices for Environmental Assessment of Development Projects* (1991), *Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Developing Countries* (1991), *Good Practices for Country Environmental Surveys and Strategies and Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global Environmental Problems* (1991).



procedure, the three Japanese agencies reinforced environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo*) and verification of environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo-kakunin*).<sup>20</sup>

As Figure 4.5 shows, the three agencies become involved at different stages of the environmental assessment process – for example, JICA in environmental consideration and OECF and JEXIM in verification of environmental consideration and monitoring. Due to their commitment to the different stages of the environmental assessment process, their dedication to it also varies in ODA and OOF operations according to their concessionality requirements and business orientation. For instance, the environmental assessment process of ODA agencies (JICA and OECF) were procedurally more committed than that of the JEXIM's (Dauvergne 1997; FOEJ 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003).

The approach to environmental assessment in Japanese foreign aid also reflects domestic practices. Thus, EIA practice in the Japanese national context strengthened the predisposition of those agencies to implement environmental assessment. Crucially, it does so in a particular way. For example, EIA is used in Japan at the end of decision-making process simply to give a go ahead sign (Barrett and Therivel 1991; Broadbent 1998; Harashina 2000). Therefore, project approval is justified as the system is designed to ensure environmental consideration in the process while not causing unnecessary delays and costs. In fact, considering EIA practice is performed by the companies or consultants hired by them,<sup>21</sup> it is unlikely to find that a proposed project has environmentally harmful impacts (Glasson et al. 2005).

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<sup>20</sup> As this research focuses on Japan's bilateral international cooperation, the environmental assessment process is studied according to Japanese policy terminologies. However, in order to avoid confusion, although the Japanese translation for the term *kankyō-hairyo-kakunin* is environmental consideration confirmation, this thesis uses instead verification of environmental consideration.

<sup>21</sup> Large Japanese corporations often have subsidiaries that specialise in environment/development consulting or engineering. In most cases, those subsidiaries carry out the EIA practice for their mother companies. For instance, both Tokyo Electric Power Company and Kansai Electric Co. have such subsidiaries (Takahashi, interview, 2004; The General Environmental Technos 2004; Tokyo Electric Power Services 2002)

**Figure 4.5. Three Stages of Environmental Assessment Process in Japan's Bilateral International Cooperation Project Cycle**

Project Cycle	Flow of Activities	Japanese Agency	Funding category	Aim	Tool
Planning and Preparation	Development Plan or Investment Plan by the Recipient Government or the Borrower ↓				
	Master Plan ↓	For ODA projects - JICA	Technical Assistance	Assisting the recipient's environmental consideration (EIA) (This activity is commissioned to consulting companies)	Environmental consideration guidelines
	Feasibility Study with EIA ↓				
	Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) ↓	For ODA projects - OECF	Grants	Assisting the recipient's project formulation in general strengthening environmental elements in particular (This activity is commissioned to consulting companies)	
Appraisal	Official Request to Japanese Government or Agency (JEXIM) by the recipient or the borrower ↓				
	Environmental Appraisal ↓	For ODA projects - OECF	Yen loan	Verification of environmental consideration by reviewing EIA reports submitted by the recipient.	Environmental guidelines
		For OOF projects - JEXIM	Export credit, etc	Verification of environmental consideration by checking EIA reports submitted by the borrower	Environmental checklists
	Loan Agreement ↓				
Implementation and Monitoring	Project Implementation with Monitoring	For ODA projects - OECF			
		For OOF projects - JEXIM			

Source: Adapted from JBIC (2001a).



In addition, the close relationship between the Japanese government and the private sector means that EIA practice is readily manipulated; that is, Japan's closed decision-making system provides the Japanese private sector with significant power to influence government ministries (Arase 1994; Broadbent 1998; Imura 1997; Kerr 2001; Mason 1999; McCormack 1998; Revell 2003; Woo-Cummings 1999).<sup>22</sup>

It would be wrong, though, to dismiss out of hand the process of greening in Japanese aid despite this Japanese domestic context of superficial environmental assessment. In the following discussion, therefore, the two main procedures (environmental consideration and its verification) of that process are considered as well as associated organisational changes in the key agencies involved.

#### **4.3.1. Greening of JICA: Assisting the Recipient's Environmental Consideration**

JICA was the first Japanese aid agency that responded to global green trends. By establishing an Aid Study Committee on the Environment in 1988, it emphasised the significance of environmental consideration in aid projects. That committee thereafter produced an important report that set out the parameters of proposed policies as well as associated recommendations, while discussing a more systematic and comprehensive system to tackle environmental problems in general (JICA 1988).

Based on the recommendations contained in this 1988 report, JICA produced the first aid-related JICA environmental guideline in 1990. Of particular interest to this thesis, it focused on the issue of the environmental impact of dams which was an important element in Japan's aid at that time (see Chapter 5). Later, JICA was to specify further guidelines on other sectors, including agriculture, forestry, harbours, roads, and tourism. In 1989, it also established a dedicated Environment Section (*Kankyō-sitsu*) to

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<sup>22</sup> For example, the role of the dominant national idea of '*dokenkokka*' (the construction state) – which is related to public works – is attributed to many environmental problems in Japan (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 1998; Kerr 2001). This particular issue is often linked to the 'iron triangle' of private corporations, politicians, and bureaucrats who support (as well as benefit from) Japan's gigantic public works (Mason 1999; Kerr 2001)

coordinate all JICA activities concerning environmental protection. This Section later became the Environment and Women in Development Division in 1993, and the Global Issues Division in 2000 (JICA 2002a).

It is important to note that JICA is usually the only Japanese agency that actually participates in the recipient's environmental assessment in order to reduce a project's potential environmental impact at the early stage of its preparation (JICA 1988, 2002b; JACSES 1996; Hama 2005). Thus, any greening of JICA's organisational structure and policy would logically have a direct impact on the recipient's activities. Indeed, as Figure 4.5 shows, it is JICA as well as consulting companies commissioned by JICA that perform the environmental consideration work. However, formal responsibility for this activity rests in the hands of the recipient government, and hence not JICA since the latter merely assists the former (Usui, interview, 2004; see also JICA 1988).<sup>23</sup>

Central to making sense of possible JICA greening is the development study (*kaihatsu-chōsa*) where environmental consideration is actually carried out by JICA (or consultants hired by JICA). The development study itself is comprised of several component studies that are related to the project assessment procedure including a preparatory study, a feasibility study and a master plan study.<sup>24</sup> However, it is only the preparatory study here that is subject to the JICA guideline – although it is important to note that this study is a pre-requisite for the subsequent master plan study and feasibility study (see Table 4.1). With the result of the preparatory study at hand, JICA or its commissioned companies then performs master plan studies or feasibility studies according to the recipient country's environmental regulations (JICA 1989, 1992; MOT 1996b).

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<sup>23</sup> This point is often strongly emphasised by Japanese aid officials when asked about the implementation of environmental consideration and problems related to it. Thus, the Japanese government including JICA is “neither an owner or an executing body of the project [as] we only assist the recipient government with poor capacity” (Usui, interview, 2004).

<sup>24</sup> The master plan study generally relates to a project with a bigger geographical scale and a more comprehensive development focus (such as a regional development plan as exemplified in Chapter 6) while a feasibility study (discussed in Chapter 5) is confined to a particular project and its technical, economic, and socio-environmental viability (JICA 2001a).



**Table 4.1. JICA's Environmental Consideration Procedure for Development Study**

Project Implementation Stages		Environmental Consideration Stages	
JICA's Implementation	Preparatory Study	Preliminary Environmental Survey - <i>JICA environmental guideline applied</i>	
	Full-scale study	Master Plan Study	Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
		Feasibility Study	Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

Sources: JICA (1990, 1992)

**Figure 4.6. Detailed Procedural Activities of JICA Development Study**

	Stages of activity	Details
Project excavation ( <i>Anken-hakkutsu</i> )	Requested study/project finding ( <i>Purofai</i> ) ↓ Terms of Reference (TOR) received ↓ TOR examined	Preliminary screening: estimating the needs of IEE or EIA  ↓
Preparatory study	↓ Preparatory Study (Field research) ↓ Agreement on Scope of Work (S/W) discussion ↓ Producing preparatory study report	Screening: confirming preliminary screening (the need of IEE or EIA)  ↓ Scoping: decision on priority areas in IEE or EIA
Selecting consulting company	↓ Producing S/W ↓ Consulting company selected	
Full-scale study	↓ Producing Initial Check Report and its discussion ↓ Conducting IEE or EIA ↓ Presenting Draft Final Report and discussion ↓ Producing Final Report	

Sources: JICA (1990: 6-9; 1992).

Figure 4.6 sets out detailed procedural activities which are integral to the overall development study. The latter starts with project 'excavation' (*anken-hakkutsu*) as it assists the recipient to specify a project through so-called project finding (*purofai*). Thereby, this Tokyo-based activity essentially involves preliminary screening to see whether a recipient's proposal needs an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). After the Terms of Reference are received and examined, the JICA research team is dispatched to a project site to carry out a 'scoping' activity whereby the detailed scope of work is agreed between JICA and the recipient. And finally, a scope of work for a master plan study or feasibility study is finalised, even as a consulting company is then hired by JICA to complete an IEE or EIA as well as to conclude the study report.

This complex set of provisions provides ample scope, in theory at least, for a full environmental consideration of a proposed project. Indeed, even if a project was 'excavated' with minimal environmental consideration at the start, other elements in the chain of procedures can enable supplementary analysis. Still, there arise environmentally destructive projects in spite of the array of formal procedures adopted. To understand why this happens, it is necessary to address the implementation structure of the development study where there are major organisational problems *within* JICA as well as associated operational processes. Chapter 2 briefly mentioned concerns over these development studies as most of them are carried out by private consultancies. Indeed, the Japanese Special Investigation Committee on Economic Cooperation to the Philippines in 1986 (National Diet 1986e, 1986f, 1986g) discussed such problems in assessing the San Roque Dam project fiasco (see Chapter 5).

Given the importance of any implications for possible greening, these deficiencies merit close attention here. Five key institutional and operational problems *within* JICA as well as the associated commissioning process are thus considered.

The first problem derives from JICA's own organisational structure, namely the lack of staff able to go into the field. As the request-based approach requires a recipient government to propose projects to the Japanese government, JICA through its project finding activities needs to assist recipients with poor institutional capability to make an official request. However, the former Vice President of JICA, Taizō Nakamura, explained



that due to the “scale of ... the staff, [number]”<sup>25</sup> although it would be an ideal situation for JICA ... to excavate (*hakkutsu*) all projects, it is almost impossible to [do so, thus, JICA intends] to use private sector initiatives for these reasons” (cited in National Diet 1987: 18). Thus, “most of the projects are formed by the private consulting companies’ *hakkutsu-sagyō*” (excavation) and not JICA itself, he added (National Diet 1987: 17). And yet, this argument is highly problematic considering the private sector’s vested interest in promoting aid activities in recipient countries to their own benefit (see below). Indeed, it is especially problematic in the initial project stage since this one is dedicated to identifying the recipient’s development needs and aims to “improve the people’s life quality in the developing countries” (MOFA 2003a: 5).

The second problem relates to the *political* influence that is wielded by powerful actors at the initial stage of the development study. This problem was acknowledged as a crucial one to be tackled by the Japanese government as early as 1973 (MOFA 1973; National Diet 1987). The leading role of the Japanese company in ‘excavation’ has a long history starting with the post-war reparation process. Further, given the nature of the aid process, the personal interests of recipient political leaders often become entangled in project formulation and selection. Indeed, two sets of interests are linked: consulting companies are usually subsidiaries of big Japanese corporations that enjoy close ties to Philippine political and economic elites (Boyce 1993; Takahashi 1993; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; IBON 2003).

The third problem concerns the business interests of the big Japanese corporations often camouflaged behind “dummy” subsidiaries (National Diet 1986e: 24). As discussed above, from the very start of project preparation, consulting companies reflect their ‘mother’ corporations’ business interests during their input to the feasibility study and project finding. This close relationship was not opposed by the Japanese

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<sup>25</sup> In the year (1987) that he made the remarks, JICA had only 7 employees in the Manila office, who were managing 12 projects worth 11 billion JPY (National Diet 1987; MOFA 2002a). During the Committee, the number of Philippine-based employees of JICA (7) and USAID (31) were compared (National Diet 1987: 18). Although it is not strictly a fair comparison because USAID combines both the functions of JICA and OECF, one cannot dismiss the fact that JICA staff (or Japanese aid staff as a whole) is overworked and responsible for such large budget (Forrest 1991; Dauvergne 1997; Hirai, interview, 2003).

government. To the contrary, the latter even helped the private sector to have close ties with recipient governments. Thus, the Ministry of Trade and Industry long subsidised a private consulting company, the Japan Consulting Institute (*nihon-puranto-kyōkai*)<sup>26</sup> from its ODA budget to work on project finding. The subsidy was for the company to establish close ties with the recipient country from the early stage of the project (National Diet 1986g). The implementing stage of the development study is thus designed, in part, to advance Japanese business interests with the blessing and support of the Japanese government. This dynamic sets up a possible mechanism for large Japanese corporation that provides an opportunity to even legitimise their business interests in aid projects and encourages them to strengthen the ties with recipient governments.

The fourth problem is related to the JICA commissioning process itself and specifically, its perceived objectivity in selecting consulting companies to do the job. Up to 1986, a period encompassing the San Roque Multipurpose Dam Project considered in Chapter 5, the process involving JICA's development study had addressed 16 project proposals for official request relating to the Philippines (National Diet 1986e). However, five out of these 16 proposals were contracted out to only two favoured companies: Sanyu Consultants and Japan Overseas Consultants Ltd. Indeed, while there were over 300 registered Japanese consulting companies, only 1% of this total accounted for more than 31% of the 16 projects. This sort of record led to the suspicion that favouritism was being shown to key firms. Most of the contracts were in fact strongly criticised as being subjectively selected by JICA officials (National Diet 1986h, 1986i; Murai et al. 1989; FOEJ 1997; Yamamoto, interview, 2002). This issue concerning bias in the selection process became even more controversial after one senior JICA officer was arrested on bribery charges in August 1986 (National Diet 1986h, 1986i).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> *Nihon-puranto-kyōkai*, if directly translated into English, is 'Japan plant association'. As the Japanese name implies, the company provides consulting on plant construction, operation and maintenance in developing countries. Still, Japanese government subsidises the Institute from its ODA budget (Japan Consulting Institute 2003).


<sup>27</sup> The case occurred during the selection process of a rural development project in Morocco. The JICA official received a bribe from the consulting company Chūōkaihatu. In return, the official made a favourable arrangement for the company to enter a contract for the project. The official and the executive manager of the consulting company were arrested as a result (National Diet 1986h, 1986i).



Lastly, there were concerns raised in terms of the quality of corporate performance (i.e. ‘value for money’). Thus, the performance of Japanese companies was widely regarded as being poorer than that of their North American and European counterparts (National Diet 1986e: 24; Aratame, interview, 2004). In this light, a former Japanese development consultant commented, “if you look at the contractor list of the World Bank, [an organisation] that requires a higher level of performance with stricter guidelines than [indeed] that of the Japanese aid agencies, you hardly see any Japanese consulting companies” (Aratame, interview, 2004; see also Forrest 1991). Between 2000 and 2004, the World Bank made a total of 97 consultant contracts for its projects in the Philippines. Among 97 projects, only three were commissioned to Japanese companies (World Bank 2005).

Clearly, big Japanese consulting firms were closely linked to and supportive of the great growth in Japanese aid in the post-World War II era, especially in East and Southeast Asia where more than 50% of Japanese aid has been allocated since 1970 (MOFA 1997a, 1997b). As Figure 4.7 shows, Japanese aid has indeed been concentrated there, albeit with a weakening focus, over the years.

**Figure 4.7. Japanese Aid Allocation to East/Southeast Asia 1970- 1997**



Source: Adapted from MOFA (1997a, 1997b)

Whatever the vicissitudes of Japanese aid flows, what is of greatest interest here is the significant role played by consulting companies in development study implementation throughout this period. It is critical therefore that we appreciate how the ‘greening’ of JICA in the 1990s may have affected the



consulting companies as aid project contractors even as the manner in which the latter may have influenced the former is also considered. Thus, the consulting companies are studied in relation to JICA in terms of the environmental consideration practices of these companies.

In theory, the practice of consulting companies has undergone ‘greening’ in step with JICA’s ever more rigorously articulated environmental guidelines. However, the degree of greening in actual practice here has been described by one industry insider as “quite difficult and unsuccessful” (Kimura\*, interview, 2003).<sup>28</sup>

This situation originates from the business-oriented nature of consulting companies discussed earlier. Yet, in turn, the “*kou to otsu no kankei*” (the relations between the client and the contractor) also constrains the potential greening of consulting companies (Hirai, interview, 2003). For consulting companies, JICA is the client but more importantly “*okami*”<sup>29</sup> (Hashimoto 2002; Murai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003). This power dynamic created a condition for the development study implementation to be ‘quite difficult and unsuccessful’ in terms of environmental consideration. The crucial condition limiting the possible effectiveness of Japanese aid in this respect was thus that JICA has no flexibility on either its budget or the time span by which a study must be completed. This process was strongly influenced by the fiscal year of the Japanese national budget within which a particular study falls, and hence not to the specific conditions of a proposed project (Kerr 2001; Hori, interview, 2003). This inflexibility limits possible greening during the development study stage since the consulting companies did not have control over time or budget to produce alternative plans to minimise environmental degradation when a project was predicted to have serious adverse socio-environmental impacts (Kimura\*, interview, 2003). This particular issue will be further considered in relation to JBIC’s practice too (see Chapter 6).

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<sup>28</sup> In order to protect informants, names have sometimes been changed for citation purposes. Thus, the names with \* are anonymous informants.

<sup>29</sup> *Okami* (something or somebody high above) is still a very widely used term to refer to the government in Japan. According to Japanese dictionaries, the term refers to the institutions that administer the state affairs such as government or *bakufu* (the old expression for the government) in the most respectable way. This term clearly suggests the hierarchical relationship of the Japanese government with its people (see Mason 1999).



Indeed, the unique nature of the environmental consideration (comprising both social and ecological aspects) in the project procedure could mean that it was a costly element in the overall budget. Thus, for example, the procedure typically required two specialists: one for social assessment and the other for environmental assessment (Kimura\*, interview, 2003; Tamondong, interview, 2004; see also JICA 2001a, 2001b, 2004). However, attempts to allocate two specialists were often denied in practice with senior JICA managers ordering that there be only one specialist mainly in order to achieve cost reductions.

A powerful added factor influencing the Japanese aid process was that the recipient government often simply desired to see a project accepted and without costly work on their part in the process (Ross 1994; Lee and George 2000a). This point was critical since, as we have noted, it was the recipient government that is formally responsible for the environmental consideration procedure. Thus, the combination of a weak capacity and desperate wish to see projects realised could mean that the recipient might manipulate the EIA result to guarantee a positive outcome (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987; Ross 1994).

However, critics alleged that the Japanese government turned a blind eye to this process by simply checking in a cursory fashion the recipient's submitted report (Kimura\*, interview, 2003; see also Miyako\*, interview, 2004). Without proper and rigorous review and checking, the EIA was thus "seen as a bureaucratic requirement needed to obtain project approvals" (Ross 1994: 217). What was more, due to the relatively weak capacity of most recipient governments in terms of completing the environmental assessment, there was an opportunity for both JICA and Japanese consulting companies to exert great influence on their client (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987; Murai et al. 1989; FOEJ 1997).

The development study was an important step in any effort to 'green' Japanese aid since it was at this stage that a recipient's needs were identified and where a project was assessed for its economic and socio-environmental feasibility. Yet, in spite of the need for highly scientific expertise to make



environmental consideration meaningful, the above discussion suggests that it was politics rather than science that was crucial to the outcome of the development study. From the start, this process was shaped by the interests of powerful actors in the aid business. This state of affairs, in turn, had important implications for understanding the specific *kankyō-hairyō* (environmental consideration) of the two case study projects in the Philippines that are analysed in Chapters 5 and 6.

So far, we have explored environmental consideration by looking at both policy procedures and practice in the context of JICA's development study. The following two sections examine the next stage in environmental assessment: namely, verification of environmental consideration. This aspect should be important too since, once the recipient's environmental consideration was completed, the donor had to "*ensure* that an EIA of the aid-assisted project takes into account ...(its) development co-operation standards" (OECD 1992:10, emphasis added). This was the stage where Japanese agencies used their own Guidelines or Checklists to ensure that the recipient acted appropriately. Thus, the following two sections examine Overseas Economic Cooperation (OECF) for ODA projects and Export and Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) for OOF projects.

#### **4.3.2. Greening of OECF: Verifying the Recipient's Environmental Consideration**

Upon the recommendations of the 1988 JICA report, OECF devised in 1989 its own environmental guidelines (OECF 1989). These guidelines included 16 categories of projects including roads, airports, railways, sewage systems, power stations, mining, and so on. As most OECF-financed projects were infrastructure-oriented, there was a need for the recipient to conduct appropriate environmental consideration and for OECF to ensure that it was done well.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> A prior development fiasco was important here. Thus, Japan's lesson from initially co-financing the Narmada Dam in India expedited the establishment of the environmental guideline (Kimura 1990; National Diet 1990; Sumi 1992; IRN 1995a; JBIC 2003b).



The guidelines contained five main principles: strengthening *kankyō-hairyo*; expansion of environment-related programmes; improvement of environment-related information; reinforcement of *kankyō-hairyo* implementation system; and strengthening cooperation with other international aid agencies (OECF 1989). The guidelines were then related to inter-connected questions of pollution, the natural environment, and the associated social environment (e.g. community livelihoods and indigenous people).

**Table 4.2. Categories of OECF's guidelines (1995)**

Category	For appraisal
A	Submission of Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report is required. The EIA report must be accompanied by a summary in English or Japanese. The project is then appraised in the light of the Guidelines.
B	Although submission of an EIA report is not required, the project is to be appraised in the light of the Guidelines.
C	Submission of EIA report is not required, and appraisal in the light of the Guidelines may be omitted.

Source: OECF (1995).

This system was elaborated and revised over the years. In 1995, for example, projects were classified into three categories (see Table 4.2). This system required notably submission of an EIA when a project is appraised as Category A, which is with considerable potential environmental impact. In addition, environmental consideration was extended to new topics including biodiversity, involuntary resettlement, and conservation (OECF 1995).

Finally, OECF also produced “A Guide to Preparing an Environmental Impact Assessment” that stated desirable procedures and evaluation methods as well as items to be checked and monitored (OECF 1997). The guide notably aimed to improve the implementation and administrative capacity of the recipient's EIA system in as much as that guide was distributed to them in advance (JBIC 2003c).

In terms of organizational structure, OECF appointed its first environmental officer in 1988 in charge of environment-related issues. Subsequent




reorganisation was designed to strengthen environmental consideration. In 1993, for instance, the Environment and Social Development Section (*kankyō-shakai-kaihatsu-shitsu*) was upgraded to a fully fledged Environment Section (*Kankyō-shitsu*), which later became the Environment and Social Development Department (*kankyō-shakai-kaihatsu-ka*). That said, OECF remains vague on the extent to which this apparent environmental focus is adequately staffed. Indeed, it proved impossible to even acquire basic data on staff numbers as they are “not available to the public” (JBIC 2004g), or simply “do not exist” (Kojima, interview, 2004). Whatever the reason, such institutional non-cooperation raises some doubt over the extent to which these sections are fully or adequately staffed – especially, considering all the three agencies were widely seen to be understaffed by international standards (Forrest 1991; Potter 1994; Söderberg 1996; Dauvergne 1997).

Likely staff shortfalls have nonetheless not stopped OECF from extending its operations into new aspects of the aid project process. A key step here was the Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) programme created in 1988. SAPROF was designed to fix an apparent flaw in the Japanese ODA procedure. Thus, an officially requested project, even though given a high priority, may not be able to win through the strict OECF selection system due to financial and technological difficulties. SAPROF sought to address this flaw by giving guidance on ‘upstream operations’ even as projects are being first formulated and prepared (JBIC 2003c: 58; see Figure 4.8).

The advent of SAPROF was also designed to reinforce the process of environmental consideration. Thus, for example, when the environmental assessments of recipient agencies are considered unsatisfactory, it is empowered to step in to carry out additional studies at the early stage of the project cycle (JBIC 2001b, 2002b, 2003c; Anda, interview, 2004; see below). This process is particularly relevant to this thesis as SAPROF is notably seen to demonstrate OECF’s green commitment given its key role in environmental appraisal (JBIC 1999b; see Chapter 6).



**Figure 4.8. Upstream Operation in ODA Project Cycle**



Source: Adapted from JBIC (2001c: 8).



Despite these various green policy commitments, OECF has been the subject of much criticism. The perceived problems here relate to OECF's complex role in Japan's international cooperation policy procedure. In effect, OECF's weakness is seen to reflect notably its overall place in the articulation of that system. Thus, OECF operations are based on the outcome of JICA's development study and the recipient's EIA (National Diet 1999; Tsuji, interview, 2004). Yet, if these activities are not properly conducted in the first place, then OECF's own operation cannot help but have the same flaws.

True, this dilemma may be overcome by OECF's own field survey work including such activities as SAPROF (National Diet 1990; JBIC 2001a).<sup>31</sup> However, even then, such work was not often performed in practice due to the shortfall of OECF staff (Kadowaki, interview, 2004).

Further, even when an OECF survey for project appraisal has been conducted, the way in which the remit of the survey was narrowly defined, often limited the utility of this work. This was so because a survey team consisted of two people who were only in charge of economic and technical aspects of the project (Söderberg 1996). Difficulty occurred particularly when a targeted project had serious social and environmental problems like the Narmada Dam in India and the Kotopanjang Dam in Indonesia (National Diet 1990, 2003). Thus, by defining the study area very narrowly in a technical fashion, the OECF team did not see the wider causes of local problems such as community eviction and displacement as well as environmental destruction of the surrounding area (National Diet 1990; IRN 1995a; FOEJ 2002b). For example, in the case of the Narmada Dam project, the field survey was confined to the dam construction site as the OECF only funded power generation facilities there, and hence was not responsible for considering possible social and environmental effects elsewhere (National Diet 1990).

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<sup>31</sup> The survey was to inspect economic, social, financial, technical, environmental, organisational and managerial aspects of the project (Söderberg 1996).



This section has considered OECF ‘greening’ commitment in relation to policy reform and organisational change, highlighting notably perceived problems with this process of change. Next, we turn to JEXIM – the agency that manages Other Official Finance (OOF) projects – to consider its environmental appraisal procedures.

### **4.3.3. Greening of JEXIM: Verifying the Recipient’s Environmental Consideration**

In contrast to JICA and OECF, the ‘greening’ of JEXIM has been less pronounced, undoubtedly because there was relatively little global consideration of this particular sector of the aid industry during the 1990s (Bern Declaration et al. 1998; Motoyama et al. 1998; Rich 1998, 2000).<sup>32</sup> Still, JEXIM did undertake some policy reform in order to improve its ability to verify the environmental consideration of project proponents. As noted above, JEXIM was the agency responsible for Other Official Finance (OOF) including export and import credits.

The first action taken by JEXIM was the appointment of a senior advisor for environmental issues attached to the Project and Corporate Analysis Department in 1988. That single position later became a full-fledged Environment Division (*kankyō-shitsu*) in 1992 (JBIC 2003b). It began to compile sector-specific environmental manuals in 1989 which was indeed the first environmental checklist of its kind. Then, JEXIM established an Environmental Survey System<sup>33</sup> in 1991 which basically revised the 1989 environmental manuals and further set out a policy on how to deal with environmental problems in loan projects. To facilitate this process, it also recommended employing external consultants where a project required monitoring with specialist knowledge. These steps culminated in 1993 in the production of an Environmental Checklist designed to reinforce the

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<sup>32</sup> This sector has come under greater scrutiny in recent years though (Hildyard and Gilfenbaum 2005; Yildiz and Hildyard 2004; see also The Corner House Online; ECA Watch Online)

<sup>33</sup> Its official Japanese name is *Purojekuto ni taisuru kankyō-chekku-tetsuzuki*. Here, the Japanese term *tetsuzuki* is meaning a procedure. However, according to JEXIM official publications, it is translated in English as ‘system’ that is more comprehensive and bigger in scale than standard use of procedures (JBIC 2002e, 2003).



verification of environmental consideration activity (JEXIM 1993; see also Chapter 5).

The overall significance of these assorted measures should not be exaggerated, however. Thus, they did not have any basic orienting principle or objective as did the comparable moves by JICA and OECF around this time. Instead, there was simply a collection of basic checklists for 11 industrial sectors with three broad categories provided: natural environment, social environment, and monitoring. Clearly, JEXIM as an export credit agency did not establish the same depth of environmental consideration as the other two agencies seemed to do – it appeared rather cosmetic (Dauvergne 1997; Motoyama et al. 1999; see also Rich 1998, 2000; Goldzimmer 2003). In September 1999, though, JEXIM did create fully-fledged Environmental Guidelines (just before it was merged into JBIC) that included general principles, objectives and procedures, and that classified projects “in accordance with the extent of the environmental impact(s) and/or JEXIM’s involvement in the project” (JEXIM 1999a: 2). This latter policy shift, nonetheless, came at the end of the period covered in this thesis – and hence, does not figure significantly in our investigation.

The limited extent of apparent greening at JEXIM has been made hard to verify given the notorious secrecy of this politically sensitive agency. Indeed, unlike the other two agencies just discussed, JEXIM’s operations are even less well known and open to the public (FOEJ 1997, 2002b; Motoyama et al. 1999). In a bureaucratic culture of non-transparency, basic institutional practice, such as the number of staff in the Environment Division and policy details are more often than not still classified (Dauvergne 1997; JBIC 2004c; see also Chapter 5).<sup>34</sup>

Notwithstanding patchy disclosure and field survey practices, then it is fair to say that environmental consideration and its verification as a policy procedure was elaborated in all three of the international cooperation agencies just considered during the 1990s. True, there are differences in the

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<sup>34</sup> The 1989 environmental manuals are confidential (Dauvergne 1997), therefore are not available to public.




seeming degree of greening between the ODA implementing agencies. Yet, there is enough evidence – however partial and ambiguous – to suggest that ‘greening’ *may* have been taken seriously in the 1990s. Indeed, further support for this view is provided by assessment of a new category of explicitly ‘green’ aid that Japan introduced in that decade.

#### 4.4. ‘Green’ Aid: *Kankyō-enjyo*

Japan proclaimed its first Environmental ODA policy at the 1989 G7 Summit pledging the disbursement of 300 billion yen over three years directly on environment-related matters. This policy was elaborated two years later when an environmental assessment system was introduced designed specifically to promote environmental conservation in recipient countries (MOFA 1999, 2001c). At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Japan pledged a further disbursement of nearly one trillion yen over the following five years – the vast bulk of it in the form of highly concessional loans. As a result, Japan’s environmental aid sharply increased (MOFA 2001a).


**Figure 4.9. Trends of Japanese Environmental ODA Loans**



Source: Adapted from JICA (2001a)



**Figure 4.10. Japanese Bilateral Environmental ODA as a Proportion of Total Japanese Bilateral ODA**



Source: Adapted from JBIC (2003a)

As Figure 4.9 shows, bilateral environmental ODA loans neared the 500 billion yen mark in 1999, then accounting for about one-third of total Japanese bilateral ODA (see Figure 4.10). Indeed, despite the economic dislocation caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, environmental aid continued to increase in both absolute and relative terms. Mostly, Japan's 'green' aid was delivered on a loan basis (Potter 1994; Dauvergne 1997; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Kitazawa, interview, 2006) – therefore, the aid component thus focused on the degree of concessionality in the interest rates that attached to the loans.

Of interest here is the fact of the difference between ODA loans granted for regular 'development' projects and loans granted for 'environmental' projects. Thus, after 1995, by introducing lower rates<sup>35</sup> for environmental projects than those given for development projects, the Japanese government aimed to demonstrate its commitment to privileging environmental issues while providing a greater incentive to recipients to conserve or otherwise improve their environments (JBIC 2002c, 2003a, 2004a).

<sup>35</sup>Standard environmental interest rates of 1.7% in 1995 and special concessional interest rates of 0.75% were introduced. The latter was applied to one of the case study projects (see Chapter 6). The typical interest rates for OECF loans were below market rates, for example, an average 2.65% in 1993 and 2.2% in 1999 and 2001 (Söderberg 1996; JBIC 1999a, 2001d).



Japan's formal commitment to 'greening' was publicly affirmed at the highest level befitting the country's growing role in global environmental issues and governance. Thus, former Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto announced a comprehensive environmental cooperation policy in 1997, grandly titled 'Initiatives for Sustainable Development toward the 21st Century' (MOFA 1997a). This step was seen as a pivotal development in so far as it signalled Japan's involvement in a much wider array of environmental issues (such as biodiversity conservation, global warming and environmental capacity building) than had hitherto been the case (Potter 1994; Taylor 1999; see also Revell 2003).<sup>36</sup> This expanded programme "reflected the changes in recipient's needs" (JBIC 2003b: 117).

Yet, it was Japan's central role in the climate change negotiations and the hosting of the Kyoto Protocol talks that most vividly demonstrated the new national priority given to the environment (Mason 1999). Linked to that high-profile role, the 1997 Kyoto Initiative was specifically designed to support developing countries that were combating global warming (MOFA 1997b). To that end, 'the most concessional terms' were offered – thus, a 0.75% annual interest rate and a 40-year repayment period (MOFA 1997b). It was under this scheme that the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan that is the focus of Chapter 6 was devised.

High-level support for a wider environmental remit proved to be a 'green' light for a series of new/ or expanded ODA initiatives. Aside from the three main agencies discussed above, a total of 10 other government ministries have participated in environmental aid since the early 1990s.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, the Green Aid Plan of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was the best-known programme. Focused on Asia, MITI's programme had been first introduced back in 1992 to support the *jijyo-doryoku* (self-help effort) of developing countries to tackle energy and environmental problems

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<sup>36</sup> Traditional issues covered included residential environmental improvement and rehabilitation, forest preservation and reforestation, anti-pollution measures, disaster prevention, energy/resource saving, and alternative energy (JICA 2001a).

<sup>37</sup> These are: Science and Technology Agency; National Land Agency; Ministry of Health and Welfare; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery; Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of Post and Telecommunication; Ministry of Construction; and Environment Agency.



in industries with low levels of energy efficiency (Evans 1999). By transferring Japan's advanced environmental technology, the subsequently elaborated programme aimed to help recipients work on anti-pollution measures for industrial activities, such as water pollution and air pollution, waste management and recycling, and energy conservation (MOFA 1997a; Evans 1999; JICA 2001a). The MITI plan was seen to be a quintessential Japanese contribution focused on environmental technology transfer because "it was not only something Japan was good at, but also [because of] the achievements Japan has accumulated [in the sector] for years" (Takayanagi, interview, 2003; see also Barrett and Therivel 1991; Revell 2003; Imura and Schreurs 2005).

Top-level political support for 'greening' was reflected in other cases of Japan's international cooperation. Thus, the OOF component also started to feature more 'green' projects prominently involving such issues as conservation, pollution, and energy use. For instance, to promote alternative energy production, JEXIM co-financed with Global Environmental Facility the Leyte Geothermal Power Development Project in the Philippines to the tune of 13.3 billion yen<sup>38</sup> in 1994 (JBIC 2003b).

And yet, this flurry of 'green' initiatives in the 1990s has provoked much criticism. Indeed, in spite of a significant increase in the volume of environmental aid, a common view is that such aid merely involves the same old project with a splash of 'green' paint (Potter 1994; Keohane 1996; Hori, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004). One high-ranking JICA official that I interviewed thus explained that, "as we were told to expand the share of *kankyō-enjyo*, what we eventually did was just re-categorise the projects under the name of *kankyō-enjyo* at the end of financial year as long as a project had any environment-related element in it" (Hori, interview, 2003). This process was strongly criticised by Japan-based NGOs. Mekong Watch Japan, for example, asserted that,

"[the Japanese] government put new names like environmental ODA on the old projects. For example, they continue to support

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<sup>38</sup> This amount in Japanese yen is equal to US\$ 133 million.



hydropower dam [construction] under the name of ‘environment’ by saying it reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ... [foreign pressure] made the government change the label of the old schemes. Having the ‘green’ label on does not necessarily mean that the project is ‘green’. What the Japanese government did with *kankyō-enjyo* is just a matter of labelling, nothing else” (Matsumoto, interview, 2004; see also Potter 1994; Keohane 1996).

The reason why Japan can re-categorise its projects with a new green label in this manner is because it does not have strict official criteria on environmental aid as, for instance, the World Bank does (World Bank 1992; Franz 1996; Hama 2005).<sup>39</sup> Moreover, a definition of environmental aid has never been officially announced nor have there been coordination efforts among Japanese agencies on this matter. Considering the significant aid volume involved (Franz 1996; also see above), this certainly raises some questions over the possible ‘green’ contents of these enormous financial flows. However, such vagueness reflects a wider problem in the donor world (OECC 2001). Indeed, there has been no agreed definition or criteria for environmental aid among bilateral donors as “the majority of [donor] agencies ... have had problems in assembling conclusive information on specific levels of funding allocated to environment-related programmes and projects ... [due to confusion in conceptualising] what constitutes an environmental project (OECD 1997: 9). This absence of international consensus on environmental aid criteria has thus left Japan (as well as other donors) with considerable freedom to re-categorise existing development projects as environmental efforts.

So far this chapter has explored selectively the general history of Japan’s international cooperation and its greening efforts during the 1990s. We now finally turn in this chapter to the Philippines, one of the top recipients of Japanese aid and the recipient country focus of this thesis, in order to

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<sup>39</sup> In the case of the World Bank, (1992: 24): “a project is deemed ‘primarily’ environmental if either the costs of environmental protection measures included in the project, or the environmental benefits accruing from the project exceed 50 percent of the project’s total costs or benefits. Projects are considered to have ‘significant environmental components’ if environmental protection costs or environmental benefits exceed 10 percent of the total project costs or benefits”.



provide the necessary background for the following empirical chapters that provide in-depth analysis of two case study and projects.

#### 4.5. Japanese 'Aid' to the Philippines

The Philippines has maintained a prominent place in Japanese aid flows due to historical circumstances. Thus, it was a major beneficiary of the reparation system discussed earlier. Indeed, it was the largest recipient of reparations, receiving about US\$ 550 million in total (Ofreneo 1993; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).

