

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King's Research Portal at <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/>



Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden and Taiwan A Comparative Study

Yuan, Li-Chung

Awarding institution:
King's College London

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT



Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed

under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

licence. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work

Under the following conditions:

- Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
- Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
- No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

This electronic theses or dissertation has been downloaded from the King's Research Portal at <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/>



Title: Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden and Taiwan – A Comparative Study

Author: Li-Chung Yuan

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>

You are free to:

- Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work

Under the following conditions:

- Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
- Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
- No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden and Taiwan – A Comparative Study

Li-Chung Yuan

A thesis submitted to King's College London, in
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. in
the Department of War Studies

September 2013

Abstract

Shaped by some similar but also contrasting geostrategic and domestic political circumstances, in 2009 Sweden and Taiwan - both non-aligned - coincidentally decided to suspend conscription and shift to an all-volunteer force (AVF). Without facing an immediate military threat to its territory, Sweden aims to build a capability-based expeditionary force that is usable for both international and domestic operations. For Taiwan, while still facing the military threat from the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), the goal is to build a smaller but smarter AVF with an enhanced deterrence capability to defend the homeland in wartime and to conduct disaster relief operations during peacetime. Their ongoing experiences in military personnel reform present an opportunity to examine critical issues surrounding the post-decision implementation process of the AVF.

This study compares and contrasts the concurrent AVF transformation in both countries by discussing their historical and strategic contexts and examining the drivers of change. The AVF implementation process is considered in terms of the strategic goals and objectives that both countries aim to achieve, how they define the metrics and criteria of their respective AVF transformation, and the factors that facilitate or impede the implementation process. The key objective of the thesis is to better understand the current status of AVF implementation in Sweden and Taiwan and to evaluate their likely chances of success. This thesis offers a contribution to the literature on the decline of mass armed forces, which hitherto has not included a European/Asian comparative analysis. Furthermore, the thesis has policy relevance to both countries, enabling them to share some lessons from each other, and to other countries considering a similar course of action.

Keywords: All-Volunteer Force (AVF), Sweden, Taiwan

Acknowledgments

Looking back to my military career, I should say that I have been one of the lucky few to be sent abroad for pursuing postgraduate degrees. Studying a PhD degree of War Studies at King's College London is truly an honour for me. First of all, I am so grateful to my supervisor Professor Christopher Dandeker, for his expert guidance and continued support towards my PhD. Without his recommendation, my thesis could have been a one-country show. Professor Dandeker suggested me to incorporate Sweden and make the thesis as a comparative study, which has broaden my view and research scope. Scandinavia was a strange place to me before I started my PhD; now I am much familiar with the Swedish Armed Forces and have built wide contacts.

Having been able to pass the viva, I am grateful to Professors Joseph Soeters and Andrew Dorman for being my examiners, spending time to read my thesis, and giving me so many insightful and useful comments. By the same token, I want to thank my secondary supervisor Dr Alessio Patalano for his useful advices during my thesis writing.

As a foreigner to Sweden, I am indebted to Dr Karl Yden of Gothenburg University for his kind efforts in helping me build contacts with the Swedish Armed Forces. Without his coordination and assistance, it was not possible for me to conduct so many important interviews with the senior officials of the SAF. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Erik Hedlund of the Swedish National Defence College for organising the cross-national survey, which became a crucial part in my thesis. In addition, I want to acknowledge the Ministry of National Defense of Republic of China (Taiwan) for providing me financial support to study PhD at King's.

Without a doubt, I have to thank my wife Miao-Kuang, my son Kai-Hung and daughter Jia-Zih for their encouragement, endless support and patience. We cannot forget the wonderful time we had during our three years of stay in London, which was such a special and sweet experience in our life. I would also want to thank mother for her concern about me. Finally, I want to tell my father in Heaven that 'I have made it!'.

Table of contents

Abstract	I
Acknowledgments	II
List of Tables	V
List of Figures	VI
List of Abbreviations	VII
 Chapter 1 Introduction	 1
1.1 Overview of Background	3
1.2 Literature Review	8
1.2.1 The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Conscription	10
1.2.2 Analysing the process of AVF implementation Cases of AVF Transition in the West	18
1.3 Research Outline	37
1.4 Case Selection: Why Sweden and Taiwan?	40
1.5 Methods	44
1.6 Chapter outline	47
 Chapter 2 Background and Context of Sweden and Taiwan	 50
2.1 Introduction	50
2.2 Sweden	51
2.2.1 Historical Context: Swedish Defence and Conscription	51
2.2.2 Post-Cold War Era	58
2.2.3 Political and Strategic Context:	63
2.2.4 Defence Transformation since the Cold War	64
2.3 Taiwan	68
2.3.1 Historical Background	68
2.3.2 Strategic Context	73
2.3.3 Defence Reform	77
2.3.4 Reasons to End Conscription in Taiwan	79
2.4 Emerging Themes	81
2.5 Conclusion	83
 Chapter 3 Strategic Goals and Objectives of the AVF in Sweden and Taiwan	 85
3.1 Introduction	85
3.2 Sweden	86
3.3 Taiwan	109
3.4 Discussion and conclusion	132
 Chapter 4 Metrics and Criteria of AVF Implementation in Sweden and Taiwan	 135
4.1 Introduction	135
4.2 Government policy makers' metrics and criteria for personnel reforms in Sweden	136

4.3	Government policy makers' metrics and criteria for personnel reforms in Taiwan	156
4.4	Conclusion	183
Chapter 5	Factors, Conditions, and Constraints on the AVF Implementation	185
5.1	Introduction	185
5.2	Sweden	186
5.3	Taiwan	205
5.4	Questionnaire-based survey on soldiers' attitudes, motivation and satisfaction	219
5.5	Conclusion	238
Chapter 6	The Two Cases compared and the Implications	241
6.1	Introduction	241
6.2	Contexts, goals, metrics and factors	242
6.3	Comparisons between two cases	247
Chapter 7	Conclusion	251
Reference		257
Appendix		271

List of Tables

Table 3-1	The Personnel Structure of the SAF	96
Table 3-2	Number of Specialist Officer Positions	101
Table 3-3	Objectives of Defence Reform and Timelines	107
Table 3-4	Transformation of the Swedish defence	109
Table 3-5	Estimated Personnel Target during the phase of Implementation and Validation	119
Table 3-6	Three phases of AVF Implementation	130
Table 3-7	Transformation of Taiwanese Defence	131
Table 3-8	Comparisons of AVF implementation between Sweden and Taiwan	134
Table 4-1	Overall Current and Forecasted Size of SAF Personnel (as of 31 December 2012) and Planned Recruitment	141
Table 4-2	Recruitment of volunteer soldiers in 2011 and 2012	141
Table 4-3	Causes for regular soldiers drop outs as of 31 December 2012	142
Table 4-4	Comparison of quality between conscripts and volunteer soldiers	143
Table 4-5	Personnel flow and Targets of reserve soldiers	149
Table 4-6	Officers set to be placed in Specialist Officer positions (in %)	153
Table 4-7	Planned number of officers and specialist officers	153
Table 4-8	Implementation of Military Downsizing	158
Table 4-9	Performance Index: Increase of volunteer personnel	159
Table 4-10	Percentage of the overall draftees with university and college degrees	167
Table 4-11	Volunteer soldiers' intention to stay in the armed forces	175
Table 4-12	Recruitment of NCOs in 2012	180
Table 4-13	International comparison of the officer/NCO/soldier ratio	180
Table 5-1	Military Expenditure of Sweden	204
Table 5-2	Military spending of Taiwan	216

List of Figures

Figure 1-1	Typology of Force Structure and Expected Changes in Europe	13
Figure 1-2	Research outline of the thesis	38
Figure 3-1	Personnel trend of the SAF	95
Figure 3-2	The proportion of women in the armed forces	98
Figure 3-3	Defence policy and military strategy of Taiwan	113
Figure 3-4	Implementation progress of AVF	121
Figure 3-5	The public image of Taiwan's military personnel	128
Figure 4-1	Recruitment targets of the basic training	138
Figure 4-2	Recruitment results of volunteer soldiers from youth cohorts	163
Figure 4-3	Recruitment Rate of volunteer soldiers from the youth cohorts	164
Figure 4-4	Performance of volunteer soldiers assessed by superiors	169
Figure 4-5	Volunteer soldiers' satisfaction toward jobs and the armed forces	171
Figure 4-6	Superiors' perception on the performance between male and female soldiers	172
Figure 4-7	Volunteer soldiers' satisfaction with the military service	174
Figure 4-8	Job satisfaction of volunteer soldiers	176
Figure 5-1	Support for SAF and people's willingness to defend	188
Figure 5-2	People's preference of type of military	190
Figure 5-3	Public support for international peace missions	191
Figure 5-4	Threat perception on Russia	193
Figure 5-5	Public perceptions of Sweden's NATO membership	194
Figure 5-6	People's attitudes toward the personnel systems	207
Figure 5-7	Motivating factors for volunteer soldiers to stay in the armed forces	212
Figure 5-8	Discouraging factors (obstacles) for volunteer soldiers not to remain in the armed forces	213
Figure 5-9	Expectations of basic military training	224
Figure 5-10	Motivation to serve in the military	225
Figure 5-11	Reasons for completing the basic military training	227
Figure 5-12	Who and what motivates soldiers to join the military?	228
Figure 5-13	Soldiers' self-assessment of quality	230
Figure 5-14	The surveyed recruits' self-assessment of working attitudes	231
Figure 5-15	Identification with the military roles	232
Figure 5-16	Satisfaction with basic training	234
Figure 5-17	1 Perceived impact of basic training on knowledge and skills	235
Figure 5-18	Motives for pursuing a military career	236
Figure 5-19	Influence from within the military on decision to pursue a military career	237

List of Abbreviations

AVF	All-Volunteer Force
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CR	Conscript Ratio
DIB	Defence Industrial Base
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
GMU	Basic Military Training
GSS/K	Regular Soldier (Sweden)
GSS/T	Reserve Soldier (Sweden)
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KMT	Nationalist Party
MAF	Mass Armed Forces
MND	Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan)
MOD	Ministry of Defence (Sweden)
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MPR	Military Participation Ratio
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SAF	Swedish Armed Forces
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Outline

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic transformation in the international security environment. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact substantially decreased the military threat to the Western world. Owing to this reduced level of military threat, the armed forces, whose structure and purpose was rooted in Cold War thinking, gradually lost their function and legitimacy. Since then, Western countries cut down on armaments production and decreased the size of their military establishment. In particular, the armed forces of European states have been undergoing radical reform; with a handful of exceptions, most of them have been transforming their militaries. They are doing so by both downsizing the military establishment and also ending conscription and shifting towards an all-volunteer force (AVF) system. Despite the fact that, historically speaking, compulsory military service was the backbone and major source of manpower for the armed forces, this military transformation has become increasingly prominent.

After the Second World War, the UK, Ireland and Luxembourg were the only countries to adopt the AVF in Europe; however the situation changed dramatically after the fall of Berlin Wall. In the European context, starting with Belgium and the Netherlands, which decided to abolish conscription in 1992 and 1993 respectively, the following European countries have to date already ended conscription: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Hungary, and Czech Republic. The latest participants in this trend in the past three years have been Sweden and Germany. Both countries, which have a tradition and long history of conscription, ended conscription in 2010 and 2011 respectively.

The trend of ending conscription has also aroused keen debate in East Asia. In a different geostrategic background and security circumstances in which China still poses

a serious military threat to regional security, in 2009, nonetheless, Taiwan still decided to do away with conscription. Judging from the transition cases in Europe, shifting from conscription to an AVF was not an easy task, and it has sparked various issues in terms of what is required to accomplish a successful AVF implementation.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the implementation efforts of AVF transition in Sweden and Taiwan through examining the goals and objectives of transition, identifying metrics and criteria for implementation, and discussing the factors and conditions that influence the results of transition. Although the focus of research is primarily on the post-decision implementation process, it would not be convincing if the process of decision making itself were not discussed; a review of the background and context of the decision is essential as it forms an important part of the goals and objectives of transition. In order to take both pre and post decision processes into account, two conceptual approaches are adopted as the foundation of the thesis: the first approach provides a theoretical foundation- theoretical arguments about the nature and causes of the decline of mass armed forces and the abolition of conscription; the second approach is an empirical foundation - cases of the post-decision implementation processes in the West and what lessons can be drawn from those cases. These two approaches are intertwined and both play important roles in this study.

To analyse the likely success of AVF transition in both cases, it is imperative to scrutinise the details of their goals of transition. In general, like every other country seeking this kind of change, both Sweden and Taiwan are trying to accomplish the same goal, namely a zero draft. However, underneath this shared general goal, the specific objectives for achieving AVF in both countries (and in other countries considering this transition) are not necessarily the same; the differences stem from the fact that they are operating in different contexts. The two cases share characteristics of any shift to AVF; but this thesis focuses on the specifics of transition through an analysis of similarities and differences between Sweden and Taiwan.

Understanding the decision to shift to an AVF including strategic goals and specific objectives is essential. Before examining their implementation process, hence, the immediate context and background as to how each decision was made need to be

comprehended. Nonetheless, as this thesis focuses on the process of post-decision implementation, reviewing pre-decision processes in detail and predicting the future of AVF transition are beyond the scope of study. To fully understand what their goals are and the objectives they contain, such as size, structure and mission of their armed forces, this study first needs to review the contexts of decision-making and identify the drivers of change. This chapter reviews the literature on the decline of mass armed forces (MAF) as a theoretical approach from which to discuss the key theories about major drivers of change in military organisations in western states after World War II.

In terms of research timeframe, based on the implementation process this thesis makes an evaluation of how likely both transitions are going to be successful, rather than predicting the outcomes of their future. It starts with the time when both countries took the decision to end conscription and finishes when this thesis is completed in September 2013, and sets out to analyse how both cases define their goals of transition in terms of specific objectives, what they have done so far about those objectives, what metrics for success are adopted to achieve these objectives, and what are the factors and conditions that would either help or hinder the implementation of AVF. The conclusion of the thesis will provide an evaluation of how likely the success of their attempts will be. It is important to note that this thesis will not be able to conclude by dichotomising whether the transitions in both cases have succeeded or failed; it will rather, through an empirical assessment, analyse how well (or poorly) both countries have performed during the implementation process, and will make suggestions on what they should be doing in order to fix any remaining problems.

1.1 Overview of background

Changes in security environment and decline of mass armed forces

Due to changes in the international security environment and the end of ‘total war’ following the conclusion of the Second World War, states started to demobilise their mass armies.¹ Since then the overall size of the military establishment in Western states

¹ Post 1945 the idea of total war persisted but with deterrence in the nuclear age (Cold War); eventually the war did not break out.

has been substantially reduced; most importantly, the structure of armed forces has gradually been transformed from the Cold War type (mass army relying on conscription) to a smaller but more professional force equipped with more complex weapon systems. The conscript ratio (CR, defined as the number of conscripts as a proportion of the total number of employed military personnel) also decreased because armed forces started to recruit and rely more on volunteer soldiers.² A few Western states shifted their military structure away from conscription to an all-volunteer force (AVF) system, such as the UK in 1960, US in 1973, Canada in 1945 and Australia in 1972, while most West European states reduced the size of the military establishment, although persisting with conscription. To examine the phenomenon of force reduction and the shift in military personnel structure, the theory of the decline of mass armed forces gradually emerged.

The MAF played a crucial role in both World Wars and persisted in the East-West confrontation during the Cold War era. Its structure comprised a relatively homogeneous system based on compulsory military service for manpower supply, and relied on a mass of citizens with a small core of professional cadres to perform military tasks.³ Military sociologists argued that the decline in MAF started after the demobilisation of armed forces following the end of the Second World War - a total war - in 1945. Van Doorn observed that military organisation shifted away from a mass type to a professional force after 1945.⁴ Burk also pointed out that, since the end of Second World War, the format of military organisation in the liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America has fundamentally changed.⁵ A new military system - what Janowitz called the 'force-in-being', which was a smaller force equipped with more sophisticated weapons and able to react quickly for international missions - gradually emerged.⁶ All this notwithstanding, and despite a smaller size of the military, conscription was still widely adopted as the dominant system for military manpower in the Western armed forces during the Cold War era.

² With adoption of a two-tier system, which is a mixed personnel system combining conscripts and volunteers.

³ Dandeker, C 1999, *Facing uncertainty: Report No 1*, Swedish National Defence College, p.49.

⁴ Van Doorn, J 1975, 'The decline of the mass army in the west', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February, pp.147-156.

⁵ Burk, J 1992, 'The decline of mass armed forces and compulsory military service', *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 8, No 1, pp.45-59.

⁶ Janowitz, M 1971. *The professional soldier*. The Free Press, New York, p.ix.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact altered the geostrategic balance of the world and significantly reduced the level of military threat, especially in Europe. While the post-Cold War peace is considered a norm in the North Atlantic context, the change in security environment in East Asia after the Cold War has been less evident than that of West Europe. Given the new security environment, militaries in Western Europe with mass army type were thus subject to increasing criticism and soon became obsolete as territorial defence was no longer the primary objective of the armed forces. With the pace of decline in the MAF being accelerated by the end of Cold War, the pace of reform in the military organisation of Western states has thus been relatively quick. In contrast to the conscripts of the MAF, the personnel of AVF are considered to be more professional,⁷ flexible and can be deployed rapidly in support of today's expeditionary missions, including war-fighting and peacekeeping, internal security and policing, humanitarian relief and nation-building.⁸ This increased efficiency is due to higher motivation and longer training among AVF personnel.

After the end of Cold War, owing to a much reduced military threat to national territory, the most important and underlying legal and moral justification for conscription - territorial defence - gradually lost its claim to be the main mission priority. Thus it was possible and legitimate for Western states to further reduce the size of their military establishment. Since the main mission of today's armed forces has shifted to outside European territories for various types of abovementioned expeditionary operations, the functions and capabilities of conscripted forces have been found to be limited and insufficient. To date, by law, no country in Western Europe deploys conscripts abroad to perform expeditionary missions unless they volunteer and undergo appropriate training. This raises a question: is it because of political legitimacy or skill problems that countries are constrained from sending conscripts overseas? In the political context, as there is a limited threat to national territory, the politicians and the public think it is not legitimate to send conscripts abroad because they are obliged to defend the territory. As

⁷ There is confusion in literature as people often tend to misinterpret that AVF means 'professional' force. Compared with conscript soldiers, volunteer soldiers serve for longer period, thus becoming more professional experts in terms of combat skills and other military specialties. Professional has been used too often as another word for volunteer.

⁸ Edmunds, T 2006, 'What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe', *International Affairs*, 82: 6, pp.1059-75.

for skills, it depends upon the missions; for example, reserve police, communication and engineering corps [based on volunteer ex-conscripts with appropriate civilian skills] on international missions such as in Bosnia might be more competent and useful than regular infantry units.

In spite of the decision of most European states to restructure and transform the armed forces after the Cold War, and partly due to their geographic proximity to Russia, Scandinavian states still upheld the conscription system. Owing to its military nonalignment and neutrality policy, Sweden managed to avoid becoming involved as a combatant in two world wars. It was not allied throughout the Cold War and as such it did not share NATO's collective security protection. However, Sweden has acted as an informal member of NATO in that it is still an aspect of Sweden's defence, and even more so in recent years. Its consequent needs for self-defence drove the unique structure of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) and conscription thus became an essential source of personnel. It has also helped Sweden develop a strong and advanced defence industry. This reflects the fact that if countries are unsure or not confident about an alliance, not only does conscription play an important role, but they also need to develop an indigenous defence industry as a backup. Despite a long tradition of neutrality and conscription, since operations in Bosnia the mission orientation of the SAF has gradually shifted from territorial defence to expeditionary peace keeping and support operations. Finally in 2009, Sweden decided to suspend conscription and shift to an AVF.

In East Asia, the decline of MAF has not been as evident as it has been in Europe. The level of military threat in this region has not reduced as the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been significantly modernised during the last decade and the situation in North Korea is still unstable and unpredictable, especially under the control of Kim Jong-un. Given this hostile and unpredictable security environment, countries in this region have not made fundamental reforms to the personnel structure of the armed forces. Taiwan, which faces a persistent threat from China and lacks international recognition as a fully-fledged state, has felt it has had to rely on conscription to staff its armed force for more than half century in order to provide its own security. Nonetheless, without the similar circumstances facilitating the

shift to an AVF in the West, coincidentally in 2009, Taiwan decided to suspend conscription. Nevertheless, Taiwan set a longer timeframe, aiming to terminate drafting soldiers by the end of 2014.⁹

The theoretical framework of this thesis relies on two major themes as theoretical approaches. The first reviews and examines the literature of decline of the MAF from which this research gains as a whole and identifies the research question. It sets up this research by discussing the MAF literature. However, despite the fact that the MAF literature covers a wide range of issues and subjects, it has rarely explored and studied the on-going implementation process of the AVF. Therefore, another approach is needed in order to bridge this knowledge gap. The second approach is focused on the analysis of the implementation process. For convenience, these two approaches are labelled as A1 and A2. Although this thesis does not aim to re-explore the MAF literature, analysing the background and context is by no means trivial. To this end, the A1 identifies the studying field and the research question, and sets the context of the thesis. The second approach (A2), on the other hand, covers the empirical and essential part of the thesis with the aim to answer the research question. Each approach has its function this thesis; nevertheless, they are not on an equal footing as the main task of the thesis is not to discuss the MAF literature but rather focusing on the analysis of the implementation process. In other words, A2 plays a larger role than A1. This does not deny the contribution of the first approach because the AVF implementation cannot be analysed from a vacuum.

Although much has been written on the theme of force transition in Western states, the literature focuses mainly on why decisions were made with little analysis of how their transformations were implemented and managed. In addition, even less literature focuses on Scandinavian states; among them, Sorensen, Leander, Petersson and Dandeker stand out.¹⁰ Also, research on the MAF in East Asian states has long been a

⁹ Note: both states suspend, not abolish conscription.

¹⁰ See Sorensen, H 2000, 'Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century,' *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.26, No.2, Winter, pp.313-334.; Leander, A 2006, 'Enduring Conscription: Vagueness and Varnplikt in Sweden', *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, pp.119-136.; and Leander, A 2003, 'Disenchanted conscription: a military recruitment system in need of justification', working paper, Danish Institute for International Studies.; Petterson, M 2011, 'Defense transformation and legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War: theoretical and practical implications', *Armed Forces & Society*, vol 37, no 4, pp.701-724. And Dandeker, C 2000, *Facing Uncertainty: Report*

neglected topic since there has been not much on dynamics of conscription and MAF in East Asia in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, comparisons of AVF transition between Eastern and Western states were rarely made. The cases of Sweden and Taiwan provide an opportunity to fill the knowledge gap with regard to this theme.

1.2 Literature review

In order to establish the conceptual framework of analysis to examine the two cases of AVF transition, reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on the decline of MAF and AVF transition is essential. This includes two components which serve as the twin approaches of the conceptual framework of the thesis. It first reviews the major sources on the decline of MAF, which include Janowitz (1971), Van Doorn (1975), Feld (1975), Kelleher (1978), Burk (1992, 2006 & 2007), Van der Meulen & Manigart (1997), Manigart (2006), Haltiner (1998 & 2003), Dandeker (1999 & 2003), Williams (2008) and Segal (2009).¹¹ Reviewing these contributions helps form the theoretical foundation of this thesis by examining why and how the MAF in the western world has declined in response to the changes in social trends and the international security environment. As mentioned in the previous section, it is a question of balance how far the first approach (A1) drives the thesis compared with the second approach (A2). A1 sets the context and helps the thesis show that transition has been neglected. A2 is the main focus which sets out to provide basis for framework of goals, objectives, metrics,

No 2, Swedish National Defence College.

¹¹ There is extensive literature about the decline of MAF, such as Janowitz, op. cit.; Van Doorn, op. cit.; Feld, M 1975, 'Military Professionalism and the Mass Army', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, p.191.; Kelleher, C 1978, 'Mass armies in the 1970s, The debate in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 5, No 1, November, pp.3-30.; Burk, op. cit.; Burk, J, 2006, 'Military mobilization in modern western societies', in *Handbook of the Sociology of The Military*, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New York, pp.111-128; Burk, J, 2007, 'The changing moral contract for military service', in *The long war: a new history of US national security policy since world war II*, eds A Bacevich, pp.405-455.; Van der Meulan, J and Manigart, P 1997, 'Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The final shift to the All-volunteer force', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp.315-332; Manigart, P, 2006, 'Restructuring of the Armed Forces', in *Handbook of the Sociology of The Military*, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New York, pp.323-343; Haltiner, K 1998, 'The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.7-36.; Haltiner, K 2003, 'The decline of the European Mass Armies', in *Handbook of the Sociology of The Military*, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New York, pp.361-384.; Dandeker 1999; Dandeker, C 2003, 'Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century', in *Handbook of the Sociology of The Military*, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New York, pp.405-416. 2003.; Williams, J 2008, 'The military and society beyond the postmodern era', *Orbis*, Vol 52, Issue 2, pp.199-216.; and Segal, D 2009, 'Building and Maintaining a post-9/11 All-Volunteer Military Force,' in *The impact of 9/11 on politics and war: the day that changed everything?*, eds M Morgan, Palgrave Macmillan.

factors and conditions, a crucial empirical part of thesis so there is not much room for MAF theory. However, A1 has rarely touches upon the management of transition process, which is the main focus of this research, as analysis of literature shows that not much has been done.

The second theoretical approach focuses on empirical analysis by discussing the cases of post-decision implementation in the US and major west European countries. It aims to generate a framework to examine the transitions in Sweden and Taiwan through the analysis of these cases. Most of the literature on AVF reforms were conducted after the AVF transition in the UK in the 1960s; major studies include Bachman, Blair & Segal (1977), Janowitz and Moskos (1979), Segal (1989), Jehn & Selden (2002), Bos-Bakx & Soeters (2003), Battistelli (2003), Boëne (2003), Forster, Edmunds & Cottey (2003), Williams (2005), Gilroy and Williams (2006), Lecomte (2006), Rostker (2006), Hartley (2007), Tresch and Leuprecht (2010).¹² These contributions provide a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of how the transitions were implemented, what obstacles and problems were encountered, what measures were undertaken to solve problems and whether those measures were effective. This knowledge is potentially useful to countries seeking to make the same transformation. In this regard a question can be asked in which case might be more suitable for the SAF to emulate or learn from and which models of change might best fit the needs of Taiwan.

¹² Bachman, J, Blair, John & Segal, D 1977, *The All-Volunteer Force*. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.; Janowitz, M and Moskos, C 1979, 'Five years of the all-volunteer force: 1973-1978', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 5, No.2, February, pp.171-218.; Segal, D 1989, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence.; Jehn, C & Selden, Z 2002, 'The End of Conscription in Europe?' *Contemporary Economic Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 2, April, pp.93-100.; Bos-Bakx, M, & Soeters, J 2003, 'The professionalization of the Netherland's Armed Forces', in *Conscription vs. all-volunteer forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.83-99.; Battistelli, F 2003, 'The professionalization of the Italian Armed Forces', in *Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Baden-Baden, pp.151-171.; Boëne, B 2003, 'Going, Going, Gone: How France did away with conscription 1996-2001', in *Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.101-132.; Forster, A, Edmunds, T, & Cottey A 2003, *Soldiers and societies in postcommunist Europe: legitimacy and change*, Palgrave, New York.; Williams, C 2005, 'From conscripts to volunteers: NATO's transitions to all-volunteer forces', *Naval War College Review*, Winter. Accessed 2 Nov 2009.; Lecomte, J 2006, 'The rise and death of conscription: the case of France', in *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, p.78.; Rostker, B 2006, *The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. Rand Corporation. Santa Monica, CA.; Hartley, K 2007, 'The British Experience with an All-Volunteer Force', in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, p.287-312. Tresch, T & Leuprecht C 2010, *Europe without soldiers?* McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, Canada.

1.2.1 The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Conscription

This section discusses the first theoretical perspective, which reviews the definition and history of the decline of MAF. The past 60 years have seen a considerable reduction in the size of military establishment all over the world, especially in Western Europe. In addition, the proportion of defence budgets against national GDP, the conscript ratio and the average length of compulsory military service have also been in constant decline. Since the 1990s, conscription as a basis of military manpower has been waning at a remarkable pace. Owing to the considerably reduced military threat, countries in West Europe such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain started to shift away from conscription to an AVF system. The literature on the MAF and its decline is ample; the major arguments are discussed below.

History and definition of the MAF

The structure of the MAF relies on a small core of professional cadres (on a voluntary basis) and the mass conscripted citizens to perform military tasks. The term ‘mass armed forces’ usually refers to large standing armies,¹³ and they can be traced back to the military systems of the European industrial land powers from the 19th century until the end of World War II. The rise and spread of the MAF was marked by the French ‘Levée en Masse’ introduced in 1793; five years later France passed the ‘Jourdan Law’ in September 1798 which ushered the era of the mass conscript army.¹⁴ The ‘Levée en Masse’ greatly influenced Europe’s military organisation for the next 150 years until 1945. The MAF experienced a short-term decline during 1815-1850, and rose again and spread in 1870 with the dominance of Prussian Army in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. The trend of MAF also spread to Asia as Japan copied the model of Prussian Army to develop a mass army in conjunction with its new Conscription Law passed in 1873. In fact, early in 1870, Japan had already modelled its navy on that of the Royal Navy in an effort to modernise its military and respond to western power in Asia. The MAF flourished from the rise of the Prussian Army in 1870 and served as the backbone of

¹³ The MAF mainly focused on armies as they are more labour-intensive rather than navies and air forces because they are more technology or equipment intensive. There is a military idiom in western militaries: ‘Army equips the man, Navy and Air Force man the equipment’.

¹⁴ Gooch, J, *Armies in Europe*, Routledge, 1980, pp.25-30.

military manpower supply during the two world wars until 1945. Therefore, the end of World War II is considered by military sociologists as the starting point in the decline of MAF.

Dutch sociologist Jacques Van Doorn wrote an influential article on the MAF in the founding years of military sociology and made an analysis of the decline of the MAF; his definition of the MAF comprises three components.¹⁵ First, the MAF is large in size which is associated with the high military participation ratio (MPR).¹⁶ Second, the MAF is relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated, meaning the weapon technology used by forces is fairly simple. Third, society can mobilise its members for large-scale collective objectives; examples include the conscription army of the Nazi and Soviet forces during WWII,¹⁷ and it can also be found in democracies at war such as UK and US. Until now, the totalitarian states (e.g. North Korea, Iran and Syria) have been still able to mobilise their populace en masse for political and military purposes.

The model of the Prussian army in the 19th and 20th centuries represents a typical format for the MAF. The Prussian commander-in-chief Helmuth von Moltke stressed to the Reichstag that, 'without conscription, the state's security would be forfeit and therefore all productivity lost'.¹⁸ The victory of the Prussian mass army over France during the Franco-Prussian War was partly because the French models of military organisation and railway systems were inferior to those of Prussia.¹⁹ After that war, the German conscription model of military organisation had thus become the basis of the European land powers. General mobilisation turned what had been a privilege into a civic duty; it became an item of dogma that without general mobilisation the state could not go to war.²⁰ It served as a means for Germany to fight two total wars in 1914 and 1939, although it still led to its defeats.

Using a quantitative method, Swiss military sociologist Karl Haltiner defined the MAF

¹⁵ Van Doorn, op. cit., p.149.

¹⁶ The military participation ratio 'MPR' was first termed and defined by Andreski as the proportion of military utilized individuals in the total population. See Andreski, S, *Military Organization and Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1954, p.33.

¹⁷ Russia calls World War II as a 'Great Patriotic War'.

¹⁸ Strachan, H 1983, *European armies and the conduct of war*, Routledge, London, pp.109-111.

¹⁹ Howard, M, 1961, *The Franco-Prussian war*, Routledge, pp.1-8.

²⁰ Feld, op. cit., p.203.

by looking at the Conscript Ratio (CR). He adopted the MPR and CR to evaluate how far the decline of MAF in Western Europe has progressed since the Cold War. He divided and defined the West European armed forces into four types:

Type 0. All-volunteer forces, e.g. UK and Ireland. Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal joined this group in late 90s and early 21st Century.

Type 1. Conscripts constitute less than 50 percent of the armed forces (also called pseudo-conscript forces). The majority of the force members are volunteers although these forces could legally rely on universal conscription for the recruitment of their military personnel.

Type 2. More than half, but less than two thirds of the armed forces are filled with conscripts. The military organisation is in MAF type.

Type 3. Armed forces whose CR was above two thirds; they can also be called 'Hard Core' conscript Forces.

Applying the two selected cases to Haltiner's model, Sweden is now in Type 0 as it reached a zero draft in July 2010. Taiwan is currently adopting a two-tier system and has successfully reduced its conscript ratio from 57% in 2005 to 30% in 2012; thus it is now in Type 1 and is aiming to reach Type 0 by end of 2014 (Figure 1-1).²¹

Drivers of Decline of MAF and Main Arguments

With the MAF defined, military sociologists have been keen to identify the drivers that have contributed to the decline of MAF and abolition of conscription. Their arguments have gone a long way towards explaining why this phenomenon happened. After the end of the Second World War, armed forces in most western states still kept conscription but underwent force transformation from a mass type to what Janowitz called a 'force-in-being'. This trend has been observed in many western states and the fall of Berlin Wall has undoubtedly further encouraged the decline of MAF.²² Therefore, this section examines the drivers of the decline of MAF by dividing into two periods:

²¹ Ministry of National Defense, 2013, Ministry of National Defense 2012 performance report, 9 May, p.40.

²² However, the 'force in being' can and did run across both conscript and AVF eras.

post-World War II and post-Cold War eras.




Figure 1-1 Typology of Force Structure and Expected Changes in Europe

Source: Haltiner, 2003. Sweden, Taiwan and Germany adapted and updated by author.

Post WWII- 1945 to 1990

The early works on the decline of MAF in military sociology were primarily produced during the Cold War era. In the context of the post-WWII demobilisation of armed forces and military standoff between NATO and the Eastern bloc, Western countries sought to decrease the size of armed forces by downsizing the military establishment, cutting the length of compulsory service and recruiting more volunteers (thus the CR went down). Morris Janowitz analysed the changing nature of the armed forces after WWII by defining the military as a constabulary force which is always ready to act, ready to use force at the lowest level, and their underlying goal is to preserve viable international relations rather than victory.²³ From a sociological perspective, Janowitz argued that the waning support for the MAF was associated with advancing industrialism and individualism of the youth cohorts which eroded the public belief in the moral worth of compulsory military service. To be specific, Janowitz further explained that high levels of education and material abundance in the youth population, the declining appeal of nationalism, changes in public attitudes towards military service,

²³ In other words, 'successful' rather than 'victory', see Janowitz, op. cit., p.418.

and a growing unwillingness of the majority of citizens in the western democratic societies to perform military service have also played a key role in the decline of MAF.

From a strategic perspective, Janowitz stressed that the growth in the destructive capacity of modern weapon systems made mobilisation of conscripts for a mass army virtually irrelevant to an effective military organisation.²⁴ Furthermore, the armed forces had gradually shifted to a constabulary force and need to contain conflict with rapid response.²⁵ He and Charles Moskos identified four basic elements contributing to the attenuation of conscription.²⁶ First was the deployment of nuclear weapons, which generated a military posture of deterrence. Second, drafted ground troops had demonstrated limited utility. Third, the tasks of national security in the western societies must compete with those associated with social welfare and management of the environment. Fourth, the idea that military service was an opportunity to acquire and demonstrate masculine traits declined due to changes in youth culture. These factors reduced the chance of a return to conscription.

Van Doorn was one of the early European military sociologist who discovered the decline of MAF, he identified that the erosion of MAF was due to: 'increasing unpopularity with the general public, especially the younger generation; diminution of unspecialised mass characteristics in the military such as infantry; and diminution of the power of political elites to command the uncritical support of the population.'²⁷ He also emphasised that the basis of the MAF was being subjected to increasing pressure, and plans for an AVF were becoming more definite in the west. A prudent prediction was made by Van Doorn that the tendency to reduce the draft in the west would continue, though it would not culminate in the end of the draft in all cases.

1990s – Post Cold War

The fall of Berlin Wall broke up the bipolar strategic stance of the world, and created

²⁴ Janowitz, M 1983, *Reconstruction of Patriotism*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.57.

²⁵ Janowitz, Morris. 1971. *The Professional Soldier*. New York: Free Press, p.418. Constabulary force is defined as: 'continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and viable international relations rather than victory'.

²⁶ Janowitz, M and Moskos, C 1979, 'Five years of the all-volunteer force: 1973-1978', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 5, No.2, February, pp.171-218.

²⁷ Van Doorn, op. cit., pp.151-154.

conditions for Western states to facilitate the pace to restructure their armed forces and abolish conscription. The decline of MAF in this era has accelerated, as can be seen, with a rapid shift away from conscription. Like the domino effect, starting from Belgium in the early 1990s, countries in Europe one after another abolished or suspended conscription and shifted to AVF (with a handful of exceptions). With the infusion of international and geostrategic factors, an immediate cause due to much reduced threat (especially from the Soviet Union) contributing to the decline of MAF, military sociologists in this period paid more attention to these factors. Nevertheless, at the same time the social factors also gained its momentum. Military sociologists thus started to embark on how social factors had influenced the decline of MAF.

Burk integrated political and societal factors and elaborated on what he called political realist and social dominance approaches to answer the question of why MAF in the West has been in decline.²⁸ The political realist approach argues that elite decisions about conscription reflect considerations of cost and technical efficiency; while the social dominance approach stresses the willingness of citizens to accept either conscription or voluntary military service as legitimate. To explain variation in patterns of national adherence to the norm of compulsory military service, he accentuated that a perspective is required which is broad enough to take both political and societal factors into account.²⁹ In terms of military manpower issues and due to a more complex military division of labour, Burk observed that armed forces relied more on highly-trained professional and longer-serving career soldiers. In addition, he also analysed the trends in technological development of modern weapons, increasing limits on the utility of military interventions, and changing life-style associated with increased affluent materials which have combined to bring about this shift in the format of the military.

Burk questioned Janowitz's argument about the declining appeal of nationalism which undermined people's motive for public service. He believed that national identity crises and the weight of national political traditions are general political-moral factors, which help explain the varied pattern of response to pressures for voluntary recruitment associated with the decline of MAF. He compared four country cases: the UK, US,

²⁸ Burk, op. cit., p.46.

²⁹ Ibid, p.48.

France and Germany, which had similar levels of economic, political and military development, to explain why France and Germany maintained conscription while the UK and US abolished it. The principles of territoriality and constitutionality were identified as the key factors that affected the fate of conscription; both France and Germany faced boundary and constitutional crises, while neither the UK nor the US confronted serious challenge from the uncertainty of territorial or constitutional crises. Finally, Burk echoed Van Doorn's argument that the decline of the MAF and the rise of the force-in-being would not necessarily foreshadow an end to conscription.

The aforementioned drivers of the decline of MAF in terms of technical and social factors were also pointed out by Van der Meulen and Manigart, who found that technological advancement and socio-evolution were the major drivers in the fundamental change in military organisation. In light of the AVF transitions in Belgium and the Netherlands, they predicted a situation that without a major deterioration of international relations in Europe, a zero draft would be the rule throughout Europe within 10 years.³⁰ Their prediction proved to be correct.

As discussed earlier, Haltiner introduced the decreasing CR as a key indicator of the decline of MAF and argued that the lower the CR, the more a force is based on voluntary personnel, and the more can it be called a volunteer force.³¹ Haltiner forecasted that the era of MAF was nearing its end in Western Europe even though not all states would abolish conscription in the near future. Based on what Burk called the political realist's perspectives of international relations and strategy, Haltiner emphasised the importance of strategic and military goal-bound factors based on the AVF transitions in Western Europe. He argued that: 1. being a member of defence and political alliances (such as NATO); 2. being far from a direct military threat; and 3, participating frequently in international missions would facilitate the abolition of conscription and the change of military format into a force with no or a low number of non-voluntary military personnel. His arguments were used to examine the two selected cases.

³⁰ Van der Meulen & Manigart, op. cit., p.330.

³¹ The following indicators could likely be observed from the decrease of conscript ratio: 1. smaller size of armed forces (a reduced number of overall military personnel), 2. reduced proportion of conscripts, 3. less men in the youth cohort have to be drafted and 4. reduction in the length of compulsory military service.

Nevertheless, one fact has to be stressed that, despite the strong tendency of the decline in MAF, the ‘weight of history’ (i.e. social and cultural preferences), impact of economic circumstances and a state’s location in the international system, have led states such as Norway, Finland and Austria to continue to keep conscription. This indicates that states could either maintain conscription or adopt the ‘two-tier system’ using conscripts for territorial defence and volunteer soldiers for expeditionary missions which still keeps the principle of conscription but with reduced characteristic of MAF.

Summary: Decline of MAF as a theoretical framework for history and context of AVF decision

The decline of MAF has been an overarching trend in the western countries. For over half a century, many concepts regarding the decline of MAF were discussed and developed, and the factors driving the change were also identified. This complicated set of factors explains most of the reasons for the decline of MAF and the end of conscription.

From a political realist point of view, Haltiner emphasised the strategic and international factors in driving the shift in the military organisational format, whereas Burk claimed that a combined political realist and social dominance perspective better explained the change. In light of their arguments, Dandeker summarised the debates suggesting that the decline of MAF and shifting away from conscription to AVF has been caused by a combination of societal and international factors with addition of the modern weapons technology.³² He found that the international factors have played a more significant role in driving this trend. Without ruling out the societal factors, Dandeker interpreted Haltiner’s arguments as: ‘the societal changes might undermine the MAF concept but that political elites will not judge it right to break with the weight of history unless strategic circumstances indicate that it would be prudent to do so.’³³

The first theoretical approach underpinning this thesis has not only examined the theories of the decline of MAF, but set out the historical context in the initial part of the thesis (chapter one and two). Most importantly, it identifies the gap regarding the

³² Dandeker 2006, op. cit. p.410.

³³ Ibid, p.411.

transition process, which is the main question that this thesis aims to answer. The key theoretical question is: 'How far the similarities and differences in terms of the decisions to shift to AVF between Sweden and Taiwan can be explained by the decline of MAF theory.' This framework provides a basis to analyse the pre-decision phase of ending conscription with focus on both the longer term and more immediate causes of change.

Theoretical argument

Apparently a theoretical framework based on decline of MAF literature – the first theoretical approach, can now be established. Adapting it to examine the two selected cases, Haltiner's international model in general works well on the western states, including Sweden, as they 1. are far from threats, 2. frequently participate in international missions, and 3. join defence alliances (Sweden's *de facto* alliance with NATO). However, it appears to be less convincing in explaining the case of Taiwan.³⁴ Burk's combined approach, on the other hand, appears to be more persuasive in terms of Taiwan's AVF decision because international factors were less influential than domestic political and social ones.

Although the theoretical perspective provides abundant literature on decline of MAF, only a few studies focus on the post-decision implementing process. Due to this knowledge gap, this thesis needs another approach to bridge this gap. The next section will embark on a discussion of the second theoretical approach underpinning the thesis: the experiences and lessons drawn from the AVF implementations in the West.

1.2.2 Analysing the process of AVF implementation cases of AVF transition in the West

In terms of military reform, states often see whether they can achieve it by looking at what and how other states have done (for example, France copied the British experience in shifting to AVF). When examining how states achieving the goal and particular objectives of AVF transition, it is useful to see how other states made the transition.

³⁴ Taiwan is still facing China's military threat and is neither joining defence alliance nor participating in any international mission.

Through empirical case analysis, this section sets out to establish the second approach underpinning this thesis. The cases of AVF transition in Western states are discussed with a focus specifically on the post-decision implementation process. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine every Western AVF transition in detail; it rather selects several transition cases from the UK, US and other West European countries, discusses their implementation experiences, and then summarises some common lessons.

This section focuses on three questions: 1. what are Sweden and Taiwan doing, thinking, deciding and prioritizing in AVF transition? 2. Cross-fertilisation: whether what they are thinking and doing is drawing on what they found out from other cases.³⁵ There is a factual question, when other states have made the transition, have both cases looked at other transitions such as the UK and US? 3. What does the author as an observer think about these issues? It is useful to see if states have looked what other states doing and are copying things. States may be inaccurate but they still copy. The observer as an independent third party may give a more objective perspective in terms of what states want to copy, and what the observer think states could have copied if they did not. These three perspectives intertwine and interact with each other, and are a valuable part of the analysis.

By reviewing and examining the western AVF cases, this section starts with a brief overview of the changing conscription policies and factors initiating transitions, and then describes the obstacles and problems encountered by these states during transitions. Finally, measures taken by these states are examined to summarise general lessons for countries with either ongoing or future AVF transitions. The other main task of this section is to build the second theoretical approach by asking an empirical research question: ‘To what extent can the experiences from the western AVF cases be relevant to current transition cases?’ The discussion starts with the early AVF transition, the United Kingdom.

³⁵ For example, does Taiwan know that America’s GI Bill is effective in attracting young people to serve in the military? If so it should consider designing a similar educational benefit in its AVF implementation plan.

The United Kingdom

The UK was one of the earliest western states to end conscription after the Second World War. The 1957 Defence Review played a vital role that proposed the phased ending of National Service,³⁶ with the last call-up in 1960 to achieve an AVF by 1963. The transition was not instantaneous and took an adjustment period of six years. Navias examined the two year period prior to the British decision to terminate the national service and explained how British policy makers were constrained from using conscripts abroad between the end of WWII and 1957.³⁷ He pointed out that the objections to compulsory military service had been a constant factor in British politics, and arguments to end conscription were mainly focused on economic and political reasons. Interestingly, as Navias found, not too much effort was made by the proponents of an AVF to link the termination of national service to a focus on nuclear deterrence. This was due to the fact that the Services attempted to retain the national service based on a strategic conception that paid little regard to the implications of nuclear weapons for conventional force levels. Vasquez identifies three factors contributed to the end of National Service in the UK: concern over the use of young conscripts abroad, the length of terms of obligatory military service, and the mobilisation and deployment of reservists. Beyond social unease with conscription and political constraints on use of national servicemen and reservists abroad, he argues that the prominent egalitarian norm made selective military service untenable and thus prompted the shift to an AVF.³⁸ Hartley highlighted that the problem of defence budget in the 1950s was one of the main causes for the AVF transition.³⁹ Dandeker also pointed out that the continuing pressures on defence expenditure (almost 10 percent of GDP in the 1950s) along with the development of UK's nuclear deterrence helped trigger the change.⁴⁰

³⁶ Conscription is part of the National Service.

³⁷ Navias, M., 1989. Terminating Conscription? The British National Service Controversy 1955-56. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, pp.195-208.

³⁸ Vasquez, J., III, 2011. More Than Meets the Eye: Domestic Politics and the End of British Conscription *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 37, Number 4. October, pp.636-656.

³⁹ Hartley, K 2007, 'The British Experience with an All-Volunteer Force', in *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, p.287-312.

⁴⁰ Dandeker, C, 'Recruiting the All-Volunteer Force: Continuity and Change in the British Army, 1963-2008', in *Israel's Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective The New Citizen Armies*, eds C Stuart, Routledge. And *1957 Defence White Paper*. The defence share of GDP was 9.8% in 1952, 9.7% in 1953, and 9.2% in 1954.

Vasquez agrees with Burk that his paired political realist and social dominance approach explains in Britain's decision to end conscription. In addition, weight of history played a key role in the decision; it is important to emphasise that the British AVF transition is what Dandeker termed an 'echo of empire' as the AVF is the historical norm and conscription the exception for the UK in its history.⁴¹

The AVF transition in UK was not easy and had seen problems in the early stages. With regard to the recruitment, in the early years the armed forces could not obtain a sufficient number of recruits. It was caused by the low birth rates in the 1950s, the tendency for youth cohorts to stay in school longer, rise of individualism in the youth cohorts, increased competition in the labour market as well as better training opportunities in the civilian sector. Over the period of 1963-1975, the armed forces rarely reached 90% of their recruitment targets, especially the Army. To boost recruiting, the government launched various incentives to make service life more attractive. Various monetary measures were introduced including across-the-board pay increases, designing a more attractive career structure and, after 1969, the introduction of military salary based on the principle of the comparability with the civilian sector known as the 'X factor'.⁴²

The transition also came with a significant military restructuring and downsizing of 300,000 personnel by 1963. The solutions to remove redundant personnel included offering special lump sum payments and relaxation of the retirement rules for premature retirements. Even though high defence budget was one of the reasons that UK decided to abolish conscription, shifting to AVF did not bring the military expenditure down in the first five years of UK's transition as the defence spending even rose by to 11 percent of GDP between 1963 and 1968.⁴³ Nevertheless, the share of defence GDP had shown a long-term downward trend from nine percent in 1957 to 2.5 per cent in 2004.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Dandeker, C, 2010, 'Echo of empire', in *Europe Without Soldiers?: Recruitment And Retention Across The Armed Forces Of Europe*, eds T Tresch and C Leuprecht, McGill-Queen's University Press. The UK is an island and has a longstanding suspicion of a large standing military since the Civil War in the mid 17th century.

⁴² X factor is a supplement to military salary to allow for the duties and difficulties surrounding military service that are not present in civilian life. For example, being on-call or duty 24 hours a day and the risks attached to military service.

⁴³ Hartley, K 2007, op. cit.

⁴⁴ MoD/DASA (2004). *UK Defence Statistics 2004*, the Stationary Office, London.

Judging by the British experience of AVF transition, shifting to an AVF is not cheap, and often it is more expensive than conscription during the early stage of transition. The budget is an important consideration in AVF transition. The other key issues for the success of the AVF transition are qualitative and quantitative aspects of recruitment. States shifting to AVF tend to encounter a common problem: how to recruit enough people with the right quality to serve and how to retain them. As Fabyanic argued, the uncertainty of manpower availability in a voluntary system inexorably leads to a decreasing cycle of manpower expectations.⁴⁵ There is one universal yet costly way to solve recruitment and retention problems for the AVF: offering monetary incentives. The restructuring and downsizing of armed forces also contributed to the accomplishment of the British AVF transition.⁴⁶ However, the question of the appropriate size of the military establishment as part of the optimal design of a military organisation needs significant research. The British AVF transition was completed alongside with major reduction in personnel; the result was demonstrated by the efficient and professional performance of the British armed forces during the Falkland and first Gulf wars.

The British AVF transition shows that the extent which domestic politics related to military manpower can constrain a state's international action meaning; its experience can lend lessons to both Sweden and Taiwan (to lesser extent) in that political factors play a key role in the decision of both cases. In light of British experiences of the defence budget during transition, it is an interesting question to ask whether Sweden and Taiwan realise that budget could be a problem during transition, and whether they can draw on lessons from the British experience.

The United States

Throughout the American history, national conscriptions were employed four times during various wars. During the American Civil War, the Congress of the Confederate States of America passed the first American legislature of the National Conscription

⁴⁵ Fabyanic, T 1976, Manpower trends in the British all-volunteer force, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 2, pp.553-572. Fabyanic explains that the inability to recruit may force military leaders to misinterpret that the achieved level is the desired level; also the recruiting shortfalls are cumulative and are followed by lower force levels.

⁴⁶ Abolition of conscription is often planned simultaneously with a cut in military personnel.

Law in 1862.⁴⁷ The American people generally accepted conscription when service was universal; this can be traced back to American Revolution which contributed to the expansion of the definition of the citizenry and defined participation in armed conflict as part of the normative definition of citizenship.⁴⁸ It is widely considered that the increased protests over the Vietnam War in mid-1960s had caused the public acceptance of conscription began to wane.⁴⁹ The key problems of conscription were summed up by the Marshall Commission in the title of report: '*In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?*'⁵⁰ Economic considerations also facilitated the transition as: conscription generated the opportunity costs; AVF could save the costs by preventing evasion of draft, maintaining a higher retention and lower turnover rate of personnel, and offering better incentives to military personnel.⁵¹ In 1969, President Nixon announced the formation of the President's Commission (known as 'Gates Commission') on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. Based on the report of Gates Commission, in 1970, Nixon decided to abolish conscription with the completion deadline set at 1 July 1973. The transition to an AVF was completed within three years.

The early stage of transition in the US, especially the quality of recruitment had been problematic. The first five years of AVF transition (1973-1978) was summed up by Janowitz and Moskos as: 'the AVF is smaller, more expensive, of lower quality in selected but crucial segments, and less socially representative than the economists anticipated'.⁵² They argued that the most important issue of the AVF transition is whether the armed forces had been able to attract sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel with the right quality, and whether they will be able to do so in the future. In particular, they pointed out that the key problem was the recruitment and retention in the Army and Marines. During the first three years of transition the military managed to reach the planned goal of recruitment. Nevertheless, over the next few years the transition encountered some problems. Due to the recovery of the US economy, there was a significant increase in salaries in the private sector while military pay failed to

⁴⁷ Rostker, op. cit., p.19.

⁴⁸ Segal, D 1989, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, pp.9-12

⁴⁹ Due to negative public attitudes toward conscription.

⁵⁰ Marshall, B 1967, *In Pursuit of Equity? Who Serves When Not All Serve?* Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, Washington, D.C., National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, February.

⁵¹ Jehn & Selden, op. cit., pp.93-100.

⁵² Janowitz & Moskos, op. cit., p.177.

keep pace. The consequence was the quality of soldiers dropping dramatically, thus caused difficulty in training and competence.⁵³ In tackling this issue, military pay was raised in order to be competitive with the private sector. Other measures included offering education opportunities (famously known as Montgomery GI Bill) and a variety of service bonuses, improving quality of life for military families, diversifying the recruitment pool by recruiting more women and ethnic minorities, building a professional cadre of recruiters and investing heavily in marketing research and advertisement. Not only was the range of extrinsic incentives expanded (monetary incentives, education etc.), intrinsic incentives such as a well-defined rationale for service (a wide cross section of viewpoints and ideologies recruited into the AVF) were also developed.

Gilroy *et al* analysed the first 15 years of recruiting experiences of the US army and found that the free education (GI Bill) is the key to the success of recruitment. Thirty years after shifting to AVF, the quality of new recruits in the US armed forces has been improved.⁵⁴ Rostker et al summarised four broad reasons for the success of the AVF transition in the US.⁵⁵ First, Leadership: President Nixon's decision was no doubt the key to reach the success of the AVF. A successful AVF transition requires prudent political decision and support. Second, understanding the problems requires substantial research. Research had been a critical part of the AVF from its very beginning as the Gates Report greatly influenced the decision. Third, skill in management: The AVF transition presented special challenges for which new programmes had to be developed. The military had to learn about whom and also how to recruit. Finally, the commitment to maintaining the solution requires adequate budgets. It is crucial to ensure that adequate resources are available to support the AVF. The defence budget must be sufficient to support pay raises, to keep pace with both inflation and salary in the private sector, to support advertising, professional recruiters, bonuses, quality-of-life incentives, housing and educational benefits, and to fund the military retirement programmes. The American case shows that the problem of recruitment of quality is more serious than

⁵³ Gilroy, C, Phillips, R, & Blair, J 1990, 'The All-Volunteer Force Fifteen Years Later', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Spring, pp.329-50.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Rostker, B & Gilroy, C 2006, 'The transition to an all-volunteer force: the US experience', in *Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.233-262.

quantity; this lesson should help Sweden and Taiwan emphasise the importance of quality rather than merely looking at the immediate number of soldiers.

The British case is unique because conscription is not the norm in British history and UK represents a European maritime power; while the American case illustrates the transition of world's most powerful armed forces. Both transitions were finished during the Cold War era and thus operated under the Cold War strategic thinking. Therefore, it is essential to briefly look at cases from European continental views in the post-Cold War era.

Belgium

Belgium was the first country to respond the end of Cold War with the decision to abolish conscription announced in July 1992. The transition took one and half years to reach zero draft in January 1994. By then, insufficient research and analysis on the potential quantity of recruitment had been conducted. It is not difficult to imagine that the Belgian armed forces had encountered many obstacles, especially recruitment and ageing of personnel.⁵⁶ The Belgian government tackled the problems through redesigning employment contracts and initiating a series of measures attempting to make enlistment in the armed forces more attractive. Nevertheless, the armed forces fell short of sufficient volunteers and the target announced in the initial plan did not materialise. As a result, the Belgian armed forces experienced a sudden loss of young soldiers. Reducing the number of redundant personnel by encouraging them to leave the military earlier was the key to fix the problem. Early retirement deals along with other monetary incentives were offered to senior personnel and later on these measures were proved effective. Furthermore, a new short-term contract was proved to be effective in bringing down the average age profile of military personnel.

Four lessons were summarised by Manigart regarding the Belgian transition case.⁵⁷ First, from a purely military point of view, he suggested that a longer transition period would seem to be preferable due to the short (1.5 years) transition period and the strict

⁵⁶ Van der Meulan, J and Manigart, P 1997, 'Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The final shift to the all-volunteer force', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp.315-332.

⁵⁷ Manigart, op. cit., pp.146-147.

budgetary constraints. Second, the ageing problem of personnel impacted on the military's operational readiness. Third, during transition Belgium faced difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel from labour market, he believed that more structural and cultural measures (such as recruiting migrants) were needed to attract sufficient qualified soldiers from young cohorts. Finally, in order allow them to solve structural disarmament dilemma, he suggested that the force restructuring process requires a greater integration and cooperation of armed forces at the European level.