**Table 4.3 Japan's Reparations to the Philippines**

(JP¥ million)

Sector	Amount	%	Items
Agriculture and fishery	12,851	6.8	Irrigation and flood control (pump, tractor, etc), Farming equipment and machinery, fishing boat
Electric power development	1,461	0.8	Power generator equipment, transmission wire, insulator, etc.
Mining	966	0.5	Dump truck, refinery
Industry	30,074	15.8	Cement plant, glass-bottle manufacturing plant, steel manufacturing and refinery plant, machinery/equipment/ materials for textile, paper manufacturing, car, etc.
Transportation and communication	49,571	26.1	Rail-road coach, freighter, ferry boat, cargo ship, vehicle, communication device (wired and wireless devices)
Public works	65,402	34.4	Water supply facility, airport and port related facility materials, school house construction material, bridge construction material
Salvage of sunken ships	2,946	1.5	Salvaging sunken ships
Education, sanitation, health, research	9,316	4.9	Medical equipments, hospital facilities, equipment for education and research
Service	5,760	3.0	Expenses of the Reparation Mission, banking charge, bidding advertisement fees, export inspection fees
Credit on reparation	6,686	2.7	Telecommunication system expansion and improvement plan, Manila railway expansion
Consumer goods	5,102	3.5	Rayon fabric, fertilizer
Total	190,135	100.0	

NB: Above amount equals US\$ 550 million

Source: Tsuda and Yokoyama (1999: 234)



Also as Table 4.3 shows, such reparations were heavily focused on infrastructure projects through capital goods and construction services (Ofreneo 1993; JBIC 2003a).

In 1976, when the phase of official reparations had ended, international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) began in the form of economic cooperation (*keizai-kyōryoku*) with the Philippines. The basic form and objective of such assistance, though, was carried over from the reparation system. Thus, the key elements were *yōsei-shugi* (a request-based approach), a strong role for Japanese firms as suppliers and beneficiaries of economic cooperation, and the ‘cosy’ relationship between Japanese businesses, Japanese ODA *zokugiin*<sup>40</sup> and Philippine elites (Takahashi 1993; Söderberg 1996; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).

Japanese assistance has therefore had a great influence on the political economy of the Philippines with Japan being the largest single donor to the country for more than two decades (Inada 1990; Embassy of Japan in the Philippines 2003). Such a prominent role has drawn criticism. For example, critics of the reparation agreement observed, that ‘*enryo*’ “... peg(ged) Philippine industries to the raw-material needs of Japan... [and reduced] the Philippines into an economic vassal of Japan” (Ohno 1986: 123; see also Ofreneo 1993; NHK shuzaihan 1996; IBON 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d). Indeed, although it was one of the most economically advanced developing countries before the mid-1960s in Asia, the Philippines has lagged behind neighbouring countries in terms of economic development ever since (Broad 1989; Boyce 1993; Takahashi 1993).<sup>41</sup> That Japan’s aid to the Philippines has generated debate is clear and diverse aspects of this controversial aid process are examined in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Before turning to that empirical analysis, the next section highlights general trends in the

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<sup>40</sup> Diet members who act in the interest of certain government ministries and industries they regulate and benefit from their efforts. The most recent and famous case is Muneo Suzuki, who was a Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker. He was arrested on suspicion of accepting bribes for influence peddling regarding ODA projects in Kenya (Sundu-Miriu hydroelectric power plant) and in Russian-held islands off Hokkaido (Komori 2002; see also *Mainich Daily News* 2002, *Sankei-shinbun* 2002; *The Japan Times* 2002a, 2002b).

<sup>41</sup> Many Koreans in the 1960s studied abroad in the Philippines due to its more advanced status among neighbouring countries (Kim 2003).



Japan-Philippines aid relationship, before concluding with a brief overview of our two case study projects.

#### 4.5.1. Trends and Case Studies

The amount of Japanese assistance (both grants and loans) to the Philippines has clearly increased over time (see Figure 4.11 and 4.12). Aid operations there have become more complex too in terms of regional and sectoral distribution. On the one hand, ODA grants steadily increased until 1993 then started to drop thereafter. On the other hand, and specific oscillations aside, ODA loans assumed a broadly upward trend through the 1990s.


**Figure 4.11. Japanese ODA Loans to the Philippines from 1970 to 1998**



Source: Adapted from MOFA (2001b, 2002g)




**Figure 4.12 Japanese ODA Grants to the Philippines from 1970 to 1998**



Source: Adapted from MOFA (2001b, 2002g)

Japanese assistance has been allocated to a great extent to develop infrastructure for economic growth (Potter 1996). It also shows a tendency to conform to the development plans of the Philippine government of the day – each with its own regional and sectoral priorities. Overall, though, geographical priority, has been given to heavily populated areas such as Metro Manila, surrounding regions in Central Luzon, and other regional centres (such as Cebu) where tourism-related industries are located. Sectoral priority has been given to power, energy, water, transportation and communication development (NEDA 1991, 1993, 2000).

**Figure 4.13. Top 10 ODA Grants Recipients**




N.B. Accumulated amount from 1950 to 1999

Source: Adapted from MOFA (2001a, 2001b)




The important role of Japanese aid to the Philippines can be seen when that support is compared with that received by other recipients (see Figure 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15). The Philippines has thus been ranked in the top 10 of the key elements of Japan's international cooperation, clearly demonstrating its status as a key recipient in all three types of Japanese international cooperation: ODA grants (Figure 4.13), ODA loans (Figure 4.14) and OOF (Figure 4.15).

**Figure 4.14 Top 10 ODA Loan Recipients**



N.B. Accumulated amount from 1950 to 1999  
Source: JBIC (2003c)

**Figure 4.15 Top 10 OOF Recipients**



N.B. Accumulated amount from 1950 to 1999. Australia, UK and USA are excluded as they are OECD DAC member countries.  
Source JBIC (2003a)



Benefiting from the strong Japanese aid focus on basic infrastructure projects which have been the main priority (see Table 4.3), the Philippines, in spite of its size (in terms of economy, land mass and population), has retained its relative prominence in Japanese assistance compared with other (much larger) top ten recipients such as China, India, Indonesia and Thailand (Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; Yokoyama 1994; see also JICA 2002a; MOFA 1999a, 1999b).

Japanese aid to the Philippines has nonetheless experienced some change over time with shifts in both ‘conventional’ and ‘new’ projects reflecting the broader shifts discussed in this chapter. It is the task of Chapters 5 and 6 to assess these shifts in terms of possible ‘greening’. Therefore, here, this chapter briefly situates the two case study projects, leaving a more detailed description to the following chapters.


The first case study project is the San Roque Multi-purpose Dam in Northern Luzon (see Figure 4.16), our focus in Chapter 5. This project has been a conventional ‘development’ aid effort and will enable us to assess the extent to which ‘greening’ has occurred in the mainstream aid process. The project is a major economic infrastructure scheme linked to hydropower expansion. There have been many permutations to the project linked to wider political economic processes. Thus, in the 1980s, the Philippine government was preoccupied with development-linked structural adjustment policies that laid the foundation for neoliberal-style privatisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Broad 1988; Boyce 1993).

Such privatisation privileged foreign investors especially under the Ramos administration in office during the period between 1992 and 1998 (Serrano 1994; IBON 2003). As a key donor, Japan also recognised the significance of the *minkatsu-jigyō* (privatization project) for the Philippines (JICA 1999a, 1999b). The privatisation saga is of interest here because of the power sector – propelled by the massive blackouts of the 1980s and early 1990s that hindered national economic development. In response, President Ramos pushed through legislation to prioritise the sector and its projects. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the San Roque Multi-purpose Project (SRMP)



was one of them and has played a key if controversial role in satisfying electricity demands in the Manila region.

**Figure. 4.16. Location of the Two Project Sites**



Source: Adapted from the University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin (2005).

While economic infrastructure projects like the SRMP have predominated, there has also been a ‘green’ theme to the bilateral relationship since the early 1990s. Along with change in Japan, the growth of an influential environmental movement in the Philippines (from the late 1980s) meant that NGOs pushed environmental issues and indigenous people’s rights high up the political agenda. For example, there were outcomes in terms of the establishment of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 and the Indigenous People’s Right Act of 1997. In particular, Palawan has appealed to Northern donors and middle-class Philippine activists alike as the Philippines’ last frontier needed urgent environmental conservation (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Arquiza 1996; Bryant 2002, 2005; JBIC



2002a; Lawrence 2002; Conservation International 2003). Through the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSD) and other initiatives, the province of Palawan has been very successful in attracting aid money not only for conservation purposes but also for ‘environmentally-friendly’ development projects such as community-based ecotourism. As aforementioned, these new ‘green’ themes were also promoted in Japanese policy during the 1990s (MOFA 1991, 1997a, 1997b). One project that emerged from this situation was the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) (see Figure 4.16), our focus in Chapter 6. The analysis there will enable us to gauge possible greening in one of Japan’s new generation of environmental projects.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed in a selective manner the history and general features of Japan’s international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) policy as well as the possible formal ‘greening’ of that policy, especially in relation to the three key agencies involved. It has also briefly contextualised Japanese international cooperation to the Philippines. This thesis accordingly now turns to the detailed empirical analysis of the two case study projects in the Philippines. Chapter 5 investigates the San Roque Multi-purpose Dam Project in Pangasinan province on Luzon island, while Chapter 6 explores the Sustainable Environment Management Project in Northern Palawan. These two chapters thereby examine development aid and environmental aid separately. Yet, each case investigates the role and impact of environment-related guidelines and policy procedures in order to assess the evidence of possible greening in Japan’s bilateral aid in relation to the Philippines in the 1990s.



## Chapter 5. Greening of *Kaihatsu-enjyo*: San Roque Multi-purpose Project

Chapter 5 considers the San Roque Multi-purpose Project (SRMP) in order to assess to what extent and in what ways a traditional *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) project has been the focus of a greening process. Our concern here is to evaluate the degree of greening in the project in terms of the procedural framework developed to that end, that is, the environmental assessment process discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, three major elements are assessed: first, the *kankyō-hairyō* (environmental consideration) system; second, the *kankyō-hairyō-kakunin* (verification of environmental consideration) process of the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM); and third, the subsequent monitoring procedures.

**Figure 5.1. A Development Project**



LET'S MAKE SURE I'VE GOT THIS RIGHT. WE GET TO KEEP SOME LIZARDS AND BLUE BUTTERFLIES ON OUR HEATHLAND, AND IN RETURN YOU GET TO BUILD 3,200 NEW HOUSES ON OUR GREEN BELT . . . .

Source: Glasson et al. (2005: 209).

The thirty-year history of the SRMP demonstrates how a contentious project eventually led to a gigantic Yen loan agreement. It simultaneously enables us to see how this failed Official Development Assistance (ODA) project of the 1980s turned into an Other Official Finance (OOF) project in the 1990s. The project also needs to be explored in the context of a focused appreciation of the political economy of Philippine development. The



process from project formulation to approval enables us to consider, firstly, how JEXIM's *kankyō-hairyō-kakunin* process was put into practice, and secondly, how effectively the San Roque Multipurpose Project's *kankyō-hairyō* meshed with the Philippines' own system based on Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) and Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECC).<sup>1</sup> There is too an ability here to gauge the impact of subsequent monitoring provisions.

## 5.1. Project Overview

The San Roque Multi-purpose Project divides into two main components: a power component (power generation) and a non-power component (construction of the dam and spillway). JEXIM funded both components by providing an untied loan to the Philippine National Power Corporation (NPC) for the non-power component, and an investment loan to San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) for the power component. However, the core of the two components is the construction of the San Roque dam, still today the tallest hydro-dam in Southeast Asia. The project was formerly known as the San Roque Multipurpose Dam Project (or San Roque Dam Project) before its resurgence as an OOF project in the 1990s. The actual construction of the San Roque Dam started in March 1998 and was completed only in February 2003 (SRPC 2006a). It is built on the lower Agno River of Pangasinan Province in the Cordillera region of northern Luzon (Figure 5.2). This rock-filled dam is 200 meters high and 1,000 meters long, generating 345 mega watts of power and irrigating 87,000 hectares. It is also designed to 'improve' water quality by reducing downstream siltation and by cutting disastrous floods that often wipe out crops during the rainy season.

SRPC financed and constructed the San Roque Dam under a power purchase agreement (PPA) with the NPC on a build-operate-transfer (BOT) basis (NPC 1997; SRPC 2006a).<sup>2</sup> The electricity generated by the dam is sold for 25 years at fixed rates to the NPC and provides power for diverse

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
<sup>1</sup> Any project must go through the Philippine system to comply with Philippine law. Both the EIS system and ECC are discussed briefly below.

<sup>2</sup> Details of both PPA and BOT are discussed below.



economic activities in northern Luzon, including mining, cash crop agriculture, and tourism (Valdes, interview, 2004; DOT 2005; FOEJ 2005d).<sup>3</sup> Yet, its task to solve power shortage in Metro Manila and Southern Luzon was more emphasised (Perez Jr. 2004; SRPC 2006a). However, the project is opposed by indigenous *Ibaloi* people who have been protesting against the construction of the third dam on the Agno River for five decades (see below). According to SRPC, a total of 720 households have already been relocated and are living at resettlement sites provided by NPC (Kurita 2004a; SRPC 2006a).

**Figure 5.2. Location of San Roque Multipurpose Project**



Source: Kurita 2004a: 3

The San Roque Multipurpose Project required substantial financing, for which President Marcos had first approached the Japanese government for aid in 1983. Indeed, SRMP was never possible without funding from JEXIM and six associated Japanese banks. It was thus eventually implemented as an OOF project on the basis of a Power Purchase Agreement signed between the NPC and the SRPC on 11 October 1997. Yet,

<sup>3</sup> The NPC has a plan to boost 'eco-tourism' in Luzon as a part of the national development plan. The plan involves the building of golf courses that are 'environmentally friendly' to attract tourists from overseas (Valdes, interview, 2004). However, according to the DENR EMB (2001), golf course development is classified as an Environmentally Critical Project along with other development project including (heavy industries, resource extractive industries, infrastructure).



looking at the key shareholders of the SRPC exemplifies the political and economic influence of two former rulers, the US and Japan (see Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1. San Roque Power Corporation**

Corporate Shareholders	Holding Company (Headquarters)	Percentage of the shares
Sithe Philippines Holdings, Inc.	Sithe Energies, Inc. (New York, USA)	50.05%
Marubeni Corporation	Marubeni Corporation (Tokyo, Japan)	42.45%
KPIC Singapore Pte Ltd	Kansai Electric Power Co. (Osaka, Japan)	7.5%

Source: SRPC (2006a)

Table 5.1 is instructive in several ways. First, and befitting colonial links between the two countries, there is a major American stake in the SRPC. Secondly, and reflecting close contemporary ties, there is a notable Japanese share in the consortium. Third, and most significant of all, is the role of one key Japanese firm in the enterprise. In this regard, it is interesting to note that 29% of the shares of the US-based Sithe Energies company are owned by the Japanese corporation Marubeni (Berne Declaration et al. 1999; FOEJ 2002; SRPC 2006a; see below). Sithe entered into the contract with the Philippine government to build, operate and maintain the dam for 25 years (Berne Declaration et al. 1999; FOEJ 2002). Although, Sithe has more than a 50% share in SRPC, considering Marubeni's share in Sithe itself, Marubeni is effectively the major player in the San Roque Power Corporation.<sup>4</sup> As the term *marubeni-kosu*<sup>5</sup> – coined to describe Marcos's 'special relationship' with Marubeni – suggests, this mammoth development plan from the 1980s was set up by Marubeni, of which the economic scale and political 'boldness' stunned even Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior officials (National Diet 1986d: 31; Abracosa and Ortolano 1989).

<sup>4</sup> In spite of its Japanese domestic ranking (fourth) among other general trading companies (*sōgō-shōsha*), in 1986, Marubeni's business share in the Philippines was the largest, almost reaching 90% of total Japanese business deals in the Philippines (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986).

<sup>5</sup> This term is widely known among Japanese academics. The term is made by combining Marubeni and *marukosu* (Marcos) (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Tsuda, interview, 2004).




As noted, the SRMP combines a power component and a non-power component, financed as follows (see Table 5.2). Figure 5.3 outlines the relationship between the key funders in the project, and when combined with Table 5.2, provides a revealing glimpse into the political economy of a mega-development project.

**Table 5.2. Financing the San Roque Multipurpose Project**

Power component by San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC): Total US\$450 million towards the construction of power generation facilities and their management			
Lender to the SRPC	Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) - overseas investment loan.	Amount	US\$300 million
	Japanese private banking corporations: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Fuji Bank, Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company, Sakura Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and Norinchukin Bank <sup>6</sup>	Amount	US\$150 million
Non-power component by National Power Corporation (NPC): Total US\$600 million towards the construction of dam and spillway			
Lender to the NPC	Export Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) – Untied loan	Amount	US\$400 million
	the NPC's operating revenues allocated for socio-environmental issues	Amount	US\$200 million

Source: Adapted from Berne Declaration et al. (1999)

**Figure 5.3. Relations between Key Funders in SRMP**



Source: adapted from FOEJ (1999a); JEXIM (1999b), NPC (1997); SRPC (2006a)

<sup>6</sup> Fuji Bank was merged into Mizuho Bank in 2002, and Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank were merged into Sumitomo Mitsui Bank in 2001.



Thus, about 66% of total project costs were covered by JEXIM. While the risk of lending an untied loan to the NPC was fully covered by a Philippine government guarantee, the overseas investment loan was a huge risk for this agency to take due both to its commercial nature as well as the fact that the SRPC was the borrower and not the Philippine government itself.

The decision about an overseas investment loan is normally based on a financial evaluation, and is thus more business oriented than in the case of an untied loan. Considering the political and economic circumstances of the Philippines, funding a project that requires such financial resources is rather a risky business. But in this case, by combining an untied loan to the state-owned NPC with an investment loan and an associated commercial loan from the consortium of six banks, there were clearly some political tactics employed by JEXIM and the Japanese banks to arrange funding. Indeed, as it was impossible for the project to go ahead without JEXIM's US\$ 700 million disbursement being confirmed, politicised negotiations on the funding occurred from the start in early 1994 when previous studies of the project were reviewed (see below). Such politics left no room for socio-environmental issues, for example, raising concerns about the bypassing of standard procedures that ought to have been fully considered in JEXIM's decision-making process (FOEJ 2002b). Thus, JEXIM covered the risk of the commercial bank loans to SRMP while its own risk was ultimately covered by the Philippine government as SRPC was a contractor to the *state-owned* NPC (JBIC 2000a, 2003c).

JEXIM thus played a role of guarantor of a sort in order to cover the political and financial risks of the project. That role then created the necessary conditions for the Japanese banks to finance it. There is also the hidden guarantor of this project: the Philippine government. As discussed, San Roque Multipurpose Project is based on the Power Purchase Agreement between the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) as the independent power producer and the state-owned NPC under the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme. In short, therefore, the NPC commissioned SRPC to build the dam. Although the San Roque Multipurpose Project is an OOF project involving the private sector, it is thus the Philippine government that eventually pays



for the project, thereby putting a heavy debt burden on the Philippine people (Motoyama *et al.* 1999; Rich 2000).<sup>7</sup>

Combining huge financial commitments and immense perceived risks, the SRMP inevitably became the subject of both national and international criticism. Of particular note in this regard are a series of technical review reports published by the environmental NGO, the International Rivers Network (IRN). These reports were made by independent researchers based in the US, and focused on the most controversial issues surrounding SRMP's environmental impact assessment (Feld 1999; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999; see also IRN 1999). They found that the SRMP's EIA was 'unreliable' and 'wrongly assumed' (Feld 1999). This conclusion was based on several grounds: the estimated sedimentation, water quality, earthquake-related risks to the dam, the consistency between the original and the updated EIA, technical problems in the watershed management plan, and flood control provisions (Feld 1999; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999). It is striking how the official EIA report and the IRN's EIA review reports present two very different pictures of the same development initiative. Indeed, this discrepancy goes to the heart of the concerns of this thesis. It will thus be kept in mind as this chapter examines the environmental assessment procedure of the San Roque Multipurpose Project in relation to its *kankyō-hairyo* and *kankyō-hairyo-kakunin* elements.

Before turning to that procedure, the next section relates how the aid project has been influenced by the political decisions of successive Philippine leaders in a manner that contradicts any notion of objective or technocratic development. It is essential to investigate this aspect as political and economic factors have often influenced the environmental assessment process.

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<sup>7</sup> The Philippine inter-government agency repayment arrangement for the untied loan further proves this point as it is three government agencies (National Irrigation Administration, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and Department of Public Works and Highways) and the NPC that pay for the project (SRPC 2006a).



## 5.2. Political Economy of a Dam

According to the Agno River Basin Development Programme in 1946, dam construction was designed to maximise the hydropower potential of the river with a total of six dams originally envisaged to be built along it (Carino 1999; Shalupirip Shantahnay Indigenous People's Movement 1999a; CPA 2003; Usui, interview, 2003). The San Roque Dam was specified as the third such structure (Itchon *et al.* 1986; Afable 1999; CPA 2003). However, that dam, the “Agno III”, was initially considered to be located at one of two possible sites: Tabu in Benguet province and San Roque in Pangasinan province (Afable 1999: 11; SRPC 2006b; see also Figure 5.2).

According to a preliminary report by the NPC in July 1976, San Roque was deemed to be the more feasible of the two as Tabu raised complicated social, cultural and environmental issues (SRPC 2006b). Physically, the Tabu site was not appropriate for the construction of a dam since the mountain walls along the Agno River there were neither big nor strong enough to sustain the dam structure (Carling, interview, 2004; Hatae, interview, 2004; Mooy, interview, 2004; Direct observation March 2004). Socio-culturally, the site was contentious with forceful protests occurring during the study team’s visit to Tabu for the 1976 NPC study. Indeed, news of a third dam construction plan triggered community protests all along the valley and comprised diverse tactics including the rolling down off the mountain of large rocks targeting the visiting researchers (Norma, interview, 2004; Kurita, interview, 2004b). Indeed, the Tabu community protest was strong in part because former President Ramon Magsaysay had pledged to the community in 1956 that there would not be a third dam on the Agno river (Afable 1999; FOEJ 1999a). There was also a long-standing Communist insurgency in the area (Afable 1999; Antislavery Society 1983; CPA 2003; Hilhorst 2003; Kurita, interview, 2004b; Mooy, interview, 2004).

The construction of two dams at Ambuclao and Binga in the 1950s and 1960s had not affected the downstream community as significantly as it did the upstream community (see below). However, due to the location of the third dam, the downstream community had also joined in the protests. These protests emphasised specific adverse physical impacts where dams had been



already built to justify why they were protesting vociferously against the third dam. Thus, it was noted how sedimentation significantly affected the livelihoods of upstream communities which was caused by the original dams. The Ambuclao and Binga dams were among Asia's biggest dams in the 1950s and 1960s, yet by the 1980s were already seriously malfunctioning. Ambuclao dam had become impossible to operate by the mid-1990s due to heavy sedimentation (World Bank 1994) while the Binga dam only operated at half capacity then due to siltation (CPA 2003; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003; Carling, interview, 2004).

The history of local resource use is also at issue here. Thus, Benguet province where these dams are located was once the heart of a mining industry (Rood 1988; ESSC 1999; Kurita 2001; Usui, interview, 2003). Mountains were cut and forests were felled as a standard step to permit mining (Carling, interview, 2004; Capulet\*, interview, 2004; Kurita, interview, 2004b; Mooy, interview, 2004). The mountain valleys along the Agno River have thus been left barren resulting in land slides, soil erosion and flash flooding. When combined with earthquakes as well as the effects of mining operations themselves, heavy sediment movement into the river was inevitable (NPC 1997). Such sediment flows in the Agno River would normally empty into the Lingayen Gulf along the north-western coast of Luzon (Siringan and Mate 2001; SRPC 2006a). Due to the construction of the Ambuclao and Binga dams, however, sediment accumulated instead in dam reservoirs, eventually stopping the Ambuclao Dam power generation. For this reason alone, therefore, the proposed third dam in the Agno River was contentious (Miyako\*, interview, 2004). The two malfunctioning dams had also severely damaged local livelihoods. Thus, siltation reached up to the rice fields of Ambuclao and Banao situated along the valley floor, thereby making farming impossible (CPA 2003; see Figure 5.4).

In spite of such lessons and protests from the local community, the construction of the third dam nonetheless went ahead with a land breaking ceremony held in May 1997 – that is, before even the second ECC was issued in February 1998 (see below).



**Figure 5.4. Siltation in Bokod Municipality**



Source CPA (2003)

Local community concerns were well placed. Thus, although the San Roque Dam was designed to improve water quality by reducing siltation and flooding, the downstream community at Barangay San Vicente in San Manuel Municipality still suffered from flooding and siltation in 2004 well after the dam had started operation (FOEJ 2004a; see Figure 5.5).

**Figure 5.5. Silted Rice Fields in Barangay San Vicente in the Aftermath of August 2004 Flooding**



Source: FOEJ (2004a).

Such local community concerns were no match, however, for the keen and long-standing political interest in this strategic dam project. Indeed, as noted briefly in Chapter 4, plans for the San Roque Multipurpose Project gained impetus in the early 1990s for a Ramos government desperate to build more power plants in order to stop damaging power blackouts that hampered industrialisation (Serrano 1994; World Bank 1994; Thompson 1995;



Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a, 2002b; Samonte-Pesayco and Rimban 2002; IBON 2003).<sup>8</sup>

The project, in spite of political controversy in both the Philippines and Japan, was thus speedily implemented from 1995 onwards. Indeed, it was still praised as a “*spectacular* hydropower dam ... worth visiting” by the Philippine Secretary of the Department of Energy even in 2004 (Perez Jr. 2004, emphasis added). It is very important therefore to see how it was possible for a project with so many perceived socio-environmental deficiencies nonetheless came to be implemented in the post-Rio ‘greening’ era, especially at a time when some donors were ever more reluctant to fund this type of project (Ito, interview, 2004; Ondrik, interview, 2004; Tamura, interview, 2004).

In order to see how and why the project was resurrected in the 1990s after falling by the wayside in the 1980s, it is essential to discuss the context in which the project was first formed and then reshaped via strategic political decisions based on national development goals. Without doing so, the possible ‘greening’ of Japanese international cooperation in regard to the San Roque Multipurpose Project cannot be appreciated. As such, the chapter next investigates the history of the SRMP from its origins as an ODA project to its resurrection as an OOF project.

### **5.2.1. From Marcos Dream to Ramos Legacy**

The San Roque Multi-purpose Project is over 30 years old now. It was first conceived in the early 1970s by the Philippine government under President Ferdinand Marcos, fuelled by his dream of building the biggest dam in Asia near his home turf of Ilocos Norte. Hence, the San Roque site was his dream come true (Asahi-shinbun-shuzaihan 1985; National Diet 1986d). Under the NPC’s Power Expansion Programme (1981-1990), the SRMP was identified as a key project contributing to Philippine development (Itchon *et al.* 1986). This project had been originally proposed to the World Bank, the Asian

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<sup>8</sup> “I said our first priority in terms of infrastructure is energy. Second is energy. Third is energy” (President Ramos cited in Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b Online; see also Rimban, interview, 2004).



Development Bank, and the Italian government. Yet in each case, the proposal was turned down due to the huge project cost and perceived socio-environmental risks including heavy siltation and strong community resistance (National Diet 1984c, 1984d, 1986d; FOEJ 2002b; Samonte-Pesayco and Rimban 2002; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003). Undaunted, however, Marcos then requested funding for this project from Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone during the latter's visit to the Philippines in May 1983 (National Diet 1986e).

And yet, the project was also a problem for the Japanese government given the project's history of prior refusal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in particular was aware of the risks here, based on input from Ambassador Yoshio Ōkawa in Manila (National Diet 1984c). Thus, and upon MOFA advice, Nakasone did not agree straight away with the president's "very enthusiastic" (*netsui no hijyō ni tsuyoi*, National Diet 1986e: 23) request concerning an "extremely important" (*hijyō ni jyūyō na*) project (National Diet 1986c: 23). Instead, Nakasone played for time by suggesting: "Let's do [an additional] feasibility study [to the NPC's initial feasibility study] for the San Roque Dam thoroughly first. At this moment, that study is our top priority. With the result of the study, then we can discuss the project as a potential ODA project" (National Diet 1984e: 23). This is probably the first and last *temiyage anken* (gift project; see Chapter 4) that failed to go straight on to the Japanese ODA list. JICA took charge of this feasibility study as a part of its overall responsibility for doing development study (*kaihatsu-chōsa*) work.

The NPC's initial feasibility study had been completed by Electroconsult (ELC)<sup>9</sup> –an Italian transnational consulting company – between 1974 and 1979. The necessary documentation had been then finished in 1982 (NPC 1997). As requested, JICA reviewed the ELC report. JICA thereafter added three items for the new study that was notably more 'environmental' in nature and produced a report in 1985 (JICA 1985a, 1985b; see below). However, after the "People Power" Revolution in February 1986

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<sup>9</sup> Electroconsult was established in 1955 by two major Italian private firms specialising in the planning, design and construction of hydropower schemes in Northern Italy (ELC 2004).



(Thompson 1995), the National Diet organised a committee to investigate the *marukosu giwaku* (Marcos scandal) and its link to Japanese aid. The SRMP was investigated as a likely by-product of ‘crony capitalism’ linking Marcos and his cronies to Japanese corporations (NHK shuzaihan 1996; Manapat 1991; Thompson 1995; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1992, 1999). The San Roque Dam project was thus one of the most heavily discussed cases during the Diet hearings (National Diet 1984a, 1984b, 1986c, 1986d). This controversy eventually put an end to this ODA project – and hence, is worth a closer look here in order to appreciate the shifting nature of the Japanese aid process with attendant implications for the possible greening of aid in the 1990s that is our central concern in this thesis.

Three issues in particular were raised at the hearings: the cost of the project; the process by which the SRMP became a top priority on the request list of 1983; and corruption and rebate issues involving Marubeni. These issues were hotly debated and seen by many participants as obstacles to effective aid delivery from project formulation right through to subsequent monitoring.

First, there were serious concerns surrounding the cost of the scheme. The official estimate for the dam was 125 billion Japanese Yen (JPY) in 1983 (National Diet 1986e: 23).<sup>10</sup> The concern here partly stemmed from the fact that the Japanese government had decided to spend on a single project a cost equivalent to one third of the total aggregated Yen loans to the Philippines over a fourteen year period, between 1971 and 1984.<sup>11</sup> That the Japanese government was fully aware of the high project cost, as well as the perceived social and environmental risk, suggests that the funding decision might not have been based on ‘rational’ development planning per se, alleged critics (FOEJ 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; Murai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Rimban, interview, 2004), but rather on the narrow interests of the Philippine elites and the Japanese business sector.

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
<sup>10</sup> 1 USD = 250 JPY in July 1983 (1USD = 110 JPY in May 2006). Thus, the total project cost was 900 million USD.

<sup>11</sup> The aggregated total Yen loan to the Philippines from 1971 to 1984 was 400 billion JPY, and the total amount that Japanese contractors received was 103.3 billion JPY for the same period (National Diet 1986e: 23).



Second, there was the issue of perceived political favouritism for this project. Thus, the Philippine National Economic Development Authority had had a ‘shopping list’ for Japanese ODA of a total of 42 projects in 1983. Among the 42 nominees, 16 projects were confirmed as being on the official request list on March 23, 1983. The San Roque dam project was not among them (National Diet 1986d). Interestingly, on May 5, 1983, that was one day before Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit, the San Roque dam was suddenly included. And yet, given limited funds, not all projects were guaranteed funding. Thus, and in order to ensure that the San Roque dam received funding, five other projects were ‘checked’ personally by Marcos and then removed from the list (National Diet 1986d: 31; Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986).

**Figure 5.6. Structure of Marcos Rebate**



NB. Thicker arrows are the flows of rebates including entertainment cost.  
Source: Yokoyama (1994)

Third, the relationship that Marubeni had with President Marcos raised troubling questions about the involvement of Japanese firms in ‘crony capitalism’ – a relationship also known as “*marubeni-kosu*” in Japan (Yokoyama, interview, 2003). This kind of relationship emerged through Marcos’s distinctive aid controlling mechanism – shown in Figure 5.6 – that was *only* found with Japanese aid not with other Northern donors’ (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999; Yokoyama 1994). This



special Yen loan mechanism *only* existed in the Philippines during the Marcos era, which was revealed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government organised by President Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s.

Unlike Japan's own bilateral Yen loan programme to other developing countries (not to mention other bilateral ODA relationships such as that of the USAID), this Japan-Philippine specific mechanism had a dedicated Philippine government official called the Japanese ODA Implementing Officer (IO).<sup>12</sup> This position was created by Marcos in 1972 via Executive Order No. 338 with full control over project contracts and all dealings with the Yen loan implementing agency Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. Thus, it was Marcos who appointed contractors for ODA projects thereafter receiving rebates from them. Averaging 25% to 30% of project costs, these rebates were channelled to Marcos's Swiss Bank account through an agent company (Smith 1986; Boyce 1993). However, unlike the usual rebate route of Japanese aid to the Philippines, Marubeni had a "direct hotline" with Marcos (National Diet 1986d: 32). Before the Japanese Prime Minister's visit, Marubeni was even strongly suspected of advising Marcos that "the Japanese government had already informally agreed to the San Roque Multipurpose Project" (National Diet 1986b: 31).<sup>13</sup>

Although the amount of the rebate to Marcos in this case is not known, applying the general rebate 'rule' – that is, a minimum 25% of the project cost (National Diet 1987; Yokoyama 1994) – 31.25 billion JPY<sup>14</sup> is quite likely to have gone into the Marcos's Swiss Bank account for the San Roque Dam alone.

As the above three points show, the San Roque Dam was not an aid project based purely on technical design and 'rational' planning in keeping with

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<sup>12</sup> Oscar Rodriguez was then the IO while at the same time being the Undersecretary of Department of Public Works and Highways. He acted as President Marcos' agent in charge of contracts for the Japanese aid projects and who said to be one of the most trusted men of Marcos (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).

<sup>13</sup> MOFA officials refused to comment on whether they gave such informal consent. Thus, MOFA officials neither admit nor deny the fact. MOFA staff members also questioned whether they later called in some of Marubeni's top ranking managers to give them a "scolding" over Marubeni's advice to Marcos (National Diet 1986d: 32).

<sup>14</sup> Considering the exchange rate of 1983 (1 USD = 250 JPY), this amount equals to 125 million USD.



Philippine law. Rather, it was a product of crude political intervention and corrupt dealings with a Japanese corporation with the possible complicity of senior Japanese government officials. Under these circumstances, the project was never confirmed as an ODA project once the Marcos scandal erupted. The Dam's life as an ODA project thus ended abruptly. And yet, Marcos' dream eventually returned in the guise of a Ramos-inspired project in the 1990s.


of the Dam

A bit like Marcos before him, President Fidel Ramos displayed much “personal involvement in all power projects” during and even after his presidency (NPC 1993a: 4). Thus, Ramos himself visited the project site to mitigate the dispute over the dam (noted above), and later returned for the land breaking ceremony in 1997 (Kurita 2004a; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b). As part of his ‘dam interest’, he paid special attention to the San Roque Multipurpose Project because, also just like Marcos, Ramos wanted to have the largest dam in Asia to be located in his home province of Pangasinan (Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b; Hatae, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2003; Rimban, interview, 2004).

1992

Figure 5.7

**Figure 5.7. Ramos Showing Two Aerial Photographs of the SRMP**



Source: Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco (2002b).

This personal interest meant that he demanded to be kept informed on the progress of the dam even after his presidency had ended in June 1998. Indeed, in his office in the Makati district of central Manila,<sup>15</sup> Ramos had two aerial photographs of the San Roque Multipurpose Project nearing

<sup>15</sup> Makati is the leading financial and commercial centre of the Philippines, and the location of many leading national and transnational corporations as well as multilateral institutions.



completion in Pangasinan dated February 2002 given to him by the US construction contractor Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd<sup>16</sup> (Berne Declaration et al. 1999; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b; see also Figure 5.7).

Here, too, presidential involvement was critical. It was based on a close personal relationship with the contractors and showed how the interests of a top political leader could make the entire process run much easier. In spite of its financial, technical and legal ‘infirmities’ (IPP Review Committee in PCIJ 2002; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b),<sup>17</sup> therefore, the Ramos legacy project in his home province of Pangasinan has been operating since February 2003.

### 5.2.2. Privatisation of the Philippine Electric Power Sector

During a public lecture at the University of the Philippines on March 11, 2004, the Secretary of the Department of Energy, Vincent S. Perez Jr. concluded his presentation on energy sector reform with the observation that, “energy is *apolitical*”. This observation was vigorously rebutted by the next speaker, Pete Ilagan, President of the National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc., who declared: “Excuse me, Secretary Perez. But energy is political, *very* political.” Although Secretary Perez did not seem to take this comment seriously,<sup>18</sup> this exchange does indeed underscore that energy is very political in the Philippines. To appreciate this point is to understand in turn the political changes to the energy sector that enabled Ramos to bring the SRMP to life once more. More importantly, these changes have influenced the possibility of ‘greening’ in the SRMP which is our core concern in this chapter.

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<sup>16</sup> Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd., a unit of Lexington-based Raytheon Co., the third-largest U.S. defence contractor, was the contractor hired to design and build the San Roque dam in 1996 (*Boston Business Journal* February 28, 2002).

<sup>17</sup> The inter-agency IPP review committee was organised by Administrative Order No. 14 and No. 10 of May 26, 2001 to review all the IPP contracts. The Committee reported the San Roque Multipurpose Project as one of five independent power producer (IPP) projects with infirmities. The inter-agency committee organised by Republic Act No. 9136 consisted of the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, and the National Economic Development Authority (GOP 2001).

<sup>18</sup> Secretary Perez was laughing while Mr Ilagan was making his point (Direct observation 11 March 2004).



After the overthrow of the Marcos regime, President Corazon Aquino created three major conditions that enabled her successor Fidel V. Ramos to put private-sector-led infrastructure projects on a 'fast track' (see below). First, the Aquino administration abolished the Department of Energy (Viray 1998; *Manila Times* 14 June 2003; also see Perez Jr. 2004). This step was taken because the view was widespread that this Department, especially under the Marcos regime, had "become synonymous with corruption" (*Manila Times* 14 June 2003 Online). Yet, the abolition of the Department was criticised because it was seen to have created a policy vacuum for the country's future energy plan; not having a single government institution dedicated to the energy sector was linked to a serious power crisis in the Philippines (Viray 1998; *Manila Times* 14 June 2003; Perez Jr. 2004). Second, in 1987, Aquino also liberalised power generation under Executive Order 215. A huge blow to the National Power Corporation (NPC)'s monopoly, this Order opened up power generation to the private sector for the first time in Philippine history (GOP 1987; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a). Third, the Aquino administration stopped the operation of the Bataan nuclear plant when international inspectors diagnosed the plant to be unsafe due to its geographical proximity to major earthquake fault lines and the Pinatubo volcano. This plant had been built by the Marcos administration during the early 1970s energy crisis but later became infamous for its role in the Marcos corruption scandal (Broad 1988; Sales 1992; AFP 1 July 2004). In response to this move, the NPC appealed to Aquino to construct additional power plants to make up for the 600 megawatts that were supposed to have been generated by the Bataan nuclear plant (Sales 1992; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a). This appeal went unheeded. As a result, crippling power shortages became more frequent in Manila and beyond and that subsequently contributed to the end of her presidency.