The Netherlands

Despite sharing geographic proximity and similar strategic contexts with Belgium, the Dutch AVF transition was relatively less difficult. The Dutch Parliament decided in 1993 to abolish conscription and shift to an AVF by end of 1997. However, it went earlier than expected in September 1996. Unlike Belgium, research on potential recruitment of volunteer soldiers was conducted for the state committee advising on the transition. Recruitment feasibility studies published in 1993 indicated that it was possible to acquire a maximum of 8,000 volunteers on short-term contracts per annum. Another key factor is that the AVF transition was carried out simultaneously with a significant cut in personnel in order to keep costs low. During the early years of transition, the recruitment results were satisfactory, and the Dutch military also spent a great effort on retention of personnel. However, the key aspect of the personnel quality, educational level of new recruits has always been of concern but in fact it dropped after abolition of conscription, but not as much as expected.

Bos-Bakx and Soeters highlighted the factors which helped achieve the Dutch AVF transformation.⁵⁸ First, the public image of military as an employer need to be promoted in the first place. In doing so military salaries and working conditions require improvements and armed forces have to recruit more women and ethnic minorities. Second, labour market need to be constantly monitored because it is important to gather accurate information on supply and demand of personnel from the labour market in order to fill the ranks of military. Third, there was the factor of flexible contracts.

⁵⁸ Bos-Bakx, M, & Soeters, J 2003, 'The professionalization of the Netherland's Armed Forces', in *Conscription vs. all-volunteer forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.83-99.

Offering flexible contracts can satisfy the needs of various kinds of young men and women. Providing more options makes contracts more attractive. Fourth, there were education opportunities; it is essential to social and political acceptance of the AVF, and education is needed to reinforce recruitment and to keep the unemployment costs under control. Bos-Bakx and Soeters suggested that all these approaches need to be integrated in order to achieve a better transition result. In short, the AVF transition in the Netherlands was completed in a well-planned manner within the planned transition period with satisfactory recruitment in terms of both quantity and quality.

France

As France was the inventor of the *Levée en masse*, its abolition of conscription was a symbolic move in Europe. The reform was initially proposed by President Chirac during the presidential election campaign in 1994-5. In 1996, he announced that 'France's military would do away with its traditional organisational format, and turn to an AVF by 2002'. Similar to the Dutch case, before the decision was made, studies on recruitment were carried out between 1992 and 1996 to explore potential sources of volunteers. The British AVF model was closely studied by French armed forces,⁵⁹ and military planners sought to establish a higher-quality professional force able to deploy more soldiers for international missions. Lecomte pointed out that France's decision was to make the transition basically consisted of pushing the French military apparatus to accommodate to the changes in the international environment.⁶⁰

Similar to other transitions, low quality of recruitment was faced by French military.⁶¹ To ensure the recruitment targets could be met, qualification standard of recruitment was set lower than originally planned to guarantee its success. Also, an improved public image, pay raise, enhanced technology, more comprehensive resettlement aid policies, and record high unemployment rates among young people in the country helped French armed forces achieve the recruitment targets. The French military took several

⁵⁹ Beyond the analytical point, it is interesting to find out who else copied the British AVF model.

Sweden learned from the British model. In fact, instead of looking at the fully developed British AVF, it would be easier if Sweden looks at Taiwan in terms of the NCO issues as both started at the same time.

⁶⁰ Lecomte, J 2006, 'The rise and death of conscription: the case of France', in *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, p.78.

⁶¹ Ibid.

initiatives to eliminate the quality and quantity problems of recruitment, and to strengthen the links between military and society for the new AVF. Improved pay, free housing, food and clothing, and other welfare services offered the service men and women a decent status in the society. The transition to an AVF was considered successful since the targets set by military programming law for 1997-2002 were 95 percent materialized.⁶² Another key indicator, the retention rate was also satisfactorily achieved and even better than anticipated. On balance, as Boëne commented, ‘the French case is heartening for the numerous European countries set to follow suit and take the radical step of abolishing conscription’.⁶³

Spain

The pace of the military transition in Southern European countries was relatively slow, compared to West Europe; yet they caught up with the trend of abolishing conscription in late 1990s, as Spain and Italy had all started to reform the personnel structure of armed forces.

Due to lack of financial incentives as military pay was much lower than those of the public and private sectors, the Spanish transition also faced a recruitment problem. From a social perspective, the image of the military to the average citizen was still contaminated by the former authoritarian Franco regime which was backed by the military. High rates of conscientious objection undermined the success of recruitment efforts during the transition as 75 per cent of draft-age men claimed themselves as conscientious objectors.⁶⁴ The Spanish government took many initiatives to cope with recruitment problem, including: ensuring military pay comparable to salaries in private sector, establishing facilities for recruitment and training professional soldiers, creating financial incentives such as bonuses and benefits for new recruits, investing on advertising campaign in mass media, and establishing an efficient selection procedure to

⁶² Daffix, S, Medina V, & Nidier, C 2007, ‘Transition to an All-Volunteer Force’, in *Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, p.316.

⁶³ Boëne, B 2003, ‘Going, Going, Gone: How France did away with conscription 1996-2001’, in *Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlansgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.101-132.

⁶⁴ Sands, D, 2001, ‘Even Military Experts Consider Draft Antiquated’, *Insight on the News*, 12 February. This is believed to be a single case as it was not found in other cases.

avoid losses of new recruits. One solution to the recruitment problem was to diversify the recruitment pool by recruiting up to 2000 Latin American migrants per annum. Besides, the armed forces raised the age of recruits and lowered intelligence standards to obtain sufficient recruits (i.e. compromising quality for quantity).

There have been different comments on Spanish AVF transition. For instance, Zubeldia argued that the transition process failed to achieve the full professionalisation of Spanish armed forces.⁶⁵ However, Diaz considered Spain's transition an initial success due to the satisfactory results of recruitment and retention rates, and the AVF fully integrated women and migrants as an expanded recruitment pool.⁶⁶ One important implication from Spanish lessons is that the poor public image of the military could take toll and affect the transition.

Italy

The Italian government announced a plan to suspend conscription in 1999. A significant cut of 90,000 military personnel was also made at the same time. Originally, the transition was planned to be accomplished in seven years in order to allow enough time to recruit sufficient volunteer soldiers. Later on the Italian government considered the period was too long. After the Ministry of Defence conducted a series of research enquires that led to decisions to accelerate the end of conscription the transition period was shortened from seven to five years.

Recruitment had proved more difficult than anticipated. The decline in the overall size of the population and ageing in society had consequently caused recruitment of volunteer soldiers more challenging. Similar to the Dutch, to promote recruitment, three flexible types of service contracts were introduced; young men and women can choose from one-year enlistment (VFA), short-term enlistment (VFB) for three years, and career soldiers (VFP) in which soldiers can serve up to age of 60. The costs for the transition in a constrained budget environment had also caused serious concerns to the

⁶⁵ Zubeldia, C 2005, 'The Spanish defense polity in regression', in *The European Armed Forces in Transition*, eds F Kernic, P Klein & K Haltiner. Peter Lang GmbH, pp.91-128.

⁶⁶ Diversifying their recruitment pools is the key to success. See Diaz, J 2006, 'The all-volunteer Spanish Armed Forces', in *Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.331-353.

Italian government.

Battistelli commented that, in the context of those contrasts common to other European countries, the transition of Italian armed forces proceeded with fewer obstacles than expected.⁶⁷ He argued that this favourable result was interestingly assisted by two what he called ‘weaknesses’ of the Italian system: 1. job market statistics and the social-economic gap between the North and the South; 2. the youth unemployment rate in Italy is among the highest in Europe, which allowed for a large potential recruitment pool for military.

Lessons from Western cases

This section sums up the lessons and experiences of post-decision implementation of AVF from the Western cases discussed above. Their experiences in implementing the AVF help the development of the second theoretical approach that will answer the research questions of the thesis.

Recruitment and retention: universal problems

Most countries during their AVF transition faced recruitment and retention problems. In order to achieve immediate results in recruitment quantity, some countries such as US, France and Spain sacrificed the quality of recruits by lowering the entry standard, thus causing problems of reduced competence of soldiers later on. The early years of the AVF transition in the US had seen a generally poor quality of volunteer soldiers, resulting former president Nixon to comment that ‘the volunteer army has failed to provide enough personnel of the calibre we need.’⁶⁸

AVF: not as cheap as anticipated

The early indications from European cases suggested that the transition to AVF has been more expensive. The pay raise, monetary incentives and compensation programmes had

⁶⁷ Battistelli, F 2003, ‘The professionalisation of the Italian Armed Forces’, in *Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe*, eds M Malesic, Baden-Baden, pp.151-171.

⁶⁸ Nixon, R., 1980. *The Real War*, New York, Warner Books.

together led to increased manpower costs. The share of personnel cost in the defence budget during the initial stage of transition also increased. Hartley pointed out that for the UK and other countries, the lessons of an AVF are that defence budget constraints and rising input costs of personnel and equipment means that difficult defence policy choices cannot be avoided.⁶⁹

Economic and demographic factors play a role

Economic factors, especially the unemployment rate among youth cohorts, have had a significant impact on the recruitment of personnel, especially quality. The saying ‘a bad economy is good for military recruiting’ confirms this fact. For example, the economic recovery of the Netherlands in 1996 had caused the recruitment of volunteer soldiers under pressure. In addition, the French experience showed that as unemployment figures vary significantly for different levels of education, the incentive scheme must be adapted to each specific labour market in order to meet recruiting goals. The issue of downward trend in birth rates in Europe needs to be addressed to deal with the future recruitment, as the cases of UK, Italy and Spain showed.

Measures & Initiatives

Monetary and in-kind incentives are essential

Monetary incentives have been proved by most examples as a useful measure to attract young men and women to serve in the military. Basic pay was universally increased as a direct incentive, especially for the less-skilled positions. Other monetary incentives include bonuses and special wages which compensates for the hardship of military life; the other kind of bonus is paid to those who participate in international missions and this is quite substantial compared to the basic pay. In the UK, the hardship of military life is compensated in a pay increment called the ‘X-factor’, which links and synchronises military salary with the average pay in the private sector. The US offered the GI Bill which allowed military personnel to pursue college qualifications after leaving the military; it proved to be highly effective in terms of attracting young men

⁶⁹ Hartley 2006, op. cit., p.312.

and women to serve in the military. The other important measure is the in-kind incentives. After the armed forces shifted to the AVF, the number of married personnel has been increasing.⁷⁰ As merely raising salaries may not satisfy the needs of personnel, improving the quality of family life has been introduced. In-kind benefits and tax-free compensation are important incentives to military personnel, especially for retention purpose.

Improving career options and post-service opportunities

Immediate incentives to military personnel is important to recruit and retain them, however, they also need to consider the future of military careers as many young people treat a military job as a life-long career. Therefore, a clear and sound career path for soldiers needs to be planned in order to retain soldiers longer. There should be chances for soldiers to be promoted to NCOs and officers. In addition, servicemen and women expect the armed forces to look after them after they leave the armed forces; veteran caring programme and retirement scheme has thus become an important issue.

Flexible contracts offer more choices

The armed forces should realise that in general there are two kinds of young people who join the military: the first kind who love military life and treat it as a career and the second kind who need immediate money and treat military service as immediate ends to this situation. Therefore, flexible service contracts offer young men and women more choices and may better meet their needs. Lessons drawn from previous cases that shorter term seemed to be more welcome; however, it will increase the turnover rate.

Diversifying and expanding recruitment pool

Segal stressed that, in order to recruit qualified personnel in the post September 11th era, the military should increasingly rely on ethnic and racial minorities, particularly

⁷⁰ The number of married persons in the military has steadily increased. Taking US armed forces as example, in 2002, 58 percent were married, up from 51 percent of over 20 years earlier. For career personnel, senior enlisted and senior officers, the rate is 93 percent. Data gathered from the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. <<http://www.acq.osd.mil/housing/housing101.htm>>, accessed 2 August, 2013.

non-citizens, as well as women.⁷¹ Hence, diversifying the recruitment pool has been a crucial task not only to boost the number of recruitment, but also to enhance the social representation of the military by increasing the proportion of women, minority group and people with different ethnic background in the armed forces. By doing so the military also fulfils its social function.

Investing in advertising

To increase exposure, the armed forces must learn how to sell themselves in the labour market and study marketing strategy. The US armed forces established a professional recruiting team and considerably invested on marketing research and advertisement. Similar to US, European countries are also working to improve recruitment by building professional recruiting teams and investing more in advertisements.

Public image matters

To gain public support for the armed forces and defence reform and to motivate young men and women to join the military, it is imperative that the military must improve its public image. The Spanish case showed that the stereotyped public attitude towards the military had negatively affected the recruitment during its AVF transition. The public image of the armed forces is influential in the decision of youth cohorts in choosing the military as a career. For example, during the transition, the Netherlands found that the image of the armed forces was the crucial factor concerning recruitment as the armed forces were competing with the private sector in the labour market.

Conducting research – the need for evidence based policy

Before states made their final decision to end the conscription, research may provide useful information and reveal feasibility for the armed forces to identify the potential recruitment, estimate budget, and assess impacts and obstacles during transition. Before the US decided to abolish conscription, the report of the Gates Commission contributed

⁷¹ Segal, D 2009, 'Building and Maintaining a post-9/11 All-Volunteer Military Force,' in *The impact of 9/11 on politics and war: the day that changed everything?* eds M Morgan, Palgrave Macmillan.

to the decision-making process as it comprehensively analysed and estimated the force level, budget and recruitment. The Dutch case also showed that a feasibility study on recruitment conducted before the AVF implementation was influential to its success.

Reform Personnel Structure

Removing ageing and redundant personnel

Ageing has been a problem in many European armed forces, especially at the officer and NCO level. In many European countries it is against the law to make personnel redundant against their will. To tackle this issue, monetary incentives and attractive retirement deals were proposed to encourage redundant or ageing personnel to leave military earlier. For example, as an incentive to leave the military, during transition UK and France offered a special lump-sum payment to those who were already qualified for the military pension but were under the age limit for mandatory retirement.

Reforming NCOs and reserve forces

The NCO corps is the backbone of the armed forces in terms of middle management of troops, execution of specialised skills and training soldiers. As such, the quality of NCOs could have impacted on the performance of volunteer soldiers. For example, France created a new category of contract officers called ‘specialists’ who had acquired specific skills in the civilian sector. They do not take command positions but merely served in the units as technicians. For established NCO corps, the quality of NCOs needs to be enhanced and labour should be clearly divided between officers and NCOs. On the other hand, due to the smaller size of AVF, more frequent use of the reservists has complemented the American and British regular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as a means to share the heavy burden of war. Spain restructured the reserve system in order to complement the smaller AVF structure; it was made up of temporary reservists and then added a volunteer component in 2004. In the Netherlands, all active armed forces generate a reserve complement called regular reservists in the form of former military personnel; also, the Dutch military constructed the stand-by reservists to perform peace

support operations.⁷²

Restructuring the working environment and conditions

Williams observed that European militaries have attempted to eliminate traditions that either annoy service members or produce few or no military outcomes. In an AVF, the concept of manpower costs is different from that of conscription. Therefore, the mindset about the manpower costs needs to be changed. She argued that it is possible to drastically and economically improve working conditions by eliminating unnecessary traditions and regulations. However, she stressed that improving the infrastructure of military bases could cost a fortune.⁷³

Summary of the process of AVF implementation

The post-cold war AVF transitions in Western Europe have provided a rich source of information for military sociologists to explore and extend the themes of decline of MAF. Drawing on the experiences and insights from these cases, it has found that abolishing conscription and shifting to an AVF has not been easy and countries can face unanticipated problems during implementation process.

Acquiring sufficient numbers of volunteer soldiers has always been a major task for transition, and this has been proved more difficult if young men and women do not think military career, salary and working environments attractive. Even if a country managed to acquire sufficient people, quality usually became another problem. To boost recruitment and retention of personnel, armed forces in the West have developed and offered a number of measures including monetary and in-kind incentives. These incentives not only offer better pay to service men and women, but also provide various types of caring schemes to their family members. Improving career path and developing post-service job opportunity are useful to retain personnel to stay longer. In addition to incentives, these countries have also found other effective ways to improve recruitment, including designing flexible contracts to meet the needs of the youth cohorts, expanding and diversifying recruitment pools, investing in advertising and conducting research.

⁷² Box-Bokx & Soeters, 2003, p.94.

⁷³ Williams, C., 2005, p.52.

Without a doubt, the public image of the armed forces plays a key role in the recruitment as a good public image could help boost the recruitment.

Another common obstacle is budget constraints. Countries tend to assume that shifting the AVF along with a considerable downsizing in military personnel, could bring the defence budget down. On the contrary, the cost for AVF transition is associated with an increase in the personnel costs. In order to attract young people to serve, the pay must be attractive and competitive to what is offered in the private sector. In addition, other programmes such as retention scheme, retirement plan, bonus and benefits, and caring programmes, all require a considerable fund to subsidise. As a consequence, an adjustment must be made to increase personnel costs and thus squeeze the budgets for operation and equipment acquisition. Warner and Negrusa showed that while AVF is usually cheaper than conscription in the long run in terms of real costs to society, conscription can have a lower social cost than an equally capable AVF.⁷⁴

Changes in the personnel structure have been a radical step in the AVF transition. In addition to the reduction in military establishment – a crucial part of the transition, the armed forces in the West also had to deal with the problems of an ageing society, reforming the NCO corps and reservists, and restructuring the working environments and conditions. From a broader national context, the economic and demographic factors can have an impact on the AVF transition, especially on future recruitment. According to Sandell, demographic growth in Europe has altered and his analysis indicated that the youth cohorts between the ages of 15 and 29 will drop markedly throughout next four decades in most of Europe.⁷⁵ Economic factors could influence the result of recruitment and retention of military personnel, especially during economic upturn because the military as an employer has to compete with private sectors. Finally, the length of transition needs to be carefully planned; a transition window that is either too long or too short could have an impact on the implementation. The experiences and lessons drawn from these country cases, both successful and less so, are worthwhile for states

⁷⁴ Warner, J. and Negrusa, S. 2006, The economic case for all-volunteer forces, 'Transition to an All-Volunteer Force', in *Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.123-155.

⁷⁵ Sandell, R. 2006, Coping with demography in NATO Europe, in *Service to country: personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries*, eds C Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.72-73.

seeking the same path like Sweden and Taiwan to emulate, as learning from previous cases can help states avoid repeating similar mistakes.

1.3 Research outline

Criteria of success

Chapter one has set up the basis of a comparison of selected cases, summed up the discussion of the two theoretical approaches and listed a set of criteria for a successful AVF transition. In terms of the decision making for shifting to the AVF system, many issues need to be evaluated such as whether states can afford to financially sustain this type of military, whether AVF fulfils state's strategic needs and fits in with its history and cultural preferences, and whether the military is able to recruit sufficient number of soldiers with the right quality. Once a decision is made, the transition reaches the post-decision implementation process, which is the research focus of this thesis.

Analysis of a successful implementation of an AVF relies on a model adequate for measuring the criteria of transition. The model contains three key elements which are different yet interrelated, namely:

1. The strategic goal and the specific objectives it contains,
2. The metrics and criteria for a successful implementation and
3. Those factors and conditions which can facilitate, hinder and influence the transition.

Building on these three elements, this thesis aims to use the second theoretical perspective to examine the implementation process by considering the experiences of other cases. The criteria and variables in the model can be considered from three perspectives:

1. From states' perspectives, the criteria, variables and the priorities considered and adopted by Sweden and Taiwan.
2. How states draw on the experiences and lessons from other AVF cases.
3. The author's judgement as an analyst of the nature and conditions of a successful AVF implementation.

In an interconnected world, when states designed their objectives and metrics for AVF implementation, they often do so by comparing their projects with those in other states. In the capacity of an independent analyst and observer, it is useful for an analyst to make an objective judgment. In terms of causal logic, the ultimate strategic goal provides the framework for the specific objectives of the AVF. Particular metrics are designed by states to achieve each of the specific objectives, as pathways for managing the process from decision to success. These metrics take place in the conditions or contexts in which the process of transition is being managed: the conditions can assist transition, hinder it, or be neutral in their effects. (See Figure 1-2 for the research outline). These three elements are elaborated in the following sub-sections and examined in three separate empirical chapters (chapters three, four and five). In short, this model aims to help answer the research question of this thesis:

‘Do the nature and manner of decisions, the contexts in which they sit, and the metrics they adopt determine and influence the eventual success of all-volunteer force transition?’




Figure 1-2 Research outline of the thesis

1. Goals and objectives

In terms of country's own analysis of AVF transition, defining goals of AVF is a priority in the process of transition. It is essential to refine the goal of transition into detailed and specific objectives as a zero draft is a necessary but not sufficient condition of success. Distinguishing differences between goals and objectives of AVF transition is a way of understanding the complexity of the two cases. However, in light of the previous western cases, some criteria, variables and conditions are likely to be similar. For example, the poor quality and low quantity of recruitment are overarching phenomenon of AVF which occurred in almost every transition case. This thesis focuses on the analysis of similarities and differences in terms of their strategic goals of the AVF. Following the goals, the specific objectives set by both cases shape the characteristics of both AVFs. Therefore it needs to identify how both cases defined their goals and specific objectives regarding the structure, size and function of the new personnel system.

2. Metrics and criteria

The second element is metrics and criteria, which comprise the factors that establish whether a successful transition has been achieved and also the milestones on the pathway to success. The comparative variables and criteria in the metrics aim to explain whether both countries are performing well or less so in the implementation process. In terms of identifying metrics the following questions will be addressed:

- ‘What metrics are adopted by Sweden and Taiwan for measuring success and achieving the objectives in terms of which the goal is defined?’
- ‘How do both countries justify these metrics?’
- ‘How do the metrics connect with the goal and objectives?’

In light of the criteria adopted by both selected states and the experience of other western transition cases, some of the metrics are likely to be similar, such as quantity and quality of recruitment and retention. Some metrics are rather case specific; for example, Sweden managed to phase out conscription within one year, but in Taiwan this will take five years. Also an important issue to address is that even the same metrics can be understood differently as the circumstances maybe different (e.g. NCO reform). Another key issue regarding metrics is how states justify the prioritisation of metrics?

Among all criteria, should states plan the budget first in order to finance the transition?
Or should parliament amend the conscription laws and regulations first?

3. Factors and conditions

Factors and conditions are the facilitators or obstacles that could help or hinder the implementation process. For example, soldier's motivation towards the military service and public support for the armed forces can potentially affect the AVF implementation results in terms of recruitment and retention. Another crucial factor would be finance as defence budget restraints could cause problems in implementation. Some factors are case specific; for example, legislation is crucial for Swedish reform, while old-styled management has damaged soldiers' intention to retain in Taiwan's armed forces.

1.4 Case selection: why Sweden and Taiwan?

This thesis adopts a comparative method in that the nature of thesis is based on two AVF transition cases. In general, Yin argued that case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.⁷⁶ In a comparative study, the selected cases must share some common features in order to generalise knowledge or facts on a particular issue. Taking this into account, Sweden and Taiwan are selected as both possess similar characteristics in terms of international security circumstances. Both have not joined any defence alliance and have faced a serious military threat in the past.⁷⁷ Most importantly, in 2009 both coincidentally decided to suspend conscription and shift to AVF.

Notwithstanding, the causes behind their decisions to shift to an AVF model seem to vary: changes to the international strategic environment, increased expeditionary missions and other political reasons triggered Sweden to reform, while domestic political and societal issues played a more important role in Taiwan's AVF decision. In

⁷⁶ Yin, R 2003, *Case Study Research-Design and Methods*. 3rd Edition, Sage, New York, p.1.

⁷⁷ Both Sweden and Taiwan have not much experience of real combat in recent decades (Sweden fought in Congo between 1960 and 1964, while Taiwan had an artillery war against PRC invasion in 1958). Sweden is currently engaging in operations in Libya and ISAF in Afghanistan but Taiwan not at all.

addition, Sweden and Taiwan are quite different cases in terms of international political identity. Unlike Sweden and rest of the countries in the world, Taiwan is not recognised by the United Nations and international community as a fully-fledged state but rather a part of the PRC, and is subject to the complex status quo of a form of de facto independent state. Therefore, Taiwan's armed forces have been banned from participating in any kind of international missions which other states with an AVF are designed to perform. Despite parallels and goals shared by both cases, the key factor should be focused on the differences in their objectives of AVF and metrics for implementation.

Both Sweden and Taiwan represent good examples of the AVF transformation in their respective geographical regions; Sweden has become the first Scandinavian state while Taiwan is the first country in East Asia to suspend conscription after 1990. Through an East-West comparative analysis on AVF transition, it is possible that the western theory of the decline of the MAF when confronted with case in East Asia (Taiwan) can open some new perspectives of thinking on the AVF transition in Asia or even in the world.

Parallels between two cases

1. Non-participation in defence alliances

The war in 1814 dissuaded Sweden from any future armed conflicts and was the basis of their neutrality policy. Owing to this policy, Sweden has managed to stay out of wars including two total wars for two centuries. Immediately after World War II, Sweden's neutrality policy was based on maintaining a strong self-defence force. It entailed non-alignment in times of peace, with a view to remaining neutral in the event of war.⁷⁸ Hence, during the Cold War, Sweden intentionally kept a distance from NATO; the policy of military non-alliance has been considered to be the best security option for Sweden. The Swedes have been relying on themselves for their own national security and conscription system was considered the most suitable means to provide the manpower source for the Swedish armed forces.

⁷⁸ Lassinantti, G 2001, 'Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective', in *State and Alliances*, eds. E Reiter & H Gartner, Physica Verlag, Vienna, p.101.

In contrast to Sweden's non-alignment policy, Taiwan has been eager to join the international community including participation of international defence alliances. Nonetheless, international reality and opposition from the PRC have prevented Taiwan from joining in most international organisations and defence alliances. In order to provide security against military threat from PRC, the military strategy of Taiwan always focuses on homeland defence and deterrence capability, and has been adopting conscription as the military manpower supply for over 60 years. Albeit *de facto*, Taiwan heavily depends on the 'alliance' with the US through the foreign military sales and other training programmes to acquire advanced defensive weapons.

2. Facing military threats

Both Sweden and Taiwan have had to confront a much larger military power in the past. Interestingly, the military threats which Sweden and Taiwan have faced are from former 'iron curtain' states, Russia and China. Regardless of keeping neutral, Sweden still faced a military threat from Soviet Union during Cold War. Traditionally, Sweden was not covered by NATO's protection umbrella; it had to rely on self defence through conscription and its own defence industries, and had even considered developing its own nuclear capability. Compared to other West European states, the decline of the MAF was relatively less evident in Sweden during and even after the Cold War era. After 1990, Russia underwent fundamental changes and reforms in a broad range of areas. As Russia becomes more stable, its conducts in terms of foreign, security and defence policies would become more predictable. Nevertheless, the post Cold War détente does not offer Sweden a security guarantee as it learned cruel lessons from neighbouring countries that Russia can launch ruthless attacks at any time. For example, the cyber attack on Estonia launched by Russia during April and May of 2007 aroused major concerns in Sweden as it feared it could be the next victim.⁷⁹ This attack was a significant warning for Sweden; even though it currently faces no military threat to its territory, a similar cyber attack could cause significant damage and chaos to Sweden's economy and social order. Another lesson that is of relevance is the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, which made it clear that Russia is willing to use force to deepen and promote its national interests. As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military

⁷⁹ Ashmore, W 2009, 'Impact of alleged Russian cyber attacks', *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Vol. 11, pp.4-40.

force has once again become a major resort in Russia's foreign policy.⁸⁰ In addition, in recent years the competition over Arctic resources with Russia and other states has made Sweden uneasy.

Taiwan has faced a military threat from China for over six decades. China has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan since 1949 and keeps threatening to use force if Taiwan moves from *de facto* to *de jure* independence. The security over the Taiwan Strait is based on the cross strait relations between two sides. In the past five years has seen a cross-strait *détente* due to Taiwan's open and exchange policy with Beijing. However, this does not mean that threat from China has disappeared as China is unlikely to give up the 'One China' and 'peaceful unification' policies over Taiwan. China keeps expanding and advancing its armed forces, yet the defence budget has always been opaque. The military threat can be judged by the increasing number of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan from some 500 in 2004 to over 1,400 in 2010.⁸¹ Therefore, China still poses a significant military threat towards Taiwan.

3. Coincidence of time: the key factor

In March 2009, the Swedish Ministry of Defence proposed the Government Bill 2008/09:140 entitled '*A Functional Defence: a focus that extends over a five-year period 2010–2014*'.⁸² The bill was passed (but only with a very small majority -153 for, 150 against) by the Swedish parliament in June 2009, which led to the suspension of Sweden's long-practised conscription. The bill also acknowledges the realities of today's changing strategic environment and the requirements to build an expeditionary force which can immediately be deployed based on voluntary participation. More than a century-old institution of universal duty to serve in armed forces was suspended and will be launched only in a case of national defence emergency. The bill also emphasises that the recruiting system of the armed forces will be modernised so that voluntary participation can be the basis for providing personnel to the operational organisation rather than compulsory military service.⁸³

⁸⁰ Tsereteli, M 2009. 'The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor', Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C.

⁸¹ Tsai, D, Chief of National Security Bureau, ROC, testified in the Legislative Yuan on 20 Oct 2010.

⁸² Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009, '*A Functional Defence*', Stockholm, Sweden, March.

⁸³ Note, conscription in most other cases is suspended, not abolished. It is possible that the decline of

Shifting from conscription to AVF has been debated for a decade in Taiwanese society, and similar to the case of Spain, ending conscription was the election campaign promises of current president Ma. After assuming the presidency in May 2008, he reiterated this promise to replace conscription with an AVF within 4 to 6 years, indicating that he is determined to follow through with his pledge. Coincidentally at the same time (March 2009) when the Swedish government proposed the government bill, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of Taiwan announced that conscription will be suspended and replaced by a relatively small AVF with a substantial military cut. The AVF is being implemented in a gradual manner, with the number of personnel recruited through a voluntary enlistment system increasing ten percent year-on-year from 2009 with the hope of eventually achieving AVF by the end of 2014.

These three factors justify the selection of these two cases. They provide a good opportunity to fill a knowledge gap in the literature of MAF. However, it should be noted that the analysis of this study may be relevant and can be applied to some cases, but does not mean it fits every country case. Instead, this study should serve as an empirical basis for future comparative studies on the process of AVF transition.

1.5 Methods

Comparative case study

The comparative case study method was adopted to analyse the concurrent AVF transformations in Sweden and Taiwan. It seeks to move beyond plain description by providing empirical evidence drawn from across states to systematically compare core issues of the AVF transition. Comparative cases studies on the decline of MAF and AVF transitions have been widely conducted in the past decades by military sociologists mainly focusing on West European states and the US. For example, Kelleher investigated the mass armies in the 1970s concentrating on six west European states.⁸⁴ Burk compared the experience of the UK, France, West Germany and the US and

MAF but still retain conscription. Even the US can launch conscription again quite easily (legally) if not politically.

⁸⁴ Kelleher, C 1978, 'Mass armies in the 1970s, The debate in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 5, No 1, November, pp.3-30.

concluded that western industrial countries had shifted away from the MAF to the force-in-being. Sorensen used the Democrat-Deterrence-Deployment model to analyse the changes in conscription in three Scandinavian countries: Sweden, Denmark and Norway.⁸⁵ Van der Meulen and Manigart compared and analysed the process of AVF transitions in Belgium and the Netherlands.⁸⁶ Leander conducted a comparative study on Swedish and French military reforms.⁸⁷

The comparative method is effective in overcoming false universalism in which conclusions drawn exclusively from one state.⁸⁸ Through paired comparison, this thesis sheds light on different processes with similar states where certain factors are controlled to better analyse others. Moskos pointed out that the opportunity to explore the characteristics and dynamics of European armed forces and society makes a comparative method an appropriate approach.⁸⁹ According to Burk, adopting case-oriented comparative methods is important to explain the variation in patterns of national adherence to conscription.⁹⁰ As Sweden and Taiwan coincidentally decided to suspend conscription and share some similar features, they lend themselves very well to a dual case study; therefore, the comparative method is adopted.

Interviews and documentary analysis

Opinions and experiences from those who specialise in the issues surrounding military manpower (e.g. defence decision makers and military experts) are essential to this study. The interview results provide a more in-depth analysis than mere document analysis and literature review; they also generate important data and information which cannot be found in other methods such as archives, documents and media. For example, the motivation of government departments can be obtained through interviewing defence officials; while journalists' views somewhat reflect public opinion. To collect documents, archives and to conduct interviews, four field trips were made to Sweden and two trips to Taiwan.

⁸⁵ Sorensen, op. cit., pp.313-334.

⁸⁶ Van der Meulen & Manigart, op. cit., pp.315-332.

⁸⁷ Leander, A 2003, 'Disenchanted conscription: a military recruitment system in need of justification', working paper, Danish Institute for International Studies.

⁸⁸ Mackie, T & Marsh, op. cit., pp.173-187.

⁸⁹ Moskos, op. cit. p.14.

⁹⁰ Burk, op. cit., p.48.

In terms of data collection in Sweden, being a foreign postgraduate student, it would be difficult to build a contact network for interviews without assistance from a local coordinator, especially interviewing military personnel in the conservative environment of the armed forces. Apart from four fieldtrips to Sweden for conducting interviews and data collection, the author also participated in meetings hosted by War Studies Department to discuss defence reform issues with Swedish experts. With respect to Taiwan, the author's military background makes it less complicated to contact and arrange interviews with officials and members of the transition team from the MND. Other interviewees include the legislator of the defence committee, defence journalists, defence analysts and scholars, NCOs and volunteer soldiers. To explore the hands on experience of those who have either actually participated or specialised on the issues of AVF transition, interviews were carried out in a semi-structured form. Due to the high English proficiency of Swedish people, interviews were conducted in English; whereas in Taiwan, Chinese mandarin was the language used to conduct interviews.

Documentary analysis includes finding significant information embedded in the documents of relevant issues on conscription and AVF transition in Sweden and Taiwan. Information related to this issue is obtained from documents such as memos, records, government reports, archives, and policy statements. Archives from Taiwan's MND, Swedish Ministry of Defence, other government agencies and think tanks, together with official documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, Defense White Papers, Annual Report of the Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Government Bills have contributed to the triangulation of data and increased the reliability of this study. In addition, existing studies will also be used to support the empirical evidence.

Cross-national survey

A cross-national survey, in which the author was involved, was organised and carried out by the Swedish National Defence College.⁹¹ This survey takes a close look at soldiers' motivation, perceptions, satisfaction and self-evaluations on various issues in both armed forces. The survey was conducted in March and April 2011. Data were obtained from the structured questionnaire with close-ended questions designed by the

⁹¹ Research ethics for the survey is granted by School of Social Science and Public Policy.

Swedish National Defence College.⁹² The questionnaire is divided into four parts: Part I focuses on respondents' demographic data including age, gender, education, branch and service type; second part measures soldiers' personal attitudes toward the quality of basic military training and factors that influence soldiers' decision to join and extend the voluntary service.⁹³ The third part investigates how the surrounding environment affect the willingness of volunteer soldiers to both join and remain in the military, what are their self-identities as soldiers, and how they perceive the situation in the military and their job satisfaction. The final part explores their perception of military values and their intention to extend the service. As respondents' perceptions are abstract and difficult to quantify, the Likert Scale was adopted to divide questions from five to ten scales depending on types of questions. The survey evaluates the motivation of volunteer soldiers, which associates with the important metric of success: the quality of recruits. Despite sufficient quantity and good quality of soldiers, the AVF would not be fully competent if soldiers are not highly motivated.

1.6 Outline of Chapters

The outline of the chapters is based on the two theoretical perspectives outlined earlier. The first two chapters, namely the literature review and the background and context of cases, are based on the first theoretical approach as it identifies the research question and sets up the context of the thesis. The remaining chapters focus on empirical analysis of the AVF implementation in both countries. In light of the second theoretical approach as the theoretical foundation, these chapters examine and analyse the goals and objectives, metrics, and conditions and factors of the AVF implementation in both countries. Based on lessons and experiences of previous AVF cases in western countries, the second approach serves as the chief part of thesis in which empirical analyses are carried out. It is thus useful to find out whether the lessons drawn from previous AVF cases were learnt, studied or copied by the two selected countries. The two theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter identify the key research question: Why the MAF literature still has a gap and what is needed in order to bridge the gap? It also explains the main focus of the thesis, which is less the decision to move to an AVF and more on how that decision has been implemented and with what degree of success.

⁹² Sweden and Taiwan were two of the participating countries of the survey.

⁹³ Refer to survey in Appendix II.

Having reviewed the literature of MAF and previous AVF cases, Chapter Two describes the historical, political and strategic contexts and evolution of conscription in Sweden and Taiwan; it then discusses the causes of decisions to shift to AVF and formation of AVF policy. The causes of change will be explained through the Approach I, the decline of MAF; arguments made by MAF writers, particularly Haltiner and Burk, will be drawn for explanation.

Chapters Three, Four and Five form the empirical trilogy of the thesis, which focus on three elements of this thesis: goals, metrics, and conditions respectively. Chapter Three examines the first element, the goal and objectives of AVF. How do both countries define their goals for AVF? What are the specific objectives of AVF that both Sweden and Taiwan are trying to achieve? What particular types of AVF are Sweden and Taiwan trying to build? Then it will start to look at each comparative variable and identify the similarities and differences of the AVF objectives between two cases. The link between MAF and the goal will be discussed with focus on how threat perception, domestic politics and public support affect the goal that both countries constructed? Chapter Four identifies and examines the second element, metrics for a successful transition. It intends to answer the following questions: What metrics are adopted by Sweden and Taiwan for measuring success and achieving the objectives in terms of which the goal is defined. How do both countries justify these metrics? What are the factors that determine how well both countries do to get from decision to the successful transition? And finally how do the metrics connect with the goal? Chapter Five explores the factors and conditions. Conditions will be divided into positive, negative and neutral factors. This chapter will attempt to hypothesise the factors that either facilitate or hinder in achieving the metrics for successful transition.

Chapter Six is an integrated comparison of two cases which comprehensively evaluates the results of AVF implementation, and attempts to find out: Have both countries achieved their goals and objectives so far? And what obstacles, challenges and problems have Sweden and Taiwan faced in the AVF implementation? Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter which will provide an evaluation of how likely the efforts of both countries to achieve their goals and objectives for all-volunteer force will be successful or less so in the next few years. Future research regarding this issue will also be

suggested.

CHAPTER 2

Background and Context of Sweden and Taiwan

2.1 Introduction

The ‘final decline’ of mass armed forces has been identified in the previous chapter as an overarching trend in the wake of the end of the Cold War, especially in the West. Two cases reflecting this trend, Sweden and Taiwan share several characteristics in terms of their position in international affairs. Both armed forces have undergone similar organisational restructuring in the past decade. Similarities can be found in their strategic postures as both countries have not joined any defensive alliance such as NATO, have faced a serious military threat in the past, and have continued to rely on conscription for two decades after the end of Cold War. Finally, both have decided in 2009 to do away with conscription.

Nevertheless, the reasons for their decisions on AVF transformations are different: the changed international strategic environment, mitigated military threat and increasing international missions, non-universal conscription, and factors of economic efficiency, encouraged Sweden to pursue defence reform. On the other hand, improved cross-strait relations with China, and apparent domestic political, social and economic efficiency played a more important role in Taiwan’s AVF decision. Both cases share different backgrounds in other important aspects such as weight of history, political calculations, and social changes. A fundamental distinction concerns international political identity. Unlike Sweden, which is a normal state with full sovereignty, Taiwan can only be considered a quasi-sovereign state in that it is not recognised by the UN and the international community as a fully-fledged state but is formally seen rather as a part of the PRC. However, both countries represent good examples of the AVF transformation in their respective geographical regions. It is, therefore important, to review the background and contexts of both cases, and to discuss the reasons behind their AVF decisions. This could help discussion of these issues and principles of their defence reform plans to develop an AVF.

This chapter reviews and discusses the background of the armed forces and conscription in both countries in terms of following themes: the history and legal basis of conscription, military threats and strategic environment, defence policy and reform, and domestic and international factors that influenced the AVF decision. It then explores how the armed forces in both countries have adapted to the new strategic environment and transformed their personnel structure.

2.2 Sweden

2.2.1 Historical context: Swedish defence and conscription

While many western states have abolished conscription since the end of Cold War, Sweden, along with a handful of other countries, maintained conscription for 20 years in the post-Cold War era. Conscription played a central role in Sweden's defence policy for over a century and has been widely considered to be essential for guaranteeing the security of the Swedish 'people's home' (*Folkhemmet*) and the credibility of Sweden's neutrality abroad.⁹⁴ The concepts of people's home and neutrality are two essential elements of the Swedish national identity.

The weight of history made conscription an important aspect of Sweden's defence policy. It was based on the involvement of all young, healthy males in the military at some period in their lives and had been in effect since 1812.⁹⁵ In line with neutrality and military non-alignment, conscription underpinned Sweden's successful strategy of avoiding wars for two centuries, including two world wars. On the other hand, due to its non-alignment policy, theoretically Sweden was not protected by NATO's collective security mechanism, and thus was supposed to confront the Soviet Union alone during the Cold War. Upholding its non-aligned status entailed a high degree of self-reliance for defence and a credible defence industrial base (DIB) to design and produce weapons such as jets, tanks and submarines. Sweden's defence model, similar to Switzerland, which was subject to strictly maintaining neutrality and compulsory military system, was unique in the western world and successfully provided security for the Swedish

⁹⁴ Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, 2006, The Swedish military manpower policies and their gender implications, in *The Changing face of European conscription*, eds. P. Joenniemi, Ashgate, p.138.

⁹⁵ Sorensen, H 2000, 'Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century,' *Armed forces and society*, Vol.26, No.2, Winter, p. 313.

people throughout the entire Cold War era. The peculiar geostrategic background and neutrality backed by conscription have made the decline of mass armed forces less evident in Sweden compared with other West European states.

The deeper roots of Sweden's military system can be traced back to the age of the Swedish empire (1561–1721); since which time Sweden has kept a distinctive and unique military system. Foghelin argues that the Swedish defence during the Cold War era relied on four 'pillars' which not only consolidated the Swedish national identity, but ensured peace and security to Swedish people.⁹⁶ These pillars are:

1. 'The concept of "total defence", meaning all societal functions should support national defence. Both military personnel and civilians should bear the defence duty and be prepared for defence tasks.
2. A conscription system, the mainstay of military manpower.
3. Non-alignment in peace-time and maintaining neutrality during war-time.
4. An advanced indigenous defence industrial base.'

These pillars are discussed below.

Concept of total defence and conscription

Sweden's conscription was based on the concept of total defence, and this concept has been broadly perceived as an important way to protect the Swedish 'People's Home' and emphasised the importance of general conscription, voluntary organisations and the armed forces. Total defence was composed of both military and civilian defence organisations and, through the Total Defence Duty Act, all Swedish residents aged from 16 to 70 were obliged to defend the country through various forms of duty.⁹⁷ The principal task of military defence was to be able to engage in armed conflicts in order to protect the integrity of Sweden's territory and immediate environment.

During the 17th and early 18th century, Sweden was one of the first European countries to shift from local militia system that was inherited from the Middle Ages to national forms of conscription.⁹⁸ An allotment-militia system was adopted in the late 17th

⁹⁶ Foghelin, J, Defence Transformation with Frictions – The Case of Sweden, *NATO Report*.

⁹⁷ Axel Adlercreut and Birgitta Nyström, 2010, *Labour law in Sweden*, Kluwer Law International, p.107.

⁹⁸ Boene, B & Dandeker, C 2000, *Facing Uncertainty: Report No 2 The Swedish military in international*

century which not only supplied soldiers for the armed forces until the end of the 19th century, but also contributed to people's acceptance of the military. Having practiced the militia system for centuries, Sweden for the first time introduced conscription in 1812 in which members of the male cohort between age 20 and 25 were drafted. However, conscription was not carried out in a universal format so not every man was called up to serve. Learning from the successful experience of the Prussian conscript-based army during the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, in the late 19th century, general conscription became a necessity in Europe if a country wanted to defend itself from land based powers. Under this strategic environment, Sweden was no exception and conscription was kept in practice. However, the Swedish government worried that universal conscription could make the military too powerful and thus feared military subversion, that conscription was made non-universal.⁹⁹ It was not until the universal conscription launched in 1901 that every man within the draft age between 21 to 40 was obliged to serve in the military.¹⁰⁰

The Swedish government demanded that 'a strong popular engagement was the precondition if society was to be equipped to handle and resist serious threats, risks and pressures in both peace and war.'¹⁰¹ To transform this idea into practice, the 'Total Defence Duty Act' (*totalförsvarsplikt*) was introduced in 1994 and extended to all Swedish citizens (including women) and all foreign residents who have lived more than 5 years in Sweden have to perform duties in relation to national defence. Nevertheless, in reality only men were drafted; women were not obliged to serve compulsory service but could volunteer to be conscripts. In a culturally diversified Swedish society, the 1994 'Total Defence Duty Act' redefined and re-thought the relationship between state, society, and the military.¹⁰²

perspective, National Defence College, Sweden, p.153.

⁹⁹ Actually, there is no relationship between conscription and military power, which is power in society and control of state and people. Conscription may not always make the military powerful; in fact it depends on the political structure of the state. For example, a universal militia system would make people the power, not the military. In fact, one of the reasons Germany kept conscription was that it feared the AVF would become 'state within a state'.

¹⁰⁰ This was similar to France. After defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, France amended the unequal and limited conscription and replaced with the Prussian conscription model which was universal. France adopted conscription throughout 20th century until 2001. It decided to end it in 1996.

¹⁰¹ Leander, A 2004. Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Summer, p.589.

¹⁰² Ibid.

After the Total Defence Duty Act took effect, all citizens aged from 16 to 70 were required to contribute defence duty which could be performed in a civilian, military and voluntary capacity should Sweden be invaded. The act also signalled that the old defence duty was undergoing a change. An evident part was the reduction in the proportion of the youth cohort to be drafted. For example, in 1996 a total of 31,000 men were drafted out of an annual cohort of about 50,000; the number dropped to 17,000 in 2001, and further down to 8,000-10,000 in 2005-7. This meant that while 63% of the male cohort in 1996 (dropped from above 80% during the cold war) were summoned for military service, only 17 % were actually called up in 2005, showing a significant decline.¹⁰³ This phenomenon generated a legitimacy issue with regard to compulsory military service that was no longer universal. In several Western countries, the inequality of compulsory service was one of the main reasons that caused the abolition of conscription. For example, the non-universal conscription in the US during the 1960s incurred serious criticism of its legitimacy, as many people questioned ‘Who shall serve when not all serve?’¹⁰⁴ The equity issues were also found in France; during the 1990s, a substantial reduction was recorded among those finally called to serve.¹⁰⁵ While as high as 78% of those with a college degree managed to avert military service, it was no longer able to justify the legitimacy and equality of conscription.¹⁰⁶

In light of the increasing international peacekeeping missions, the total defence act did not assume that the primary duties of the armed forces were only to defend Swedish territory but involved missions abroad. Having defined and stipulated the source of defence manpower, the ‘total defence duty’ concept also expanded and diversified the recruiting pool of the armed forces by promoting the participation of women, immigrants, as well as homosexual people in the armed forces and moving away from stereotyped identities, thus reflecting a change in the perception of social hierarchies. In addition, a redefinition of the link between rights and duties was reflected in the idea of ‘total defence duty’. The concept and value of performing compulsory military service as an exchange for political rights has gradually vanished in Swedish society, and the

¹⁰³ Leander, A. 2006, The Swedish military manpower policies and their gender implications, in *The Changing face of European conscription*, eds. P Joenniemi, Ashgate, p.129.

¹⁰⁴ For the American military in the 1960s, see Andrew Bacevich’s review: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/books/review/those-who-have-borne-the-battle-by-james-wright.html?_r=1&ref=review>, accessed 30 May, 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Lecomte, J 2006, ‘The rise and death of conscription: the case of France’, in *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, p. 75.

¹⁰⁶ Leander, 2004, op. cit., p. 586.

focus is rather on individual rights that are not dependent upon a military contribution.¹⁰⁷

The 1994 Act restructured the military personnel system by not just expanding the recruitment pool but providing the means for drafting privileged, educated social groups into the armed forces when and if they were needed. It offered the armed forces the choice to decide who was suitable for active service. Leander argued that, in principle, the 1994 ‘total defence duty’ may have been more encompassing than the definition of its predecessor the 1901 law on defence duty because more diversified groups of people are required to serve.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, in practice fewer men had been drafted by the armed forces. Leander thus identified two problems of this revised concept of ‘total defence duty’.¹⁰⁹ ‘1. The reduced numbers for compulsory service would make the total defence duty seem unfair and arbitrary. 2. It would reduce the importance attached to defence issues in society at large.’

Conscription has successfully fulfilled its mission by staffing the Swedish armed forces to defend the country throughout the 20th century, including two world wars and the Cold War. Public support towards conscription in Sweden was relatively positive during the Cold War era. Based on polls conducted in the 1990s, Leander observed a steady majority of Swedes supporting conscription. Between 1980 and 1991, polls showed that an average of 86% of Swedish population favoured a conscription based army over an AVF.¹¹⁰ However, this high support of conscription started to fall since the 2000s. The 2002 opinion polls showed that only a slight majority (52%) of the public supported conscription, and 41% favoured an AVF. In 2003, another poll reflected that support for conscription had lost the majority and dropped to 45%.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ However, another Scandinavian case shows that Sweden’s neighbour Norway still maintains conscription, while due to post Cold-War military downsizing, it acknowledges that it no longer needs to draft every man; therefore it has seen reductions in the number of persons called up every year. Up to date, no one is drafted who does not want to serve.

¹⁰⁸ The 1901 defence duty law was modified 18 times between 1901-1995.

¹⁰⁹ Leander, op. cit., p.133.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.139.

¹¹¹ SPF 2003, Styrelsen for Psykologisktforsvar. <www.psykdef.se/opinion/>, accessed 25 May 2012.

Neutrality and Non-alignment policy

Without an appreciation of Sweden's neutrality and non-alignment policy, it is difficult to see the whole picture of Swedish defence policy. Neutrality is a foreign policy whereby states aim to maintain a neutral status in case wars break out in the region. Through non-participation in international defence alliances, military non-alignment is how a state implements its neutrality policy. In Sweden it has been intertwined with its neutrality policy since the end of World War II and throughout the entire Cold War period. Upholding military non-alignment means 'non-participation in military alliances with other states in peacetime in order to claim and maintain the status of neutrality in the event of war'.¹¹² Akin to Switzerland, being neutral entailed a strong and self-contained military defence. Swedish neutrality relied on keeping a capable conscription-based defence force in order to deter a potential invasion from the Soviet Union. During its heyday, theoretically, the total defence based Swedish armed forces were able to mobilise up to 800,000 troops in case war broke out.¹¹³

After 1989, West European countries started to abolish conscription and shift to the AVF. Sweden did not immediately follow suit because it did not feel that the possibility of Russian invasion could be totally ruled out. Following Sweden's entry into the EU in 1995, the situation changed when the 1995/96 Defence Resolution dictated a reduction in appropriations in defence and a change in military tasks. The transformation in defence tasks coincided with France's announcement of its decision to move to an AVF in February 1996. Although there was no direct link between France's AVF decision and Swedish calculations, it influenced Sweden to participate in more international missions. Ann Leander compared the abolition and retention of conscription in France and Sweden respectively and commented that 'the most common interpretation of these contrasting fates is that France has already walked a path that Sweden will soon have to take.'¹¹⁴ This was more likely due to the increasingly expeditionary orientation of Swedish thinking in defence.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Wedin, L. 2006, The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts and planning: the case of Sweden. In *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, eds. A. Bailes, G. Herolf & B. Sundelius, 2006, Oxford University Press, p.142.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Leander, A. 2004, Drafting community: understanding the fate of conscription, *Armed forces and society*, 30: 571, p.583.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.592.

After the mid-1990s, Swedish political elites perceived the possibility of military invasion from Russia to have gradually diminished and it was thus possible to engage in more international peace operations. Sweden started to shift its defence paradigm from territorial defence to international missions because the EU served as an important platform for multi-national military collaborations. The traditional concept of maintaining a large force for territorial defence was losing its influence and *raison d'être*.

Although military non-alignment remained an important element in Swedish foreign and defence policy, being an EU member requires Sweden to provide a military contribution to its defence. Unlike NATO which is a military actor led by the US, and although the EU is not a major military actor, it has its own security mechanism. Furthermore, the Swedish armed forces have been involving in peacekeeping operations under NATO auspices in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, and regularly participating in manoeuvres with other countries within the Partnership for Peace framework. Sweden's increasing involvement in international operations has gradually eroded its neutrality policy. In light of this, in April 2001 Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh publicly announced that Sweden would no longer call itself a neutral state.¹¹⁶ Therefore, one of the main tasks of the Swedish armed forces in the years to come is to proactively take part in international peacekeeping/support operations. Nevertheless, it was not efficient to use conscripts abroad, as they always needed to volunteer and undergo special training before they were allowed to perform international missions and Sweden has been no exception.¹¹⁷

Defence Industrial Base (DIB)

The last pillar supporting Swedish defence system relates to its indigenous defence industrial base (DIB), which can be traced back to when Sweden was a more active and influential European military power. During the Second World War when Sweden was cut off from foreign imports because of its neutrality status, the defence industry had become self-sufficient, and since then it had developed to the present scale. During the Cold War, Sweden's military non-alignment policy entailed a strong DIB to meet its

¹¹⁶ Svedberg and Kronsell, 2006, p.151.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p.152.

arms requirements.¹¹⁸ Due to a relatively small population but a rather large geographical area, the Swedish defence opted for variety and quality in the development of defence equipment. Ranging from rifles to fast jets and submarines, the unique Swedish DIB has met the arms needs of the armed forces.

After the end of Cold War, difficulties in Sweden's DIB started to loom. The reduced threat level led to a cut in defence expenditure and the size of the armed forces. With the decrease in domestic weapon demands, internationalisation to extend sales of weapons abroad was viewed as a more promising option in order to keep its DIB surviving. However, it requires increased international co-operation due to the principle of reciprocity.¹¹⁹ Since the mid-1990s, Sweden has exported weapons to some 35-40 countries annually.¹²⁰ Another key dimension of DIB is to maintain the capacity and know-how of weapon technology. Although internationalisation of DIB is a supplementary but useful method, the core strategy still relies on government's decision to keep the DIB by purchasing domestic arms. This was reflected in the 2009 defence bill which guaranteed the higher priority of acquiring domestic weapons such as the purchase of Gripen. However, questions can be raised about whether the budget for the new generation Gripen would compromise the finance for AVF transition? On the other hand, given the fact that the objective of AVF is to build a professional and high-tech military, would Sweden's DIB influence the success of its AVF transition?¹²¹

2.2.2 Post-Cold War Era

Even though the strategic environment changed significantly after 1990, owing to its geographical proximity to Russia, Sweden did not radically reform the format of military personnel system. As discussed in Chapter one, Haltiner argued that states

¹¹⁸ Börjesson, S. and Elmquist, M. Aiming at innovation 2012, A case study of innovation capabilities in the Swedish defence industry. *International Journal of Business Innovation and Research*, (2) pp. 188-201.

¹¹⁹ Boone, B & C. Dandeker, 2000, *ibid*, p. 34.

¹²⁰ <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/industry-se.htm>>, accessed 12 March 2012. In addition, Sweden has finalised the specification of Gripen, and national defence industry is still an important issue for Sweden. Even with reciprocal military assistance, Sweden air force will still purchase Gripen. See also Saab website <<http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/Gripen/Gripen/In-use/>>, accessed 1 May 2012.

¹²¹ According to Van der Meulen and Manigart, advancement of weapon technology was one of the reasons facilitating the decline of MAF. Without advance weapon system, the AVF could become what Dandeker calls a 'hollowed AVF'. Therefore the DIB could play a role in the success of AVF transition.

closer to the border of hostile states are more cautious about changing priorities in defence structure. Furthermore, the consensus politics in Sweden made defence reform even more difficult at least until the recent conservative alliance formed the government in 2006.¹²² Boene et al. pointed out that Sweden underwent a difficult time in adjusting to the post-Cold War era. They identified the following factors that affected defence reform in Sweden: ‘the end of the standoff between East and West blocs and the substantial reduction in military threat which for a long time had structured force configuration, civil-military relations, societal cohesion and national identity’.¹²³ These factors have facilitated significant changes in the structure of armed forces which include, as they suggested, actively taking part in international peace operations, and giving up the mass army format by streamlining and downsizing the armed forces.