In order to solve the severe power crisis that he inherited upon assuming the Presidency in mid-1992, Ramos urgently worked on three major tasks. First, in May 1992, he brought the Department of Energy back to life again with a focus on delivering an energy programme predicated on both short and long term energy projects (GOP 1992d). Second, in April 1993, the Congress



gave him special powers to negotiate the independent power producer (IPP) projects by passing Republic Act No. 7648. This Act enabled him to circumvent the existing time consuming process so that he could enter into contracts with mostly foreign owned private corporations quickly. The so-called “Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993” became widely known as the Ramos ‘fast track’ act (GOP 1993; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a). Third, he also pushed through Congress Republic Act No. 7718, also known as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law, that provided an array of incentives to the private sector to undertake infrastructure and development projects (GOP 1994).<sup>19</sup>

The ‘fast track’ contracts with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) under the BOT law made it easier for foreign investors to enter the Philippine energy sector under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) scheme as the Philippine private sector has had limited financial resources to enter into huge infrastructure projects (Bosshard 2002; IBON 2003). BOT law emphasised the role of the private sector in Philippine development, and thus provided incentives such as minimum government regulations as well as government support for BOT projects (GOP 1994). Despite these generous incentives, the efficacy of IPP projects has been questioned. Although it is natural that excess supply brings the price down, the more power generated by the NPC paradoxically resulted in higher electricity rates for Philippine consumers. The major cause for this unnatural phenomenon is the ‘take or pay’ provisions in IPP contracts stating that NPC has to buy for resale more than 80% of planned IPP-produced electricity thereby assuming most of the market risk as well (World Bank 1994; Bosshard 2002; IBON 2003). Also the high energy rates of IPP projects such as the SRMP meant that the NPC’s price remained artificially high (ADB 2005). The NPC has entered into a total of 48 IPP contracts of which more than half were made during the Ramos Presidency (1992-1998) (Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002b). The SRMP is one of them.

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<sup>19</sup> This BOT law is in fact the second and expanded BOT law. The BOT scheme was first introduced by Republic Act No. 6957 in July 1990 during the Aquino administration allowing private firms to build and operate power plants through the BOT schemes (GOP 1987, 1990; IBON 2003).



This chapter has so far described the political economy of the San Roque Multipurpose Project in order to clarify the context in which ‘greening’ was meant to take place. From the next section, the chapter will explore that greening process in the *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) type of project by focusing on the environmental assessment procedure of the San Roque Multipurpose Project from the JICA feasibility study of 1985 up 2005, thereby encompassing JBIC monitoring efforts.

### **5.3. Greening the Dam: Implementing *Kankyō-hairyō***

As noted, the San Roque Multipurpose Project started with a preliminary study by the Italian consulting company Electroconsult (ELC) in 1974 in order to assess the hydropower potential of the lower Agno River (Abracossa and Ortolano 1989). Considering that actual project implementation only took place in 1999, the SRMP has had a long and complex history both in terms of environmental consideration and formal confirmation as a project. This section thus begins to investigate the possible greening of *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) by focusing on the first or preliminary stage of the project cycle where the environmental consideration procedure (*kankyō-hairyō*) involves JICA interacting with Philippine counterparts to conduct a feasibility study linked to the Philippine EIS system. To appreciate this dynamic partnership, a brief discussion of the latter is in order here – given that it is integral to Japanese ‘greening’ as a whole (see Chapter 4).

#### **5.3.1. The Recipient’s Environmental Consideration: Philippine EIS system**

The Philippine EIS system was established in 1977 by Presidential Decree No 1151 (PD 1151) (Smith and Wansem 1996). Section 4 of Presidential Decree 1151 was key here because it required that “all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment” (GOP 1977a). Since 1977, further legal changes have been made (see Table 5.3).



**Table 5.3. The Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment: Legal and Regulatory Framework**

Year	Law/ Regulations	Features
1977	Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151	Philippine Environmental Policy: Requiring sponsors of all government and private projects affecting the quality of the environment to prepare an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
1977	PD No. 1152	Environment Code: Reinforcing land use management regulation and systems to consider serious environmental impact.
1978	PD No. 1586	Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System: centralising the EIS System under the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC: predecessor of DENR), setting up a screening mechanism for Environmentally Critical Areas and Environmentally Critical Projects classification.
1981	President Proclamation No. 2146	Proclaiming certain areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System.
1982	Letter of Instruction No.1179	Authorizing the NEPC to issue Environmental Compliance Certificates.
1983	NEPC Office Circular No. 3	Technical definitions of ECAs and ECPs by NEPC.
1987	Executive Order (EO) No. 192	Establishment of DENR: transferring all work from NEPC.
1992	DENR Administrative Order (AO) 21	Revision of PD 1586: Decentralising DENR's EIA operation; necessity of public participation.
1996	DENR AO 96-37	Revising DAO 21, Series of 1992, to further strengthen the implementation of the EIS System and Environmental consideration in the earliest possible stage, using EIS as a planning tools and maximising public participation.

Sources: adapted from Smith and Wansem (1995); DENR EMB (1996a); Usui (2003).

The chronology of this process is crucial since the San Roque Multipurpose Project's original EIS report as well as the 1997 update (both examined below) have been prepared in light of these changes. Here, therefore, a brief summary of the key elements is provided to facilitate analysis.

In 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586) provided a basic screening mechanism with Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) and Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) as the categories.<sup>20</sup> The National Environment Protection Council (NEPC) then became the lead agency to

<sup>20</sup> ECPs are projects that "will most likely have high risk or negative environmental impact" and ECAs are certain areas which are "ecologically, socially, or geologically sensitive" (DENR-EMB 2001 Online). ECPs have three major undertakings such as heavy industries, resource extractive industries and infrastructural projects. And ECAs are classified with 12 categories (GOP 1981).



review Environmental Impact Statements (GOP 1978). Any project falling on to the ECP and ECA lists was required after 1982 to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the NEPC (which later became part of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources). An ECC is only issued when a project is considered to be acceptable following review of submitted documents that are required by this system.

All ECPs are required to submit Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) to the DENR in order to obtain ECCs. An EIS is “a document of studies on the environmental impacts of a project including the discussions on direct and indirect consequences upon human welfare and ecological and environmental integrity” (DENR 1996). The DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) is formally responsible for evaluating EISs but the actual evaluation is carried out by an independent interdisciplinary review committee that makes recommendations to the EMB director. For projects with an EIS requirement, the committee on occasion recommends a public hearing. Compliance monitoring is also a means used by the DENR to ensure compliance with the conditions of the ECC and other environmental regulations. If a project proponent fails to comply, the ECC issued for the project is to be revoked.

This system just sketched was designed to respond to “an urgent need to formulate intensive, integrated program of environmental protection” (GOP 1977a). However, it also has “special economic significance” (Smith and Wansem 1996: 39) because the EIS system has an effect on the implementation of a project deemed to be critical to national development. Further, the issuance of an ECC as a procedural item is a prerequisite for project implementation.

In practice, the EIS system has often been used simply to provide legitimacy for projects. Some Environmental Compliance Certificates were applied while a project was under construction or even *after* project completion (Ross 1994; De Quiros, interview, 2004). Despite such irregularities, the system is there to satisfy those proponents who “wish to comply with the



law; that is the EIS system as a bureaucratic requirement creates a desire to comply” (Ross 1994: 223).

### 5.3.2. Feasibility Study and the Original EIS

The San Roque Multipurpose Project went through the environmental consideration process as required by both the Philippine government (under the EIS system) and the Japanese government (under JEXIM’s environmental checklist). Interestingly, the Philippine EIS system was first established in June 1977 two months after the original feasibility study of the SRMP started in May 1977. However, during the first phase of SRMP (between 1977 and 1985), this EIS system had “legal and technical loopholes” which then created room for disagreements and resistance in enforcing the system (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989: 66). Thus, it is crucial to discuss the sort of context in which the environmental consideration was undertaken.

In the early years, there were many obstacles to an effective EIS system. Indeed, it was doubtful how influential either the EIS system or the National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC) created in 1977 and charged with that system’s introduction would be in terms of halting socially and environmentally controversial projects such as SRMP (GOP 1977a).<sup>21</sup> Not surprisingly, the system was not taken seriously by government agencies.<sup>22</sup> Given that the NEPC reflected a “decentralized regulatory process” (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987: 294), those agencies involved with projects maintained power over the way that the EIS system operated. As Section 4 of PD 1151 thus declares, “before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the same” (GOP 1977a). Progress was indeed hampered by bureaucratic opposition to “a central environmental

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<sup>21</sup> As noted, there was the matter of high-level political interaction by President Marcos and his cronies through crony capitalism (Manapat 1991).

<sup>22</sup> The EIS system was not perceived as ‘effective’ by government agencies until 1982 when detailed rules and regulation were published in the Philippine Official Gazette (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989).



‘superagency’” (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987: 295). Thus, under Presidential Decree No. 1586, the NEPC was annexed to the new Ministry of Human Settlement in 1978 and was provided with a centralised EIS review and approval process centred on the issuance of ECCs. Many government officials feared that Imelda Marcos, the powerful first lady, would use this mechanism to meddle in their activities.<sup>23</sup> The revised system thus predictably failed to overcome the resistance of agencies such as the Department of Public Works and Highways which, in any event, had their own connection to the President.

It was during this time that SRMP underwent its first environmental consideration. Before the National Power Corporation began to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the first feasibility study for the SRMP had been carried between May 1977 and March 1979 (ELC and EDCOP 1979). This work reported favourably on the project – highlighting, for example, its prospective positive role as a huge mine tailing dam which, by trapping and diluting water in its reservoir, would *improve* water quality in the Agno River.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, the study concluded that the SRMP was technically sound and economically feasible despite an estimated cost of US\$ 1.2 million (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989; see also ELC and EDCOP 1979).

Responsible for an ambitious power expansion programme, the NPC ranked the SRMP as a high priority and the Philippine government swiftly approved it in 1982. With President Marcos’s personal support, the NPC began its implementation plans. In the ensuing bidding process, the Japanese corporation Marubeni submitted a proposal with the most attractive funding package based on financing from Japanese ODA through the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). As discussed earlier, Marubeni’s proposal was approved by Marcos before Nakasone’s visit in May 1983.

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<sup>23</sup> Imelda Marcos, the first lady, was in charge of the Ministry of Human Settlement.

<sup>24</sup> Three mining companies are operating in this area: Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., Benguet Corporation, Inc. and Philex Mining, Inc (Usui 2003).



Nothing seemed capable of delaying this priority project. Thus, project preparatory works, including site development and access road construction, had already begun by February 1983.<sup>25</sup> And yet, it was only *after* the financial arrangements were confirmed in May 1983 that the NPC belatedly approved a contract for an EIA for the project as it needed to submit an EIS for ECC issuance (Test Consultants 1984). Project implementation thus began *before* an EIA was even started let alone completed (Ross 1994; De Quiros 2004). Further, as the first ECC was only issued on November 26, 1985, NPC had also thereby started the project without receipt of an ECC. As such, it can only be concluded that the initial 1984 EIA was merely conducted to gain legitimacy rather than to be a decision-making tool designed to minimise environmental damage (Abracosa and Ortolano 1987; Ross 1994; De Quiros 2004). Indeed, the NPC finalised and sent out the bid documents for dam construction to bidders before the EIA contract was made. There was no room for an EIA report, therefore, to influence project decision-making process at this juncture.

### 5.3.3. The JICA Re-study

With President Marcos's approval, the San Roque Multipurpose Project was thereafter put on the 13<sup>th</sup> Yen Loan request list as the top priority of the Philippines. This action came at a time of great political tension. The country was politically and economically unstable due to intensifying political oppression and protest under the Marcos dictatorship. In this context, the US was urging Japan to aid the Philippines in order to stabilise the situation (National Diet 1984a; Boyce 1993). Yet, as noted, and in spite of a strong personal request by Marcos, an additional feasibility study based exclusively on environmental criteria was required by the Japanese government before a decision would be formally made (National Diet 1984e). This requirement was made because the initial 1979 feasibility study had been carried out in a situation where both the Philippine government and the NPC were desperate to present the SRMP as a perfect product with no harmful impacts in order to attract funding. Therefore, Japanese government with recommendation from the OECF representatives

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<sup>25</sup> San Roque Bridge at the dam site was also built during this time (Direct observation 24 March 2004; Valdez, interview, 2004)



and Japanese embassy officials in Manila thus decided that it was necessary first to review the original study. A JICA team subsequently arrived in Manila in July 1983 and carried out three additional studies including a review of the NPC hydrological analysis as well as an additional assessment of the reservoir and irrigation water quality (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989; JICA 1985a, 1985b).

Yet the utility of this JICA ‘re-study’ as a form of development study (*kaihatsu-chōsa*) amenable to careful environmental evaluation proved to be quite minimal. Since no environmental guidelines on proposed dam construction existed in 1983 for JICA to work with, it is not therefore possible to assess compliance in any meaningful manner in terms of our concern with ODA ‘greening’ here.<sup>26</sup> Not surprisingly, therefore, JICA produced a report that covered few of the possible negative socio-environmental impacts that were later highlighted in independent reviews (Feld 2004; Grifoni 1999; Moran 1999; Willing 1999). Instead, it mostly confirmed the original study concluding that the project was “*kigyōka-kanō*” (feasible) (National Diet 1986d: 32).

That said, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the JICA ‘re-study’ as a prototypical element of a later ‘greening’ process. For this work, team members with different specialities were allocated to each component, albeit with a strong contingent drawn from civil engineering. Out of a total of 17 specialists on the team, 11 worked on the reservoir water quality component while the irrigation water quality and hydrological analysis components shared the remaining 6 members. Thus, two-thirds of the team was allocated to the study of reservoir water quality as the effect of mine tailings on the project was the biggest concern raised by the JICA preliminary investigation. This clear focus can also be seen by comparing it with that of the NPC’s original EIA (Test Consultants 1984; JICA 1985a). While the latter studied water quality with a focus on soil erosion and siltation caused by the physical construction of the dam itself, the former studied the water quality issue mainly in terms of the effects of mine tailings. This difference

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<sup>26</sup> The first JICA environmental guidelines for dam construction appeared in 1990 (JICA 1990).



mainly derived from the purpose of the JICA study: to review and complement the original study; and to conduct an environmental survey (JICA 1985a: i; National Diet 1986d: 32).

It is worth recalling in this regard that JICA's aim here was simply to *assist* the NPC's own environmental consideration efforts. In order to do so, the JICA team was supposed to coordinate with the NPC in its activity to complement the NPC's initial EIA.<sup>27</sup> However, the JICA study was not properly coordinated and hence overlapped with the NPC's EIA (Abracosa and Ortolano 1989).

The lack of systematic coordination and cooperation (which was seemingly deliberate)<sup>28</sup> between the two environmental assessment activities was revealing on two counts (National Diet 1984e). First, the JICA activity was not serving its formally stated role of *assisting* the recipient's environmental consideration activity (here, the NPC's EIA). Instead, the JICA report was used as an independent review of the project for the Japanese government's own reference even while the project EIA was the NPC's own responsibility in order to satisfy the EIS procedural requirement. Second, this situation strongly suggested therefore that the recipient's EIA had little or no influence on the funding decision of the Japanese government given that the 1984 EIA was not even referred to by the JICA team (JICA 1985a, 1985b). True, the JICA 're-study' was officially requested by the Philippine government. In reality, however, it was 'proposed' by Japan during the Prime Minister's state visit, and the Philippine government was in no position to disagree as the project was not possible without the Yen loan (National Diet 1986b, 1986d, 1986e; FOEJ 2002b). There is a paradox here: a last minute condition was attached to proposed aid that opened up the possibility of a greener project via further environmental assessment that then failed at its own formal aim to *assist* the recipient's environmental consideration, let alone reduce the potential environmental damage of the dam through the new requirements. Here, a sense emerges of a new condition simply added to the process to *show* environmental concerns were

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<sup>27</sup> In 1983, NPC commissioned an EIA to Test Consultants, Inc. in order to apply for an ECC which was completed in May 1984 (Test Consultants 1984; SRPC 2006a).

<sup>28</sup> See below.



not neglected – but also to buy time for an embattled and clearly embarrassed Japanese leader.

In the end, the JICA Re-study took one year to complete. This time-consuming procedure thus played a significant role in ending the first ‘phase’ of the project. Two particular events are worth noting in this regard. First, since this study took a year to complete, it delayed the SRMP’s formal acceptance which, in turn, meant that the project lost an opportunity to be funded under the 13<sup>th</sup> Yen loan arrangement. The entire process suggested that the Japanese aid industry was dragging its heels on the matter. Thus, although the NPC was already committed to doing an EIA for the SRMP, JICA had nevertheless insisted on the need for a further “mainly environmental study” (JICA 1985a: i; National Diet 1986d: 32). Due to its widely known socio-environmental problems, there was a sentiment that Japanese aid officials according to one insider simply “wanted to crush (*tsubushitakatta*)” the project (Usui, interview, 2004; see also National Diet 1984c, 1986d). Indeed, by behaving in this matter, the Japanese actors involved gained several advantages. On the one hand, the Japanese government was able to ensure that it had done or was at least *seen* to have done a ‘rigorous’ vetting procedure in order to avoid future criticism, especially if the project became even more controversial than it had already become. On the other hand, JICA scepticism about it meant that the need for delay to await the report cost the Marcos regime crucial time as the funding opportunity ‘closed’ due to budgetary rules.

The second event to note is that, in the midst of the additional delay, Philippine opposition leader Benito Aquino was assassinated on August 21, 1983 – dealing thereby a huge blow to the project’s prospects. Turmoil increased thereafter until, in early 1986, President Marcos himself was thrown out of office. This event was a trigger for the Special Investigation on the Marcos scandal in the Japanese National Diet in April 1986. As a result, SRMP had no chance to be on *any* Yen loan list at this delicate juncture. Indeed, the Japanese government quietly buried it since the project had been seen as an archetypal case of corrupt Japanese aid to Marcos



(National Diet 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).

The JICA Re-study itself, which was entitled “Final Report on the Development Planning Study of San Roque Multipurpose Dam”, remained undisclosed to the public (National Diet 1986d). According to senior MOFA official Kimio Fujita during his testimony to the 1986 hearings, the report was not made available to the public because the Philippine government had provided classified information for the purpose of the feasibility study and hence, the Japanese government needed to respect inter-state confidentiality (National Diet 1986d; Tsuda and Deocardiz 1986). However, it is even more likely that the lack of disclosure reflected a wish on the part of key players in Japan to bury a politically embarrassing and ‘diplomatically sensitive’ chapter in Japanese aid giving (Asahi-shinbun-shuzaihan 1985; Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986).<sup>29</sup>

#### **5.3.4. The 1997 Update EIS and ECC**

If particular events in both the Philippines and Japan served to undermine the SRMP in the mid-1980s, altered political and economic conditions in the early 1990s meant that this project was soon re-visited. As noted, a desperate need for greater power capacity in order to fuel Philippine industrialisation meant that there was now, once more, top-level political and economic support for new dams. At the same time, however, growing environmental concerns were reflected in fervent opposition to dam construction (Carino 1999; Shalupirip Shantahnay Indigenous People's Movement 1999a, 1999b; CPA 2003).

Here, reviving the SRMP looked to be the politically expedient thing to do. After all, it had ‘passed’ key planning requirements at both the Japanese and Philippine ends of the process. Thus, the San Roque Multipurpose Project

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<sup>29</sup> This view was corroborated by a later yet similar incident involving Japanese aid. Thus, when challenged to disclose loan agreement related documents, a JBIC lawyer during the Kotopanjang Dam hearing at Tokyo district court told the court that they were unable to do so due to ‘respect for the recipient’s sovereignty’ and ‘secrecy for the sake of diplomacy’ (Direct observation 13 November 2003). However, it is important to note that the same comments were made as the Marcos scandal was investigated in the National Diet hearings (Tsuda and Deocadiz 1986).



had been the subject of an environmental consideration procedure under the Philippine EIS system between 1978 and 1985 in order to obtain an ECC for project implementation as required under Philippine law. As noted, the EIA for the EIS was prepared in 1984, while the ECC was thereafter issued in 1985 by the National Environmental Protection Council (the predecessor of the DENR).

Although the original ECC of 1985 was still “*in full force and effect*” in the 1990s (SRPC 2006b: emphasis added), the NPC was required by the DENR to update the original EIS in order to enhance the social, environmental and technical credibility of the project (SRPC 2006a). The updated EIS was therefore submitted to fill the 10 year time gap during which time changes in erosion and sedimentation patterns needed to be accounted for. DENR-EMB thus attached additional terms and conditions to the original ECC of the San Roque Dam in February 1998, which is the revised 1998 ECC, as a part of a process designed to revalidate the ECC and thus, thereby permit implementation.

As with the original environmental consideration, the treatment of the SRMP reflected complex political and bureaucratic negotiations, as a variety of actors and issues become embroiled in the affair. Given the stated importance of the recipient’s regulatory framework to the Japanese aid approval process (discussed in Chapter 4), our analysis here focuses inevitably on the Philippine decision-making process. This detailed discussion serves to underscore the clear ambiguities of a process of Japanese international cooperation that is so thoroughly implicated in the vicissitudes of recipient environmental consideration.

A central question in the 1990s phase of the project deliberations was whether this was a new project or the same project as in the mid-1980s. Linked to this was another question, namely why the original ECC issued ten years earlier was still in force despite notable changes to the EIS system in the intervening period. Very clear answers were given here by both the DENR and the NPC. Thus, the NPC stated that the “SRMP... is *essentially the same project in the same location* as originally evaluated by the [NEPC]



in 1984 for which an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has already been issued” (NPC 1997: P-1, emphasis added). The DENR-EMB, meanwhile, stated that the 1985 ECC was still valid as the EMB considered the SRMP to be the same project as before, albeit, subject to significant amendment to the original ECC (see below) (NPC 1997).<sup>30</sup>

Despite this effort to smooth the process, there were clearly major differences between SRMP phase I and II (NPC 1997). Due to the effects of a major earthquake that struck the area in 1990, and the fact that simply ten years had elapsed since the original study,<sup>31</sup> the SRMP was required to make further design changes to the project based on the updated 1997 EIA (see below) as following. First, it had to account for the fact that the project proponent itself had changed from the NPC to the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) based upon a Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement signed in 1997. Second, the planned height of the dam had to be lowered from 210m to 200m to allow for altered estimated ecological impacts. Third, the power generation capacity also had to be reduced from 390MW to 345MW. Finally, the size of the storage reservoir had to be reduced from 14 km<sup>2</sup> to 12.8 km<sup>2</sup> (NPC 1997).

Upon a formal request from the NPC to confirm the validity of the original ECC, the DENR-EMB was broadly supportive but required that the ECC be amended to account for the altered circumstances noted above. Specifically, the DENR-EMB required that the NPC address five new items (DENR 1997 letter in NPC 1997: P-2). The NPC was thus required: first, to update the 1984 EIA; second, to conduct an Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA); third, to prepare a detailed Resettlement Plan as a part of the updated EIA; fourth, to secure endorsement from Local Government Units (*barangay*<sup>32</sup>, municipal, provincial levels); and lastly, to address all other critical and relevant environmental issues identified in the updated EIA.

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<sup>30</sup> The 1985 ECC’s validity is stated in both the DENR-EMB’s response dated 15 June 1995 and the DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos’s letter dated 22 April 1997.

<sup>31</sup> The 1990 earthquake in this area caused severe landslides that threw soils from neighbouring mountains into the Agno River (NPC 1997).

<sup>32</sup> Barangay is the smallest unit of administrative district in the Philippines.



In accordance with DENR-EMB instructions, the 1997 update was thus based on the first EIS conducted on questionable grounds in 1984, albeit with some modification. In the process, the resurrected SRMP was able to avoid being assessed under the more rigorous EIS arrangements put in place in the 1990s. The five items noted above are nonetheless meaningful in terms of the ‘greening’ process in development aid (*kaihatsu-enjyo*) as they addressed potential environmental and social impacts of the SRMP.

The 1997 update was not therefore merely a cosmetic exercise done for political effect. Indeed, the term ‘update’ makes the 1997 EIA sound like a minor affair. In fact, it was completed in October 1997 after a major undertaking that resulted in a hefty volume plus seven annexes, including detailed accounts of the Environmental Management Plan, NPC Resettlement Programme, Proof of Social Acceptability, a 1997 Anthropological Study on the Proposed San Roque Multipurpose Project, and an Environmental Risk Assessment (NPC 1997). Apart from the Resettlement Programme Annex, the other annexes were new by-products of a post-Rio ‘green’ discourse enthusiastically adopted by Ramos (GOP 1992c, 1996a, 1996b; Philippine Council for Sustainable Development 1992; Bryant 2005). As such, there were elements such as a proposed sustainable livelihood programme with community capacity building as well as an indigenous people’s rights provision that included reference to ancestral domain. Well aware of this important discursive shift in the Philippines and beyond, the updated EIS shows both the NPC and the SRPC ‘voluntarily’ incorporating these other elements into their revised project design (NPC 1997; SRPC 2006a).

The updated EIS was nonetheless soon beset by criticism. The content was widely challenged. Thus, for example, technical reviews by the International Rivers Network (Feld 1999; Moran 1999; Grifoni 1999; Willing 1999) used such phrases as ‘unreliable’ and ‘underestimated’ with reference to sedimentation estimates, water quality evaluation, and the level of risk due to the project being located in a region prone to earthquakes and flooding (see also FOEJ 2002b; Rimban and Samonte-Pesayco 2002a, 2002b; CPA 2003). The updated EIS was also criticised for what it did *not* contain or



even down-played such as the impact of an illegal quarry discussed below. In this regard, the NPC was seen to have taken advantage of an anomaly in the EIS rules. This anomaly related both to the scoping activity of the project and the nature of the ECC itself.

First, the scoping guideline (DENR-EMB 1996b) only included items derived from broad issues covering the physical environment (geology, soils, topography, water, air), the biological environment (terrestrial flora/fauna, aquatic ecology), and the socio-economic environment (health, culture, employment, livelihood, displacement). Thus, it used descriptive rather than technical criteria to decide what should be included in an EIS. Such vagueness could mean that a proponent might omit or understate socio-environmental or technical issues that are ‘inconvenient’ but nonetheless critical to implementation. Yet, scoping is indeed a critical stage in the EIS procedure since it is where most key issues are identified, thereafter producing a narrower focus for the remainder of the EIA review (DENR-EMB 1996a). This means that a project proponent, by manipulating the scoping stage, can influence the overall EIA. Since an ECC is issued based upon the information provided in a submitted EIS/EIA, it also inevitably omits to consider those issues not featured in the original scoping activity. There is the likelihood that in the SRMP case, then, the NPC intentionally omitted to consider issues that would highlight adverse socio-environmental impacts (Reyes-Boquiren 1996; Carino 1999; Glasson et al. 2005). A case in point here is that this would thereby have complicated approval.

Second, the DENR-EMB states that the ECC itself “is not a guarantee by DENR that no adverse effect will be caused by the proposed project or undertaking” but rather an official recognition that the proponent has committed to undertake or implement mitigative measures to reduce the negative impacts to ‘acceptable levels’ (DENR-EMB 1996a).<sup>33</sup> Therefore, although the SRMP indeed had an ECC for its quarry activities (discussed

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<sup>33</sup> Here again, there are no concrete criteria to define what is an ‘acceptable level’. One senior DENR official defined social acceptability as: “holding public hearings where issues are addressed and discussed with the local stakeholders by the [project proponent] sufficiently *whether they (local people) agree to the project or not*” (Peña, interview, 2004, emphasis added).



below), it failed to *guarantee* that negative environmental impacts would not thereby occur.

The case of the illegal quarry is of greater interest here than its immediate biophysical impact might suggest as the SRPC carried out quarrying activities around the project site for the raw material for the dam construction. Indeed, it is central to a thorough understanding of the possible greening of a *kaihatsu-enjyo* project such as the SRMP. To the extent that an argument can be made as to the greening of this sort of Japanese aid, it is likely that evidence of meaningful environmental consideration would be most likely to be found in the 1990s phase of the SRMP when environmental concern was at its greatest. As we shall see in a later discussion of the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project, there is indeed *some* evidence – albeit quite limited – to suggest that a measure of greening did occur in the process via the recipient’s own environmental initiatives. And yet, the case of the illegal quarry is particularly revealing because, in contrast, it shows how the project proponent still sought, even in the late 1990s, to circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the Philippines’ environmental legislation – thereby raising doubts as to the ultimate utility of a Japanese aid process predicated on recipient country environmental management systems.

### **5.3.5. Greener EIS: ‘Illegal’ Quarrying, Executive Order and Special Mineral Extraction Permit**

The controversy that erupted over a quarry was linked to SRMP-related dam construction work. However, the San Manuel municipal government raised concerns on SRPC’s quarrying taking place in an area *without* ECC sanction. Thus, the EIA did not have a “clear and detailed burrow/quarry plan, ... [although c]lay and gravel burrowing/quarrying will definitely alter the existing environment with greater impact seen on the existing river channel and the adjacent agricultural lands” (DENR-MGB 1999: 2). The Municipality’s concern was indeed correct. It *was* an illegal quarry as there was neither a specific ECC nor a necessary mining permit issued for this activity (DENR-MGB Regional Office I 1999). Raytheon Ebasco Overseas



Ltd (REOL)<sup>34</sup> had been found extracting sand and gravel materials within an area that an official directive (dated 14 September 1983) had already defined as a ‘banned area’, and hence, one that required a special mining permit (Ministry of Natural Resources 1983). The DENR-Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) therefore conducted an investigation based on an appeal lodged with it by the San Manuel municipality.

As a product of this investigation, DENR-MGB produced a 2 page memorandum dated 31 August 1999 in which it commented on two issues: the possible impacts of quarrying on the local hydrology and an environmental assessment of the proposed clay, sand and gravel extraction by the SRPC. This memorandum is revealing because it provided the sort of technical insight that the EIA process had itself failed to produce in this case. First, it stated that, after construction, those excavated areas would enhance erosion of the river banks, such that villages in adjacent areas were liable to be submerged as a result of the quarrying. Second, the memorandum pointed out that clay and gravel quarrying was having an ecological impact by altering river channels near adjacent agricultural lands. Mass quarrying along the Agno River was thus intensifying existing erosion and sedimentation problems (DENR-MGB 1999). The memorandum therefore concluded that this sensitive area should remain classified as a ‘banned area’ since the environmental impact of the quarrying had not been properly addressed by the proponent.

However, the project proponent did not take kindly to this memorandum. In reply, the SRMP Project Director Raymond Cunningham (1999),<sup>35</sup> wrote directly to Manuel B. Gaite, the Undersecretary of the DENR, making three key claims against it. First, he argued the data used in the MGB investigation was ‘biased’. The tactic here was to seize on the MGB’s own admission that the memorandum was “basically limited” and “merely based on the information gathered/interview[s] with the stakeholders and actual observations in the field” (DENR-MGB 1999: 1). Cunningham (1999: 1) thus criticised it as a “superficial document” with allegations made rather

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<sup>34</sup> It was the subcontractor for construction work at the quarry site.

<sup>35</sup> He is also Senior Vice President of SRPC (SRPC 2006a).



than facts presented since “the ‘stakeholders’ ... adopted the rhetoric of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance<sup>36</sup> and other NGOs”, who were implacable opponents of the SRMP. Cunningham’s second claim related to the actual ban. Here, he suggested that the ban was not set to “prevent the environmental impacts of quarrying... but rather to preserve these resources ... and to prevent the acquisition of mining rights/concessions for speculative purpose” (1999: 1). Third, and most importantly, Cunningham claimed that the positions of the EMB in Manila and the regional MGB office contradicted each other over this matter. This was so because, although the EMB issued the ECC for the SRMP, the DENR-MGB Region I office later ordered the project proponent to cease and desist from the “illegal activity” (DENR-MGB Regional Office I 1999). By raising this particular point, he was suggesting that the DENR was itself negligent in its duties in reviewing the SRMP’s EIS. As the DENR did not comment in the first place on the absence of a clear and detailed burrowing/quarrying plan and environmental programmes in both EISs, the ban was therefore wrong. Accordingly, Cunningham (1999: 2) strongly urged Undersecretary Gaité “not [to] wait for the NPC and the SRPC to prepare a detailed technical response to the DENR-MGB report *alleging* environmental impacts and any debates or reconciliation of the findings. Instead, the above arguments are sufficient to justify exempting NPC from the ban and issuing the proposed Presidential Order creating the Special Government Permit without further delay.” In spite of this SRPC intervention, the DENR Region I<sup>37</sup> office (1999) ordered a suspension of quarry activity through a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) issued on 5 October 1999 based on the MGB’s memorandum.

However, Cunningham’s claims over the negligence of the DENR missed the core of the issue raised by both the local community and the regional DENR-MGB office. Illegality was derived from two accounts: first, the quarrying by Raytheon Ebasco Overseas Ltd (REOL) took place in the banned area as defined in Minister Teodoro Peña’s official memorandum

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<sup>36</sup> Cordillera Peoples Alliance is the leading Philippine NGO in the anti-SRMP campaign. At the same time it is a well-known left-wing organisation. Under its umbrella, there are a few small local people’s organisations and NGOs. It works as the ‘window’ for global networking and appeals (Clarke 1998; Hilhorst 2003).

<sup>37</sup> Region I is Illocos region where SRMP-affected Pangasinan and Benguet Provinces are located.



dated 14 September 1983, and second, it occurred without the necessary mining permit for the specific area having been attached to the ECC (Ministry of Natural Resources 1983). In addition, the regional office's order was based on the Mining Act of 1995 that gives the regional director power to issue instant orders to suspend mining or quarrying operations when there is imminent danger to life or property in terms of safety and environmental protection (GOP 1995). The DENR Region 1 office clearly felt this to be the case. Further, it was clearly stated in the DENR-EMB's fax to the SRMP consortium dated 12 February 1998 that "any expansion and/or modification of the approved operation will be subject to EIA requirements" (DENR-EMB 1998a). And yet, since REOL had been quarrying in an area not covered by the 1998 ECC and EIS, the SRPC was therefore automatically subject to a new EIA. In short, the SRPC was on weak ground for a number of reasons.

As the stakes were raised, the political pressure on the Philippine EIA system's particular role here was increased. On 15 October 1999, ten days after the Cease and Desist Order was issued, the three affected companies (NPC, SRPC and REOL) sent a letter to the DENR-MGB Region I Director requesting that the CDO be reconsidered. The three corporations argued that it was "inconsistent with numerous legislative and executive issuances" recognising the SRMP as "the Philippines largest Presidential Flagship project" (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 1). The letter further argued that, without an immediate lifting of the CDO, it would jeopardise "social benefits" of the project to the affected local communities. And, it would also mean that the Philippines would be less able to "secure international financing for other infrastructure projects" because of its inconsistent legislative and executive issuances such as the CDO (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 3). In this context, the most important fact to be noted was that the NPC had already applied to Office of President for a special ('waiver') permit rather than opting to apply for an additional ECC for the contested quarry – which suggested that the project proponents were seeking a political solution to a contentious, and perhaps unwinnable issue.<sup>38</sup> The tone of this letter was sharper too than the

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<sup>38</sup> This permit, according to Section 49 of the Mining Act, may be granted by the provincial governor to any government entity to quarry materials needed in infrastructure construction



earlier intervention by Cunningham. Indeed, it was decidedly confrontational: the “NPC will not withdraw these applications *until and unless* it can obtain the special government quarry permit discussed herein” (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999: 3 emphasis added). Clearly, the authors were undoubtedly confident of their ability to acquire the special permit as they had already gone over the head of the Regional Director straight to the DENR Manila office and even to the President himself who did not hesitate to even organise several committees to assist the completion of the project (NPC-SRPC-REOL 1999).

Events were soon to prove them right. In January 2000, that is, barely three months after the CDO was issued, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order 200 (GOP 2000).<sup>39</sup> This EO 200 was about “the issuance of onshore special minerals extraction permits to qualified government entities/instrumentalities for government projects”. It clearly stated that “... quarry, sand, gravel, clay and related materials from onshore areas are highly suitable raw materials for government infrastructure projects, *especially flagship projects*, and other related civil works(.) ... it is in the national interest to prioritize government projects in the utilization of these materials to enhance the delivery of services vital to the Government’s economic and social development programs” (GOP 2000, emphasis added). EO 200 thus provided the legal cover that the SRPC needed to proceed with quarrying in the contested area. On 7 July 2000, it therefore acquired an Interim Special Mineral Extraction Permit (Natural Resources Development Corporation 2000a), and, three months later, a ‘permanent’ Special Minerals Extraction Permit (Natural Resources Development Corporation 2000b) was issued, which allowed SRPC to quarry 2,606 hectares in San Manuel and San Nicholas in Pangasinan province.

The quarrying incident is revealing for our purposes on two counts. First, it clearly demonstrated how an illegal quarry was later ‘covered’ by a belated Special Mineral Extraction Permit based on direct Presidential intervention – in other words, it underscored the politicised nature of the recipient EIA

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for public use (GOP 1995).

<sup>39</sup> Joseph Estrada who was elected in 1998 was impeached by the House of Representatives in November 2000 for alleged corruption.



system. Second, it is of particular interest here in as much as, instead of applying for an ECC specifically to cover the quarry, the NPC and the SRPC clearly chose to avoid further environmental assessment (that they might lose from) – instead by-passing the EIS framework altogether via a Presidential EO, thereby underscoring how easy it still was in the ‘green’ 1990s to circumvent basic environmental procedures.

### **5.3.6. Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project**

In contrast to the ‘old style’ and ‘non-green’ politics revealed by the case of the illegal quarry, the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project is critical in understanding areas of possible greening in an aid project of this sort. Here, the main objective was “ecological stability” and the project involved four main actors - SRPC, NPC, DENR Regional Office and JBIC - in its implementation (IIWMP-PMO 2000a: 1; IIWMP-PMO2000b: 3).

In the 1998 revised ECC, there were three conditions that did not appear in the original ECC issued in 1985: an Environmental Management Plan, a Comprehensive/Integrated Watershed Management Plan, and an Environmental Guarantee Fund (DENR-EMB 1998b; see also DENR 1996). These topics had already been addressed in the updated EIA upon which the ECC was based.<sup>40</sup> The original ECC from 1985 in fact had only addressed the immediate socio-ecological problems that surrounded construction of the dam. In contrast, and based on the additional conditionalities specified by the DENR-EMB, the revised ECC was expanded to include environmental management of those surrounding areas that would also be affected by the dam.

The watershed management project was particularly important here since, as the NPC itself observed, the SRMP was “one of the major water resource projects essential to the economic development of the country” (NPC 1997: E2-3).<sup>41</sup> As such, this can be considered as one of the most likely ‘green’

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<sup>40</sup> Annex E and J in NPC (1997).

<sup>41</sup> Behind this green ‘curtain’, there is another story. The water resource in this area is particularly important as the upstream mining industry is greatly affected by it. There are some private mining companies trying to buy the water source in the upstream Agno River to secure water for their refining process (Carino 1999; Carling, interview, 2004).



elements because this project sought to “attain ecological stability of the watershed by providing sustained protective and productive values supportive to the specific development objectives ... and at the same time, address socio-cultural and economic concerns in the area” (NPC 1997: E2-3).