Although little in the way of reform took place in the early 1990s, changes occurred in the late 1990s. The 1995/96 defence bill had for the first time identified the post-Cold War changes in international strategic environment and observed that, while the threat from Russia had substantially reduced, regional conflicts and the new transnational threats could pose a challenge to Sweden’s security. In addition to territorial defence, based on the concept of reciprocity in which helping other states should lead to receiving support in return, the bill demanded Swedish defence policy to increasingly focus on participation in international peacekeeping/support operations. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in light of the participation in UN operations abroad and the absence of a significant territorial military threat, the defence bill (1999/2000:30) entitled ‘*The New Defence*’, offered clear direction in adjusting the Swedish armed forces to the post-Cold War strategic environment. It stipulated four main tasks: defending Sweden against armed attack; upholding Sweden’s territorial integrity; contributing to peace and security abroad; and strengthening the Swedish society in case of severe challenge in peacetime.¹²⁴

The 1999/2000 defence bill facilitated another defence reform by emphasising the importance of international military co-operation.¹²⁵ With this renewed bill, Sweden

¹²² BBC News, 18 September 2006, Analysis: Sweden changes direction, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5356402.stm>>, accessed 1 June 2012.

¹²³ Boene, B & C. Dandeker, *ibid.*, p. 156.

¹²⁴ SOU 2001:23. *Personal for ettnyttforsvar*, Forsvarsdepartementet, Stockholm, p. 46.

¹²⁵ Wyss, M. 2011, Military Transformation in Europe’s Neutral and Non-Allied States, *RUSI Journal*, April/May 2011 Vol. 156 No. 2 pp.44–51.

aimed to enhance its military co-operation with the Nordic countries within the frameworks of Partnership for Peace (PFP), and with other western states under the frameworks of UN, EU, OSCE and NATO. More importantly, the bill demanded a new personnel concept which required a higher proportion of volunteer soldiers in order to perform expeditionary missions. In other words, the 1999/2000 bill signalled that Sweden should consider ending conscription.

NATO: Sensitive issue

Even though Sweden has not sought formal membership of NATO, there is no doubt that NATO has been influential on Swedish strategy both during and after the Cold War. Without NATO to counterbalance the Soviet Union during Cold War, Sweden's neutrality and non-alignment would have been difficult to sustain. The Swedes have long been reluctant to have formal membership of NATO for obvious reason – it would damage Sweden's non-aligned status, even 20 years after the end of Cold War. However, Sweden has been actively participating in NATO-led operations. For example, participation of PFP in 1994 was the first time that Sweden was brought into military co-operation under a NATO mandate. In 1995, Sweden also decided to take part in IFOR in Bosnia under a NATO mandate. While the option of NATO membership remains a political taboo and has low public support, Sweden has gradually extended its co-operation and interaction with NATO in an increasing number of fields, including ISAF in 2003.

Carrying out NATO missions is an important move for non-aligned Sweden. The strategic concepts, military doctrines, compatibility and standards of NATO for peacekeeping/support operations have become new military and strategic guidelines for Swedish armed forces. These NATO concepts have driven the Swedish armed forces to reorganise in directions totally different from its old Cold War thinking and configuration, which was based on an exclusive Swedish national profile with indigenous doctrines together with Swedish designed weapon systems.¹²⁶ In other

¹²⁶ Huldt, B. 2001, Swedish Baltic Sea Policies – Return to A Historical Role? *Swedish Security Review*. Spring.

words, through collaboration with multi-national missions, the “interoperability” of Swedish armed forces has been improved greatly.¹²⁷

After the Kosovo crisis in 1999, even though Swedes realised the importance of developing European crisis management capabilities, it did not persuade Sweden to join NATO. The Kosovo crisis offered many useful lessons on how NATO was maintaining its stable and central position in the European security order. However, for Sweden, non-alignment and neutrality was still regarded as an asset rather than a burden due to its strategic culture and weight of history based on two centuries of peace. Participating in missions under the UN and EU mandate is more legitimate and convincing in terms of domestic public opinion than those under NATO. Although the Kosovo crisis indicated that Sweden may be willing to compromise ideals with reality, it still prefers that both the EU and NATO should have a UN mandate for their peacekeeping/support operations.

The UN mandate may appear important both for the reason of integrating Russia under the UN framework, and for creating an international system based on common norms.¹²⁸ Therefore, despite increasing co-operation with NATO, acquiring NATO membership has not been on the agenda in Swedish politics. It would be difficult to reach agreement in the environment of consensus politics, which is an obstacle to change. The domestic debate on the NATO membership has thus been sensitive and cautious. In short, with regard to the co-operation with NATO, everything else other than joining it formally as a member seems to be acceptable. Sweden will practically keep working with NATO without a *de jure* membership, at least for the next 10 years.¹²⁹

International missions

The fundamental proposition of participating in international missions is to build security together with other states. To stress this fact, Sweden introduces a solidarity clause for the EU and the Nordic countries; the clause states:

¹²⁷ Forsberg, T. & Vaahutoranta, T 2001, Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's Post-Neutrality. *European Security*, Vol.10, No.1, Spring , pp.68-93.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Christopher Dandeker, in dialogue with Swedish defence officials, 2012.

‘Sweden will not remain passive if a catastrophe or an attack should hit another member country or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act similarly should Sweden is under attack.’¹³⁰

To comply with the solidarity clause, Sweden must possess the capacity and political will to provide military support to other countries. The clause is based on the concept of reciprocity, indicating that Sweden is willing to risk damaging its long tradition of military non-alignment in exchange of mutual assistance from allied states in case of war. This means that neutrality is unlikely to withstand conflict in the nearby region. Thus, since Sweden joined EU in 1995, the possibility of maintaining neutral status started to wane, especially after the solidarity clause took effect. However, compared with the issues of NATO membership, domestic debate on this shift in doctrine has been politically less controversial and rather supportive.¹³¹

An international mission is less controversial and more acceptable if it can be flagged as a UN one. For example, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is led by NATO but established by the UN Security Council. In 1996, Sweden deployed a battalion for the first time on the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, Sweden decided to provide a mechanised company and support units to the peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The 1999 decision was the watershed which shifted Swedish defence strategy and concept from territorial defence to an expeditionary orientation. The largest international mission in post Cold-War era was launched in 2003: some 500 personnel have been working alongside allied forces as part of the ISAF in Afghanistan. In April 2011, Sweden joined the Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the NATO military operation in Libya under UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The Swedish Air Force deployed eight Gripen aircraft to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.¹³²

As of August 2013, Sweden is currently performing peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In the light of its international military experience, an issue should be addressed regarding the future missions. As performing international peacekeeping mission is the main driver of the Swedish AVF transition, it would be difficult to justify

¹³⁰ It is based on the EU *Lisbon treaty* article. 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”

¹³¹ Christiansson M. 2009, *Far Away, So Close: Comparing Danish and Swedish Defence and Security Policies*, *Militært Tidsskrift*, 138. årgang - No. 3, September, pp.1-18.

¹³² NATO website, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52535.htm>, accessed 16 May 2012.

the force transformation if there were no peace-enforcement or peace-keeping missions with which to be involved. Therefore, the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 might lead to insufficient missions for designed force structure and thus generating a further question: Will Sweden be willing to participate in Afghanistan-styled kinetic operations again in the future? Or rather will it opt for counter-piracy and Libya-styled missions, that is, without significant 'boots on the ground'? This is a challenge for Sweden as its current defence reform significantly focuses on international missions. Without proper international missions, the legitimacy of its AVF transformation could be jeopardized.

2.2.3 Political and strategic context:

Perception of Russia

After 1990, Russia's military capability went into decline. On the other hand, Russia's foreign and defence policies were then considered to be more transparent and consistent than they were during the previous Cold War decade. The continued economic development in Russia and its increasing collaboration with the western world during 1990-2000 contributed to the stability in Sweden and Scandinavian Peninsula. Despite the détente in strategic environment and reduced military threat from Russia, it was not until the turn of the 21st century that Swedes began to feel Russia had become more predictable and less threatening. According to Government Bill 1999/2000:30, Sweden has first time described its emancipation from the tension of Cold War and Russian threat.¹³³

Unfortunately, this emancipation did not last long. Since Vladimir Putin took office as Russian president in 2000, his anti-Western ideology has caused some concerns in Sweden.¹³⁴ The 2008 aftermath of Russian invasion over Georgia deepened its worry. The Georgian war and Putin-styled governance have proved that Russia can still be pictured as a hostile state. Fears of a resurgent Russian military power after the Georgian War have ignited some critics in Stockholm to call for a return to a territorial

¹³³ Government Bill. 1999/2000:30, p.10

¹³⁴ For example, in February 2012 Russia and China vetoed the UN resolution on Syria calling on President al-Assad to step down.

defence posture.¹³⁵ On the other hand, the increased importance of the Arctic and Barents Sea regions also attracts Sweden's attention as the abundant natural resources such as oil and natural gas make the Arctic Circle a strategically important region.¹³⁶ The competition for resources in this region is becoming more intense, and therefore Sweden does not rule out the possibility of future confrontation with Russia over this issue. The former supreme commander of Swedish Armed Forces Hakan Syrén thus warned that 'it would be unwise to build our security policy on a one-sided positive assumption about the international development'.¹³⁷

2.2.4 Defence Transformation since the Cold War

Defence Reform

The Swedish armed forces had already undergone reform before the government decided to suspend conscription; therefore the reform should be discussed as part of the wider context of AVF transformation. Defence reform in Sweden since the end of Cold War has come a long way after an initial decade of slow pace of change. The peculiar historical and geostrategic background prevented Swedish armed forces from immediate transformation during the early post-Cold War era. It waited ten years for the 1999 government bill (1999/2000:30) to shift its defence concept from an invasion-based to a mission-based expeditionary defence.

After the September 11th attack in 2001, the Swedish government further realised that the threats of terrorism and intra-state conflicts had replaced the conventional Cold-War type of confrontation and the concept of what Sir Rupert Smith calls 'industrial war'.¹³⁸ Missions in the past decade also show that there have been fewer traditional state on state wars but more multi-national operations, thus underline the importance of international military co-operation. To deal with new types of war, the old territorial defence concept thus needed to be shifted to an expeditionary, flexible and usable force concept. In fact, the reform was within the framework of conscription; while still based

¹³⁵ Wyss, M. 2011, op. cit.

¹³⁶ Syrén, H. 2007, *Bådeoch – en liten bok om dubbla uppgifter och framtiden krav. Stockholm: The Armed Forces*, p.64.

¹³⁷ Syrén, H. 2009, *Vaktombyte – reflektioner efter fem års om ÖB*, *Stockholm: The Armed Forces*, p. 52.

¹³⁸ Smith, General Sir R. 2005, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World*, pp 64-104.

on conscription, the defence reform since late 1990s has seen significant development in terms of outward strategy and less territorial defence.

Since 1901, the conscription system in Sweden not only staffed the armed forces, but also functioned as a manpower pool for Swedish armed forces to acquire quality contract soldiers (other states call them volunteers or professionals). This was similar to Germany where conscription was seen as an ideal way to obtain quality volunteer soldiers after they had served. With proper training and selection, on average the contract soldiers recruited from conscripts were better than those recruited from the open market. However, Sweden's outward strategic focus has made conscription inefficient and less useful to acquire a large number of soldiers who can be deployed for international operations on short notice. In addition, when less than 20% of male youth cohorts were actually drafted, the fairness of conscription thus faced increasing pressure and could no longer be achieved.

As the defence orientation shifted towards a more expeditionary posture, more volunteers were needed so they could be efficiently deployed abroad. Therefore a mixed, two-tier system had gradually formed composed of one tier of conscripts for territorial defence and another tier of volunteers to be deployed for international missions. Another benefit of the two-tier system was that volunteers could be recruited from the conscript pool. This two-tier system along with the military downsizing has gradually transformed the *de jure* general conscription into a *de facto* volunteer force system.

In the domestic context, western armed forces have faced increasing budget pressures amid the downward trend of military establishment. Swedish armed forces have encountered the same situation. The economic calculation has also played a role in the Swedish AVF decision, although this issue was not as prominently discussed as those of the international and security factors. By the same token, from a wider societal perspective, the value for money (or opportunity costs) of the individual young men who were selected for service should be considered. Therefore, the issue of economic efficiency and budget has been addressed in Sweden's AVF implementation.

NCO Issue

The Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps is the backbone of the armed forces and is crucial in executing military orders and training soldiers. Before discussing the NCO issue it is important to identify the role of NCO. While the commissioned officer leads, commands, directs and sets the strategy, the NCO organises and administers and the soldier executes. The NCOs carry out the middle management of the armed forces and increasingly take on an executive management function.¹³⁹

Sweden abolished the NCO system in 1983 and is now bringing this system back along with its AVF implementation. In the 1970s the Swedish government decided to reform the officer corps because the class system in the officer corps did not conform to the egalitarian concept which was deeply rooted in the Swedish society.¹⁴⁰ In addition, due to the pressure from the union movement, which aimed to merge its organisations in the public sector, in 1983 the Swedish government combined two categories of officer systems into one unified officer corps, and disbanded the NCO corps. Swedish armed forces thus became the first military in the world without an NCO corps.

The result was not so successful. Without NCOs, officers were required to carry out the NCO's tasks - detailed management in training and organising. The confusion of officer and NCO tasks had compromised the capability of the armed forces. Åselius identified that officers who command and lead operations are not necessarily qualified to be instructors or technical specialists; lack of professional specialisation among command personnel has eroded the quality and efficiency at all levels of the Swedish armed forces.¹⁴¹ In addition to performing mixed roles, Swedish officers are also required to absorb a very diverse spectrum of knowledge. The former Commandant of the Swedish National Defence College Karlis Neretnieks observes that there has been a wider range of military and non-military specialised knowledge provided for the professional officer in which he refers to as the 'tree of knowledge'.¹⁴² With so much to learn, officers therefore do not have time to develop experience in leadership and simultaneously to

¹³⁹ September 2003. The Role of the Non Commissioned Officer in the British Army. The UK defence forum.

¹⁴⁰ I am indebted to Dr Karl Yden of Gothenburg University for this point.

¹⁴¹ Åselius, G., 2005. Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945, *Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol 40(1), p. 38.

¹⁴² Dandeker, C. 2012, *Military professionalism and professional military education in the 21st century: the challenges and potential responses*, Report to Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters.

deal with middle management and further to specialize in a specific military skill. Especially under the AVF context, the mixing of roles has prevented both officers and NCOs from carrying out their roles properly. This problem can also be observed in Taiwan; the difference is that it was not an egalitarian ideology that led to the development.

The consequence is that training and many of the command functions have to be entrusted to soldiers themselves. Dandeker suggests that, for officers to focus on their field of professional competence, in an AVF it is essential that a cadre of NCOs is created who are able to supervise other ranks and deliver sub-tactical effects.¹⁴³ A new category of military personnel called 'specialist officers' similar to NCOs has thus been planned in its personnel reform. Since July, 2011, the newly created specialist officers are trained in the Military Academy in Halmstad rather than the Swedish National Defence College.

2009 Government bill: a significant personnel reform in recent decades

Two decades after the end of Cold War, in 2009, Sweden eventually decided to suspend conscription. It was also the first Scandinavian country to shift its armed forces to an AVF system. The new personnel system was described in the Government Bill 2008/09:140 titled '*A Functional Defence*', which was announced in March 2009. The 2009 bill was based on broad agreement reached by the Defence Commission which extend across seven political parties. When Defence Minister Sten Tolgfors presented this bill, he described the bill as 'the largest renewal of the Swedish armed forces in many decades'.¹⁴⁴

The 2009 bill sets two phases to complete the military personnel reform. The first phase started in 2009 and will be completed by 2014. During this phase, conscription ended in July 2010. The second phase will start from 2015 and end in 2019; one important task will be accomplished by the end of this phase. The overseas missions will be conducted by 1,700 personnel for continuous engagement. The other goal is focused on territorial

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ *Stockholm News*, 2009, 19 March. <<http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=2893>>, accessed 28 December 2011.

defence, in which the Home Guard plays a greater role.¹⁴⁵ Of the planned 22,000 Home Guard soldiers, 16,600 will receive advanced training and equipment and be required to carry out tours of duty even in peacetime.

In terms of the restructuring of personnel, the fundamental change was to suspend conscription. The two-century old compulsory military service was suspended and replaced by personnel recruited on voluntary basis. The abolition of NCOs in the 1980s caused problems in training and competence due to a lack of experienced leadership available at a lower level. In the new reform plan, the officer corps will be restructured by reintroducing NCOs (based on restructured specialist officers); with more specialist officers who train and command troops and fewer people in staff and command functions.¹⁴⁶ The current military force structure will remain intact until 2014, after which there would be a gradual shift until the final completion of transformation in 2019.

2.3 Taiwan

2.3.1 Historical background

Not in full-fledged international status

Before discussing the context and background of Taiwan, it is necessary to explain that the fundamental difference between Sweden and Taiwan lies in the nature of their statehood. While Sweden is a normal sovereign state, the international status of Taiwan has been controversial for decades. Neither the United Nations nor the international community recognises Taiwan as an independent state, but rather as a part of the PRC. Also, because the 'One China' policy is accepted and abided by most of the countries in the world, Taiwan has thus been isolated from the international community and banned from participating in most international organisations including defence alliances. Therefore, Taiwan struggles to gain access to the international community. Chinese opposition is based on the following reasons: '1. there is only one China and Taiwan is

¹⁴⁵ Home Guard soldiers are different from regular and part-time (reservist) soldiers because they are not deployed overseas.

¹⁴⁶ Foghelin, J., op. cit. In light of the chaos caused by abolishing the NCOs, the reform aims to focus on soldiers training and commanding by cutting desk officers.

a part of China; 2. PRC is the sole legal government representing all China; 3. and membership in international organisations is confined to sovereign states'.¹⁴⁷

Taiwan's problematic international status was highlighted in 1971 when its UN membership was taken away, and since then the statehood of the ROC was collectively denied by the international community. Immediately after the withdrawal of UN membership, Taiwan experienced relative isolation. To date, Taiwan only maintains formal diplomatic relations with some twenty countries; most of them are small states in Africa, Latin America and Pacific Islands. Given these circumstances, the relationship with the US is thus vital to Taiwan's security. Although official diplomatic relations between US and Taiwan were terminated in 1979 when the Carter administration formally recognised PRC as the legitimate China, the US has been a firm ally of Taiwan and played an important role in both defending the security of the island and maintaining cross-strait peace. Taiwan's *de facto* alliance with the US is based on Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as a legal foundation requiring the US to provide Taiwan defensive weapons, and to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardise the security of Taiwan.

Against all odds, Taiwan has been effectively self-governed by the government of the Republic of China (ROC) as a *de facto* small island state since 1949. In terms of the relations with China, Taiwan currently maintains the *status quo*, meaning that neither independence nor unification will be pursued in near future. The *status quo* serves as an equilibrium which allows for much flexibility, however, it also restricts Taiwan's possibilities in becoming a full-fledged international actor.¹⁴⁸

The Retreat of the Nationalist Party to Taiwan in 1949

The history of the Republic of China was preceded by the Qing Dynasty. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the corruption of this Dynasty caused its downfall, weakened its state power, and led to invasions by western countries. After the Qing

¹⁴⁷ Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, PRC. <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White&m_id=4>, accessed 6 March 2012.

¹⁴⁸ Winkler, S. 2011. Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan's International Status, *Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis*, Number 7, November. <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/17-taiwan-international-status-winkler>>, accessed 16 February, 2012.

Dynasty was toppled in 1911, the formation of ROC in 1912 announced an end to over two thousand years of imperial rule in China. Between 1912 and 1949 the ROC was governed by the Nationalist government. During this period, the ROC history was one of turmoil characterised by war lord occupations, the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese occupation, and the Chinese Civil War. After the eight-year Sino-Japanese war ended in 1945, the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-Shek lost the Chinese Civil War on the mainland to Communist forces led by Mao Zedong. In 1949 Mao's Communist government took control of the mainland and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC), thus the ROC government retreated to Taiwan.

The victory of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had not only forced Chiang and the Nationalist Party (KMT) to withdraw to Taiwan, but also created complicated and hostile cross-strait relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Military, diplomatic, and political tensions between two sides have been at a high level since 1949. Saving face is an important issue in Chinese culture. After the defeat of the KMT, Chiang adopted the 'Three No's Policy' towards China: 'no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise.' There was neither communication nor negotiation between Beijing and Taiwan during the presidencies of Chiang Kai-Shek and his successor, Chiang Ching-kuo (his son). Most importantly, the strategic objective during Chiang's era was not only to defend the territory, but also seek to re-take China. The structure of the armed forces was based on this ambitious ideology and therefore maintained a large quantity of active-duty personnel (600,000) and offensive capabilities. During the 1950s and 60s Taiwan's military was always kept on high alert and readiness in order to respond the Chinese military invasions. Military assistance from the US was vital and successfully helped Taiwan counter the Chinese invasions, including the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s.¹⁴⁹

To defend and establish what it considers to be its full territorial integrity, China has never given up claiming Taiwan as its territory and at various times has launched military invasions of Taiwan.¹⁵⁰ With a strong determination to protect the homeland and military assistance from the US, Taiwan's conscript-based armed forces effectively deterred these Chinese invasions (or efforts at 'liberation'). Under Chiang's strategic

¹⁴⁹ During 1960s and 70s, military tie with the US was close and Taiwan air force even carried out secret reconnaissance missions for the US by flying U-2 spy plane over PRC.

¹⁵⁰ For example, Battle of Kuningtou in 1949, first and second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 and 1958.

thinking and political ambition, the high readiness of Taiwan's armed forces was not just to defend the island, but even aimed to counter-attack and re-take the mainland. In order to do so, maintaining a large standing armed forces based on conscription was necessary.¹⁵¹ During the early years of a re-established ROC on such a small island with a relatively low population, conscription was an optimal method for filling the ranks of the armed forces.

After almost four decades of military stand-off, the hostile situation started to thaw in the past two decades. Since 2008, an open and peaceful policy toward China was adopted with the aim of stabilising and normalising relations across the Taiwan Strait. Owing to this open policy, cross-strait trade and exchange relations have been substantially increased and tensions between two sides have been reduced, which somewhat reflect a reduced possibility of military conflict with China.

Legal basis of conscription

In order to acquire sufficient soldiers to safeguard the island, every male reaching the age of 18 was required to serve the compulsory military service. In terms of legal context, the Constitution of ROC and the Military Service Act serve as the legal foundation of conscription, stipulating that all males from age 18 to 40 are obligated to perform military service. As prescribed in Article 12 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Military Service Act, 'male citizens of the ROC are obligated to undergo military service'. In 1954 Taiwan government further amended both the 'Military Service Act' and 'Military Service Enforcement Rules' to ensure that the military service system kept 'conscripts as the mainstay and volunteer soldiers and national militia as the supplement'.¹⁵²

From an historical perspective, Martin Edmonds points out that conscription remains the primary mechanism in Taiwan by which important elements of military culture are transmitted to the population. On the other hand, he stresses that conscription also presents a restraint on change and reform within the armed forces because the concept of mass army could prevent or slow down the incentive for the armed forces to pursue

¹⁵¹ Taking an offshore island Kinmen as example. During first and second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1950s, 100,000 troops were deployed on this tiny island alone.

¹⁵² 2009 *National Defense Report*, ROC, Taiwan, p.115.

hi-tech transformation and professionalisation.¹⁵³ Based on Edmonds' argument, conscription impedes innovation and sound change-management. This is because only until the AVF decision was taken was thought given as to what would be the real roles and responsibilities of officers, NCOs, and soldiers. Nevertheless, conscription has been an important element in the strategic posture of Taiwan vis-à-vis a potential invasion from China.¹⁵⁴

Unlike Sweden, where in the 2000s only as few as 20% of male youth cohorts were actually drafted, conscription has been strictly enforced by law in Taiwan, thus making it an equal and universal duty. All men were required to serve in the military when they reached draft age, no matter what their family background was. They underwent a collective life experience which strengthened their sense of responsibility. Draft-aged men can only be exempt from service if they are severely unfit or disabled. Conscientious objectors can choose to undertake alternative service. Alternative services are available for conscripts whose physical condition makes them unfit for military training. Therefore, recalling Haltiner's MAF definitions, the strict execution of conscription in Taiwan is similar to the situation of what he calls the 'hard-core' European states such as Turkey and Finland.¹⁵⁵

However, the conscription system delayed many gifted young men from investing their time in social and economic development, and had an impact on Taiwan's economic competitiveness. Although inequality has not been a problem in Taiwan's conscription, the legitimacy of conscription in Taiwan, similar to that of Sweden, has been questioned since the 2000s, but in a different way. Taiwan has not fought a war or performed military operations for four decades. From the perspective of economic efficiency, conscription has often been considered a waste of time for the youth cohorts. Thus, a question has been raised in the past decade: 'Has conscription fulfilled its mission and had its day in Taiwan?' The transition to AVF system is thus believed potentially to enable more human effort to be devoted toward Taiwan's economic development.

¹⁵³ Edmonds, M. 2002, Taiwan's strategic and military culture, in *Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy*, Routledge, p. 234.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Taiwan's current CR ratio is below 50% and therefore is not a hard-core state. This is due to the proportion of draft age men serving for alternative services has increased.

Given the history of Taiwan and its geopolitical context since 1949, conscription was the only available option for staffing the armed forces during its early years, especially when confronting a great and hostile power. Conscription was immediately implemented in an effort to uphold military leverage with the PRC, and it has underpinned national security and effectively deterred against Chinese invasion since then. Thanks to the rapprochement between the two sides in the past two decades, especially the fast pace of détente since 2008, the cross-strait tension has been gradually reduced; however, a lower level of military confrontation still cannot be ruled out. Akin to western states, before carrying out a full-fledged AVF transformation, Taiwan has been recruiting volunteer soldiers since 2003 and a two-tier system has developed in Taiwan's armed forces. The legal basis for recruiting volunteer soldiers is based on Article 3 of the Act of Military Service for Volunteer Enlisted Men passed in 1959; it was amended in 2003 to incorporate the recruitment of women. On the other hand, the length of compulsory service had been shortened four times during the 2000s, which required the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to recruit more volunteer soldiers in order to keep up with the required force level. Since then, the MND had been embarking upon the professionalisation of armed forces through the recruitment of volunteers.

2.3.2 Strategic context

Chinese military threat

Territorial integrity and sovereignty is the key principle for Beijing in terms of foreign and defence policies. In the past, the majority of instances where China has resorted to force have mainly been to defend its territory and sovereignty, such as several territorial disputes along the border with India, and the armed conflict with Vietnam in 1979.¹⁵⁶ A recent case of Chinese military intimidation of Taiwan was the 1996 Chinese missile exercise dubbed as the third Taiwan Strait crisis, aiming to coerce Taiwan not to opt for *de jure* independence. Before 2008 Taiwan had been under the rule of pro-independence governments for almost 20 years.¹⁵⁷ Even though no formal moves claiming

¹⁵⁶ Chen, K. 1986, *China's war with Vietnam, 1979*. Hoover Institute, Stanford University, pp.48-50. But China's view of south china sea is rather broaden concept of sovereignty so that it is not seen as defensive by Vietnam etc.

¹⁵⁷ Lee Teng-Hui (1988-2000) and Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008).

independence were taken, the frequent use of what the PRC regarded as provocative language had led to a deterioration in the already tense cross-strait relations and exchange between two sides was thus limited. In terms of a current military threat, the most imminent and evident is that the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan has continued to increase from 500 in 2004 to more than 1,100 in 2013.¹⁵⁸ In addition, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) frequently conducts military exercises simulating an invasion across the Taiwan Strait.

According to the decline of MAF literature, one of the key factors motivating the western states to abolish conscription was the disappearance or reduced level of threat following the end of the Cold War. However, the same cannot be said for Taiwan, where the military threat remains. Since 1949, Beijing has continued to claim sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory, and keeps threatening to use force if Taiwan declares independence. The two sides of the Taiwan Straits have been at 'armed peace' in past decades and therefore cross-strait relations have been crucial in mitigating the status of a military stand-off.

Cross-Strait relations

Cross-Strait relations have always been a vital issue between the two sides, and this theme significantly influences Taiwan's politics, economy and security. Since 2008, Taiwan has made great progress in improving relations with China. The new 'Three No's policy': no unification, no independence, and no use of force, clearly describes Taiwan's future vision of cross-strait relations under Ma's presidency. Most importantly, Ma firmly endorses the '1992 Consensus' which is interpreted as both sides of Taiwan Strait agreeing that there is only one China, with each side having their own interpretations over what constitutes this 'One China'. Beijing welcomes Ma's cross-Strait policy especially the recognition and upholding of the '1992 Consensus'; and these peaceful moves have contributed to an unprecedented cross-strait détente and significantly boosted exchanges between two sides. In terms of security, the rapprochement has somewhat eased the tension over Taiwan Strait and to some extent can be interpreted in terms of substantially reduced possibility of military conflict. With

¹⁵⁸ *Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA, p.5.

this less hostile situation, it can be considered a ‘golden time’ for Taiwan to carry out defence reform and consider building an AVF.¹⁵⁹

Nevertheless, given that a PRC threat still exists, defence reform in Taiwan is not to compromise or reduce military capability but rather to build a smaller AVF with modern technology and defence concept in order to effectively deter Chinese threat and defend homeland. In general, the new AVF reflects three government objectives: 1. The AVF is a way of creating good value of money; 2. the voluntary military is more in tune with the wider society, especially popular to the ‘strawberry generation’;¹⁶⁰ and 3. it does not necessarily signal greater or lesser threat from PRC and it is rather neutral in its effects. Therefore, it is a good time for Taiwan to respond a combination of factors including economy, politics, society and strategy. In addition, the concept of Taiwan’s defence is quite different from Sweden’s expeditionary orientation, and this difference makes it significant in the comparison between the two cases.

Despite all positive moves and situations, however, a cross-strait détente does not necessarily mean the disappearance of the military threat, and it should be realised that the military threat from China still exists alongside closer cross-strait ties. The Taiwanese government has several times appealed to Beijing to withdraw the missiles aimed at Taiwan but has still received no positive response. The steadily increased defence spending reflects another potential threat from China. The annual growth rate of the Chinese defence budget has reached double digits for consecutive two years.¹⁶¹ Amid the worldwide trend of shrinking defence spending, China’s ambition in defence affairs has deepened Taiwan’s concerns.

Strategic objectives

Due to the rapid modernisation of the PLA in the past decade, the relative military strength between China and Taiwan has tilted to Beijing’s advantage. Facing such military power, Taiwan has adopted the defence policy of ‘Hard ROC’ through the strategies of: ‘war prevention, homeland defence, contingency response, conflict

¹⁵⁹ To use President Ma’s goal to create a ‘Golden Decade’.

¹⁶⁰ Strawberry generation is a Chinese language neologism for Taiwanese people born between 1981 and 1991 who ‘bruise easily’ like strawberries – meaning they cannot withstand social pressure or work hard like their parents’ generation.

¹⁶¹ 12.7% in 2011 and 11.2% in 2012. *People’s Daily*, 06 March, 2012.

<<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7749766.html>>, accessed 12 March 2012.

avoidance, and regional stability.¹⁶² The military strategy in supporting ‘Hard ROC’ underlines ‘credible deterrence and resolute defence’ as core strategic concepts. The main foci of military strategy are to maintain the security of Taiwan’s national territories, and to improve the armed forces’ war-fighting capabilities. In addition, in the aftermath of the 2009 typhoon disaster, disaster relief missions have been recently included as one of the core tasks of the armed forces. Apart from regular military training, the armed forces are required to deploy troops, equipment and resources quickly in response to natural disasters.

In short, Taiwan’s strategic objectives aim at and are confined to territorial defence, which differ from Sweden’s ‘functional defence’ emphasising expeditionary operations. A similarity between two countries can be compared in terms of the *de facto* military alliance. While Sweden collaborates with NATO mandate missions without official membership, Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), maintains informal but strong military alliance with the US to counterbalance the Chinese threat. This has significantly influenced Taiwan’s defence and security thinking in recent years. Therefore, in a wider regional security context, the strong alliance with the US makes Taiwan involved in the international security mechanism in East Asia. The US plays a pivotal role in the region and has developed a new operational concept of ‘air-sea battle’ believed aiming to check and deter the Chinese growing military power.¹⁶³

Defence industry

The neutrality policy has made Sweden rely on its own DIB for its arms supply. For Taiwan, according to TRA, the US is obligated to sell defensive weapons, and thus becomes Taiwan’s largest arms supplier. Nevertheless, according to the National Defence Act, the priority of weapons acquisition should be given to domestic manufacturers. Therefore, similar to Sweden, Taiwan has also developed a credible DIB which designs and produces fighter jets (Indigenous Defense Fighter), missile systems,

¹⁶² *The ROC Quadrennial Defense Review*, 2009, p.17.

¹⁶³ Durnin, M, 10 November, 2011, Battle Plans Tempt Chill in U.S.-China Relations, *Wall Street Journal*. < <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/11/10/battle-plans-tempt-chill-in-u-s-china-relations/> >, accessed 14 May 2012.

combat vehicles and radar systems. However, Taiwan's defence industry is state-run, and mainly serves one customer: the ROC armed forces.¹⁶⁴

Increasing international visibility has been the goal of Taiwan's DIB. Despite its state-run nature, Taiwan's DIB has sought to internationalise and expand its global market. Other than producing military jets, Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) also receives foreign orders to produce parts and sections of commercial aircraft. Selling assault rifles to Jordan is another example of its arms exports.¹⁶⁵ To achieve 'Hard ROC' with strategies of credible deterrence and resolute defence, the DIB should play a role and be integrated into the implementation of AVF in order to build a more professional and hi-tech armed forces.

Having a core domestic defence industry is crucial for both Taiwan and Sweden, and the DIB in both countries in the context of AVF can generate an interesting question: what is the motive for them to keep their DIB? For Sweden, even though it is moving away from non-alignment and engaging in more peace missions, the DIB still plays an important role in its defence. As for Taiwan, developing a credible domestic industry is necessary in order to enhance its defence and deterrence capability.¹⁶⁶ For both countries, one issue needs to be addressed –the AVF impact on their DIB.

2.3.3 Defence reform

Military downsizing

In light of western experience, the transformation of the military into an AVF has usually been the consequence of a series of defence reforms; this section briefly discusses the reform of Taiwan's armed forces since the mid-1990s. Reviewing defence reform can help understand how AVF is formulated, including the size, shape, type and missions. As mentioned earlier, under the rule of Chiang Kai-Shek (1949-1975), the key defence objective was to recover the mainland by force. Given such an asymmetrical difference in military size and power, Taiwan realised that it did not seem possible to

¹⁶⁴ The institute is called the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology.

¹⁶⁵ <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/10/09/2003275057>>, accessed on 12 May 2012.

¹⁶⁶ For example, developing and manufacturing IDF has significantly improved Taiwan's aeronautical capability.

achieve such ambitious objective. Therefore, after martial law was lifted by former president Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1987, Taiwan officially abolished this decades-long unrealistic ambition. Military strategy then shifted from retaking the mainland to maintaining integrated defence and offense capabilities, and eventually to its current key focus on territorial defence. Under the post-Chiang strategic posture, the old forms of resource allocation, force deployment, and personnel structures had all become obsolete. Thus in 1996, the (MND) began to streamline military structures and manpower, and a large downsizing in military establishment was undertaken. Over the past 15 years, the total number of military personnel has been reduced from 450,000 in 1997 to 275,000 in 2009.

Eroding the role of conscription

During the 2000s under the Chen administration, the MND shortened the service length of compulsory service.¹⁶⁷ This resulted in a decreasing number of conscripts; the immediate effect was a sudden reduction in Conscript Ratio (CR) and subsequent reduction in the Military Participation Ratio (MPR). Reduction of the CR and MPR due to shortening the length of compulsory military service are important dimensions of the decline of mass armed forces and have often been adopted as a transition move before states fully embrace AVF. These factors also have eroded the role of conscription.

Shortening the service length on its own, however, is merely a ‘cosmetic’ approach and does not reinforce defence capability because it increases the personnel turnover rate. Continuing moves to shorten service length were considered as an attempt to gain support from young voters in elections. The (then) opposition party KMT understood that conscription was not popular in society and a shortened period of service was welcomed by most youth cohorts and their parents, who considered military service as a barrier for career planning. Eventually, the bi-partisan consensus allowed this legislation to pass smoothly without major resistance.

¹⁶⁷ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, ROC, 2009, p. 54. Starting from October 1999, the service length was shortened four times from 24 months to 12 months in 2008 due to the satisfactory results of recruitment of volunteer soldiers.

Defence reform under Ma's administration

Even though the idea of abolishing conscription was proposed and discussed 10 years ago, it did not become a government policy until 2008 when President Ma took office. To make the AVF financially affordable, the government decided that the overall force size needed a significant reduction and restructuring. In line with the planned force downsizing project, the total number of personnel will be reduced from 275,000 to 215,000. Ending conscription is an important defence policy which entails budget consequences and requires political will. To reassure his election promise and the resolution to fulfil this policy, in May 2011, President Ma stated that:

‘Taiwan has the resolve to defend itself. My administration wants to enhance Taiwan’s defence capability on a newly designed volunteer military system. This is a huge undertaking, as we need to overcome difficulties in training, organisation, finance and military doctrines. However, we are confident that we will succeed in building a small but strong military force.’¹⁶⁸

2.3.4 Reasons to end conscription in Taiwan

The suspension of conscription in Taiwan did not result solely from the President’s own decision, nor was cross-strait détente the only justification for the change. It was based on a set of factors: 1. domestic political, economic and social factors, and 2. and improved cross-strait relations. The peculiar international status of Taiwan and the ‘One China policy’ abided by international community prevents Taiwan from conducting international operations, thus has made international factors relatively less evident.

From the perspective of value for money, labour costs in a conscription system are low. But the budget can hardly represent the true opportunity cost of labour in terms of its alternative use value elsewhere in the private sector. Taiwanese military officials and commanders have long been used to a sufficient amount of cheap labour (conscripts). Thus, they tend to favour labour-intensive tasks and concepts. This is why, as mentioned earlier, Martin Edmonds argues that conscription is also a sort of restriction for Taiwan’s armed forces in terms of thinking about innovative solutions to personnel issues in the defence setting. Due to a lack of real combat missions in the past four

¹⁶⁸ The ROC President’s Office.

<<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284&rmid=2355>> accessed 29 February 2012.

decades, non-military tasks and menial jobs, *inter alia*, cleaning, often dominated conscripts' daily lives. It is no surprise that most youth cohorts view compulsory service as a waste of time.

Due to rapid economic growth, the labour structure in Taiwan has shifted from labour intensive to high-tech and high value-added oriented industries such as IT and bio-tech industries, which require longer periods of time for people to acquire the necessary education and training. On the other hand, the human resource cost for compulsory military service is enormous as it interrupts the education and career planning of youth cohorts.¹⁶⁹ President Ma agrees with this point and in fact it influenced his decision.¹⁷⁰ These problems have been publicly discussed since the last decade, yet they were dealt with differently by both Chen's and the current Ma administration, as both recognised that conscription is an inefficient and costly method in terms of utilisation of labour.

From the social perspective, according to Edmonds, there is an anti-militaristic preference among the majority of the Taiwanese population, based on their experience under Japanese occupation and traditional Confucian values.¹⁷¹ The military's public image was further tarnished by the autocratic regime of Chiang.¹⁷² Therefore, the social status of military personnel in traditional Taiwanese society has been deemed inferior to other professions such as teachers, civil servants, and policemen. In addition, the output of defence, security is an abstract concept that can only with difficulty be felt and recognised by people, especially during peace time. Another important issue is that, compared with the earlier generations who did not have abundant material welfare, the post-1980's youth cohorts are often called the 'strawberry generation', in that they have nominal experience with hardship and thus lack endurance and firmness.¹⁷³ Therefore, people in Taiwan start to question whether these unmotivated young conscripts are able to defend the country.

¹⁶⁹ It is an overall judgment as there are no available data.

¹⁷⁰ Ma revealed that his AVF decision was partly influenced by a professor from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2004. He told Ma that Taiwan has many outstanding students in the high-tech fields such as Electrical Engineering, communication etc. However, after two-year compulsory military service, they have forgotten half of what they learned in school, and the remaining half has unfortunately outdated. Ma therefore realised that conscription has seriously interfered with the career planning of young men. Central News Agency, 28 June 2010.

¹⁷¹ Martin Edmonds, *ibid.* p. 232.

¹⁷² *Ibid.* This is similar to the Spanish case, where the military's public image was damaged by Franco regime.

¹⁷³ As Van Doorn and Janowitz had argued, the increasing individualism of young people has also reduced the traits of mass armed forces.

To sum up, from domestic social and economic perspectives, due to changes in traditional values, unpopularity of conscription, rapid economic development, consideration of opportunity costs, and shortened service terms, conscription in Taiwan has gradually lost its value and support. From the international strategic perspective, the détente in cross-strait relations creates a good opportunity and a suitable environment for the armed forces to transform. In the political context, ending conscription can be manipulated as an election instrument to gain votes without encountering too much resistance from the opposition. When Ma announced this decision during the presidential election, there was only minor criticism from the opposition party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Political consensus over conscription

Military service issues such as shortening of service length and abolition of conscription usually attracts public attention. In Taiwan's politics, it is not easy for two major political parties, KMT and DPP to reach an agreement; ending conscription and shifting to an AVF is one of the few exceptions. Why is it that two political parties who tend to disagree with each other on almost every political issue have both reached a consensus on the AVF issue? It is not difficult to answer: political attempts to gain votes. This could explain why Jehn et al. argued that ending conscription is a politically popular move.¹⁷⁴ In brief, reaching consensus over conscription and AVF issues in Taiwan did not encounter major resistance.

2.4 Emerging themes

The background and contexts of the two cases have been reviewed; they generate several emerging themes. The reform of NCOs has been cited in both countries' AVF plans. In the historical context, the NCO corps has been proved by recent wars as a mainstay in terms of war-fighting and training of soldiers. Therefore the quality of NCOs could influence the overall quality of AVF. Reintroducing NCOs in Sweden is beneficial to the officer corps. Since Sweden is planning to reintroduce NCOs, two questions have been raised in the Swedish Armed Forces amid this personnel reform: What makes the best junior officers and should Sweden adopt foreign models such as

¹⁷⁴ Jehn, C& Selden, Z 2002, 'The End of Conscription in Europe?' *Contemporary Economic Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 2, April, pp. 93-100.

the British or American models of junior officer cultivation programmes? Or should they keep the current Swedish model (starting from private soldier)? There is a debate between reformers and traditionalists; the former argue that if the NCO corps is competent, a one year training programme is enough to cultivate competent junior officers. Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that due to the absence of proper NCOs, one year of training can only produce amateur or incompetent officers. Nevertheless, both views all agree on the necessity of NCOs. Similar questions can be raised for Taiwan too. How to cultivate young officers and NCOs in responding to the new AVF structure? It is also worthwhile for Taiwan's military elites to think through what kind of NCOs they need and what tasks should be carried out by NCOs in order to build a competent volunteer force.

A crucial issue needing to be addressed regarding Taiwan's NCOs is that Taiwanese officers have focused too much on NCO roles in terms of detailed management of troops, which is similar to Swedish 'specialist officers' who combine officer and NCO roles. However, unlike Sweden,¹⁷⁵ Taiwanese NCOs are sergeants, and their main jobs before the reform were basically to run the conscript system, whereas the officer's job was to lead the NCOs. Therefore a change in the division of labour and readjustment of roles are required in order to fit into the new AVF system. It is important to explore this emerging theme as the NCO reforms in both countries are very different.¹⁷⁶

Another question is that whether the Swedish armed forces should shift the personnel structure to a smaller number of professional regular soldiers, with the remaining ranks to be filled with reservists available for call up for international missions. Although stereotyped reservists seem to be less professional and less useful, after repetitive annual call-ups and trainings, they can be competent for missions. The British army is a good example and some reservists even transfer to full-time status.¹⁷⁷ However, from a traditionalist's perspective, standing units should always be the priority.¹⁷⁸ Similar

¹⁷⁵ Specialist officers are senior NCOs OR 6-9.

¹⁷⁶ Sweden abolished NCOs due to egalitarian ideology; but in Taiwan mixing up the roles was the key in that it has prevented either officers or NCOs to do a proper job.

¹⁷⁷ The Reserve Forces Act 1996 provided for other categories of reservists, such as: Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS), *Army Instructions for Filling FTRS Appointments in the Army*, <http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/din_089.pdf>, accessed 15 May 2012.

¹⁷⁸ For example, there is a similar debate on British army's plan to rely on civilian drivers, reserves and foreign armies. See <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9275812/British-Army-will-have-to-rely-on-civilian->

issues are debated in Taiwan too, including NCOs reform and professional military education for officers.¹⁷⁹

During his election campaign Putin promised to build up Russia's military capability and planned to modernise Russia's armed forces over the next decade to deal with global uncertainty and the US military power.¹⁸⁰ Further, particularly concerning Syria, Russia has been seen to be more aggressive in asserting its perceived interests. Putin's behaviour somewhat reflects his hegemonic thinking; it is thus worthwhile for Swedes to consider whether the Swedish armed forces are capable of dealing with Russia's military threat to its territory; and whether changes in metrics in terms of size, structure and mission are necessary to make AVF adequate to meet all contingencies? As for China, recent evidence suggests that its ambition for control of the South China Sea could lead to potential military confrontations. It is therefore a good time for both Sweden and Taiwan to rethink and reassess the perception and level of threat from Russia and China respectively, then incorporate their reassessment into their AVF implementation plans.

2.5 Conclusion

Differences and similarities in history, politics, and defence strategy between the two cases have been identified through the review of their background and respective contexts. From a theoretical point of view, the reasons for Sweden and Taiwan to pursue AVF transformation show both differences and similarities. They set out the foundation and context of their on-going AVF implementation, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

Compared with other West European countries, the defence structure of Sweden is distinctive. The four pillars of the Swedish defence model during the Cold War had underpinned Sweden's military capability to avoid war for two centuries. However, this model faced increasing pressure after 1989 and the pillars began to shake. Being the first and the only country to suspend conscription formally, Swedish defence is unusual compared with other countries in the Nordic region - Finland, Denmark and Norway.

[drivers-reserves-and-foreign-armies.html](#)>, accessed 10 June 2012.

¹⁷⁹ Professional Military Education Forum held in ROC National Defense University, November 2011, Taiwan.

¹⁸⁰ Englund, W., 20 February, 2012. Putin promises Russian military buildup. *The Washington Post*.

By reviewing the causes of change in the Swedish armed forces, it fits quite easily into Haltiner's approach. His three arguments on the decline of MAF stand firmly in the Swedish case: 1. Due to frequent contributions to international missions, it appears that Sweden has been under the protection umbrella of EU and UN, and potentially NATO; 2. The military threat from Russia has been greatly reduced since 1990; 3. Sweden has constantly participated in international missions, and the mission itself plays a vital role in the reform in terms of strategic concept, doctrine and personnel structure. However, social factors and economic efficiency cannot be overlooked; one evident problem - inequality of compulsory service which has seriously eroded the legitimacy of conscription, may not be solely explained by Haltiner's theories. Some more comprehensive methods such as Burk and Van Doorn are needed to better explain that social fact.

As for Taiwan, although international factors did not play a key role in its decision to end conscription, the détente in cross-strait relations - a quasi-international factor - helped facilitate the decision by creating an opportunity and favourable strategic environment for the armed forces to reform. However, the primary causes were domestic ones, such as political considerations during election campaigns, an eroded military capability due to shortened length of conscription service, the unpopularity of conscription and economic factors. By and large, when echoing the decline of MAF theory, whilst Haltiner and Burk's arguments are complementary and fit well in a European context which includes Sweden, it is difficult to use Haltiner's arguments to explain Taiwan's case. Burk's combined political realist and social dominance approach better explains the case of Taiwan.

Chapter two has described the background and contexts of two selected cases, and identified the causes of their AVF decision. The second phase of the thesis, empirical analysis, will comprise forthcoming chapters. Based on evidence gathered through expert interviews and documents, the next chapter will examine the goals and specific objectives of AVF implementation in both countries. Each comparative variable will be examined to identify the similarities and differences of the AVF objectives between the two cases.

CHAPTER 3

Strategic Goals and Objectives of the AVF in Sweden and Taiwan

3.1 Introduction

The second part of this thesis consists of four chapters focusing on the empirical analysis of AVF implementation in both countries. The main purposes of these chapters are to: 1. identify the strategic goals and specific objectives of AVF implementation and defence reform in Sweden and Taiwan; 2. examine the metrics, criteria, and current status of AVF implementation and personnel reform; 3. discuss why the process of AVF implementation and defence reform is more or less successful and identify the facilitating factors, conditions or constraints that could have influenced their transformations; and 4, compare both transformations through an assessment of individual issues and criteria, then concluding with a discussion of which country's defence transformation is easier or more difficult than the other. These four major themes are respectively discussed and analysed in four chapters from chapter three to six.

This chapter discusses the strategic goals and objectives of AVF and defence reform in both countries. Petersson argues that, in order to understand the logic of defence reform and organisational change, it is important to study how the central actors of the reform process justify change in terms of goals, strategies, and the structure of the organisation.¹⁸¹ To compare defence transformations in two very different countries, first of all their primary goals and the specific objectives of the transformations must be identified. The chapter consists of two sections: 3.2 and 3.3, which discuss the objectives of AVF implementation and defence reform in Sweden and Taiwan. In addition, it explains how and why these objectives were shaped, and how they fit into the wider context of defence reform.

It is not possible to closely examine and compare every transition detail; key criteria

¹⁸¹ Magnus Petersson, 2011, Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War, *Armed Forces and Society*, October, vol. 37, no. 4, p.705.

related to defence reform, for example, the size and shape of the armed forces, must therefore be selected for comparison. According to many western countries that have undergone AVF transitions, the concepts for AVF implementation and defence reform share several characteristics. It is thus feasible to borrow these concepts and adapt them to the major issues of the two AVF transformations studied here. To this end, seven criteria based on this approach are used to analyse the objectives of AVF and defence reform in two cases.

First of all, the strategic concepts that underpin and guide the defence reforms are examined in order to understand the rationale and context of how and why their specific objectives were formulated. Although the two countries, as discussed in chapter one, share several similarities in terms of strategic contexts and timeline of implementation, their strategic goals and objectives are quite different. In Sweden, the ultimate goal is to transform Swedish defence into a 'usable and available defence' in which the AVF is one of the major components of the overall defence reform. For Taiwan, although the government aims to produce a smaller but smarter force, the AVF itself is the ultimate goal.

Having identified the strategic goals and concepts for reform, the discussion turns to examining what size and structure of AVF both countries desire to build. After the format of AVF is decided, how to staff the AVF is discussed next, which relates to the quantity and quality of recruitment. The NCO and reservist reforms play important roles in defence transformation in both countries; therefore they are discussed separately following recruitment. This is followed by an examination of the public image and support of the armed forces, as both armed forces seek to create an image of an attractive employer. The last factor is about when the objectives will be achieved, viz.: transition timeline. The discussion of both cases follows this format in order to make systematic comparisons. The last section of this chapter summarises their objectives of AVF transition and personnel reform, and draws out the implications.

3.2 Sweden

Shift in strategic concept

Sweden embarked on shifting its strategic focus and defence concept in 1999. During

the Cold War, the conscription-based defence system was designed for territorial defence, which was difficult to adapt to the post Cold War strategic environment, in that it requires higher competence and readiness to respond quickly and effectively to various kinds of threats. According to the 1999 Defence Commission Report, threat-based defence was no longer practical and the SAF should be restructured to respond to a more complex threat perception.¹⁸² The change in defence concept resulted in significant reductions both in defence expenditure and the size of the military establishment, demanded by the 1999/2000 Defence Bill.¹⁸³ Frequent peace operations have made the SAF realise that conscription had become a constraint on its goal to develop a more expeditionary force. Former defence minister Tolgfors identified the structural limitations of the SAF as:¹⁸⁴

- ‘The Armed Forces cannot adapt to the concept “operating here and now”.
- Only one third of the force structure is required to have a readiness up to one year. The rest of the units have lower readiness.
- Two separate organisations co-exist: one for national operations and one for international missions.
- An inadequate and antiquated personnel organisation.’

These limitations and weaknesses had affected and compromised the competence of the SAF. Therefore, a call for defence organisational reform and professionalisation of the SAF emerged.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the SAF has been transforming into a mission and capability-based force that is usable, available and flexible for both national and international missions. The radical reform on the personnel system was officially demanded by the 2008 Defence Report ‘*Defence in Use*’ (Ds 2008:48) to develop a useable defence with enhanced operational competence.¹⁸⁵ In short, the process of defence transformation from 2000 until 2014 can be divided into three phases.¹⁸⁶ Each phase features its own strategic concept and focus. Downsizings in military establishments have been substantially carried out across all phases. The three phases are briefly described below:

¹⁸² Defence Commission Report 1999:2, p.111.

¹⁸³ Defence Bill 1999/2000:30 ‘*The New Defence*’.

¹⁸⁴ Sten Tolgfors, *A usable defence*, The 13th Conference of U.S.-Sweden Defence Industry, 10 June 2009, Stockholm.

¹⁸⁵ The Defence Commission Report *Defence in Use* (Ds 2008:48), 16 June 2008.

¹⁸⁶ General Michael Moore speech at US - Sweden Defence Industry Conference, ‘Relationship between U.S. and Swedish militaries’, on 10 June 2009. See also *Planning for the unknown*, Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson to Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, on 10 April 2012.

Phase 1: 2000-2004

International tasks started to play a greater role in the Swedish defence. The SAF has sought to enhance internationalisation and interoperability. Joining NATO's Partnership for Peace was the key for the transformation at this stage. In order to adapt to the new strategic environment, significant force reduction was carried out during this period: the Army was reduced by 70 percent, while Navy and Air Force were reduced by half and 25 percent respectively.

Phase 2: 2005-2009

Multinational operations and territorial defence were two main tasks during this phase. The SAF aimed to further improve the interoperability in order to better collaborate with allied forces. The strategic goals emphasised rapid response and success in missions. The concept of the EU Battle Group was crucial because Sweden was the framework country for the Nordic Battle Group 2008. Force reduction continued during this period: the Army and Navy were both reduced by half, while Air Force by a quarter.

Phase 3: 2010-2014

In the present phase, enhancing the availability and usability of the armed forces are the priority. Conscription was suspended and replaced by new personnel system based on voluntary participation. To enhance the competence of the officer corps, a two-tier officer system has been introduced by creating the rank of 'specialist officer'. All personnel of the SAF are obliged to take part in missions abroad. A new type of operational organisation staffed mainly by reservists is to be established. The Nordic Defence Cooperation plays a key role during current transformation. The planned force reductions during this period are 25 percent across all services.¹⁸⁷

Strategic objectives for transformation

The objectives for the personnel transformation are set in accordance with the 2009 Defence Bill titled '*A Functional Defence*'. The personnel department of the SAF Headquarters outlines the strategic objectives for the transformation as to:¹⁸⁸

- '1. Increase capability to act with others.
2. Increase units' accessibility.
3. Streamline administration and logistics.
4. Transform manpower management system.
5. Increase attraction as employer.
6. Strengthen values by action with focus on gender, equality and working conditions.'

These strategic objectives underpin the ultimate success of the defence transformation;

¹⁸⁷ Planning for the unknown, Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson to Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, on 10 April 2012, p.4.

¹⁸⁸ Internal non-confidential document, acquired by author from Personnel Department, SAF Headquarters with permission to use.

they are categorised into seven criteria and discussed next.

Objectives of Swedish defence reform

1. Strategic concept for the defence reforms

Without an understanding of current Swedish defence policy and strategic concepts, it is difficult to grasp the rationales and contexts for the objectives of AVF and defence reform. In contrast to military non-alignment during the Cold War, since the accession to the EU Swedish security has been increasingly associated with that of the EU and its neighbouring Nordic and Baltic states. After the 1999 strategic shift, the perspective based on Declaration of Solidarity with neighbours has been pivotal to the Swedish defence. The threat-based defence focusing on production and training of conscripts has gradually been phased out and replaced by a mission and capability-based defence. Consequently, to promote the efficiency of the operational units for international operations, the division between a territorial-oriented organisation and the ad-hoc international force was discarded.

Having transformed the armed forces for nearly a decade since 1999, Sweden finally decided to pursue a radical shift in the personnel system by establishing an AVF. Based on the 2008 Report '*Defence in Use*' as a blueprint, in March 2009 the Ministry of Defence proposed the Defence Bill 2008/2009:140 with the aim to transform the structure of personnel and operational organisations. Most of the objectives set in the third phase of defence reform are based on the 2009 Bill as it gave a clear strategic guidance and objectives on personnel reform and restructuring of operational organisations. Suspending conscription and shifting to AVF was one of the major objectives of the 2009 Bill, demanding the suspension of conscription by 1 July 2010. Thereafter all military personnel, including professional and reservist officers, NCOs and soldiers, must be recruited based on voluntary participation.

The ultimate goal of the 2009 Bill was to meet the operational requirements demanded by Parliament to enhance the usability and flexibility of the armed force, so it could be deployed 'here and now.' The capability of the armed forces was expected to be enhanced to respond to contingencies quickly and efficiently within and outside the

Swedish border. Lodin summarised the capability of the SAF as to strengthen:¹⁸⁹

- ‘1. Availability: today’s armed forces must be available to perform national and international tasks, with operational and strategic mobility;
2. Usability: using single set of forces to perform national and international missions;
3. Flexibility: restructuring the armed forces into modular operational organisations to deal with all levels of conflicts;
4. Cooperation: Cooperating with other countries and organisations, other Swedish governmental actors, with improved civil-military relations.’