The Lower Agno Integrated Watershed Management Plan was thus set up in June 1998 during President Ramos’ consultation with the affected communities as part of his quest to advance the overall project (IIWMP-PMO 2000a; IIWMP-PMO 2000b; Capulet\*, interview, 2004; Fionza, interview, 2004; Tobias, interview, 2004). The plan, better known as the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project (IIWMP), evolved as a response to the concerns raised by the affected communities in Itogon about the San Roque dam construction.<sup>42</sup> The IIWMP was also formulated to comply with the amended ECC conditionalities. The project was therefore met with (initially) great expectations from the local communities, as it was to use a bottom-up ‘community-based’ approach and was to formulate an incentive mechanism to protect forests in the watershed area. IIWMP also had five specific components: soil and water conservation, forest and environment protection, livelihood and research, land tenure, and biodiversity conservation (IIWMP-PMO 2000b). This array of issues to be covered seemed to augur well for the project in terms of accounting for (or ‘covering’) an array of hitherto neglected social and environmental issues (Mori\*, interview, 2004).

And yet, although the IIWMP was set up to contribute to ecological sustainability as well as to address the socio-economic and cultural concerns of the Itogon communities, implementation of the project has caused problems to local communities. Individuals, as well as individual households from local communities, were thus certainly chosen as contractors to this project, mostly for the reforestation and livelihood projects. However, some people in Itogon soon became suspicious about the way contractors were chosen as well as how the contractors then used the

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<sup>42</sup> Sanggunian Bayan Resolution No. 126 by the Municipality of Itogon (Office of the Sangguniang Bayan 1998) and No.16 (Municipality of San Manuel 1999).



allocated money (Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, interview, 2004; Besitan, interview, 2004; Mooy, interview, 2004).<sup>43</sup> Indeed, my own field observations suggested all was not well: thus some of the planted trees were already burnt, and those remaining were dying due to a lack of management (Direct Observation 26-27 March 2004). Joan Carling (2004), the President of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), even maintained that reforestation contractors who did not receive payment from the local government burnt the trees on purpose in retaliation. While debate over who is to blame for local project deficiencies persist, what is clear is that the IIWMP has had a patchy record in terms of achieving its stated aims.

Doubts over land tenure have further complicated project delivery. *Ibaloi* people are anxious about losing their ancestral land titles as prime watershed areas are declared protected areas (Rood 1998; Bryant 2000; Lawrence 2002; see GOP 1992a, 1997). Once their ancestral land is declared as a protected area, *Ibaloi* people fear that they will not be able to continue their economic activities in the area. This is because the National Integrated Protected Areas System limits certain types of activities such as hunting and cutting plants or trees without permit within the protected area in order to promote environmental conservation (GOP 1992a). Whatever the merits of this view, its seeming prevalence among the *Ibaloi* underscores the local obstacles that exist even when the SRMP seems to incorporate selected environmental concerns into its planned activities.

The mixed record of the IIWMP occurred even despite financial intervention by JBIC that made the project more economically viable. Thus, based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)<sup>44</sup>, 137.79 million Philippine Pesos (about US\$ 3.12 million) were put into the DENR's annual budget starting in 2000 (DENR 2000; IIWMP-PMO 2000a; Fianza, interview,

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<sup>43</sup> A remark from one interviewee in a local village is revealing in this regard. Luisa had a contract and built a medium size (2.5m x 1.5m) gate on the way to the rice fields. She explained about being a contractor as follows: "people think that the house I built with my own savings was built with the contract money. People gossip about my family. Dalupirip people were not like this before. We used to respect and value the wisdom of the elderly people, experience, and ties between *Ibaloi* before. Here now, people become more and more [money oriented]. Everything is about money." (Besitan, interview, 2004)

<sup>44</sup> This MOA was entered into by the DENR with other government agencies, i.e., Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, Department of Agriculture, National Irrigation Administration, and NPC in September 1998 (DENR 2002)



2004). This money was the DENR's share in the interest payment for the NPC loan (i.e. from the non-power component of SRMP) that was normally due to the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) but which was channelled instead by this agency to support the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project. JBIC had waived the interest payment in this case as there was no definite funding source to meet the Philippine government's commitment to implement IIWMP and JBIC wished to see the latter proceed (Fianza 2004; Tobias 2004). However, in spite of JBIC's gesture, implementation of IIWMP has not been particularly successful even since 2002 due in part to the DENR's ongoing funding difficulties.<sup>45</sup> Thus, what had been originally a project based on a seven year plan was further delayed – indeed, there was not even a budget allocated for it in 2004 (Fianza 2004; Tobias 2004).

Despite such difficulties, for our own purposes the fact of JBIC's voluntary financial contribution (via the interest payment waiver) is interesting because it suggests at least *some* 'green' aspect to its operations. These sorts of interest repayment are obligatory under Japanese banking law and thus tend to restrict the room for manoeuvre of Japanese aid agencies in practice, especially the more business-oriented ones (Hayashi, interview, 2004).<sup>46</sup> Thus, JBIC's contribution can be seen as a partial step towards greening by the agency in as much as the diverted money went to support an environmental management project in jeopardy.

#### **5.4. Greening the Dam: JEXIM's Verification of Environmental Consideration and Monitoring**

In the preceding section, the concern was to analyse the role of the recipient in carrying out environmental consideration in order to meet its own environmental laws – but more importantly from our perspective, the environmental standards required by the Japanese donor. Based on the

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<sup>45</sup> One anonymous interviewee stressed the role of corruption within the Philippine agencies: "if DENR had used all JBIC's funding, 100%, then the reforested area by the IIWMP should reach the other side of the earth" (Capulet, interview, 2004\*; see also Azafar et al. 2000).

<sup>46</sup> One JBIC high ranking official (a former OECF official) during my interview emphasised the difficulties of complying with Japanese banking laws that obliges profit making (Hayashi, interview, 2004).



record of the SRMP since the 1980s, however, doubts have been raised about the efficacy of such (largely) devolved responsibility – at least with regard to *kaihatsu-enjyo* (development aid) projects. And yet, there is also a further role for Japanese aid agencies in this greening process, notably at the stage of project appraisal (that is verification of environmental consideration) and monitoring. Here, where the Japanese can *directly* control the agenda, it might be expected to find maximum environmental concern – at least, that is, if the greening of Japanese aid is a serious objective. As such, this section will assess Japan's appraisal and monitoring system with a focus on the SRMP. After first setting out that system, the discussion will then consider how effective it was in relation to the SRMP.

#### **5.4.1. The Appraisal System**

For a project of the type discussed here, and over the time period in question, our attention needs to be focused on the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) since this was the key agency in charge of the environmental appraisal procedure. As noted, the SRMP phase I was ended without it becoming an ODA project. Nonetheless, it was resurrected with JEXIM's help. Japan's reconsideration of SRMP in relation to the role of this agency can be explained on three grounds. First, and most importantly, the second-time around, it was not funded as an ODA project but as an OOF project. As OOF projects do not require strict environmental standards as well as public scrutiny like ODA projects (see Chapter 4), therefore, financing the project through JEXIM was not as 'risky' as before for Japanese government in terms of satisfying social and environmental standards. Second, since 1989 JEXIM has increased its financing operations in order to respond to the growing trend towards privatisation in developing countries, especially vis-à-vis BOT and PPA projects (JBIC 2003b). Lastly, there were growing demands for overseas investment loans since the late 1980s by Japanese corporations as their business strategies became increasingly global (JEXIM 1990; JBIC 2003b). These three factors coincided with the SRPC (and ultimately, Marubeni) project proposal, and thereby helped in the resurrection of the SRMP in 1990s.



As noted in Chapter 4, JEXIM ‘greening’ was less pronounced than that of either JICA or OECF in the 1990s. Nonetheless, it did feature in the introduction of an Environmental Checklist. That Checklist was used in turn for the Bank’s environmental appraisal (*kankyō-shinsa*)<sup>47</sup> prior to a funding decision and was devised to improve the system by verifying (*kakunin*) the environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyō*) procedure implemented by the recipient (JBIC 2003b). The Checklist itself consists of a schema comprising eleven industrial sectors as well as three ‘*yōinbetsu chekkupointo*’ (checkpoints by causes) (see Table 5.4). The three checkpoints by causes were specifically prepared for projects that would not otherwise fit into the scheme but were also applied to each of the eleven industrial sectors on the main list (JEXIM 1993).

**Table 5.4. 11 Main Industrial Sectors and Three Checkpoints by Causes in JEXIM’s Environmental Checklist**

11 Main Industrial sectors	
	1. Thermal power plant projects
	2. Hydropower Projects
	3. Steel Mill Projects
	4. Copper Smelting Works Projects
	5. Paper and pulp Projects
	6. Petrochemical Projects
	7. Port and Harbour Projects
	8. Mining Projects
	9. Road Construction Projects
	10. Forestry Projects
	11. Petroleum/Natural Gas Development Projects
Check points by causes	
	1. Air pollution
	2. Water pollution
	3. industrial waste

Source: JEXIM (1993)

The Checklist does not have any stated objectives or principles as do, for example, the JICA and OECF guidelines (see Chapter 4). Instead, there is a one page summary that explains how to use the Checklist as well as factors that appraisers should keep in mind during appraisal. Despite its brevity, this summary has important things to say about the Checklist’s implementation

<sup>47</sup> Appraisal here is an overall assessment of the relevance, feasibility and potential sustainability of a development intervention prior to a decision of funding (MOFA 2003f).



and by extension, about how the appraisal functions in the overall greening process.

The first striking feature about the JEXIM Checklist is the considerable flexibility that is built into the process. Thus, appraisers are told that, where a project is to be subject to environmental appraisal, they must “take each project’s specific features into account, and add and alter the industry sectoral checklists [categories] if needed” (JEXIM 1993: 1). Hence, rather than being a rigid guideline, the Checklist is open to modification in recognition of the wide variety of projects to be appraised. Further, the appraiser also has leeway in terms of how detailed the investigation is. Thus, once the project has been initially reviewed, it is up to the appraiser to decide whether there are any issues requiring further investigation.

Given the power of the appraiser, it is rather surprising that the Checklist does *not* require that this individual be an environmental specialist. Thus, the summary notes, almost in passing, that when further investigation is required “*if needed*, the Environment Office *as well* would like to be consulted regarding the matter” (JEXIM 1993: 1; emphasis added). This passage is revealing on several grounds. First, it suggests that the environmental appraisal is not usually conducted by Environmental Office staff based at JEXIM despite the intrinsically environmental nature of the topic. Considering the fact that the more ‘environmentally conscious’ OECF’s appraisal teams usually consisted only of financial and technical experts (see Chapter 4), it is even less likely that JEXIM had an environmental specialist on board. In fact, it was a senior officer in each loan department<sup>48</sup> was responsible for environmental assessment of a project (Dauvergne 1997). Even for current JBIC operations (which represent a continuation of prior JEXIM practice after the merger), although now it is *officially* the Environmental Office’s<sup>49</sup> job to conduct an environmental appraisal (JBIC 2002e, 2003d), that appraisal in practice is often carried out by other non-environmental staff who are located in finance departments or

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<sup>48</sup> JEXIM had five loan departments responsible for the Bank’s financial commitments: international loans to Asia, Oceania; Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas; overseas investment, etc (FOEJ 1997).

<sup>49</sup> It is called in JBIC the Environmental Analysis Department (JBIC 2005c).



in JBIC regional offices (Hatae 2005; Hama 2005).<sup>50</sup> Second, the Checklist indicates that even when there is an issue requiring detailed investigation, the Environmental Office is not necessarily consulted. Indeed, the identity and training of the JEXIM appraiser is not written anywhere in the Checklist. This omission matters as other official documents describe the role of JEXIM's Environmental Office as "reinforcing the environmental appraisal function/system for loan projects" (JBIC 2003b: 231). Simply reading this sort of passage would intuitively lead to the view that it is the Environmental Office that implemented environmental appraisals. This vague line of accountability was also a part of the Bank's secrecy (Dauvergne 1997). And yet, the Checklist documentation itself gives a different picture of the process (see below).

Without an environmental science background, moreover, it is doubtful that a designated JEXIM appraiser could appropriately conduct an environmental appraisal. And yet, to be able even to check the contents of an EIA, produced after all by environmental consultants, would require a certain minimal level of environmental knowledge. Thus, the use by JEXIM of non-experts suggests that the process could never amount to much more than a mechanical matter of ticking boxes. Indeed, that the Checklist is designed simply to elicit yes/no responses would only appear to confirm the superficial nature of the exercise (i.e. a question such as "will the construction of projects such as large dams in tropical dry areas bring about localised climate changes and cause damage such as localised heavy rains?") (JEXIM 1993: 2; see Appendix 2 for a complete list of the Checklist questions).

Although JEXIM's Environmental Office was officially designed to provide input in that organisation in terms of environmental appraisal, there is nonetheless little publicly known about the work done by that office or even the number of its staff complement (JBIC 2004g). Thus, for example, when I made an enquiry about it, JBIC replied that it did not disclose information on the number of staff in the Environmental Office because that information

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<sup>50</sup> This point was made both by a JBIC employee and by a knowledgeable NGO employee in interview (Hama 2005; Hatae 2005).



was ‘classified’ (JBIC 2004g). It was again suggested that such secrecy was ‘standard practice’ among Japanese aid agencies (JBIC 2004g).<sup>51</sup> This response does raise questions, though, as to *why* this particular data is ‘classified’, and suggests a basic unease about their environmental appraisal system — and, even perhaps about the quality of the appraisal itself. Indeed, various scholars have highlighted precisely this point (CPA 2003; Feld 2004; FOEJ 2003, 2004; Grifoni 1999; Mori\* 2004; Moran 1999; Willing 1999).<sup>52</sup>

A further striking feature of the Checklist is that it is largely, if not entirely, dependent on the previously completed EIA report upon which the project was based. Thus, JEXIM appraisers must rely on data provided by proponents as per EIA procedures under the Philippine EIS system discussed above (JEXIM 1993; Tsuji 2004). One former Japanese aid official candidly explained that staff “have no choice but to trust” those submitted EIA reports due to the lack of human and financial resources in the Japanese agencies themselves to investigate sites (Miyako\*, interview, 2004; see also National Diet 1987). In addition, the Checklist does not provide any guidance on how to review EIA reports, let alone how to check whether they were appropriately conducted in the first place.

This seemingly casual environmental appraisal system flies in the face of JEXIM’s own recognition that this system *should* be an integral and significant part of the overall aid disbursement process. Thus, the Checklist summary clearly states that given a particular environmental appraisal outcome, “...if needed, necessary measures in contracts or Loan Agreement *must* be arranged” (JEXIM 1993: 1; emphasis added). This is a very important passage as it shows that JEXIM was well aware of its need to assess and, if need be, reinforce the recipient’s environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo*) process. By adding environmental issues raised during appraisal to conditions that frame loan agreements, JEXIM thus had the

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<sup>51</sup> JBIC’s email reply to my query stated that “we are afraid that the number of staff for environment-related work is classified therefore the data is not open to the public. This is the same case with OECF and JEXIM as well” (JBIC 2004g; see also Chapter 4).

<sup>52</sup> One senior JBIC official commented on the quality of SRMP’s environmental appraisal as “too badly done ... which eventually cost more money to cover the problems caused by a badly done environmental appraisal in the first place” (Mori\*, interview, 2004).



power to suspend a loan when the standard of environmental consideration of a proposed project was seen to be poor and/or the project proposal was not deemed to comply fully with its own EIA report. Indeed, senior Japanese officials at the agency readily acknowledged this obligation. Thus, for example, during the Committee meeting on Public Administration Monitoring in the National Diet on November 20, 2000, the former president of JBIC (i.e. JEXIM's successor agency), Hiroshi Yasuda, confirmed that "regarding socio-environmental consideration...there are measures devised in the loan agreement to suspend loan disbursement if any illegal condition occurs" (National Diet 2000: 12).

However, even when environmental concerns are added to the conditions of a loan agreement, those conditions are not usually disclosed to the public. For example, in the case of the Kotopanjang dam project in Indonesia, "three conditions"<sup>53</sup> were apparently included in the Loan Agreement as related by the relevant OECF official, Tōru Shinozuka, during National Diet hearings (National Diet 1999: 13). Those three conditions became the centre of a lawsuit over the legality of the Kotopanjan Dam project. Yet, and as noted before, JBIC refused to submit the loan agreement document either to the National Diet or to the Tokyo district court. JBIC's reasoning was that "the loan agreement documents cannot be disclosed and submitted to the court as they are very much diplomatically sensitive. Disclosing them would damage the *bilateral* relations between the Indonesian government and our [government]" (a JBIC legal representative at Tokyo District Court 13 November 2003).

However, unlike the JICA and the OECF environmental guidelines and checklists, JEXIM's checklist *is* occasionally made available to the public, albeit, only to those prepared to be tenacious in their search. A personal anecdote from fieldwork is relevant here. Thus, in January 2003, a librarian

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<sup>53</sup> Those three conditions mostly concern the social and environmental aspects of the project such as protecting biodiversity (Sumatran elephant), maintaining the local livelihoods of the affected households, and fair process in obtaining agreement from affected households on resettlement (National Diet 1999: 13). The non-compliance of the three conditions led to a lawsuit filed in Tokyo district court by four thousand Sumatran residents against Japanese government, JICA, JBIC and Tōden-sekkei, a Japanese consulting firm (Direct observation 13 November 2003).



at the JICA library<sup>54</sup> helped me to locate the 1993 JEXIM environmental checklist. Yet, the librarian only found it when searching an internal library system which the public cannot access. On that internal system, more than 50 items relating to JEXIM's operations were classified 'for internal use only'. Apparently, I was told, this was at the express wish of JEXIM.

As the appraisal takes place before any funding decision is made by the Japanese government, the role of the appraiser (whether based at JEXIM, OECF or since 1999 JBIC) should be critical to the donor's confirmation process and constitutes the main opportunity to incorporate environmental elements into decision making. However, the Japanese system is opaque to the outside scholar even as what is visible comes across as being rather superficial at times – superficial, at least, when compared to Japan's formal and high profile commitment to 'green' its aid. Next, we examine how this secretive appraisal system worked in our case study.

#### **5.4.2. Implementing Environmental Appraisal: San Roque Multipurpose Project**

It is not surprising that my efforts to learn about the environmental appraisal of SRMP were hindered by the secretive Japanese system just discussed. Thus, JBIC (2004f) reluctantly and, ultimately quite poorly, responded to my questions<sup>55</sup> concerning the SRMP's environmental appraisal by providing a positively bland statement on that project. Specifically, JBIC (2004f) replied: "JEXEM (at that time) confirmed the appropriateness of environmental and social consideration which includes environmental compliance with the relevant regulations and laws in the Philippines as well as the properly planned resettlement action plan. Furthermore, JEXIM confirmed the appropriateness of the environmental and social management plan in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prepared by the project proponent of the Philippines". Despite the blandness, this JBIC summary is revealing on at least two counts. First, it affirmed the 'appropriateness' of

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<sup>54</sup> In Tokyo, most accessible 'aid' related references and environmental guidelines can be located in the JICA Library in Ichigaya, Shinjuku ward.

<sup>55</sup> I asked specifically *how* the 1993 JEXIM environmental checklist was applied for the SRMP with additional questions including scoping and screening activity and JEXIM's monitoring activity for the project. But JBIC did not mention the environmental checklist or monitoring activity in its reply to me.



the recipient's work including its 'compliance' with Philippine environmental laws and regulations. However, our own discussion above concerning the illegal quarry occurred *after* the JEXIM verified the recipient's environmental consideration was appropriate – apparently suggests a poor appraisal by the JEXIM. Second, the JBIC reply suggests the 'appropriateness' too of the project proponent's social and environmental management plan for the SRMP. And yet, such a plan is only as good as the data used to underpin it. Here again, though, our discussion above highlighted controversy over the proponent's data (e.g. the IRN reports) as well as the more general manipulation of the Philippine EIS system to minimise any SRMP pitfalls. In short, JBIC's response to my detailed questions raised doubts over the seriousness with which the environmental appraisal was conducted.

There was, too, though, the possibility that JBIC secrecy here was partly a result of institutional embarrassment over SRMP – in other words, that JBIC officials were only too well aware of the pitfalls of this project and its Philippine recipient's environmental consideration (Dauvergne 1997; JBIC, interview, 2004h; Mori\*, interview, 2004; see also JICA 1997, 1999a, 1999b). My interviews with JBIC staff support this point. As discussed above, Mori\* (2004) admitted the environmental appraisal was 'too badly done'. Also during my interview with JBIC Philippines department staff regarding the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) project, I briefly asked why the SRMP was so controversial. JBIC interviewees (three from the SEMP team and two from public relations office) suddenly became silent and did not speak a word on that matter (JBIC 2004h). Evidence to support this view also came in the form of a special briefing that JEXIM undertook for National Diet member Shūichi Katō on the matter in February 1999 (JEXIM 1999b). This briefing report sheds further light on the environmental appraisal process undertaken in this case. It thus notes how the appraisers had assessed both the EIA report and the ECC for the SRMP. According to that report, moreover, JEXIM had already completed by February 1999 an environmental appraisal for the hydropower plant construction and was in the midst of completing an *additional* environmental appraisal for the multipurpose dam construction.



Recall that under the terms of the Checklist, an additional investigation only occurs “when there is an issue that needs further attention” (JEXIM 1993: 1). In the case of SRMP dam construction, JEXIM had focused the supplementary enquiry on socio-environmental issues (e.g. the resettlement of affected communities) – thereby suggesting that there were some potential problems in this area that were flagged during the original appraisal (JEXIM 1999b; Mori\* 2004).

In general, and based notably on the National Diet briefing, the available evidence suggests that the standard operating procedure discussed in the last section seems to have been followed – however much this seems to have been done in a basic fashion or even again superficial. Thus, the EIA report and ECC were both reviewed as per the Checklist – although there is little indication of the appraisers’ detailed response to them. For the hydropower plant, JEXIM conducted the appraisal by visiting the project site as well as resettlement sites. In the process, staff met with officials at SRPC, NPC, DENR’s Region I office and Local Government Units. JEXIM appraisers also consulted with local communities and concerned NGOs such as the Cordillera Peoples Alliance and Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway ti Agno (TIMMAWA)<sup>56</sup> (JEXIM 1999b; FOEJ 1999b, 2002a, 2005a, 2005d; Barangay San Nicholas Villagers, interview, 2004; Doton, interview, 2004; see below for detailed discussion the JEXIM’s visits).

Based on this appraisal process, it would seem derived from the evidence available to me that JEXIM staff had three particular concerns about the SRMP. First, there was some doubt as to whether the proponent’s environmental consideration satisfied the Philippine EIS system. Second, there was also a practical worry as to whether SRPC and NPC environmental consideration would actually mean that the project would avoid serious adverse environmental impact as was claimed. Third, there was some question over whether the environmental management plan

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<sup>56</sup> TIMMAWA (Alliance of Peasants to Free the Agno) is an alliance of farmers along the upstream and downstream Agno River who are affected by the SRMP. TIMMAWA through its alliance with other national/international organizations and individuals, has been protesting against the SRMP (RWESA 2003; FOEJ 2005a).



(including monitoring) was appropriately detailed given the likely impact of this complex mega-development project.

Needless to say, JEXIM has never made public either its misgivings or its specific response to those misgivings. Thus, while the 1999 briefing report did not specify the JEXIM reaction to what it saw and heard about the SRMP, on the basis of the appraisal that was submitted, JEXIM later decided to put in place a lengthy 15 year monitoring system to cover the period during and after construction of the hydropower plant (JEXIM 1999b; FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). In fact, JBIC implemented this decision after the merger of JEXIM and OECF in 1999 (see Chapter 4). However, such lengthy monitoring was in addition to the usual procedure and is rarely done given the cost involved and the aforementioned staff shortage in the Japanese aid agencies. It can thus be confidently surmised that JEXIM indeed had some strong reservations about the efficacy of the Philippine EIS process, at least as it was conducted at the SRMP site. Nonetheless, the overriding point in all of this is that the JEXIM environmental appraisal gave a green light to the SRMP, thereby enabling it to move forward smoothly – beginning with the destruction of houses at the project sites in February 1998 (FOEJ 2002a).

JEXIM's environmental appraisal of the San Roque Multipurpose Project was criticised for having been done inappropriately. Both local and international NGOs as well as Local Government Units protested about it – and even appealed to JEXIM, the JBIC and even to the Japanese government for a suspension of loans to the SRMP (FOEJ 1999c; Shalupirip Shantahnay Indigenous People's Movement 1999b; CPA 2000). Yet, the loans, and hence the project went ahead anyway. This discussion may have been a good thing for the project proponent. However, it simply stored up trouble for the Japanese aid bureaucracy itself. This was because an inappropriately conducted environmental appraisal tends to make the subsequent monitoring even more costly than would otherwise be the case in so far as the donor simply tries to 'cover up' past mistakes (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004; Mori\*, interview, 2004; Murai, interview, 2004).



### 5.4.3. Monitoring: *Kankyō-jissa*

The monitoring process is the final stage of environmental assessment, and hence the final occasion at which Japanese officials can encourage ‘greening’. True, there are clear constraints at this final stage, given that this aspect is about checking the compliance between prior agreement and implementation – rather than assessing whether those agreements were sufficient to begin with. Yet, here too, and despite these constraints, evidence should be available to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to greening – for example, by insisting on the full completion of all prior environmental undertakings.

The key agency at the monitoring stage for this project was JBIC. Such monitoring was thus based on JBIC’s guidelines with the specific purpose of ensuring compliance with socio-environmental commitments at the SRMP based on prior stages in the environmental consideration process (FOEJ 2004c). According to the Japanese Ministry of Finance and JBIC itself, the monitoring system for the SRMP was established in accordance with the delegated monitoring plan set by JEXIM in light of its own environmental appraisal noted above (FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e). JBIC thus was to be regularly updated by reports from the NPC and the SRPC, even as it was to conduct its own field investigations by dispatching an environmental mission team to the area biannually. Thus, monitoring is mostly undertaken remotely from Tokyo, and based on the project proponent’s own reports while the field investigation is to be carried out regularly at times “when [it was] perceived opportune” (MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2). It is further emphasised in the monitoring plan that, in order to check compliance with regard to the project’s environmental consideration, JBIC monitoring is “in the first place, based on the report and information provided by the project proponent” (MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2). However, monitoring reports submitted by the NPC are not available to the public as there is no bilateral agreement to disclose them (MOF in FOEJ 2004e).<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> My request to JBIC in this regard was thus predictably turned down.



The field investigation itself is usually carried out by a JBIC *kankyō-jissa* team. In practice, this team has been regularly (biannually) sent to the project site and neighbouring areas. The team consists of five members from the Environmental Analysis Department (*Kankyo-shinsa-shitsu*), the project office (International Finance Department I), and one external ‘independent’ environmental consultant hired by the JBIC “if necessary” (*hitsuyō ni ōjite*) (MOF in FOEJ 2004e: 2, 2004b, 2005c). The regular dispatch of this team, though, is a costly affair for JBIC— notably because it often needs to hire a consultant and must pay for staff travel to and from, as well as around the Philippines, including helicopter hire to get to remote areas (Kaori Nakajima in FOEJ 2004c: 4).<sup>58</sup> Hiring third party (*daisansha de aru*) environmental consultants – so far, only white male consultants according to locals (see below) – also contributes to the monitoring expenses. Yet, the presence of the third party within the team is critical in that it provides professional expertise and at the same time gives international legitimacy to the JBIC monitoring activity (FOEJ 2004e: 2). Again, just like other examples of secrecy at JBIC, information on consultants’ identities as well as their roles are not disclosed (but see below).

In spite of the costly nature of the *kankyō-jissa* team, its activities at the SRMP site were simply described as “covering up the dirt” by one Japanese aid official “rather than ultimately solving the actual problems” (Mori\*, interview, 2004). This is due to the strong tendency within the Japanese aid bureaucracy to deny failure in their aid delivery (Hirai, interview, 2003; Yokoyama, interview, 2003; Matsumoto, interview, 2004; Mori\*, interview, 2004; Murai, interview, 2004). Such an attitude can be seen in the perfunctory nature of the site visit itself. Thus, and although the mission is a *field investigation*, the mission team usually only spends two days actually at the project site, (out of a total of four days) with the rest of time spent in Manila (FOEJ 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).

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<sup>58</sup> It is, in fact very dangerous, time consuming and painful to travel to the SRMP site area including the affected communities because public transport is extremely poor. I travelled to the affected communities by ‘jeepneys’ that were the only public transport connected to the area. The return trip from Baguio (Capital city of Benguet Province) to the Dalupirip (*Ibaloi* village, see Figure 5.1) takes 7 hours along deadly mountain roads. Jeepneys are small converted minivans (originally US military jeeps) in the back of which a lot of people (as many as can be squeezed in) are transported. There is no health and safety consideration here (Direct Observation 24-29 March 2004).



Whatever the precise merits of this critical view, it does indeed raise questions about the utility of monitoring as an independent and thorough mechanism by which to ensure that environmental consideration has taken place in project implementation. Given the various flows of the environmental appraisal system noted above, to the extent that monitoring is tantamount to ‘cover up’, then little can be expected at this final stage by way of sanction for unfulfilled environmental commitments.

Indeed, there is rather little evidence of any substantive impact on the ground arising from Japanese monitoring. Thus, and in sharp contrast to both JEXIM’s report (JEXIM 1999b) and JBIC’s pronouncements on its commitment to environmental monitoring (FOEJ 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2005e), local people have seen little evidence of the team in action. For example, one indigenous community leader described the mission team’s visits dismissively: “Every time they come and ask the same questions over and over. That is all. But I have seen them very few times. Not many.” (Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, interview, 2004). As well as this leader, other local people also told similar stories about the mission team – above all, that they rarely saw the team in their communities (Besitan, interview, 2004; Mooy, interview, 2004). One *Ibaloi* woman did recall, though, an Australian consultant’s visit,<sup>59</sup> but remained quite unclear as to what he was exactly doing in their community – despite this field investigation purportedly involving local consultation (Mooy, interview, 2004). Even the SRPC social and environmental department officer Tom Valdez said he had met the monitoring team only once (Valdez, interview, 2004).

In spite of its key purpose being to investigate the project site and to consult with the affected communities, therefore, the Japanese team was not that visible locally, seemingly even for the SRPC officer who was in charge of socio-environmental issues. Several issues are thereby raised over *kankyō-jissa* itself as a monitoring activity. First, as mentioned earlier, the team spent only two days around the project site out of a total of four days. It is, however, very unlikely that five investigators can appreciate the complex

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<sup>59</sup> During interview, Norma Mooy said she met an Australian consultant who was called Mr. Gordon (Mooy, interview, 2004).



socio-environmental conditions of the affected area and its communities including four resettlement areas covering three municipalities (San Manuel, San Nicholas and Itogon) in such a short time (see Figure 5.2). Second, as the investigation team was mainly guided by NPC and SRPC staff even when there, the nature of the consultation with local community and hence the associated assembled data were inevitably biased (FOEJ 2004e: 3).<sup>60</sup> Takuya Miyazaki, a senior MOF official, thus explained NPC and SRPC attendance at the consultations: “it is because the responsibility of SRMP’s environmental consideration lies with the project proponent. JBIC *only checks* as a lender, therefore *monitoring without the project proponent at all is difficult from the beginning*” (Miyazaki in FOEJ 2004e: 3 emphasis added). What has been underlined here, therefore, is the JBIC is ‘only’ a lender which is (ultimately) not responsible for the environmental consideration, but rather needs NPC and SRPC involvement as the key local players in that process. And yet, such dependency inevitably raises questions about the ability of the Japanese agency in charge of monitoring (here JBIC) to conduct this task in a independent manner benefiting the serious formal intent of Japan’s ‘green’ aid policy.

## 5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has examined to what extent and in what ways a traditional development ‘aid’ (*kaihatsu-enjyo*) project has been ‘greened’ in terms of the procedures adopted. In order to assess this topic, the chapter analysed the three stages of the environmental assessment procedure (namely, environmental consideration, verification of environmental consideration, and monitoring) where both JEXIM and the project proponents were to make efforts to ensure that environmental concerns were incorporated into the project. Now, since the San Roque Multipurpose Project is a business-oriented and profit-driven mega-development ‘aid’ project, the degree of greening was always expected to be *relatively* minor, as green concerns are sidelined in favour of standard economic calculations.

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<sup>60</sup> Even community meetings including interpreters were also arranged through the SRPC and NPC (FOEJ 2005b).



Yet, it is fair to say that there was nonetheless *some* evidence of limited greening. Such limited greening was seen here and there in the process: notably, in the JICA Re-study, the environmental appraisal, the IIWMP. The IIWMP in particular showed JBIC's 'green intent' on the socio-environmental issue (i.e. watershed management and sustainable livelihood programmes) in that a purely voluntary interest repayment waiver enabled extra funds to go to this SRMP component.

The Philippine EIS system also clearly played a role in environmental consideration here by requiring an EIA report and an ECC issuance before a project could formally proceed. As noted in Chapter 4, the Japanese international cooperation system is reliant on a recipient government's actions – such that, the greening of a Japanese aid project cannot be assessed only by the donor's efforts alone. Indeed, in the core of SRMP, specific environmental management plans (such as the watershed management plan) were produced that incorporated 1990s discourses on conservation, sustainable livelihoods, and indigenous people's rights and ancestral land titles – and hence, that suggested *some* recognition of the need to account for socio-environmental issues by relevant Philippine agencies.

That said, the analysis of this chapter also observed how practices at all stages revealed serious deficiencies that were notably linked, in turn, to political and economic dynamics. Although project procedures were thus technically 'greened', political and economic interests often subverted such greening in the implementation phase – for example, through the issuance of a special permit under EO 200 to allow illegal quarrying. Some procedural practices – for instance, the JEXIM environmental appraisal – meanwhile, were seemingly not conducted by environmental specialists, while subsequent JBIC monitoring was apparently perfunctory. Thus, there were clearly gaps between 'green' promises made and practical project-related measures taken which meant that, overall, environmental concerns surrounding the SRMP were imperfectly addressed.




However, it still might be argued that the greening of Japanese international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) is most likely to occur in a new generation of aid projects linked to environmental conservation (rather than in the ‘traditional’ development project covered here). Using a second case study, therefore, Chapter 6 next assesses this matter to further probe the extent to which green procedural commitments have been met in the Japanese aid sector.



## Chapter 6. Greening of *kankyō-enjyo*: Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan

This chapter investigates the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) in order to assess to what extent a ‘*kankyō-enjyo*’ (environmental aid) project in the 1990s was able to incorporate green elements. Our concern here is thus two fold. First, it is to investigate how the greening process may have differed from that of a traditional development aid project such as the one examined in Chapter 5. Second, and if different, the concern is to assess what tools and procedures were used in the environmental aid project. Overall, then, the purpose is to map the greening process in Japanese aid with a particular focus on environmental assessment procedures such as environmental consideration and its verification.

Figure 6.1. A Tourism Development Project



Source: Glasson et al. (2005: 1).

The process from project formulation to approval in SEMP directs our attention to how the formal greening of policy and procedures has affected the practices of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the



Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). The main objective of SEMP is to promote ‘community-based’ and ‘environmentally sustainable’ tourism. This sort of development was a key theme in aid discourse in the 1990s promoted through a series of policy statements (see Chapter 4) – and became, in turn, one of the most popular project types of the decade.

Unlike the project discussed in Chapter 5, where all stages of the environmental assessment process were considered, this chapter mainly focuses on environmental consideration and its verification as well as the implications for this project’s implementation. This is because, on the one hand, the project is still being implemented as of writing, and thus, monitoring is yet to be undertaken, and on the other hand, these two particular procedures show the degree of greening most effectively in this case since the SEMP was designed to be an environmental management project from the start.

This chapter first introduces the SEMP and its specific setting of Northern Palawan, including its unique political ecology. Next, it examines in depth the donor’s input to the recipient’s own environmental consideration procedure by assessing two key documents: the JICA Master Plan study and the OECF Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity document. Such analysis enables us to assess the wider procedural compliance in this environmental aid project in keeping with the concerns of this thesis.

## **6.1. Project Overview**

The Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP) is the first Japanese *environmental* aid project in the Philippines that specifically targeted environment conservation (JBIC 2000c; Chan 2004). Moreover, during the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, this particular project was registered by the Japanese



delegation with the United Nations as a type II project<sup>1</sup> under the category of “environment-related assistance for developing countries” (MOFA 2002f) – thus, indeed, it is one of the ‘star’ projects of the current Japanese ODA system.

Its formal goals are to “conserve the precious environment and natural resources in Northern Palawan by ... the establishment of E[nvironmentally] C[ritical] A[rea] N[etwork] zoning<sup>2</sup> [as a tool for producing a conservation map], the prevention of soil erosion, and the provision of substitute income methods for community residents in order to deter the conduct of activities detrimental to the environment” (JBIC 2003d: 1, 2004c: 1). The project is made up of sites located in 11 municipalities: Busuanga, Coron, Cullion, Linapacan, El Nido, Taytay, Araceli, Dumarán, San Vicente, Roxas, and Puerto Princesa (see Figure 6.3).<sup>3</sup>

A total of 2.034 billion yen (or about US\$ 17 million) was agreed to be disbursed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to fund this project. As the project is categorised by JBIC as a natural environment conservation project (JBIC 2002a), ‘the most concessional terms’ (MOFA 1997b) were applied: specifically, a special ‘environmental’ interest rate of 0.75% and a repayment period of 40 years (including a 10-year grace period) owing to its status as a conservation project (JBIC 2003d, 2004c; see also Nishigaki 2000).

Although the actual loan agreement was only made on May 30, 2001, the environmental consideration process had begun long before that with the project formation and preparation stage occurring between 1994 and 1999. With both JICA and OECF involved at various stages, a master plan study and a Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity were conducted. Both of these activities were designed to assist the recipient

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Type II’ projects are voluntary projects carried out in partnership between different stakeholders such as governments, NGOs and business in order to contribute to the implementation of Agenda 21 (see UNDESA 2003).

<sup>2</sup> See below


<sup>3</sup> However, according to the ECAN Zoning Component’s report (2003: 1-3), project sites total 14 sites with the additional three sites being Magsaysay, Agutaya, Cuyo.



government to strengthen its environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo*) activities. Thus, below, this chapter will consider them in some detail. All of these activities need to be understood in order to see how, together, they may have defined the project in terms of possible greening (see Figure 6.2).

Recall what was discussed in Chapter 5 in this regard. There, we saw that the presence of the donor was less significant in the San Roque Multipurpose Project – even at the stage of environmental appraisal where Japan *had* to play a direct part. However, in the environmental aid project examined in this chapter, the presence of Japan as a donor is visible from the early stages of environmental consideration due to a more rigorous environmental consideration procedure including master plan study and Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) – and hence not just in the verification of environmental consideration stage (*kankyō-hairyo-kakunin*).

**Figure 6.2. The SEMP Project Cycle**




Source: This Author

Project formulation thus began in 1994 with a JICA development study comprising a preparatory study and master plan study (JICA 1995a, 1997).



In 1997, the Master Plan was finalised, but in order to (apparently) strengthen environmental consideration and local community participation in the Master Plan, OECF, the Yen loan implementing agency, conducted a Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) initiative with the well-known international environmental NGO Conservation International as the key subcontractor (see below). The SAPROF final report (JBIC 1999b) was completed in 1999 and was based on two key principles: biodiversity conservation and community participation (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004). Later, these principles were incorporated into the ensuing SEMP project design so as to implement an effective environmental guideline through project practices such as ECAN Zoning (see below).

**Figure 6.3. Organisational Chart for Project Implementation**



Source: JBIC (2003d)

The SEMP itself has been composed of three components: an environmentally sustainable tourism development component (often called SEMP Tourism); an Environmentally Critical Area Network (ECAN) Zoning component; and a soil erosion protection component (JBIC 2003d, 2004c). Although the Philippine Department of Tourism (DOT) is the leading executing agency for the overall project management, each component is controlled and implemented by different agencies: DOT, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSDS), and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) (see Figure 6.3).



These agencies in turn have contracted their work out to private companies (see Table 6.1). As Table 6.1 shows, most of the companies are either based in or linked to the Philippines, Japan or the European Union (EU).<sup>4</sup>

**Table 6.1. Four contracts in place (as of February 2004)**

Project Component	Details of Contractor (Consultants)
Soil erosion protection component (DWPH)	PCI in association with Filipinas Dravo Corporation, Philipps Technical Consultants Corporation, TCGI Engineers, J.F. Cancio & Associates and Sustainable Ecosystem International Corporation Philippines (Japanese/ Filipino)
ECAN Zoning Component (PCSDS)	PCI in association with Almec Corporation, Daruma Technologies, Inc., Certeza Surveying and Aerophoto Systems, Inc., and Geo Survey and Mapping, Inc. (Japanese/Filipino)
Project Management/ Tourism Development Component (DOT)	CHL Consulting Co., Ltd, in association with CEST, Inc. (Irish/Filipino)
Civil Works Component (DPWH)	Welex Construction/Goldrock Construction and Development Corporation (Filipino Joint Venture)

Source: Adapted from JBIC (2004c)

The three project components reflected a multi-faceted engagement with environmental issues. Thus, the environmentally sustainable tourism development component (hereafter SEMP Tourism) aims mainly to prepare standards and guidelines for tourism by producing a tourism development plan for the environmentally diverse but endangered Coron-Busuanga and El Nido-Taytay sites. It also aims to enhance community participation and introduce an environmental conservation fee into the areas where the plan is to be implemented in order to generate funds through carefully targeted tourist activity.

The Environmentally Critical Area Network Zoning (ECAN Zoning) component was one of the critical areas identified by both JICA (1995a, 1997) and JBIC (1999b) as needing support if the overall conservation effort

<sup>4</sup> The EU has a significant presence in Palawan as well as elsewhere in the Philippines in terms of environmental conservation (Bryant 2002; Lawrence 2002; GOP 1997). An EU funded Palawan Tropical Forestry Protection Programme (PTFPP) was started for example in 1995 and finished in 2004 with a two year extension (PTFPP; De Vere Moss, interview, 2004).



was to proceed. Such an identification reflected the fact that, although ECAN Zoning had been adopted as the main tool by which to implement the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) Act (GOP 1992b), very few municipalities had produced an ECAN map due to difficulties linked to local corruption as well as the lengthy negotiation process among the stakeholders (Arquiza 1996; Lawrence 2002; see below). This component thus includes such activities as resource inventory surveys, GIS mapping, as well as support mechanisms such as capacity building for the PCSDS and local government units.

Finally, the soil erosion protection component, unlike the other two components, has been involved in carrying out assorted civil engineering works. This component is designed to rehabilitate an existing 59.3 km road between El Nido and Taytay that runs inland as well as along the coastline (SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component 2004). It aims to prevent further environmental degradation to the road and adjacent areas by using environmentally-sound technology – providing good drainage, a gravel surface with improved highway geometry, and planting indigenous trees for slope protection (Mangubat, interview, 2004).<sup>5</sup>

**Table. 6.2. Allocation of Loan**

Category	Details	Loan allocation (Million JPY)	%
Soil erosion protection component	Civil works, Consulting services	1180	58%
ECAN Zoning component	Procurement of Equipment, Consulting services	547	27%
SEMP Tourism component	Consulting services for project management and tourism development	284	14%
Contingency		23	1%
TOTAL		2,034	100%

Source: Adapted from JBIC (2004c)

<sup>5</sup> The Soil Erosion Protection Component used the Palawan indigenous species of Calabaw grass of which roots grow vertically to hold soils. The grass does not spread horizontally, therefore does not affect the road either (Magubat, interview, 2004).



While each component stressed the importance of ‘green’ elements, the actual loan allocation suggests a technologically-driven project with more than half of the loan being allocated to mainly civil works for physical infrastructure development (58%) and expensive ECAN Zoning equipment procurement (27%) (see Table 6.2.). This allocation is, in fact, critical in assessing the SEMP as an environmental aid project – because this project is indeed heralded as one of the key “projects for environmental protection” (JBIC 2004b, 2004e).

Furthermore, although the soil erosion protection component promised to be based on environmentally sound technology, it still involves constructing ten *new* 301 meter bridges and rendering concrete 4.2 km of the road (SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component 2004). Such new work is hardly ‘green’ yet stems from OECF’s re-categorisation of project contents because the annual budget for a ‘regular’ development aid project in the same area had run out (Hillel, interview, 2004). Indeed, ‘re-categorisation’ can also be seen in the JICA 1997 Master Plan Study, as the project devised there was originally a mainstream tourism development project and not an environmental management project (Hillel, interview, 2004; JICA 1995a, 1997).

This project overview enables us to see both its complexity and possible contradictory nature. As reiterated elsewhere in this research, the role of the recipient and the local context is crucial to understanding the implementation of ‘green’ Japanese aid projects. Thus, the next section explores the Palawan context in order to appreciate how the SEMP has fitted into that setting.

## **6.2. Palawan: the Philippines’ Last Frontier**

To appreciate why Japan’s ‘green’ aid targeted Palawan is partly to recognise the unique environmental history of this province. Palawan is the fifth largest island in the Philippines with 21 municipalities, 419 barangays, one main city and 1769 islands/islets (CEC 1994; see Figure 6.4).



**Figure 6.4. Map of Northern Palawan with Planned Road Rehabilitation Route and Project Sites**



Source: DPWH (2004)



This province was once malaria infested ‘backwater’ as well as being used as a leper and convict colony. However, since the late 1980s, the province has been widely known as the last natural frontier of the Philippines (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Plantilla, interview, 2004; Ylaya 2002).<sup>6</sup> This reputation has been seized on, meanwhile, by the Department of Tourism (DOT) as it stresses Northern Palawan in particular as one of the country’s most beautiful and socio-environmentally sensitive areas (DOT 2005; see Figure 6.5).<sup>7</sup>

**Figure 6.5. Northern Palawan**




Coron Island – Kagayan Lake




El Nido – Helicopter Island

Source: Own Photo



Coron Island



Coron Island – Mangrove Forests

Source: SEMP Tourism Component (2003).

<sup>6</sup> Yet, this image was threatened due to excessive logging and mining according to environmentalists and anthropologists (CEC 1994; Arquiza 1996).

<sup>7</sup> DOT and CEC’s demarcation of Northern Palawan area is slightly different from SEMP project sites. DOT (2005) demarcates it as encompassing “Puerto Princesa and the northward islands including Cuyo, Cagayancillo, and Busuanga” while CEC (1994: 7) more specifically identifies it as “Puerto Princesa city and the municipalities of San Vicente, Roxas, Taytay and El Nido in mainland and the island municipalities of Busuanga, Coron, Culion, Calaut, Cuyo Islands, Dumarán Islands, and other islands north of Puerto Princesa”.



The report by the Commission of European Communities (CEC 1994: 7) also underlined that the area is “the most easily accessible therefore ... is most at risk”. Out of a total of 7 protected areas in Palawan,<sup>8</sup> 5 of these are located in Northern Palawan, which suggests the latter’s rich socio-ecological heritage has thus been recognised at both the national and international levels: El Nido-Taytay Managed Protected Area, Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, Malampaya Sound Land and Seascape Protected Area, Coron Island Protected Area, and the Calauit Game Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary. Indeed, Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park is even designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.<sup>9</sup>

However, this status as a biodiversity ‘hotspot’ was not gained in one day – rather, long-standing concerns over the state of the Palawan environment played a prominent role in this process. Following the downfall of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, Philippine NGOs promoted new national agendas such as environmental conservation and indigenous people’s rights (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Bryant 2000, 2002, 2005; Leonen 2000; Silliman and Noble 1998). A series of environmental disasters in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave additional public attention to the consequences of irresponsible commercial practices caused by excessive logging (Lawrence 2002; Vitug 1993). The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) responded by cancelling the operations of all timber licenses (Vitug 1993). This was regarded as a significant victory by environmental NGOs which further led on to a national strategy for community forestry (Gauld 2000; Steinberg 2000).

This movement developed into the ‘greening’ of Palawan in the 1990s, through both state and civil society action. Donors played a key role in this greening process, as they both reflected and encouraged this shift (Ross 1996; Lawrence 2002). For our purposes, this can be seen in the context of

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<sup>8</sup> Two other protected areas are Ursula Island Game Refuge and Bird Sanctuary as well as Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park.

<sup>9</sup> The Philippines has three UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites: Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park (Palawan), Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park (Palawan), and Banaue Rice Terraces (Northern Luzon).



Japanese aid, as expressed through the main concerns of the SEMP. Unlike the case of the San Roque Multipurpose Project studied in Chapter 5 and which was framed in the broader context of the Philippine political economy, then, the SEMP is examined in the specific setting of a province that is the most advanced nationally in terms of environmental awareness as well as local participation (Balcos, interview, 2004; Bryant 2000). Thus, the next section focuses on more particularly Northern Palawan in order to situate SEMP's concerns of biodiversity conservation and sustainable tourism in the wider setting of the province's environmental governance structures, thereby highlighting the local recipient's environmental consideration mechanisms that are linked to Japan's overall 'greening' procedures.

### **6.2.1. Environmental Conservation: SEP, PCSD, and PCSDS**

The Philippines is well known for its rich biodiversity and much attention has been paid to the quest to conserve one of the hottest of the world's biodiversity 'hotspots' (National Geographic 2002; Conservation International 2003). Unfortunately, biodiversity loss is rapid and caused by both natural and human processes (JBIC 2000c, 2002a; Lawrence 2002).

Rafts of donor-encouraged laws were propagated in the 1990s to tackle this problem. In order to provide a legal framework for environmental management and protection, the National Integrated Protected Area System (NIPAS) was established in June 1992 (GOP 1992a). Shortly thereafter, a Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) was set up (GOP 1992b).<sup>10</sup> While NIPAS is to govern the protected areas in the Philippines nationwide, SEP is specifically designed for Palawan's sustainable development.<sup>11</sup> This province's fairly progressive initiative is central to projects like SEMP since special local rules affect project implementation.

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<sup>10</sup> Considering that the Rio Summit was held in June 1992, symbolically important gestures were shown for conservation and sustainable development by passing the two Republic Acts during that time.

<sup>11</sup> SEP is the first law introduced to totally ban commercial logging that plundered the province for decades (Section 2 of RA 7611: see also Arquiza 1996; Arzaga, interview, 2004; Matulac, interview, 2004).



Establishment of these new laws did not emerge in a political vacuum. They were products of a series of political battles since the late 1980s (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; Bryant 2005). Palawan in particular was a key battleground for environmental protection – and notably, the Philippine NGO Haribon Foundation’s campaign to protect forests against powerful opponents such as the logging tycoon Jose Alvarez. Eventually, with national and international support, Haribon led the way in achieving a total commercial log ban in Palawan (Plantila, interview, 2004, Bryant 2005). Therefore, it is critical for this thesis to consider that the SEP was created in this turbulent time in Palawan’s history.

The SEP was funded under the Palawan Integrated Area Development Project originally begun in 1982 by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and European Economic Community (EEC) (Arquiza 1996; Miguel 1997; ADB 1998). While the ADB’s 47 million US\$ loan was used to improve physical infrastructure,<sup>12</sup> the 7 million US\$ EEC grant funded the Integrated Environmental Programme for Palawan which prepared and implemented an environmental plan (ADB 1998).<sup>13</sup> SEP was, in fact, one outcome of the Integrated Environmental Programme (Arquiza 1996; ADB 1998; Miguel 1998; OIDCI 2001). With the support of Palawan’s two powerful Congressional leaders<sup>14</sup>, SEP became a law (GOP 1992b) that finally provided an “adequate or applicable (legal system) to ... the ecologically-sensitive frontier” (Arquiza 1996: 47).

The SEP Act set up a comprehensive framework to guide actors involved in the formulation and implementation of local development plans and programmes (GOP 1992b). Importantly, although it is strictly only a provincial matter, the Act allotted a share of the Philippine national budget

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<sup>12</sup> The ADB’s funding pattern is heavily focused on physical infrastructure leading to its nickname as “Asian Dam and Bridges” (Itoh, interview, 2004; Tamura, interview, 2004; Tanaka, interview, 2004). ADB’s operation and its organisation culture is said to be very similar to that of Japanese aid agencies as Japan is the largest shareholder of the Bank (ibid.).

<sup>13</sup> It is also interesting to notice that those consulting firms that worked on the report the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan (SEP) Towards Sustainable Development were mostly English companies. As the IEP was funded through an *CEC* grant, two companies out of three were English consulting firms: Hunting Technical Services Limited, England and Sir MacDonal and Partners, England (PIADPO 1987).



to assist Palawan (Arquiza 1996). The Act coordinates both development and conservation activities that protect the ecosystem and rehabilitate exploited areas (GOP 1992b). Three major implementing elements were identified: Environmentally Critical Areas Networking (ECAN), the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), and the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCS DS). As these elements are vital to appreciating the implementation of SEMP, the discussion now explores the role of each element in the environmental management process.

Environmentally Critical Areas Networking (ECAN) serves as the main planning strategy of SEP in that it divides the province into areas meant for economic activity, human settlement and strict environmental protection. In effect, it is a land use plan with legally binding force (JICA 1997). It has three main components (terrestrial, coastal/marine area, and tribal ancestral lands) and zoning categories (core, buffer, and multiple use) (GOP 1992b; see also below). By using ECAN, the SEP established a system that seeks to ensure forest conservation by imposing a total commercial logging ban in core and buffer zones, even as it promotes watershed protection, biodiversity preservation, as well as tribal people's right and their cultural protection (GOP 1992b).

The Act also created the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) with a remit to govern, implement and give overall policy direction in the context of the SEP. The Council is interestingly not just a provincial agency but a national one as it is directly under the control of the Office of the President.<sup>15</sup> The Council is composed of both provincial/local and national agencies<sup>16</sup> in order to ensure proper co-ordination between local

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<sup>14</sup> Ramon Mitra and David Ponce de Leon.

<sup>15</sup> Although Ramon Mitra expressively denies personal interests, it is often said that PCSD was set up in this way as he wanted it so (Arquiza 1996; Arzaga, interview, 2004). As a presidential candidate in 1992, he was confident about winning the election – yet, because he wanted to maintain control over Palawan (and its valuable resources), he created the Council under the Office of the President.


<sup>16</sup> The Council consists of mandated members such as the Congressmen from the two districts of Palawan, Governor of Palawan, Deputy Director General of National Economic and Development Authority, Undersecretaries of Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Agriculture, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, President of League of Municipalities of Palawan, President of Liga ng mga Barangay, representatives from the



governments, national agencies and private organisations in formulating and implementing SEP-compliant plans. It also has a role to negotiate donations and other financial resources to perform activities for the SEP (GOP 1992).

The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff (PCSDS) has played the role of the PCSD's secretariat since 1992. In turn, the PCSDS has two main departments and four divisions directly under the office of the executive director (See Figure 6.6). As we can see from Figure 6.6, the PCSDS is quite specialised and technically oriented. This is particularly true for the ECAN/GIS division that requires considerable scientific expertise from its employees.

**Figure 6.6. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff Structure**



Source: PCSD (2004b)

However, this unique structure of the PCSD and PCSDS has been rather a double edged sword. This is because, on the one hand, the Council can be generously supported by national government funds – but on the other, it can also equally be influenced by central government. This situation is most

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Office of the President, Palawan Provincial Board, NGOs, military, business, tribal sectors



evident in the appointment of the PCSDS leader, which indeed affects implementing aid projects such as the SEMP. Given the nature of the PCSDS brief, the executive director is a “highly technical post” (Arquiza 1996: 48). Yet, in practice, appointees have been clear political figures linked to the Philippine president. Thus, for example, President Ramos nominated a political protégé, Arthur Ventura, as executive director – prompting one embittered Palawan leader to note, “we can’t do anything because it is the will of the President” (Arquiza 1996: 48). Yet, this appointment process is highly problematic insofar as non-professional appointees are ultimately unable to perform an effective leadership role, as envisaged under the SEP.

### 6.2.2. Ecotourism

The task of the PCSD and PCSDS has been further complicated by national development processes. In particular, the Philippine government has adopted ecotourism as a key to promoting eco-sustainability and poverty reduction since the early 1990s, which resulted in a 1991 Tourism Master Plan collaborated on by the Department of Tourism (DOT), the United Nations Development Program and the World Tourism Organization (DOT 1991; Chen Ng 2003; PCVC 2002).<sup>17</sup> The DOT and the DENR further collaborated in 1998 on the Plan and notably defined then the concept of ecotourism as a “low-impact, environmentally-sound and community-participatory tourism activity in a given natural environment that enhances the conservation of biophysical and cultural diversity, promotes environmental understanding and education, and yields socio-economic benefits to the concerned community” (DENR and DOT 1998 in Andrada 2002: 169).

In the 1990s, Palawan’s leadership was in search of an alternative industry to commercial logging, a long-standing major industry of the province that had nonetheless been banned in 1992 as noted above (Broad with Cavanagh, 1993). The 20-year Philippine Tourism Master Plan made this wish seem

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and the Philippine National Police-Provincial Command (PCSD 2004a).

<sup>17</sup> The San Roque Multipurpose Project area was also promoting ecotourism by building a golf course in the area (see Chapter 5).



feasible as it identified the province as one of the major national ecotourism destinations, and also designated Northern Palawan as a priority ecotourism area (DOT 1991; *Malaya* 18 May 2005).

As a result, ecotourism was seen to be the way forward in policy circles. This was epitomized in House Bill 3453 filed by Palawan Representative Abraham Mitra in 2002 that sought to make Palawan the ‘Ecotourism Capital of the Philippines’ (*The Palawan Times* March 2002). The assumption here was that this economic activity would bring about increased income, promotion of the province, and protection of the environment (*The Palawan Times* March 2002). Indeed, and as part of the growth of all Philippine tourism receipts,<sup>18</sup> Palawan experienced a tourism boom in the 1990s (PGP 1995; SEMP Tourism Component 2003).<sup>19</sup> The existing tourism products exclusively rely on the area’s natural attributes such as white sandy islands, as well as the rich and diverse marine life (Chen Ng 2003; DOT 2005). Northern Palawan in particular with its natural beauty and cultural heritage has been one of the most attractive such destinations (DOT 2005).<sup>20</sup> As such, and as reflected in Philippine government policy on ecotourism, it has been deemed to be imperative to manage the area’s environmental resources carefully through eco-friendly and sustainable tourism (CEC 1994; DOT 2005). Donors such as UNESCO and JBIC, as well as international NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International, have supported this goal.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the SEMP has also sought to do so through collaboration between the DOT and other Japanese aid agencies.

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<sup>18</sup> Average annual growth here was 11.4% between 1990 and 1995, and 2.5% between 1995 and 2000 (NEDA 1992; WTO 2003a, 2003b).

<sup>19</sup> It is very difficult to acquire Palawan statistical data. That is why only a general statement can be given for tourism growth in Palawan. Two of the Provincial Medium-Term Development Plans (PGP 1993, 1995) clearly state “data is not available on past tourism growth”. But at the same time, there was no current data incorporated there to explain present tourism trends in Palawan either.

<sup>20</sup> The area’s popular attractions are the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, El Nido-Taytay Managed Protected Area, Coron Island Protected Area, the Calait Game Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary. The area is also well known as an ideal site for diving, swimming, trekking, island hopping as well as for cultural tourism since the promotion of the area’s ethnic and cultural diversity.

<sup>21</sup> In collaboration with UNESCO, local government has also implemented a community based ecotourism plan for Ulugan Bay in Puerto Princesa. WWF also has been working with a local community to promote tourism in El Nido (Chen Ng 2003).



However, the DOT's attempt to privilege environmental issues through ecotourism has faced difficulties as its definition of ecotourism conflicted with JICA's own notion of 'sustainable tourism' as used in the master plan study. Such a discrepancy reflected wider debates over these terms. Thus, shifts in global environmental concern and development needs have enhanced interest in, but also debate over, ecotourism and sustainable tourism (Duffy 2002; Hall and Lew 1998; Honey 1999; Page and Dowling 2002). While sustainable tourism sounds technical and value neutral, ecotourism seems to be more explicitly focused on ethics, which is shown in the Philippine government's own definition cited above (Libosada Jr.1998; Page and Dowling 2002). This difference even caused a conflict while the JICA and the DOT were designing the tourism master plan – and which led ultimately to a change in the master plan title. Initially, it was the “Eco-tourism Master Plan for Northern Palawan” (JICA 1995a: 166), but later it became the “Master Plan for Environmentally Sustainable Tourism Development” at JICA's behest. This change was “to clearly indicate the aimed type of tourism development which is environmentally sustainable and economically feasible” (JICA 1995a: 186). This subtle but important title change suggested that JICA's initial focus was on tourism development rather than on environmental conservation – not surprisingly, as it started out as a development aid project as we have noted (Hillel, interview, 2004). This relative emphasis between environment and development – as symbolised in this title change – has also shaped the environmental consideration process for the Palawan project, to which we now turn.

### **6.3. Assisting the *Kankyō-hairyo* process: JICA's Development Study**

Over the course of the next two sections, this thesis examines the SEMP in terms of the donor's own procedure to assist the recipient's environmental consideration. As we have noted, in the case of the SRMP, the NPC's EIA was at the centre of the recipient's environmental consideration due to the nature of project – that is, a hydropower dam development project with EIA submission required by JEXIM (see Chapter 5). However, for the SEMP,



environmental consideration was rather different. First, it was a regional development plan involving multiple project sites scattered across Palawan and which required a great deal of technical expertise as well as financial backup. Therefore, the Philippine government officially requested that the Japanese government provide technical assistance to perform environmental consideration activities including the Master Plan study by JICA and the Special Assistance for Project Formation (SAPROF) activity by the OECF (the latter is analysed in section 6.4). Second, an EIA submission by a Philippine agency was not required by the OECF in the light of the SEMP's project classification (see below). Hence, here we first assess the JICA development study in order to interrogate the extent to which this environmental aid project was formulated in accordance with 'greener' procedures.

### **6.3.1. The JICA 1992 Environmental Consideration Guideline for Tourism Sector**

The formulation of the SEMP began with JICA's own development study (comprising both a preparatory study and a master plan study) that started in 1994. In that year, the DOT had made a request to the Japanese government that a study of ecotourism be done in order to "combine concerns on Northern Palawan's vulnerable environment and [a] rapidly expanding tourism industry" (JICA 1997: i, 1995b). This 'request' was also guided by Japan's interests in the region as there was increasing Japanese business interest in particularly tourism development in the early 1990s (Hillel, interview, 2004). JICA then dispatched a study team to confirm the terms of reference and then a fully-fledged study for sustainable tourism development in the region was carried out (JICA 1995a, 1995b; see Figure 4.6).

JICA's first task in this regard was the production of a preparatory study. Given the specific nature of the project, as well as JICA's own environmental guideline procedures (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6), reference was made to the relevant tourism sector guideline (1992) in



undertaking this environmental consideration.<sup>22</sup> As such, we need to first examine that specific guideline in order to appreciate how environmental consideration here was actually carried out.

As noted, JICA established an environmental consideration guideline for a total of 13 sectors, specifically designed so as to predict environmental problems caused by socio-economic infrastructure projects (JICA 1992). In order to undertake the requested preparatory study for the Philippine government, the JICA team thus resorted to the 1992 tourism sector guideline specifically using its screening and scoping activities to complete the environmental consideration. Unlike the JEXIM environmental checklist discussed in Chapter 5 however, the 1992 guideline provided more detailed information to its users.

To reiterate a point made in Chapter 4 – at the preliminary survey stage, scoping and screening play a critical part in assessing potential environmental impacts. This work is thus vital to the overall ‘greening’ process. Recall how, in the case of the San Roque Multipurpose Project discussed in Chapter 5, for example, slipshod scoping and screening activities did not properly identify some socio-environmental issues, thereby causing problems later on during project implementation. Even prior to the start of scoping and screening in the present case study, though, it was vital to know how JICA defined tourism development since the guideline and other JICA activities are based on that definition. The 1992 JICA guideline thus defined tourism development as “an activity that *changes* the natural environment to create more pleasant surroundings and to increase tourist receipts” (JICA 1992: 10; emphasis added). This definition thus acknowledges the inevitability of environmental impacts and even specifies two types of tourism development according to their “typical (environmental) impacts”: namely, rural resort development and urban

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<sup>22</sup> With its first guideline in 1990 “Guideline for environmental impact study on Dam construction”, JICA therefore established “Environmental consideration guideline on socio-economic infrastructure development plan” for 13 sectors.



tourism development (JICA 1992: 10).<sup>23</sup> It simultaneously highlights the positive economic gains from an inflow of tourists to local development but also acknowledges negative environmental impacts notably from the physical construction of infrastructure. This understanding does indeed suggest that JICA perceived tourism development as mainly about infrastructure-oriented development (JICA 1992).

Detailed knowledge is required from the start under JICA's environmental consideration. Prior to scoping and screening, the JICA guideline thus specifies a need for completion of a project summary and a project site environment form based on secondary data collected in Tokyo. During the field visit itself, the study team then acquires further data to complete the relevant forms (See Table 6.3 and 6.4).

As Table 6.3 and 6.4 show, the project summary form identifies straightforward (i.e. 'circle as appropriate') physical and socio-cultural environments at the project site, while the project site environment identifies further socio-economic issues relevant to implementation such as the constitution of the local community, the nature of the local economy, and local pollution records. Both forms are nonetheless simply descriptive of a project with minimal information thus provided. As such, the kind of data the team is asked to collect is inescapably general, possibly posing difficulties later on when more precise data may be needed to support informed decision-making. True, though, this stage is prior to the actual screening or scoping activities, and hence may be expected to be somewhat general. Yet, those two forms are important in their own way as the data contained in them are then used to orient both screening and scoping activities, following which important decisions about the direction of the project are made (see below).

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<sup>23</sup> While the former produces physical pressure on to the natural environment (i.e. water pollution, deforestation and biodiversity loss) by building new infrastructure, the latter increases pressure on existing infrastructure facilities.



**Table 6.3. Format of Project Summary**

A. Project Summary	
Item	Details
Project title	
Background	
Objective	
Location	
Implementing Agency	
Beneficiary local population	
Planning data	
Tourism resource	Circle as appropriate Natural environment (coast, highland, Scenic sites. Flora/fauna)/ Historic sites, monuments/ Museum/ Cuisine and drink/ Shopping/ Sport activities (diving, yacht, golf, tracking, etc.)/ Others
Main plan	Circle as appropriate Demand projection/ medium-, long-term planning/ Infrastructure planning: transport facility improvement (port, airport, road, railway, river)/ Living environment facilities (water supply and sewage system, waste management, etc.) tourism resource development
Others	

Source: JICA (1992:13).

**Table 6.4. Format of Project Site Environment**

Project Site Environment	
Item	Details
Project title	
Social environment	Local community (resident/ indigenous people/ awareness towards the plan)
	Economic activity, transportation and living environment (commerce/ logistics/ water supply and sewage system/ waste)
	Historic site, cultural monument/ health and hygiene (how they are preserved and used/ disease outbreak )
Natural environment	Topographic features, geological condition (scenic site, mountain area, marsh)
	Lake and river system, coast, weather (water quality, seashore, number of rainy days, etc.)
	Flora/fauna, habitat (endangered species/ mangrove/ coral reef, etc.)
Pollution	Degree of complaints (pollution with serious complaints)
	Measures taken (institutional measure/ compensation)
Others	

Source: JICA (1992: 14).



The next stage – the screening activity – is critical to the overall process as it judges whether a project needs an initial environmental examination (IEE) or EIA (see Table 4.1). However, this judgement is derived not from precise criteria based on scientific evidence, but from a general “principle/perspective” view derived from the aforementioned forms for project summary and project site environment (JICA 1992: 19).

Indeed, and instead of precise scientific criteria, the guideline here provides four ‘horizontal stances’ for screening (See Table 6.5). These stances aim to provide a way to improve the environmental consideration process by setting up criteria based on the project’s scale as well as land use plan.

**Table 6.5. Four “Horizontal Stances” for Screening**

1. Harmful impact on sustainability of economic activity that mainly relies on natural resources
2. Significant impact on human health
3. Degradation/loss of invaluable biological resources and their habitat
4. Inequitable impact on affected local community’s lives and livelihood

Source: JICA (1992: 19)

However, as Table 6.5 suggests, these four horizontal stances are again quite vague, and hence prone to flexible interpretation. The professed reason for such flexibility is the difficulty of establishing general quantitative criteria due to a recipient country’s unique socio-political system and environmental features (JICA 1992). At a practical level too, this provides room for the accommodation of interests when conflict occurs between the Japanese guideline and the recipient’s system. However, such flexibility, when combined with vague criteria, simultaneously robs the mechanism of applied utility in assisting the study team to do their work. As the guideline does not provide detailed information on how to apply these stances in practice, it thus thereby can weaken the entire endeavour (JACSES 2004).

Such ambiguity can be clearly seen in the case of the principles guiding assessment of a tourism development plan. These principles stress that a project is not to cause harmful impacts on a local community and “not to *significantly* damage” the natural environment, but rather is to ensure



sustainable development in the affected area (JICA 1992: 21; emphasis added). Yet, it is rather difficult indeed to see how users can apply these principles in practice as the guideline does not provide a precise means by which to gauge the impact – given the alarming vagueness of the word ‘significantly’ here.

Other features of the screening format compound the sense of vagueness. Thus, it offers only three simple categories to “*tick as appropriate: Yes/No/Unknown*” (JICA 1992: 22-23; emphasis added). However, these categories cannot assess the degree of significance. Rather, they are designed to answer not *how* significant potential damage is but *whether* there is potential damage. This passage thus contradicts the guideline in as much as the latter is designed to assess “*to what extent* tourism development affects the local ecological system” (JICA 1992: 10 emphasis added). Without concrete criteria to estimate significance, however, it is difficult to make an accurate decision on whether an EIA/IEE is necessary for a project.

Subsequent environmental consideration scarcely eliminates such inadequacy. Thus, the next stage is to “select certain environmental impacts of a development project that are more critical than others, and to identify priority sectors/issues based on the chosen impacts” (JICA 1992: 25). Here, a scoping checklist is used “to identify all the potential environmental issues that would be possibly caused by project implementation” (JICA 1992: 25). Items listed on the checklist are then incorporated into a matrix in order to better highlight linkages between development activities and listed environmental issues. However, it is questionable whether the items on the checklist address “*all* the potential environmental issues” in a *measurable* way in order to assess their impacts (JICA 1992: 25, emphasis added; see also Appendix 3).

Ambiguity here has a knock on effect for the matrix itself. Ten items on the matrix form are thus designed to cover all potential environmental issues arising from tourism development: resettlement, economic activity, waste disposal, landscape, transport system and infrastructure, health and hygiene, underground water, water pollution, noise and vibration, and ground



subsidence. Yet, some issues are thus omitted including such things as soil erosion around tourism facilities and coral reef destruction caused by tourism. Thus, reliance on the matrix may create loopholes in addressing potential environmental issues, which would eventually affect any project therefore supported by JICA (see Abe 2002; Okamoto 2002; Ozeki and Matsumoto 2002).

As with the screening procedure, the scoping matrix lacks quantifiable precision. Thus, it provides four categories to classify rough degrees of environmental impact (see Table 6.6). Thus, terms like ‘significant’ (*kyūdai-na*) and ‘a certain degree of’ (*tashō-no*) lack further definition let alone the sort of quantitative indicators that might assist project workers (JICA 1992: 31).

**Table 6.6. Four Categories of Potential Environmental Impact by project implementation**

Category	Explanation
A	Significant Impact expected
B	A certain extent of Impact expected
C	Unknown
D	No IEE/EIA required as there is hardly any environmental impact

Source: Adapted from JICA (1992: 31).

To be sure, the 1992 JICA Environmental Consideration Guideline for Socio-economic Infrastructure Project – little more than a collection of checklists, forms, and a matrix – are readily comprehensible even by non-specialists (“*senmonkade nakutomo*”), a convenience for a development plan that is produced under great time pressure (JICA 1992: 25). Indeed, the JICA guideline in this regard is akin to the JEXIM checklist discussed in Chapter 5 – and hence is subject to many of the same criticisms.<sup>24</sup>

Having briefly reviewed the general nature and principles of the JICA 1992 Guideline, we can now turn to a detailed assessment of its use in both the JICA preparatory study of 1994-1995 and the JICA master plan study of



1997. Specifically we investigate to what extent environmental consideration was incorporated here – and hence, to be later reflected in actual project formulation.

### 6.3.2. JICA's Preparatory Study 1994-1995

As the DOT's official request suggests, the SEMP was not originally an *environmental management* project – rather it was meant to produce a sustainable *tourism development* project that simultaneously promoted environmental conservation and local socio-economic improvement (Hillel, interview, 2004; JICA 1995a, 1997). With the official request in hand, JICA began a preparatory study as a prerequisite to the master plan study. The DOT also requested that the latter take into account the findings of the Commission of European Communities (CEC) funded report entitled 'Preliminary Tourism Development for Northern Palawan' (CEC 1994) in order to avoid duplication among donor projects.<sup>25</sup>

The preparatory study was completed over 1994-1995. It is of concern here mainly in three aspects: the interests of the study participants; the manner of problem identification; and the donor's dominance of agenda setting in the project.

The first aspect relates to the interests of the participants comprising the study team. For the preparatory study, a total of eight Japanese staff members were dispatched as a JICA *chōsadan* (research team), but which in reality was a multi-agency endeavour (JICA 1995a). Thus, only three JICA employees were on this team with the others (a majority) being drawn from the Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a private firm Mitsui Consultants Co. (MCC). Indeed, even the team leader was from the MOT and not from JICA as one might have expected. Here, it is important to note why the MOT in particular played an important role on the team. On the one hand, it was because the project was fundamentally an

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<sup>24</sup> Yet, as note above, the JICA guideline is certainly more detailed than the JEXIM checklist.

<sup>25</sup> The CEC report addressed concerns on mass tourism development and proposed alternative models such as community-based ecotourism (CEC 1994).



infrastructure-oriented tourism *development* project, although it had had some green elements subsequently incorporated into it. Since the MOT is responsible for tourism administration in Japan, it made sense therefore that this agency took a leading role. On the other hand, the MOT has long been working on tourism development research and promotion overseas (MOT 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996a). The MOT even created a term ‘*kankō ODA*’ (tourism ODA) (ITDIJ 1990)<sup>26</sup> to underscore how deeply it had become involved in the tourism sector as well as associated transport facilities through Japan’s international cooperation (ITDIJ 1990, 1994; see also MOT 1995).<sup>27</sup>

The participation of MCC, further, suggested that the preparatory study would be infrastructure oriented.<sup>28</sup> As MCC is a general *construction* consultant (MCC 2005), it follows that it would tend to produce a plan with more of a focus on civil works and infrastructure rather than on community-based conservation. In addition, as MCC was set up and co-financed by the parent Mitsui Group, it was likely that it would attempt to reflect the business interests of this Japanese conglomerate, notably in the automobile, construction, mining, machinery and shipbuilding sectors (Mitsui Public Relations Committee 2004).<sup>29</sup>

The second aspect of interest here is the way in which problems and solutions were defined in the preparatory study – something already hinted at in the particular make-up of the JICA research team. Above all, the team emphasised that three inter-linked problems needed to be addressed: the living conditions of the local community, the state of the local natural environment, and poorly implemented environmental regulation in the

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<sup>26</sup> This International Tourism Development Institute Japan (ITDIJ) study report was commissioned by MOT (ITDIJ 1990).

<sup>27</sup> The Japanese domestic tourism industry depends heavily on transportation facilities, especially the railway system. Japan Railway has thus been the centre of tourism campaigning by connecting remote rural Japan (Ehrentraut 1993; Kim 2002).

<sup>28</sup> MCC’s Japanese name is *Mitsui-kyōdō-kensetsu-konsarutantsu* of which translation is Mitsui Joint Construction Consultants. Thus, here again, the research team’s interest lies in infrastructural facilities including civil works.

<sup>29</sup> Mitsui Group was one of the big four *zaibatsu*, the big family-controlled banking and industrial combines of modern Japan, which then developed into top Japanese business conglomerate (called *keiretsu*) in the post WWII era. (Matsumoto 1979; Roberts 1973; Yasuoka 1982).



tourism industry in Northern Palawan (see also Arquiza 1996; Bryant 2005). The first problem in fact highlighted the linkage between poverty and environmental destruction. Northern Palawan was seen as “one of the least developed areas in the Philippines” (JICA 1995a: 1) – therefore, it is an area that lacks the means of a decent livelihood, which consequently had driven local communities into practicing environmentally destructive and illegal blast fishing for their survival (Luyt 1995; JICA 1996a, 1996b, 1999a, 1999b, 2002a; Rodrigo 1998). The proposed solution was development that promoted environmental conservation at the same time as it created employment and/or business opportunities for local people. Japanese aid agencies and consulting companies used this particular discourse throughout the SEMP (see Luyt 1995). Accordingly, poor local communities were the core ‘problem’ in need of education, training and employment to correct their ‘inadequate’ environmental awareness and behaviours (Bryant 2002; Lawrence 2002; Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004).

The next problem noted in the preliminary study was that Northern Palawan still possessed valuable tourism ‘assets’ such as rich coral reefs and marine life that were nonetheless subject to growing threat. There was a seeming paradox here, though. Thus, the report noted that the main reason for the relatively intact condition of the local natural environment was that the area had not hitherto been easily accessible due to the poor transport system (see CEC 1994). The logical conclusion was thus that better transport facilities would inevitably degrade the ‘less spoilt’ condition of the environment. And yet, the study recommended building *more* infrastructure such as airports, roads, and ports to create *easier* access to the area, thereby contradicting its own findings.

The final problem set out in the preparatory study concerned poorly managed environmental regulations as well as dubious use of the idea of ‘ecotourism’ in Northern Palawan. Indeed, large-scale development in the area was even given the ecotourism label (CEC 1994; JICA 1995; see also Libosada Jr. 1998). Further, this was not counting the many small and

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medium sized resorts already in operation, many having been built without proper regulation and guidelines (Direct observation in Coron and El Nido May 2004; see also Coruña, interview, 2004; Rabe, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004).

The third aspect of interest to arise from the preparatory study was the way in which it highlighted the donor's dominance in setting the agenda for the master study, notably as manifested in the minutes of a meeting on implementing arrangements (I/A) contained in an appendix of that study. These minutes trace the negotiation between the JICA research team and the DOT on what would be the priority issues (JICA 1995). The I/A set the aim of the preparatory study as being to devise a plan to achieve three goals: environmental 'protection'; community benefits; and generating Philippine national income and foreign exchange earnings. Among the three, top priority was placed on environmental protection, and development plans were thus to be decided within the framework of this key concern (JICA 1995a: 147).<sup>30</sup> Nonetheless, tourism development became the favoured solution and was adopted as a means to create local employment, boost the local economy, and generate local government revenue.