The AVF transformation was one component of the 2009 Bill; other components included an obligation for all personnel to serve on international missions, recruiting reserve soldiers and structuring reserve units, and building a two-tier officer system with the introduction of a new cadre of officers called ‘specialist officer’.¹⁹⁰ In short, the government requires the SAF to be volunteer-based, and be able to initiate, maintain, enhance and complete operations both at home and abroad in various levels of conflict from peace support to full-scale war.

The purpose of Swedish defence

According to the 2008 Defence Report and the 2009 Bill, the purpose of the Swedish defence was to safeguard its basic values and interests in order to: prevent and manage conflicts and war, guarantee the sovereignty of Sweden and protect society and its ability to function. To attain these objectives, the SAF must be able to:

- ‘1. Defend Sweden and maintain its basic values and interests. This involves operations in the global arena, Europe, Swedish territory and its immediate region.
2. Detect and repel invasions of Swedish territory.
3. Use existing capabilities and resources to assist society at large and other government agencies when needed.’¹⁹¹

In the midst of transformation, the third task ‘using the existing capabilities and resources’ is of significance because, financially speaking, the SAF is required by the government to fund the AVF and defence reform by freeing the existing defence budget and resources as the government only guarantees a flat defence budget until 2014.¹⁹²

Whilst an increase in defence expenditure is unlikely, it is thus crucial that the SAF ensure good utilisation of existing and available resources.¹⁹³ With the goals for both the overall national defence and objectives for the reform identified, the subsequent

¹⁸⁹ General Per Lodin, Director Strategic Planning and Development. Future Swedish Military Requirements – The implications for industry and international cooperation, 18 May 2011.

¹⁹⁰ In effect, it is a re-introduction of the NCO corps that had been discarded in the 1980s.

¹⁹¹ Defence Bill 2008/09:140, *A functional defence*, and Ds 2008:48.

¹⁹² Interview, participant SE-1.

¹⁹³ A Functional Defence, Defence Bill 2008/09:140.

criteria are examined individually. It starts with the restructuring of defence organisation.

2. Restructuring of operational organisation

Defence personnel reform has often been associated with organisational restructuring, ranging from small-scale personnel reductions to large-scale organisational overhaul. The 2009 defence reform featured a large restructuring of operational units. The disbandment of the existing international units replaced by both regular and reserve units is an important initial task. The objective is to establish a standing force with a staff of 1,700 that is always ready for rotation of international deployment, with an additional 300 personnel on stand-by for reinforcement and evacuation efforts. This objective has doubled the current personnel capacity for international operations and is expected to be achieved by 2019.

Other than the standing regular units, contracted reserve units will be established in the future organisation. This is dictated by the 2008 Defence Commission Report that the SAF should establish the reserve (or contracted) units to operate in line with the regular standing units, which is an unprecedented and untested attempt in Swedish defence. The third type is the Home Guard, which only deals with territorial defence and domestic contingencies. The terms 'regular and reserve' are only used to differentiate and describe the personnel composition of the units, and are not utilised to actually name the operational units.

According to the reform plan, the number of reserve personnel, especially soldiers, will be increased significantly to fill the newly structured operational units; regular soldiers and NCOs will be relatively fewer. The principle for personnel allocation is based on the complexity of military tasks; labour-intensive units in the army and land forces will be primarily staffed by reserve officers, NCOs and soldiers.

A. Regular (or permanent) units

By definition, regular units are filled primarily by full-time regular personnel. It is stipulated that at least 65 percent of the staff in regular units are of full-time status.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Interview, participant SE-4. It does not mean that all personnel must be full-time in regular units.

Regular units are designed with higher readiness and higher competence due to their higher percentage of full-time personnel. Most operational organisations in the Navy and Air Force are formed from these types of units. All regular units are expected to be available for international deployment within one week of notification.

To strengthen the competence of regular units, the SAF has gained considerable experience from participating in EU and Nordic Battle Groups. The concept of battle group, including its organisational structure, size and function provides a favourable framework within which the SAF may achieve the deployability and flexibility of the operational organisation. The modular design indicates that the battle groups are organised to carry out missions independently or become a component in a larger multinational unit. The SAF have therefore borrowed this concept to transform its operational units, and by 2014, seven battle groups will be established in the form of modular manoeuvre battalions for tactical operations. These battle groups are affiliated with tanks, air defence, engineering corps, logistics and intelligence units. In addition, they are reinforced and supported by Navy and Air Force. On the other hand, the Army was required to deactivate several infantry and tank units, and replace its heavy mechanised forces with modular mechanised and light-manoevre battalions. For the Navy and Air Force, the aim of the operational units is to enhance the capability to take part in joint naval and air operations with foreign countries. The scale of downsizing on the establishments of Navy and Air Force is smaller; the Navy will keep its seven corvettes and four submarines, while the Air Force will keep all 100 Gripen C/D jets operating in four divisions together with helicopter and transport battalions.

B. Reserve (or part-time contracted) units

In contrast to the defence concept of the past, given the present low threat level, the SAF seeks to reduce significantly the number of regular personnel and replace them with volunteer reservists to form the reserve units. The purpose of reserve units is to complement and adjust defence manpower and resources in order to maintain adequate regular units at higher readiness. From an economic perspective, cost efficiency is an important consideration because, in the midst of downward trend in defence expenditures, it is financially impossible to maintain every operational unit at high readiness. In order to sustain the endurance and capability of the armed forces in

constant operations, in western countries, voluntary reservists have increasingly played a bigger role in contemporary military operations.¹⁹⁵ The British armed forces are a good example of this; they have seen an increased number of reservists deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 1998, approximately 10 per cent of all British armed forces deployed on operations have been reservists.¹⁹⁶ The other advantage is to link the armed forces with people who have desirable civilian skills. Keeping the armed forces connected with society in the AVF era is also an issue in Sweden;¹⁹⁷ because good civil-military relationships can help improve the military's public image affecting not just the reputation of the SAF but also its capacity to recruit and retain personnel. The personnel proportion in the reserve units requires at least 65 percent to be reserve personnel. Recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers is currently a challenge to the SAF because this type of personnel has not been recruited and tested before.¹⁹⁸

The majority of operational units in the army and land forces will be primarily composed of this type of unit. Granting legal rights for soldiers to temporarily leave their civilian jobs for military service and protecting soldiers' civilian jobs are two vital issues to allow them perform part-time reserve services without being denied employment or penalised by their employers. The Employment Act was passed by Parliament in May 2012 and became effective in July 2012.¹⁹⁹ Due to the delay of employment legislation, the recruitment of reserve soldiers has been two years behind schedule. The objective is to recruit some 9,500 reserve soldiers by 2019. In the meantime the SAF is focusing on the potential group of ex-conscripts as the manpower pool for recruitment.²⁰⁰

Service term and international work obligation

After being recruited, both regular and reserve soldiers are required to undergo three

¹⁹⁵ Segal, D 2009, "Building and maintaining a post-9/11 All-Volunteer Military Force", in *The impact of 9/11 on politics and war: the day that changed everything?* eds M Morgan.

¹⁹⁶ Christopher Dandeker, Neil Greenberg and Geoffrey Orme, The UK's Reserve Forces: Retrospect and Prospect. *Armed Forces & Society*, April 2011; vol. 37, 2: pp.341-360.

¹⁹⁷ Erna Danielsson and Berit Carlstedt, 2011, The Swedish Reserve Officer: Filling Vacancies or Using Competences, *Armed Forces & Society*, 37(2), pp.284-300. See also Dandeker et. al, 2011, *ibid*.

¹⁹⁸ Interview, participant SE-4.

¹⁹⁹ Regeringens proposition 2011/12:115, Soldatanställningari Försvarsmakten, passed in May 2012 and effective on 1 July 2012

²⁰⁰ Interview, participants SE-3 and SE-4.

months of basic military training (GMU) before they are qualified for employment.²⁰¹ Unlike officers and specialist officers, both regular and reserve soldiers and junior NCOs are not permanently employed, but are offered time-limited employment contracts. The normal service term is eight years with an option to extend for up to 16 years. In contrast to the old territorial defence system, according to the new employment contract of the SAF, both types of soldiers are obliged to serve on international operations.²⁰² As previously mentioned, this objective of international work obligation has been achieved ahead of schedule.²⁰³

C. Home guard

Soldiers of the Home Guard are reservists recruited locally on Home Guard contracts. Their tasks are to defend the Swedish territory and perform the following duties: territorial surveillance, base security, field work, escort duties, transport protection, target identification and artillery spotting.²⁰⁴ It also conducts civilian duties such as responding to forest fires, floods or searching for missing persons. Despite the number of Home Guard personnel being reduced to 22,000 and the battalions being reduced from 60 to 40 by 2014, its size still represents almost half of the entire SAF personnel and therefore the quality of Home Guard could potentially influence the overall competence of the SAF. To enhance its capability, the reform requires that as many as 16,600 Home Guard personnel recruited and staffed by SAF receive more advanced training and equipment. Home Guard soldiers are obliged to serve during peacetime and are expected to be mobilised from standby preparedness to operations within 24 hours.²⁰⁵

In terms of service conditions, Home Guard officers serve approximately one week per year and are available for service during extreme national emergencies;²⁰⁶ soldiers serve a minimum 20 hours a year. They can choose to serve a certain number of days per year for military training. Although Home Guard personnel are employed on a

²⁰¹ This is similar to its pre-2009 reform which required soldiers to receive 85 days of basic military training.

²⁰² Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar (Personnel supply in the defence reform), SOU 2010:86, pp.29-40

²⁰³ 2011 Armed Force Annual Report, p.8.

²⁰⁴ 2009 Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces, p.38.

²⁰⁵ *A functional defence*, Fact Sheet, MoD, Sweden, March 2009.

²⁰⁶ Erna Danielsson and Berit Carlstedt, 2011, op. cit., p.295.

contract basis, they have the opportunity to seek positions in the regular and reserve units. Similarly, soldiers who have completed the basic training and served in operational units can also transfer to Home Guard contracts. From the human resource perspective, Home Guard and reserve personnel act as an ideal manpower pool. The qualification of training for Home Guard is similar to regular and reserve soldiers; all are required to undergo the basic training.

Total size of force

The total number of SAF personnel will be reduced to around 50,000 by 2019 (Figure 3-1), which includes approximately 27,000 regular and reserve personnel serving in both regular and reserve units, and 22,000 personnel serving in Home Guard units. The Army will still be the largest service branch with personnel size of 18,500. The Navy will exclusively be composed of 1,500 regular personnel. By the same token, most of the 3,000 service personnel in the Air Force serve on full-time basis. Apart from personnel in the three-services, there are 4,000 personnel serving in central joint branches including intelligence, logistics and Special Forces (Table 3-1).²⁰⁷




Figure 3-1 Personnel trend of the SAF

Source: Compiled by author based on the data from the Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009, and documents acquired from the Personnel Division of the SAF Headquarters.

²⁰⁷ All data from the internal non-confidential document, Personnel Director, SAF. Acquired by author with permission in September 2011.

Table 3-1 The Personnel Structure of the SAF

Branch	2006	2007	2008	2009	2014-2019	
Army	18000	21000	17500	16300	18500	Regular Officers: 4600
Navy	5000	5000	4600	3800	1500	Specialist Officers (SNCOs): 4600
Air Force	10000	8000	3000	3200	3000	Reservist Officers & SNCOs: 2200
Command	32000	7500	6900	5300	4000	Regular Soldiers: approx. 6600
Logistics	-	5500	5000	5400	-	Reservist Soldiers: approx 9500
Home Guard	41000	41000	38000	38000	22000	Regular and Reserve Units: 28000
Total	106000	88000	75000	72000	Approx 50000	Home Guard: 22000 Total personnel in 2019: approx. 50000

Source: Compiled by author based on the data from the Swedish Armed Forces website, Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009, and document acquired from the Personnel Division of the SAF Headquarters.²⁰⁸

3. Recruitment

In the AVF era, it is up to young people to choose the military as an occupation and a place to work. Without conscripts as the source of manpower, the armed forces need to act more like a civilian employer and go to the labour market to recruit young men and women continuously.²⁰⁹

Recruiting personnel for international operations is one of the most important and difficult tasks for the SAF.

The 2009 Bill underlines four criteria for the SAF to focus on recruitment: number, skill, age and motivation. The government requires the SAF to become a correctly staffed organisation and be able to predict the personnel needs of the services. It must also recruit, develop, retain and reduce personnel in a way that balances needs and availability.

In the past, people's impression of the military was usually stereotypical focusing on conscripts and weapons with only few people perceiving the armed forces as an employer where they could pursue a career.²¹⁰ The SAF needs to create an image to the public that it is not just an armed institution, but also a desirable workplace and a potential employer in the labour market. This is underlined as one of the six strategic

²⁰⁸ In 2019 the SAF will have 6600 full-time regular and 9500 part-time reserve soldiers. See *Planning for the unknown*, speech by Sverker Göranson, 2012.

²⁰⁹ No matter how small an AVF is, it is a young people's organisation constantly needing to recruit young people.

²¹⁰ Interview, participant SE-4.

objectives for defence transformation.²¹¹ Targeting potential groups such as second generation immigrants in the youth cohorts could be an effective way to boost recruitment. However, the SAF should not just focus on those who are already interested in the military, but rather look at the broader part of the manpower base that consists of those who are at least initially, less interested.²¹²

The foremost recruitment target is to employ around 16,000 volunteer soldiers, in which the majority are reserve soldiers. The recruitment is to be fulfilled with step by step progress within the four-year timeline between 2011 and 2014; each year the SAF needs to recruit approximately 4,000 soldiers.²¹³ Nevertheless, the SAF emphasises that setting the recruitment targets for part-time soldiers should wait until 2019. To become a soldier all applicants must be Swedish citizens with at least 18 years of age to be qualified. Other criteria include the minimum academic performance in high school and no criminal records in past five years.²¹⁴ Unlike the American AVF transition in the 1970s, the SAF does not compromise quality for quantity; according to a senior information official from the Headquarters, the recruiting standards in terms of intellectual and physical standards of applicants will not be lowered.²¹⁵ Soldiers' motivation is another vital issue as it not only influences recruitment, but is heavily associated with retention.²¹⁶ The SAF has been improving and creating incentives to inspire and motivate the youth cohorts to join the military, and to retain the existing personnel. The recent pay raise for soldiers is a good example.²¹⁷

Diversity of personnel recruitment

Generally speaking, the diversity of the military is an important issue in West Europe because the military as an organisation also has a social function to perform;²¹⁸ Sweden

²¹¹ 2009 Armed Forces Annual Report, Appendix 2, pp 6- 8.

²¹² 2011 Armed Forces Annual Report, p.7.

²¹³ Interview, participant SE-1.

²¹⁴ At least Grade G in math, English, Swedish and A in civics.

²¹⁵ Interview, participant SE-2. However, the SAF have not yet faced recruitment shortage.

²¹⁶ People who are not motivated by military life are less likely to join. If soldiers are not highly motivated or are not content with military life, they are more likely to leave or drop out, causing low retention and high turnover rates.

²¹⁷ Height pay for squad leaders, soldiers and sailors, 17 Oct, 2012.

<<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Aktuellt/centralanyheter/Hojd-lon-for-gruppbefal-soldater-och-sjoman>>, accessed 22 Oct, 2012.

²¹⁸ Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, 2003, *Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 29, No.4, pp.481-507. See also Tresch and Leuprecht, *Europe without Soldiers? Recruitment and retention across*

is no exception. To fulfil social responsibility and to meet the recruitment target, functional, ethnic and gender homogeneity is not encouraged. The objective of diversity has two aspects in the SAF: gender and ethnicity, which is less to do with operational effectiveness, but rather associated more with social responsibility. Each service member in the SAF no matter what his or her ethnic origins, gender, skin colour, religion, sexual orientation, or service grade is, should be equally respected and treated. The SAF uphold a policy that every person should have the equal right to gender identity, therefore an objective is to represent the entire Swedish society with a broad representation of the population.²¹⁹ Broadening recruitment target groups and increasing the proportion of women and people with other ethnic backgrounds are therefore an objective for the SAF.²²⁰ However, in the meantime women only account for five percent of the officer corps and 10 percent of soldiers and NCOs, which is considered by the supreme commander as a failure of the armed forces (Figure 3-2).²²¹



Figure 3-2 The proportion of women in the armed forces

4. Reform of the NCO corps

The NCO is the core of training and execution of operations. Throughout history the NCOs in the US armed forces have played roles as leaders, trainers, and technical experts. Garrett found that the professionalisation of American NCOs has given increasing levels of training, education, pay, power, prestige, and authority to those who accomplish their military missions while looking after soldiers.²²² Dandeker also argues

the armed forces of Europe. Montreal and Kingston: Queen's Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen's University Press.

²¹⁹ *Planning for the unknown*. Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, 10 April 2012.

²²⁰ 2011 Armed Forces Annual Report, p. 12.

²²¹ Göranson, 2012, op. cit

²²² Scott Garrett, *Seeking excellence: professionalization of the US Army Non-commissioned Officer*

that in order for officers to focus on their field of professional competence, it is essential for an AVF to create a cadre of NCOs who are able to supervise other ranks and deliver sub-tactical effects.²²³

Before the reform of the officer's rank structure in 1984,²²⁴ NCOs had already existed in the SAF and the ranking system of officer corps was similar to the US and British armed forces. It was due to government's intention to enhance the integration of democratic and civil values in the armed forces, and to eliminate one of the last remnants of the old Swedish hierarchical society built on social classes.²²⁵ In addition, owing to the non-alignment policy during Cold War, in many aspects the SAF did not interoperate with allied forces, including military ranking structure. In the unified officer system, officers are recruited to be focused on pursuing higher, theoretical studies and career development favouring promotion to the senior level.²²⁶ After NCOs were abolished in 1984, the SAF lacked this important category of officer for more than two decades, resulting in shortage of specialists who have the specific knowledge and skills. A senior official from the information department of the Headquarters pointed out:²²⁷

'Now we are introducing a brand new idea, AVF, and going back to the NCO system because we need specialists and we need NCOs. (...) American advisors told us that we have excellent officers and soldiers, but we lack NCOs; we need to have an NCO system, we need to have professionals.'

It has to identify what kind of NCOs that the SAF need? The new NCOs should possess the right specialised competence and skills, which can support and allow young officers to develop their military career. In the past, the SAF created many staff officers whose bureaucratic skills can presumably run the warfighting conscript organisation in peacetime. However, in the AVF era, this kind of staff officer has had a much reduced utility because skills such as the training of conscripts are not needed anymore. The SAF therefore need more NCOs but less bureaucratic staff officers.

Corps in the 20th Century, pp.66-69, (N.D.).

²²³ Christopher Dandeker, January 16 2012, Military professionalism and professional military education in the 21st century: the challenges and potential responses, p. 23.

²²⁴ Due to emphasis of social democracy, all personnel in the officer corps (including specialist officers) are treated as officers.

²²⁵ Erik Hedlund, 2013. Civil-military control over the Swedish military profession: an analysis from the perspective of officer rank and officer education, *Armed Forces and Society*, 39(1), pp.135-157.

²²⁶ But one problem is that there are some officers who only have bureaucratic skills so can neither be promoted to officers nor be placed on specialist officer positions.

²²⁷ Interview, participant SE-2.

Another consideration for officer rank reform is to enhance interoperability. For multinational missions, establishing an officer ranking system that is in accordance with the international system helps enhance interoperability. The objective of the specialist officer reform is based on the demand to have different types of skill-sets in the SAF, in order to meet the need for personnel working in the practical part of the military tasks. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of the officer resource system and to increase the number of specialists with good knowledge and skills, the SAF decided to pursue the officer rank reform by creating the two-tier officer system and increasing the number of specialist officers.²²⁸

The SAF started to embark on the specialist officer reform in 2009 to introduce different categories of ranks. Specialist officers are in fact equivalent to NCOs since the rank is below the officer level and the job functions centre on middle management which requires them to develop specialised techniques. Adopting two categories of officers means that the roles between officers and specialist officers need to be redefined: officers are leaders and managers, while specialist officers act as trainers and experts. These two types of officers will need to work complementarily with each other, where an officer is a generalist mainly dealing with higher levels for planning, the specialist officer is an expert concentrating on middle to lower activities. However, for a military culture that is rooted from the legacy of military non-alignment where interoperability was not essential, creating a competent specialist officer corps has faced obstacles. The main tasks of NCOs are to train, assist and support platoon commanders to run the platoon and higher levels. There is a cultural and organisational problem existing in the current relationship between officers and NCOs in terms of division of labour. The discrepancy lies at that NCOs think junior officers should focus more on the details of running the platoon, while officers wish to move on quickly without spending too much time in the platoon level.²²⁹ Another issue worth thinking about is that if an officer has special expertise, then he/she should be a specialist officer, which then serves as the deputy to the generalist officer. Could this affect the morale of the officer corps?

In order to facilitate the transition and increase the number of specialist officer posts, it is considered that the terms of employment for specialist officers should be in

²²⁸ Ibid. The SAF is reluctant to use the language of 'NCO' rather than specialist officer which is the social democratic ideology that persists in Swedish military and civilian culture.

²²⁹ Author's discussion with Christopher Dandeker.

accordance with commissioned and reserve officers who are on permanent contracts.²³⁰ Therefore, specialist officers are categorised as senior NCOs in order to distinguish them from junior NCOs who are on fixed-time contracts. The challenge lies in dealing with the imbalance between the number of officers and specialist officers as only a few officers will leave the armed forces before 2014 and there will be a substantial surplus of officers and a shortage of specialist officers. The approach is to fill the positions of specialist officers with the existing officers. In comparison with the officer corps in 2009 (9,170 officers and 529 specialist officers)²³¹, the number of officers will be reduced to 4,600 while the number of specialist officers will increase equally to 4,600 (Table 3-2); nearly half of the officer corps will be affected.²³²

Table 3-2 Number of Specialist Officer Positions

Category	1 Jan 2012	1 Jan 2013	Difference
Officers	8600	4600	-4000
Specialist Officers	1000	4600	+3600
Total number of Officers	9600	9200	-400
Civilians	6600	6200	-400

Source: *Forsvarets Forum*, number 6, 2012, p.9.

According to the new personnel plan, the platoon commander serving as the first-line manager will be significantly empowered to have greater responsibility for setting salaries, employment and promotion for soldiers. Considering that experienced specialist officers can play the role as a mentor to assist young or less experienced officer to run the platoon, the SAF plans to assign the existing officers as deputy platoon commanders. Platoons can either be led by experienced officers with specialist officers as a deputy or by experienced specialist officers with less experienced specialist officers as a deputy.²³³ Another consideration for NCO reform is to enhance officer's educational qualifications: the new personnel rules dictate that officers should have university degrees; existing officers without proper academic degrees are more likely to be assigned to the positions of specialist officer.²³⁴

This is a dramatic change to the structure of the officer corps and also a great challenge

²³⁰ The Inquiry on Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces.

²³¹ Swedish Armed Force 2009 Annual Report, p. 17.

²³² *Forsvarets Forum*, nummer 6, October, 2012, p.9. However, according to the 2009 Bill, the original plan was to reduce the number of officer to 3300 and increase the number of specialist officer to 5200.

²³³ A Functional Defence, Defence Bill 2008/09:140.

²³⁴ Interview, participant SE-4.

to the military culture of the SAF. The conversion in officer ranks is complicated and related to many personnel issues such as the seniority, pay grade, form of employment and military expertise which would have potential consequences to the usability and availability of the armed forces. Another important issue is that the imbalance in officer corps should not be assessed merely by numbers, it should also be judged by the competence of officers. According to a senior official in the personnel department of the SAF Headquarters.²³⁵

‘The reform of the officer corps is not just a mathematical calculation and thus cannot be carried out based on wishful thinking or officers’ willingness. The skills and competence of officers in fitting the specialist officer positions must be considered and evaluated. Due to the difficulty in balancing competence, the armed forces have explained to the government that the goal of a two-tier officer system will need to wait until 2014 to be fully accomplished.’

New training and education programmes for officers and specialist officers have been separated since 2009. Compared with the longer period of officer training conducted in the National Defence College, the specialist officer training is a shorter three-term programme with practical-oriented courses. Most courses are held at the Armed Forces military Academy in Halmstad and also in the training units.²³⁶

5. Reservist reform

The present reform aims to significantly increase the number of volunteer reservists to form the contracted reserve units. The SAF has long history and substantial experience of recruiting and utilising reserve officers and NCOs. Reserve soldiers were excluded in this category because conscripts already supplied sufficient manpower to the SAF.

These reservists were voluntary based rather than ex-regular service personnel.

Danielsson et al. identify four roles played by Swedish reserve officers. First, they are required to fill vacancies, that is, a volume regulator. Second, the reserve officers are needed because they have unique competences other than military that are used by the armed forces. Third, reserve officers are needed from an economic point of view because the personnel costs are cheaper. Finally, reserve officers contribute to the civil–military relationship.²³⁷ These four roles underpin the importance of reservists in the Swedish defence.

²³⁵ Interview, participant SE-3.

²³⁶ Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009, p.47

²³⁷ Erna Danielsson and Berit Carlstedt, 2011, op. cit., pp.284-300.

The SAF's personnel structure is overhauled in the 2009 defence reform through significant utilisation of the new type of recruits: reserve soldier, seaman and squad leader. These types of soldiers serve on a part-time contract basis. Their designed pattern of work is similar to reserve officers, where soldiers spend 80 per cent of their time working in civilian jobs, with the remaining 20 per cent for the reservist service. Reserve soldiers can be called for full-time duty to be deployed for international missions, which could take up to six months. The reserve system will form an important component of personnel supply for SAF in the future. The advantage is that the SAF does not need to bear the large personnel cost; and it is expected to link people with desirable civilian skills to the armed forces without requiring them to serve continuously.

Paired with full-time regular soldiers, reserve soldiers will gradually become the backbone of personnel those reserve units discussed above. It is an innovation, but also a challenge because the SAF has never recruited this type of soldier in the past. In addition, in the long-term, 75 per cent of the entire order of battle in the armed forces will serve on part-time basis.²³⁸ Legislation is the key to the success for recruiting reserve soldiers. The Act 2012 came in effect in July 2012. According to Article seven of the Act, the normal period of employment is between six and eight years, with the possibility to extend up to sixteen years. In addition, Article 27 stipulates that reserve soldiers shall inform their civilian employers about their military employment and are obliged to keep their civilian employers informed of scheduled military service.

6. Public image of the SAF and support from society

Previous experience has shown that without a positive image and public support, recruiting young men and women from the society could be difficult. The SAF acknowledge that public image is influential for the youth cohorts to perceive the SAF as a potential employer.²³⁹ Parliament's defence committee stressed that it is crucial that the public has a good knowledge of the SAF and society's crisis preparedness.²⁴⁰ Despite efforts made to increase the exposure of the SAF to the public, studies and surveys conducted in recent years have shown a declining trend regarding public

²³⁸ Figure given by a senior SAF official during interview with participant SE-1.

²³⁹ Swedish Armed Forces 2012 budget information: Appendix 1, p.16.

²⁴⁰ Total försvarsplikt och frivillighet (Total defence obligation and voluntary), SOU 2009:63, p.55.

awareness on security and defence issues.²⁴¹ According to the SAF analysis, Swedes' knowledge of and interest in the armed forces and defence affairs is low. Furthermore, the public image of the SAF as a working environment suffers from the impression of being obsolete, hierarchical, risky and unequal.²⁴²

Since the end of the Cold War, while general support for the armed forces remains strong, defence issues have become somewhat insignificant, and defence affairs have been gradually neglected by the Swedish politics and society. Petersson observes that both internal and external legitimacy for the transformation process of the SAF has been in decline, as the reform is questioned and the external support for AVF only reaches 25 percent.²⁴³ The SAF therefore need to regain public support and attention for AVF and personnel reform.

Due to lack of a clear and immediate threat to the country, public debate on current defence reform has been overshadowed by other issues such as health and education. A senior information official from the Headquarters commented:²⁴⁴

‘...[i]f general public support for the SAF and operations in Afghanistan, Libya was greater, the AVF transition would be much easier. Because when we talk about recruitment, regardless of the financial side, if general public, parents and relatives recognise the SAF, recruitment would be easier. It would be very hard if soldiers do not get support from their families, and they would be reluctant to join the service.’

From the media's perspective, a Swedish defence journalist highlights that public support is the most important factor for a successful AVF transition. However, he gave a pessimistic view on the public support of the AVF transition as he believed that the general public do not understand this defence reform so support for it could be limited.²⁴⁵ Lack of wider public interest and debate on defence issues could also affect how decision makers formulate defence policies. The SAF needs to explain to its society its foreign missions in order to gain support. For example, in contrast to the mission in Libya where most Swedes understand and support the mission, support for ISAF missions have been in decline because the majority of Swedes do not know what

²⁴¹ A considerable proportion of respondents who either “have no opinion” or “do not wish to” or “cannot answer” questions about defence. See Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, SPF, Opinion 2008, SPF, pp.119-125.

²⁴² The 2010 Swedish Armed Forces annual report – Appendix 2, p.9.

²⁴³ Petersson, *ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Interview, participant SE-2.

²⁴⁵ Interview, participant SE-11.

the SAF is doing in Afghanistan or why. Also, the shift of mission away from expeditionary and international missions with more focus on territorial defence in the past two years should also be addressed.

Current public image and support for the SAF

The current public image and support for the armed forces can be gathered from the recent defence psychological surveys on people's perception, attitudes and willingness of defence toward the Sweden's security. The results show that in the past decade the support for the Swedish defence and the armed forces remains strong and stable. About half of people strongly support it while more than one quarter fairly supports the Swedish armed forces. In general, the military defence is supported by 80 percent of Swedes.²⁴⁶

Support for the armed forces can also be reflected by the people's willingness to defend the country. Empathically, people who show robust and positive willingness to defend the country would more or less tend to support their armed forces. The figures are similar to those indicating support for military defence. The results show that more than 70 percent of Swedes are willing (both strongly and fairly) to bear arms to resist in the event of military attack.²⁴⁷ Despite the SAF enjoying stable support from the public, and Swedes demonstrating a solid determination to defend the country, support for the all-volunteer force transition should not be taken for granted. Before the AVF decision was announced in 2009, only one quarter of Swedes favoured the AVF while nearly 40 percent or higher preferred the conscription system.

The government survey is also backed by the 2009 media poll conducted just days after the MOD announced the AVF decision: 63 percent of the entire population favouring conscription.²⁴⁸ A more recent survey in Austria showed similar results.²⁴⁹ Foghelin explains that it is psychologically difficult to change processes and culture which have served well for a long time.²⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the latest (2011) survey showed that, one year after the suspension of conscription, the support for AVF has increased from 29

²⁴⁶ *Opinioner* 2012, pp. 75-76.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ *Svenskarnavill ha karlumpen, SvD*, 23 March, 2009.

²⁴⁹ 60 percent of Austrians are in favour of keeping the conscription, despite no obvious military threat. <<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article3663119.ece>>. Accessed 25 Jan, 2013.

²⁵⁰ Jan Foghelin, *Defence Transformation with Frictions – The Case of Sweden*, NATO Report.

percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 2011, for the first time exceeding the support for conscription.²⁵¹ This dramatic change can probably be interpreted thus: one year after the adoption of AVF, Swedish people have started to accept and get used to the new system.

The strong public support for the armed forces and the determination to defend the country confirm that the SAF is highly regarded in society. Blended with lower but increasing support for AVF, it can be deduced that Swedes tend to favour the form of military service based on voluntary participation which is more helpful for recruitment. However, it is still too early to say that the SAF has acquired the image of an attractive employer. It requires a longer-term observation to identify the trend in terms of support for the AVF. As one personnel staff from the SAF Headquarters commented: ‘We are still on Honeymoon!’²⁵²

7. The timeline of defence reform

Having examined various objectives of defence reform, the last issue is to identify when these objectives will be accomplished. It only took Sweden one year to end conscription after the bill was passed in June 2009, a relatively short transition period compared with other countries. The decision of a one-year AVF transition timeframe was taken mainly for political considerations as it was initiated and demanded by the Parliament and the government rather than driven internally by the military. In fact, when AVF reform was discussed within government in early 2009, the original timeline proposed by the armed forces was two years in order to spare sufficient time for implementation and correction. However, the government decided to hasten the transition by shortening the time to one year.²⁵³ A senior official of the SAF commented:

‘From [a] military perspective, the transition period should be longer in order to be better prepared. What SAF originally proposed in 2008 and 2009 was to wait until July 2011 to end the conscription. However, in order to avoid the conscription issue being debated during the Parliamentary election campaign in October 2010, the former Liberal/Conservative government decided to make a quicker transition before the election. The Parliament and the government thus suspended conscription one year earlier in July 2010.’²⁵⁴

The SAF followed the political decision and reached a zero draft on time. Nevertheless,

²⁵¹ *Opinioner* 2011, p. 73.

²⁵² Interview, participant SE-5.

²⁵³ Interview, participant SE-3.

²⁵⁴ Interview, participant SE-1.

the opposition Social Democrats argued that the defence reforms and the legislative bills were rushed through parliament, and added ‘defence policy and the implementation of important reforms should not be handled in such a hasty way.’²⁵⁵ Overall defence reform should be looked at from a broader perspective; the one-year AVF transformation is not the only goal of the 2009 defence reform as it is part of a wider personnel and structural reform package. The entire defence reform is set to be achieved in two phases by 2014 and 2019 respectively.²⁵⁶ The Government demands the reform to be delivered in 2014, but the SAF argue that, due to budget constraints, 2014 will only be one step closer toward the end goal, which is estimated by SAF around 75 to 80% of targets is expected to be achieved. The remaining 20-25% of tasks will have to wait until 2019 to be fully implemented.²⁵⁷ One senior personnel official of the SAF Head Quarters stressed:²⁵⁸

‘The reform is a tremendous challenge; but I think so far at least if you look at 2018 or 2019, for sure we are going to be successful, but not in the short perspective.’

Depending on tasks, various objectives and proposed timelines are shown in Table 3-3. Two crucial objectives: imbalance in personnel and the formulation of operational units will take a longer time than the scheduled date of 2014.

Table 3-3 Objectives of Defence Reform and Timelines

Objectives	Timelines
Voluntary recruitment	2014
Work obligation for all duties	2014
Imbalance are corrected	2019
Regular units and reserve units	2019
Two-tier system – officers and other ranks	2014
The international force is disbanded	2014

Source: Personnel Department of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, acquired and updated by author in September, 2011.

One of the important breakthroughs is the obligation for all personnel to serve on international missions. The reforms require all levels of personnel employed by SAF

²⁵⁵ Comment made by foreign policy spokesman Urban Ahlin. Gerard O'dwyer, Jan. 25, 2010, Sweden's Military To Detail Reforms.

<<http://www.defensenews.com/print/article/20100125/DEFSECT04/1250306/Sweden-s-Military-Detail-Reforms>>, accessed 3 Sep, 2012.

²⁵⁶ Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson, *Planning for the unknown*, Speech to Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, on 10 April 2012.

²⁵⁷ Numbers provided by a senior personnel official of SAF during author's interview, participant SE-3.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

including soldiers, NCOs, officers and civilians to serve on international operations in accordance with their individual employment contracts.²⁵⁹ Important progress has been made in which all officers have agreed to the new work obligation to serve in international operations. This objective is to regularise international commitments to missions with a move away from ad hoc elements to proper rotation of regular and reserve components; it was achieved in 2010 and has been applied since then.²⁶⁰ Even though missions like KFOR and ISAF may not last long, the commitments are now performed by standing regular units rather than ad hoc units. Voluntary recruitment is aimed to be achieved in 2014; it includes three types of soldiers: full-time regular soldier, part-time reserve soldier, and Home Guard soldiers. As noted above the specialist officer reforms are expected to be rolled out by 2014.

Summary

Table 3-4 summarises Sweden's AVF transformation and defence reform, which highlights the key differences between pre and post-reform of the Swedish defence. The strategic objective, military strategy, operational environment, missions, functions, and structure of the armed forces will have undergone significant transformation, which is a great challenge to the SAF. Although some objectives such as the zero draft have already been reached, others such as recruiting reserve soldiers and restructuring operational units need to take a longer time, up to 2019. It would be worthwhile to observe whether the reserve soldiers can be recruited in sufficient numbers and of the right quality or whether the specialist officer reform can be carried out smoothly. Whether or not the objectives of these tasks can be reached will affect the ultimate target: a functional defence. How Taiwan sets its strategic goal and individual objectives for AVF transformation is discussed next with a similar thematic arrangement.

²⁵⁹ Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar (Personnel supply in the defence reform).

²⁶⁰ 2011 Ministry of Finance Defence ESO Report.

Table 3-4 Transformation of the Swedish defence

Before reform	After reform
Defence against invasion	Actively used security policy tool
Preventive approach	Oriented towards involvement
Defence against massive military invasion	Continuously ongoing crisis management operations
National perspective	Multinational & International perspective
Stored material/ mobilization system	Frequently used military capabilities
Opponents well defined	Blurred picture of opponents
Quantity based organisation	Quality based organisation
Focus: Plans, administration, training of conscripts	Focus: Ongoing crisis management operations
Fixed structures	Modular structures
Operational environment defined	Variation of operational environment
Military non-alignment	Frequent participation of UN, EU and NATO based on solidarity declaration

Source: Tommy Jeppsson, May 2009, Swedish Military transformation and the Nordic Battle Group – for what and towards what? p. 95. Modified by author.

3.3 Taiwan

Changes in strategic concept

Strategic objectives of Taiwan's defence reform

The defence transformation and specific objectives of the Swedish AVF are strongly influenced by changes in strategic environment and concepts. On the contrary, for Taiwan as a quasi-sovereign state, much of its strategic contexts and background has been fixed and remained the same as before. No significant amendment in strategic concept has so far been made, despite some modest changes in military strategy in accordance with recent cross-strait detente. International operations and multinational military exercises are not foreseen in the near future. It was the primacy of domestic politics that triggered the change in the military manpower system. Therefore, in light of the fixed strategic concept, the objectives of Taiwan's AVF are almost self-contained. As part of the 2008 presidential campaign platform and subsequent declarations, in terms of defence agenda, President Ma pledged to:

- ‘1. Transform Taiwan's conscription-based armed forces to an AVF within four to six years;
2. Restructure the military to a smaller but smarter, and more competent force; and
3. Maintain defence spending to the level of no less than three per cent of GDP.’²⁶¹

²⁶¹ Ma Ying-Jeou/Hsiao Wan-Chang 2008 presidential campaign platform: Defence Policy, see <<http://2008.ma19.net/policy4you/defence>>, accessed 28 June 2011.

Building a smaller volunteer force is the strategic goal that the president intends to achieve at the political level. Taiwan would like to show the region, not least PRC in the context of less strained cross-strait relations, that its small but capable AVF is able to deter any enemy and defend the country. After assuming the presidency in 2008, suspending conscription became the government's policy and the Ministry of National Defense immediately embarked on AVF implementation. By the government's calculation, it is expected to create a force that is capable to respond to invasions and to carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, while resolving the problem of insufficient supply of able-bodied men due to the low birth rate and an aging population. President Ma's idea is to enhance the quality of the armed forces and create an effective deterrence capability through utilisation of fewer personnel and less resource,²⁶² which is somewhat similar to Sweden's approach by using existing resources to implement the reform.

Taiwan's armed forces have undergone two major military downsizings in the late 1990s and mid 2000s.²⁶³ Although the number of personnel was dramatically reduced, the military manpower supply was still dependent on a mixed system comprising a majority of conscripts with an increasing number of volunteer soldiers. Compulsory service was still maintained and therefore fully suspending the conscription is more challenging than simply downsizing the size of military, in which former defence minister Kao admits that the AVF transition is the most important and challenging task. Most measures conceived by the MND, including an auxiliary military downsizing and restructuring project, legislation for relevant military service laws, adjustments in strategy and missions, and the creation of incentives, are ultimately aimed at building an AVF. At the political level, the government has expressed a firm commitment to push on with this reform and the President has stressed this issue on various occasions.

Objectives of AVF transformation

This section is focused on the objectives of Taiwan's AVF in a structured discussion along lines similar to that followed earlier for Sweden. It starts with the description of

²⁶² President: AVF uses few resources to achieve maximum capability. 31 Aug, 2012. Radio Taiwan International.

²⁶³ The first downsizing was the 'Jing-Shi' project (1997-2001) followed by 'Jing-Jin' project (2004-2008).

five overall objectives of AVF and four guiding principles for implementation. Based on these important guidelines from the MND, the next task is to discuss the criteria of achieving a successful transition one at a time. It first identifies the missions of the AVF, followed by force restructuring in which a significant part through downsizing. Then the recruitment issues, reform of the NCO corps and reserve force, and public support of the armed forces are examined. The last criterion is the timeframe for the transition.

1. Strategic concept and objectives for Taiwan's AVF transformation

Even though Taiwan's strategic environment and context has not radically changed, its defence policy and strategy have undergone some alterations, from offensive strategy with the intention of retaking the mainland in the early decades after 1949, to the current defensive strategy. The latest strategic shift was in 2008, as Taiwan revised its defence strategy from 'active defence' adopted by former DPP regime to current 'pure defence'. Due to former President Chen's pro-independence political stance, Taiwan's defence posture upheld a more active element. Since 2008, the open policy towards the mainland under the current Ma administration has led to a slight thaw in the rigid military tension between the two sides and therefore a provocative military strategy was abandoned. All this notwithstanding, it does not mean that Taiwan has given up its determination to defend itself because the mainland Chinese military threat continues with its formidable and advanced capability.

Taiwan's current national defence strategy dubbed as 'Hard ROC' is meant to consolidate the defence of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as hard as rock, through the military strategy of 'resolute defence and credible deterrence'. The Hard ROC is one of Taiwan's recent changes in terms of military strategy and serves as a two-edged sword as it not only defends the territory of Taiwan, but also poses a credible threat to PRC without claiming the first use of force. Even though tensions still exist, the concept of Hard ROC is based on peaceful co-existence and is supposed to supplement easier cross-strait relations. The strategic objective of Hard ROC is not victory in war, but to deter the PRC by presenting the threat of inflicting significant damage and to maximize the cost to PRC through an enhanced deterrence capability. Taiwan's approach to AVF contrasts with the expeditionary ambitions of Sweden and other western countries. The constant military threat from China only allows Taiwan to continue its commitment to

territorial defence.

National strategic objectives

Taiwan as a quasi-sovereign state is neither threat-free nor is it allowed to participate in international operations and joint military exercises; building an expeditionary AVF is therefore not feasible, at least in the near future. Without a significant change in the strategic environment and a reduction in the level of threat, Taiwan's national defence strategy is still threat-based with focus on war prevention, homeland defence, contingency response, conflict avoidance and regional stability (Figure 3-3). It is obvious that Taiwan's defence strategy is rather reactive and inward looking. In terms of missions and tasks, by upholding the military strategy of 'resolute defence and credible deterrence', the armed forces aim to:²⁶⁴

1. Defend the territory to ensure national security;
2. Deter the enemy and maintain strong warfighting capabilities;
3. Counter blockade to maintain sea and aerial lines of communication;
4. Pursue joint Interception to retard enemies from approaching the territory;
5. Conduct ground defence to prevent enemy's landing operation.'

The concept and principle underpinning these tasks is basically to engage with the enemy away from Taiwan's territory in order to avoid war breaking out on the island. Aside from defence and deterrence, the first line of defence is counter blockade in order to keep Taiwan's economy functioning. By combining the Navy, Air Force, and land-based air defence, joint interception is the second line of defence to prevent enemy landings on Taiwan's soil. If an enemy is approaching and ready to land, ground defence based on the Army is the last resort to degrade or defeat the enemy before they land on the island. The armed forces need to build a high mobility within the territory of Taiwan to quickly engage the enemy.

²⁶⁴ 100 ROC Defense Report, 2011, p. 108




Figure 3-3 Defence policy and military strategy of Taiwan
Source: ROC Quadrennial Defense Review, 2009, p.17.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) - A new mission focus

One of the most obvious shifts for Taiwan armed forces is to focus more on Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. On top of the traditional military tasks, Taiwan armed forces since 2009 have incorporated these missions into its core responsibilities. The 2009 typhoon disaster caused political unrest as people lost trust in the government's ability in handling disaster relief. Accordingly the HA/DR operation has since become one of the major focuses and priorities for the armed forces. In light of this shift, Dandeker points out that the underpinning concepts for the missions of Taiwan's armed forces are to prevent the outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait, to protect democracy and freedom in Taiwan, and to provide a context of the development of HA/DR missions.²⁶⁵

To enhance the efficiency of HA/DR efforts, the government amended the Disaster Prevention and Rescue Act in 2010. An immediate effect has been the shift of the military's operational focus towards active engagement in HA/DR missions.

²⁶⁵ Christopher Dandeker, 2012. Maritime Partnerships: Maritime Defence Cooperation in the Indian-Pacific Ocean: Taiwan and the potential of HA/DR activities for its contribution to international peace and stability. The SLOC Conference, ROC National Defense University, 23-24 September 2012, p. 14.

Notwithstanding this development, some officers think that the shift may compromise regular training and combat readiness. However the government's aim is for the armed forces to take on mission roles with focus specifically on HA/DR operations during peacetime, and carrying out war-fighting along with mobilised reservists when war or conflict breaks out.²⁶⁶

The next task is to introduce what Taiwan armed forces intend to achieve in order to deliver the AVF transformation. The discussion is divided into two parts: first describing and discussing the overall objectives of Taiwan's AVF transformation followed by introducing the guiding principles for the AVF implementation.

Overall objectives of AVF implementation

According to MND, general objectives for the implementation of AVF have been formulated.²⁶⁷ First of all, there is the aim of building an elite and professional AVF. Under the political guidance of building a 'smaller but smarter force', the AVF should be built through efficient utilisation of existing defence resources without compromising quality and competence. This is of significance especially when the government does not provide extra funds for the armed forces to implement the AVF. The MND has had to seek available resources to subsidise the transition, such as shifting operational maintenance expenditure to supplement personnel costs. However, by doing so the military competence of the armed forces could be compromised.

Secondly, there is the matter of selecting an appropriate type of AVF that fits Taiwan's special strategic situation. As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War did not trigger substantial strategic change in Taiwan. It is an unusual case to end conscription while still facing a military threat and not being part of a strategic defence alliance such as NATO.²⁶⁸ Taiwan's AVF is therefore stand-alone with threat-based strategic objectives

²⁶⁶ Taiwan's Defense Transformation and Challenges Under Ma Ying-Jeou, Fu S. Mei, Jamestown Foundation, *China Brief*, Volume XI, Issue 7, April 22, 2011

²⁶⁷ The AVF propaganda reference material No. 1, MND, 1 January, 2012. <<http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/TheNewIndex/News.aspx?newsid=1777>>, accessed 16 April, 2012. A MND document written in Chinese and the title 'propaganda' is a direct translation to English, which might confuse westerners. It should be made clear that due to historical reasons (losing the mainland in 1949 was partly because the Chinese Communist had political and propaganda warfare), propaganda is still one of the functions in Taiwan armed forces.

²⁶⁸ Haltiner, K 1998, 'The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe? *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.7-36.

and military tasks. Although some lessons from the West are worth learning, a purely western expeditionary-typed AVF may not fully function in Taiwan. The type and functions of Taiwan's AVF need to be carefully tailored so it can fulfil its own security requirements, and can fit into its political, economic and social contexts.

Thirdly, there is the issue of enhancing the competence of the regular force.²⁶⁹ For decades, the defence structure of Taiwan has been solely composed of active-duty regular forces, which have been the backbone of Taiwan's armed forces since 1949. Without a significant change, this AVF transformation will still focus on active-duty regulars to fill all positions in the regular units. In light of political guidance, the MND expects to build a smaller but more capable AVF, which is to be reached through adoption of the auxiliary military downsizing project aiming to cut 60,000 personnel by the end of 2014. Important questions arise here: Does downsizing simply mean fewer regulars with better quality? The quality of the longer-serving volunteer regulars is expected to be better, so the Taiwan armed forces aim to have fewer regular soldiers who can play multiple roles and conduct various military tasks.

Fourthly, there is the matter of establishing a reliable reserve force. Taiwan has been maintaining a 2.8 million strong force of reservists but only with a purely theoretical capability; therefore the MND aims to improve the reliability of the reserve force.²⁷⁰ This is to be done in line with the compulsory four-month basic military training service. Because Taiwan will still be facing the PRC military threat, even after the AVF is fully implemented, compulsory service will still carry on but in a much reduced form through basic military training. The other consideration is that the legal basis of the AVF is an amendment of the Military Service Law; the constitution which requires all men liable for conscription service is untouched. Following the compulsory (constitutionally mandated) four months basic training, men are automatically registered into the reserve force until the age of 36. The purpose is to transform all draftees into the reserve manpower pool through a short period of infantry training. The operational guidance is to engage the enemy with regular forces in the frontline, while reservists are mobilised for homeland protection in the rear. Regular and periodical exercises are conducted to

²⁶⁹ It sounds like cliché, but this is the MND statement of the basis of the new AVF, despite the MND have been saying this for years, even before the AVF.

²⁷⁰ The ROC Executive Yuan administration report to the Legislature Yuan, session 3, February 2013, p.32.

refresh the combat skills of reservists and to improve the efficiency of mobilisation. In addition, if the need arises, reservists are required to perform HA/DR operation. The 2010 Disaster Relief Act authorises the MND to mobilise reservists to supplement regular forces for HA/DR operations.

Lastly, there is the issue of creating an attractive service environment. In traditional Taiwanese society, compared to other professions, the military is not highly regarded because it is believed that those who serve in the military perform poorly at schools. Therefore attracting young men and women to serve in military and retain them staying longer is a challenging task. A desirable working environment with attractive incentives is central for recruiting personnel. Various incentives including both monetary and in-kind schemes must be designed in order to attract young people to join.

Principles for AVF implementation

The AVF will be implemented based on the MND guiding principles.²⁷¹ First, the stable growth of the numbers of volunteer soldiers must be maintained. The proportion and number of volunteer soldiers will grow incrementally each year over a four year period in the pattern of ‘initially fewer recruitment with increased volume later on’, which means that in the first half (2011-2012) of implementation, the recruiting volume target is lower than the second half (2013-2014).

Second, relevant military service laws need further amendments. Laws and regulations regarding the following issues are to be legislated or amended: personnel management, cultivation, career planning, selection, alternative service, elimination and compensation. Most of the legal regulations have been in place. Third, the incentives will be gradually increased in coordination with financial resources in order to boost recruitment and retention. This is difficult because the MND has requested financial support from the central government (the Executive Yuan) to increase the base pay and bonus for volunteer soldiers, no positive response has yet been received. Unlike western militaries that can have adventure and challenges by going abroad, salary seems to be one of the few incentives that can attract the youth cohorts in Taiwan. Without proper incentives to attract young men and women, recruitment and retention will be difficult. Lastly,

²⁷¹ 100 Defense Report, 2011, p. 116

conscription is not fully suspended by being converted to a shorter version of basic military training. This principle is vital and worth explaining in full. The most obvious characteristic of Taiwan's AVF is that conscription is only partly suspended because draftees are still required by law to undergo four months of basic training. This is due to the obligations imposed by maintaining national security and conscription stipulated by the constitution.²⁷² A senior legislator of the defence committee explained that:

‘...[I] was one of the initiators of the four-month basic training. The initial thought was to put draftees in the boot camp for six weeks then deploy them to units performing simple tasks like guarding the barracks, in order for volunteer soldiers to operate sophisticated equipment and perform more difficult and complicated tasks.’²⁷³

From a strictly military point of view, the short military training period is merely symbolic without contributing real competence. It is difficult to build up military competence with short service length, which is the main reason Taiwan decided to end conscription.²⁷⁴ People may argue that even though the one-year service is considered by many young men a waste of time, at least it serves its military purpose. Therefore people might doubt that why spending four months for basic training without fulfilling a military purpose. As a matter of fact, the existing military threat is another major concern for keeping the military training service because Taiwan's armed forces adopt the approach of ‘maintaining a smaller force during peacetime, while expanding the size when war breaks out.’ The purpose of the basic training is to create a reservoir of qualified infantry soldiers, so they can be mobilised to expand the military size in case of war. The training will start with a two-month general infantry training in the boot camps, followed by another two months of specialist training; there will be no deployment to operational units. In fact, from a political perspective, it is difficult for Taiwan to totally abolish the compulsory service because the threshold and costs for amending the constitution are even higher. In facing the PRC military threat, once conscription is fully abolished from the constitution, it will be very difficult to retrieve it and this will leave Taiwan at a higher risk of military invasion.

Both the overall objectives and guiding principles have shown that the success of basic

²⁷² It is similar to the case of Germany; without amending the German Basic Law, conscription is suspended not abolished.

²⁷³ Interview, participant TW-6.

²⁷⁴ President Ma explains the shift to AVF is not to build a ‘posh’ army, but is due to the shortened length of conscription which has eroded the competence of the armed forces. Central News Agency, 26 June, 2013. <<http://news.chinatimes.com/politics/50207798/132013062600793.html>>, accessed 26 June 2013.

training is influential to the entire AVF implementation. The armed forces need to sell themselves to the public and justify the purpose and legitimacy of basic training. Further questions can be raised on this issue: How will the four-month basic training be carried out? Will the quality of draftees through basic training satisfy the defence need? Will the armed forces face resistance and anticipate the four-month training to be a problem? The armed forces need to prepare and address these issues.

In retrospect, both by law and by tradition, the Taiwanese people have been used to military service and most people abide by the law. The report rates for reservist mobilisation have always been very high; those who do not show up without proper reasons will face prosecution. In 2012 alone, 145,593 reservists were called up in 662 batches for mobilisation training, and the average annual report rate reached 98.63 percent.²⁷⁵ Therefore it can be assumed that Taiwanese people should be able to adapt to the new rule for the following reasons: 1. Traditionally, it is the long-enforced law for decades and Taiwanese people have been accustomed to it; 2. The new rule is shorter and easier than the previous one. People are less likely to resist a less tough law. In fact, many young men who were born after 1993 actually feel lucky as they do not have to serve one year but only four months instead. 3. Conscription is part of Taiwanese culture, even though most people do not like it, they simply accept it.²⁷⁶ It is worthwhile to observe and follow up whether the basic training can be carried out smoothly and problem free.²⁷⁷

2. Restructuring of operational organisation and force size

Downsizing the military establishment

Taiwan's large military is a legacy of decades of tensions with PRC since 1949. After the abolition of the offensive strategy, significant downsizing has been carried out since mid-1990s; however, in order to make the AVF financially affordable, the overall number of military personnel needs to be further reduced. By the end of 2014 the

²⁷⁵ The ROC Executive Yuan administration report to the Legislature Yuan, session 3, February 2013, p.32.

²⁷⁶ In fact, after leaving the conscription service, those who served in rigorous or physically demanding units such as the Marines Corps or Special Forces are usually proud of what they have done and like to show off to their colleagues and friends.

²⁷⁷ But it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

overall number of positions will be reduced from the current 275,000 to 215,000. The MND aims to fill 90 percent of the positions so the number of total personnel will be reduced to 196,000, which includes 19,000 annual draftees for the four month training. In fact, the actual volunteer personnel only accounts for 176,000 and combat forces would constitute only 147,000. The force level and organisation is adjusted through comprehensive assessment of the level of threats, national security situation, and financial resources. The size of the military establishment must be balanced between maintaining enough personnel for homeland defence and available financial resources. The magnitude of downsizing between 2011 and 2014 is shown in Table 3-5.

Table 3-5 Estimated Personnel Target during the phase of Implementation and Validation

Category/Year	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total Number of Billets	264,000	250,000	233,000	215,000
Organisation Number of Personnel	239,000	226,000	211,000	196,000
Increased Number of Volunteer soldiers	1,000	8,000	15,000	15,000
Target of Total Volunteer Personnel	138,000	146,000	161,000	176,000

Source: Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2012, Vol. 101, No. 14. p.202.

Organisational restructuring

In addition to force reduction, efforts to restructure the defence organisation have been made. The principle is based on ‘streamlining high-level command and solidifying basic/lower level of units’, with the administrative and logistics personnel (tail force) being the priority to be cut.²⁷⁸ The complete force restructuring project is carried out by complying with AVF implementation and the military downsizing project. To reduce personnel costs, the total number of ranks of one-star and above and the proportion of non-combat personnel are being significantly reduced.²⁷⁹ Thus the MND has not saved higher ranking officers from reform and rationalisation.

With regard to the command structure, the aim is to merge Logistics, Reserve, and Military Police commands into the existing tri-service system - Army, Navy and Air

²⁷⁸ 100 Defence Report, 2011, p. 131.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. A total of 101 positions for generals and admirals will be cut by 2014.