Yet, the I/A also showed a revealing difference in how to address environmental and social issues between the Japanese and Philippine agencies. There was, firstly, some skirmishing over how to define 'environment' in operational terms. Thus, for the purpose of the study, the JICA team confined the term environment to "attributes of environment that are perceived as tourist attractions not the environment as a whole (*kankō-shigen to nariuru kankyō*) ... also environmental resources that may be

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<sup>30</sup> Throughout the report, the words environmental protection (*kankyō-hogo*) and environmental conservation (*kankyō-hozen*) are interchangeably used although they have different meanings in Japanese. Therefore, the researcher translating the report cannot avoid the dilemma of mixing them too. However, interestingly, it is the same case with those documents drafted in English by the Philippine government, such as the minutes of the meeting on I/A (JICA 1995a: 147, 152). They are interchangeably used. This is highly problematic in two ways. First, it will cause confusion and may create dilemmas in implementing an environmental project like SEMP that also has development elements, not having clear understanding of the difference between conservation and protection. Second, it shows the poor performance of the JICA, an agency known as with pool of leading development experts in Japan. In the mid 1990s, JICA thus still did not clarify the use of



affected by the tourism development” (JICA 1995a: 10, 153). This definition was agreed to by the DOT and subsequently determined not only the coverage area of the project but also its time span. Yet, due to subsequent time and budgetary restrictions, the JICA team broke this agreement by excluding areas such as Tubbataha Reefs and Cuyo Islands that the DOT wished to see included, as these areas would be potentially affected by tourism development.<sup>31</sup> However, for its part, the DOT wanted to complete the master plan as speedily as possible in order to quickly gain benefit from the project. Thus, it requested that the time devoted to the study be less than 17 months. In this light, the DOT reluctantly agreed to JICA’s exclusion of the two areas only because it was seen as a way to accelerate the process. However, while the exclusion remained in force, the DOT’s request for a shortened study period was turned down by the JICA team because the latter believed that the study needed “*at least 17 months*” (JICA 1995a: 11; emphasis added).

There was, seemingly, a disagreement also revealed in the I/A over the role of NGOs in the project’s steering and technical committee as well as the status of participation by local communities. As the SEP Act emphasises the social acceptability of development projects, the DOT strongly requested the ‘inclusion’ (*torikomi*) of NGOs, but the JICA team disagreed, such that the DOT had to settle instead for a weaker ‘dialogue’ (*taiwa*) process. Indeed, JICA carefully circumscribed such dialogue: “communication with NGOs is only possible through an *informal* route” (JICA 1995a: 11, emphasis added). The responsibility of managing ‘dialogue’ with NGOs meanwhile would lie with the DOT as the Japanese government was bound to *assist only when* there is a request from its Philippine counterpart. On local community participation, meanwhile, JICA suggested “*interaction (kōryū)* with communities” rather than more extensive involvement or participation – reasoning that the local community was not an “official development plan entity” (JICA 1995a: 147).

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the two terms. This problem is also reflected in power dynamics between the Japanese ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Iiyama 2004).

<sup>31</sup> Tubbataha Reefs and Cuyo Islands are popular tourist destinations for daytrips. Therefore, an increase in tourist numbers to the project sites will significantly affect those two places.



Such uneasiness towards local participation is not, in fact, an unfamiliar situation in Japan as many researchers and government officials are reluctant to get involved in politically sensitive issues. For example, during the preparation of Japan's ill-fated EIA bill in the late 1970s,<sup>32</sup> the term '(active) participation' (*sanka*) in the original draft was changed to '(passive) involvement' (*kanyo*) (Isobe et al. cited in Barrett and Therivel 1991: 158). This disposition was also shown in practice. Japanese citizens were thus not allowed to directly participate in the decision-making process, as that process was confined to local authorities, relevant government agencies, and the environmental agency (Mason 1999; Hirata 2002; Revell 2003).

In the end, JICA's unwillingness to sanction active local community involvement prevailed over the DOT's wishes. As such, the preparatory study was carried out based on an informal route of interaction with local communities as well as NGOs. This project was thus certainly based on the recipient's official request. However, as this discussion of the preparatory study stage reveals, the proposed project was clearly shaped by Japanese perceptions and interests rather than those of the Philippine partners. From the wider viewpoint of this thesis, moreover, those Japanese perceptions and interests were not exactly consonant with an expansive sense of 'greening' – for instance, a sense that prioritises environmental conservation and local participation. A similarly ambiguous process can be seen with the master plan study which was undertaken based on the preparatory study.

### **6.3.3. JICA's 1997 Master Plan Study**

The Master Plan Study (MPS) was conducted between 1995 and 1997 resulting in the 1997 final report (JICA 1997).<sup>33</sup> Ultimately, this report

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<sup>32</sup> Before the establishment of EIA law in 1997, there had been prolonged deliberations. However, in 1984, after eight years of negotiations and revisions, the Environmental Agency gave up on the introduction of EIA law. Instead, the Cabinet approved a non-legally enforceable decision that included the bill's main concerns (Barrett and Therivel 1991; see also Chapter 4).

<sup>33</sup> Unlike the preparatory study of which a full report (Japanese) was publicly available, for this master plan study, there was only an executive summary (Japanese) publicly available during the period of this research investigation. Therefore, here, discussion of master plan study report refers to the summary only.



aimed to find a way to transform the existing tourism industry into one that could be described as sustainable tourism and, as such, recommended a detailed development plan integrating concepts of environment (as understood by JICA and as noted above) and land use planning to that main end (JICA 1997). Below we discuss three key elements of the MPS – information/data sources, the sustainable tourism development master plan, and sustainable tourism development guidelines – which are most relevant to our exploration of the environmental consideration process. But, first, we need to discuss the way in which the nature of project-oriented problems were defined there, as the contents of MPS as well as the actual development plan were based on this process of definition.

**Figure 6.7. Northern Palawan Tourist Leaflet**



Source: Ten Knots Development Corporation (2002)



Source: El Nido Tourism (2004)

The major problem identified was that of environmental degradation and its influence on local tourism. The MPS thus found the level of environmental degradation in Northern Palawan to be much more serious than had ever been assumed in the preparatory study (JICA 1997). As a result, the MPS emphasised the great importance of establishing an environmental management plan in order to achieve sustainable tourism development. This



environment-tourism linkage was already well established in the business world. Thus, environmental conservation was principally used to sustain tourism itself often by promoting the idea of a rich natural environment (see Figure 6.7). This link was also there already in the preparatory study insofar as the term environment was understood as “attributes of environment that are perceived as tourist attractions not the environment as a whole (*kankō-shigen to nariuru kankyō*)” (JICA 1995a: 10, 153).

Yet, environmental degradation was mainly put down to inappropriate socio-economic practices by local people including population increase, environmentally destructive activities (such as blast fishing), and infrastructure development without appropriate environmental consideration and caused by inadequate institutional capacity (JICA 1997: ii; see also Aquiza 1996). Therefore, community-based sustainable tourism development was proposed as the best solution here because it would help create local employment and boost local business even as it would promote environmental conservation in order to maintain tourism ‘assets’ needed for diving, and dolphin/whale watching.

More controversially, the MPS report also identified a problem of *too little* local infrastructure. Thus, there was a need for more infrastructure development since “a big problem in tourism development in Northern Palawan...[is that] all kinds of infrastructure are absolutely lack[ing] ..., in particular, transport infrastructure needs serious improvement” (JICA 1997: vi). The report thus sought to marry diverse and seemingly contradictory elements (including environmental conservation, and tourism infrastructure work) in one overall package. This possible tension can also be seen in the key elements of the MPS itself, to the analysis of which we now turn.

The first key element of the MPS report concerns the data/information sources as well as the methodology used in the study. Some of the data used was of dubious utility to any serious effort at environmental consideration. Thus, because “environmental data and information on Northern Palawan is extremely limited”, the JICA team used a map based on aerial photographs from the 1940s and 1950s to establish a foundation for the development



study and plan (JICA 1997: 3). Yet, this map is clearly outdated. As Palawan's forests have rapidly dwindled since the 1950s, the landscape has changed significantly, thereby calling into question the utility of its use in the master plan.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, resort here to outdated data clearly did not represent the kind of 'technical assistance' that the Philippine government had requested in calling for this study (JICA 1995a, 1997).

The MPS incorporated a socio-economic survey in its report that also reveals interesting issues of relevance to our analysis of Japanese ODA 'greening'. That survey consisted of two activities: a household interview survey and a more informal discussion with selected villagers.<sup>35</sup> Of particular interest here are the "serious problems raised by local communities" (JICA 1997: 6; see Table 6.7).

**Table 6.7. Problems Raised by Local Communities in JICA's Household Survey**

Services	Busuwanga	Coron	El Nido	Total
Employment opportunity	56	73	64	193
Marine resource destruction	16	71	25	112
Deforestation	1	58	5	64
Lack of agricultural facilities	9	44	10	63
Lack of medical facilities	25	47	45	117
Lack of education facilities	4	37	3	44
Waste management	1	30	22	53
Lack of electricity	26	31	34	91
Lack of road	19	35	44	98
Lack of transport facilities	5	29	18	52
Water shortage	25	14	26	65
Lack of administrative information	5	36	12	53
Security	2	11	7	20
Squatters	0	22	3	25
Migrants issues	1	33	1	35
Political leadership	2	7	9	18

Note. Numbers show the numbers of times that households raised an issue

Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 6)

<sup>34</sup> The same use of inappropriate and outdated data occurred in the preparatory study too which used data (such as rainfall) collected between 1965 and 1981 (JICA 1995a: 64).

<sup>35</sup> However, the executive summary does not explicitly state whether the survey was open-ended or closed and whether they covered all households in each community. The former matters because a closed interview often involves fixed choice questions that limit an



Thus, Table 6.7 reports JICA's own data based on a household survey conducted in three communities between 1996 and 1997. The surveys asked local households to list all of the problems they faced. Table 6.7 thus addresses local complaints and issues but has a wider import. Indeed, there is a resonance here with my own field interviews in these communities.<sup>36</sup>

A couple of things stand out here. Thus, while there are differences between the three areas, local priority issues include employment, roads, medical facilities, as well as water supply and sewage systems – all of which tend to have an infrastructure component. True, environmental issues such as marine resource destruction and deforestation were also highly ranked. Nonetheless, the issues raised by the local communities are dominated by infrastructure items. Indeed, these issues were also raised in my own interviews with local officials and residents of El Nido, Busuwanga and Coron during field research there in May 2004 (Corral, interview, 2004; Densula, interview, 2004; Distal, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004; Sariego, interview, 2004). Among others, transport infrastructure (road, airport) and medical facilities were the most frequently raised issues due to their urgent nature. As one interviewee typically put it, “to help the tourism [industry in El Nido], we need a proper local airport, ... and need to improve access here by air ” (Corral, interview, 2004; see also Densula, interview, 2004; Rocés\*, interview, 2004). This view reflected perceived local inequalities. In El Nido, for example, the existing airport was owned by a private firm El Nido Resort, and hence was only built for the transportation of its own customers and not for non-El Nido Resort users. This situation mattered enormously for the local El Nido tourism operators as tourists to the area are mostly backpackers and other ‘non-mass’ tourists (Rocés\*, interview, 2004)<sup>37</sup>. Health worries were also prevalent. This was

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interviewee's response and the latter matters as it raises the issue of representation (Bryman 2004). Consequently the data presented below must be interpreted cautiously.

<sup>36</sup> Data from the three locations noted in Table 6.7 are taken from the original source (JICA 1997: 6) as they are also the three case study locations for my own research presented in this chapter.

<sup>37</sup> There was much discussion in the local community of El Nido when I was there regarding the tension between El Nido Resort and SEA Air (the commercial airline flying to El Nido). It was said that the SEA Air's infrequent schedule was due to El Nido Resort's disapproval of its flights. The Resort is a powerful local business in El Nido. Its staff occupy a majority of the tourism development and planning related bodies, such as the



because the lack of a local hospital had caused serious trouble in the past when accidents required intensive and urgent medical care (Acosta, interview, 2004; Densula, interview, 2004; Laririt, interview, 2004).<sup>38</sup> Most of these issues call for infrastructure development as a solution. For her part, the Vice Mayor of El Nido Leonor Corral declared her wish to see no more “surveys, studies” but “action” and “development” – clearly understood to mean new infrastructure (Corral, interview, 2004; see also Sariego, interview, 2004).

The JICA survey reported in Table 6.8 also revealed the strong desire of local people for economic development. Indeed, that desire was often manifested in environmental terms. Thus, in spite of being classified as environmental issues, both marine *resource* destruction and deforestation are also deeply linked to two main local economic activities, fishing and agriculture. Rapid depletion of the marine resource has thus been a huge blow to local fishing communities, as Palawan accounted for more than 37% of total commercial fish output in the Philippines in 1991 (CEC 1994: 8). Similarly, soil erosion was seen to be linked to deforestation in coastal areas, resulting in silt flowing down rivers and into the sea, thereby damaging coral reefs and marine resources (Broad with Cavanagh 1993; JBIC 2002a; Lawrence 2002). Thus, environmental issues in the JICA survey were privileged locally notably because of the strong environmental basis of local livelihoods. Again, my own research in the area tended to confirm this point. Thus, as one villager observed “there have been many buildings built, especially near the foot of the mountain that has a good view, without thinking about environment [for example cutting trees and], ... [not building appropriate] sewage [system, therefore,] ... dirty water with lots of soils goes straight into the sea” (Roces\*, interview, 2004; see also Pablico, interview, 2004; Laririt, interview, 2004). As far as can be told

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local tourism council. The owner of the Resort is the president of the Palawan tourism council (Roces\*, interview, 2004, Laririt, interview, 2004).

<sup>38</sup> The nearest hospital is in Taytay – 67 km from El Nido town taking 2 hours by car. El Nido has one Rural Health Unit (1 doctor and 1 dentist) and a private clinic. Therefore, luxury private resorts like El Nido Resorts have arranged medical services with Lifeline Arrows for emergency cases including helicopter air lift service while there is a nurse on duty and a doctor is on call for immediate treatment at the resorts (Laririt, interview, 2004; Ayson 2006; Lifeline Arrows Online).



from the JICA survey, therefore, the local response provided relevant and potentially even legitimate basis on which JICA could advance its own particular agenda of promoting combined conservation and development goals. Thus, environment was perceived, even by the local communities themselves, as being a matter for infrastructure and economic development in order to safeguard livelihood. The collected data, as suggested by the household survey result, fit well therefore with JICA's own interpretation of environmental consideration.

And yet, other information in the MPS report pointed to clear inadequacies in local government structures that encompassed environmental issues. Indeed, the environmental problems just noted were seen to be partly driven by existing environmental (mis)management in Palawan. Thus, "the current environmental management system totally lacks human resources, financial resources, and technological resources (for example, planning, implementation and regulation), and therefore, PCSD particularly needs to strengthen its environmental management system" (JICA 1997: 22). It is often said that the Philippines has an international reputation for high quality legislation inadequately implemented (Serrano 1994; Arquiza 1996; Lawrence 2002). Thus, it is not surprising to find problems highlighted here in terms of the implementation of existing Philippine environmental management programmes like ECAN Zoning and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in Palawan.

In the case of ECAN Zoning, for example, and in spite of its mandatory nature, it had been advanced very little at the time of the JICA study – that is, 5 years after the SEP Act had originally been passed (JICA 1997: iii). Delay was mostly put down to difficulties in the implementation process such as conflict between government agencies and local community organisations on the ECAN board<sup>39</sup> as well as official corruption (Arquiza 1996; Lawrence 2002; Miclat, interview, 2004). Since ECAN Zoning work

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<sup>39</sup> PCSD had to organise ECAN boards in every town. The ECAN board consists of both government agencies and community organisations whose interests often conflict with each other over such issues as the demarcation of core zones and buffer zones (Corral, interview, 2004; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Reyes, interview, 2004). As



had thus not been carried out properly, the JICA team produced its own zoning data in order to be in a position to consider the environmental implications of the master plan as it was required to do. This step, in and of itself, suggested a proactive Japanese role in as much as it revealed a willingness to make some extra effort to facilitate greening in the proposed case project area.

Based on the terrestrial criteria of ECAN Zoning provided in the 1992 SEP Act (see Table 6.8), the MPS thus classified most of Northern Palawan as core or buffer zones. It is important to be clear here about what zoning involved and, accordingly, Table 6.8 sets out zoning area specifications.

**Table 6.8. Terrestrial Components of ECAN Zoning**

Core zone or Area of maximum protection	Fully and strictly protected and maintained area that is free of human disruption: all types of natural forest, areas above 1,000 meters elevation, peaks of mountains or other areas with very steep gradients, and endangered habitats and habitats of endangered and rare species. Exceptions may be granted to traditional uses of tribal communities of these areas for minimal and soft impact gathering of forest species for ceremonial and medicinal purposes	
Buffer zone	Restricted use area	Generally surrounds the core zone and provides a protective barrier. Limited and non-consumption activities may be allowed in this area.
	Controlled use area	Encircles and provides the outer barrier to the core and restricted use area. Controlled forest extraction, like the collecting of minor forest products, and strictly controlled logging and mining may be allowed.
	Traditional use area	Edges of intact forests where traditional land use is already stabilized or is being stabilized. Management and control shall be carried out with the other supporting programs of the SEP.
Multiple/Manipulative Use Area	This is the area where the landscape has been modified for different forms of land use such as intensive timber extraction, grazing and pastures, agriculture and infrastructure development. Control and management shall be strictly integrated with the other supporting programs of the SEP and other similar programs of the Government.	

Source: Section 8-10 of SEP Act (GOP 1992b)

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such, coordination has been hard in most cases (Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004).




Thus, there are core and buffer zones where the protection of the environment is privileged over development. In core zones, no development access is permitted at all except for the purpose of research or environmental management, while buffer zones permit selective development under strict conditions. In practice, there were very few areas where unregulated development activities would be allowed in Northern Palawan according to the MPS zoning. This MPS classification thus underscored that a tourism master plan involving infrastructure development would need to take socio-environmental considerations very seriously indeed if it were to respect the requirements of ECAN Zoning (JICA 1997).

This observation in the report was all the more acute given the history of poor past environmental practices. The MPS thus diagnosed that much environmental degradation was due to poorly managed infrastructure development (especially road projects) since inadequate EIAs did not prevent soil erosion, siltation and landslides from occurring in these areas (JICA 1997: 21). Further, JICA observed that EIA reports were sometimes either not submitted or poorly done even when submitted. Further, approved projects were not appropriately monitored thereafter as required in their EIA reports (JICA 1997: 21). Thus, JICA was fully aware of the problems of poor capacity of both consulting companies and Philippine agencies in the EIA process, which one would expect should then have been addressed fully at the later stage of project formulation (see below).

The second key element of the MPS of interest to the concerns of this thesis comprised the sustainable tourism development master plan. Here, tourism is identified as an alternative industry for local communities, thereby enhancing both socio-economic development and “environmental protection (*kankyō hogo*)” (JICA 1997: 30). The MPS identified in this regard a vicious circle that had harmed both local livelihoods and the environment (see Figure 6.8).



**Figure 6.8. Vicious Circle in Environmental Destruction**

Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 30)

The circle begins with illegal activities (fishing and logging) that lead to environmental destruction. Local livelihoods based on the fishery and agriculture are thereby also heavily damaged. Worsening conditions further drive local communities to rely on illegal activities for survival, producing a desperate ‘eco-cide’ of the poor (Blakie 1985). In Palawan, population increase due to the arrival of new settlers (mainly poor folk from the Visayas, Mindanao) has only amplified the problem (JICA 1997; Pablico, interview, 2004; Sariego, interview, 2004; Palomar, interview, 2005).<sup>40</sup> The newcomers, who are also desperately poor, also fell trees and deplete fisheries to survive (Pablico, interview, 2004; Palomar, interview, 2005; Direct observation in Coron May 2004).<sup>41</sup>

The JICA report thus proposed tourism as an alternative industry in the sustainable tourism development plan that would stop this vicious circle because ecotourism perceives the environment as resource to be protected and not simply consumed (JICA 1997: 30). To implement this proposal, however, the MPS stressed the need for better environmental administration by proposing project tasks such as strengthening institutional capacity, more rigorous guidelines for environmental conservation, and securing adequate financial resources for good governance. As discussed in Chapter 5, environmental matters certainly involve political, institutional, and technical

<sup>40</sup> In 1990, those newcomers already accounted for 60% of the total Palawan population (JICA 1997: 19).

<sup>41</sup> During my visit to Coron and Busuwanga, there were a few areas that were already totally burnt out. In those areas, a group of new settlers (about 6-10 individuals) was clearing low land forests and building houses (Direct observation in Coron 15 May 2004).



issues concerning the recipient government. With poor local institutional capacity, successful aid delivery is rarely attainable since it depends ultimately on the Philippine governance mechanism. In order to realise these goals, therefore, the MPS advocated the introduction of a system of environmental fees to local governments that would ease the financial burden for conservation and rehabilitation activities by increasing their revenue. User fees to be obtained from tourists were a key component here.

Overall, the sustainable tourism master plan proposed an initial 10-year budget of US\$350 million for such activities as regional environmental management, policing illegal fishing, conservation activities and soil erosion rehabilitation (JICA 1997: 33). However, this initial estimate was not reflected in the actual SEMP budget in as much as the actual loan amount there was US\$ 17 million – or only 5% of what the original figure had been recommended (Hillel, interview, 2004).<sup>42</sup> The SEMP team leader told me in interview that this was partly because of the Asian financial crisis that broke out in 1997. Economic turbulence caused by the crisis diminished Japanese investors' interests in Northern Palawan tourism development at a time of great regional uncertainty (Hillel 2004; see also JICA 1999a, 1999b; JBIC 2003b, 2003c). Such corporate disinterest ultimately led, in turn, to a project budget cut as Japanese ODA is in general greatly influenced by private sectors interests (see Chapter 4).

Interestingly, the sustainable tourism development master plan stressed the importance of non-official stakeholder involvement in sustainable tourism development, which was in sharp contrast to the JICA position on this matter that was revealed during the implementing arrangement meeting for the preparatory study (see above). This apparent about-turn was particularly evident in terms of the local community's role in environmental monitoring (see Figure 6.9). Although fully-fledged local community involvement in project planning had been explicitly denied earlier due to the 'non-official development plan entity' status of this local actor (JICA 1995: 147), for the

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<sup>42</sup> During the interview, Oliver Hillel, the SEMP tourism component leader, expressed dissatisfaction with the budget for the SEMP as there was a huge gap between the initial



actual project implementation, the master plan specified that the local community be designated as a main regulating agency for tourism development maintenance and environmental monitoring (JICA 1997).

At the same time, however, private tourist firms also assumed some aspects of Local Government Unit (LGU) environmental administration in the master plan – indicating a more general opening out to non-official groups in that plan (JICA 1997). This inclusion of the private sector was not as unnatural as it might initially seem. It is, in fact, a rational response for tourist resorts to take conservation issues seriously as their business entirely depends on a rich natural environment to attract the tourists. As they are in the practice of selling a ‘beautiful environment’ (see Figure 6.5 and 6.7), conservation is for them a routine business maintenance matter. For that reason, tourist resorts could not simply expect LGUs to take action, given the institutional and financial weakness of the latter (Distal, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Laririt, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004).<sup>43</sup>

Local community capacity building, meanwhile, was also anticipated in the plan as a necessary step forward for tourism development as an alternative livelihood. Yet, involving local communities in the project in this way required that they be provided with training and education. Of interest here, though, is the fact that, although the MPS repeatedly emphasised the importance of the environment (its conservation and management), it was curiously silent on the provision of assistance – to local communities so that they might be able to promote local conservation activities. Thus, for example, Table 6.9 shows that the estimated number of community personnel to be trained was missing even though all other sectors were clearly specified. The unavailability of complete data on environment-related community training was not explained in the report.

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budget estimation in the MPS and the actual JBIC loan that was the basis of the actual budget.

<sup>43</sup> For example, El Nido Resort has invested in coastal policing but also on researching the surrounding coastal areas in collaboration with the University of the Philippines (Laririt, interview, 2004; see also The Coral Reef Alliance 2005). UP marine biologists were invited to do research on such issues as damage caused by starfish to the local reefs.



Figure 6.9. Tourism Development and Management System

	DOT	PCSD	Provincial government	Local government		Local community	PTA	Private sector	NGO
				Municipal	Barangay				
Tourism policy	●	○	○	○	□	□			□
TD Planning	○	○	●	●	■	■		□	■
TD Implementation									
- infrastructure	●		●				■	○	
- land acquisition	○			●	○	○	■		
- tourism facilities				○			■	■	
TD maintenance/management				○	○	●		●	□
Tourism promotion	●		●	○	○			■	□
Capacity building	●		●	●		○		■	■
Environmental monitoring			●	●	●	●		■	■

Note: ● : Main regulating agency, ○ : Secondary regulating agency, ■ : Main involvement field, □ : Secondary involvement field  
 TD- Tourism Development, DOT – Department of Tourism, PCSD – Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, PTA – Palawan Tourism Authority  
 Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 45)



Although (as aforementioned) the JICA data must be cautiously interpreted, this anomalous lack of data in Table 6.9 raises some concerns. Thus, while a one million Philippine Peso budget for the training cost in the environment sector was provided, this figure is of limited utility in reality without a clear sense of projected demand. As any budget estimate in the JICA system is generally based on how and what the budget would be used for – in this case, the total number of trainees in environment related employment – the absence of information on the latter suggests either indifference to this ‘lost’ item on the list or even a lack of preparation in this area. Indeed, for an agency firmly committed to ‘greening’, such an omission of details is not to be expected.

**Table 6.9. Estimated Needs in Training/Education**

Sector	Total projected demands (persons)	Total estimated training cost per year (million Philippine Peso)	Education facilities
Middle manager/specialist	2,500	2	Existing universities/ improving vocational school
Management/ hospitality service	2,500	2	Vocational training
Food and restaurant	3,000	1.5 – 2	Vocational training
Housekeeping	650	1	On the job training
Gardening	2,000	0.5	Vocational training
Maintenance	900	1 – 1.5	Vocational training
Environment	-	1	Vocational training

Source: Adapted from JICA (1997: 47)

Such inattention to detail may thus be indicative of a wider sense of ‘business as usual’ in JICA operations. Take for instance the composition of the JICA team that conducted the Master Plan Study. Unlike the preparatory study, there was no government official involved as the MPS was commissioned to consulting companies (JICA 1996a). Hence, it was four Japanese companies who carried out the MPS: Almec Corporation, Metocean Environment Inc., Pacific Consultant International and International Tourism Development Institute Japan (JICA 1996a). Although the specific role of each firm in the team was not stated in the summary of MPS, the general nature of each company’s business activity is certainly



revealing here – after all, presumably they were expected to lend their expertise to the JICA deliberations. At least three of the participants were thus heavily involved in the development industry. It is interesting in particular to note Almec's participation as it is a firm that is mostly concerned with urban/regional planning including transport planning (Almec 2005). It can be plausibly assumed therefore that Almec was selected for the team because JICA wanted to include a transport system infrastructure component in the first place – and therefore, needed a company with the relevant experience and technology involved. This composition of the team thus explains why the sustainable tourism development master plan proposed more infrastructure development activities than conservation activities and even perhaps why consideration of environmental issues was uneven in general in the MPS.

That said, the MPS *did* address the issue of environmental guidelines, as one of the main professed aims of the MPS was to establish environmental guidelines for tourism development and related activities in environmental management areas (see below). This specific concern was later developed into one of the major tasks of the sustainable tourism development component of the SEMP (SEMP Tourism Component 2003). It was indeed clear that this element (i.e. of the guidelines) needed to be properly conceived and implemented. Because development activities in small designated islands in Northern Palawan were in principle banned according to the DENR Proclamation No. 219 (CEC 1994), it was particularly important to produce environmental guidelines for the area's tourism development which was mostly focused on small island beachfronts (JICA 1997; see also NEDA 2004). Small islands have limited environmental 'carrying capacity' and therefore cannot accommodate excessive amounts of tourists (CEC 1994; France 1997; Honey 1999; Duffy 2002). Although the Northern Palawan resort business is still relatively small scale, it is nonetheless scattered across a wide area of 'isolated' small island beaches.<sup>44</sup> In order to produce tailor-made sustainable tourism development for the

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<sup>44</sup> For example, one of the popular destinations is El Nido Resort which has only 15 cottages (Ten Knots Development Corporation 2002; Laririt, interview, 2004; Direct observation in El Nido May 2004).



area, the MPS thus needed to take the area's limited carrying capacity seriously. Indeed, it identified such issues as waste management (including sewage) as a top priority – since waste often causes serious problems for both the local community and the tourism industry – to be incorporated into a future environmental guideline (see ADB 2004; Chanco 2005; Chen Ng 2003).<sup>45</sup>

This section has considered the JICA development study (both the preparatory study and the Master Plan Study) to assess the provision for greening in the initial environmental consideration phase of SEMP – our case study of *kankyō-enjyo* or environmental aid. There was a complex and at times ambiguous process at play here. Yet, environmental consideration in this project also involved a second Japanese aid agency (OECF) whose own procedures on greening are next assessed. As we consider the verification phase of the project environmental deliberation.

#### **6.4. Verifying the *Kankyō-hairyō*: OECF 1999 SAPROF and Appraisal**

The Japanese government provided two grants at the stage of project preparation for the SEMP: the JICA development study discussed above and the OECF's SAPROF considered here. Although it is common to have two aid agencies involved given the complexities of both the project cycle and the fragmented Japanese aid system (see Chapter 4), it was a bit unusual to see the OECF involved in a grant-based activity since it is a Yen loan implementing agency only. However, SAPROF was an additional procedure carried out in order to elaborate a “more realistic and integrated development schedule” for the 1997 JICA master plan (SEMP Tourism Component 2003: 3). This extra procedure was again requested by the Philippine government to satisfy concerns about possible weaknesses in the strategic delivery of the SEMP before project (environmental) appraisal (see

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<sup>45</sup> Carrying capacity is a significant matter in tourism development. Boracay Island (one of the most popular destinations in the Philippines) has exceeded its carrying capacity thresholds resulting in various problems including water quality, waste overflows and related health hazards like malaria (Evangelista 2005; Trousdale 1997).



below; JBIC 1999b; Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004).<sup>46</sup> Here too, then, given our focus on greening, there is an opportunity to assess procedures and practices possibly suggestive of a ‘green’ ODA focus via SAPROF and appraisal.

#### **6.4.1. Implementing SAPROF**

OECF thus dispatched a SAPROF team in August 1999 led by the Japanese consulting company Pacific Consultants International (PCI) in order to assist the Philippine DOT in elaborating a viable ODA project. SAPROF therefore involved re-formulating the SEMP by reviewing and supplementing the JICA 1997 master plan study (Anda, interview, 2004; JBIC 1999b, 2003c).

The SAPROF prioritised five environmental strategies that were later condensed into three project components that are discussed below (JBIC 1999b: 2) As Table 6.10 suggests, these strategies asserted the urgency of environmental protection as well as the need to minimise the local environmental impact of tourism in as much as they described Palawan’s natural environment as “invaluable...resources”, “tourism assets”, and a “lifeline of ... economy” (JBIC 1999b: 2). Interestingly, the SAPROF report appeared in places to endorse a project thrust that was somewhat different from JICA’s infrastructure oriented development – thus stressing in parts a vision of a small-scale, local economy driven, sustainable tourism (JICA 1997; see also Distal, interview, 2004\*; Pablico, interview, 2004; Otadoy, interview, 2004).

Overall, though, the SAPROF report remained faithful to the basic thrust of the JICA master plan study. For example, the former placed priority on road rehabilitation as in the latter.

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<sup>46</sup> The SAPROF report was completed and published in December 1999. As the merger of OECF and JEXIM took place and JBIC was established in October 1999, the second phase of the SAPROF activity was carried out by JBIC and the report was published under the name of JBIC (JBIC 1999b).



**Table 6.10. Five Priority Strategies for SEMP**

No.1	Invaluable environmental resources endowed with the Northern Palawan are identical to attractive tourism assets, so the co-existence of both is a lifeline of the Palawan economy
No.2	A proper velocity and carrying capacity of the potential area development should be sought to ensure a balanced development mechanism while minimizing the environmental deterioration
No.3	Urgent actions should be placed to stop on-going environmental deterioration in both terrestrial and marine resource areas: particularly serious soil erosion problems due to poor engineering and maintenance works of existing road close to the coastal areas.
No.4	The institutional framework being particularly applied for Palawan (ECAN system) should be functionally operationalised to ensure the environmental management and control illegal activities at the local level – capacity building program for all the stakeholders to promote their awareness and understanding of the ECAN system
No.5	Community-involvement and local economy-driven tourism should be encouraged to create a sustainable development basis – introduction of the resource-user charge from tourists which will be utilized for local activities for sustainable environmental conservation as well as livelihood programs related to resource management.

Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999: 3)

**Table 6.11. Proposed Project Components by SAPROF**

Major Category	Project Component	Estimated Project Cost
Environmental Management System Development (Strategy No.4)	Component 1: Facilitation of Establishment of ECAN Zoning System	342.0 (16.4%)
Environmental Protection (Strategy No.3)	Component 2: Soil Erosion Protection Project along the existing road sections of Roxas – Taytay (74.7 km)/ Taytay – El Nido (61.1 km)/ St. Nino – Busuanga – Buluang (45.4 km)	1,030.7 (49.5%)
Environmental cum Social Improvement (Strategy No.2)	Component 3: Municipal Solid Waste Management Systems (Sanitary Landfill Sites Development) in El Nido (6 ha)/ Busuanga (3 ha)	117.2 (5.6%)
Environmental Resource Restoration with Livelihood (Strategy No.5)	Component 4: Environmental Reforestation Programs	458.7 (22%)
Project Management (Strategy No.1)	Component 5: Overall Project Implementation Management	135.4 (6.5%)
Total		2,084.0 (100%)

Note: In millions of Philippine Pesos (in 1999 prices) as well as the share of total costs

Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999: 6)



Table 6.11 is suggestive in this regard. Thus, the estimated budget for civil works accounted for about 55% (road rehabilitation and sanitary landfill sites development), which left a budget for pure conservation-related activities of less than 40% (ECAN Zoning and reforestation). Problems with this perceived imbalance were also raised by many local NGO staff who were already critical about the JICA's strong infrastructure development emphasis (see below).

The SAPROF report represented a delicate balancing act by the OECF given the circumstances of its creation. Thus, it was initially arranged through informal dialogue between Conservation International Japan and the OECF held in Tokyo in 1997 – itself, an unusual practice (JBIC 2000c, 2002a, 2004h; Fukuoka 2003; Anda 2004). Due to its infrastructure orientation and the perceived lack of adequate local community consultation, the 1997 JICA master plan was facing much resistance from local NGOs and community organisations (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). However, opposition was not uniform here. Thus, for instance, the international environmental NGO Conservation International (CI) Palawan was judged to have a “realistic view”<sup>47</sup> in donor circles because it recognised that a huge wave of development would be coming to Palawan in the near future whatever local groups wanted (Fukuoka, interview, 2004; see also Anda, interview, 2004).<sup>48</sup> Thus, instead of simply opposing development, CI decided to propose that the Palawan Governor adopt the JICA Master Plan on condition that three aspects were strengthened: environmental consideration, local participation and environmentally sustainable income generation. With these conditions in mind, CI approached the OECF informally with its idea – and ultimately succeeded in bringing the OECF on board through SAPROF.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> CI's moderate approach to donors is further discussed below.

<sup>48</sup> This is indeed a very hotly contested view because other organisations like PAFID and ESSC resisted this view (Zingapan and De Vera 1999; Bryant 2002; Miclat, interview, 2004).

<sup>49</sup> CI Palawan contacted its Japan Office and channelled its concerns there as it was the best way to open dialogue with the Japanese aid agency OECF through the Japan office (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004). OECF was approached as it made the final funding decision and drew up a loan agreement based on the JICA Master Plan. CI Japan office staff met with OECF staff in Tokyo to explain the perceived shortcomings of the Master Plan and relay concerns and propose improvements. Ms. Fukuoka, who was in



Such NGO participation in the early stage of project formation is very rare in Japanese aid practice. However, it can be explained notably in terms of CI's character as a US based international environmental NGO. On the one hand, the CI's global organisational base made it easier for CI Palawan to approach the OECF through its Japan office (Conservation International 2002, 2005).<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, CI is a politically acceptable NGO for the Japanese aid bureaucrats due to its internationally renowned scientific and policy status as well as its *moderate* political tactics.<sup>51</sup> Most international NGOs in Japan, for instance, are far more radical – and indeed are allied with Japanese left-wing activists (Hirata 2002). As noted, Friends of the Earth Japan has thus been campaigning fiercely against Japanese aid projects causing socio-environmental 'harm' in the Philippines and other Southern countries – to take but one example (see Chapter 5).

Despite the innovative aspects of CI-OECF relations, there were still hurdles to be addressed surrounding NGO participation in the Japanese aid process. The first obstacle was the role of NGO participation in the bidding process. CI was thus not able to participate here because it is not a legal 'person' and is therefore not eligible for contract bidding (Yamashita, interview, 2003; Anda, interview, 2004; Watanabe 2006a). Besides, as the contractual procedure of SAPROF activity takes place in Tokyo, without having a contract (or a form of joint venture) with Japanese company, it is difficult to enter a bidding if a firm or organisation is not based in Japan (Watanabe 2006a). This is an important point in relation to project implementation because NGOs with valuable experience and expertise nonetheless cannot contribute to aid projects. As a result, the contract for the SAPROF activity was given to the Japanese consulting company Pacific Consultants

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charge of CI Japan office, recollected, "I guess I was lucky enough to meet with someone likeminded at OECF, and they invited us to work together for the proposed areas of improvement" (Fukuoka, interview, 2004). Yet, it cannot be dismissed that the OECF also was receptive because it was politically expedient to be seen internationally to be "working with" NGOs over aid projects by the later 1990s (JBIC 2003c).

<sup>50</sup> CI has local offices in more than 40 countries (Conservation International 2002, 2005).

<sup>51</sup> The Japanese are reluctant to join NGOs like Greenpeace due to their perceived radical campaigning strategy and political views (Mitsuda 1997; see also Kerr 2001; Revell 2003).



International (PCI), although CI was then hired by PCI as a subcontractor upon the OECF's strong recommendation.<sup>52</sup>

The second obstacle was the relative cost structure of CI operations (Anda 2004). Thus, and in terms of project work, CI was simply not as competitive as private consulting companies. This was because firms like PCI have full-time consultants working for them, which can significantly cut the project cost in their bidding proposal (Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004). In contrast, CI needs to hire external consultants for each occasion a bid proposal is made, thereby raising individual proposal costs (Anda, interview, 2004).

A third obstacle surrounding NGO involvement was the fact that, in general, the private consultancies have much better official connections and political knowledge about project dynamics in the aid process than do NGOs. For example, and as one interviewee bitterly pointed out, an Irish Consulting company, CHL Consulting Group, won the bid for the SEMP tourism component because it hired the former regional director of the DOT who had better political connections than the other bidders (Anda, interview, 2004).

In spite of these difficulties, CI still managed to maintain a good relationship with OECF (Anda, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004; Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004). Indeed, through SAPROF, OECF seemed keen to formulate an *environmental* aid project<sup>53</sup> – and, CI's record addressed this interest in a way that PCI's development orientation did not (Nagayama, interview, 2004). Yet, for PCI, the undue restriction of development would cost it future business since it needed to satisfy both clients in Japan and in the Philippines (Kume, interview, 2004; Nagayama, interview, 2004; see Adams 2001). On the one hand, the DOT and the DPWH (the executing agencies) had a strong desire for

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<sup>52</sup> CI conducted two aspects of the SAPROF: marine rapid assessment and community consultation (Anda, interview, 2004; JBIC 2002a).

<sup>53</sup> As noted in 1999, the annual budget for a 'regular' development aid project in the same area had run out – therefore, presumably, there was a need for some 'green' alteration for project re-categorisation (see Hillel, interview, 2004).



infrastructure development (Corral 2004; Gacot-Lim 2004; Otadoy 2004; Sariego 2004). On the other, OECF insisted that the project be ‘greened’ to better fit the formal project aims – wrangling thus ensued. For example, when PCI proposed to use concrete surfacing for road rehabilitation, OECF rejected the proposal and instead asked PCI to come up with a more ‘environmentally friendly’ proposal (Anda, interview, 2004; Kume, interview, 2004; Nagasawa, interview, 2004).<sup>54</sup>

These power dynamics between OECF, the Philippine agencies and PCI were thus reflected in SAPROF, as each player’s political and economic interests were there asserted, and which in turn influenced overall project formulation. An interesting point to emerge from this discussion is that the usual Japanese claims of limited involvement at the early project stage out of ‘respect’ for recipient preferences are decidedly ambiguous – at least in the case of SEMP. After all, the OECF via SAPROF played a key role here that is indeed rather similar to that of other donors, as when, for instance, they attach green conditionality (Lewis 2003; Neuman 1998; Ross 1996). Japanese aid officials often proudly state that they do not impose conditionality on recipients (Yamamoto, interview, 2002; see Chapter 4). Yet, by ‘assisting’ in the formulation of a potential ODA project as witnessed here, Japanese agencies are moulding projects into something more appropriate to the political economy of Japanese aid and its assorted preoccupations (such as ‘greening’).

This section has thus highlighted some grounds for seeing a ‘greening’ effort by at least one agency – OECF through its SAPROF initiative – at the crucial stage of project formulation. Still, such greening was seen to have its own ambiguities and inconsistencies given the agency’s own complicated agenda.

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<sup>54</sup> That is why the soil erosion rehabilitation component does not involve concretising the existing road system but improving it with methods such as gravel surfaces and ditches to cope with heavy rains for drainage.



## 6.4.2. Environmental Appraisal

As noted in Chapter 4, the OECF's greening was more pronounced than that of JEXIM. Therefore, more pro-active greening was expected at the appraisal stage in which the donor was to play the central role in verifying the environmental consideration. However, as mentioned above, the OECF was merged into JBIC during the SAPROF activity in 1999, so OECF tasks were passed on to the latter, including the SEMP's environmental appraisal.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the 1999 JBIC environmental guidelines (hereafter the Guidelines) were applied to the SEMP (see below).<sup>56</sup>

Before we consider in general terms the SEMP appraisal, it is important to note that, unlike the SRMP, an actual environmental appraisal was not highlighted as needed by either JBIC,<sup>57</sup> the Philippine government agencies involved or local stakeholders (local government units, community members and NGOs).<sup>58</sup> This difference was presumably attributable to the fact that the SEMP was Japan's first aid project to the Philippines that *specifically* targeted environmental conservation – therefore, harmful environmental impacts were not anticipated. For instance, throughout the interviews conducted during my fieldwork, great expectation was placed on

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<sup>55</sup> Despite the seemingly epoch-making establishment of JBIC, the merger, in reality, has not induced much change (Hayashi, interview, 2004). The JBIC simply created an umbrella that combined both agencies for ODA and OOF operations, which was a part of the Japanese government's administration reform (*gyōsei no surīmuka*) begun in 2000 (Murai, interview, 2003; Hayashi, interview, 2004; Hirai, interview, 2004; Matsumoto, interview, 2004). For example, even after the merger, JBIC still maintains two separate budgets for ODA and OOF instead of one single budget.

<sup>56</sup> As noted in Chapter 4, the JBIC established environmental guidelines for ODA loan projects in 1999 based on the 1995 OECF guideline. In fact, the two guidelines are *identical* as JBIC simply took the OECF guideline on board by attaching a new title “JBIC Environmental Guidelines for ODA Loans” (JBIC 1999c).

<sup>57</sup> During the SRMP fieldwork, most interviewees raised the issue of the NPC's EIA and the JEXIM's environmental appraisal without even being asked. However, for the SEMP, even when I asked directly about this matter during an interview with the JBIC SEMP project officials in Tokyo, interviewees seemed to have very little idea even about the procedure. Thus, in response to my questions (“In what way was environmental appraisal conducted? What category was used?”), they replied: “this is a project to produce environmental guidelines for the tourism development in Northern Palawan [which is one of the tasks of SEMP tourism component]” (JBIC, interview, 2004h).

<sup>58</sup> During my interviews with local government officials and NGO members, the core debates concerning the SEMP were mainly over the JICA master plan study due to its heavy focus on infrastructure development as well as the SEMP ECAN Zoning component due to the size of the core zone and ancestral domains (Anda, interview, 2004; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Fukuoka, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Rabe, interview, 2004; Sariago, interview, 2004).



the anticipated *benefits* of the SEMP through such means as advanced environmental technologies and a community-based ecotourism initiative, while the focus of interviewees on SRMP was more concerned with the *costs* of the poorly performed EIA by NPC, problems with JEXIM's environmental appraisal and the irregularity of the ECC issuance (see Chapter 5). This may echo the general perception concerning likely environmental effects of development as opposed to environmental aid projects – hence, for an environmental aid project like the SEMP, greater expectations for greening are pertinent here.

The use of the Guidelines is meant for environmental appraisal prior to funding decisions in order to verify the appropriateness of a proposed project's environmental consideration. As discussed in Chapter 4, unlike the weak JEXIM environmental checklists, the JBIC guidelines were set up with two underpinning mechanisms: first, five basic rules for environmental consideration were established that were in turn incorporated in the environmental checklist (see Table 6.12 and 6.13); and second, project classification that screened whether a proposed project requires an EIA submission (see Table 4.2). The former included compliance with the recipient country's environmental regulations, consideration of environmental pollution, natural environment, involuntary resettlement, and environmental conservation measures, which then became the basis of the four main topics to be assessed for the environmental checklists. The latter was to classify proposed projects into three categories – Category A, B and C – and thus required submission of an EIA when a project was classified as Category A.



**Table 6.12. Basic rules for environmental consideration**

1.	Compliance with the recipient country's environmental regulations: A project is to comply with regulations, etc., stipulated in the laws of the recipient country relating to the environment, environmental conventions to which the recipient country is a party, etc.
2.	Environmental pollution: a) In principle, a project is to comply with the regulatory standards, such as emission standards, of the recipient country. The recipient country is also to endeavour to attain any existing government target values for the protection of the environment, such as Environmental Quality Standards applying to the area around the project site. b) If emission standards are not currently established in the recipient country, when necessary, JBIC encourages the recipient country to establish provisional emission target levels for the project, referring to the emission standards established by international organizations, Japan or other countries, taking cost-benefit considerations, etc., into consideration.
3.	The natural environment: a) In principle, a project is to be implemented outside designated nature conservation areas established in accordance with the national laws, etc., of the recipient country. In addition, a project is not to have a significant impact on such conservation areas. b) Necessary action is to be taken to prevent significant project impact on the lives of endangered species and to ensure conservation of biodiversity.
4.	Involuntary resettlement a) In the planning and implementation of a project, there is to be adequate consideration for people who will be called upon to relocate and resettle involuntarily and/or lose a major source of income because of the project (hereinafter "project-affected people"). b) There is to be careful examination of alternatives at the planning stage with a view to ensuring that the number of project-affected people is the smallest possible. c) For a project which necessitates involuntary resettlement, plans are to be prepared beforehand in order to mitigate any negative impact. These plans are to be prepared by the recipient country's government following appropriate hearings of the opinions of project-affected people. d) Plans to mitigate negative impacts of involuntary resettlement are to have as their objective the restoring of living, income, etc., for project-affected people after resettlement.
5.	Environmental conservation measures a) The cost of measures to conserve the environment (including the social environment, such as the cost of involuntary resettlement) is to be included in the project cost. In particular, for a project which requires measures involving pollution-control equipment and monitoring, financing to cover operation and maintenance is to be duly obtained. b) It is desirable, in the interests of objectivity in the evaluation and monitoring of project-related environmental measures, that the executing agency of the recipient country utilizes a third party when necessary.

Source: Adapted from JBIC (1999c:2-3)



**Table 6.13. JBIC Environmental Checklist for Road and Railway from the 1999 Environmental Guidelines**

	Check Items	Major	Small	None	Not Clear	Problems	Action & Counter-measures Planned	Remarks
Pollution	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Air pollution generated by the operation of facilities</li> <li>2. Effect on aquatic organisms, fisheries, and other water utilization of charges in the water system resulting from project construction</li> <li>3. Water pollution and soil contamination caused by drainage from facilities and the project site(s)</li> <li>4. Noise and vibration around the facilities</li> <li>5. Subsidence, etc., owing to project construction</li> </ol>							
Natural Environment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Effect of construction and operation of the facilities on the ecology</li> <li>2. Effect on landscape</li> </ol>							
Human Environment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Effect of construction and operation of the facilities on the historical and cultural heritage</li> <li>2. Effect on existing infrastructure</li> <li>3. Relocation</li> </ol>							
Others	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Effect on the environment during construction period</li> <li>2. Environmental Monitoring</li> </ol>							

Source: JBIC (1999c: 12)



With reference to the Guidelines, the SEMP was classified as ‘Category B’ by the JBIC department involved;<sup>59</sup> it was therefore not formally required by the JBIC to submit an EIA, but was appraised instead simply based on the checklists provided by the Guidelines (JBIC 1999c; Watanabe 2006b; see JBIC 2002e).<sup>60</sup> The project classification was then confirmed by the JBIC environmental analysis department which further required completion of an environmental checklist. This checklist requirement was solely based on the civil works (road construction and rehabilitation) intended for the soil erosion protection component – as a result, the DPWH submitted a completed environmental checklist for road and railroad for appraisal in 2000 (e.g. see Table 6.13; see also Watanabe 2006b). The submitted checklists were subsequently appraised and verified by the JBIC environmental analysis department in the light of the recipient’s own environmental regulations.

For the SEMP, JBIC did not seem quite as reluctant as JEXIM (as noted in Chapter 5) to reveal the identity of the appraiser, the role of the environmental analysis department and the usage of the environmental guidelines. However, these basic facts do not tell us much about how *thorough* the activity was in terms of possible procedural greening – bearing in mind that the actual appraisal is not available for viewing and little is publicly known about the JBIC department. For example, even the number of its staff complement remains classified (JBIC 2004g). Such secrecy – standard practice among Japanese aid agencies – suggests a basic apprehension about their environmental appraisal system (see Chapters 4 and 5), and even (perhaps) about the quality of the appraisal itself.<sup>61</sup> Hence, it is important to discuss briefly the actual checklist so as to assess to some

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<sup>59</sup> Development Assistance Department I, Division 3 is the JBIC department dealing with loan projects in Southeast Asia including the Philippines (JBIC 2000d)

<sup>60</sup> The DPWH’s Environmental Impact Assessment Project Office completed an EIA in February 2000 in any case, notably in order to meet Philippine environmental regulations. That EIA was supportive of the project inasmuch as an ECC was shortly thereafter issued (Chan 2006).

<sup>61</sup> During the interviews with JBIC (2004h), I was able to personally approach a senior official from the environmental analysis department as I was leaving the interview room. I talked with the official whom seemed very much interested in my questions. However, this conversation was shortly cut off by a public relations officer controlling the interview throughout. The PR officer seemed uncomfortable with my conversation with the environmental official and swiftly caught an elevator (by pressing the buttons repeatedly) and sent me out from the building.



extent at least, possible greening at the SEMP's appraisal stage – because, after all, the checklist was the only procedural commitment at this stage of project appraisal and in fact ought to have therefore played a crucial role here.

As Table 6.13 shows, however, this environmental checklist raises concerns as it has ambiguous assessment criteria similar to those of JEXIM checklists and the JICA guidelines (see Chapter 5). Thus, for example, the checklist first instructs the appraiser to tick an applicable category such as major, small, none, or not clear for a total of 12 items (JBIC 1999d: 11). Yet, those categories lacked any general definition let alone quantitative indicators such that a result can clearly vary from one appraiser to another based on subjective assessment. In this regard, the JBIC environmental checklists were akin to both the JEXIM 1993 checklists and the JICA guidelines in as much as ambiguity and vagueness hinder the efficacy of appraisal procedures (see Appendix 2 and Chapter 5). In addition, considering that this JBIC guideline was established only in 1999, compared with that of JEXIM in 1993 and JICA in 1992, it is clear that not much practical improvement has been made since the early 1990s in terms of the specification of environmental guideline standards.

The SEMP's appraisal stage was thus a rather low-key affair that did not attract much attention, even from local stakeholders such as NGOs and community groups (see Anda, interview, 2004; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). Based on the limited evidence available to the researcher, it seems clear that this was a 'light touch' appraisal based on a Category B classification as well as its status as the first Japanese aid project in the country dedicated formally to environmental conservation. In short, the environmental status of the project resulted in a less rigorous set of checks being conducted than might have been the case if it had been a conventional development project. That said, and as our general discussion of the checklists here suggests, there was seemingly only ever room for superficial appraisal given the vague and ambiguous structure of the checklists themselves: superficial, at least, in relation to JBIC's *own* high profile pledge to 'green' aid through environmentally sensitive project



delivery. In any event, the appraisal did not lead to modifications in the SEMP, nor did it slow down project implementation.

## **6.5. Implementation**

Unlike the San Roque Multipurpose Project, this chapter explores the implementation stage of a project (the SEMP) as an ongoing process. Given it is still in operation at the time of writing, there are both advantages and disadvantages to this state of affairs. On the one hand, there is an opportunity for greater empirical research associated with an ongoing activity that can help fill in data gaps where otherwise it might be difficult. On the other hand, it is clearly impossible to examine all the stages of the project cycle, especially the monitoring stage, which has yet to be undertaken. Thus, this chapter is only able to explore SEMP's first two years of implementation out of a total period of 5 years. In this section, our focus is therefore on the extent to which the Japanese aid agencies complied with their own rules on greening, and more precisely, whether compliance in relation to environmental consideration requirements specified in the project formation and planning has been attained. Indeed, the implementation stage further enables us to see how 'effective' the two earlier stages have been. Therefore, this section explores the ECAN Zoning, soil erosion protection, and the sustainable tourism development components – which together comprise the SEMP as implemented.

### **6.5.1. ECAN Zoning Component**

The ECAN Zoning component has faced more problems and hurdles than the other SEMP components due to conflict between the ECAN Zoning team and local governments over existing Comprehensive Land Use Plans (CLUPs) (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). The SEP Act (GOP 1992b) had mandated local government to produce their own CLUPs with ECAN Zoning as a designated main tool. Yet, ECAN Zoning has not been properly implemented to date – therefore, there was no complete conservation map to guide the development plans of the municipalities (see above). However, local governments' desire for development could not wait until ECAN Zoning could be completed (Corral, interview, 2004; De La Calzada,



interview, 2004; Sariago, interview, 2004). Thus, some LGUs went ahead to produce CLUPs with NGOs like Environmental Science for Social Change and World Wildlife Fund (Lawrence 2002; De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). By 2004, El Nido, Busuanga, and Coron had already produced CLUPs and were thereby ready to launch development projects even in the absence of local ECAN Zoning guidance.

The problems that ECAN Zoning faced have come from inflexible organisational practices at both the PCSDS and JBIC. On the one hand, it was PCSDS organisational inflexibility that had originally caused conflicts between the ECAN Zoning team and LGUs, such that the latter had acted on their own (Arquiza 1996; De Vere Moss, interview, 2005). The ECAN Zoning component nonetheless required LGUs to replace their existing CLUPs with a new ECAN map instead of revising them, which consequently triggered further conflict.<sup>62</sup> Ironically, the PCSDS had been involved in producing those CLUPs in the first place during its preliminary ECAN activities that had included the drafting of guidelines on how to proceed with planning activities in the province. Still, PCSDS inflexibility was to blame and was felt to occur as “PCSDS has never really had the resources to carry out its mandate and has always been project-based... thus PCSDS is habitually biased towards specific projects/programme objectives since they are in effect its paymaster” (De Vere Moss, interview, 2005). That is why, although PCSDS once had played a major role in producing CLUPs, it had suddenly become ‘biased’ towards the JBIC’s ECAN Zoning scheme once new money was at hand.<sup>63</sup> Such inflexibility thereby stemmed from the political economy of donor-local agency relations, which was the reason why the ECAN Zoning team was subsequently rejected in certain

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<sup>62</sup> According to my interviews, LGUs were open to compromise if PCSDS was willing to revise and conduct additional studies to the existing CLUPs rather than replacing them (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). The LGUs also argue, if the PCSDS propose revision by adding to what is to be found by ECAN Zoning, that it would be more feasible for them to work on them in planning work (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004). However, the way that JBIC ECAN Zoning has been carried out by PCSDS was perceived as “something ridiculous” (Corral, interview, 2004). Further, the size of core zones set by the PCSDS was not agreeable (too big) for the LGUs because they wanted more development in their municipalities. This view is also shared by WWF El Nido (De La Calzada, interview, 2004).

<sup>63</sup> Recall that OECF (and hence SAPROF) was folded into JBIC in October 1999 (see above).



municipalities (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Hiler, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004).<sup>64</sup>

On the other hand, problems involving ECAN Zoning have also reflected the ‘inflexible’ terms of reference of the JBIC contract itself. Most Japanese aid projects are inflexible when it comes to solving problems that crop up during the implementation stage, even when there is an obvious solution (Söderberg 1996b; Kerr 2001; Hillel, interview, 2004; see also Chapter 5).<sup>65</sup> LGUs are implementers of the future ECAN map for their own development projects, such that conflicts with them inevitably hinder successful project implementation (Hillel, interview, 2004; see also Lawrence 2002). Yet, JBIC was steadfast here on the specific parameters of ECAN Zoning – thus, refusing to modify some specifications set out in the project formulation stage. LGU anger and even deadlock have been the result. In one sense, Japanese agency intransigence here might be seen to reflect a wish to maximise ‘greening’ as per its brief. In another sense, however, such intransigence may be notably to blame for project deadlock – and hence, the inability to actually achieve ‘green’ aims in an efficacious manner.

### **6.5.2. Soil Erosion Protection Component**

The soil erosion protection component has so far not faced problems in the way that the ECAN Zoning component has done (Hiler, interview, 2004). It used “state of the art technology to stop soil erosion and conserve the environment” according to one of the DPWH engineers working in the field (Magubat, interview, 2004). As it is straightforward construction work, obstacles relate mostly to natural conditions like the weather. For example, rain makes it almost impossible to carry on civil work, as the present road condition is described by the El Nido municipal tourism office as not

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<sup>64</sup> In Taytay, the ECAN Zoning team was in fact kicked out (De La Calzada, interview, 2004; Hiler, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Miclat, interview, 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004).

<sup>65</sup> Thus, a new ECAN map contradicts existing CLUPs in terms of setting a core zone size, which is precisely why LGUs are refusing the new ECAN Zoning, but could be adjusted through negotiation.



passable under heavy rains (El Nido Tourism 2004; Direct observation in Coron and El Nido May 2004).<sup>66</sup>

The core issue here is whether the ‘environmentally friendly’ technology used under the terms of the project would really stop the serious soil erosion – that is, the use of gravel road, ditches for drainage, and the planting of indigenous grass species to bolster slopes. In spite of this ‘environmental technology’, DPWH officials had a different view on the matter from that embodied in the SEMP (Otadoy, interview, 2004). During interview, for example, the DPWH director expressed his wish to concretise the road: “as an engineer, I believe concrete is the only solution to [this problem]. With or without JBIC's help, we can do this with our government fund or other donors [such as] ADB, World Bank, whoever is willing to give us money. For now, we are laying down the foundation for the concrete work” (Otadoy, interview, 2004).<sup>67</sup> Revealingly, this passage suggests how far the recipient government can go in terms of reversing any one donor’s green priority on ‘environmentally friendly’ technology if it was so inclined. Indeed, it also suggests that recipients are quite liable to revert to their own prior priorities once funds are disbursed (Connolly 1996). Recipients seem more inclined in general to renege on ‘green’ promises because environmental projects usually present real development ‘opportunity costs’ to them in the long term (Connolly 1996; Nagayama, interview, 2004; Otadoy, interview, 2004).

As per the SEMP implementation, ‘environmentally-friendly’ technology was still being used in the project—and hence, reflects ‘commendable’ Japanese practice here.

### **6.5.3. Sustainable Tourism Development Component**

As noted, SEMP was not originally categorised as an environmental aid project in the stage of project formulation. Thus, it was “originally a tourism

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<sup>66</sup> During my fieldwork in early May 2004 in the areas that occurred in the rainy season, a two-wheel drive van I was in got stuck on a muddy road for two hours and could not move at all. Without rescue from a four-wheel drive car passing by, I would have spent a night in the van.

<sup>67</sup> A concrete road was supported by both DPWH and the consulting company PCI in the project formulation stage as the road condition was extremely bad. Their reasoning was that



development project” to promote small scale community-based eco-tourism targeting Filipino eco-friendly tourists (Hillel, interview, 2004).<sup>68</sup> This third component is therefore the ongoing legacy of that initial focus.

This component has been notably plagued by problems of implementation – some linked to external factors. Thus, regional economic trouble has hit the component. At the beginning of the JICA preparatory study in 1995, Japanese investors had shown a great deal of interest in building infrastructure for tourism development in Busuanga and El Nido, which had made the SEMP as a whole look promising (Hillel, interview, 2004; SEMP Tourism Component 2003; Pablico, interview, 2004). However, once the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, Japanese private investment was withdrawn from the area, consequently destabilising SEMP implementation. Simultaneously, this crisis reduced the number of Asian tourists from Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan whose share of the total international tourist arrivals in the Philippines had accounted for about 45% (DOT 2005). Therefore, the weak economic situation in those countries had a significant adverse impact on the Philippine tourism sector. There was also delay encountered in the SEMP in terms of the coordination and selection of the implementing agencies within the Philippine government itself as multiple components invited multiple agency involvement (see below). Moreover, there was a more general tourism crisis in 2001. This crisis was caused both by local factors (notably by a kidnapping near Puerto Princesa in Palawan) and the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the US. Accordingly, the actual start of the SEMP project was delayed until November 2002, but in the end did not start until March 2003.

In addition to such external problems, the sustainable tourism development component faced further problems linked to the set up of the project itself that also limited its capacity. One problem thus relates to structural problems within the SEMP itself as the project’s implementing structure involves three different executing agencies – the DOT, the DPWH and the

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gravel road was not good enough to stop the soil erosion because pebbles and small rocks are easily dislocated by cars.

<sup>68</sup> This national focus is because most foreign tourists to the area are backpackers and their number is very few (Acosta, interview, 2004; Distal, interview, 2004).



PCSD. These agencies have separate agreements with JBIC, which further complicates an already complex implementation process (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.1). Although the DOT is the leading agency in this project, power dynamics between DOT and DPWH have already affected project implementation insofar as over 50% of the total budget allocation is for civil work which is a DPWH responsibility (see Hillel, interview, 2004; Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999).<sup>69</sup>

The other problem associated with the tourism component is JBIC's own business orientation. JBIC, as it gives out loans, strongly urges each component to show concrete output and results – and therefore, uses quantitative indicators to evaluate project implementation (JBIC 2005b).<sup>70</sup> The SEMP Tourism component leader referred to JBIC seeking “value for money” in this way as being unrealistic because the pressure to come up with quantitative data not only hurts staff morale in the tourism component, but also affects their capacity to act (Hillel, interview, 2004). This is so because the only available measurable output for the tourism component is an increase in the number of tourist arrivals. However, there is very little possibility to increase the number of tourist arrivals as JBIC wanted because Northern Palawan is not a mass tourism destination and in any event has been hard hit by the assorted crises just noted.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, JBIC's insistence on increased tourist arrivals may even fly in the face of the need for careful regulation of such arrivals on environmental grounds – and hence, of the ‘greening’ responsibilities that this is supposed to adhere to.

The misfortunes of the tourism component reflect a complex situation. Thus, the aforementioned decrease in tourist arrivals in the region has not only damaged the local tourism sector, but has also discouraged local conservation initiatives because of the interlinked nature of these two

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<sup>69</sup> DPWH is one of the most powerful government agencies and has been involved in many corruption cases due to the nature of civil work contracts (Azfar et al. 2000; World Bank 2000b). Also it has a closer relationship with Japanese aid agencies than any other Philippine government agency (Tsuda and Yokoyama 1999)

<sup>70</sup> Although the SEMP started out with two grant-based activities (JICA Master Plan Study and OECF SAPROF activity), it is ultimately a yen loan project (see above).

<sup>71</sup> This is largely because of poor infrastructure. For example in El Nido, there is limited electricity service running between 1 pm and 1 am, as well as no banks or even an ATM, and hence no possibility of cash advances with very limited availability of credit card use in the area; and no internet access (El Nido Municipal Tourism Office 2004).



aspects. For example, as local businesses are hit hard by declining income, they have cut back on expenditures devoted to making the locality ‘pristine’. In turn, such cutbacks have jeopardised the objective of environmental conservation (Densula, interview, 2004; Hillel, interview, 2004; Pabrico, interview, 2004).<sup>72</sup>

There is also the difficulty of quantifying the tourism component insofar as it is designed in part to create a community-based environmentally sustainable tourism system by establishing standards, piloting tourism products and building environmental capacity for the tourism sector. These elements involve non-measurable outputs that do not thus fit JBIC’s criteria on successful outputs even as they may be vital to successful long-term ‘greening’ (see above). JBIC’s criteria also do not need to be so restrictive either. For example, JICA (involved at an earlier stage of this project) classifies “projects in a soft field” (*sofuto na bunya no anken*) that involve the establishment of things such as piloting of community-based tourism products as being not suitable for assessment based only on cost and benefit calculation (JICA 2002c: 4). Thus, JBIC’s predilection for quantitative outputs has not only weakened aspects of the SEMP, but also contradicts JICA’s own policy on the matter – underscoring the perils of fragmentation in the Japanese aid system (Dauvergne 1997).

However, there is also a wider issue revealed in the mixed record of the tourism component of the SEMP so far – as the case of the tourism entrance fees attests. As per the project formulation documentation, that component has sought to distribute conservation benefits locally by establishing a self-financing system of environmental conservation fees, often known as entrance/visitor or dive fees (SEMP Tourism Component 2003, 2004; United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 1996). In so doing, the environmental fee became a key goal to encourage conservation activities by local communities (including indigenous people and private resort owners) through tangible financial gains from the system (SEMP Tourism Component 2003, 2004; Laarman and Gregerson 1996). Yet, the


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<sup>72</sup> The motto “we conserve for tourism that gives us alternative income” has been used for promoting conservation in local communities. However, local communities who witnessed a decrease in tourist numbers started challenging the project staff why they should conserve when there were fewer tourists coming (Pabrico, interview, 2004).



effort to introduce entrance fees in the area at behest of SEMP tourism component was neither new nor without opposition. Thus, for instance, in Coron, an entrance fee for use of Kaganyan Lake was already facing resistance, even as it was a major local tourist destination in 2001 (Arquiza 2001a, 2001b). The Tagbanua (the resident indigenous people) already began to charge entrance fees there in 2001, based on their possessing title to ancestral lands (under a 1998 Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim or CADC) (GOP 1997; Bryant 2002; Figure 6.5, 6.10 and 6.11).<sup>73</sup>

**Figure 6.10. Entrance Fee Receipt for Ancestral Domain – Kayangan Lake**



Source: Own Photo

Tagbanua leaders were strongly committed to limiting the number of visitors to the lake in order to stop environmental deterioration (SEMP Tourism Component 2004; see also Arquiza 2001a). Yet, both the arbitrary nature of the fee set, as well as the tight restrictions on visitor numbers, led to conflict with other local stakeholders in the tourism sector. On the one hand, new restrictions on tourist access to the lake angered both local government and affected tour operators who had previously enjoyed free access.

<sup>73</sup> The entrance fee system started out separately from the SEMP. But, since March 2003, it was combined and reinforced as a part of the implementation of the SEMP's tourism component.







hand, the Tagbanuas had attempted to raise the entrance fees without consultation with local government units and tour operators, despite a lack of evidence that the higher fee was sustainable.<sup>75</sup> The Tagbanua's imposition of an entrance fee in this specific case was therefore criticized as not having led to much ecological improvement in the lake even as the fee collection system was deemed to be flawed and unfair (Arquiza 2001a, 2001b, Direct observation 2004;<sup>76</sup> see also Nevill 2001; United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 1996).

This particular case in the tourism component does raise questions over the possible fit between key social and environmental aims especially in contexts where political division is the local norm. Nevertheless, the SEMP is strongly committed to the idea of entrance fees. Indeed, it has been monitoring tourist sites (including Kagayan Lake) through regular consultation meetings with barangay representatives, Conservation International, SARAGPUNTA, and the Coron Association of Tourism Establishments (SEMP Tourism Component 2004). Further, it has evaluated the market feasibility of Kagayan Lake fees in particular by conducting a survey of guests and their 'willingness to pay' (SEMP Tourism Component 2004; see Laarman and Gregersen 1996; Benitez 2001). In this regard, the SEMP can be seen to have provided legitimacy to entrance fees otherwise perceived by some locals to be imposed by the Tagbanua via consultations and research designed to strengthen the capacity for Tagbanua environmental management locally. In short, although it is too early to be definitive here, the entrance fees saga – and especially a Japanese insistence on it via SEMP – may indicate some evidence of greening to a Japanese aid project as it is being implemented.

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<sup>75</sup> Entrance fees vary according to visitor nationality: 200 Philippine pesos (PhP) per person from locals and PhP 400 per person from foreigners (Bulaitan 2002; Direct observation in Coron May 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). But, during my visit to Kagayan Lake, the entrance fee for locals was 270 PhPs (see Figure 6.9). 1 USD was 52 PhPs in May 2006.

<sup>76</sup> In 2003, the Tagbanuas' office for boat permits in Coron was transferred to SARAGPUNTA (federation of 7 Tagbanua foundations including Tagbanua Foudation of Coron) located in Coron. However, this was not explained to boat operators. As a result, until April 2004, boat permit fees were collected very poorly. At the same time, it was also observed that Tagbanua sometimes did not come to collect individual fees to enter tourist sites as required (SEMP NP Office Coron 2004; Pablico, interview, 2004). When I was visiting Kagayan Lake and the surrounding areas, Tagbanuas were napping in their boats even though there were three tourist boats passing by that ought to have been charged (Direct observation in Coron May 2004).



## 6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has examined to what extent an environmental aid (*kankyō-enjyo*) project has incorporated ‘green’ elements as proclaimed in top-level policy pronouncements as well as how those elements are actually translated into project practice through specific procedures and tools. In particular, it addressed three major studies at the project formation level (i.e. JICA preparatory study and master plan study completed between 1994 and 1997; OECF 1999 SAPROF activity) that were formally designed to assist the recipient’s environmental consideration (*kankyō-hairyo*) procedure.

Consideration of the SEMP in this chapter provides an interesting contrast to the analysis provided in Chapter 5. Thus, in the case of the traditional development aid project (San Roque Multipurpose Project) examined in Chapter 5, the main role played by Japanese agencies was to verify whether the environmental consideration process undertaken by the recipient was appropriately done. That discussion highlighted that the Japanese agency involved was more akin to a passive auditor than an active facilitator for environmental consideration. However, in the environmental aid project discussed in this chapter, the donor played a more active role from the stage of project formation right through to that of implementation. Even in the latter stage, the JBIC has put pressure on each project component – for example, to come up with tangible tourism outputs as it seeks ‘value for money’ or to persuade a consulting company to use ‘environmentally friendly’ technology in road rehabilitation. The donor’s presence here has been therefore more observable at diverse stages of the project than was the case for the SRMP.

Indeed, there is some certainly evidence of greening in the SEMP. It could be argued, for example, that the very fact that the donor provided *two* grant packages to assist the recipient’s environmental consideration here can be considered as evidence of greening in both JICA and OECF in so far as it demonstrated a willingness to devote time and money to such consideration. The informal dialogue between OECF and Conservation International was especially revealing given its unheard of nature. And yet, the SEMP was of course designed to be ‘green’ in the first place – and hence, a great deal of



greening was only to be expected. Moreover, careful scrutiny suggests that the degree of ‘green-ness’ of SEMP is less significant than it was said to be in official documents. True, this is partly because it was originally a development aid project as well as the onset of external factors that could not be controlled or expected (e.g. Asia financial crisis, terrorism). Beyond that, though, the SEMP at times still has had the feel of a somewhat traditional project – for instance, in its stress on economic development and above all, in its emphasis on infrastructure oriented project practices. The latter in particular has suggested that the project’s main aim is still to privilege development – here tourism activities – over environmental conservation.

Overall, then, the preceding two chapters have given us scope to assess the possible greening of Japanese international cooperation using two project case studies from the Philippines. There has been space to consider how ‘greening’ has unfolded (or not) in three key agencies: JICA, OECF, and JEXIM (with JBIC only appearing at the end of the period due to amalgamation). The thesis findings suggest in the end a complex picture – one shaped by such things as fragmented aid delivery, recipient development predilections, and wider international material and discursive trends. The next chapter concludes the thesis. It summarises the key findings even as it reflects on the possible wider implications of this study in terms of a possible research agenda.



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## Chapter 7. Conclusion

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This thesis has considered to what extent and in what ways there was a ‘greening’ of Japanese aid in the 1990s as officially claimed. Specifically, it examined Japan’s bilateral international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) policy process through the prism of two case study projects in the Philippines. In doing so, and as related in Chapter 2, it drew upon a theoretical framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as key themes drawn from foreign aid and implementation studies. Based on a qualitative and case study methodology (discussed in Chapter 3), the thesis then undertook to analyse the Japanese greening process in terms of the key stages involved –environmental consideration, the verification of environmental consideration, and implementation-linked monitoring. These stages were first considered in general form, along with the three main Japanese aid players (JICA, OECF, JEXIM), in Chapter 4. Then, the actual procedures and practices were assessed in relation to two major types of aid project (development aid and environmental aid) in Chapters 5 and 6. The two project case studies illustrated both the complexity and ambiguity of the greening of Japanese international cooperation in so far as it mapped levels of project-related compliance with formal ‘green’ policy statements and procedures. The important role of the recipient’s environmental assessment system was noted at various stages, as the inter-linked nature of donor-recipient ‘greening’ was emphasised.

This thesis has thus highlighted a rich and complex story of contemporary aid dynamics using the bilateral Japan-Philippines relationship as the analytical focus. In this, the last chapter of the thesis, I revisit the two projects considered in Chapters 5 and 6 to summarise the key findings. The key stages of the environmental assessment process are thereby evaluated in order to gauge the degree of commitment of the main Japanese aid agencies to project greening. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of a future research agenda and selected policy recommendations related to the topic of the greening of aid in the light of the thesis findings.



## 7.1. Environmental Consideration

At the stage of environmental consideration, the two case study projects were found to have had a different agenda due to the distinctive and differentiated nature of the aims and practices of these two types of project. Given this basic difference, our expectation was that the degree and depth of greening would also vary across the two projects. Thus, while the development aid project (the San Roque Multipurpose Project or SRMP) was expected to show relatively little greening and, even then, mainly linked to minimising adverse environmental impacts of dam construction, the environmental aid project (Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan or SEMP) was anticipated to display greater greening due to its environmental conservation project preoccupations. Environmental consideration, it was expected, would therefore vary in keeping with the different project aims involved.

For the environmental consideration of the San Roque Multipurpose Project, there were two types of activity performed by the donor and the recipient working in tandem: JICA's development study and the Philippine government Environmental Impact Statements (EISs). The former was designed to assist and complement the latter (which was done by the National Power Corporation). However, the SRMP became mired in political controversy in the 1980s and was only saved in the early 1990s due to the Philippine energy crisis. These larger political and economic events thus shaped the vicissitudes of this mega-development project.

As a politically and economically controversial project caught on the cusp of international greening, it is not surprising that Japan's environmental consideration here was patchy, if not downright contradictory. Thus, and as Chapter 5 illustrated, JICA's environmental assessment work showed little sign of rigour, failed to demonstrably 'assist' the recipient, and indeed seemed to be part – and – parcel of a wider set of Japanese delaying tactics arising from political embarrassment over a Marcos-related scandal. More generally, the research suggested that the environmental consideration process in a high-stakes mega-development project was only ever liable to



be superficial at best (an experience corroborated by Japanese ODA practices elsewhere in the South, see Okamoto 2002; Ozeki and Matsumoto 2002; Sumi 2004) Thus, and in keeping with the 'request-based' approach, Japanese officials sought to ensure that they had done, or were at least *seen* to have done, a 'rigorous' vetting procedure in order to avoid future criticism, especially if (as seemed likely in the case of SRMP) the project became even more controversial in the future than it had already become by the early 1980s. Accordingly, this JICA activity was performed to satisfy a mere procedural requirement even as there were sporadic signs of prototypical 'greening' in the work completed. For instance, the activity was an exclusively environmental survey including the reservoir water quality and hydrological analysis, which in the end emphasised the dam's possible contribution to water quality improvement. Such 'green' signals, however limited, nonetheless, suggested at least some concern over the likely environmental impacts of the proposed dam.

For the Philippine side, the EIS system was certainly used to provide legitimacy for the SRMP – in effect, a bureaucratic requirement met in order to gain issuance of an Environmental Compliance Certificate that could be thereafter used to rebut anti-dam related criticism. As noted, the project was revived in the early 1990s with JEXIM's blessing, thereby affording an ideal opportunity to put into practice 'greener' practices. In reality, though, the recipient's environmental consideration was even here still patchy and did not provoke a negative reaction from JEXIM. On the one hand, the effort to avoid more rigorous 1990s environmental assessment procedures by having the 1980s phase 1 work 'retro-validated' entailed complex political and bureaucratic negotiations as well as generating much controversy. On the other hand, *some* effort was made by the DENR to enhance the quality of the original (and clearly inadequate) 1980s environmental consideration through specific steps that suggested *some* recognition of the need to better account for socio-environmental issues. Thus, for example, specific project-related environmental management plans incorporated new ideas on environmental conservation, sustainable livelihoods, and indigenous



people's rights and ancestral land, with the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project providing a useful case in point.