Force command headquarters to streamline the effectiveness of joint operations. Defence resources will be mainly distributed to combat units; therefore most of the teeth forces will be maintained. Underperforming and redundant forces (for example, the corps for performing arts and the military police) unfitted to the operational requirements will be either merged or dismantled. The logistic organisation is one focus of reform: the present inefficient joint logistic system is to be replaced by service logistics in which the common logistics is under the command of the Army.²⁸⁰

Regarding the type of personnel, the MND plans to increase the proportion of civilians in the MND headquarters as part of the civilian control of the military.²⁸¹ In terms of non-combat tasks, administration and support works such as catering will be outsourced to civilian contractors so military personnel can focus on training and combat readiness. Reserve mobilisation and training will be centrally planned at the ministry level to incorporate ground operational needs.²⁸² Generally speaking, the structure of operational units is not significantly modified in that the major forms of operational units are basically maintained: the Army is organised around combined arms brigades, the Navy in flotillas and the Air Force in fighter wings. All personnel in operational units are active-duty and volunteer-based. This can be interpreted from two perspectives: on one hand, Taiwan's defence reform is conservative; on the other, it is rather realistic as it has recognised its limits regarding operating with other countries.

3. Recruitment

Recruiting volunteer soldiers is the foremost task of the AVF transformation.²⁸³ Under the current mixed system, the approach is to increase the number of volunteer soldiers while reducing conscripts in a gradual manner. Figure 3-4 shows the evolution of annual personnel targets set by MND in terms of the overall number of personnel and the number of volunteer personnel during the transition. The proportion of volunteer soldiers will grow by ten percent incrementally year by year over the four year period. As previously mentioned, the recruiting volumes in the first half of the third phase

²⁸⁰ It seems counter intuitive, but services have been complaining about the inefficiency of the joint logistic system in the past decade, especially navy and air force.

²⁸¹ The purpose is not to save personnel costs but to assert civilian control. Most defence ministers in past decade were retired generals.

²⁸² ROC Quadrennial Defense Review, 2009, p.80.

²⁸³ Ibid, p.51.

(2011 and 2012) are fewer in order to allow a buffer period for modification. In the second half (2013 and 2014), the MND will greatly increase the recruiting volume in order to quickly fill the vacant posts left by conscripts before the last one leaving the military. It aims to recruit 23,000 volunteer soldiers in 2013 and 39,000 in 2014.²⁸⁴ An interesting question to ask is: based on the recruitment in the past few years, will Taiwan's armed forces achieve these targets? The recruiting targets, especially in 2013 and 2014, may be unrealistic.




Figure 3-4 Implementation progress of AVF
Source: Ministry of National Defense

In terms of quality, in order to qualify to apply, all applicants must be at least 18 years old without a criminal record, receive high school or vocational school qualification, and pass the physical examination. They are then required to undergo a series of tests, including IQ, aptitude and physical tests, and interview. All these criteria must be met in order to be admitted to basic military training. Similar to Sweden, the qualification for entering the military has so far not been lowered, but the application procedure has been simplified to facilitate the intake flow.

Creating incentives

A way to overcome recruitment difficulties and employ the desired number and quality of people is to make it more attractive for young people to join the military than alternative employers. Incentives play a big role in enhancing attractiveness. Across all

²⁸⁴ Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2012, Vol. 101, No.14.

phases, providing various incentives to boost recruitment and retention is an important objective dictated by the MND. The MND emphasises four motives that could attract young people: '1, the pay that is better than what is offered in the private sector; 2, providing a sound welfare and family care system; 3, a comprehensive retirement plan and veteran care system; and 4, taking soldier's career and family into the consideration of the service regulations.'²⁸⁵

Depending on the financial position, the MND aims to raise soldier's basic salary to twice the legal minimum wage set by the government. Other objectives include offering service bonuses, streamlining career paths, increasing educational opportunities, improving working and living environments, revising the retirement scheme and veterans' welfare, and enhancing family cares. Similar measures and schemes are also adopted to retain existing soldiers.

Apart from operational effectiveness, the objective for the western AVF, including Sweden, also focuses on its social responsibility. From the political perspective, diversity of recruitment has been an important issue in Sweden (indeed in Western Europe as a whole), especially with respect to ethnic diversity. This is also an issue in Taiwan, nevertheless it involves a focus on gender rather than ethnicity as Taiwanese society is more culturally homogeneous. While western states can offer citizenship to immigrants as an incentive to join the military, Taiwan does not have such a broad immigrant base and therefore the way to diversify the recruitment pool is mainly to increase the number of women, which has been successful in recent years.

4. Enhancing the quality and quantity of NCOs

When it comes to NCO reform as part of the AVF implementation in Taiwan, several issues should be addressed: How did the NCO system work in the old conscript-based system? What do armed forces anticipate from the new NCO corps? What is the optimal size of the NCO corps? And do the armed forces need more NCOs but less officers and soldiers? What kind of specialised knowledge and skills do NCOs need so the overall competence of the armed forces can be enhanced? These questions should be answered before detailed reform measures are carried out.

²⁸⁵ The AVF propaganda reference material No. 5, MND, 1 Jan, 2012, <<http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/TheNewIndex/News.aspx?newsid=1777>>, accessed 16 April, 2012.

Taiwan's armed forces have been relying on NCOs ever since their foundation and the system has been consistently functioning in harmony with officers and soldiers. Compared with Sweden's discontinuation of NCO system for over 25 years, Taiwanese NCOs as a central part of the three-tier personnel system have underpinned the competence of the armed forces in terms of execution of missions and tasks, training soldiers, and carrying out specialised tasks. Therefore, the quality of soldiers is to a great degree associated with the competence of the NCOs because they are in close contact with soldiers.

Since 1990s, the modernisation process and acquisition of hi-tech weapon systems require high quality personnel, especially NCOs, as they are the main ones who actually operate and maintain the equipment. Nonetheless, as in Sweden the NCO also faces some problems, but in different ways. Although the competence of NCOs has developed, the three-tier system has not been running flawlessly in the entire personnel system as friction exists between the officer and NCO corps. Lack of autonomy and full authorisation due to detailed control of officers, and frequent turnover of conscripted NCOs due to shortened service length, have resulted in disharmony in the middle management of the armed forces and a lower proportion of NCOs related to officers and soldiers.²⁸⁶ These mismatches have affected the competence of the NCO corps.

In fact, the fundamental problem of Taiwan's NCOs is not the competence of NCOs per se; it is rather the relationship and coordination between officers and NCOs in terms of division of labour. The armed forces tend to attach more importance to the operational commanding officers and neglect technical officers and NCOs. Furthermore, the detailed management of officers has impeded and eroded the autonomy and authority of NCOs. One senior sergeant major identified the current problem for NCOs:²⁸⁷

‘A serious issue of NCOs is that we are assigned too many responsibilities without having proper autonomy and authority in terms of the management and command of soldiers and NCOs. Until now, as a sergeant major [the highest NCO rank] and most senior NCO in the base, I do not have the authority to reward and punish soldiers and NCOs, and recommend their promotions. Besides, even though there is a NCO committee in every unit, the resolutions reached by the committee still need approval from the superior. The committee seems to be like a rubber stamp.’

²⁸⁶ There are two types of NCOs: conscripted and volunteer NCOs. As part of the compulsory service, draftees with college degree who pass the examination can serve for 12 months as conscripted NCOs with the rank of corporal (NATO code OR-4).

²⁸⁷ Interview, participant TW-10.

Former vice defence minister Michael Tsai et al pointed out that the priority in the modification of defence organisational structure is to change the proportions of different categories of personnel, enhance the technological skills of the personnel and the capabilities of the operational units. They went on and stressed that this should be done by professionalising and increasing the proportion of volunteer NCOs.²⁸⁸ The first NCO reform launched by MND in the late 1990s was aimed at improving the career planning, quality and welfare of NCOs; it also attempted to correct the ill-administered division of labour and increase the proportion of NCOs in the entire military personnel. Nevertheless, as a study conducted by the investigatory agency of Taiwanese government Control Yuan reveals that the proportion of NCO in recent years has not yet increased.²⁸⁹

In coordination with the AVF implementation plan, the MND has initiated another NCO reform aiming to effectively utilise the functions of NCOs and to gain full authorisation and support from officers in order for them to dedicate to the middle-management, letting officers concentrate on planning and executive works. Schemes and targets for the professionalisation of NCOs have been developed and described below.²⁹⁰

First, there has been a process of gradually reducing the number of conscripted NCOs as part of the effort in reducing the conscript ratio, and increasing the number of volunteer NCOs along with the recruitment progress of volunteer soldiers. The target is to raise the ratio of officer to NCO to soldiers from 1:1.88:1.95 in 2012 to 1: 2.12: 1.70,²⁹¹ which has confirmed that the armed forces need more NCOs but less officers and soldiers. Second, the military has been establishing and assigning senior positions for NCOs as Sergeant Major and NCO supervisors in command headquarters, corps, brigade, battalion, and company levels. This should not be just a position setting or window dressing, but rather they will be given full authorisation to command and manage soldiers and NCOs in their units.²⁹² Third, reforming the division of labour in

²⁸⁸ Tsai, Michael M. and Lin, Jason C., 2006, Funding for Taiwan's defense reform, in *Taiwan's Defense Reform*, eds. Martin Edmonds and Michael/ M. Tsai, Routledge, pp. 177.

²⁸⁹ *The impact of MND proposed all-volunteer force on government's finance and military capability*, The research and investigation project, Republic of China Control Yuan, 2008, p. 163. The proportion of NCO in terms of the officer-NCO-soldier ratio dropped from 1:1.55:2 in 2008 to 1:1.48:2 in 2009.

²⁹⁰ 100 Defense Report, 2011, p. 167; see also QDR p. 101. This is based on the personnel structure of the US armed forces and Japan Self Defence force, and taking mobilisation of reservists into consideration.

²⁹¹ The propaganda reference of AVF plan, MND, February, 2012, p. 4.

²⁹² 100 Defense Report. 2011, p. 167.

terms of authority and responsibility between officers and NCOs. NCOs will not only be more autonomous in training and commanding, but are empowered to review and evaluate promotions, transfers, post assignments, trainings, and performance of personnel. Last is to promote overseas exchange programmes for NCOs. Similar to officers, NCOs will have more chances to be sent abroad for training, education and exchange visits.

In addition to looking after and retaining NCOs, the MND will increase bonuses and improve the welfare and benefit of NCOs, and encourage them to acquire technical certifications and academic degrees. To cope with the increasing number of female volunteer soldiers, more female NCOs will be recruited, which is part of an effort to increase the participation of women in the military.

5. Reforming reserve forces

Promoting the capability and reliability of the reserve force is pledged as a major concern for the AVF implementation because the concept and practice of the ‘all-out defence’ demands a competent reserve force to operate in line with the regular component.²⁹³ A smaller regular force during peacetime requires a supplement of a large reserve force through mobilisation during war. While Sweden emulates the US and UK in recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers, due to differences in historical and strategic contexts, reserve forces in Taiwan only contain ex-regular personnel. Conscripts who have finished compulsory service are automatically registered as reservists until age of 36. This is still applied to all draft-age men after they have done the four-month basic training.

As for missions and tasks, the MND dictates that ‘the regular forces are deployed in the frontline to engage an enemy’s invasion, while the reservists deal with homeland defence in the rear.’ During peacetime, regular call-ups are practiced to sharpen reservists’ military skills and mobilisation efficiency. Non-traditional HA/DR missions have also been added to the responsibilities of the reservists. In principle, young and junior reservists are mainly assigned to combat units while senior and experienced personnel are allocated to technical and logistics units.

²⁹³ The title ‘all-out’ defence is adopted by MND, meaning total defence.

A question can be raised about how military training service can be carried out. According to statistics in past few years, the report rate for reservist recalls has always been high.²⁹⁴ With such short training, to ensure capability the reservists must rely on regular call-ups to refresh training and practice mobilisation. In general, reservists are mustered for training and exercise every two years. Another crucial part of reform is to enhance the combat readiness of reservists by incorporating them into the annual Han-Kuang military exercise. Within 24 hours, about 12,000 reservists are mobilised to perform various tasks in line with regular troops during exercises in order to validate the training results.²⁹⁵ This is a crucial step to test and demonstrate the training results of reservists, not just on paper.

As part of the sixth National Defence Law, the administration and command structure of the reserve command has been amended from an independent command to sit directly under the Chief of General Staff. The basic military training regiments (the boot camps) which originally belonged to the reserve command have been shifted to the army. To allow a unified command, preparation and deployment of reserve units, ground reserve units are also reallocated under the jurisdiction of army.

Although Taiwan's reserve force is large in size (2.8 million), its competence has existed only on paper, and long been criticised as a symbolic force based on mass mobilisation. Taiwan adopts a rather traditional and conservative approach with the main focus on command structural change. Radical overhaul in the concept of reservists is limited as the function, mission and personnel type stay unchanged. In other words, reservists are still being treated as a symbolic backup force with on-paper competence. Many people worry about the quality of reserve forces as one officer from MND feels that once war breaks out and reservists are mobilised: 'They will probably be the first ones to flee.'²⁹⁶ Without a considerable change in the personnel structure, the reserve force reform in Taiwan can only be considered as a pool of ex-regulars with those who have done the basic training. Therefore, it is important for Taiwan's defence officials to think through what kind of reserve force it needs. If the definition of a competent reserve force is the western type which can be deployed overseas for real warfighting, Taiwan's current

²⁹⁴ For example, average report rate was over 98% in 2012.

²⁹⁵ The largest annual military exercise of Taiwan armed forces; 12,000 reservists were mobilised for 2013 Han-Kuang exercise.

²⁹⁶ Interview, participant TW-16.

reserve system and structure needs an overhaul, otherwise it is still a window-dressing type of force.

Horowitz has suggested that Taiwan should utilise volunteer part-time reservists who can be drawn on in an emergency on short notice to fill roles that do not require full-time peacetime attention. He stressed that greater reliance on post-mobilisation assets can reduce the need for active-duty recruits.²⁹⁷ A research project conducted by Taiwan's Research, Development and Evaluation Commission backed Horowitz's argument and suggested MND to consider recruiting volunteer reserve soldiers as part of the complementary measure for the proposed AVF project.²⁹⁸

6. The Military's public image and support

Support for the Armed Forces

Since the last major military conflict with PRC in the 1958 dubbed the 'August 23rd Artillery Bombardment' or 'the second Taiwan Strait Crisis' and sporadic minor conflicts during the 1960s, Taiwan's armed forces have had no real military operations and international joint exercises. Thus the media tend to be harsh on the armed forces and often report the negative sides of the military such as notorious incidents or discipline issues. The death an Army conscripted corporal in July 2013 due to unlawful punishment has been reported on headlines for entire month, which has severely damaged military's public image.²⁹⁹ In addition, Taiwanese society has a stereotyped impression of the military that tends to be authoritarian, dogmatic, and unproductive, and these views have discouraged most young people to join the military. It is further worsened by the soldier's low social status. By advocating the importance of an all-out defence, the MND has strived to improve its public image with efforts to explain the mission of total defence to the public, strengthen civil-military relations, increase disaster relief efforts, open military bases to the public, and even make a TV drama series about life in boot camp.³⁰⁰

In terms of military's public image, a survey conducted by media in 2009 revealed that

²⁹⁷ Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Taiwan Stanley A. Horowitz, IDA, 2009, p.4

²⁹⁸ *The Complementary Measure of AVF*, Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, 2007, p.148 and 167.

²⁹⁹ <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/07/30/2003568486>>, accessed 30 July 2013.

³⁰⁰ 100 National Defense Report, 2011, pp.164-173

the image of military personnel was viewed positively only by 44 percent of respondents, while 29 percent responded negatively. Comparing to the result of the same survey conducted in 1999, the majority (72 percent) of people showed much stronger support to the military, and only 12 percent of people had negative view on the military (Figure 3-5).³⁰¹




Figure 3-5 The public image of Taiwan's military personnel (in %)

The willingness to defend the country

In terms of the willingness to defend Taiwan against Chinese invasion, the results indicate a complex picture. In 2011 the MND commissioned a civilian poll agency to conduct a survey on people's willingness to defend the country. The result showed that 76 percent of people are willing to fight if Taiwan is invaded.³⁰² However, another survey conducted in the same year asking Taiwanese high school students about their willingness to fight for the country if it is under invasion: some 44 percent of respondents were not willing to do so, whereas only 39 percent answered yes.³⁰³ A 2012 survey revealed that almost 60 percent of Taiwanese young people felt that people should have the right to refuse military conscription in the event of war against China.³⁰⁴ These results not only show that most Taiwanese young people do not intend

³⁰¹ <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/news_list.asp?no=arieslu20090416195349>. Accessed 5 November 2012.

³⁰² 27 Dec, 2010. <<http://www.nownews.com/2010/12/27/301-2676981.htm>>, accessed 30 June, 2012.

³⁰³ *Common Wealth Magazine*, survey conducted between 17 Oct and 14 Nov, 2011, <<http://media.cw.com.tw/cw/cwdata/pdf/2011-CW-2011edu.pdf>>, accessed 13 May 2012.

³⁰⁴ Youth will not fight for Taiwan: poll, 13 May, 2012, *Taipei Times*, Page 1.

to sacrifice their lives fighting for the country if it is invaded, but also reflect the ‘pragmatic attitudes’ of young people toward the cross-strait detente. In other words, amid the close economic tie with China, people’s attitudes toward China have started to shift from the traditional communist enemy and threat, to an open market where they have the opportunity to work, study, travel and do business.

Support of AVF policy

Unlike the shaky support for the armed forces, public support of Taiwan’s AVF policy has been relatively strong and stable. This can be seen from several surveys conducted by various institutes in the last decade. In July 2004, a media survey showed that a slight majority (52%) supported the AVF, with 33 percent opposed it; 15 percent had no comment or did not know.³⁰⁵ Between 2008 and 2010, four polls on the support of AVF policy were conducted by the MND, which showed that on average 70 percent of Taiwanese people support this policy.³⁰⁶

The relatively low support for the armed forces, the unwillingness to defend the country and strong support for the AVF, to some extent reflects people’s traditional view of the military. Thus, based on survey results, it can be interpreted that most Taiwanese people have a limited desire to work in the military and prefer someone else to do the service. In light of these results, recruiting personnel might be foreseen to become more difficult if the military does not improve its public image.

7. Timeline for zero draft: three phases by end of 2014

The last objective to be discussed is the timeline for AVF implementation. Taiwan’s current threat-based defence, a relatively large conscript based military, and constraints on defence expenditure have prevented it from a swift shift in its personnel system. Taiwan government has thus spared more than five years to implement the AVF. The timeline was adopted by MND based on the President’s campaign promise ‘suspending conscription within four to six years’ through phased approach with overall implementation of AVF to be divided into three phases.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ <http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/tvbs2011/pch/tvbs_poll_center.aspx> accessed 12 October, 2012.

³⁰⁶ AVF policy propaganda material No.2, MND, 1 Jan, 2012.

³⁰⁷ ROC Quadrennial Defense Review, 2009. p. 83, and the 100 ROC Defense Report, 2011, p.180

Phase I (from May 2008 to June 2009) concentrates on planning and preparation works for AVF implementation. The main tasks include restructuring in defence organisation, boosting personnel recruitment, planning mobilisation mechanisms, benefits for service personnel, and a retirement scheme.

Phase II (from July 2009 to end of 2010) focuses on AVF project formulation. Completing and amending relevant legislations and adjusting the organisational structure were the key efforts. Planning for incentives to boost recruitment was another focus. The Conscript Ratio (CR) was reduced to 40 percent during this stage.

Phase III (from January 2011 to end of 2014): focuses on implementation and validation of the AVF. The AVF will be fully established in the final phase of transition. To measure and regulate the implementation progress, targets are to reduce CR by 10 percent each year from 40 percent in 2010, 30 percent in 2011, 20 percent in 2012, 10 percent in 2013, then finally reaches zero draft by the end of 2014. An important breakthrough during this phase is the passage of the amendment of the Military Service Law which dictates the cut-off time for conscription. Table 3-6 shows the planned three phases of implementation timeframe.

Table 3-6 Three phases of AVF Implementation

Phase	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
	Planning and Preparation	Project formulation	Implementation and Validation
Timeframe	05/2008 to 06/2009	07/2009 to 12/2010	01/2011 to 12/2014
Tasks and targets	Planning for legislation, restructuring defence organisation, planning for recruitment, mobilisation mechanisms, and incentives	Conscript Ratio: 40% Completing legislative amendments, planning more incentives based on financial availability.	The third reading of the amendment of the military service law passed. Conscript Ratio: 2011: 30% (recruiting target: 15,000) 2012: 20% (recruiting target: 17,000) 2013: 10% (recruiting target: 23,000) The last draftee entering conscription service. 2014: 0 (recruiting target: 39,000) The last draftee entering one-year conscription in end of 2013, and last draftee leaving the service in end of 2014.

Source: Gazette, Legislative Yuan, Republic of China, 2012, Vol. 101, No. 14, p.202.

Summary

Table 3-7 summarises the features of Taiwan's AVF transformation. Due to the existing threat level and international constraints, Taiwan's AVF goal and objectives are based on its constant strategic needs and therefore, no significant shift in strategic concepts is being made. Although Taiwan armed forces will shift to an AVF in 2015, compulsory service is not 100 percent suspended, but in a much reduced form. Taking the military threat and constitutional requirement into account, draft-age men still need to go to short military training but no deployment. Other than a cut in the overall establishment of the armed forces and some organisational changes in the chain of command, the basic structure of the armed forces and reserve force is not overhauled. Recruitment is to be enhanced by creating incentives and employing more women; nevertheless, recruitment target has been difficult to achieve. The competence of NCOs has already developed but the officer-NCO relationship needs to be coordinated and the quality and number of NCOs will be increased. The reservists are ex-regular service personnel with the addition of the draft-age men after they have finished basic training. The public image of the military is mediocre, but support for AVF is relatively high. This does not necessarily mean that people are interested in joining the military.

Table 3-7 Transformation of Taiwanese Defence

Before Reform	After Reform
Threat-based defence	Threat-based AVF
Hard ROC with Resolute defence and effective deterrence	Hard ROC with Resolute defence and effective deterrence with emphasis on improved HADR capability
Reactive	Reactive and pre-emptive for HA/DR with enhanced mobility
Opponent well defined: PRC	Opponent well defined: PRC with improved cross-strait relations and slightly mitigated military threat
One year compulsory service	AVF, draft men need to receive 4-month basic military training
Fixed structure regular force 275,000	Fixed structure regular force 215,000
Ex-regular reserve forces, no volunteer reservists and National Guard	Expanded ex-regular reserve forces to accommodate the draftees, with modified command structure. No volunteer reservists and National Guard
Operational environment defined: National perspective	Operational environment defined: National perspective
NCOs already existed	Coordinated officer-NCO relationship. Increasing proportion of NCO, quality enhanced with more responsibility, autonomy and authority.
Quantity-based force based on conscripts	Smaller, smarter and more capable AVF

Source: compiled by author.

3.4 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has identified and analysed the strategic goals and specific objectives of the AVF transformation set by both countries and discussed the rationales behind those objectives. Both countries only suspended conscription with an eye to re-launch it in case of necessity. Sweden has acquired a pure AVF, whereas Taiwan is a quasi-AVF because all draft-age men are still liable for basic training, and this is difficult and unlikely to change due to constitutional regulation and Taiwan's strategic posture. Both countries treat the goal of AVF differently in the overall defence reform context. The AVF is included in the broader defence reform project in Sweden; it nevertheless is the nexus and ultimate goal for Taiwan with other auxiliary reform projects affixed to it.

By comparing the goals and objectives of AVF transition and defence reform of the two countries, it is evident that the way Sweden is transforming its armed forces is relatively radical and innovative in terms of personnel types and organisational structure, which can be observed from its significant utilisation of part-time reserve personnel, and formulation of contracted reserve units. The timeline for defence reform is set up to 2019, which gives the armed forces relatively longer time to implement the changes required. The recruitment pool is more diversified as the SAF focuses on women, immigrants, and other ethnic groups. To fill the skill gap caused by lack of NCOs, Sweden has reintroduced the two-tier officer system by reassigning existing officers to new specialist officer positions while they develop a new cohort. Having abolished NCOs for a long period of time, the reform is challenging as problems come from both officers and specialist officers. Cultural resistance is seen among existing specialist officers. It is a rare example of AVF transition in which some parts of the officer corps are told to be reassigned as specialist officers or NCOs (with the NATO ranking of OR). The Swedes generally support the SAF, but this cannot be said of the AVF.

Taiwan's AVF transformation, on the other hand, is implemented in a somewhat conservative manner. This is mainly due to its current strategic posture and threat level that still would not allow significant shift in strategic concepts to be made. In other words, it can only build a territorial AVF which is also a rare example of AVF transition. The personnel reform emphasises AVF itself. Defence organisation has been undergoing

downsizing, but the structure has not been substantially reformed. While the NCO system has functioned steadily in Taiwan armed forces, problem and friction exists in the relationship between officer and NCO corps mainly due to officers' detailed control. In contrast to Sweden, the Taiwanese people support AVF, but not the armed forces per se and the military's public image is mediocre, which could affect young people's intention to join the military.

Table 3-8 illustrates the similarities and differences of AVF and defence reform between the two countries. Based on the criteria discussed above, a question can be raised about this two-case comparison: given Sweden's lower military participate ratio MPR (0.0055), longer transition timeframe (2019) and higher support of the military, comparing with Taiwan's higher MPR (0.0092) and relatively shorter transition time (end of 2014) and lower support of the military, it seems easier for Sweden to transform its armed forces to a Functional Defence.³⁰⁸ This question will be answered in the following chapters. Having identified the strategic goals and objectives of AVF and defence reform, the next chapter will embark on criteria, metrics and strategies for AVF implementation.

³⁰⁸ Military Participation Ratio: Sweden: 50,000/total population 9,088,728=0.0055; Taiwan's Force size 215,000/ total population 23,234,936=0.0092. Author's calculation.

Table 3-8. Comparisons of AVF implementation between Sweden and Taiwan

Category	Sweden	Taiwan
Legal status of conscription	Suspension of conscription.	Suspension of Conscription; all able draft-age men are liable for 4-month basic training.
Goal	The strategic goal is to build a 'Functional Defence' which is usable and available force for national and international missions. AVF is part of the overall defence reform	The strategic goal is to build a smaller, smarter and more competent AVF focusing on resolute defence and effective deterrence. AVF is the ultimate goal
Level of Threat:	Unlikely to be attacked in foreseeable future. Recently focus more on territorial defence due to Georgia War and Russia's increasing military spending	Constant military threat from PRC, slightly lower since 2008 due to mitigated cross-strait relations
Military Participation Ratio	0.0055 (50,000/9,103,788)	0.0092 (215,000/23,234,936)
Size and structure	28000 regular and reserve personnel, 22000 Home Guard personnel. 3 types of operational units: regular, reserve, and Home Guard units	215,000 active-duty posts, which includes 4-month training draftees. One type of operational unit: regular units
Recruitment: Quality and Quantity	Quality not compromised. Attractive employer Diversity both in gender and ethnic fronts	Quantity not reached in past few years. Increasing incentives to attract young people Less diversified in recruitment pool in gender front
NCO (Specialist officer) reform	Two-tier officer system by introducing specialist officer. Placing existing officers to Specialist Officer positions. More challenging due to lack of this category for long time and no previous cases can be learned.	NCO Corps already exists but undergoing reform to enhance competence and division of labour so NCO can focus on middle management. The proportion of NCO will increase and will be empowered to have more responsibility and authority
Reserve Force	Significant and innovative by recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers. Reservists have same duty as regulars.	Draftees register to reserve pool after finishing 4-month basic training. Traditional and conservative thinking of ex-regulars.
Public image and support	Soldiers are regarded in the society Support for military: high Will to defend the country: high Support for AVF: first time exceeds conscription in 2011	Soldiers are not highly regarded in the society Support for armed forces is not high, but support for AVF reform is.
Timeline	Suspended conscription within one year; the overall defence reform will be finished in 2019	Will take more than 5 years to reach zero-draft through gradually reducing CR in phased approach; transition will finish by end of 2014

Source: compiled by author.

CHAPTER 4

Metrics and Criteria of AVF Implementation in Sweden and Taiwan

4.1 Introduction

Sweden and Taiwan have set a diverse set of strategic goals and objectives in carrying out their personnel reform and shift to an AVF. Based on the objectives set by both countries, the second part of the empirical trilogy aims to explore how both armed forces have been implementing these changes and what is their current status against their goals and objectives. The intention is to bridge the gap in the literature of decline of mass armed forces outlined in chapter one by looking at these two concurrent implementation processes.

The framework of this chapter is somewhat similar to the arrangement of chapter three, with a slight alteration to suit the purpose of examination of the metrics. It is divided into two major country sections; sections 4.2 and 4.3 investigate the status of AVF implementation and personnel reform in Sweden and Taiwan respectively. To keep the implementation results as up-to-date as possible, the metrics of each country are based on data and information gathered from interviews conducted in both countries,³⁰⁹ and documents such as recent armed forces annual reports, defence white papers, research projects, archives and conference papers from European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) Amsterdam 2011 and Madrid 2013, and IUS/Canada 2012. It first examines the recruitment of volunteer soldiers in each country in terms of quantity, quality and retention. It is followed by exploring the NCO and reservist reforms in each country as they also played an essential role in the transformation. Besides, important country-specific issues, such as the abolition of the ad-hoc international unit in Sweden and carrying out the four-month basic training for all male draftees in Taiwan, are also discussed in the individual country sections.

³⁰⁹ In total, four field trips were made to Sweden and two trips to Taiwan. The author was cleared and given permission by the Research Ethics Committee of the Department of War Studies, King's College London to conduct interviews, survey and data collection in both Sweden and Taiwan: REP(WSG)10/11-27 'Cross National Survey on Basic Military Training' and REP(WSG)10/11-37 'Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden and Taiwan – A Comparative Study.'

In terms of sources written in Swedish, on-line translation software was used to conduct preliminary translation; it was then followed by face-to-face consultation with a professional Swedish translator to ensure accuracy of translation.³¹⁰ On the other hand, documents and articles written in Chinese and interviews conducted in Taiwan were translated to English by the author. Section 4.4 summarises the implementation statuses in both countries before proceeding to the next chapter – factors and conditions.

4.2 Government policy makers' metrics and criteria for personnel reforms in Sweden

After 1999, Sweden started to embark on significant defence reform with a considerable reduction in both the size of the military establishment and defence expenditure. The fundamental reforms to the personnel system did not start until the government decided to shift to an all-volunteer force in 2009. Currently in the midst of dynamic transformation, Sweden now has a smaller, modern and expeditionary type of armed forces that is quite different from its previous Cold War-type military that focused mainly on territorial defence. The transition from a conscription-based military to an AVF was quickly made within one year. Starting in July 2010, all personnel have been employed by the SAF on a voluntary basis. However, the transformation of the personnel system is still on-going; objectives such as recruiting regular and reserve soldiers have not been fully met. Recruiting volunteer soldiers has thus become a crucial task for the SAF. Another radical change on the personnel system is the specialist officer (NCO) reform in which more than half of the existing officers will be transformed into the positions of specialist officers.³¹¹

With several challenging tasks being conducted simultaneously, this section seeks to investigate the current implementation status of AVF in terms of the quantity and quality of recruitment, the reform of the two-tier officer corps with regard to the increasing number and the competence of the new specialist officers' cadre (also called senior NCOs). To provide a picture of the current implementation of the personnel reform that is as up-to-date as possible, in addition to expert interviews conducted in Sweden, evidence is drawn from recent annual reports of the Swedish armed forces, defence

³¹⁰ The author is grateful to Mrs Ruth Ekstrom for her assistance in the translation from Swedish to English.

³¹¹ To avoid the class system, the SAF call this category 'specialist officers' rather than NCOs.

budget proposals, recruitment reports, and also internal documents collected from the SAF Headquarters.

Recruitment

As explained in the previous chapter, volunteer soldiers in the post-reform personnel system of the SAF are divided into three categories, full-time regular soldiers, part-time reserve soldiers, and the Home Guard. They are recruited from two main sources: 1. Three-months basic training, meaning recruiting from youth cohorts to basic training and employing them upon finish of training. 2. Ex-conscripts who have previously served their compulsory military service and can be employed directly into positions. Recruiting soldiers from ex-conscripts is currently an effective and cost-efficient way to fill the rank and file because they have already built up military competence from previous service. Nevertheless, unlike the general youth cohorts, the supply of ex-conscripts is limited and shrinking. Therefore the SAF has sought to increase the number of regular soldiers through the basic training programmes.

Recruitment from basic military training

In order to be qualified for employment, basic military training is a newly designed mechanism for admitted candidates for regular service to receive fundamental military training and education. Basic training lasts three months; it was first introduced in 2011 with three batches conducted that year. It aims to train three categories of personnel: officer candidates, regular soldiers, and Home Guard soldiers. The training for reserve soldiers has not yet been introduced and will start in 2013.

The results of basic training recruitment in the first two years have been successful: in the first year a total of 22,425 applications received for 1,578 places with 1,556 eventually admitted. In the second year, among 19,486 received applications, 2,823 were admitted for a planned target of 3,008 positions. The recruitment results in both years were satisfactory. However, Jonsson et al. considered that the recruiting outcome in 2012 was not as good as the previous year because the number of applicants was lower compared to 2011. Besides, due to a higher number of positions in 2012, there

were fewer applicants per position.³¹² With a successful start in 2011, the number of batches and new recruits for the basic training was increased to five in 2012 with increased vacancies for new recruits. Figure 4-1 shows the gradual increase in the annual volume of the basic training from 1,578 in 2011, 3,008 in 2012 to 5,500 in 2016.³¹³




Figure 4-1 Recruitment targets of the basic training

Source: Drawn by author based on several sources (2013 data unavailable).³¹⁴

Successful recruitment requires a well-prepared recruiting strategy focused on the groups of potential recruits. Three groups of young people have been identified and targeted by the SAF for potential recruitment. The first consists of those who have an interest in the armed forces but have not decided whether they really want to commit to military careers in the longer term. The second group comprises those who have previously shown interest in specific posts within the armed forces. The third specific group is more specific – those who are only interested in jobs within the Home Guard. Based on these target groups, the SAF has thus adapted its marketing strategy accordingly.³¹⁵ Demographically speaking, the SAF is targeting men between ages 18 and 27, and women between ages 18 and 35.³¹⁶ In addition, according to the personnel department of the Headquarters, the SAF is aiming at recruiting two groups of population: ‘one is unemployed young people living in the country side, the other is those who are older but ambitious, and would like to go abroad for peace missions to

³¹² Emma Jonsson & Berit Carlstedt, *Rekryteringsunderlaget 2012*, (2012 Recruitment Basis) Swedish National Defence College, p.8.

³¹³ *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, special reports, 28 February 2013, p. 25; *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, Appendix 2: Personnel, 2012, p. 10; and *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, Appendix 2: Personnel, 2013, p. 12.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ *Total defense obligation and volunteerism (Totalförsvarsplikt och frivillighet)*, SOU 2009:63, p.54.

³¹⁶ *Armed Forces 2009 Annual Report*, Appendix 2: Personnel, 2010, p.7.

make a difference for the world.’³¹⁷

Recruitment of regular soldiers (GSS/K)

To discuss AVF recruitment in Sweden, apart from the division of the three abovementioned categories of soldiers, the terms of recruitment and employment need to be defined. Recruitment means the number of new recruits that the SAF aims to acquire to join basic training, while employment refers to those who have successfully completed the training and signed employment contracts with the armed forces. Roughly speaking, each year the SAF aims to recruit 4,000 soldiers to basic training, and among them to employ 2,500 soldiers to the units; of which 1,500 are regular soldiers and 1,000 as reserve soldiers. The discrepancy between recruitment and employment is mainly due to drop outs during basic training, some seeking positions in the Home Guard, and some transferring to officer and reserve officer training. In fact, it is also common that people join basic training without being employed, because they want to have the experience of military training in order to ‘add a line or two on their CVs’.³¹⁸

The initial recruitment of regular soldiers was successful. According to the Personnel Department of the SAF Headquarters, approximately 7,000 applications were received for the first batch of regular soldier positions. After selection and screening, a total of 738 entered basic training in January 2011 with 665 completing the training. Of those who completed basic training, 434 were employed as full-time regular soldiers, 106 chose to work in the Home guard, and 89 progressed to officer training.³¹⁹ Another fact worth mentioning is that there were around 6,000 conscripts serving in the last tier of compulsory service at the end of June 2010; in principle they could have left by July because conscription was officially suspended. Beyond expectation, 93% of the last tier of conscripts chose to stay with the SAF.³²⁰ Therefore, the SAF managed to avoid the ‘personnel vacuum’ during the transition. For those recruited from the youth cohorts, on average 85% were employed after the basic training.³²¹

³¹⁷ Interview, participant SE-4.

³¹⁸ Interview, participant SE-4. According to interviewee, it is easier for people who have the experience of basic military training to be admitted as police.

³¹⁹ Interview, participant SE-3. Data from the non-confidential internal document from the Personnel Department of the Headquarters, with permission for this information to be used.

³²⁰ Interview, participant SE-4.

³²¹ Interview, participant SE-3.

In contrast to many Western countries, which had faced poor recruitment at the initial stage of AVF transition, the recruitment of regular soldiers during the first two years transformation was rather satisfactory in Sweden. In the first year of transition, a total of 3,287 regular soldiers were recruited in 2011, achieving 88% of the annual recruitment target.³²² The number of regular soldiers had grown to 4,148 by the end of 2011, which was 3.7% over the numerical target for the year. The SAF thus raised the target by recruiting additional 200 regular soldiers during the year. By the end of 2012, the SAF had employed 4,487 regular soldiers, of which 2,685 (including 244 females) were recruited in 2012. Among them, 937 soldiers were recruited from basic training.³²³ Therefore, it would appear that the ex-conscripts played a key role in the fulfilment of recruitment. Eventually, the SAF aims to employ 6,600 regular soldiers by 2019,³²⁴ see Table 4-1. Apart from good intakes, it is also important to analyse the personnel outflow. The departure of regular soldiers is mainly due to three reasons: termination of employment contracts, soldiers' dropping out at their own request, and transferring to officer training programme.³²⁵ Compared to 2011, although fewer people applied which reduced average number of applications per position from 6.5 in 2011 to 4.5 in 2012 (Table 4-2),³²⁶ the recruitment result in 2012 was even better than the first year as 96% of the annual recruitment target of regular soldiers was met.³²⁷

³²² *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, p. 11. And Emma Jonsson, Outcomes of soldier recruitment to the Swedish Armed Forces 2012, presentation in ERGOMAS Madrid, 4-7 June 2013.

³²³ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.21.

³²⁴ According to 2013 budget proposal, it was planned to be achieved in 2018.

³²⁵ *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, 2013, p. 25

³²⁶ Emma Jonsson et al., p.15.

³²⁷ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.13.

Table 4-1 Overall Current and Forecasted Size of SAF Personnel (as of 31 December 2012) and Planned Recruitment

	Officer	Specialist Officer	Reserve Officer	Regular Soldier	Reserve Soldier	Home Guard	Civilian
Current size	8,424	1,116	7,029 (103 active duty)	4,487	1,582	20,427 (Total)	6,567
Planned size in 2019	4,050	5,050	2,000	6,600	8,800	15,650	5,100
Ultimate size	4,100	5,100	2,000	6,600	9,500	16,600	5,100
2013 inflow	100	200	100	1,150	1,700	1,600	250
2014 inflow	80/80*	300/300*	250/200*	1,400/1,300*	1,200/1,600*	1,600/1,450*	250/350*
2015 inflow	70/85*	350/350*	250/200*	2,150/2,150*	1,000/1,500*	1,600/1,450*	400/400*
2016 inflow	85*	350*	250*	1,900*	1,800*	1,550*	400*

Source: Compiled by author based on several sources.³²⁸

Table 4-2 Recruitment of volunteer soldiers in 2011 and 2012

	2011	2012	Difference
Recruitment test	15,180	13,809	-1,471
Initial selection	8,039	10,968	2,930
Achievement test	4,711	6,871	2,160
Selection	2,041	2,823	782
Available positions	2,318	3,057	739
Application per position	6.5	4.5	-2.0
Fulfilment	88%	92%*	4%

Source:³²⁹

Drop-outs

Regardless of the successful recruitment of regular soldiers, the high drop-out rate has so far been a major concern for the SAF as it has been higher than anticipated. Lack of physical fitness was the most common reason causing high drop outs, as many new recruits could not cope with the physical strain that military service demands. In 2011, in comparison with 4,148 employed regular soldiers, 546 new recruits dropped out during basic training,³³⁰ this made the drop-out rate rise to 13%. The SAF estimated a 10% drop-out rate in 2012; however, the rate increased to 19% by the end of year, almost double the estimate. The SAF predicted 400 drop outs in 2012, but the actual

³²⁸ Ibid, p.17. *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2013*, p.47. *: indicating data from *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, special reports, 28 February 2013, pp.25-28. Data for current number of Home Guard is from: *Armed Forces Report 2012 Appendix 1, Additional Report, (FÖRSVARSMÅKTENS DELÅRSRAPPORT 2012 BILAGA 1, ÖVRIG ÅTERRAPPORTERING)*, 15 Aug 2012. p.14. This number includes those recruited from voluntary defence organisations.

³²⁹ Emma Jonsson, ERGOMAS Madrid conference, 4-7 June, 2013. *: Note that the fulfilment in 2012 was 92%, slightly different from the data published by the 2012 annual report of the armed forces (96%). This is perhaps due to the data used in this report was up to November 2012, rather than the entire year.

³³⁰ *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, p.21.

number reached 750 by the end of year, see Table 4-3.³³¹ Most drop outs occurred during August when various schools and training started. The drop-out rate for regular soldiers employed through basic training is found to be lower, around 10%.³³² The SAF considered that the high dropout rate was due to inadequate selection and physical screening process conducted by the national service administration. A defence journalist noticed the drop-out rate:

‘I went down to a Marine regiment and talked to officers, it turned out that 30% drop out rate during the basic training for medical reasons. According to officers, new soldiers are more motivated than conscripts. But there is one worry, 141 volunteer soldiers came here in April 2011, now only 99 stayed; 42 dropped out before final exercise, so a 30% of drop-out rate.’³³³

Table 4-3 Causes for regular soldiers drop outs as of 31 December 2012

Reasons for Drop-out	Prediction	Actual results
At their own request	300	665
Failure in training	100	85
Total	400	750

Source: Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report, p. 21

One of the measures the SAF has adopted to tackle the high drop-out rate was to intentionally set a higher recruitment target, roughly 15% more than the actual need. For example, despite only 944 regular soldiers being needed from basic training in 2012, the SAF decided to raise the annual recruitment target to 1,211. It turned out 937 graduates who completed the training, barely sufficient to meet the annual demand.³³⁴

Quality of Soldiers (GSS/K)

Similar to the quantity of recruitment, another favourable situation for the SAF in the first two years of transition has been the high quality of volunteer soldiers. Compared with conscripts, the level of motivation and quality of volunteer soldiers is higher. The armed forces value soldiers’ satisfaction in basic training; to this end the SAF conducted interviews with recruits in the final stage of training in order to identify their motivation, and what were the incentives or obstacles for them to join the armed forces. Despite the fact that there was still room for improvement in certain areas, the result from

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Interview, participant SE-11.

³³⁴ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.11.

interviews showed that the majority of new recruits were very satisfied with the quality of training and education in the basic training.³³⁵ Due to the favourable quantity and quality of volunteer soldiers, the selection standards of soldiers were not lowered.

New recruits during basic training requested their training officers to let them repeat drills and practices because they know this would become a required skill for their career. According to reports from platoon leaders in the operational units, volunteer soldiers are competent and willing to accept more training than conscripts. The Navy is especially satisfied with the quality of seamen because the voluntary system allows seamen to serve longer on board.³³⁶ Through quantitative measurements, Jonsson et al. compared the quality of male volunteer soldiers recruited in 2012 with conscripts; they discovered that the quality of volunteer soldiers was better than conscripts in five out of the six criteria, namely: general intelligence, psychological ability, leadership potential, muscular performance and BMI.³³⁷ For female soldiers, improvements were found in three criteria and unchanged for the other three. A comment from a FOI researcher partly explained this phenomenon:

‘... women have always been underestimated, and men were overestimated in terms of how well-trained and how good they are. Women are much better than they said, because they were underestimated about their ability.’³³⁸

Using the same criteria to measure the quality of those recruited in 2012 and compared with 2011 recruits, it seems that there is no significant difference between two male groups, see Table 4-4.

Table 4-4 Comparison of quality between conscripts and volunteer soldiers

	AVF 2012 compared with Conscripts		AVF 2012 vs AVF 2011	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
General Intelligence	Improved	Improved	Unchanged	Improved
Psychological ability	Improved	Unchanged	Impaired	Impaired
Leader potential	Improved	Unchanged	Unchanged	Impaired
Physical capability	Impaired/Improved	Unchanged	Improved	Unchanged
Muscular performance	Improved	Improved	Unchanged	Unchanged
BMI	Improved	Improved	Improved	Unchanged

³³⁵ Ibid, p.9.

³³⁶ Interview, participant SE-5.

³³⁷ Emma Jonsson et al., p.38.

³³⁸ Interview, participant SE-13.

Source:³³⁹

Physical strength is the only factor that has not seen improvement. This is due to the fact that the average physical strength of young people nowadays at the national level has been lower compared with those in one or two decades ago. One senior MoD official explained that

‘most people nowadays in Sweden are not used to physical works and training as those who were 15 years ago.’³⁴⁰

Qualitatively, most comments from the armed forces about the quality of volunteer soldiers were positive. Officers from operational units acknowledged that both the quality and motivation of volunteer soldiers are higher than conscripts. From the perspective of training, the quality of soldiers has gone up. One Lieutenant Colonel from the Air Defence Regiment pointed out:

‘When it comes to material and technology, they (volunteer soldiers) become much better than I started 30 years ago. (...) so the training at the soldier’s level becomes better.’³⁴¹

Despite the satisfactory quality of soldiers, the armed forces are cautious, and suggest that current favourable results cannot be taken for granted for the future. One senior official of the SAF Headquarters emphasised:

‘Up to now! It is very important to say up to now! We can face difficulties next month, or six months, or one year. But up to now it has been successful. From my perspective it has been more successful than I anticipated. The poor quality and quantity of recruitment has not happened yet.’³⁴²

A similar view was expressed by a Lieutenant Colonel from the Land Warfare Centre of Army:

‘Right now there is no problem for quality. (But) I am afraid if we don’t make it (military service) so attractive, it will become a problem.’³⁴³

Despite the fact that, overall, the SAF are satisfied with the quality of volunteer soldiers, negative comments were also expressed on the quality of soldiers. One defence

³³⁹ Emma Jonsson et al., p.38.

³⁴⁰ Interview, participant SE-7. In fact, US and UK have similar situation; for example, statistics show that about three-quarters of young Americans are not eligible to serve because of obesity or some other factors. Chicago Tribune, 29 July, 2013.

³⁴¹ Interview, participant SE-9.

³⁴² Interview, participant SE-1.

³⁴³ Interview, participant SE-8.

researcher from the Swedish National Defence College observed that:

‘I went down to units; I actually met people there. My impression is that when I actually talked to them (volunteer soldiers), some of them should not be in the armed forces because the standard was too low. I met some soldiers who did not pass the test to go to the conscription, but they manage to get in here. (...) I worry a little bit about the quality. I think I have met many enough to see that some of them should not be there.’³⁴⁴

In addition, a defence journalist observed both bright and dark sides of the quality of soldiers, he said:

‘They (volunteer soldiers) are doing much better jobs. Also in Sicily the NATO operation in Libya, Canadians told Swedes that you are embarrassing the Americans, so they (Swedes) are doing very well.’

Then he observed that:

‘One lieutenant told me one example about the shooting range; if conscripts missed and performed poorly then they were asked to do it again. He told the volunteers the same way he told conscripts that this is not good enough, you have to do it again, but volunteer soldiers started to cry. It never happened in the conscript system.’³⁴⁵

Diversity of recruitment: women and minority ethnic communities in Sweden

Promoting the diversity of personnel has been a task for the SAF in terms of recruitment; this can be divided into two parts: gender and ethnicity. The SAF continue to enhance the proportion of women and people with diversified cultural background and multiple linguistic competences. Despite Supreme Commander Goranson’s dissatisfaction with the low proportion of female personnel in the SAF,³⁴⁶ since 2010 recruiting female soldiers has improved as the proportion of females among regular soldiers has gradually increased from 9.8% in 2010, to 10.1% in 2011, and then 10.8% in 2012.³⁴⁷ Many efforts have been made, for example, if one man and one woman who are equally good in quality to compete for one position, the SAF usually select the woman.³⁴⁸

Nevertheless, with regard to ethnic diversity, efforts are still needed to make favourable progress. For those recruited to basic training in 2012, people who were born in Sweden

³⁴⁴ Interview, participant SE-12.

³⁴⁵ Interview, participant SE-11.

³⁴⁶ Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Goranson, Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, 10 April, 2012, p.6.

³⁴⁷ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.5

³⁴⁸ Interview, participant SE-13.

accounted for 95.3%, 2.4% were born in other European countries, and only 2.3% were born outside European countries.³⁴⁹ In other words, citizens with non-EU background were under represented. To improve this situation, the SAF co-operated with the National Employment Agency and launched a preparatory military training programme dubbed as the 'Open Door Programme' aiming to promote minority people's interest and knowledge about the SAF as a potential employer. For the Employment Agency, it increased the chance for young people from minority groups to find a job. The programme provided 500 unemployed young people with non-European backgrounds an opportunity to experience a 10-week preparatory course for those aspiring to a military career. The objective is to recruit 300 individuals to start the official basic training. It has led to successful dialogue with the target group during various activities. A total of 392 young people (with 19% female) applied and started the preparatory training in November, 2012.³⁵⁰ One lesson from this programme is that the SAF have learned where, how and when to contact and interact with the public especially with minority youth.

Retention

For the success of the ongoing defence transformation, a senior official from the MoD dealing with military capability underlined two major issues that needed to be addressed: 'recruitment, and how long these soldiers will stay with the Armed Forces.'³⁵¹ Along with the unexpectedly high drop-out rates, the other major concern is whether the SAF can retain soldiers long enough within the armed forces. According to Swedish labour law, voluntary military service is based on employment rather than bound by fixed-term contract, meaning that soldiers can quit/resign whenever they decide. The contract favours the employees as there are no sanctions when personnel decide to terminate their employment contracts, which is unusual because it affects retention and force

³⁴⁹ Emma Jonsson et al., p.17. As of 1 January 2012, Swedish citizens who were born in non-EU countries accounted for 9.9% of total population. See Foreign and foreign-born population by group of citizenship and country of birth, 1 January 2012.png, Eurostat. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign_and_foreign-born_population_by_group_of_citizenship_and_country_of_birth,_1_January_2012.png&filetimestamp=20130315154514>, accessed 22 August, 2013.

³⁵⁰ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, pp. 12-13. See also <<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Jobba-har/Forberedande-militar-utbildning/Aspirant-Military-Training/>>, accessed 17 May 2013.

³⁵¹ Interview, participant SE-6.

planning.³⁵² A Member of Parliament from the Defence Committee therefore concerned about the retention: 'I think the real challenges lies ahead, keeping soldiers in service is important as they can leave whenever they want.'³⁵³

In fact, in 2010 the Swedish government had foreseen this issue and pointed out that retaining personnel for their full period of employment is reportedly the greatest problem.³⁵⁴ According to an analysis made by the Personnel Department of the Headquarters, an optimal situation is that volunteer soldiers should serve for at least six years, which is calculated on the basis of an annual recruitment of 4,500 after 2014. If soldiers stay just four years, the turnaround will be increased to approximately 6,000 recruitments per year.³⁵⁵ This can cause problems for the SAF because not only the recruitment target is difficult to achieve, but the training capacity would be unable to cope with the throughput. Based on a similar calculation made by MOD, a senior official in charge of military capabilities and operations estimated that the SAF need to retain soldiers for five to eight years; but he emphasised that it will take at least five years to see how the system works.³⁵⁶ As a matter of fact, not every soldier is interested in serving for six or even eight years. Dandeker and Yden observed that one soldier from the Air Defence Regiment seemed only like to stay two to three years instead of eight years. However, if there were a chance to transfer to a junior NCO, he would be happy to stay.³⁵⁷ A Lieutenant Colonel from the Air Defence Regiment held a conservative view towards the retention:

'I think there is fairly large number of people who will quit when they realise that this is not what I (they) expected, or for other reasons. So without knowing any detail, I would say that we have to be careful in the long run.'³⁵⁸

In Sweden, many young men and women join the military because they want to be sent abroad for peace missions. However, their motivation starts to fade after they have done

³⁵² Malin Ivarsson and Amanda Eriksson, Who wants to be a soldier? in Magdalena Tham Lindell, Jerker Hellström, Lena Molin and Åke Wiss (eds.), *Strategic Outlook 2013*, FOI, June 2013, p.26. The Swedish labour law is quite different from contracts of employment in other countries such as UK for example. The volunteer service contract in Taiwan is also fixed like UK and US.

³⁵³ Interview, participant SE-10.

³⁵⁴ *The Inquiry on Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces* (Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar), SOU 2010:86, pp. 29-40.

³⁵⁵ Interview, participant SE-3.

³⁵⁶ Interview, participant SE-6.

³⁵⁷ Christopher Dandeker's interview with a soldier in Air Defence Regiment in Halmstad, February 2013.

³⁵⁸ Interview, participant SE-9.

the mission.³⁵⁹ An Army officer from the Land Warfare Centre observed this phenomenon and commented:

‘Retention could be a problem; the other day we had a lecture by a platoon leader who had been in Afghanistan. His platoon was one of the first (unit) with volunteer soldiers went down to Afghanistan; (...) he said 50% (of soldiers) had claimed to quit when they came home. Because they had done a year and had done a mission, what do they want to do? They try to find a long term job.’³⁶⁰

Recruitment of reserve soldiers (GSS/T)

Although Sweden has abundant experience in the employment of reserve officers, the most important and challenging part of personnel reform is to recruit part-time reserve soldiers, which has been neither practiced nor tested in the past. In contrast to the successful recruitment of regular soldiers, recruiting reserve soldiers (GSS/T) has been not easy. Not only is the proposed number of reserve soldiers larger than their regular counterparts, but the recruitment of reserve soldiers has been two years behind schedule. A Member of Parliament from the Defence Committee regretted that the government did not have the legislation for part time soldiers in place when the decision for shifting to AVF was taken.³⁶¹

Officially, recruitment of reserve soldiers commenced in the summer of 2012 after the legislation for employment of reserve soldiers was passed in May and came into effect in July. The enactment of the employment law is a major step forward for Sweden’s AVF transition as it protects the civilian employment of reserve soldiers and legalises the right for soldiers to temporarily leave their jobs and report to military duties. During the two years of vacuum,³⁶² the SAF had sought non-binding interim agreements from youth cohorts and ex-conscripts. By mid 2012, a total of 4,736 non-binding agreements to apply for reserve soldiers were gathered.³⁶³

The initial target was to recruit 2,400 reserve soldiers by the end of 2012.³⁶⁴ As

³⁵⁹ It is not unusual for the motivation to deploy fades after two or three rotations; British soldiers and officers are good example, as they often say – I have done that now and want to do something else.

³⁶⁰ Interview, participant SE-8.

³⁶¹ Interview, participant SE-10.

³⁶² Due to the delay of employment legislation so no recruitment could be made.

³⁶³ *Armed Forces Report 2012 Appendix 1, Additional Report*. p.14.

³⁶⁴ *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, p.23.

mentioned earlier, currently the SAF is relying on ex-conscripts as an important manpower source. This is especially true in respect of recruitment of reserve soldiers. By the end of 2012, a total of 1,582 reserve soldiers were employed, indicating that 66% of the target figure had been achieved.³⁶⁵ The SAF conceded that this outcome was unsuccessful.³⁶⁶ According to the SAF's assessment, the recruitment failure was due to an over-favourable assumption concerning those non-binding interim agreements, as it turned out that many who signed did not show up. Moreover, among those who applied, many did not meet the qualification standard during the selection process. Some were thus offered Home Guard contracts instead. Another cause was the lengthy selection process, which has led to hesitation among young people to join the military. The SAF facilitated the selection process in the fourth quarter of 2012 by offering target groups a more frequent and flexible way to apply. Ex-conscripts employed in the first year as reserve soldiers were directly deployed into positions without undergoing basic training as they had served in the military and possessed required competence. Recruitment of reserve soldiers from youth cohorts through basic training starts in 2013.

In light of the uneasy beginning, the target for employing 9,500 reserve soldiers by 2018 has been postponed to 2023 and the numbers in employment in the first few years have also been lowered accordingly, see Table 4-5.³⁶⁷ The outflow includes dropping out at the soldier's own request, termination of employment and transfer to officer training programme.

Table 4-5 Personnel flow and Targets of reserve soldiers

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Current number of soldiers	1,582				
Calculated inflow	2,400	1,700	1,600	1,500	1,800
Calculated outflow	N/A	200	300	350	450
Total number of reserve soldiers	2,400	3,900	3,800	4,950	6,300

Source:³⁶⁸

Recruitment of Home Guard

The Home Guard is now a significant and growing element of the military. It plays an

³⁶⁵ 66% is author's own calculation based on SAF published figures.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, p.23. *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2013*, p.43. *And Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, p.26.

³⁶⁸ 2012 data from *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*; *Armed Forces Budget Proposal for 2013*. Data from 2014-2016 are based on *Armed Forces Budget Proposal for 2014* as figures have been re-adjusted.

essential role in terms of territorial defence as it deals with domestic operations and contingencies, therefore the Defence Committee of Parliament greatly concerns about the recruitment of the Home Guard.³⁶⁹ Of the proposed 22,000 Home Guard personnel, the SAF is responsible for filling 16,600 soldiers' positions and 250 officers', along with training assignments. The remaining 5,100 positions are employed from local voluntary defence organisations.³⁷⁰ The personnel intake is based on recruitment from basic training, renewed Home Guard contracts, and transfer from regular and reserve soldiers. The outflow contains those whose contracts end and those who resign.

Akin to the recruitment of reserve soldiers, filling positions for the Home Guard has also been tricky, as only 69% of the allocated positions were filled in 2012. According to SAF, the figure only showed part of the result as the recruitment process was extended to 2013.³⁷¹ By mid 2012, a total of 20,427 were employed by the Home Guard,³⁷² the SAF has estimated that the final personnel target will be achieved in 2022.³⁷³

The poor public image of the Home Guard is the key to the difficulty in meeting recruitment targets. The Home Guard has been long perceived and described as 'old men running around with homemade guns.'³⁷⁴ Therefore, compared with other categories of volunteer soldiers, the Home Guard is perhaps perceived as secondary or 'Team B'. In 2012, there were many available positions in the Home Guard for those who completed basic training; nonetheless, good quality applicants were less interested in serving in the Home Guard.³⁷⁵ Rebranding the Home Guard is crucial in order for young people to eliminate their stereotyped impression. Enhancing the combat capability of the Home Guard is also essential; to this end the SAF has strengthened the competence of the 16,600 staff as they are obliged to participate in more training and exercises, and also receive better equipment. A dramatic change has seen at the decrease of the average age of Home Guard staff. Most importantly, Home Guard has built good

³⁶⁹ Defence Committee, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2012/13:FöU10, p.5 and 13.

³⁷⁰ *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, p. 26.

³⁷¹ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.13.

³⁷² *Armed Forces Report 2012 Appendix 1, Additional Report, (FÖRSVARSMÅKTENS DELÅRSRAPPORT 2012 BILAGA 1, ÖVRIG ÅTERRAPPORTERING)*, 15 Aug 2012. p.14.

³⁷³ *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, p. 26.

³⁷⁴ Interview, subject SE-13. Similar view was expressed by a personnel staff of HQ as he described Home Guard as '70-year-old men drinking Vodka in the woods.' It echoes the British WWII 'Dad's Army' and stereotypes of Territorial Army as weekend warrior ever since that time.

³⁷⁵ Emma Jonsson, ERGOMAS Conference, Madrid, 4-7 June 2013.

relationships with local governments so it operates well in local operations, which is important for territorial defence.

International units and work obligation

To build an expeditionary force, the SAF has abolished the previous ad hoc unit for international operations and instead established a standing force dedicated to such operations with the rotation of regular personnel. The other objective was to demand all SAF personnel, including civilians to accept the new employment term to work/deploy for the international operations.

Compared to other reform tasks, the international work obligation has been accomplished at a rather early stage of transformation. By 20 September 2010, every person employed by the SAF, including civilians, should have signed a written agreement to take a position of employment including international work obligation. Those who do not accept the obligation could face the risk of being placed on the redundancy list.³⁷⁶ The SAF have reached consensus with all staff and the international work obligation for all SAF personnel came into force on 1 September 2012.³⁷⁷ However, according to the SAF's analysis, this new employment regulation has not led to any major change in terms of filling the vacancies in the international units due to lack of available personnel who have the right skills. Regular soldiers recruited through the three-month basic training are less experienced than those who have been directly recruited from ex-conscripts because either civilian work experience or previous military competence of ex-conscripts is better than those recruited straight from the high street. At the time of writing (September 2013), only a few individuals have been ordered to serve on or in international missions. Therefore, it is too early to jump to conclusions from the preliminary results of the execution of the international work obligation because neither individual soldiers nor operational units have built up enough competence to carry out tasks for international missions.³⁷⁸

The objective of establishing an international force with 1,700 regular personnel has not yet been accomplished. An important issue connected with the scaling down of

³⁷⁶ *Headquarters decision, (HÖGKVARTERET BESLUT, HKV)*, beteckning 16 320:60761, 2 July 2010.

³⁷⁷ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.27.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p.9.

international missions needs to be addressed, especially after the withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan. According to Parliament's decision, the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan will be gradually reduced to around 200 in 2014; after 2014 the objective of the operation will focus on the continued support to the Afghan National Security Forces on education and training.³⁷⁹ It will have a potential impact on the development of the international force in that no overseas mission in the foreseeable future will match the size of ISAF. The SAF thus has to deal with the smaller scale of missions and modify the force size accordingly. From the perspective of the SAF, the originally planned size of 1,700 therefore needs to be modified.³⁸⁰

Specialist officer (NCO) reform

The Specialist Officer reform is worth explaining in full because, although the progress is on schedule in terms of quantity of personnel, the reform itself has so far been controversial and encountered some problems. While there is a substantial surplus of officers and a shortage of specialist officers, the approach adopted by the SAF is, along with new recruitment of young specialist officers, to fill these new specialist officer positions with existing officers who possess appropriate skills and competence. To thoroughly carry out the reform, in September 2012, all officers received a notification letter from the SAF Headquarters asking them to choose either accept their new position or otherwise leave the armed forces. A senior staff officer in charge of the reform from the personnel division of the Headquarters described how specialist officer reform is implemented:

‘The Second Lieutenant becomes the platoon leader, the captain becomes the deputy platoon leader. That is the result of the reform to introduce officers and senior NCOs.’³⁸¹

With such determination, similar to the implementation of international work obligation, the NCO reform has been carried out on schedule in terms of the growth in the specialist officers' cadre. In contrast to only 8% of officers placed on specialist officer positions in 2010, the proportion increased to 45% in 2012 (Table 4-6). During the year,

³⁷⁹ Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Goranson, Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, 10 April 2012, p.2.

³⁸⁰ Interview, participant SE-4, second interview. In the meantime the target of 1,700 personnel is still valid; the SAF has to wait for the next defence review.

³⁸¹ Interview, participant SE-4, second interview.

around 3,500 officers were reassigned to the specialist officer positions.³⁸² Starting in 2013, the number of specialist officers will be further increased to 4,600 which will result in an equal number of officers and specialist officers.

Table 4-6 Officers set to be placed in Specialist Officer positions

Year	2010	2011	2012
Proportion of Specialist Officers in Officer Corps	8%	40%	45%

Source: ³⁸³

After a rapid and dramatic change of the officer corps in the first three years, the SAF will gradually reduce the number of tactical officers to 4,100 while eventually increasing the number of specialist officers to 5,100 by 2020.³⁸⁴ As of the end of 2012, the officer corps comprised 8,424 officers and 1,116 specialist officers. In 2013, the interim target of increasing the proportion of specialist officers to 50% will be achieved.³⁸⁵ Table 4-7 shows the planned number of officers and specialist officers from 2013 to 2016 with gradual increase in the fulfilment of specialist officer positions and decrease in number of officers.

Table 4-7 Planned numbers of officers and specialist officers

Year	2013		2014		2015		2016	
Category	Officer	SO	Officer	SO	Officer	SO	Officer	SO
Total	4,600	4,600	4,200	4,800	4,100	4,850	4,000	4,900

Source: Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014, special reports, 2013, p.27.

Notwithstanding that the majority of the SAF employees have been offered and accepted a continued employment in the wake of the initial stage of the specialist officer reform, it was not possible to avoid layoffs. The officers without the necessary competence, who therefore cannot be placed in specialist officer positions, have been placed on the redundancy list and asked to leave the military. In February 2012 approximately 1,200 commissioned officers, with more than four years left to normal retirement, were offered the opportunity to apply for premature retirement benefits.

³⁸² *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, pp. 26-27.

³⁸³ *Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report*, p.4; and *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p.5.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p.5. See also *Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014*, special reports, 28 February 2013, p. 44.

³⁸⁵ *Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report*, p. 5.

Approximately 450 officers applied and 350 were granted early retirement.³⁸⁶

According to the SAF's assessment, the restructuring efforts seem to have created a better environment in the operational organisation than before. However, several important issues need to be addressed. First of all, one of the fundamental problems remains as the SAF still have problems in finding appropriate officers to fill the existing specialist officer vacancies in operational units. Since many officers only have bureaucratic or essentially irrelevant skills, such as training conscripts, they do not fit into the specialist officer positions that require specific competence. One personnel official from the SAF Headquarters evaluated the NCO reform:

'If we are manning these 5,500 positions (specialist officer) just with these guys, we cannot fulfil our missions because they don't have the right competence.'³⁸⁷

In fact, the newly recruited young specialist officers have demonstrated high quality and motivation, as a researcher from the Swedish National Defence College described:

'When I talked to the (young) specialist officers, I would say they are 100% motivated and that they want to be specialist officers. They want to be the king on certain things. They don't want to be regular officers because they are too general.'³⁸⁸

While, quantitatively speaking, the specialist officer reform has progressed on schedule, it has also ignited discontent and complaints among officers. Another approach adopted is based on so-called 'credentialism',³⁸⁹ meaning that all officers should have a university degree. Those without a degree are more likely to be assigned to specialist officer positions; and they must either accept it or they will be forced to leave the armed forces. Despite the fact that pay and rank were not affected for those who were assigned to specialist officer positions, they felt upset and angry about the decision because that was rather a demotion.³⁹⁰ One Lieutenant Colonel from Air Defence Regiment criticised that:

'A lot of my colleagues used to be officers, like captains and majors. Two weeks ago (September 2012), their positions were transformed to NCO positions. Quite a lot of them chose to leave. (...) Dignity is an important factor to consider; for example, asking a senior captain to take on the

³⁸⁶ Ibid, pp. 26-27.

³⁸⁷ Interview, participant SE-3.

³⁸⁸ Interview, participant SE-12

³⁸⁹ Author exchange opinion with Karl Yden.

³⁹⁰ For example, see officer's blog,

<<http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.se/2012/09/gastinlagg-officersforbundets.html>>, accessed 31 August 2012.

position of deputy platoon leader under the command of a Second Lieutenant could hurt his self esteem. What do soldiers in this platoon think? Because they now see that this young 20 year-old second lieutenant is now in command of this 40 year-old captain. This second lieutenant has no experience at all, and we might be going abroad where people shoot at us under his command.’³⁹¹

A similar view was made by an FOI researcher who noticed that the NCO reform is related to a controversial change in leadership, as she commented:

‘Because the person who is in charge is always the best. But now it would be different when these younger officers come out from officer academy, and then the NCOs who are older, got lots of experience and know the specific things so much more. But he will still be under the command of younger officers. (...) I mean to shift people’s mind is the most difficult thing to do and it will take time.’³⁹²

Similar disappointment among officer cadres was observed by an SNDC researcher. Being one of the first researchers studying the specialist officer reform, he pointed out the problem of the specialist officer reform:

‘I make a study with the first ones who became NCOs, and they were very disappointed. Many of them already think to quit. (...) They (the SAF) are in big trouble because commissioned officers don’t want to be specialist officers, and the ones who are specialist officers maybe want to quit. That’s very difficult situation.’

He went on and explained:

‘...they (the SAF) haven’t done anything for these specialist officers yet; the normal routine should be to talk with the unions to decide how the salary steps look like. So I don’t know why they haven’t done it, because that cannot be that difficult. So for the moment you can have soldiers that earn more than the specialist officers. And then they got really angry.’³⁹³

The SAF consider that the most difficult task is to ensure that officers understand, accept and adapt to this cultural shift, and then change their mindset. It is easier for young officers and NCOs to understand and accept, but rather difficult for older or senior officers to hold the similar views because many of them do not understand or accept this transformation.³⁹⁴ In fact, most officers understand the importance of the NCO reform and are not against a mixed type of officer and NCO system, but the question is whether there is a better way to implement it.³⁹⁵ One officer suggested that:

‘Let’s start with generals; let’s take Swedish generals I would say, that you will now to be the highest NCO in the army, change your rank to become the highest NCO, I don’t know, the master sergeant of army or something. And he will do that and in that way he will send the message that

³⁹¹ Interview, participant SE-9.

³⁹² Interview, participant SE-13.

³⁹³ Interview, participant SE-12.

³⁹⁴ Interview, participant SE-2.

³⁹⁵ Interview, participant SE-9.

even I can do this. You start from the top.’³⁹⁶

Having lost the category of NCO for a quarter of century, the SAF is keen to retrieve this type of personnel and their competence. However, it is indeed challenging for the SAF as on one hand a competent specialist corps needs to be established, and on the other those who spent decades serving the country deserve a basic respect. More negotiations and communications with the officer corps should be conducted in order to make a smoother reform of the NCO system. Discontent among the ranks cannot be ignored as it could potentially compromise the morale of officers and their trust in their leadership.

In short, the personnel reform of the SAF significantly relies on the part-time reservists to fill the rank and file, which has not been done or tested before. Although the recruitment of reserve soldiers and Home Guard soldiers has been slightly behind schedule, it has been satisfactory in terms of the quantity and quality of the regular soldiers. Nevertheless, while personnel reforms in Sweden have, for the most part, been carried out to schedule and are generally in a healthy shape, there are concerns that a retention problem will loom after withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Extra attention is needed to be paid on the NCO reform as the results should not be looked merely at the numbers but the competence of the newly introduced specialist officers. Having examined the status of the SAF personnel reform, the AVF implementation in Taiwan under a very different strategic context, is examined in the next section.

4.3 Government policy makers’ metrics and criteria for personnel reforms in Taiwan

Ever since Taiwan decided to shift to an AVF system, it has been facing major issues such as whether the armed forces are able to recruit and retain enough people of sufficiently high quality, and whether the AVF system can strengthen Taiwan’s defence capability in order to cope with potential threats from the PRC. Before examining the current status of AVF implementation, it is essential to highlight that, unlike most western AVFs where conscription was either abolished or suspended, Taiwan’s AVF is a quasi-AVF in that all male citizens are still obliged to perform four-months of military training. In addition, the strategic purpose of Taiwan’s AVF is also different from the

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

western expeditionary AVFs, by focusing as it does on territorial defence. Therefore, its implementation process and experience presents a new field of study on how an AVF focusing on territorial defence can be successfully implemented.³⁹⁷

Implementing an AVF in Taiwan is more challenging because, as discussed in the previous chapter, traditionally the public support of the military is not strong in Taiwanese society. Taiwanese politicians rarely mention military service during election campaigns, as ‘if it were a badge of shame.’³⁹⁸ In a society that does not appreciate and value military service, it is more difficult for the armed forces to acquire sufficient volunteer personnel of the right quality. Since the MND started to recruit volunteers in 2003, attracting young people to join the military and retaining them to stay longer has not been easy. The situation has become more difficult since 2010 after the MND carried out a fully-fledged implementation of AVF. Although the demand for volunteer soldiers has increased significantly, the supply has failed to keep up. This section examines how efficiently Taiwan’s armed forces have implemented the AVF in terms of the proportion of volunteer personnel in the armed forces, the status of the four-month basic training, the quantity of recruitment, the quality of volunteer soldiers, the retention rate, NCO reform and reservist reform. It follows the similar pattern discussed in the previous Swedish section with slight alterations to suit the specific circumstances in Taiwan.

Evaluation of performance

As described in chapter one, according to the AVF implementation plan, the MND set an annual 10 per cent year-on-year decreasing rate in the conscript ratio at the final phase of a three-phased AVF implementation. However, currently the MND seldom focuses on a gradual decrease in the conscript ratio but rather tends to examine the indicators with regard to the annual recruitment rate, and the annual increase in the percentage of volunteer personnel. Although the planned force size of 215,000 billets (overall number of personnel positions) is the ultimate goal, the MND only plans to fill 90% of the billets with a total of 196,000 active-duty officers, NCOs and soldiers.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ Note that Sweden is also shifting back from expeditionary to territorial defence.

³⁹⁸ Associated Press, 13 May, 2013. Taiwan short of volunteers for the military. <<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/13/3394726/taiwan-short-of-volunteers-for.html#storylink=cpy>>, accessed 16 May 2013.

³⁹⁹ Interview, participant TW-1.

The performance of the personnel reform and AVF implementation is evaluated by the MND from two important perspectives: the progress of military downsizing and the increase in the proportion of volunteer personnel. In terms of downsizing, the ‘Jingtsui Downsizing Programme’ with reduction of 60,000 personnel has been carried out on schedule with all targets reached since its outset in 2010, see Table 4-8.⁴⁰⁰

Table 4-8 Implementation of Military Downsizing

Year	2010	2011	2012
Number of personnel reduction	838 (693 officers 145 soldiers)	8,902 (1,398 officers, 1,636 NCOs, 5,868 soldiers)	12,260 (1,711 officers 2,903 NCOs 6,646 soldiers)
Achieving rate	100%	100%	100%

Source: MND Performance Reports, 2010, 2011, 2012

As identified in chapter three, attaining a total of 176,000 volunteer personnel by the end of 2014 is a crucial objective for the implementation of the AVF. According to the MND’s plan, during the transition the proportion of volunteer personnel (including officers, NCOs and soldiers) will gradually increase to 176,000, whereas the rest (around 19,000 positions) will be filled by draftees receiving four-month basic training. The annual increase in the number of volunteer personnel was set at 8,000 in 2012 and 15,000 in both 2013 and 2014, which is conducted in line with the gradual reduction in the number of conscripts.⁴⁰¹ Since 2009, the number of volunteer personnel has increased steadily and the targets were met in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, although the total number of volunteer personnel (including soldiers, NCOs and officers) reached 136,000, which accounted for 70.09% of the 196,000 billets, it still fell 10,000 short of the annual target of 146,000 and left a 93.15% of achieving rate, see Table 4-9.⁴⁰² Compared with 2011, the actual number of volunteer personnel in 2012 had not increased but rather decreased; the government (Executive Yuan) thus considered that the MND had failed to achieve the annual target.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ MND Performance Reports, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

⁴⁰¹ MND Mid-Term Plan, 2013-2016, 2 Oct 2012, pp.3-24.

⁴⁰² MND 2012 Performance Report, 9 May 2013, p.4. As described in Chapter 3 (Table 5), the number of volunteer personnel should increase 8,000 from 138,000 in 2011 to 146,000 in 2012.

⁴⁰³ MND 2012 Performance Report, 9 May 2013, p.40.

Table 4-9 Performance Index: Increase of volunteer personnel

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Target (% of volunteer personnel)	60%	60%	70%	To reach 146,000 volunteer personnel
Actual percentage of volunteer personnel	55.6%	64.76%	70.46%	70.09%
Actual number of volunteer personnel	133,000	136,000	138,103	136,000
Annual achieving rate	92.7%	100%	100%	93.15%

Source: MND Performance Reports 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

Recruitment

Heavily reliant on active-duty regulars, the military personnel in Taiwan's armed forces and its recruitment are relatively homogeneous compared with armed forces in the West. The volunteer reservists and the National Guard (or Home Guard), working on a part-time basis, have not yet been planned for or considered by the MND. During the amendment of the Act of Military Service System, the MND had reserved the possibility of reinstating conscription in case of PRC military invasion. The recruitment of volunteer soldiers made amendments of several laws and regulations necessary. As discussed in Chapter three, in order to underpin the personnel transformation, appropriate legislation is one of the important tasks that need to be done during the initial phase of AVF implementation. According to the MND's mid-term (2013-2016) plan, legislation of relevant laws for AVF implementation has been listed as a priority.⁴⁰⁴ After it had been rejected by the Executive Yuan several times, finally the amendment of the 'Act of Military Service System' came into effective on 30 December 2012.⁴⁰⁵

Four-month basic military training

The peculiarity of Taiwan's AVF lies in its upholding of mandatory basic military training for all male citizens, which was due to two considerations: maintaining the Constitution and the military threats from the PRC. Without amending the Constitution and to cope with the potential conflict with PRC, the Act has not only underpinned the legal status of AVF in Taiwan, but created the four-month basic training for all draft-age male citizens. Based on the Act, starting from 2013, all male citizens born after 1 January 1994 are no longer required to serve one year of military service, but instead they are only obliged to undergo four months of basic military training. With the

⁴⁰⁴ MND Mid-Term Plan, 2013-2016, 2 Oct 2012.

⁴⁰⁵ Gazette, Legislative Yuan, Vol. 101, No.9. 2013.

necessary legislation in place, the MND started to make a significant move towards an AVF in 2013 by executing the four-month basic training.

The first batch of draftees for four-month training was processed in February 2013, with a total of around 2,800 draftees born after 1994.⁴⁰⁶ They became the first individuals in Taiwan's history subject to the new military service regulation. According to the National Conscription Agency of the Ministry of Interior, approximately 160,000 men will reach drafting age in 2013, among them around 70% will qualify for the four-month training and will therefore benefit from the new regulation.⁴⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the shortened military training is by no means easy-going. The MND claims that the new training regimen requires those drafted as servicemen to meet higher physical standards than those required during the one-year conscription system.⁴⁰⁸

The content of basic training comprises eight weeks of boot camp followed by eight weeks of specialist training. The boot camp is conducted in Army's basic training regiments with the objective to train draftees to be qualified as infantry soldiers. The specialty training is carried out in the following specialised schools in the Army: infantry, artillery, armour, communication, chemical warfare and engineering; within eight weeks, draftees are expected to learn different kinds of military specialities. The training capacity of these schools has been expanded and strengthened to accommodate the draftees.⁴⁰⁹ Although one of the main purposes of the four-month training is to train draftees with combat skills in order to supplement the manpower of the reserve force, an increasing effort is to focus on the competence for conducting Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions.⁴¹⁰

Since there are still many draftees who were born before 1994 and are liable for one-year service, those who have not been called up for duty by the time conscription terminates (end of 2014) will still have to serve for one year, but in a non-military capacity to perform alternative service during the transitional period. Within eight years after discharge, all draftees are subject to periodic reservist recalls once every two years

⁴⁰⁶ Defense News, 23 February 2013, Ministry of National Defense.

<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=67&p=56476>>, accessed 27 February, 2013.

⁴⁰⁷ Taiwan's shift to volunteer military passes new milestone, Central News Agency, 21 February, 2013.

⁴⁰⁸ This is what the MND aims for, but the results are unknown yet.

⁴⁰⁹ Interview, participant TW-1.

⁴¹⁰ MND policy propaganda reference, 2012, p.9. Unpublished document, acquirement from the MND.

for refresher training to maintain their combat skills and to strengthen mobilisation efficiency.

Although the MND stresses that four-month training will be tougher in the physical context, questions and doubts have been raised about how draftees can be qualified as competent soldiers within such short period? Defence scholars have not been optimistic about the quality and competence of draftees as one suspected that whether these draftees are able to fight.⁴¹¹ There are also voices suggesting that the contents of basic training should be altered from the conventional war fighting to stress more on social functions. The training could be divided into another two parts, with one part focusing on strict military training, the other highlighting the maintenance of domestic (homeland) security and conducting disaster relief. Through efficient use of the four-month draftees, one defence analyst commented:

‘I think four months is enough; especially the main mission of reservists is to protect our homeland, which they will be willing to do so. This will generate better effect for the country.’⁴¹²

Quantity

Types of manpower sources

Before examining the recruitment results, the sources of manpower for volunteer soldiers need to be identified. The intakes of volunteer soldiers in Taiwan are mainly from four origins; the first and also the largest is the group of high school and college students and youth cohorts from the society. The other three groups, similar to Sweden, are to take advantage of conscripts who: 1. are currently receiving basic training in the boot camps, 2. are currently deployed and serving in operational units, and 3. have discharged and registered as reservists. In fact, from a career perspective, those who choose to serve as volunteer soldiers can be categorised into two groups: ‘one treats the military as a long-term career, the other considers military service as a temporary job option and a stepping-stone before finding a civilian job.’⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Interview, participant TW-8. In Europe anything below 8 months was seen more or less as a waste of time regarding military capability.

⁴¹² Interview, participant TW-7.

⁴¹³ Interview, participant TW-6.

To recruit students from high schools and universities, the military training instructors who serve in civilian high schools and universities play an important role in that they act as the intermediary between students and the military which facilitate the efficiency of recruitment.⁴¹⁴ With military background and good relations with civilian education systems, these military training instructors co-operate well with the armed forces recruitment centre to hold various events in schools to attract students. According to their experiences of the armed forces recruitment centre, recruitment resulting from participation in civilian job fairs or career events to recruit youth cohorts from society is less successful than recruiting directly from schools. Using tuition fees as an incentive, recruiters often explain to students how they can both earn and save money by serving in the military to: 1. pay their student debts for those have acquired college degrees, or 2. save money to pay their tuition fees for those who want to pursue college degrees in the future. Recruiting from student cohorts has therefore become a priority for the armed forces recruitment centre, as the director of recruitment centre identified and explained why they could recruit effectively from schools.

‘My role is to keep good relationships with schools. (...) Recruitment is judged by the academic reputation of schools. For well-known high schools, we recommend their students to apply for officer programmes such as service academies or Medical College; they will not welcome us if we target their students to become soldiers or sergeants. As for recruiting soldiers, we aim at those high schools and vocational schools that are less well-known in academics. We recommend their students to consider entering job market first by serving as volunteer soldiers. The headteachers and military training instructors of these schools understand the academic performance of their students so they normally welcomed us and were quite co-operative.’⁴¹⁵

Despite various efforts and measures that have been taken, in the past few years Taiwan’s armed forces have faced difficulty in meeting the annual recruiting targets. Figure 2 shows the recruitment results for volunteer soldiers since 2008. It is clear that, the results for recruiting youth cohorts from society and schools were unsuccessful, with exceptions in 2008 and 2009 due to the high unemployment rate caused by the global economic downturn. In 2010 only 64.5% of the recruiting target was reached; whilst in 2011 and 2012 the recruitment rates further dropped to 50% and 47% respectively.⁴¹⁶ Given the fact that recruiting from youth cohorts has been difficult, to supplement the insufficiency of recruitment an alternative but crucial approach is to focus on existing conscripts who are currently serving the compulsory service or ex-conscripts who have

⁴¹⁴ Currently there are more than 4,000 active-duty military training officers in schools to teach defence related courses and are in charge of campus and students’ safety.

⁴¹⁵ Interview, participant TW-5.

⁴¹⁶ The last batch of 2012 recruitment continued and entered in 2013 so the final overall rate increased.

recently discharged from military.⁴¹⁷ Adding recruited conscripts to the youth cohorts, the overall recruitment rate in 2012 was substantially raised from 47% to 74%, see Figure 4-3. Nevertheless, it still fell approximately 4,000 short of its 15,311 annual target. The difficult situation has not improved in 2013; during the first half of 2013 the armed forces only managed to recruit 1,847 out of an annual total of 17,447 soldiers with the achieving rate for the first half of 2013 only reached 31% (see Figures 4-2 and 4-3 respectively).⁴¹⁸




Figure 4-2 Recruitment results of volunteer soldiers from youth cohorts

Source: Personnel Division, Ministry of National Defense.⁴¹⁹

*: indicating recruitment from both youth cohorts and conscripts.

⁴¹⁷ Sweden has taken the similar move by recruiting ex-conscripts.

⁴¹⁸ MND press release, 21 July 2013. <<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=58166>>, accessed 22 July 2013.

⁴¹⁹ *: Recruiting from youth cohorts and current conscripts, <<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Print.aspx?cnid=2248&p=56197>>, accessed 8 March 2013.




Figure 4-3 Recruitment Rate of volunteer soldiers from the youth cohorts

Source:⁴²⁰

When recruitment is divided by gender, the recruitment rate for male soldiers was even lower; the only favourable situation is the recruitment of women, which has been better than anticipated. Applications from female cohorts substantially exceeded the annual targets and the armed forces have over-recruited female soldiers for several years.

Analysing by military branches, given applicants can choose preferable military branches and locations to serve, it has been found hard to attract young people to serve in physically demanding and rigorous branches such as the Army and the Marine Corps, and units located in remote areas or off-shore islands. In 2012, the Army only fulfilled 54% of its annual recruitment target, while the figures were even lower for the Marines Corps and Military Police, with both only achieving 45% of their recruitment targets.⁴²¹

Furthermore, combat positions were difficult to fill as well. For example, in 2012 the Army recruited only 1,452 soldiers to staff its 3,124 vacant combat positions in the frontline. The Marine Corps faced the similar dilemma as only 304 soldiers were recruited to fill 784 vacancies.⁴²² The non-combat positions in the Army, on the contrary, were much more popular among youth cohorts and easier to recruit. In 2012 for example, while there were only 599 available non-combat positions, the Army eventually recruited 828 soldiers.⁴²³ In contrast to less than half (46.4%) of combat positions in the Army were able to be filled in 2012, non-combat positions were over

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Gazette, 2013. Legislative Yuan, Vol.102, No.8.

⁴²² Taipei Times, 11 January, 2013, Concerns raised for volunteer military, p.3. <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/01/11/2003552274>>, accessed 15 January 2013.

⁴²³ Ibid.

recruited with 138.2% of recruitment rate.⁴²⁴

Young men and women and especially their parents understand that serving in combat-units demands more physical endurance and implies the need to cope with isolation, remoteness, and a more risky environment without a significant gain in extra salary or compensation.⁴²⁵ A more important consideration is, given that those who serve in logistics or engineering units can learn specialised skills which are useful in the private sector, combat skills are less practical for soldiers' post-military careers and thus discourage people from pursuing them. The lower recruitment rate in combat units has affected the proportion of volunteer soldiers, as there is a clear distinction in the conscript ratio between combat and non-combat units. Combat units have a lower share of volunteer soldiers (57%) whereas it is higher in non-combat units (73%). It is apparent that young people prefer not to serve in combat units and it has become a concern for the MND. Through the assessment on AVF capability, a senior MND staff from the Integrated Assessment Office identified the seriousness of the problem and commented:

‘...in an investigation report I underlined the problems I found. For example, some units have lower share of volunteer soldiers such as the Marines, which has shown that tougher units are more difficult to recruit volunteer soldiers. These units usually have better combat capability, but currently they mainly rely on conscripted manpower so it does not cause a big problem at the moment. However, if the conscripted manpower is gradually reduced in the future, I will start to worry. Monetary incentives must be given in order to solve the problem. J-1 (Personnel Division of MND) is planning to offer combat bonus to those who serve in combat units, which is included in MND's AVF implementation plan. I personally think it will still be difficult (to offer combat bonus) due to the financial constraint.’⁴²⁶

Recruitment is also associated with geographic areas, which is similar to the situation in Sweden. Recruitment has been found to be more difficult in northern Taiwan where job opportunities are better; youth cohorts from central and southern Taiwan, on the other hand, are more likely to join the armed forces due to a scarcity of available jobs.⁴²⁷ There is a tendency for the majority of volunteer soldiers to come from minority families in the non-metropolitan areas, and it is difficult to recruit youth cohorts from

⁴²⁴ Central News Agency, 10 January, 2013.

<<http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aIPL/201301100131-1.aspx>>, accessed 15 January 2013.

⁴²⁵ Those who serve in special operation units or ships, remote areas and off-shore islands receive hazardous pay or bonus, but not significantly compared to the hardship they have to face.

⁴²⁶ Interview, participant TW-2.

⁴²⁷ Apple Daily, 24 December, 2012.

<<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20121224/34725445/>>, accessed 27 December 2012.

metropolitan areas where people are richer and have higher educational level. One important point is that, in general, there are two types of high-school graduates who choose AVF: the first is comprised of those coming from poor families; the second is composed of those who perform poorly at schools.⁴²⁸ Based on her own case, a female sergeant explained:

‘Most volunteer soldiers’ families had economic problems so they want to help their families; that is why they join the armed forces. Also, I think the welfare in the military is better than those offered in private sectors.’⁴²⁹

Owing to the failure of MND to achieve recruitment targets, without compromising the selection standards, the Executive Yuan has demanded amendments in recruitment by simplifying recruitment rules and application process; they include:

1. ‘Loosening the restrictions on age and lowering the height limit.
2. Starting February 2013, applications can be accepted on daily basis, and the process for selection and basic training is conducted monthly.
3. Starting from 2013, the IQ test can be exempted for those who had taken the armed forces IQ test before with scores higher than 90.
4. Those who passed physical fitness test within one year can be exempted from the test.
5. The specialty options are increased from current five to ten.
6. The reservists are allowed to re-enter the service and choose different branches of armed service, however they will need to undergo specialty training.’⁴³⁰

Apart from those measures, the MND has also been working on improvements in the following fields: career development, salary and benefits, educational opportunities, living and working facilities, and veterans’ assistance. Although a pay increase for soldiers, planned to be twice the minimum national legal wage, has not yet been granted, the MND is not giving up on this objective. The MND also aims to provide combat bonuses to those who serve in combat positions and to keep volunteer soldiers serving longer. These proposals have been budgeted in 2014 annual expenditure; however, at the time of writing (September 2013), it is still uncertain whether the Executive Yuan will approve these incentive programmes.

Quality, satisfaction and motivation

The quality of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers is a key to the ‘smaller but smarter force’; these issues have been assessed through several surveys on soldiers’ performance,

⁴²⁸ Interview, participant TW-10.

⁴²⁹ Interview, participant TW-12.

⁴³⁰ MND 2012 Performance Report, 9 May 2013, pp.20-22 and 37. The restrictions on height and age are expanded so shorter and taller people and people up to age of 28 can apply.

satisfaction and motivation. Overall, drawing from the judgements and experiences of soldiers' superiors, the quality of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers is acceptable in terms of training and working performance. However, when it comes to soldiers' satisfaction and motivation with their service, the general approval rates have dropped, especially after they have served for a certain time. Since Taiwan adopted a two-tier mixed system, the average educational level of volunteer soldiers has been lower than that of conscripts. For example, less than 10% of volunteer soldiers recruited in 2005 held university degrees; most volunteer soldiers (83.6%) were senior high school or vocational school graduated.⁴³¹ The educational level of recruits has not greatly improved since the armed forces started to recruit volunteer soldiers, as only 16% of volunteer soldiers recruited in 2008 had university degrees, much lower than the national average 42.6% (See Table 4-10).

Table 4-10 Percentage of the overall draftees with university and college degrees

Year	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008
% of conscripts with University or College degrees	48.4%	47.3%	46.4%	45.4%	45.6%	42.6%

Source: Calculated by author based on data from the Conscription Agency, Ministry of Interior, ROC

Soldiers' educational levels may not directly affect the capability of combat units; it has however affected the competence of the specialised units which required a higher quality of personnel. A senior sergeant major from the communication equipment base depot addressed this issue:

'It is difficult to find a conscript without a university degree; it is also difficult to find a volunteer soldier who has a university degree. Most volunteer soldiers with high school education are difficult to train. Although they studied information or electric engineering in vocational school, after these soldiers were deployed to the repair line, I found they are incompetent. In our communication repair depot, the quality of conscripted soldiers is better than volunteer soldiers because they have university degree in the electric engineering or electronic fields. I don't even have to teach them.'⁴³²

The fact that conscripts' quality is better than that of volunteers is also acknowledged by volunteer soldiers. According to their self-assessments, many volunteer soldiers felt that the quality of volunteers is lower than that of conscripts. A female Army corporal who

⁴³¹ The Quality of the Armed Forces and the AVF, Chapter 5, 2010, p.142. See also: Less than 20% of volunteer soldiers have university degree, *China Times*, 9 March 2009, page A4.

⁴³² Interview, participant TW-10.

was promoted from the enlisted ranks pointed out:

‘I feel the quality of conscripts is better. Most of volunteer soldiers are only high school graduated. Most conscripts have university degrees and they are assigned in the regiment headquarters doing administration works. After they are discharged, they might teach or become civil servants...’⁴³³

She further explained

‘... many volunteer soldiers are quite lazy but because they have served for a long time and know the tricks to truant without getting caught. Conscripts know their time is strictly controlled and they have to one-year obligation so they work diligently.’⁴³⁴

A similar view was expressed by a female volunteer soldier:

‘The quality of conscripts is better because I feel they work harder than volunteer soldiers. Conscripts are more junior in the unit so there are many senior soldiers and superiorities watching them. They are afraid of being blamed or punished so they basically work quite hard.’⁴³⁵

Analysing from the perspectives of seniority and mind-set, a defence journalist observed that the working attitudes of volunteer soldiers could affect the capability of the armed forces, as he elaborated:

‘I am worried about the capability and readiness of the AVF. I think the steadiness of the armed forces will start to deteriorate. These volunteer soldiers may not fully obey their superiorities. They might think that I am a career soldier and I have to face an incompetent squad or platoon commander. Why should I listen to them? They will become passive, as they think superiors will be rotated and so will they. Volunteer soldiers will become what I called “defence civil servants”; like those civil servants. Their mentality is: if I do more, it is more likely to make mistakes; therefore it is better doing nothing.’⁴³⁶

In fact, the initial mediocre quality of volunteer soldiers can be improved and enhanced through continued training, education, and on-the-job studying for civilian degrees. According to his investigation and assessment, a member of MND staff in charge of AVF capability assessment was thus optimistic about the quality of volunteer soldiers:

‘According to my interviews, volunteer soldiers are more mature in operating weapon systems, and they perform better than conscripts. With regard to professional knowledge and skills, volunteer soldiers are also better than conscripts. (...) I am positive about the capability of the AVF.’⁴³⁷

Subjective judgments on the quality of volunteer soldiers may show one side of the fact but may not be able to present a whole picture of volunteer soldiers’ quality. Thus, the

⁴³³ Interview, participant TW-12.

⁴³⁴ Interview, participant TW-11.

⁴³⁵ Interview, participant TW-13.

⁴³⁶ Interview, participant TW-9.

⁴³⁷ Interview, participant TW-2.

MND recently conducted a comprehensive assessment of the satisfaction and quality on training and working performance of volunteer soldiers through both questionnaires and interviews with soldiers' superiors. Nine variables were evaluated with regard to volunteer soldiers' performance, for example, discipline, knowledge, efficiency, comparison with conscripts, and preference in assigning tasks to volunteers, see Figure 4-4.⁴³⁸ The results showed that both male and female superiors were satisfied with the general performance of volunteer soldiers (means>3). They acknowledged that volunteer soldiers were disciplined, had good knowledge in handling jobs, and could accomplish tasks on time. In comparison with conscripts, superiors felt that volunteer soldiers' performance was better and would first assign tasks to them. Currently, volunteer soldiers and conscripts are mixed in the same unit, which has sometimes caused discrepancies in management of soldiers due to complaints about inequality.⁴³⁹ Therefore, superiors preferred that volunteer soldiers and conscripts should be assigned separately in different companies or battalions. Overall, male superiors tended to be more satisfied with the performance of volunteers.



Figure 4-4 Performance of volunteer soldiers assessed by superiors (median=3)

⁴³⁸ Study on the satisfaction and training and working performance of volunteer soldiers. May 2013. Comptroller Bureau, Ministry of National Defense. It surveyed 6,271 male volunteer soldiers and 658 female soldiers with five-scaled questions (median=3). http://www.mnd.gov.tw/UserFiles/File/%E4%B8%BB%E8%A8%88%E5%B1%80/Governmen_troops_rsc.doc, accessed 25 May 2013.

⁴³⁹ For example, volunteer soldiers are allowed to go out every Wednesday evening but conscripts are not.

Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013.

To identify how satisfied volunteer soldiers were, surveyed soldiers were further requested to assess 12 variables in respect of salary and welfares, interaction among colleagues, organisational culture, leadership, work challenges, self-development, and opportunity for promotion and further studying. The mean of volunteer soldiers' overall (male and female soldiers) satisfaction was 3.22 (median=3), indicating that generally volunteer soldiers were satisfied with these variables, see Figure 4-5.⁴⁴⁰ It is worth noting that there were significant differences (P-values < 0.01.) in the satisfactions between male and female soldiers, in which female soldiers showed higher satisfaction than males in all 12 variables (all results>3). The variable 'interaction among colleagues' was defined in terms of most satisfied with, while salary and welfare were least satisfied, despite soldier's pay on average is higher than what is offered in the private sector. This is partially due to the heavy workload in comparison with the fixed pay.⁴⁴¹ In addition, male soldiers tended to be discontented with salary and welfare (mean=2.98) and the situation of facilities in barracks (mean=2.95).

⁴⁴⁰ The means ranged from 3.01 to 3.55, higher than median 3.

⁴⁴¹ Heavy workloads make soldiers to work over time without getting extra pay.




Figure 4-5 Volunteer soldiers' satisfaction toward jobs and the armed forces

Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013.

The Management of gender issues in the armed forces has been emphasised since the number of female soldiers, NCOs and officers has increased over the past decade. The survey further examined the perceptions of superiors on whether there were differences between male and female soldiers in terms of performance, coordination, workloads, norms and physical standards. According to results there was no difference but female superiors felt that the physical training standard for female soldiers should be slightly lowered. An interesting finding was that the majority of superiors agreed that male soldiers performed better than females (mean=3.34), as both male (mean=3.37) and female superiors (mean=3.08) acknowledged that male volunteer soldiers performed better than female soldiers in terms of training and fulfilling tasks (Figure 4-6).




Figure 4-6 Superiors' perception on the performance between male and female soldiers (median=3)

Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013.

Retention

Retention of soldiers is highly associated with the recruitment and is key factor in the success of transition. If the armed forces are able to retain more soldiers, recruitment will be a lot easier.⁴⁴² From the management perspective, an important factor for a successful AVF is the retention of soldiers; otherwise the personnel turnover would be high and could not achieve cost efficiency in terms of manpower costs.⁴⁴³ A senior staff member from MND in charge of the implementation of AVF took the view that retention is in fact a more serious problem than recruitment, and in his opinion retention is related to the characteristics of individual units.⁴⁴⁴ That is to say, if a unit is able to create a favourable working environment, including leadership and morale, soldiers are more likely to stay.

Nevertheless, retention is one of the big problems in Taiwan's AVF transition, as the armed forces have been losing half of their mature and trained soldiers every year and it is difficult to keep them. Retention rates have rarely reached 50% since transition started - from 44% in 2010 then dropped to 33.5% in 2011.⁴⁴⁵ Improvement was

⁴⁴² Interview, participant TW-5.

⁴⁴³ Interview, participant TW-7.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview, participant TW-1. This reflects the fact similar to the poor recruitment in rigorous or combat units.

⁴⁴⁵ United Evening News, 21 Oct, 2012. Insufficient recruitment incentives, 70% volunteers leave after finishing service. < <http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/7444253.shtml#ixzz29wgNAM00> >.

observed in 2012 as the rate rose to 53%.⁴⁴⁶ Many reasons contribute to the low retention rate, but soldiers' dissatisfaction with the military service, poor working environment and leadership were particularly influential. A female Army corporal who served as a qualified interim recruiter for the regiment echoed this point as she described and criticised the working situation in the military:

'In fact, recruitment is fine, the problem is retention. For example, if we recruit 10 people, but there are 15 (existing volunteer soldiers) who want to leave, the efforts are in vain. No matter how many have we recruited, there are even more soldiers want to leave the military.'⁴⁴⁷

Discontent with the excessive workload and internal management are the main reasons; she explained:

'(...) there is no recreation in the barracks, so who is willing to stay in barracks? No body! The daily routine is to work during the day, and then work overtime in the evening, day after day. No extra leaves or bonus were given to offset our overtime work. During inventory or equipment inspection, everyone must stand-by and no leave could be granted, and we only had two hours of sleep a day. If you calculate the salary, it is about the same as private sector because they get paid for working overtime but we don't, which has seriously impacted on soldier's willingness to stay.'

With no intention to stay in the military, a female soldier from the Army agreed with the above comment, as she argued:

'This is the main reason (workloads). As for myself, I do not plan to stay in the military. Work seems to be endless which can never be finished, no matter how hard and how long we have worked; it never ends. I don't understand why they (superiors) want to force us to do this...'⁴⁴⁸

A defence analyst denied that salary is an important reason to retain soldiers but instead the military should make soldiers feel a sense of honour:

'Why is retention still low? I think you (soldiers) should treat the military as a career instead of a job. The armed forces need to make soldiers feel a sense of honour; then they are willing to stay and contribute to the organisation. This is crucial, but how do you create these? I think strict training is the key. I believe only strict training can cultivate the sense of honour, then they (soldiers) are willing to stay. For example, conscripts all complained when they were discharged because everything was easygoing. But in the past, although conscripts experienced a more rigorous training, they cherished the hardship during their compulsory service; that was the reason for them to have the sense of honour.'⁴⁴⁹

A more important reason that affects soldiers' willingness to stay is a lack of freedom.

'In my interviews, the last question I asked volunteer soldiers: what was the biggest reason for your

Accessed 20December, 2012.

⁴⁴⁶ Figure is acquired from Manpower Division, MND, unpublished with permission to use, 2013.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview, participant TW-12.

⁴⁴⁸ Interview, participant TW-13.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview, participant TW-7.

former colleagues not to stay in the military? I summarise: 1. Many soldiers feel that there is no freedom in the armed forces. 2. frequent turnover of leaderships so soldiers have to re-adapt themselves to new superiors, and even new rules and regulations, therefore causing them to leave the military.⁴⁵⁰

With further analysis, it has been found from the MND's 2013 survey that male soldiers were less likely to retain in service if they were not transferred/promoted to NCO, which is in accordance with the findings discussed in the previous Sweden section. They also tended to disbelieve that being a volunteer is a sound career option, and most importantly, male soldiers tended not to recommend their friends and colleagues to join the military (mean=2.79). A similar factor was also found amongst female soldiers; notwithstanding that they in general were more satisfied with the armed forces, they hesitated to recommend that to their colleagues that they join the military (mean=3), (see Figure 4-7). This has given a warning sign to the armed forces that even volunteer soldiers themselves might not strongly recommend this job to their friends and colleagues.



Figure 4-7 Volunteer soldiers' satisfaction with the military service (median=3)

Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013

A case study on volunteer soldiers' willingness of retention and work satisfaction conducted in 2010 discovered that a high proportion of volunteer soldiers were not content with service and working environment in the military.⁴⁵¹ Some implications can

⁴⁵⁰ Interview, participant TW-1.

⁴⁵¹ Huang, Chien-Hsiung, 2010, A study on volunteer soldiers' willingness of retention and work

be drawn from these results. Over 60% of soldiers felt that actual service conditions were different from the advertisements. Less than half (43.8%) of respondents were willing to stay in the armed forces. The survey concluded that the following groups were more likely to stay in the armed forces: sergeants (who were promoted from privates),⁴⁵² those who served in non-combat units, females, soldiers and sergeants who are older and more senior, those who were recruited during their conscription service, and those who were more satisfied with the service (Table 4-11).

Table 4-11 Volunteer soldiers' intention to stay in the armed forces (N=5,254)

Criteria	Category	Number surveyed	Intention to retain in service	Percentage
Overall	All volunteer soldiers and volunteer NCOs	5,254	2,299	43.8%
Rank	Sergeant	1,753	944	53.9%
	Private	3,501	1,355	38.7%
Type of Serving Organisation	Administration (e.g. HQ)	3	2	66.7%
	Operational Units	2,669	1,053	39.5%
	Schools (e.g. Logistics School)	71	44	62%
	Repair & Maintenance Base Depots	2,511	1,200	47.8%
Sex	Male	4,233	1,766	41.7%
	Female	1,021	533	52.2%
Age	Under 20	1,454	611	42%
	21-25	3,352	1,434	42.8%
	26-30	417	227	54.4%
	31-35	31	27	87.1%
Year of service	Under 1 year	1,668	688	41.2%
	1-2 years	2,437	1,016	41.7%
	3 years	730	356	48.8%
	4 years	271	128	47.2%
	5 years or more	148	111	75%
Source of recruitment	Youth cohorts from society	2,933	1,356	46.2%
	Boot camps	1,591	567	35.6%
	Conscripts from operational units	597	311	52.1%
	Reservists	133	65	48.9%
Education	Junior High School	74	33	44.6%
	Senior High School	3,677	1,608	43.7%
	2-year College	781	348	44.6%
	University	704	302	42.9%
	Master and above	18	8	44.4%
Satisfaction	Not at all	568	73	12.9%
	Unsatisfied	941	195	20.7%
	Mediocre	3,005	1,444	48.1%
	Satisfied	653	516	79%
	Very satisfied	87	71	81.6%

Source: Comptroller Quarterly, No. 328, April, 2010

satisfaction, case of Combined Logistics Command, *Comptroller Quarterly*, No. 328, April, p.92.

⁴⁵² Once again, this is similar to the Swedish soldiers.

Overall Satisfaction with Military Service

All in all, the fundamental problem for retaining soldiers in Taiwan's armed forces lies in the volunteer soldiers' dissatisfaction with military service, which was reflected in the survey results. Of all respondents, the majority of soldiers (57.2%) were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the military service. While around 14% of surveyed soldiers who were very satisfied and satisfied, those who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the military service accounted for 29% (Figure 4-8).⁴⁵³ One important issue needs to be addressed; the armed forces should notice that a high satisfaction rate does not necessarily mean a favourable retention rate. The results of another survey conducted by the Army on volunteer soldiers' satisfaction and retention demonstrated a good example. Despite figures as high as 75.3% of 935 respondents were satisfied with their service in the armed forces, paradoxically, only less than half (47.4%) had the intention to stay.⁴⁵⁴




Figure 4-8 Job satisfaction of volunteer soldiers (N=5,254)⁴⁵⁵

Source: Comptroller Quarterly, 2010

Diversity of new recruits

The issue of diversity of military personnel in Taiwan's armed forces is centred on gender issue, as the population in Taiwan is relatively homogeneous. Other than increasing the share of female military personnel in the armed forces, unlike Sweden,

⁴⁵³ Huang, 2010, p.91.

⁴⁵⁴ Yang, Chih-Chin & Kuo, Kuo-Chen, Satisfaction of AVF, Army Bimonthly, Vol.507, Oct 2009, pp 155-168.

<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Upload/200910/%E5%9B%A0%E6%87%89%E5%8B%9F%E5%85%B5p155-168.pdf>>, accessed 5 Dec, 2012.

⁴⁵⁵ Huang, 2010, p.91.

ethnic minorities were not specifically highlighted as a potential group to recruit from. The recruitment of female soldiers into the armed forces has been carried out successfully; targets were not only met, but results were better than expected. As demonstrated in several survey results discussed in the previous section, compared with male soldiers, female soldiers have higher motivation, tend to be more satisfied with military service, and are more likely to stay in service for a longer time. The recruitment centre director discussed the reasons why the recruitment of women was successful:

‘One of the reasons is that many women serve in lighter and less physical demanding units. The average wage for women in the private sector is lower than men, and there is less chance for women to achieve highly in private sectors. However, the military salary is universal regardless of gender, and the chance for promotion in the military is fair. Another is that women tend to have a stable job, so the job stability in the armed forces suits their needs.’⁴⁵⁶

The MND set an 8% cap for females in the entire armed forces personnel. The current percentage of women accounts for 7.6% of the entire armed forces personnel, with around 15,000 female personnel.⁴⁵⁷ In light of the successful result in recruitment of female soldiers in past years and global trend of utilising females in operations, in 2013 President Ma ordered the MND to review the female personnel policy and lift the 8% restriction on females.⁴⁵⁸ The armed forces have thus doubled the recruitment of female soldiers from 1,528 in 2012 to 3,058 in 2013, and raised the proportion of female personnel from 8% to 12%.⁴⁵⁹

One question worth considering, since the recruitment of women has been better than expected but recruitment of men has been far from reaching targets, is should the armed forces consider shifting the recruitment strategy back to focus more on male soldiers? In addition, as in western countries where female personnel have been deployed for missions, the utilisation of female personnel must be re-evaluated by allocating more women to combat units and carry out duties from which hitherto they have been excluded.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁶ Interview, participant TW-5.

⁴⁵⁷ Military News, MND, 8 March, 2013. <<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=56592>>, accessed 10 March, 2013.

⁴⁵⁸ *United Daily*, 8 March, 2013. President Ma: lifting the 8% restriction on female soldiers, <<http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/7745392.shtml#ixzz2N1bjVpQ6>>, accessed 10 March, 2013.

⁴⁵⁹ Gazette, 2013, Legislative Yuan, Vol.102, No. 8.

⁴⁶⁰ For example, females were exempted from night duties on naval ships. Interview, participant TW-16.

NCO reform

A quality NCO corps is essential to provide both troops and technical leadership to soldiers. The NCO corps in Taiwan's armed forces has been existing and functioning, and play an important role in terms of the military capability. In line with the AVF implementation, the armed forces expect to enhance the quality of NCOs by emphasising longer periods of service and fostering training. According to the US experience, the better educated the NCO corps, the better the NCO perform, which creates stronger competition for advancement and retention.⁴⁶¹ The NCO corps plays a crucial role in the armed forces with regard to troops training, execution of tasks, and performing specialised tasks; they have contributed to the competence of the armed forces. A navy captain praised the quality of naval Petty Officers:

‘I have worked on surface ships for 16 years as an engineer; the Petty Officers with whom I worked were professional and highly experienced. In the past when ships were old, we frequently faced engine malfunctions. As a junior officer and engineer on board I had to consult and rely on these Petty Officers because they had built up enough experience and can quickly identify and fix the problems.’⁴⁶²

In the past, Taiwan had sought to enhance the quality and competence of NCOs during 1997-1998, but the results were unsuccessful because neither the roles and responsibilities between officers and NCOs could be clearly divided, nor were the salary and welfare for NCOs greatly improved in line with the enhancement project. In addition, the proportion of NCO in the entire armed forces personnel was not increased. A legislator from the defence committee of the Legislative Yuan identified Taiwan's NCO problem: ‘NCOs often do not receive the respect that they deserve. We should learn from the American experience that NCOs are fully in charge of training and officers do not interfere with them.’⁴⁶³

A competent NCO corps is essential to Taiwan's AVF transition, as it is described in the Defence Report as ‘the backbone of basic level units and an important key to the success of voluntarism.’⁴⁶⁴ The NCO corps is increasingly relied upon to train troops and develop their combat performance. Nevertheless, Taiwan's NCO corps has encountered

⁴⁶¹ Bernard Rostker and Curtis Gilroy, *The transition to an all-volunteer force – the US experience. Service to Country*, eds. Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams. The MIT Press, p.256 and 463.

⁴⁶² Interview, participant TW-16.

⁴⁶³ Interview, participant TW-6.

⁴⁶⁴ Defense Report, 2011, MND, p.167.

a problem of a 'brain drain'. After the majority of career NCOs have retired during the last decade, the proportion of career NCOs has been reducing and the percentage of NCO reservists in service has increased.⁴⁶⁵ The NCO reservists are on active duty for a limited period of time, thus making it difficult for them to keep up with changes in the operation and maintenance of sophisticated weapons and equipment. Solutions to this problem lie in the recruitment of new NCOs and reconfiguring the NCO organisational structure. A crucial approach in the midst of AVF transition is to cultivate volunteer soldiers to be qualified for promotion to NCOs.⁴⁶⁶ In other words, volunteer soldiers will become the largest manpower source for future NCOs.

A new NCO enhancement programme went into force in 2009 in accordance with the implementation of AVF. The five objectives of the enhancement programme were to: 'increase the status of NCOs, increase their responsibility, build confidence, cultivate professionalism and develop their careers.'⁴⁶⁷ Since the transition started, the proportion of volunteer NCOs has increased from 70% in 2009 to 90% in 2012 along with the constant drop in the percentage of conscripted NCOs. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of volunteer NCOs has increased from 52,248 to 64,105, while the number of conscripted NCOs has reduced from 16,515 to 5,750.⁴⁶⁸

The implementation policy for NCO enhancement centres on the clear division of labour between officers and NCOs so that the functions of 'officers for planning, and NCOs for executing' can be ensured and NCOs can be fully authorised to utilise their expertise. To enhance the competence of NCOs, various education and training programmes including courses for acquiring civilian professional certificates were offered to NCOs.⁴⁶⁹ In terms of recruitment, the NCO training programme did not attract enough applicants in 2012 with a low attainment rate of 41%. The other NCO intake through the two-year NCO colleges was much more popular (93%), see Table

⁴⁶⁵ In addition to career NCOs, the other type is called NCO reservists who are active-duty NCOs serving on a 3-year contract. Afterwards they can extend contract for 2 years on rolling basis.

⁴⁶⁶ Volunteer soldiers must have served at least 18 months and undergone NCO training to be qualified for promotion.

⁴⁶⁷ MND policy explanation document number 12: 'Enhancing the NCO System', 2012.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. See also 2011 Defense Report p. 167. Conscripted NCOs are in the rank of corporal who serve one year of compulsory service.