Unlike the development aid project, Japanese officials played a more proactive role from the start in the Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan (SEMP). A great deal of greening was thus expected at the environmental consideration stage of this project as this was an explicitly environmental project (*kankyō-enjyo*). Attention was centred here on JICA's master plan study. However, and as we saw in Chapter 6, the focus of that study was largely on tourism (infrastructure) development, in part because it had in fact originally been intended as a tourism development project. A green re-labelling was nonetheless possible because there were no strict criteria set by the Japanese government on what constituted 'environmental' aid. Thus, a development project was re-worked in the 1990s to benefit from increased environmental aid provisioning by the Japanese government, as part of the latter's international 'greening' campaign (JBIC 2003a; Potter 1994; Taylor 1999)

That said, environmental consideration *was* clearly applied to the SEMP. This effort demonstrated JICA's procedural compliance insofar as it involved the undertaking of two studies (preparatory and master plan study) with considerable financial commitment. Still, there were ambiguous results here. Thus, the 1992 JICA environmental guideline was used but proved of relatively limited utility. This was the case because it was little more in practice than a collection of checklists, forms, and a matrix that provided a simple description of a project and its context, but with minimal detailed environmental information thereby required. As the guideline was used to generate data for the master plan study that, in turn, was the main basis for the final decision as to whether or not to proceed with the SEMP, this situation raised questions about the ultimate rigour of the procedures utilised to ensure 'greening' in project design.

Interestingly, as the discussion in Chapter 6 illustrated, Japanese interests and preferences were dominant in agenda setting as indicated notably in the



master plan study. In spite of Japan's 'request based' approach designed to privilege a recipient's environmental consideration, therefore, evidence from the case of the SEMP suggested strong donor conditionality akin to what other Northern donors do as a key feature in the Japanese aid process here. For our purposes, this proactive role suggested that there was more scope for Japanese agencies to ensure that there was indeed 'greening' in the project. To some extent at least, the OECF's intervention under the SAPROF achieved precisely this outcome, as specific requirements here and there assumed a 'greener' hue (see below). That said, there was nonetheless much 'business as usual' to be seen in the SEMP. Thus, influenced by strong Japanese corporate involvement, the SEMP was based on a master plan with more of a focus on civil works and tourism-related infrastructure than an emphasis on community-based conservation, as perhaps might have been expected if a more rigorous environmental consideration had been completed.

## **7.2. Verifying and Strengthening Environmental Consideration**

The stage where the environmental consideration is verified (environmental appraisal) and strengthened (Special Assistance for Project Formation or SAPROF) provided us with a second opportunity in the project cycle to gauge the Japanese commitment to aid 'greening'. Given the distinctive nature of the two case study projects examined in Chapters 5 and 6, the verification of environmental consideration in each project reflected a different central preoccupation at the procedural level. Thus, for the SEMP, there was an emphasis put on anticipated project environmental *benefits* (e.g. 'environmentally friendly' technologies and a community-based ecotourism initiative), while for the SRMP, there was a stress on anticipated project environmental *costs* linked to the all-but inevitable adverse impacts of a mega-dam development project. As with the environmental consideration stage, it was anticipated that there would be more evidence of 'greening' in the Palawan project than in the Luzon project.



In the case of the traditional development aid project (the San Roque Multipurpose Project), the main Japanese role was played by JEXIM. The job here of this agency was checking whether the environmental consideration process had been done appropriately with the correct environmental assessment reports submitted by the project proponent (i.e. NPC's EIA). In Chapter 5, though, it was argued that JEXIM's role in the case of SRMP was more that of a passive auditor than an active 'watchdog' for effective environmental consideration. And yet, it needs to be emphasised at this stage of the project, JEXIM directly controlled the funding decision. By addressing environmental issues raised during the appraisal through new conditions added to the loan agreements, it had the power here to effect material improvements in the environmental status of a proposed project or, if necessary, to suspend a loan (and hence, terminate a project) when the standard of environmental consideration was deemed to be poor. Nevertheless, in practice in our case study, instead of reinforcing environmental standards via the loan agreement, JEXIM simply affirmed the SRMP's compliance with Philippine environmental laws. Therefore, despite opposition by LGUs, local NGOs and communities, the project went ahead more or less intact. Notably, and in order to account for some apparent reservations that had cropped up during the appraisal, a lengthier period of time was allocated to the monitoring phase. Yet, this JEXIM procedural commitment was then later somewhat subverted by recipient government action. Thus, there was the SRMP's illegal quarry that was cleared by Presidential order thereby by-passing the EIS framework since no ECC was applied for the quarry

In the case of the SEMP, the main Japanese agency involved was the OECF. Under the SAPROF initiative, this agency did indeed intervene in order to strengthen the environmental consideration process even before the appraisal stage. Considering the OECF's traditional organisational culture purely as a lending agency, there was certainly some evidence of a willingness to be pro-active about the greening of the SEMP. Most interesting in this regard was the way that OECF agreed to work with the international environmental NGO Conservation International in order to



enhance the quality of environmental consideration in the original JICA study.

However, Chapter 6 also highlighted that the SAPROF initiative was not without ambiguity. Thus, the Japanese private sector had a prominent role in it such that a complex power dynamic occurred between OECF, Philippine partner agencies (notably DOT, DPWH and PCSDS), NGOs, and the consulting company, as each player sought to advance its own interests. The end result showed an interest in *both* environmental protection and a tourism-related development, as the OECF struggled to balance the competing interests surrounding the project. Thus, on the one hand, there was the OECF decision that road rehabilitation use ‘environmentally friendly’ technology rather than conventional concrete surfacing that had been advocated by both a key Philippine agency and the Japanese consulting firm involved. And yet, on the other hand, the SAPROF initiative served to validate the prior JICA decision to emphasise an infrastructure-oriented project in support of ‘sustainable’ tourism.

In the case of the SEMP, the actual appraisal itself (that verified whether harmful environmental impacts were appropriately considered) was rather a low-key affair which was notably due to the basic difference between the SEMP and the SRMP. Thus, difference was linked to the fact that the project was Japan’s first aid project to the Philippines that specifically targeted environmental conservation – therefore, the *benefits* of the SEMP (for example, advanced environmental technology and a community-based ecotourism initiative) were emphasised and not the costs. Thus, according to the JBIC 1999 guidelines, the SEMP was classified as ‘Category B’ – and hence was not requiring an EIA submission – but was appraised instead based on the environmental checklist provided by JBIC. And, yet, that environmental checklist shared similarly ambiguous assessment criteria to those of the JEXIM checklists and the JICA guidelines also considered in this thesis – that is, a lack of definition, and quantitative indicators. The sense, then, was that this appraisal was rather superficial in relation to the JBIC’s *own* high profile commitment to ‘green’ aid.



### 7.3. Implementation and Monitoring

Finally, the stage of project implementation (notably where the monitoring process features) provided us with a third occasion to assess the Japanese emphasis on the ‘greening’ of aid. Our focus here was on the extent to which Japanese aid agencies complied with their own rules on greening, and more precisely, ensured recipient compliance with environmental consideration requirements specified in the project objectives. As ever, the implementation stage provided further evidence as to Japan’s possible commitment to greening.

The implementation of the SRMP in the 1990s was certainly not without controversy – with attendant implications for Japanese ‘greening’. Local Philippine politics thus threatened to subvert the project’s environmental consideration as proponents intrigued with political allies to validate an illegal quarry on site. The silence of the Japanese agencies here on this erosion of environmental consideration was telling – and reflected a wish to push on with this trouble-plagued development project. And yet, the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Programme (IIWMP) suggested some evidence of Japanese-backed greening in this mega-development project. Indeed, JBIC’s unexpected voluntary financial contribution (through an interest payment waiver) to the IIWMP was encouraging in this respect, especially as interest repayments to JBIC are obligatory under Japanese law and thus any changes required bureaucratic justification. However troubled the IIWMP’s subsequent history was, the gesture to assist an environmental management project component in jeopardy was one possible indicator of Japanese greening.

In contrast, the more recent JBIC-led monitoring of SRMP has been widely seen to be superficial and hence not in keeping with what might be expected of a ‘green’ donor agency. True, the JBIC team has been sent biannually to the project site and its neighbouring communities. However, its activities there were over a very short time period (2 days) only and tended to focus on working with the project proponents rather than seemingly with listening to NGOs and local communities critical of the SRMP. Indeed, there was



even a sense among some interviewees of JBIC simply ‘covering up’ past mistakes rather than attempting to solve implementation problems.

In the case of the SEMP, the project is still ongoing – and hence, a clear project outcome is not yet achieved. Still, already there is mixed evidence on donor involvement at this stage of implementation. Thus, for example, JBIC has put pressure on each project component to come up with concrete outputs as it seeks ‘value for money’. This quantitative output bias has weakened the effort to advance ‘alternative’ sustainable tourism as mandated in the original terms and conditions of the project. As Chapter 6 discussed, the pressure to come up with quantitative data not only hinders staff morale in the tourism component, but also affects their capacity to act in a way that fully accounts for environmental issues. Indeed, this stance has also contradicted JICA’s own position on this type of project in as much as the latter is deemed not suitable for assessment based on cost-benefit calculation alone. Here therefore, Japanese greening is subject to discrepancies *between* the Japanese aid agencies themselves that seem to hinder effective policy action.

Interestingly, JBIC inflexibility over the implementation of the ECAN Zoning component might be construed as being a stance in support of the greening process, albeit with ambiguous efforts. Here, an unwillingness to decrease or otherwise modify protected zones specified by the ECAN Zoning team seemingly sought to maximise areas subject to strict environmental protection. However, this stance only occurred at the expense of LGU support given the latter’s wish to open up more access to development in the proposed conservation areas. The ensuing gridlock thus jeopardised the feasibility of this component, hence its possible green attributes.

Finally, the soil erosion protection component also revealed ambiguities surrounding Japanese greening endeavours. Thus, here the OECF insistence on the use of ‘environmentally friendly’ road rehabilitation technology, rather than concrete surfacing can be seen as a positive step toward



greening. However, once more, such an endeavour can be subverted by recipient government interests – in this particular situation, there are the Philippine plans to concretise the road after the Japanese project is completed.

Over the various stages of the two aid projects considered in this thesis, therefore, there has been conflicting evidence as to the relationship between ‘green’ policy pronouncements and project practices. A complex picture was revealed in both projects. Indeed, *some* ‘greening’ was observable in both cases, albeit in varying degrees. To a considerable extent, therefore, our starting propositions for this thesis were confirmed – namely, that minimal greening would be found in ‘old style’ development projects (such as the SRMP), whereas a greater degree of greening would be seen in ‘environmental’ projects (such as the SEMP). However, both projects were riddled with political compromises and ambiguities suggesting that a clear-cut and definitive assessment of the greening of contemporary Japanese international cooperation is unlikely.

In addition to the empirical findings, this thesis has also made significant conceptual contributions to the literature. For one thing, it has demonstrated the need for and the utility of an analytical approach to political ecology that emphasises the ‘contextual sources of environmental change’ (Bryant 1992) in general, and North-South aid relations in particular. The Japanese bilateral aid relationship served as a useful case study to this end. Much research in political ecology remains focused on local community-level studies (Robbins 2004). Yet, there is a need to complement such work with a greater array of studies that examine in detail national and international political and economic dynamics that affect human-environment relations. Indeed, this thesis constitutes one of the first in-depth studies of the political ecology of the bilateral aid industry.

In addition, this thesis has suggested the utility of a ‘cultural politics’ perspective within the research field of political ecology. It did so by highlighting how cultural politics dynamics specific to individual countries



condition the ways in which unequal power relations unfold across time and space, and between a multitude of state and non-state actors that crisscross national boundaries. Here, discussion of the distinctive cultural politics of the Japanese bilateral aid system – and its ramifications for aid to the Philippines – provided rich grounds for illustrating empirically the usefulness of a more cultural-based appreciation of political ecology. This call for more ‘culture’ in political ecology is usually related to local community-level work (e.g. Robbins 2004). However, this study argues for its application to a wider array of issues and actors, notably linked to the national and international levels.

#### **7.4. Greening of Aid and beyond**

This thesis has been a study of the possible greening of the Japanese international cooperation system in the 1990s and was informed by a theoretical framework based on a political ecology perspective as well as themes drawn from the foreign aid, and implementation literatures. It has stressed both the complexity and ambiguity of an aid process in which donor and recipient are intrinsically linked. Such complexity and ambiguity was seen as being reflected in the uneven degree of greening in the Japanese aid system of the 1990s. In turn, the findings of the thesis suggest a number of policy recommendations as well as raise a variety of interesting issues that future research ought to consider.

A first policy recommendation in relation to the greening of Japanese aid concerns the introduction of an improved system of information disclosure, which if implemented would make the delivery of aid more open and transparent than is presently the case. Such a change would better enable public citizens and civil society groups including research think tanks and NGOs to follow projects with particular social/environmental issues – including traditionally ‘sensitive’ mega-development projects (such as that involving the San Roque dam in the Philippines). Hitherto, non-state groups have experienced great difficulty in gaining access to even basic information on planned or existing projects – as even my own experience in conducting research for this thesis demonstrated. The sort of outside scrutiny suggested



here would facilitate in turn constructive criticism of both the content and execution of Japanese aid projects – and it is hoped thereby, more accountable and effective aid delivery.

A second policy recommendation to emerge from the findings of this thesis is the need for a stricter environmental appraisal procedure. As this thesis has shown, Japan has been well aware of the lack of capacity both for effective environmental consideration as well as for appropriately tailored project implementation measures in the Philippines (JICA 1997; Higa, interview, 2006), the recipient government considered here. In spite of this knowledge, however, Japanese aid agencies did not do nearly enough to strengthen the recipient's environmental consideration procedures during the 1990s – even though the environment was formally a top priority for Japan at that time and this donor should have been well-placed to help out in this area. As such, change here should involve increasing the number of Japanese aid officials who deal with environment-related tasks, while strengthening their authority to act on environmental commitments in conjunction with their counterparts in the recipient government. Such joint work ought to assist local officials as they attempt to strengthen environmental appraisal – and by extension the implementation of more environmentally sustainable projects – insofar as firm donor backing often facilitates such change (e.g. Ross 1996).

A third policy recommendation relates to Philippine government practice. Although our focus has been mainly on Japanese policy procedures in this thesis, the nature of the Japanese aid system has meant that attention has also inevitably been given to the environmental management system of the recipient government. Here, it emerged that the Philippine system was very good on paper with an array of good laws and formal policy procedures. As just noted, though, capacity has been lacking. In addition, existing Philippine government policy – notably centred on the EIS and ECC appraisal system – is quite erratic due to the ever-present role of political intervention that subverts efforts to implement an effective and non-political environmental management system (Vitug 1993; Ross 1996). However



difficult, policy reform in the Philippines must be designed to root out such political interference drawing on support from donors as well as local and foreign civil society groups. The focus here should be on entrenching a much stricter EIS implementation system through, for example, a more consistent and stricter enforcement of ECC conditions attached to projects as the latter are implemented.

A final policy recommendation to emerge from the discussion in this thesis relates to the NGO sector – as noted, an increasingly influential non-state actor in the aid policy process. Given the nature of the Japanese aid system, it is crucial that NGOs – and especially Japanese NGOs who are generally better placed than foreign NGOs to win access to senior Japanese policy circles – further develop their scientific expertise and policy-related skills if they are ever to hope to play a significant long-term role in that system. The strengthening of NGO professional expertise (for example, in marine biology and conservation work) will thus enhance their standing with Japanese (and other) aid agencies even as it will strengthen their capacity to assist local partner communities in need (Silliman and Noble 1998; Bryant 2005; Suzuki, interview, 2006). In this way, NGOs will be able to work more effectively with aid agencies even as they will be better placed to criticise socially or environmentally deficient projects in a constructive manner – for example, by explaining not simply that ‘social and environmental assessments are badly done’ but how and why those assessments are ‘badly done’ as well as how they could be improved in the future (Nakajima, interview, 2006).

In terms of avenues for further research, a variety of issues come to the fore in light of the findings of this thesis. One such issue is whether the ‘green’ decade of the 1990s that was our thesis focus was the start of a new ‘green’ phase in aid history or simply an unusual blip in the political economy of that industry. Indeed, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US has even prompted the idea that we are now entering an era in which aid is prioritised largely on security grounds (JICA 2002b; UNDP 2002, 2005; Woods 2005). Thus, and in spite of growing alarm over climate change and



other worsening environmental problems, the green agenda has seemingly become less popular in aid circles in a post 9/11 world. As such, how has the green agenda of the 'Rio decade' been altered in light of the new security focus? Indeed, there is an increased emphasis in today's aid industry on 'environmental security'. Northern donors now increasingly stress environmental security as an issue that is profoundly linked to poverty and human security while underlining associated social and environmental issues including population growth, water scarcity and pollution, food security and natural disasters including the recent Asia tsunami and earthquake incidents (Warner 2000; Dalby 2002; UNDP 2002, 2005; Woods 2005). Thereby, such environmental problems (both human-made and natural) are seen as a key source of poverty that is the nurturing milieu for terrorist activities, and hence, eventually further global insecurity (MOFA 2003g; Benn 2004; Blair 2006). This new aid agenda is further highlighted by the US led counter-terrorism policy that acknowledges environmental security as central to social stability in the South (Butts and Turner 2004a, 2004b), even as aid is increasingly used to serve donors' own security concerns (Woods 2005). Thus, and as the concept of environmental security demonstrates, there is a legacy of the 1990s 'green' decade – albeit, one that is subject to modification in an age where there is also a 'war on terror'.

A second research interest relates to the possible implications of a recent return to the large-scale financing of infrastructure development aid projects. This new trend can be seen, for example, in the *Connecting East Asia* (CEA) initiative, which was launched in 2005 by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and which has (re-)emphasised the key role of infrastructure in promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, and also generating so-called 'inclusive development' (ADB et al. 2005; JBIC 2005a). Yet, considering the relative unpopularity of mega-infrastructure projects among many donor agencies during the 1990s due to adverse social and environmental impacts as well as political protests, this sort of new initiative seems to suggest "institutional amnesia" on the part of some donors (Bosshard 2004: 12). That said, and in light of this thesis, it would seem useful to ask whether there is something



different about these projects that reflect learning from previous ill-fated projects. For our purposes, the possible leading role of Japan in this ‘revival’ of interest in infrastructure development aid is also intriguing. After all, our findings suggested a keen *ongoing* Japanese interest here – even during the ‘green’ decade of the 1990s. As Asian countries including China and India have been achieving rapid economic development, there is a greater need for infrastructure development to support this process (ADB et al. 2005; Asia 2015 2006; Jones 2006; Nogami 2006). As Japanese corporations are increasingly investing in this region, they are appealing to their government to provide more financial support, notably via foreign aid to help improve the region’s infrastructure and hence facilitate their business interests (JBIC 2002d; METI 2002; MLIT 2005). Thus, Japan, through its own aid budget but also through its influence over the Asian Development Bank (dubbed by some critics as “Asian Dam and Bridges”) is now seemingly spearheading this infrastructure drive (Tamura 2004). This potentially critical shift in aid flow merits as well academic attention.

A third research interest suggested by the findings of this study relates to the under-emphasised importance of cultural politics and associated institutional dynamics in donor policies and practices that shape aid flow and impact. Indeed, qualitative research on different national aid ‘cultures’ is critical in understanding similarities and differences in donor behaviour (Mosse 2004; Rossi 2004). Thus, our aim here was to study the relatively neglected subject of Japan’s bilateral international cooperation (*kokusai-kyōryoku*) system in part in order to assess how Japan’s differentiated interests and international approach (as distinct from other Northern donors) may have resulted in unique patterns of aid giving and management, especially in relation to possible greening trends. As this thesis demonstrated, such a culturally-based difference in the Japanese aid system – including the request-based approach (*yōsei-shugi*) and the emphasised self-help effort (*jijyo-doryoku*) – has certainly played a significant role in Japan’s international cooperation. Such distinctive aid mechanisms notably resulted in significant Japanese corporate participation throughout the project cycle, reflecting their great influence over political leaders and aid bureaucrats in



both donor and recipient countries. Cultural difference also can be linked to the relatively greater emphasis on loans rather than grants in the aid system in keeping with Japanese self perception of successful national development. Still, further work on both the similarities and differences between donor aid cultures is need to further unpack and clarify national aid dynamics.

A fourth research interest considers the possible comparative implications for aid delivery of the bureaucratic organisation and structure of a given donor's aid bureaucracy. Thus, the Japanese system represents a more intrinsically fragmented approach than, say, the American approach where USAID has a clear central role. Yet, and since no Japanese aid agency enjoys similar centrality, in part because of long-standing bureaucratic rivalries in Japan over power and resources, and in part due to the complex ODA-OOF mix of the aid system itself, there is a need for multi-agency involvement and negotiation, that is arguably not as pre-eminent elsewhere (DFID 2001; USAID 2006) Assessment here could thus potentially illustrate quite different bureaucratic configurations with variations in aid delivery and greening. Indeed, the current debates in Japan on the abolition of the JBIC certainly reflect the Japanese government's attempts to address this long standing issue of fragmentation. Thus, the Japanese government as part of Prime Minister Koizumi's reform initiative is considering to transfer the JBIC's ODA functions (providing yen-loans) to the JICA while OOF functions are privatised (*Kyodo-tsushin* 2005; *The Japan Times* 2005b, 2005c). Such potential changes in Japan's international cooperation is an intriguing subject for investigation in itself, even as it reiterates the utility of a comparative understanding of donor bureaucratic organisation and behaviour.

A final research interest links the findings of this thesis back to the research profile of political ecology itself. Here, a case can be made for a greater emphasis in that field on 'the contextual sources of environmental change' as opposed to the local community centred studies that have tended to predominate so far (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant and Bailey 1997;



Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005) Such an emphasis clearly does *not* call for a move away from locally-based study, but rather its accompaniment by a series of works (as with this thesis on the possible greening of the Japanese aid system) that spotlight other key actors in depth. The result ought to be a more well-rounded political ecology.

Indeed, it is hoped that this thesis, which has highlighted both the complexity and ambiguity involved in the ‘greening’ of Japanese aid in the 1990s, using a Philippine case study, has made a contribution to that endeavour. It has done so, notably, by situating the interstate sources of environmental change in a context of global environmental concerns, institutional dynamics and international political economy so as to underscore the complex links between global/regional political economy processes on the one hand and aid-related environmental change in the South on the other hand.



## **Appendix 1.**

### **Guide Questions for Qualitative Interviews**

The following questions guided the qualitative interviews with various actors including Japanese aid agencies, national and international NGO workers in Japan and the Philippines, Japanese consulting companies, state officials and local community members in the Philippines. These questions were for general guidance only and tended to vary depending on the interview context and interviewee responses due to the political sensitivity of this research topic.

- Do you think Japan's international cooperation system is different from that of Western donors? If so, in what way is it different and how would you evaluate the difference?
- How different is the greening Japanese aid from that of Western donors? If so, could you please explain it?
- How would you define 'greening' in general in terms of Japan's international cooperation? And what would be the most appropriate term to describe this trend in Japanese? Can you describe major characteristics of this greening?
- Since when (or a particular time or incident) do you think the green shift in Japanese aid started and what triggered this shift?
- In what way has this greening influenced your organisation (or vice versa)?
- Environmental guidelines were revised in the 1990s. What were the driving factors for the series of revisions?
- How has the sustainable development concept been incorporated into Japanese aid in terms of both policy and project? How do you translate it into Japanese? Have you noticed differences in aid practices since the arrival of this concept? If so, what were the major changes?
- What does environmental aid mean exactly in Japan's international cooperation? And how does the budget work? – for example, project category, funding criteria and interest rates in case of loans?
- Does environmental aid share the same problems with development aid? If so (or different), how so?
- How are brown and green issues categorised in Japanese aid? Are they under different or the same categories? Why are they categorised in that way?
- Do you think that the request-based approach has contributed to or otherwise reflected the recipient's participation in donor's decision



making? If so, can you give me concrete examples or explain your reasons to me?

- Were there particular reasons for the merger of OECF and JEXIM?
- Was there any change in terms of aid operation since the establishment of JBIC? How has this change influenced your work?
- Have consulting companies been a subject of greening? If so could you explain this to me with some concrete examples?
- How would you describe the relationship between consulting companies and Japanese aid agencies in general?
- Do consulting companies get specific requirements from the aid agencies in term of environmental consideration?
- Do consulting companies have their own environmental guideline? If so, do you have a department in charge of application of the guideline?, and what sort of concerns are most reflected at the stage of development study and project formation?

### **San Roque Multipurpose Project (SRMP) in Northern Luzon**

- What have been the aims of this project?
- If any, in what way is the 1990s SRMP different from its 1980s version?
- In what ways are the 1997 NPC EIA and 1998 ECC different from the former 1980s version?
- How was JEXIM's environmental appraisal procedure performed on the San Roque Multipurpose Project? How was JEXIM's environmental checklist applied to the said project?
- What were the problems identified during project implementation? If any, in what way have JEXIM/ JBIC dealt with the problem(s)?
- Did those problems become worse once the dam construction started? If so could you explain in more detail?
- What are your biggest worries about this project?
- How have those concerns raised by local communities been dealt with by NPC? What was the solution to it?
- How was Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project first perceived by the different actors?



- If any, what have been the problems encountered in carrying out the Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Project? Was there any concern by implementing agencies or the local community? If so, can you explain?
- How would you evaluate the JBIC field investigation team's activity? (or have you met them or heard about their activities?)

### **Sustainable Environmental Management Project in Northern Palawan**

- Could you explain this project - why and how was this environmental aid project first conceived?
- How different is this environmental aid project from a standard development aid project – for example, financing, project criteria for environmental appraisal?
- Is a development study for environmental aid different from that for development project by design? If so, how different are they? What are the major differences?
- How has environmental appraisal been carried out? Has the Philippine side completed EIA and ECC issuance?
- How did Conservation International become first involved as a NGO with an aid project (SAPROF)? Who took the initiative for this project? Was there any difficulty and problem you (as the programme coordinator) had to tackle and solve? Was there any conflict between your goal (Conservation International's goal) and OECF's? If so, how did you manage to compromise?
- How do you think this process (Japanese and local NGO participation in an aid project) was initiated and then reinforced? Was there any event that triggered this process?
- How did the local community respond to the ECAN zoning component? Do they understand how it works? What do you think is most important for this particular project in order to maximise its effectiveness?
- What has your project component achieved so far? Is there any problem with implementation?
- What are your special measures to make this component environmentally friendly?
- What sort of development does this municipality need?
- What are the biggest environmental problems in this municipality?



## Appendix 2.

### **JEXIM 1993 Environmental Checklist for Hydro Power Projects**

Item	Problems (and main countermeasures)	Considerations accorded to each problem
<b>1. Natural environment</b>		
(1) Localized microclimatic changes Will the construction of projects such as large dams in tropical dry areas will bring about localized climatic changes and cause damage such as localized heavy rains?		
(2) Leakage, failure of dam reservoir shoreline, induced earthquakes Is there a possibility of reservoir water leakage into the surrounding land, of reservoir bank failure, or of induced earthquakes?		
(3) Water temperature change, long-term turbidity Are there any risks that the discharge of cold reservoir water will adversely affect downstream aquatic life and agriculture? Is there a possibility that long-term water turbidity will reduce downstream sunlight penetration, thereby frustrating the growth or survival of aquatic life?		
(4) Eutrophication Is there any possibility that water quality will deteriorate owing to factors such as the abnormal occurrence of zooplankton and phytoplankton, causing oxygen depletion, or the elution of heavy metals from button mud, thus bringing about negative impacts such as making impossible for fish to survive? Will water pollution caused by eutrophication and other factors affect downstream agricultural water and drinking water?		
(5) Changes in downstream flow rate, salt water intrusion Is it possible that the changes in the downstream flow rate or salt water intrusion (changes in the downstream flow rate and a lessened downflow of dirt and sand will cause the river bed to fall) will adversely affect water use by downstream inhabitants, including fishing and agriculture, as well as the river mouth and marine ecosystems? Is there a possibility that blocking the downstream flow of fertile soil will adversely affect downstream agricultural production?		



(6) **Tropical forest loss**

Is there a possibility that the formation of reservoirs in level tropical areas will flood and destroy large areas of tropical forest? Does the discharged reservoir water comply with the country's environmental quality standards? Does reservoir water comply with the country's environmental quality standards?

(7) **Protection of rare flora and fauna**

Is there a possibility that the formation of large reservoirs, the eutrophication of reservoir water, and other changes will eliminate the habitats of endangered flora and fauna, thereby reducing the number of species and otherwise adversely affecting the ecosystem?

(8) **Impacts during construction?**

Has sufficient consideration been accorded to measures for the mitigation of noise, vibration, turbid water, dust, exhaust gases, and other impacts during construction?

**2. Social environment**

(1) **Consideration to inhabitants; NGOs**

Have the inhabitants who will be forced to relocate and other people living around the area been given explanations, and has the agreement of the inhabitants (including women) been obtained? Additionally, have the inhabitants been given proper compensation, and have efforts been made to minimize the project's effects through means such as guaranteeing their post-relocation means of livelihood? What moves are being made by NGOs (domestic and international)?

(2) **Cultural heritage**

Is there any possibility that the project will damage properties or historical sites that are of great historical, cultural, or religious value?

(3) **Water-related diseases**

Is there a possibility that dam construction will cause an outbreak of malaria or other water-related diseases?

**3. Monitoring**

Specifically, what kinds of monitoring plans are there? Is this plan judged to be appropriate?

Note. When there are no problems, write "None", and write the principal environmental measures that have already been decided upon parenthesis.

Source: JEXIM (1993:2).











## **Appendix 4.**

### **List of Formal Interviews**

- Acosta, R. U. (2004) Tourism Officer Designate, El Nido Tourism Office, Municipality of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 20 May
- Alisuag, L. (2004) Attorney, Puerto Princesa, 7 May
- Anda, R. D. (2004) Palawan Programme Manager, Conservation International, Puerto Princesa City, 8 May
- Aratame, N. (2004) Professor at Faculty of International Development, Department of Development Cooperation Takushoku University, Manila, 15-23 March
- Arzaga, W. G. (2004) Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff, Puerto Princesa, 11 May
- Bagasao, F. F. (2004) Executive Director, Community Organizers Multiversity, Manila, 15 March
- Balcos, M. (2004) Local Tourist Guide in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Puerto Princesa, 8 May
- Barangay Captain of Dalupirip (2004) Barangay Captain of Dalupirip, Itogon Municipality, Benguet Province, the Philippines, Barangay Dalupirip, 28 March
- Barangay San Nicholas Villagers (2004) 5 Barangay San Nicholas Villagers, San Nicholas, 25 March
- Barangay San Manuel Villagers (2004) 6 Barangay San Manuel Villagers, San Manuel, 24 -25 March
- Besitan, L. (2004) Ibaloi Person, Dalupirip, Benguet, the Philippines, Baguio and Dalupirip, 27-30 March
- Cabrido, C. A. (2004) Deputy Project Manager, ECAN Zoning Component, SEMP, Puerto Princesa, 7 May
- Capulet\*, R. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Baguio, 31 March
- Carling, J. (2004) Chairperson, Cordillera People's Alliance, Baguio, 17-18, 31 March
- Chan, F. C. (2004) JBIC SEMP Project Officer, Manila, 13 April
- Corral, L. (2004) Vice Mayor, Municipality of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 21 May
- Coruña, D. V. (2004) DOT-PMO Project Coordinator, SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, Manila, 25 May
- De La Calzada, R. J. M. (2004) Conservation Officer, WWF Philippines, El Nido, 21 May
- De La Cruz, N. B. (2004) Interview SRMP and IIWMP, Cordillera Administrative Region Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 31 March
- De Quiros, T. (2004) Consultant, Department of Agriculture, March - May
- De Vere Moss, P. (2004) European Co-Director, Palawan Tropical Forestry Protection Programme, Puerto Princesa, 11 May
- Densula, M. M. (2004) Technical Assistant and Researcher, El Nido Office, SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, El Nido, 18-22 May
- Distal, J. (2004) Owner of El Nido Boutique, Local Tourism Operator in El



- Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 18 May
- Doton, J. (2004) Leader of Tignay Dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayaway ti Agno (TIMMAWA), San Nicholas, 24 March
- Dygico, M.P. (2004) Project Manager, Tubbataha Project, WWF Palawan, Puerto Princesa, 12 May
- Fianza, G. S. (2004) Engineer, Itogon Integrated Watershed Management Program Office, Itogon, 29 March
- Fujimoto, N. (2004) Researcher, Programme Section, Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Centre, Osaka, 25 February
- Gacot-Lim, E. (2004) Municipal Mayor of El Nido, Palawan, El Nido, 21 May
- Gapuz, A. (2004) Dalupirip Interview, 27 March
- Hatae, H. (2003-2004) Development Finance and Environment Programme Staff, Friends of the Earth Japan, Tokyo and Manila, November 2003 - April 2004
- Hatake\*, K. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo, February
- Hayashi, K. (2004) Director General, Sector Strategy Development Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 5 February
- Higa, I. (2006) Programme Officer, Environment and Social Consideration Review Team, Office of Gender Equality and Environment and Social Considerations Review Planning and Coordination Department, JICA, 8 June
- Hiler, A. (2004) Project Manager, Soil Erosion Protection Component, SEMP, 20 May
- Hillel, O. (2004) Team Leader, SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, Puerto Princesa, 11 May
- Hirai, A. (2003 - 2004) Researcher at Ferris University (A Former JICA Employee), Tokyo, November 2003- February 2004
- Hori, M. (2003) Deputy Managing Director, Forestry and Natural Environment Department, JICA, Tokyo, 12 November
- Ishida, K. (2004) Staff, Japan Centre for a Sustainable Environment and Society, Tokyo, 18 February
- Itogon Municipal Mayor (2004) Itogon Municipal Mayor, 28 March
- Itoh, T. (2004) Evaluation Specialist/ Financial Economist, Evaluation Division 2, Operations Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 29 April and 6 May
- JBIC (2004h) JBIC Environmental Analysis Department, Development Assistance Department I (Philippines and Oceania Countries), Public Relations Office (Public Information and Disclosure Division), Tokyo, 21 January
- Kadowaki, D. (2004) Engineer, Deputy Director (Forestry), Division 3, Sector Strategy Development Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 5 February
- Kim, S. (2002) Professor at Faculty of Law and Political Science, Jeon-Ju University, South Korea, London, 15 June
- Kimura\*, T. (2003) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo, November
- Kitazawa, Y. (2006) Planning Division, Development Assistance Strategy Department, JBIC, Tokyo, 6 June
- Kojima, T. (2004) Programme Officer, Global Issues Division, Planning and Evaluation Department, JICA, Tokyo, 16 January
- Kume, T. (2004) Project Manager, SEMP ECAN Zoning Component (Consultant, Department of Development Planning, Pacific Consultants International), Tokyo, 12 February



- Kurita, H. (2004b) Associate Professor at Department of Comprehensive Policy Making, Faculty of Law and Letters, Ehime University., Baguio, March and April
- Kusanagi\*, T. (2004) Anonymous Interview, March
- Laririt, M. I. (2004) Manager, El Nido Resorts, Ten Knots Development Corporation, Palawan, El Nido, 21 May
- Maeda, T. (2004) Deputy Director General (Europe, Middle East and Africa) International Finance Department II, 10 February
- Magubat, J. E. (2004) Project Engineer, SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component, El Nido, 20 May
- Marcus, R. (2004) Corporate Communications, Quality Management Division, Pacific Consultants International, Tokyo, 12 February
- Matsumoto, I. (2003) Programme Director, Development Finance and Environment, Friends of the Earth Japan, Tokyo and Manila, November 2003
- Matsumoto, S. (2004) Director, Mekong Watch Japan, Tokyo, 3 February
- Matulac, J. L. S. (2004) Department Director, Project Operations & Implementation Department, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Staff, Puerto Princesa, 7 May
- Miclat, S. S. (2004) Senior Planning Manager, Environmental Science for Social Change (ESSC), Manila, 5 May
- Miyako\*, H. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Manila
- Mooy, N. (2004) Ibaloi Person, Tabu, Benguet, the Philippines, Baguio and Tabu, 26-27 March
- Mori\*, Y. (2004) Anonymous Interview, Tokyo
- Municipal Agriculturalist of Barangay San Manuel (2004) Municipal Agriculturalist, San Manuel, 24 March
- Murai, Y. (2003-2004) Professor at Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University, Tokyo, November 2003- February 2004
- Nagayama, K. (2004) Director, Resources Development and Management Division, Pacific Consultants International, Tokyo, 12 February
- Nakajima, K. (2006) Loan Officer, Division 2, International Finance Department I, JBIC, 6 June
- Ogawa, N. (2004) Senior Advisor, Office of the Vice President, Asian Development Bank, 6 May
- Ondrik, R. (2004) Chief Country Officer, Philippines Country Office, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 6 May
- Otadoy, F. P. (2004) Director, Department of Public Works and Highways, SEMP Soil Erosion Protection Component, Manila, 24 May
- Pablico, P. E. R. (2004) Senior Research Analyst, SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, Coron Office, Coron, 14-17 May
- Peña, R. E. (2004) DENR Interview, Regional Director, Mines and Geoscience Bureau, Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, April – May
- Plantilla, A. E. (2004) Executive Director, Haribon Foundation, 30 April
- Rabe, G. R. (2004) Technical Assistant and Researcher, SEMP Project Management and Tourism Development Component, Coron Office, Coron, 14-17 May
- Reyes, V.C. (2004) Project Manager, WWF Palawan, Puerto Princesa, 12 May
- Rimban, L. (2004) Broadcast Director, the Philippine Center for



- Investigative Journalism, 12 April
- Roces\*, S. (2004) Anonymous Interview
- Sariego, M. P. (2004) Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of Busuanga, Palawan, Busuwanga, 17 May
- Suzuki, H. (2006) Advisor, Development Assistance Department I, JBIC, 6 June
- Takahashi, F. (2004) Manager of Corporate Planning Team, General Affairs Department, Kansai Environmental Engineering Center Co. Ltd. (a predecessor of The General Environmental Technos, Co. Ltd.) 25 February
- Takayanagi, A. (2003) Professor at Faculty of Global and Inter-cultural Studies, Ferris University, Yokohama, Yokohama, 9 December
- Tamondong, S. D. (2004) Evaluation Specialist, Division 1, Operation Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 26 April
- Tamura, Y. (2004) Advisor to the President, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 6 May
- Tanaka, S. (2004) Senior Poverty Reduction Specialist, Poverty Reduction and Social Development Division, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 26 April
- Tobias, F. O. (2004) Manager, Planning and Management Division, DENR-CAR, Baguio, 30 March
- Tsuda, M. (2004) Professor at Department of Philippine Studies, Graduate School of Integrated Studies in Language and Society, Osaka University of Foreign Studies, Osaka, 20 February
- Tsuji, M. (2004) Environmental Specialist, Environmental and Social Safeguard Division, Regional and Sustainable Development Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 6 May
- Usui, K. (2004) Associate Expert, Global Issues Division, Planning and Evaluation Department, JICA, Tokyo, 4 February
- Valdez, T. (2004) Environmental and Social Development Manager, San Roque and Manila, 25 March and 24 May
- Yamamoto., A. (2002) Resident Representative, JICA, UK Office, London, 17 October
- Yamashita, K. (2003) Coordinator Japan Programme, Conservation International Japan, Tokyo, 20 November
- Yokoyama, M. (2003-2004) Professor at Faculty of Global and Inter-cultural Studies, Ferris University, Yokohama, November 2003-March 2004



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