⁴⁶⁹ 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 83-84

4-12.⁴⁷⁰

Table 4-12 Recruitment of NCOs in 2012

2012 NCO Recruitment	Targets	Recruited	Recruitment Rate
NCO Training Programme	1,155	470	40.69%
Two-year NCO Colleges	1,945	1,808	92.95%

Source: MND 2012 Performance Report

Akin to the situation of filling the rank and file for combat units, it has been found difficult to fill NCO positions in combat units. Although there were vacant NCO positions in the more physically demanding formations including combat units, qualified soldiers were not motivated to serve in such units. For example, in the Air Force, it is hard to find vacancies in air force bases, but many available positions in air-defence units cannot be filled because these units are more demanding compared to serving on a base.⁴⁷¹

Another crucial task is to increase the proportion of NCOs in the military as a whole. In light of the experiences from Japan, US, France and UK, the MND decided to increase the proportion of NCOs from the current officer/NCO/soldier ratio of 1: 1.84: 1.92 to 1:2.12:1.70 by the end of 2014 (see Table 4-13).⁴⁷² Between 2010 and 2014, the proportion of NCO and soldiers in the entire armed forces personnel are expected to increase by 5% and 4.7% respectively.⁴⁷³

Table 4-13 International comparison of the officer/NCO/soldier ratio

	Japan	US	France	UK	Taiwan
Officer	1	1	1	1	1
NCO	3.34	3.64	6	1.4	2.12
Soldier	1.98	1.52	3.5	3.5	1.70

Source: The assessment of the officer: NCO: Soldier ratio and the AVF implementation,

⁴⁷⁰ MND 2012 Performance Report, 9 May 2013, pp.20-22. The NCO colleges were attractive because NCOs could receive both commission and a 2-year college degree.

⁴⁷¹ Interview, participant TW-5.

⁴⁷² Gazette, Legislative Yuan, Session 102, No. 8, 2013. p.460.

⁴⁷³ The assessment of the officer: NCO: Soldier ratio and the AVF implementation, IAO, MND, August 2009, p.7

MND, August 2009

To create and expand a career development system for NCOs that parallels to that of officers, NCO supervisors and NCO staff positions are established at the levels of command headquarters, corps, regiment, battalion, and company. As described earlier, the division of labour has long been a problem between officers and NCOs; a defence analyst elaborated:

‘As for responsibility, nowadays officers are doing tasks more suited to NCOs. Therefore they (NCOs) feel that they are not authorised to do such tasks. Because once something happened, usually officers are the ones to be blamed or punished. NCOs then ask what am I doing here? I have no authority or responsibility. So from the management perspective, the MND needs to clarify authority and relative responsibilities.’⁴⁷⁴

To clearly divide authority and responsibility between officers and NCOs, ‘NCO review boards’ were held at each level as a means of division of authority and responsibility between officers and NCOs. The authorities include reviews of promotions, transfers, position assignments, trainings, punishments and rewards, and performance of NCOs and soldiers.⁴⁷⁵

Reserve force reform

In the face of the military threat from the PRC, Taiwan has been maintaining a large number of reservists. In theory, there are more than 2.8 million of reservists registered in the MND;⁴⁷⁶ nevertheless, according to an MND assessment, only 370,000 are needed, and the quantity of reservists can meet the MND demand until 2051.⁴⁷⁷

Following the principle of ‘reducing regular forces and expanding reserves’, the reserve forces are expected to sustain a normal combat capability. Taiwan’s reserve force has undergone a change in terms of the influx of draftees after four-month basic training, changed pattern and frequency of recalls, frequent participation in the military exercises, and most importantly, conduction of HA/DR missions. In addition, according to the newly amended Defence Organisation Law, starting in 2013 the Reserve Command was degraded from an independent command headquarters to being placed directly under the

⁴⁷⁴ Interview, participant TW-7.

⁴⁷⁵ Defense Report, 2011, MND, p.167.

⁴⁷⁶ Executive Yuan Report to the Legislative Yuan, Session 8, No.3, February, 2013, p.32.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview, participant TW-1.

MND, and its six basic training regiments were shifted to the Army's command.

Taiwan's reservists are all ex-regulars. All military personnel including officers, NCOs and soldiers after discharge from active-duty service become reservists and must report to their local reserve units immediately. In line with the AVF implementation, post four-month training draftees will be listed in the 'reserve personnel management information system' to expand reserve manpower. Depending on their military occupational specialty, reservists are organised into different units. Annual reservist training is conducted through various types of recalls. The purposes of recall are to maintain readiness by practicing immediate report on call-up and to update personal information on reservist list.

Within eight years after discharge from active duty, reservists will receive four recalls for reservist training (biannually). The MND dictates the training period between 2.5 to 5.5 days depending on demands of troops.⁴⁷⁸ Apart from high mobilisation report rates, most importantly, reservists have been integrated into the annual military exercises to validate the mobilisation, capabilities and joint operations performance of the reserve forces. In April 2013, a total of 12,000 reservists were mobilised by the MND to take part in the annual Han-Kuang military exercise. Within 24 hours after the issue of mobilization order, all personnel had reported to duty.⁴⁷⁹ In response to the demand for disaster prevention and relief during the flood season, reservist training will focus on HA/DR so the capabilities and efficiency can be enhanced. The reservists will stand by to assist with disaster relief missions along with regular forces.⁴⁸⁰ Regarding such missions, a defence analyst supported the view that HA/DR tasks should be performed mainly by reserve forces; he stated:

'I suggest that disaster relief missions should not be carried out by regular units, but instead should be conducted by reserve forces; because the main mission of reserve forces is to protect homeland. In addition, since the reserve forces keep close contacts with local governments, they can perform a better job. The reserve command can organise several battalions to be specifically dedicated for HA/DR missions.'⁴⁸¹

In contrast to Sweden's significant utilisation of volunteer reservists, Taiwan's reservist

⁴⁷⁸ See <<http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/engIndex/RightsAndDuties.htm>>, accessed 25 July, 2013.

⁴⁷⁹ Apply Daily, 15 April, 2013.

⁴⁸⁰ 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, MND, pp.60-62.

⁴⁸¹ Interview, participant TW-7.

reform is relatively superficial as it retains a dependence on ex-regulars. Opinions concerning the capability of Taiwan's reservists have been mixed. Due to the reduced length of the four-month basic training, many people are concerned about whether the quantity-based reservists have the capability to defend the homeland.

Counter-intuitively, a defence analyst was not worried because:

‘Many people think that after AVF is implemented reserve mobilisation will become a big problem. Personally I don’t think so. Based on our experience in the past, do you think our reservists are able to fight? No! So what? They have been already incapable; therefore the service being reduced to a 4-month basic training will not affect much. We’ve always cheated ourselves by saying that we have millions of reservists; everybody knows that they are useless...’⁴⁸²

A good question thus worth considering is what kind of reserve force does Taiwan need in terms of functions and missions? If they are expected to be focused on war-fighting, it seems to be less capable due to the short period of basic training. Nevertheless, if it is aimed to conduct HA/DR missions or other social functions such as maintaining domestic security, four-month training would be sufficient and can allow regular troops to focus on military training and maintain readiness. Another question worth pondering is what should Taiwan learn from western countries (including Sweden) in building a volunteer reserve force?

4.4 Conclusion

According to the results of implementation in 2011 and 2012, Sweden is carrying out its military personnel reform at a rather stable pace as several important objectives have been achieved such as the abolition of ad hoc international units, the carrying out of international work obligations, and a satisfactory recruitment of regular soldiers in terms of quantity and quality. One obvious feature is that part-time volunteer reservists are significantly utilised. Most soldiers are motivated and satisfied with their military service. Although it is still too early to judge the retention result, the retention of soldiers has been foreseen by SAF as an important task. Several incentives, monetary and in-kind schemes, have been planned and carried out to boost recruitment and retention, including recently announced pay rises for soldiers. In addition, the SAF has been diversifying the personnel pool by recruiting more women and second generation immigrants. Some challenges that need to be tackled include: recruitment of part-time

⁴⁸² Ibid.

soldiers and Home Guard soldiers, a high drop-out rate of soldiers from the basic training, and the specialist officer reform. All in all, the SAF is aiming to create a public image of being an attractive employer.

In the face of the Chinese military threat, the unique geostrategic context of Taiwan has compelled it to adopt a quasi-AVF, in which all male citizens are still obliged to receive four months of basic training. This has started and been implemented on schedule in 2013. In contrast to Sweden's high recruitment rate in 2012, Taiwan in the same year only managed to achieve three quarters of its planned recruitment target. The situation in terms of recruitment and retention has further deteriorated in 2013 due to a damaged public image of the military. At the time of writing (September 2013), with less than one and half years left, recruiting a sufficient amount of volunteer soldiers has become the greatest challenge to Taiwan's armed forces in implementing an AVF by the end of 2014. The quality of soldiers has so far been acceptable as the training and performance of volunteer soldiers can meet the relevant requirements. Although the target of downsizing of the overall military establishment was achieved on time, the planned increase in the proportion of volunteer personnel failed to catch up in 2012. The NCO corps needs to refine its division of labour between NCOs and commissioned officers so they can better perform the middle management of troops. As for the reservist reforms, an issue worth addressing is whether reservists should stay where they are as a back-up for regular troops in conducting war fighting, or transform its mission to focus more on social functions such as HA/DR.

Both Swedish and Taiwanese moves toward an AVF have faced a number of similar challenges, including recruitment, retention, NCO and reservist reforms. This has impacted, albeit to differing extents, on the progress to date. While personnel reforms in Sweden generally have been carried out in good shape, Taiwan's armed forces, meanwhile, face significant challenges in recruitment, with similar concerns over long-term retention. Meanwhile, the sustainability of the respective reforms and their suitability to the defence needs of the two countries going forward will be equally telling and remains, as yet, to be seen. The next chapter will embark on the last part of the empirical trilogy: an analysis of the factors and conditions that either facilitate or hinder the progress of AVF implementation and personnel reforms in both countries.

CHAPTER 5

Factors, Conditions, and Constraints on the AVF Implementation

5.1 Introduction

Following the examination of metrics of the AVF transition and defence reform in both countries, a picture has developed in terms of what both countries intend to achieve, and what have they been doing so far. Nevertheless, there is still one important part missing; having provided a basic understanding about what and how have both countries done and been doing in making their way to the final success of AVF and personnel reform, it is necessary to look at factors and conditions that either help or impede their implementation process.

As the last episode of the empirical trilogy, chapter five aims to answer the question: ‘what factors and conditions have facilitated or obstructed the implementation process of AVF and personnel reform in both countries?’ Although the basic framework of this chapter is similar to the previous two chapters, the criteria and contents in terms of factors and conditions, although sharing some similarities, are different. From chapters three and four, it was found that Sweden and Taiwan, intent on an AVF transition, could set different strategic goals, such as Sweden building an expeditionary AVF while Taiwan’s AVF is focused on territorial defence. Interestingly, some similar objectives are shared such as attracting a sufficient number of volunteers with the right quality and a competent NCO corps. Likewise, countries can also, by emulating other countries’ AVF experiences, as discussed in chapter one, carry out similar measures to see through the transition; for example, creating incentives to boost recruitment and retention.

Different countries can encounter similar factors which affect their defence reform, such as public support for the armed forces and defence reform, which is also a crucial factor for both Sweden and Taiwan. Countries also face different factors and conditions; for example, legislation was one of the most important issues that the SAF has faced in implementing the personnel reform, as was highlighted by most of the senior officials

from MOD and Headquarters during interviews. Nevertheless, due to the more or less bi-partisan consensus in Taiwan on the AVF issue, introduction of legislation was not emphasised as much as in Sweden. Given the fact that both countries have very different strategic backgrounds and contexts as identified in chapter two, the factors and conditions discussed in the two country sections are thus not necessarily similar.⁴⁸³

The other feature of this chapter is that, unlike the first two empirical chapters which were on the basis of qualitative data gathered from interviews and documentary analysis as the source of the quantitative results,⁴⁸⁴ in the penultimate part of this chapter, the results from a questionnaire-based survey on the qualitative features of soldiers will be analysed. The aim of the survey was to measure some important factors - soldiers' motivation for, satisfaction with, and expectations from military service; their views surveyed through a retrospective method. That part of the discussion is based on qualitative evidence collected through a questionnaire-based survey conducted in both countries to examine the factors and conditions that either facilitate or obstruct the implementation processes. The approach allows for a triangulation method through a combination of interviews, surveys and documentary (secondary data) analysis. By using the triangulation method, it is expected that a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation can be reached.⁴⁸⁵

5.2 Sweden

Public support

Personnel reform of the armed forces is an important element of government policy and usually it involves the commitment of significant national resources and effort.

Therefore, in countries seeking a smooth and successful defence transformation, an important factor in facilitating the implementation process is to acquire strong public support for the reform and for the armed forces as a whole.

⁴⁸³ For example, Taiwan has to consider a crucial factor, the cross-strait relations, which most of the countries in the world do not have this kind of consideration.

⁴⁸⁴ Such as drop-out rate, the number and percentage of recruitment and retention

⁴⁸⁵ Altrichter, H., Feldman, A., Posch, P. & Somekh, B. (2008). *Teachers investigate their work; An introduction to action research across the professions*. Routledge. p.147.

Support for the Armed Forces

Although the majority of the Swedish public supports the SAF engaging in international missions, that support is divided into support for the missions and for the Swedish troops.⁴⁸⁶ As discussed below, in order to make a smooth transition to the AVF, the armed forces need strong support from society.

An MP from the defence committee argued that public support of the AVF is a crucial element; but he was doubtful that personnel reform has received support from society.⁴⁸⁷ A senior personnel official of the Headquarters pointed out the main obstacle in gaining public support for the personnel reform is that small companies are seriously concerned about their employees if they are injured during service; who will pay for their loss?⁴⁸⁸

Public support for the SAF can be analysed through three criteria during AVF transformation: 1. General support of the Armed Forces; 2. Support for the AVF reform; 3. Support for international missions. The data adopted to evaluate these criteria were extracted from psychological defence surveys conducted by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) over the past decade.

Patterson observed a decline in public support for the SAF from about 70% at the end of the 1990s to about 50% between 2004 and 2008.⁴⁸⁹ Nevertheless, according to the surveys on defence conducted in the past decade, not only did Swedes feel that they needed military defence, but their willingness to put up an armed resistance and defend the country in the event of a military attack remained strong, both over 70% (see Figure 5-1). From 2003 to 2012, around 50% of respondents believed that Sweden absolutely needs a military defence, and more than one quarter of respondents felt that military defence is somewhat important for Sweden. Likewise, with regard to defending the country, in the past decade around half showed a strong determination while a quarter were somewhat willing to fight for their homeland. With the majority of people who showed their willingness to defend the country, these results can be interpreted as strong

⁴⁸⁶ Interview, participant SE-2.

⁴⁸⁷ Interview, participant SE-10.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview, participant SE-3.

⁴⁸⁹ Magnus Petersson, 2011: Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War: Theoretical and Practical Implications, *Armed Forces and Society*, 37 (4), pp.701-724.

public support for the SAF.

While support for the SAF remains positive, public interest in defence affairs has been shaky. In recent surveys an increasing number of respondents chose ‘no opinion’, ‘do not know’, or ‘cannot answer questions’, which implies that this is perhaps due to people’s lack of interest and knowledge of defence affairs.⁴⁹⁰ Despite the SAF enjoying general support from the public, its level of trust is lower in comparison with other government agencies. A survey compared the SAF with two other government agencies - police and the law courts, and found the level of trust among the public on the SAF has always been lower than the other two agencies.⁴⁹¹ This can be ascribed to the fact that ‘the armed forces rarely get reported when they have done something good, but have always been reported when something bad happened’.⁴⁹²




Figure 5-1 Support for SAF and people’s willingness to defend

Source:⁴⁹³

Support for AVF reform

Despite the fact that, in general, Swedes support the Armed Forces and its function, support for AVF transformation has not been impressive. SPF surveys in the past decade showed a higher and stable support for conscription from the general public, see

⁴⁹⁰ SPF *Opinioner* 2008, p.123.

⁴⁹¹ Karl Ydén & Joakim Berndtsson, 2012, When the war came - the Swedes and the new defense policy (När kriget kommit – svenskarna och den nya försvarspolitiken), in Lennart Weibull, Oscarsson & Annika Bergström (eds.) *The future of shadow* (framtidens skugga). Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institutet, pp.501-512.

⁴⁹² Interview, participant SE-13.

⁴⁹³ *Opinioner* 2012, The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Stockholm, 2013. p.74, 85.

Figure5-2.⁴⁹⁴ The surveys assessed people's preferences concerning three types of armed forces: a conscripted military, a professional military, and a military entirely based on voluntary participation. The same questions were asked throughout the decade, and results showed no significant change, except in 2011 where the preference for a professional military for the first time exceeded that for the conscripted military. The remaining years' results showed that the conscripted military was preferred by most Swedes, even after conscription was ended in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, almost 40% of respondents believed that Sweden should have a professional military, a figure which had increased over previous years. Nevertheless, more than 40% still preferred a conscripted military. Only slightly more than 10% of Swedes felt that Swedish defence should be based upon voluntary participation. Through a demographic analysis, a professional military was mainly preferred by people who are under age of 50, and a defence based entirely on volunteers was supported by the majority of young people. On the other hand, conscription was advocated mainly by people over the age of 30. An MP from the Defence Committee explained:

‘I think this is the question about how different generations view the Armed Forces. Old people in Sweden ..., people in my age are quite sceptical to AVF.’⁴⁹⁵

This is partly because Swedes do not have strong opinions on conscription and AVF system, resulting in lack of public debate on this issue when the AVF decision was made.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁴ *Opinioner 2012*, pp. 75-76.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview, participant SE-10.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview, participant SE-7.




Figure 5-2 People's preference of type of military

Source: *Opinioner* 2012, pp.75-76.

Support for international missions

Swedes support international peace missions as long as they are under a UN and/or EU mandate. A defence journalist pointed out that Sweden is very loyal to the UN, and thus favours participation in peace support missions. However, he argued that public support for mission in Afghanistan has faded.⁴⁹⁷ In terms of public perception on two foreign missions that the SAF is currently engaging, half of people supported the KFOR mission in Kosovo with 20% opposing. In contrast to KFOR, the ISAF in Afghanistan received less support (43%) but higher levels of opposition (30%).⁴⁹⁸

Public attitudes towards international operations has been positive since the 1990s, but it has decreased over time. The level of public support for international missions was strong throughout the 1990s, on average higher than 70%. Since the 2000s a downward trend was observed, and the support rate fluctuated between 50 and 70%. In 1999, 73% of Swedes favoured sending forces abroad; this figure dropped to 67% in 2003.⁴⁹⁹ From 2004 to 2012 support for international missions stayed at around 60%, see Figure 5-3.⁵⁰⁰ The majority of Swedes believe that it is the right decision to deploy troops abroad even

⁴⁹⁷ Interview, participant SE-11.

⁴⁹⁸ *Opinioner* 2012, p.60.

⁴⁹⁹ SPF, *Opinion* 2003, tables 23–24, pp. 64-5.

⁵⁰⁰ According to SPF *Opinion* 2008, the support for international missions was 51% in 2004, 60% in 2005, 61% in 2006, 59% in 2007, and 56% in 2008 Table 13, p. 62.

if Swedish soldiers may suffer casualties; only less than a quarter think the decision to deploy was wrong. Since 2008, an additional question was asked with regard to whether Sweden should increase or reduce the number of troops for international mission; around one third favoured an increase, while a quarter opposed it. In short, it can be concluded that international missions are supported by the majority of the Swedish population.




Figure 5-3 Public support for international peace missions

Source: *Opinioner* 2012, p. 58-59.

Compared to Americans and other Europeans, Swedes are the most likely to support their Government's handling of foreign policy issues; with 74% of respondents showing approval.⁵⁰¹ According to the results of the Transatlantic Trends 2012 survey, Sweden's public opinion stood apart from other EU countries on many strategic issues.

Furthermore, they were more willing to support maintaining the armed forces in Afghanistan, the operation in Libya, and more likely to support intervention in Syria (if mandated by the UN). However, when it comes to participation in NATO operations, the Swedish opinion is divided, with two-thirds opposed to a Syrian intervention if such an operation was not mandated by the United Nations.⁵⁰²

⁵⁰¹ *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2012*, 2012. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, pp.2-3. <<http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf>>, accessed 30 August, 2013.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

A senior information official of the Headquarters who is in charge of the public image of the armed forces explained the reduced support for the mission in Afghanistan, but support for the soldiers from society remains strong; his comments is worth citing in full:

‘The key issue is that if you understand why you are in Afghanistan, Kosovo, you’ll have a higher acceptance rate. In Libya, there is much broader discussion, everyone understands why we should send troops to Libya, that is why we have a very wide support. We are in Afghanistan for 10 years, we need to explain to people why we are in Afghanistan, and how we do business in Afghanistan. The support for mission in Afghanistan has decreased overtime, but support for soldiers is good, so there is a difference. Now we have both national and international focuses at same time. When we report to general public, it is very important to stress the armed forces that you have, is available for both missions. For general public, it is very important to have national focus; but if you talk to soldiers, they prefer to do international missions.’⁵⁰³

Perception of threats and NATO membership

To evaluate how Swedes perceive the source of threats, a survey was conducted into the perception of threats among six countries and international organisations including Russia, China, USA, NATO, EU and the UN. Russia was assessed by respondents as the country posing the greatest impact to the world’s peace and security (48% felt Russia poses a particular problem, while 23% believed Russia poses a serious problem to world peace and security).⁵⁰⁴ Worries about Russia peaked in 2008 due to Russia’s invasion of Georgia. However, public worries about the threat from Russia has slightly increased from 31% in 2009 to 39% in 2012 (Figure 5-4).⁵⁰⁵ This can possibly be attributed to Russia’s recent increase in defence spending, Putin’s re-election to the presidency and some sporadic military activities.⁵⁰⁶ After a decade of emphasis on the development of an expeditionary force, the debate on territorial defence has gained momentum and is back on the Swedish defence agenda.

A member of the personnel staff from the Headquarters noted that:

‘Public interest in defence affairs... I think it maybe kind of come back because the bear is back to business. In the past 12 months the Headquarters has been reviewing the defence scenarios and

⁵⁰³ Interview, participant SE-2. In fact, no Swedish troops were actually deployed in Libya. Sweden deployed 8 Gripen jets and one C-130 air refuelling airplane for Operation Unified Protector. See Robert Egnell, 16 Oct 2012, The Swedish Experience in Operation Unified Protector, Stockholm Center for Strategic Studies. <http://media.wix.com/ugd/012b60_f1ddfb759804fe6809fb4f09f536405.pdf>, accessed 28 Sep 2013.

⁵⁰⁴ *Opinioner 2012*, p.39.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p.49.

⁵⁰⁶ For example, the simulated attack from Russian air force on Swedish soil in March 2013 inspired a serious debate on Sweden’s capability of territorial defence.

operational plans that we did during the Cold War.⁵⁰⁷




Figure 5-4 Threat perception on Russia

Source:⁵⁰⁸

As discussed in Chapter two, NATO has always been a sensitive issue in Swedish society. Despite the fact that Sweden has participated in several operations under a NATO mandate, public support for NATO membership has always been hesitant and never reached a majority. According to surveys conducted from 1997 to 2007, on average only about one quarter of Swedes favoured NATO membership while around 60% were against it.⁵⁰⁹ In 2008 and 2009 more than one third of Swedes preferred joining NATO and the support rate reached its peak, which could be due to Russia's attack on Georgia. Since 2011 the support rate dropped to around 30%, while opposition increased to nearly 50%. Since 2006 people who had no opinion has reached and stayed at about one quarter, see Figure 5-5.⁵¹⁰ From another survey recently conducted by the Swedish newspaper SvD, 32% of respondents prefer Sweden to join NATO, which correlates to some extent with the result of SPF *Opinioner* 2012. Although the majority of Swedes are still against NATO membership, support has increased considerably from 23% in 2011 to 32% in 2013. On the other hand, those who oppose Sweden's NATO membership dropped from 50% in 2011 to 40% in 2013.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with participant SE-4, second interview in October 2012.

⁵⁰⁸ *Opinioner* 2012, p.49.

⁵⁰⁹ And so Afghanistan has always been discussed in Sweden as if NATO is not there/involved.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, p.84.

⁵¹¹ The Swedes have softened in Nato issue (Svenskarna har mjuknat i Natofrågan), SvD, 16 May, 2013. <http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/svenskarna-har-mjuknat-i-natofragan_8175788.svd>, accessed 20 May 2013.




Figure 5-5 Public perceptions of Sweden's NATO membership.

Source:⁵¹²

Having not gained wide support from the society, more obstacles in terms of recruitment and other implementing measures can be expected. One possible reason for the low support of AVF transition is due to people's lack of interest in and understanding of defence affairs. Many Swedes' knowledge about military service derives from conscription era. Without knowing and understanding the AVF decision, it is difficult for people to support AVF transition. It is crucial for the SAF to focus on this issue and actively explain to Swedish people what the SAF is doing, including missions and reform, in order to gain public support of AVF. A defence analyst from FOI says:

'The Swedish soldiers who returned from Afghanistan have not always been met so nicely from the Swedish population. Since there are few people serving in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the society does not understand when they come back. (...) The armed forces have not been so good at explaining about what they do, what their purposes are, and therefore they have not been so visible in society. So if they (SAF) don't do anything, it (the support) will disappear. People don't see them so they don't understand what they are doing. Politicians as well have been bad at explaining. ...people rather would become policemen than soldiers; some people do the basic training because they think it would be a plus when they are applying for police officer. It's never the other way around.'⁵¹³

In short, public support for the defence of Sweden and the SAF remains stable, but support for the AVF has been not impressive, as conscription is still favoured by the majority. Most Swedes support international missions, but recently support for ISAF in

⁵¹² *Opinioner 2012*, p.84.

⁵¹³ Interview, participant SE-13.

Afghanistan has waned. As for threat perception, worry about Russia slightly increases and support for joining NATO, though still not reaching majority, has gained momentum. These various kinds of supports somehow reflect the dynamics of factors in facilitating or hindering the implementation process.

Legal factors: Legislation

Although legislation is not a metric for measuring the success of the AVF implementation, it is an essential facilitating condition especially in the initial phase of the implementation process. The transformation in the military personnel system usually involves a complicated set of changes including defence expenditure (salary and pension), service terms and conditions of military personnel, size and structure of the military establishment, recruitment of new personnel and disbandment of old personnel. Without appropriate new or amended laws and regulations for carrying out personnel reform, even though the armed forces are well-prepared and ready, they cannot proceed as it could either breach the old laws which might be still valid, or simply there is no legal basis for such new personnel system – recruiting part-time reserve soldiers being the best example. The period for the legislation could be lengthy, depending on how quickly the MOD can propose the new act and to what extent the consensus can be reached in the parliament.

When the Swedish government decided to shift to an AVF system in 2009, the recruitment and employment of reserve soldiers (GSS/T) – a substantial part of the new SAF personnel system, could not be carried out because there was no legal basis to recruit into this category. For the Swedish Armed Forces, until July 2012, they could only consider the factors surrounding how to employ reserve soldiers but could not actually do so due to lack of a legislative framework. In fact, recruiting reserve soldiers has been more complicated than suspending conscription because, according to a senior MOD official, this not only involves just the relation between the armed forces and soldiers, but is a triangular relationship among three major parties: the armed forces, employers and soldiers.⁵¹⁴ Universities were also included in the bill to give students the right to temporarily leave their studies to serve and be able to resume studies. The

⁵¹⁴ Interview, participant SE-6.

special act's provisions on the right to leave and employment protection, and on the right to interrupt or defer studies, are also to apply to reserve officers.⁵¹⁵ The protection was designed in a way similar to the protection of activities linked to the existing legislation, such as the 1994 Total Defence Service Act on the protection of employment at some military service. The new employment law should not only provide protection against dismissal, but also protects against other intrusive measures of employment.

A Swedish MP from the defence committee regretted that Parliament did not have the legislation for reserve soldiers in place when the decision was made.⁵¹⁶ Almost all senior officials interviewed from the Headquarters and MoD stressed that the legislation was 'extremely important' because 75% of army billets will be filled by part-time reserve soldiers, without legislation there is no legal framework to protect the rights of reserve soldiers to leave their civilian jobs for military service and return to those jobs.⁵¹⁷ Since Sweden has never recruited this type of soldiers, therefore it may be useful for Sweden to seek lessons from countries such as the US and UK who have abundant experience in recruiting and deploying such reserve soldiers.

Support of materials and equipment (DIB)

The Swedish Defence Industrial Base (DIB) was explained in chapter two as one of the four pillars that underpinned the security of Sweden during the Cold War. According to the 2009 Defence Bill, acquisition of equipment was cited as an influential factor in the process of the personnel reform. The rationale was to free the funding to subsidise the defence reform by reducing the costs of research and development and purchasing ready-produced weapon and equipment. This policy would inevitably have impact on the Swedish domestic defence industrial base (DIB). With such a long history of self-contained and reliable DIB, Sweden has been keen to develop a high-tech armed forces; therefore technology has been broadly mentioned to justify the defence reform in Sweden.

Domestic DIB has always been the highest priority in terms of the acquisition of new

⁵¹⁵ The Inquiry on Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces (Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar, SOU 2010:86) pp.29-40.

⁵¹⁶ Interview, participant SE-10.

⁵¹⁷ Interview, participant SE-7. Other officials include interview participants SE-1, SE-2, SE-3, and SE-5.

equipment; however, consideration should be given as to whether it is best to develop what is needed in partnership with other countries or whether ready-made equipment should be procured. If the alternatives are similar in terms of cost-efficiency, the Armed Forces should choose what best suits the future skills and development within the Swedish defence industry.⁵¹⁸

Michael Moore stressed that it is important for Sweden to have equipment comparable to that of the countries it co-operates with and that it be technically mature, reliable and accessible.⁵¹⁹ With regard to new acquisition, he argued that it should be made from fully developed, tested equipment available in the market. Development should only take place when alternatives are unavailable. International co-operation should be placed in high priority, regardless of type, when it comes to acquisitions. Increased acquisition of mature and tested equipment and system can reduce the need for certification, verification and validation. Over time, this is expected to free up funds for operational activities and the personnel reform of the SAF.⁵²⁰

The new acquisition policy revealed in the 2009 Defence Bill to a large extent follows Moore's arguments. It stipulates that: 'for acquisition of weapon and equipment, the priorities should be placed on the existing material which is economically viable while operational requirements can be achieved. If new purchases are required, it should be based on the market existing, fully developed and proven products. This means that the need for certification, verification and validation can be reduced.'⁵²¹ According to the Government strategy, new equipment should only be developed when there are no other alternatives.⁵²² A senior SAF official explained the acquisition policy:

'...there is little more international perspective on procurement. Government and parliament tell us to: first, you have to consider if there is something to buy in the market; if it is, buy it from the market; 2. If there is not anything in the international market, try to collaborate with other countries to develop new materiel; 3. We do it by ourselves. So, 1. Buy from the shelf, 2. Collaborate with other countries, 3. Develop ourselves. This is quite a lot of changes and different mindset.'⁵²³

In addition, from government's budgetary perspective, an MP from the Defence

⁵¹⁸ *Government Bill 2004 / 05:5.*

⁵¹⁹ Michael Moore, 2000, *Revolution i det svenska försvaret* [*Revolution in the Swedish Defence*], Försvarsdepartementet, Stockholm.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ *2008/09:140 Defence Bill.*

⁵²² Ministry of Finance 2011 Defence ESO Report, 2011.

⁵²³ Interview, participant SE-1.

Committee pointed out the current debates on the domestic DIB:

‘We have another problem in Sweden for defence funding, as you know we have the big defence industry, armoured vehicles, jets..., we still have these companies. It is said that Sweden is exporting per capita more than any other country in the world. We also implemented the new strategy for procurement, that we are no longer rely on Swedish defence industry, we should buy existing defence materials on the shelf. We hope for this strategy to free money to invest on education and personnel costs. I don’t think there is political possibility to increase defence budget.’⁵²⁴

Recruiting efforts: dedicated recruiting agency and campaigns

Establishing and carrying out an effective recruiting effort is a crucial factor to ensure the armed forces are on the right track to acquire enough personnel of the right quality. Unlike countries such as the US and UK where the recruitment of personnel is conducted by armed forces itself through a designated recruitment agency, recruitment of all kinds of personnel in Sweden is carried out by an agency called the ‘Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency’. Before conscription was suspended, the selection of manpower was performed by the National Service Administration to screen and select qualified conscripts. Since the end of conscription, the strategy for recruiting personnel to the SAF has been modified because a source of guaranteed manpower can no longer be taken for granted. Starting in 2011, the National Service Administration was transformed and renamed as the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency with its main tasks being to deal with recruitment of volunteer soldiers. It is a separate agency under the jurisdiction of the government and forms part of the Ministry of Defence. On behalf of the Armed Forces, this agency tests and surveys young men and women who intend to enter basic military training and seek employment in the SAF.

The agency is capable of handling 12,000 applications annually, with the main tasks to administer all applications, conduct recruitment works, admission tests and selections. The selection process begins with the theoretical test and continues with initial health checks, physical tests, medical examinations and interviews with a psychologist. After admissions tests are completed, recommendations are made for the SAF to make a final decision on who should be chosen. To boost recruitment, in 2011 the SAF started to work in partnership with the National Employment Agency to help the military meet its target of recruiting 4,000 soldiers every year. Through its operation of 320 job centres

⁵²⁴ Interview, participant SE-10.

across the country, part of the agreement calls for representatives from the SAF to train the staffs of the employment agency and ensure that the agency can promote the armed forces as an attractive employer and provide accurate information to young people for available jobs.

Reaching a favourable recruitment result has been neither easy nor cheap and it requires a great deal of effort and investment on recruiting campaigns. The SAF launched a series of TV advertisements called ‘Have you got what it takes?’ which were frequently broadcasted on TV, internet, and at public places such as train and metro stations. Most importantly, the SAF have been keen in using social media, and therefore Facebook and Twitter are substantially utilised to drive recruitment, and experimenting with creative campaigns.⁵²⁵ Other than TV and internet, recruiting campaigns were held on high streets to have direct contacts with the youth cohorts.⁵²⁶ Another advertising campaign called ‘What are you doing?’, whilst receiving both positive and negative reactions from the public, also encouraged broad debates in the society. The SAF considered this campaign successful because it has not only created public interest in the armed forces, but resulted in more applications than anticipated.⁵²⁷ In light of these recruiting efforts, a senior information official of the Headquarters remarked that ‘the initial successful result for recruiting regular soldiers relates to the successful marketing strategy.’⁵²⁸ Apart from marketing and advertising in order to support the armed forces by providing a more accurate prediction on manpower, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has created a simulation tool which embodies several parameters including number of recruits, drop outs and various competencies that are needed in the armed forces. This tool allows the SAF to better understand the factors which could affect recruitment, retention, training and operations and how these factors interact. With such technical assistance, the SAF is expected to be able to calculate supply and demand of new

⁵²⁵ In fact, according to a directive from the SAF Headquarters, employees of the SAF have been encouraged to use social media during work hours to participate in discussions on the authority's activities. See < <http://www.thelocal.se/31614/20110124/> >, accessed 28 March 2013.

⁵²⁶ For example, one campaign was all about making a difference with the title “Who cares?” aiming to seek who would like to help others. This creative campaign was successful as it quickly attracted enormous public attentions. The objective was to seek 4,300 applicants for 1,430 new positions; it turned out that almost 10,000 applications were received. See <<http://theundercoverrecruiter.com/how-the-swedish-army-use-social-media-to-recruit-video/>>, accessed 14 May, 2012.

⁵²⁷ Emma Jonsson, Outcomes of soldiers recruitment to the Swedish Armed Forces 2012. ERGOMAS Madrid, 4 June 2013.

⁵²⁸ Interview, participant SE-2.

recruits in order to find a sufficient number of personnel with the right competencies to fill the vacancies in 15 years time.⁵²⁹

Another facilitating factor to boost recruitment and reduce drop-out rate is to speed-up and simplify the selection process. From spring 2014, Sweden will introduce a modified selection process for new recruits, which is more continuous by adopting a graduated selection process. In the old system, between first selection, when people are requested to attend and by the time they attended the basic training test, on average only 6 out of 10 showed up at the basic training test; therefore the drop-out during selection process was as high as 40%. The selection time in the new system will be greatly reduced to prevent unnecessary drop-outs and mind changing of youth cohorts. It is expected that the new process with rapid selection process can reduce the drop out quotient.⁵³⁰

Retention factors

Several factors have a bearing on the retention of soldiers and the measures countries take to retain personnel vary. One recurring factor that contributes to personnel leaving prematurely is a high rate of operations requiring long absences from home and family. Individuals who do not feel that their period of service is meaningful and see the future as uncertain also leave prematurely.⁵³¹ Another potential factor that will affect and obstruct retention is the nature of the service contract as according to Swedish labour law, soldiers can resign at any time. With no way of changing the conditions of contract, the armed forces must take other measures to retain soldiers.

Given that Swedish employment law allows soldiers to leave the service whenever they want, offering education and other opportunities for career development are thus important to boost retention. Monetary bonuses were only effective in a very short term and effectiveness will fade along with time.⁵³² However, according to the favourable results in the first two years of transformation, an MOD senior official seems to be positive and optimistic about the current results of reform, and thinks that the SAF is an

⁵²⁹ *FOI 2012 Annual Report*, 2013, Stockholm, p.8.

⁵³⁰ Emma Jonsson, 2013, op. cit.

⁵³¹ The Inquiry on Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces (Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar, SOU 2010:86) pp. 29-40

⁵³² According to interviews conducted by Christopher Dandeker and Karl Yden in Halmstad in 2013.

attractive employer.⁵³³ Nevertheless, politicians start to worry about recruitment and retention if the Armed Forces continue to hold such optimistic attitudes as an MP warned that:

‘...the SAF as well as MoD are very optimistic, say we have 10 applicants for every place; everyone is happy. I think that this enthusiasm perhaps make us less prepared for the problems that will reappear for the progress.’⁵³⁴

One good example is that the SAF made a favourable assumption based on the interim agreements signed by ex-conscripts showing that they were interested in joining as reserve soldiers, and that many of those will turn up for recruitment.

Ex-conscripts: important factor for initial success

Ex-conscripts are important assets for countries undergoing an AVF transition, Sweden is no exception. These ex-conscripts serve as a manpower pool, and in the short-term, are an important facilitating factor with regard to the initial success of recruitment. The Armed Forces can save the basic training by recruiting ex-conscripts as they have done the conscript service, possessed the right competence, and intended to go abroad for missions. Those who applied and were employed as reserve soldiers were actually former conscripts serving in those posts, which therefore they did not need to go to the three-month basic training. The ex-conscripts, in the meantime, account for 70% of the regular soldiers.⁵³⁵ However, this group of manpower will eventually decline, and the SAF will need to recruit all personnel from new recruits. One Lieutenant Colonel thus questioned ‘what will happen in a few years time when we do not have those ex-conscripts anymore?’⁵³⁶

Troubled NCO Reform – a hindering factor

One of the influential factors that has so far affected the personnel transformation is the NCO reform, which has triggered dissatisfaction among officer corps. Several important issues need to be addressed here. First is the competence issue, as the Armed Forces have calculated that there will be some officers who should be made redundant because

⁵³³ Interview, participant SE-7.

⁵³⁴ Interview, participant SE-10.

⁵³⁵ Figure provided by interview participant SE-13, second interview conducted in August 2013.

⁵³⁶ Interview, participant SE-9.

they do not have the right competences.⁵³⁷ Second, as discussed in chapter four, the NCO reform dictates the majority of the existing officers to shift to specialist officer positions. Although their salary and ranks were retained, many felt that their self-esteem was damaged and chose to leave the armed forces. For example, a lieutenant colonel from an air-defence regiment noticed that there were as many as one third of officers in his unit decided to leave the military because:

‘... they didn’t want to become or fill the NCO positions; they would have done the same work, but they didn’t want to fill the NCO positions. So instead they chose to quit. Those who left were people with 20 or 30 years of experience, and they were captains and majors, and were experts in tactics and technologies about air-defence, they can’t be replaced over days. It will take 20 to 30 years to train.’⁵³⁸

The NCO reform has caused a cultural shock in the SAF. When young specialist officers have just finished their education and started working, it is difficult for them because they will work next to their older colleagues, also NCOs doing exactly the same work. There is a salary gap between them because these ex-officers are transformed to specialist officer so they keep their officer pay, but these young specialist officer will never make as much as their ex-officer counterparts.⁵³⁹

Competence is another major issue. If platoon commander positions are filled by new junior officers without much experience and expertise, the problem is that the technical skill base of these junior platoon commanders is very limited, and therefore they will depend on the specialist officers. Dandeker identifies the tricky situation of the NCO transition facing the SAF from the perspective of four types of players involved at the platoon level – which he calls the four members of an ‘unhappy family’.⁵⁴⁰ First, there are soldiers who doubt the competence of their platoon leaders and their specialist officers if they are perceived to be inexperienced and incompetent. Second, there are NCOs who want to take on the role of specialist advisor to and support for the technical officers, but might encounter a deputy platoon commander who is the ex-platoon commander and retains an officer rank. Thus, he might feel that his expertise is inferior to that of the deputy commander. Third, the older officer who takes the position of

⁵³⁷ Interview, participant SE-3.

⁵³⁸ Interview, participant SE-9.

⁵³⁹ Interview, participant SE-13.

⁵⁴⁰ Christopher Dandeker, September 2013. *The Swedish NCO-Officer partnership and the transformation of the SAF: managing the transition*. Research project commissioned by the SAF Headquarters, pp.26-27.

deputy platoon commander, feels pushed aside and having to support the inexperienced platoon commander. And last, there is the young platoon commander who just graduated from the National Defence College and holds a university degree. Facing the senior and experienced ex-officers, these inexperienced platoon commanders might fear being looked down by soldiers and the senior specialist officers. Important issues need to be addressed regarding the competence gap between the platoon commander and the rest of the platoon, and consideration given as to what might be done to make this new system functional? Without a doubt, it is a tricky situation and a great challenge to the SAF.

Budget

Drawing from experiences of the countries that have undergone AVF transition, budget has usually been a problem for a smooth shift from conscription to an AVF. An AVF system is always more expensive than conscription. Gilroy et al. argued that the transition to an AVF can be challenging and more costly than anticipated.⁵⁴¹ The British experience shows that an AVF is not cheap, and defence budget constraints and rising input costs of personnel and equipment mean that difficult defence policy choices cannot be avoided.⁵⁴² To cope with unexpected costs for the AVF transformation, Sweden estimated that the cost for training one volunteer soldier ready for active service is 2.4 times higher than training a conscript in a compulsory service system.⁵⁴³ When Sweden started to embark on personnel reform and the AVF transition, one of the prerequisites that Government demanded SAF was to implement AVF with a flat budget. On the other hand, the SAF was also guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance that no cut in defence budget during the period from 2010 to 2014. The SAF will manage to stay with a flat budget to implement the AVF and organisational reform. A senior MOD official interpreted the defence financial situation as: ‘in one way you can say budget cut but on the other hand that the Armed Forces has stable and flat budget, which is a positive thing.’⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴¹ Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, 2006, *Service to Country*, The MIT Press, p.460.

⁵⁴² Keith Hartley, 2006, The British experience with an all-volunteer force, in *Service to country*, eds. Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, The MIT Press, p.312.

⁵⁴³ *Totalförsvarspålit och frivillighet, Slutbetänkande av Utredningen om totalförsvarspålit*, Stockholm 2009, p.60.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview, participant SE-6.

The SAF receives a budget of approximately 40 billion SEK each year, which accounts for about 1.2 per cent of GDP (See Table 5-1). Without receiving an increase in budget, the SAF therefore must allocate the budget appropriately in order to acquire sufficient funds to subsidise the personnel reform. As discussed earlier, due to personnel reform, it has seen a decrease on procurement of equipment and an increase on the personnel, from up to 28 to 30% of new procurement costs before 2010, down to current (2011) 22 to 23%.⁵⁴⁵ One of the most important prerequisites and conditions for successfully implementing an AVF is to control the budget and have the information about how much budget the SAF can receive in the long term perspective. Focusing on the budget issue, a senior official of the SAF explained his role and main tasks in the AVF transition:

‘My main assignment at the Headquarters has been to get the recruitment under financial control. Having a flat budget and knowing what we are going to get for budget in the coming 3 or 4 years is one of the most important prerequisites for a successful transformation; this is crucial for the reform. The triangle of Headquarters, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance all contribute to the transformation.’⁵⁴⁶

Table 5-1 Military Expenditure of Sweden

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
SKR in million	30710	38751	42423	41070	42072
USD in million	6337	6215	6726	6324	6424
GDP	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database⁵⁴⁷

Nevertheless, from a long term perspective, it has been estimated by the SAF that the flat budget will not be able to successfully finance the transformation after 2014. The SAF have foreseen the need to increase their budget, especially the appropriation for the personnel cost from 2015 to 2019 in order to keep the system functioning. The SAF have informed the Ministry of Finance that after 2014 the budget need to be increased, otherwise the SAF will be forced to reduce its commitments.⁵⁴⁸

Notwithstanding the above, from a government and political perspective, when current

⁵⁴⁵ Figures provided by interviewee participant SE-1.

⁵⁴⁶ Interview, participant SE-1.

⁵⁴⁷ <<http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx>>

⁵⁴⁸ Interview, participant SE-1.

defence minister Karin Enström was appointed in April 2012, Prime Minister Reinfeldt stressed that one of the fundamental tasks is to keep the armed forces' finances in order.⁵⁴⁹ An MP highlighted that based on the agreement reached in the Parliament on a flat budget for defence reform, it is not politically possible to increase defence budget.⁵⁵⁰ Nevertheless, from the public's perspective, a 2012 survey result showed that 28% of people wanted the government to increase defence spending, a share in the similar level as 2011, while 41% believed that defence spending should remain unchanged, another 13% felt that defence expenditure should be reduced. The proportion of people who had no comments in recent years has been 19%.⁵⁵¹

5.3 Taiwan

Changed perception of threat

The situation of Taiwan's AVF is unlike any found in the West. Taiwanese armed forces must maintain vigilant at all times because the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of force over the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, cross-strait relations have been less tense since 2008 and economic exchange between two sides has increased significantly. It is thus a tricky situation for Taiwan to balance between the issue of national security and economic development (especially trade with the PRC). Under this dilemma, there is no easy way to recruit young people to join the military. As such, the real danger is not perceived as the military threat, but rather the economic output to mainland China. The security problem of Taiwan has thus shifted from the military front to the economic front, and therefore young people start to think 'Why join the military?' Some young people also question the need for a strong defence, because of Taiwan's rapidly improved relations and expanding trade with its once implacable foe. Moreover, given China's growing military strength, some think resistance would be futile.⁵⁵² This was reflected in chapter three that the willingness of Taiwanese people to defend the country has been shaky,⁵⁵³ and further has impacted on the implementation of the AVF. A

⁵⁴⁹ Sweden's defence 'not fit for battle': expert, 30 Apr 12, <<http://www.thelocal.se/40554/20120430/>>, accessed 22 June 2012.

⁵⁵⁰ Interview, participant SE-10.

⁵⁵¹ *Opinioner 2012*, p.82-83.

⁵⁵² Peter Enav, Taiwan short of volunteers for the military, *Associated Press*, 13 May 2013.

⁵⁵³ *Common Wealth Magazine*, 2011, <<http://media.cw.com.tw/cw/cwdata/pdf/2011-CW-2011edu.pdf>>.

defence analyst urged that: ‘Government should explain to public why AVF must be carried out; because I’ve heard nothing in the last two years.’⁵⁵⁴

Focusing on territorial defence with the feature of ‘four-month military training’, Taiwan’s AVF implementation is quite different from that of Sweden and western countries. Therefore, the factors, conditions and constraints that affect Taiwan’s AVF transition have also been slightly different from what were discussed in the Swedish transition. Nevertheless, factors such as public support and finance, as reviewed in chapter one from previous AVF transition cases, still play a key role in either facilitating or impeding the implementation process in Taiwan.

Public support of the military

Unlike Sweden, which has been conducting a consistent annual survey on the public attitudes toward the armed forces, the evidence used in examining to what extent Taiwanese people support the armed forces depends on recent surveys conducted by the MND and the media. In addition, since Taiwan’s armed forces do not perform international operations, support for international missions is thus disregarded, and the support is therefore divided into two categories, support for the armed forces and the AVF.

Support of AVF

As indicated in chapter three, Taiwanese society has a somewhat negative image of the military; the view is that it tends to be authoritarian, dogmatic, and unproductive, which has affected the public support of the military and discouraged many young people from joining the military. In terms of support for AVF, according to chapter three, MND poll results showed that Taiwanese people favour the AVF.⁵⁵⁵ Nevertheless, according to another survey conducted by the MND about people’s attitude toward the personnel system; both military personnel and youth cohorts (college and high school students) tend to favour the mixed two-tier system (46% each); 38% of military personnel and

accessed 13 May 2012.

⁵⁵⁴ Interview, participant TW-8.

⁵⁵⁵ AVF policy propaganda material No.2, 2012.

24% of students supported the AVF system. Despite, counter-intuitively, students showed higher support for conscription (30%), in general support for AVF is higher than that of conscription (Figure 5-6).




Figure 5-6 People's attitudes toward the personnel systems

Source:⁵⁵⁶ NB. Active-duty personnel include conscripts.

Recently a survey was conducted by a newspaper on young people's intentions to pursue careers in the military (as a soldier, NCO and officer) after the AVF is fully implemented. Results showed that only 27.9% of young respondents (between ages 18 and 26) showed an interest in pursuing a military career while 53.5% had no intention. Nevertheless, according to the experience of the military, the MND considers that the results somewhat reflect the real percentage of the youth cohorts who are interested in joining the armed forces.⁵⁵⁷

In fact, according to a MND's AVF implementation team member, what young men and their parents only care about is the cut-off year in which men born afterwards will be exempted from serving one-year of conscription service, only the four-month basic training instead. Other than that, the issue of AVF is not keenly debated in society.⁵⁵⁸ A comment made by an Army corporal reflects the extent of public's interest in the AVF:

'I don't think the goal can be reached in 2015, it is too difficult. We went to many schools and almost every class, each with 40 students. When we asked if they were interested, only about 10

⁵⁵⁶ MND Commissioned research report, The implementation of All-volunteer force, from the perspectives of human resource, term of service and expectation, April 2010, p.94

⁵⁵⁷ Apple Daily, Will you consider pursuing military career after AVF is implemented? 24 December, 2012. <<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20121224/34725445/>>, accessed 27 December 2012.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview, participant TW-1.

students (some only 2 or 3 students) showed interest. Among those who were interested, even fewer will actually apply. Because they don't want to serve; they don't want to stay 24 hours in barracks without freedom. So although the military provides a good welfare package, they only think about right now, they want to have fun and want leisure time. These students are still dependent on parents, so they don't have a sense of salary.⁵⁵⁹

The media are usually sensitive to social trends and can quickly pinpoint the pulse of the society. The Public have a sharp observation in their attitude towards the military. A senior defence journalist argued that the public image of military is still not highly regarded in Taiwanese society due to lack the sense of honour; he explained:

'We are still lack the atmosphere for people to join the military. In the past few years, I feel the social status of military personnel is low in Taiwan. They don't have the sense of honour for being serving in the military. Although the salary and benefits are good, the society treats the military personnel like 'rice worms',⁵⁶⁰ and are suspicious whether they are able to fight a war. This suspicion has been prevailing in the society. If this kind of perception still exists in the society, it will be difficult to make a successful AVF transition. If the society feels that serving in the military is honourable, it will become another story. I think the atmosphere about joining the military does not exist in the society.'⁵⁶¹

Furthermore, he observed that the MND has made progress in using the media to advertise the military; however, he is still pessimistic about the AVF:

Only recently has the MND been successful in terms of how to use the media. The MND allowed us (media) to produce some special reports and TV programmes to let people know what they are doing and thus to create a positive image about the military. When the military's image starts to turn to positive, then people would start to feel that it is honourable to join the military. (...) To enhance the image of the military, the MND should thoroughly change to modern concept. (...) About how the society perceives the AVF, I feel pessimistic; many people still think that 'good men do not serve in military'. (...) If young people are able to find jobs in the private sector, 95% of their parents will not encourage their children to serve as volunteer soldiers.'⁵⁶²

Volunteer soldiers are not highly regarded in society because people's stereotyped impression is they are neither able to find a proper jobs, nor can perform well in schools. In addition, NCO and lower ranking officers such as first and second lieutenant are also not very highly regarded. An Army corporal pointed out: 'even if you are a sergeant, the society treats you as a soldier; they don't treat you as a sergeant.'⁵⁶³

The AVF policy has also been doubted by the military staff. A senior sergeant major from the communication depot expressed his opinion on the prospect of AVF:

⁵⁵⁹ Interview, Male NCO

⁵⁶⁰ Implying military personnel only consume and are unproductive.

⁵⁶¹ Interview, participant TW-9.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Interview, participant TW-11.

‘When I look back, no, I will not support the AVF policy. First, it increases too much the cost of personnel. The professional skill of volunteer soldiers is not high. In the past we went to boot camps to pick conscripts. Nowadays, before volunteer soldiers apply, they heard from their friends and relatives that the communication depot is a less demanding unit and they can learn skills. Therefore, we have to accept many volunteer soldiers who have no experience in the fields of electrics and electronics, which has caused serious capability problems.’⁵⁶⁴

Damaged public image and impact on AVF implementation

Towards the end of the writing of this thesis, in July 2013, a notorious incident happened which severely damaged the reputation of the armed forces and thus is worthy of discussion in full. A conscripted army corporal died in a military detention centre after being abused by several Army officers and NCOs. It has generated unprecedented national outrage, and was headline news for a whole month. Furthermore, more than 200,000 people rallied in the capital to protest against the military for such unlawful treatment of the deceased army corporal. Not only has the President publicly apologised, but two defence ministers have resigned. Most importantly, this incident has severely damaged the image and reputation of the armed forces, which is already struggling to find enough volunteers as it tries to phase out conscription.

A survey conducted by a think tank after this incident showed a sheer drop of people’s confidence in Taiwan’s Armed Forces. The results indicated that 75% of respondents did not trust the military’s ability to investigate the controversial death of the Army corporal. The public image of the armed forces and people’s perception on the capability of the armed forces after this incident were severely damaged. As high as 72.3% of respondents believed that the situation of inappropriate discipline and mistreatment of soldiers is serious in the armed forces; 77.7% felt that the MND has corruption problems. Regarding the AVF transformation, 59.1% worried that the armed forces are not able to recruit enough soldiers. Most importantly, three quarters of respondents do not think that Taiwan’s armed forces is capable of fighting a war should there is a military conflict.⁵⁶⁵ Another survey conducted in the similar timeframe showed that only 11% of respondents believed the military investigation, and a majority of respondents (67.4%) do not trust the investigation conducted by the armed forces. With regard to the prosecution, by the same token, only 17.8% of respondents were satisfied,

⁵⁶⁴ Interview, participant TW-10.

⁵⁶⁵ Taipei Times, 29 July 2013, Poll highlights loss of faith in military, <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/29/2003568426/1>>, accessed 30 July 2013.

whilst 60.8% were discontent with the military prosecution system.⁵⁶⁶

In short, the Taiwanese armed forces suffering an unprecedented impact on its public image and support, it should treat it as a turning point and opportunity to seek ways for radical reform and improvement.

Recruiting efforts: dedicated recruiting agency and campaigns

Recruiting efforts and motivation of young men and women are significant factors influencing the success of Taiwan's AVF implementation. In contrast to Sweden, the recruitment of military personnel in Taiwan is conducted solely by the armed forces itself. To facilitate the AVF recruitment process the MND established the Armed Forces Recruitment Centre in 1999 with the objective of expanding manpower sources and recruiting officers and NCOs. Since the MND started to recruit volunteer soldiers in 2003, the recruitment centre has gradually shifted its focus on the acquisition of such category. To date, the largest recruiting group has been volunteer soldiers.⁵⁶⁷ With the ultimate aim of achieving the annual recruitment target, the main tasks of the recruitment centre are to 'formulate annual recruitment guidance and work plan, establish strategy for recruiting advertisement, set up selection standards and criteria for different categories of personnel, plan recruitment events and activities, train military recruiters, and supervise service commands and military academies'. The director of the recruitment centre summarised that: 'the objective is to inform the society the existence of the Armed Forces Recruitment Centre.'⁵⁶⁸ He further stressed that:

'When we advertise we normally emphasise two incentives: the chance to be promoted to NCOs, and subsidised study of college degrees. We don't worry about the recruitment of officers and NCOs; we worry about recruiting volunteer soldiers. So the results of recruiting professional officers and NCOs are quite good; the only problem is the volunteer soldiers. If retention is good, then the recruitment can be less.'⁵⁶⁹

Nevertheless, recruitment of volunteer soldiers is not solely conducted by the recruitment centre; every operational unit is also responsible for recruiting soldiers and is therefore assigned a certain recruitment quota. The rationale behind this is that if units

⁵⁶⁶ China Times, 3 August, 2013. Confidence crisis –only 10 per cent believe the military investigation. <<http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501013924/112013080300410.html>>, accessed 5 August, 2013.

⁵⁶⁷ Recruiters receive merit when they recruit volunteer soldiers, nothing for acquiring those who apply for officer and NCO programmes.

⁵⁶⁸ Interview, participant TW-5.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

do not reach their assigned quota, they will receive relatively fewer annual supplement soldiers in the following year. The director of recruitment centre explained how it works:

‘Each unit has responsibility to recruit the allocated quota of soldiers. The operational units send some qualified recruiters including officers, sergeants and soldiers to form an interim recruitment team under the mandate of the Armed Forces Recruitment Centre. These units will cooperate with us (recruitment centre) by attending various recruitment events. They have the pressure of recruiting assigned number of soldiers so they will try hard.’⁵⁷⁰

Planning and carrying out advertising campaigns is a crucial task for the recruitment centre. Apart from TV advertisements, social media and web-based advertisements are targeted to entice youth and student groups. Setting up recruiting information kiosks in local job fairs has been continually carried out in order to increase the exposure of the armed forces. Recently, the recruitment centre has negotiated with two large convenient store franchises to help provide and distribute recruitment leaflets and application forms in more-than 8,000 locations in the country. By marketing the armed forces in eye-catching places, it aims to make recruitment application easier and more visible. Furthermore, similar to Sweden, the MND has simplified the application process such as allowing people to apply on any given day of the year, and avoid the military fitness test by recognising physical fitness test conducted and issued by Ministry of Education.

Retention factors

In contrast to western countries where constant expeditionary operations make people aware of the existence of the armed forces, in traditional Taiwanese society, it is relatively difficult to encourage young men and women to serve in the military, especially serving as a soldier in the Army. Motivation is thus a crucial factor for soldiers to retain in the military. To analyse the motivating factors, the MND conducted a survey on Taiwan’s volunteer soldiers who were asked to choose one of 13 factors that could influence their decisions to stay in the military. ‘Job stability’ was the most mentioned factor by 20.8% of surveyed soldiers; it was followed by ‘economic pressure’ (14.8%), and ‘expectations from parents and families’ (10.2%). Satisfaction with salary accounted for 8.9%, while 8.4% favoured that they could serve near home. Few respondents chose ‘profession of occupation’ (4.6%) and ‘personal interest’ (3.2%);

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

influence from colleagues was insignificant as very few could be encouraged by colleagues (2.4%), see Figure 5-7.

Apparently, occupational and economic factors were found to be significant in soldiers' decisions, which can be attributed to the social backgrounds of volunteer soldiers. A volunteer private receives a starting salary of NT 29,480 (around US\$ 1,000) a month, which is higher than the national starting wage.⁵⁷¹ As a large proportion of volunteer soldiers come from poor families and thus cannot afford the tuition fees, many decide to work first and pursue college degrees later on. Therefore, providing the opportunity of education is a sound incentive; on the other hand, through enhanced education it can also strengthen the quality of personnel.⁵⁷² In addition to direct salary, welfare or payment in kind provided by the military is also an attractive incentive especially for those come from poor families because it helps relieve their financial constraints. An Army corporal compared the salary between private sector and the military:

'I switched from private sector to the military because I saw its advantage in terms of welfare. In the long run, welfare in the military is pretty good. The salary I earned in the private sector was about the same as what I am earning now; so welfare was my main reason to join the military. (...) My family and friends support my decision.'⁵⁷³




Figure 5-7 Motivating factors for volunteer soldiers to stay in the armed forces (N=5,254)

Source: Drawn by author based on data from *Comptroller Quarterly*, 2010

⁵⁷¹ 2012 National Salary Survey, Council of Labor Affairs. National average starting wage of NT 25,036, and NT 26,722 for university graduates. <statdb.cla.gov.tw/html/svy01/i0000080139290.htm>. Accessed 17 June, 2013.

⁵⁷² Interview, participant TW-5. This is similar to America's GI Bill.

⁵⁷³ Interview, participant TW-11.

In addition to motivating factors, the survey also explored the negative factors that prevented soldiers remaining in service through 16 variables. The most discouraging factor was ‘cannot go home/out after working hours’, in other words, lack of freedom obstructs soldiers’ willingness to stay longer.⁵⁷⁴ It was followed by ‘heavy workloads’ and ‘uneven distribution of work’. ‘Attractive incentives from private sectors’ also encouraged soldiers to leave; the factor ‘could not have regular holidays and leaves’ also discouraged soldiers to stay. Dissatisfaction with salary was found to be relatively low in this survey (Figure 5-8).




Figure 5-8 Discouraging factors (obstacles) for volunteer soldiers not to remain in the armed forces (N=5,254)

Source: Drawn by author based on data from *Comptroller Quarterly*, 2010.⁵⁷⁵

The gap between expectation and reality in terms of military service could also be a negative factor which has made a majority of volunteer soldiers hesitant to remain in service.⁵⁷⁶ This was confirmed by another research on volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction with the military career,⁵⁷⁷ in which a majority (64.4%) felt that their jobs and life in the armed forces were not what they originally expected.

⁵⁷⁴ This contrasts with the views of Swedish soldiers as they prefer to be offered beds in barracks so they can save money.

⁵⁷⁵ Huang, 2010, op. cit., pp.81-103.

⁵⁷⁶ The recruiting advertisements normally stress the military pay is higher than private sector, and soldiers can take leaves and go outside after work hours regularly. After they have found that the life and career in the military is not what they expected, the majority of soldiers leave after they finish their terms.

⁵⁷⁷ Satisfaction of AVF, Army Bimonthly, vol 507, Oct 2009, pp.155-168.

The results shown above reflect a crucial fact that has been neglected by the armed forces – ‘soldiers’ views about lack of freedom’. Although volunteer soldiers are normally satisfied with the salary, however, when salary is calculated in terms of an hourly rate, pay becomes less competitive as soldiers’ working hours are much longer than those working in both private sectors. This could explain why the survey conducted by MND’s Comptroller Bureau in May 2013 showed that soldiers were not satisfied with their pay. A volunteer Army corporal calculated his salary and compared his pay with his civilian friends; he found out:

‘...because in the private sector, people get off work, say at 6 pm; then they can take another part-time job and adding two jobs together, their overall salary is higher than ours. So I think allowing soldiers to go home everyday is absolutely crucial; if so, they (volunteer soldiers) will be willing to stay longer in the military. Just allowing soldiers to go out on Wednesdays is not enough.’⁵⁷⁸

The above statement is analysed by an MND staff on why volunteer soldiers did not want to stay in the military:

‘For retention there are more important incentives. Money is a plus, but not an absolute factor. I met an outstanding volunteer soldier who graduated from a prestigious national university. I asked him why you did not apply for retention and to be promoted to sergeant. He said “there is no freedom; my home is not far away from the barracks but I have to stay in barracks everyday”. (...) “if they (the military) allow me to go home or go out everyday (after normal working hours), then I am willing to stay, even without being promoted to sergeant”’.⁵⁷⁹

These findings could potentially help those who carry out the AVF implementation in terms of what factors facilitate and hinder the process. If soldiers can be granted more freedom without affecting the regular readiness of units, not only are soldiers more likely to join and stay longer, but it does not add a financial burden to the AVF implementation. Apart from a challenge to Taiwan’s military culture, if current bureaucratic and menial tasks can be reduced or eliminated, it does not seem to be impossible to adopt this more cost-efficient approach.

Budget

Taiwan’s AVF implementation has so far been difficult not only due to recruitment and retention problems, as identified in the previous chapter, but also lack of funding. Taiwan’s central government – the Executive Yuan, has been reluctant to give more

⁵⁷⁸ Interview, participant TW-11.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview, participant TW-2.

funding to the MND to subsidise soldiers' pay rise (twice as the national minimum wage) and other incentives proposed by the MND. Lack of financial support from the government so far has been one of the major obstacles for Taiwan's AVF transition. The allocation of the defence budget in Taiwan is divided into three main categories: personnel, operations, and military investment (procurement). The costs for personnel maintenance are to be prioritised by realising the policy guidance of the AVF. Nevertheless, one crucial consideration for Taiwan's defence spending is that it has to purchase a large amount of defence equipment, especially from the US.⁵⁸⁰ The ongoing AVF implementation has to rely on the existing defence budget which has thus driven up the proportion of personnel expenditure in the overall defence budget. The increased proportion on personnel costs has reached over 45 per cent in 2010 and 2011 and is the highest among the top five Asian countries in defence spending.⁵⁸¹ In 2011 Taiwan spent 47.5 per cent of defence budget on personnel, thus had crowded out budgets for operations and military procurement.⁵⁸² Between 2009 and 2013, Taiwan increased the share allocated for personnel (from 40% to a projected 50.1%) and reduced shares allocated for operations (from 30.1% to a projected 22.5%) and investments (from 28.4% to a projected 25.9%).⁵⁸³ Reduced spending on operations and maintenance could have a negative impact on the military readiness. Without extra funds added from government, the objectives of operational maintenance (readiness, exercise, training etc) will face a 20 per cent cutback,⁵⁸⁴ which can potentially jeopardise Taiwan's security. In 2012 the Executive Yuan increased the appropriation to 155.5 billion NT for personnel costs of the armed forces, in which the MND considered satisfaction.⁵⁸⁵ Table 5-2 shows Taiwan's defence spending in recent years.

Along with the AVF implementation plan, President Ma pledged during his presidential campaign in 2008 that Taiwan would maintain a defence budget no lower than 3% of GDP. However, the government has failed to meet the 3% target in past few years. The

⁵⁸⁰ Taiwan aims to buy F-16 C/D to replace its F-16 A/B fleets.

⁵⁸¹ *Asia Defense Spending: 2000-2011*, CSIS, 15 Oct 2012.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, Taiwan's Declining Defense Spending Could Jeopardize Military Preparedness by Craig Murray, 11 June, 2013

⁵⁸⁴ Poor recruitment; antiquated missiles; General: the weakest defence capability ever; 3 Sept 2012.

<<http://www.nownews.com/2012/09/03/91-2850703.htm>>, accessed 5 Sept 2012.

⁵⁸⁵ Military News Agency, MND will strive for appropriate budget to implement AV, 14 March 2012. According to former Defence Minister Kao: 'it should fulfil this year's growth requirement of volunteer soldiers.'

personnel costs have crowded out spending on operations and military procurement since there is no significant increase in defence budget. The MND acknowledges that there are substantial budgetary implications for recruitment and retention of an AVF, especially tied to pay rises, service bonuses, living facilities, benefits, retirement schemes, and insurance coverage. Indeed, like what had happened in the West, Taiwan has recognised that the AVF transition will be much more expensive and difficult than originally anticipated.

Table 5-2 Military spending of Taiwan

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
TWD in billion	282	302	288	295	318
USD in million	9,729	10,479	9,903	9,998	10,513
GDP	2.2%	2.4%	2.1%	2.1%	2.3%

Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database⁵⁸⁶

According to the member of MND's AVF implementation team, lack of financial support has made the MND concerned about the possible delay of the AVF transition (requiring even more funds to recruit and retain professional personnel), cut operation and maintenance funds (that could reduce readiness), postpone or cancel some arms acquisitions (while keeping the commitment to fund U.S. arms acquisitions), further reduce the force, or seek a special budget.⁵⁸⁷ He further explained that:

‘The estimated 350-370 billion NT defence budget is not realised. The Executive Yuan only allocates 290 billion NT, the budget for 2012 is about 310 billion, which has satisfied the growth of the AVF manpower, but this does not include the measures and incentives. What we are doing now is that everything regarding budget and funds will wait until government can support the MND.’⁵⁸⁸

Despite its growing military disadvantage relative to China and the implementation of AVF, Taiwan's defence budget continues to decline relative to other areas of government expenditure. It is believed that Taiwan government needs to raise defence spending from its current 2.3 per cent of GDP to about 3 per cent to reach the 2015 AVF goal. However, Taiwan's official 2013 defence budget contracted to NT \$312.7 billion (U.S. \$10.5 billion) from NT \$318 (U.S. \$10.5 billion) in 2012. The opposition party DPP in its Defence Agenda thus urges the Ma administration to immediately increase

⁵⁸⁶ <<http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx>>

⁵⁸⁷ Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, Shirley A. Kan, 23 July, 2013, Congressional Research Service, p.39.

⁵⁸⁸ Interview, participant TW-1.

the defence budget to 3 per cent of GDP as the goal of the annual defence budget.⁵⁸⁹ However, it seems unlikely as President Ma focuses on continuing to improve cross-strait relations with the PRC and thus judges the current level of defence spending sufficient and will remain unchanged. Apparently, while domestic and social welfare issues have become the foremost issue, the government is less likely to increase the defence budget since improved cross-Straits relations have reduced public perception of the China threat in Taiwan.⁵⁹⁰ An indication can be found in the 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which has dropped reference to the goal of spending at 3% of GDP and noted that the defence budget as a share of the total government budget has declined year by year with negative implications for recruitment and retention.⁵⁹¹

Old management style should be eliminated

One underestimated but important factor found by this study through interviews is the out-fashioned management style in the armed forces. From bottom up, normally this factor is rarely discussed in government reports and documents, and therefore it has usually been ignored by Taiwan's armed forces. Although over the past two decades Taiwan's armed forces have seen a significant modernisation, the management and leadership style has not caught up with the pace of modernisation and is thus obsolete - the cause of the death of Army corporal discussed in the previous section is a good example. The old style leadership has seriously obstructed the progress of the armed forces. The mindset of many military officials still stays in the era of conscription which relies on the mass type of manpower with cheap labour costs. The human resources are still not efficiently utilised.

This can be divided into two issues: manpower and time. In the conscription era, manpower was cheap and they could be used 24/7. Nevertheless, in the AVF, human capital is much scarcer than those of conscripts and their working time should be utilised sparingly. That is to say, the old concept of manpower usage needs to be abandoned. Nevertheless, this is not happening yet; the most common example is to ask soldiers to carry out unnecessary, worthless and menial tasks which do not contribute to

⁵⁸⁹ DPP's Defense Agenda, New Frontier Foundation, Tseng-Chang Su, June, 2013, pp.19-21.

⁵⁹⁰ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, Taiwan's Declining Defense Spending Could Jeopardize Military Preparedness by Craig Murray, 11 June, 2013

⁵⁹¹ 2013 QDR, pp.87-88.

the military readiness and competence.

Unfortunately, these kinds of tasks account for the majority of soldiers' working time. In addition, many high officials still believe that, except for normal leave, military personnel should stay in barracks as long as possible to prevent incidents and accidents happening. Therefore, many senior military officials set restrictions on young soldiers and sergeants going, despite the MND rules stipulate that volunteer soldiers can go out once a week after working time.

Soldier's expectation of more free time has been proved by surveys and interviews. According to a survey conducted by the Army, nearly 90 per cent of participants felt that it is crucial to be able to go home every day after work.⁵⁹² In fact, this wish is widespread if it can be addressed retention can be potentially boosted. Heinecken in her thesis claimed that it is particularly these work-life issues – the effect of separation on family life, leave restrictions, and hours worked - which have influenced retention negatively.⁵⁹³ As discussed in chapter four, most of the interviewed volunteer soldiers and NCOs stressed that allowing soldiers to go home everyday is vital in order to retain them in the military.

Another issue regarding the internal management is that soldiers are asked to do too many meaningless tasks. Many soldiers, as described in the interviews complained that they have worked overtime everyday for such worthless tasks. This has not just happened in the Army, one staff sergeant from the Air Force who repairs avionics also pointed out that: 'only one third of my job is the real professional repairing jobs, the other two thirds are just superficial or pointless jobs such as dealing with superiors' base visits and so on.'⁵⁹⁴ A defence analyst pointed out the problem of the 'meaningless tasks' as he explained:

'I think the point is whether the new tasks are meaningful or not. The big problem is that soldiers think the tasks they are ordered to do are meaningless. Therefore they don't have the feel of achievement. (...) What the MND is thinking is to build new living quarters and so on which needs lots of money. That is important, but I don't think that should be the main focus; the main focus is to reform management and leadership style. You must let them have the feel of achievement, and

⁵⁹² Yang, Chih-Chin & Kuo, Kuo-Chen, *Army Bimonthly*, vol 507, Oct 2009, p.166

⁵⁹³ Lindy Heinecken, PhD thesis, King's College London, 2006, p.98.

⁵⁹⁴ Interview, participant TW-19.

that does not cost money.⁵⁹⁵

Furthermore, after soldiers have finished work and go back to the sleeping quarters which they have to share with other 10 or 20 colleagues, these are not only old and uncomfortable [no air conditioning], but they cannot have their own privacy. It is thus not difficult to imagine that working and living four years in this kind of environment without much leisure time, privacy, esteem, sense of achievement, and most importantly, freedom, it is unlikely soldiers would like to stay, even pay is raised. One legislator from the defence committee commented:

‘Soldiers need privacy. This is to be seen in two aspects; first is the hardware which is the condition of the barracks; the second is the internal management rules. Soldiers have no privacy in the barracks; now they are still sleeping in the large group sleeping quarters and don’t have their leisure time. I strongly urge the armed forces to create the concept of work rotation and do not just want to ask soldiers to treat the military as their homes. Army is the worst, navy is alright, air force is the best. After soldiers have finished their jobs, they should be allowed to have their own privacy and break times. Therefore, good management and leadership style is crucial for the AVF.’⁵⁹⁶

In sum, the old-styled management has negatively affected the efficiency of the armed forces; it not only wastes human capital, but also damages soldiers’ morale and retention. Therefore, the efficiency of human resource management should be dramatically improved at all levels in the armed forces by eliminating red-taping and redundancy, which prevail in the military, lead to unfair work-loads and waste of human resources, and, as a side effect, hinder soldiers’ family life.⁵⁹⁷

5.4 Questionnaire-based survey on soldiers’ attitudes, motivation and satisfaction

The analysis of defence reforms in both countries has so far been mainly focused on quantitative features such as number of soldiers being recruited and retained. It has only touched upon some qualitative (or psychological) factors which are vital to the success of AVF implementation – soldiers’ motivation, satisfaction and expectation of the military service. They are measured through a questionnaire-based survey in terms of morale, attitude, satisfaction with and motivation toward the military service and basic training. Three groups of soldiers were surveyed: Swedish and Taiwanese volunteer

⁵⁹⁵ Interview, participant TW-7.

⁵⁹⁶ Interview, participant TW-6.

⁵⁹⁷ DPP’s Defense Agenda, New Frontier Foundation, Tseng-Chang Su, June, 2013, pp.19-21

soldiers and Taiwanese conscripts. It is important to bear in mind that Taiwan still has conscripts as its AVF transition is not as advanced as Sweden. None of these survey data has previously been discussed and analysed.

Three respondents of the survey were different groups and were asked to fill out the questionnaire after they have signed up (Swedish and Taiwanese volunteer soldiers) or been drafted (Taiwanese conscripts) for military service and when they were in the midst of basic training. Therefore, from a retrospective point of view, respondents were asked the following questions: what factors motivated them to join the military? How were they satisfied with the military service? What did they expect from the military? How did they feel and assess about the quality of soldiers? Did they intend to pursue a military career? And if so, what factor influenced their decision?

The survey

This survey was initiated by the Swedish National Defence College in July 2010 in Gothenburg, with a total of eight countries participating including Sweden and Taiwan.⁵⁹⁸ The author represented Taiwan as one of the researchers. After agreement was reached, the original questionnaire was co-designed in English and then translated into the languages of the participating countries. The questionnaire contained closed questions which were divided into four parts: Part one focused on respondents' demographic information including age, gender, education, branch and type of service and family background. The survey questions started in the second part which measures soldiers' expectations and attitudes toward the military service; it also assessed the reasons and factors that influenced and motivated their decision to join voluntary military service. The third part investigated how the social context could have influenced the willingness of soldiers to join the military. It examined soldiers' self-identity within their roles in the armed forces, their perceptions of working conditions, and satisfaction with the quality of training in basic training centres/regiments. Finally, the last set of questions assessed soldiers' perceptions of the military's merits and values and their intention to pursue a military career. The survey data were analysed by using the statistical software Statistical Package for Social

⁵⁹⁸ The other six countries were: Switzerland, France, Belgium, Poland, Turkey and Japan.

Sciences (SPSS).

The survey on Swedish recruits was conducted by the Department of Leadership and Management of the Swedish National Defence College, which took place in February 2011 at two basic training schools: LV 6 in Halmstad and the Naval Base in Karlskrona during week three or four of basic military training. Being a member of the research team, the author was granted full access to the Swedish data in order to make comparison with Taiwanese soldiers. With the conduct of survey approved by the Manpower Division of MND, the Taiwanese survey was started in March 2011 in two major venues: the 903rd and 907th basic training regiments in northern and southern Taiwan respectively. To expand the sample size in order to get a wider range of soldiers to participate, soldiers who had recently finished their basic training and been deployed to the Combined Logistics Command and Air Force Headquarters were contacted to participate this survey.

Most questions contained either six or ten grades of the Likert Scale. For six-grade scales, grade one represents 'not at all', while grade six means 'absolutely agree'. For the purpose of discussion, the results were calculated through the dichotomous approach by combining (adding up) those who tend to agree and thus choose from grade four 'somewhat agree', grade five 'agree', to grade six 'absolutely agree'. By the same token, results from questions with ten-grade scale were handled in similar dichotomous manner.

Demographic description

Basic military training in Sweden is three months long. A total of 275 recruits participated in the survey. They were among the first batch of volunteer soldiers who were recruited after conscription ended in July 2010. The majority (74%) of participating Swedish recruits were between 20 and 22 years old. The female participants in the survey accounted for 10.5% of the entire sample. In terms of educational level, only a small number (0.7%) of people had completed the nine-year compulsory school education; the majority of the recruits stated that their highest level of civilian education is secondary or high school (84%) and 12% have university or

postgraduate education. With regard to military branches, recruits from all three services were surveyed.

The major difference between Swedish and Taiwanese samples was that Taiwanese samples contained two types of soldiers: volunteer soldiers and conscripts, as conscription will continue in Taiwan until the end of 2014. Both categories have to complete basic training, which is a five-week course conducted in basic training regiments. It took one month from March to April in 2011 to conduct the survey and collect data. In total, 656 soldiers took part in the survey, of which 357 were volunteer soldiers and 299 were conscripts. Taiwan's sample size is twice as large as that of Sweden, which reflects the larger size of Taiwan's armed forces.

The majority of Taiwanese soldier participants were between 20 and 25 years old (86%). Although selection of gender is not a key metric in this research, 47 female volunteer soldiers (7.2%) took part in the survey. The proportion of female soldiers in the sample coincidentally corresponds to the gender distribution within the Taiwanese military as a whole.⁵⁹⁹ As for the educational level, 47% of respondents received high school/vocational school diploma, 40.7% held university degrees, while 6.4% possessed postgraduate degrees; only 4.7% finished just the 9-year compulsory education (junior high school or below).⁶⁰⁰ In terms of arms of service, 51.5% were in the Army and 33.5% were in the Reserve Command. This is due to two reasons: 1. The Army is the largest branch of service, and 2. at the time the survey was conducted, all basic training regiments were under the Reserve Command.⁶⁰¹ There were 9.9% of respondents in the Air Force and 4.4% in the Combined Logistics Command.

Results

1. Expectations of basic training

The questionnaire started by asking about the soldier's expectations of basic training in

⁵⁹⁹ As of March 2013, females account for 7.6% of the entire personnel in Taiwan's armed forces.

⁶⁰⁰ Since the 1990s many junior colleges have been 'promoted' to university status, which results in the high entrance rates to the university.

⁶⁰¹ New recruits do not know their military branches until the lot-drawing; therefore a large proportion of soldiers specify their branches as the Reserve Command. After 1 January 2013, the basic training regiments have been shifted to Army's command.

terms of eight variables. Swedish recruits expressed very high expectations as all variables were agreed by more than 90% of surveyed recruits. Almost every new recruit (99%) stated that they expected a good team spirit from the boot camps (Figure 5-9), slightly less (97%) wished to receive physical challenges and personal benefits, while 91% anticipated benefits in civilian life. For personal development, 96% expected stronger self-discipline, 95% expected character-strengthening, 93% expected better resistance to stress, and also 93% anticipated high psychological stress from basic training.

Both Taiwanese volunteer soldiers and conscripts expected less from basic training in all eight variables. Volunteer soldiers demonstrated slightly higher expectation than conscripts in six variables with the self-discipline to be the highest (90.8%); it was followed by stress resistance (87%), physical challenge (85.7%), character-strengthening (83.8%), personal benefit (81.8%) and benefit in civilian life (74%). Conscripts, on the other hand, except on team spirit (91.3%) and psychological stress (80.9%) which were higher than volunteers, had the lowest expectations in the remaining six variables.

From the results, the Swedish recruits scored highly in all eight variables by showing very high expectations toward the basic training with all categories showing over 90%. They not only wished to receive more benefits, but they also expected to take on challenges and worked in a more disciplined environment with high stress so their physical and psychological strength could be enhanced. Taiwanese volunteer soldiers demonstrated slightly lower expectations, and expectations were even lower for Taiwanese conscripts, except in team spirit and psychological stress. It could thus be argued that Swedish soldiers expected more rigorous training than Taiwanese volunteer soldiers and conscripts. In other words, Swedes were more ambitious about what they expected of basic training.




Figure 5-9 Expectations of basic military training

2. Motivation to join the military

One of the crucial tasks of this survey was to identify soldiers' motivation for joining the military. Given the fact that Swedish recruits were all serving on a voluntary basis, not surprisingly, a high percentage (85%) of the surveyed recruits indicated that they were highly motivated to serve in the military. According to a majority (95%) of the surveyed recruits, the high motivation in basic military training was attributed to the quality of their superiors, while 89% felt that the atmosphere in the group was very important. These were followed by the chance to take leadership responsibility which was supported by 74% of the respondents (Figure 5-10).

Taiwanese volunteer soldiers also felt that the opportunity to exercise leadership could motivate them to join the military (74%). Good superiors (63.6%) and atmosphere in the group (61.1%) were somewhat equally important factors to Taiwanese volunteer soldiers. There was a considerable drop in percentages when conscripts were asked whether they might be motivated by these three factors. Conscripts showed strong resistance towards these three factors, and only 14.7% would have joined the military in order to experience leadership. Very few, around 8% of conscripts would be inspired by atmosphere in their group and good superiors.




Figure 5-10 Motivation to serve in the military

3. Reasons for joining the military and completing basic military training

To identify the reasons and factors for new recruits to join the military and enter basic training, the next set of questions were designed based on 11 variables. Seven out of 11 reasons/factors were considered by the majority of Swedish respondents as influential on their commitment to join the military and complete basic military training (see Figure 5-11). The high figure of 96% of Swedish recruits felt that personal development was the most important reason. Contributing to national security ranked second as 85% of recruits highlighted this factor; it was followed by helping people in need, which was agreed by 83%. Next was friendship mentioned by 79%; it was followed by contributing to world peace (77%), travelling to foreign countries (70%) and experiencing adventure (63%) as reasons mentioned by Swedish recruits. Monetary factors seemed to be trivial for Swedish recruits as motives to complete basic training. Most Swedish recruits were not inspired by monetary factors as the opportunity to earn money was only agreed by 31% with an even lower figure for those expecting to finance future studies (9%). Quite a few (12%) chose the military because they had no better option, and interestingly, lifestyle in the armed forces was the most irrelevant factor (7%). The survey result is associated with what is claimed by SAF that the majority of soldiers join the SAF not for the salary, it is the motivation and other things

attracting them to join.⁶⁰²

Due to Taiwan's non-participation in international peace missions, the variable 'travelling to foreign countries' was highly unlikely to have been selected and therefore this question was not surveyed. Among ten other variables, the most obvious difference between Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers was found in lifestyle and money. Contrary to Swedish soldiers' very low approval of lifestyle, Taiwanese volunteer soldiers valued the lifestyle as the most important factor (75.9%); nevertheless, it was perceived by conscripts as one of the least important factors (13.4%). Salary was another major factor; while only less than one third of Swedes felt that earning money was important, as high as 74.2% of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers considered that money was important for them to serve in military. Conscripts held opposite views as they were much less interested in earning money in the military (11.7%). Similar patterns were found in the variable 'financing future studies', which was supported by a majority of volunteer soldiers (63%), whereas only 10% of conscripts agreed. All ten variables were perceived by a majority of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers as important factors with the variable 'no better option' being considered slightly important (51%). This figure could be interpreted as suggesting that a military career is not a job option of last resort. On the other hand, Taiwanese conscripts seemed to be resistant to the military service and basic training as they tended to disagree on nine out of ten variables ranging from 'adventure' (38.8%) to 'financing future studies' (10.4%). Only 'friendship' received a slight majority (58.5%) of approval. These results confirm that it will be quite challenging for Taiwan armed forces to attract and recruit conscripts to join the voluntary service and will, therefore have to look at wider civilian society for new personnel.

⁶⁰² Interviewee, participant SE-2.




Figure 5-11 Reasons for completing the basic military training

4. Who and what can motivate soldiers to join the military?

With regard to who and what can motivate soldiers to join basic training, respondents were given 12 variables to rate who and what were influential to their decision in joining the military. The most influential factor was ‘exciting training’ agreed by 95% of the Swedish surveyed recruits. It was followed by ‘team spirit’ which gained approval from 93% of recruits. Whereas money, with an approval rate of merely 20%, had an insignificant influence on recruits’ motivation (Figure 5-12). From the point of view of a majority of respondents, direct superiors, such as platoon leader (75%), company commander (62%) and squad leader (53%) to some degrees were able to motivate recruits; nevertheless, higher ranking superiors such as battalion commanders had lower influence (45%). This confirms the direct contact with recruits, or closeness between recruits and superiors, influences the extent of motivation among recruits. Furthermore, Swedish recruits considered that the influence of direct superiors on their motivation to join the military was less influential than the influence of their colleagues (83%), support from the environment (75%), and from parents (71%). As high as 62% of respondents considered the factor of personal benefit in civilian life as motivating. However, motivation based on tradition only met with the approval of just under half of

the sample (49%).

In contrast to Swedish soldiers, money was considered by Taiwanese volunteer soldiers the most important factor for them to join the military (81.2%). Support from parents (77.9%) and surrounding environment (71.7%) were also crucial factors. They were followed by exciting training (71.1%), team spirit (70.3%) and colleagues (67.5%). Tradition (59.9%) and personal benefit in civilian life (55.5%) could be somewhat influential. In terms of direct superiority, squad leaders (63.9%) were more influential than company commanders (58.8%), platoon leaders (56%), and battalion commanders (52.4%). Conscripts apparently were less likely to be motivated and influenced by these factors; with the exception of team spirit (53.5%), the rest of the variables did not acquire approval from the majority of conscripts. Exciting training (49.5%) and money (47.2%) can slightly inspire conscripts. Support from environment (43%), parents (40%) and colleagues (38%) were relatively lower. Direct superiors were not able to motivate conscripts as only around one third of surveyed conscripts stated that they were likely to be influenced by their direct superiors from squad leaders (34.1%) to battalion commanders (28.8%). Likewise, personal benefit in civilian life (34%) and tradition (32%) were less likely to inspire draftees. Again, the results clearly indicated that conscripts were a difficult group from which to recruit to the AVF.




Figure 5-12 Who and what motivates soldiers to join the military?

5. Soldiers' self-assessment of their quality of new recruits

To assess the quality of new recruits, participants were requested to assess themselves and their military colleagues by evaluating 13 variables on motivation, ambition, level of education, civilian professional skills, military skills, reliability, morals and ethics, social skills, fairness, firmness, friendliness, physical fitness, and following rules and regulations. Swedes enjoyed very high self-assessment on quality, over 90% on every variable, except on 'civilian professional skills'. There was a very positive assessment on the general qualities of the Swedish military personnel (not their own) among surveyed recruits, indicating Swedish soldiers felt that the general quality of soldiers is very high, with the approval rates of variables ranging from 92% to 97% (Figure 5-13). The only variable that was significantly lower was the civilian professional skills (72%). The favourable results were in accordance with the quality of volunteer soldiers assessed by the SAF, which showed a significant improvement compared with conscripts.⁶⁰³

Taiwanese volunteer soldiers in general are also satisfied with the quality of new recruits as a whole, but to a much lesser extent in comparison to their Swedish counterparts. Unlike Swedes' high approval rating soldier's quality, Taiwanese volunteer soldiers gave lower approval rates to all variables of soldiers' quality. Surveyed volunteer soldiers felt that the general quality of the entire new recruits was good, ranging from 57.4% to 75.1%. Among all variables, volunteer soldiers were satisfied most with the 'physical fitness' of new recruits (75%). It was succeeded by 'following rules and regulations' (73.4%), and 'firmness' (71.7%). Reliability, morals and ethics, military skills, friendliness, social skills and ambition were agreed by volunteer soldiers between 60% and 70%. The other four variables received slightly lower approval from volunteer soldiers: 'civilian professional skills' (59.9%), 'level of education' (58%) and 'fairness' (57.4%). The variable of motivation was agreed by 59.4% of volunteers, indicating that from their point of view the motivation of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers was perceived to be mediocre.

Conscripts perceived the quality of the entire group of new recruits to be much lower with more stereotyped masculine views. Similarly, they also felt that new recruits had

⁶⁰³ Emma Jonsson & Berit Carlstedt, 2012, p.38.

good ‘physical fitness’ (76.3%), which could be due to the new standard raised by the MND in recent years to improve soldiers’ physical strength. It was followed by ‘firmness’ (67.2%), ‘following rules and regulations’ (65.9%) and ‘military skills’ (60.5%). The ‘morals and ethics’ (55.5%) and ‘reliability’ (50.2%) were only assessed as slightly positive. Conscripts were less enthusiastic concerning the remaining: ‘social skills’ (47.2%), ‘friendliness’ (37.8%), ‘fairness’ (36.1%), and ‘civilian professional skills’ (31.1%). They tended to disagree with the factors of ‘ambition’ (27.4%), ‘level of education’ (24.4%), and ‘motivation’ (21.4%) of recruits.




Figure 5-13 Soldiers' self-assessment of quality

6. Recruits' self-assessment of working attitudes

Recruits were further invited to assess themselves in terms of working attitudes with four variables. A very high proportion of the surveyed Swedish recruits (99%) claimed to have helped colleagues with a task that was too hard. Similarly, almost every recruit (99%) declared that they actively participated in group tasks (Figure 5-14). Besides, 93% of the respondents view themselves as self-disciplined and claimed to do things correctly even if they were not monitored. However, if self-discipline is measured indirectly, by the degree of compliance with rules and information, the numbers were slightly lower, with 90% claiming to follow military rules and regulations.

Taiwanese volunteer soldiers and conscripts evaluated themselves along similar lines, but slightly lower. A high proportion (91.3%) stated that they will help colleagues with difficult tasks. It was followed by ‘self-disciplined and can carry out tasks correctly without monitoring’ (90.2%). If self-discipline was assessed through the compliance with rules and regulations, a lower result is observed (82.6%). Volunteer soldiers also stated that they actively participated in group tasks (88.5%). Unlike previous categories in which sharp contrasts were observed between volunteer soldiers and conscripts, conscripts showed rather positive attitudes toward the basic training. In particular, a very high proportion of conscripts (96.3%) would help colleagues. They also actively participated in group tasks (84.3%), were self-disciplined and did things correctly (81.9%), and to a less extent, followed rules and regulations (73.2%).




Figure 5-14 The surveyed recruits' self-assessment of working attitudes

7. Identification with military roles

In terms of identification with soldier's roles, recruits were given three types of core business/role of the armed forces to identify: peacekeeper, war fighter, and humanitarian aid worker. Due to the multi-tasked nature of the armed forces, it is possible that soldiers can simultaneously play different roles, so these three role models are not mutually exclusive. The majority of the Swedish recruits identified themselves as ‘peacekeeper’ (88%) followed by ‘war fighter’ (63%) (Figure 5-15). These two roles emphasised the soldier's military tasks in the armed forces. Much fewer (42%) recruits agreed that a soldier is a ‘humanitarian aid worker’, which underlined the social functions and tasks of the armed forces.

Common sense, with the existing military threat from the PRC, might indicate that Taiwanese soldiers would see themselves more as war fighters than other two roles. Nonetheless, as discussed in early chapters, Taiwan's armed forces since 2009 have made a strategic shift by incorporating the HA/DR operations as one of its core responsibilities, which has influenced soldiers' identification of roles. This phenomenon was reflected in the survey results, as the majority of both volunteer soldiers (78%) and conscripts (63.5%) identified themselves as humanitarian aid workers. Furthermore, despite the fact that Taiwanese armed forces have no Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) before nor are they likely to do so in the near future, 'peacekeeper' was nevertheless selected and ranked the second, agreed by 59.9% of volunteers and 34.8% of conscripts. The traditional role of war fighter was selected by 58.3% of volunteers and 34.8% of conscripts. Apparently, the strategic shift in missions has made soldiers feel that the non-traditional role of 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) and social functions of the military have become a higher priority.

According to results, counter-intuitively, soldiers from both countries did not uniformly consider war-fighting as the core business of the armed forces, but instead choosing the other two less kinetic functions, which somewhat deviates from the nature and characteristics of the armed forces. It is understandable that, with the absence of war for over two centuries and having conducted various peacekeeping operations in the past decades, has made a large proportion of Swedish soldiers see their role more as peacekeepers. An interesting but ambivalent result was derived from the responses of the Taiwanese soldiers, as the unlikely role of peacekeeper was perceived similarly to that of war fighter, despite Taiwan still facing a military threat from the PRC.




Figure 5-15 Identification with the military roles

8. Satisfaction with basic training

An important purpose of the survey was to evaluate soldiers' satisfaction with basic training through nine variables. Generally speaking, Swedish soldiers expressed higher satisfaction in eight out of nine variables. Most surveyed recruits felt that they were treated well by their superiors (94%). This was followed by 'mutual respect for one another in the platoon' which was agreed by 92%. With regard to the future prospects of basic training, 91% agreed that the basic training they received was of a very high quality, and accordingly 89% were satisfied with the quality of training. They were also content with the quality of cooperation in their platoons (88%). Also, a high proportion of recruits (89%) were proud to be a member of their military branches. With regard to the situation of living and training in the boot camp, 87% were satisfied. However, when asking soldiers whether they intended to stay in their current branch of service, 73% would choose the same service again. Regarding the relevance of basic training for military tasks, only 55% agreed that basic training was very relevant to the war-fighting operations (Figure 5-16). This result indicates that the recruits were in general very satisfied with the training, but they did not perceive the training to be specifically aimed at military tasks.

The highest satisfaction score for Taiwanese volunteer soldiers was found in the mutual respect in the platoon, as around 78% of both volunteer soldiers and conscripts agreed with this variable. To a similar degree, 77.3% were content with the high quality of cooperation within their platoons. Three quarters of volunteer soldiers were happy with the way they were treated by their superiors and also they liked their branches of service. 72.5% of volunteer soldiers believed that the basic training was relevant to war-fighting operations. Regarding the quality of training, 70.6% agreed that this was high; 66.2% were satisfied with the training quality and 64.1% were happy about their current situation in the boot camps. Taiwanese conscripts on average expressed much lower satisfaction with basic training. They were satisfied with mutual respect within their platoon (77.9%), relevance of basic training for war-fighting (70.2%), and their branches of service (65%). The majority of conscripts did not think the quality of basic training was high (46.5%), and therefore they were less satisfied with the quality of training (43.1%) and current situation at the boot camps (37.8%). However, conscripts were somewhat content with the quality of cooperation within their platoons (60.2%),

and slightly more than half (55.2%) of conscripts felt they were well treated by superiors. In terms of branches of service, 74.8% of volunteer soldiers and 64.9% of conscripts were proud to be a member of their Service branches. But in terms of their current branches of service, if they could choose again, around 65% of both types of soldiers claimed that they would stay. These results indicate that volunteer soldiers were satisfied with the basic training but conscripts were not. Nevertheless, both types of soldiers perceived the training to be specifically aimed at military tasks. This was probably a reflection of the fact that the content of basic training focusing on war-fighting against military invasion.




Figure 5-16 Satisfaction with basic training

9. Impact of basic training on knowledge and skills

To explore whether basic training could enhance soldiers' knowledge and skills, recruits were assessed with four variables which were designed for this purpose. In terms of skills and knowledge acquired from basic training, 93% of Swedish recruits felt that their basic military knowledge increased along with their basic training. Furthermore, military training could increase skills for a recruit's specific position (79%) and social skills (55%). However, recruits disagreed with the statement that basic training could increase knowledge of foreign cultures (18%), see Figure 5-17.

Unlike most variables where Taiwanese conscripts tended to disagree or had lower approval rates than volunteer soldiers, conscripts highly agreed with the first two

variables that their general military knowledge (85.6%) and specific position skills (77.9%) were enhanced through basic training, which were higher than those of volunteer soldiers (78.4% and 70.6% respectively). As for social skills, 75.1% of volunteer soldiers believed that the basic training enhanced their social skills; this was agreed by 56% of conscripts. It is interesting to note that Taiwanese volunteer soldiers recognised a slight increase in their knowledge on foreign cultures during basic training, while only 28% of conscripts nodded.




Figure 5-17 Perceived impact of basic training on knowledge and skills

10. The Intention to pursue a military career

An important aim of the survey was to discover how many soldiers were interested in pursuing a career in the armed forces. To address this issue, results showed that as many as 93% of the Swedish recruits (surveyed during basic training) had an intention to pursue a military career. By contrast, 357 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers were asked about their willingness to extend the contracts after the end of four-year term.⁶⁰⁴ A total of 55% (196) of surveyed volunteer soldiers claimed that they intended to serve for another four-year term. Although the intention of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers to pursue military career was lower, the result correlates with the 53% retention rate in 2012 described in the previous section, which showed an increase in the retention rate in past two years.

External motivating factors on soldiers' decision to pursue a military career

⁶⁰⁴ 299 conscripts did not participate in this question.

The survey also explored not just the intention to pursue a military career but soldiers' motives for doing so. For Swedish recruits who intended to pursue a military career, support from the private sphere was crucial (90%), viz. support from family, friends and partners. The high regard and respect for officers and other ranks in society were also significant factors in motivating recruits to pursue a military career, as 74% felt that officers were highly regarded in society, whereas 70% believed that being in military service was respected in society. Furthermore, 62% of recruits might be encouraged by the high prestige of officers in society. Tradition was not generally considered as an important reason for pursuing a military career as it was supported by a slight majority (54%). Most surveyed recruits who were interested in pursuing a military career were not motivated by family tradition, as it was only claimed by 11% (Figure 5-18).

Similarly, but to a lesser extent, among 196 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers who desired to dedicate themselves to a military career, 74.4% expressed the view that support from the private sphere would play a part in motivating their decision. The high regard and high prestige of officers in the society were also influential (both accounting for around 65%). However, when it came to respect for military service in society, the approval rate dropped slightly to 57.9%. A fairly large proportion of surveyed soldiers (77.9%) considered that tradition was not essential for them to pursue a military career. Nevertheless, more than one third (37%) claimed that joining the military was a family tradition, which could be ascribed to historical reasons.⁶⁰⁵



Figure 5-18 Motives for pursuing a military career

⁶⁰⁵ This is especially obvious in the families of so called 'mainlanders' who retreated to Taiwan with the Nationalist Army in 1949. A higher proportion of the second generations of mainlanders choose military as a career, somewhat reflecting a family tradition.

11. Influential factors from within the military on soldiers' decision to pursue a military career

Having examined the external (social and traditional) factors that could motivate soldiers to pursue a military career, for the last set of the questions, all recruits were asked about the factors from within the military which could influence and motivate their decisions to pursue a career in the armed forces. Among five variables, Swedes were obviously influenced by good superiors (97%) and good team spirit (95%). Colleagues in the platoon could somewhat inspire recruits on their decisions (53%). Specific superiors to the recruits seemed to be irrelevant to soldiers' decision as only half felt platoon leaders and 31% felt that squad leaders could inspire their decisions to pursue a military career (Figure 5-19).

Taiwanese conscripts were generally resistant to joining the military; nevertheless, it was beyond anticipation that a rarely high percentage of conscripts (93%) stated that good team spirit could motivate their inclination to pursue a military career, whereas 84.3% of volunteer soldiers might be motivated by this factor. For military superiors as a whole, 82.9% of volunteer soldiers agreed that they could be motivated by good superiors; while only a slight majority (56.5%) of conscripts expressed the same opinions. Although more than half of the volunteer soldiers claimed that their decision can be influenced by platoon leaders (56%) and squad leaders (58%), it was difficult for them to motivate conscripts as very few would possibly be influenced by platoon leaders (16.7%) and squad leaders (15.1%).




Figure 5-19 Influence from within the military on decision to pursue a military career

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the factors and conditions that will either assist or hamper the process of AVF transition and defence reform in both countries. Generally speaking, the SAF enjoys a relatively favourable public support for the armed forces and for international missions, although support for the ISAF has reduced. In addition, defence based on voluntary participation also showed weaker support; the likely reason is that many Swedes do not know about or do not pay attention to defence issues. Perception of Russia as a threat has slightly increased in the past three years. Although the majority still do not favour joining the NATO, support for this has increased. Like a pendulum, in the past two years Swedish defence strategy has seen a swing back from expeditionary operations to territorial defence.

Legislation was highlighted by many senior defence officials as a crucial factor in its implementation of personnel reform, as it serves as the foundation for recruiting the second largest group of personnel – part-time reserve soldiers. The Swedish DIB also plays a role in the reform as the government demands the funds to be freed from buying the ‘on-the-shelf’ equipment in order to subsidise the personnel reform. The recruitment of personnel is not carried out by SAF but rather by a government recruiting agency; the recruiting campaigns have successfully attracted public attention. Ex-conscripts have been a major contributor to the initial success of recruitment. The discontent with specialist officer reform among officer corps could be a potential obstacle if this reform is not handled properly. The SAF thus needs to pay extra attention to this issue. In terms of funding, the SAF is guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance to have a flat defence budget until 2014 to carry out the reform; however, after 2014 the SAF has requested more funding to keep the reform running.

In Taiwan, improved Cross Strait relations since 2008 has altered the perception of the threat among Taiwanese people, especially youth cohorts, who feel that the security of Taiwan has been less important and has shifted from the military to the economic front. Traditionally, Taiwanese people show lower support to the armed forces but in general people favour the AVF. The low social status of military personnel is mainly due to tradition and the operational vacuum in the past decades. Most importantly, the recent

incident of a corporal's death has dramatically impacted on public image of the military and the recruitment of soldiers. The budget is another major problem. Although the MND has been keen to raise the base salary for volunteer soldiers, the central government is unwilling to appropriate funds to subsidise the AVF implementation. Another important factor is the inflexible and old fashioned internal management which has prevented soldiers to remain in service.

The factors of motivation, satisfaction and expectation were analysed by conducting a questionnaire-based survey, an important empirical part of the thesis. Among three groups of respondents, the majority of Swedish soldiers showed much higher motivation, satisfaction, and expectation toward military service; they are also more likely to pursue a military career. Taiwanese volunteer soldiers, in general, also showed good motivation and satisfaction with the military service, and responded positively to those variables. The lowest assessments on motivation, satisfaction and expectation toward the military service were found on Taiwanese conscripts, indicating that this group of people is difficult to recruit from.

Emerging factors: low birth rate

Finally, in addition to the important factors and conditions discussed in each section, there is an emerging factor which will be likely to affect the implementation of defence reform or the post-reform armed forces in the future. In both Sweden and Taiwan, a factor that could affect the AVF and personnel reform will be the low birth rate because both Sweden and Taiwan are among the countries in the world with the lowest birth rates (In 224 countries in the world, Sweden ranks 187th and Taiwan ranks 216th in terms of birth rate).⁶⁰⁶ Having predicted the number of draftees, the armed forces should plan ahead to deal with the 'war for talent'.

Through qualitative and quantitative empirical approaches, this study has explored the post-decision implementation of AVF and personnel reform in Sweden and Taiwan. Results show that both countries have spent similar and also different kinds of efforts for their strategic goals and objectives of the transition. Facilitating factors and

⁶⁰⁶<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2054rank.html?countryname=Sweden&countrycode=sw®ionCode=eur&rank=187#sw>, accessed 29 August, 2013.

impeding obstacles were also identified. Now important questions arise: ‘Which transition is successful and which transition is problematic?’ and ‘Which transition is doing better than the other?’ After concluding the empirical part of the thesis, next chapter will try to answer these questions by engaging in an integrated comparison on various issues discussed and discovered from the empirical chapters.

CHAPTER 6

The Two Cases Compared and the Implications

6.1 Introduction

The decline of mass armed forces (MAF) is used as the theoretical framework for this study. However, although much has been written on the themes of conscription and all-volunteer force (AVF) transition in Western states, the literature focuses mainly on why decisions were made with little analysis of how the transformations were implemented and managed. Also, research on the MAF in Asia has long been a neglected theme: in the post Cold War era. Furthermore, comparisons of AVF transition between Eastern and Western states were rarely made. The on-going AVF transformation in Sweden and Taiwan provide researchers an opportunity to fill this knowledge gap, and indeed, this empirical research has deepened the understanding of this neglected theme.

Among many theorists of decline of the MAF, Haltiner and Burk's arguments have shown two contrasting yet important models in analysing the causal logic of the decline of MAF. Haltiner's international strategic model (3 arguments) in general can justify the AVF transformations in the West. With a reduced military threat, it appears that Haltiner's model offers a persuasive account of the Swedish case. The shift in priorities to missions that make a contribution to international peace and stability as the most likely basis for the deployment of force has added pressure to shift away from the MAF. Nevertheless, Haltiner's model is less convincing if relied on to explain Taiwan as international factors are less important. Taiwan has not joined a defence alliance, still faces threat from the PRC, and does not perform international operations. Burk's integrated approaches are rather applicable to the case of Taiwan in that domestic politics and social-economic factors play a key role in the decision making. Both countries represent good examples of the AVF transformation in their respective geographical regions, as Sweden is the first Scandinavian state while Taiwan stands out in East Asia in ending conscription in the post-Cold War era.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁷ The Japanese Self-Defence Forces have long been a volunteer force. Although conscription still formally exists in PRC and the Philippines, in reality the recruitment of the armed forces has been mainly on voluntary basis and universal conscription has yet been fully enforced. The long stand-off between South and North Korea makes it difficult for both to terminate conscription in the near future. Therefore, Taiwan can be considered as the first East Asian country to shift to an AVF after the end of Cold War.

Sweden and Taiwan have been selected for comparison in this study as both share several characteristics in terms of their position in international affairs. Similarities can be found in their strategic postures. First, both countries have not joined a defence alliance as Sweden maintained neutrality and its military non-alignment throughout Cold War. Taiwan, due to its special international status, is banned from joining any defence alliance. Second, both have faced a serious military threat in the past. Sweden encountered threat from the Soviet Union during Cold War while Taiwan has been constantly facing PRC military threat since 1949. And finally, both have coincidentally decided in 2009 to suspend conscription.

6.2 Contexts, goals, metrics and factors

In the empirical part of the thesis, three approaches - interviews, surveys and documents - were adopted for data collection. This study looks at the two AVF transitions from three perspectives, namely: from states' perspectives, the criteria, variables and the priorities considered and adopted by both countries. Second, how states draw on the experiences and lessons from other AVF cases. And, third, according to author's judgment as an analyst of the nature and conditions of a successful AVF implementation. The empirical questions of this study: What strategic goal and the specific objectives it contains are both countries trying to achieve their AVF? What are the metrics and criteria that both countries have taken so far to implement their transition? And finally, what are the influential factors that can either help or impede their implementation process? The first question was answered in chapter three regarding what strategic goals and objectives were set by those cases. In general, both are trying to produce an AVF that is capable, but different in purpose. Sweden desires to build a more capable expeditionary force that can be quickly deployed for international missions; Taiwan aims to build a smaller but smarter AVF that focuses on homeland defiance and to conduct HA/DR missions.

Shaped by contrasting historical, geostrategic and domestic circumstances, these countries' experiences of personnel reform ostensibly have little in common. Indeed, despite both have faced serious military threats while remaining militarily non-aligned, their decisions to transition to AVF were taken in very different contexts, with different aims. Sweden has not faced a threat to its territory since the Cold War, and has gradually abandoned its military non-alignment by participating more frequently in international peace operations, underpinned by its aim to build a capability-based expeditionary force.

Taiwan, meanwhile, still faces a military threat from China despite the cross-strait détente that has endured since 2008. It aims to enhance its deterrence capability, to defend the homeland in wartime and conduct disaster-relief operations in peace time. Yet despite the differing contexts, these concurrent transformations have faced a number of similar challenges, which presents an opportunity to examine the critical issues surrounding personnel reform in practice.

Sweden became the first Scandinavian country to suspend conscription. This came as part of a broader package of reforms adopted in 2008, including specialist-officer reform, the disbanding of international units, and the establishment of regular and reserve units, as outlined in the 2009 Defence Bill, '*A Functional Defence*'. The overarching aim was to transform the territorial defence force into one that could be effectively deployed on international operations. The 2009 'Declaration of Solidarity' saw a further shift, guaranteeing military support to Sweden's neighbours and EU countries in case of crisis, and expecting the same in return.

Suspending conscription was a crucial part of this reform, and was completed, in the main, by July 2010. Due to the higher personnel costs associated with a volunteer force, the transition has been coupled with considerable military downsizing. By 2014, personnel will be reduced from 65,000 to around 50,000; 28,000 of these will serve in regular and reserve units which can be deployed overseas, replacing the former, ad-hoc units previously deployed on international operations. Meanwhile, the remaining 22,000 personnel will serve in forty battalions of the Home Guard, dealing with domestic tasks.

Such considerations recall the very different calculations of Taiwan. Facing an ongoing military threat from China, and with participation in multinational peace operations not an option for Taiwan, the country's transition to a volunteer force and reduction of active-duty military personnel is taking place within the very different context of a focus on homeland defence, and a military strategy based on 'resolute defence and credible deterrence' aimed at China. This saw President Ma Ying-jeou, in his 2008 presidential campaign, vow to respond to concerns over the erosion of the country's military capability (the result of recently shortened terms of conscription) by suspending conscription within four to six years.

The implementation of this reform since 2009 has involved a step-by-step reduction in both the military establishment and conscript ratio. In contrast to Sweden, this was to take more than five years and occur in three stages, concluding by the end of 2014. Most importantly, unlike the exclusively volunteer model adopted by Sweden, those

who do not volunteer in Taiwan will still be required to undergo a four-month infantry basic-training programme to form a reservoir of reservist manpower and will be recalled every two years to sharpen their skills as reservists.

With the first and second stages of the all-volunteer transition successfully completed, the third stage, from January 2011 to the end of 2014, is expected to see the proportion of volunteer soldiers grow incrementally by 10 percent each year. At the same time, a significant reduction in military personnel, from 275,000 to 215,000, is underway, with the actual end-strength of volunteer personnel to be 176,000.

Briefly, for the SAF, in terms of the recruitment of regulars, the experience of the volunteer force has so far been positive. The main personnel inflow is through three-month basic training, and having satisfactorily attained recruitment targets for regulars over the past two years – especially in 2012, when target was reached satisfactorily. Qualitatively, according to SAF assessments, volunteer soldiers are also highly motivated and more competent than conscripts in terms of intelligence, leadership potential, and both physical and psychological ability. Meanwhile, the recruitment of females has also been a key, and the proportion of females among regular soldiers has increased in the past three years. The SAF has also effectively targeted youth with non-EU backgrounds and second generation immigrants for recruitment.

Despite positive results with regulars, however, recruiting other personnel has been more problematic. Due to a two year delay in the passage of employment legislation, the recruitment of reservists did not start until July 2012. Having recruited only around 1,600 reservists in 2012, the SAF were forced to postpone the objective of recruiting 9,500 reserve soldiers by 2018 to 2023. In terms of the Home Guard, meanwhile, the SAF aims to fill 16,600 positions by 2022, with a further 5,100 to be recruited locally by voluntary defence organisations. Yet it has proven difficult to attract bright, young people to the Home Guard due to its unfavourable reputation. The planned rebranding of the Home Guard will thus be crucial.

A final consideration is the creation of the cadre of specialist officers – a subset of senior NCOs, as in the US military. As part of broader government plans to eliminate the old, class-based hierarchical society, the NCO cadre was abolished in the 1980s, resulting in a shortage of specialists. Senior NCO ranks have since been re-introduced, under the title of ‘specialist officers’, with these positions to be filled by existing officers. This process has progressed rapidly, the proportion of specialist officers among NCOs having increased from 8 percent in 2010 to 45 percent in 2012. By 2020, the total

number of officers will be reduced from some 9,000 to 4,100, while specialist officers will be increased to 5,100.

While the Swedish government had expected all aspects of the broader personnel reform to be accomplished by 2014, the SAF have stressed that, due to ongoing budget constraints and other issues – which have also delayed full implementation – transformation will not be completed until 2019. At the same time, the armed forces have also claimed that the government's reluctance to increase defence expenditure after 2013 may leave it no choice but to mothball core naval and air force assets, while the sustained underinvestment in defence led Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson to highlight in January the country's incapacity to defend itself, alone, for more than a week.⁶⁰⁸

Indeed, although Sweden's defence reform emphasises participation in international operations, recent incidents, including Russia's simulated bomber strikes on Sweden in March and the flight of a Russian spy plane close to its airspace in April, have caused Sweden to re-assess its defence priorities.⁶⁰⁹ These events have not only caused a majority of Swedes (83 percent) to doubt Sweden's ability to defend itself, but have led to increased support for de jure NATO membership (up to 32 percent from 23 percent two years ago). They have also led to calls, in some quarters, for a return to territorial defence, casting a shadow over recent personnel reforms.

In contrast to the favourable recruitment results of the SAF, The recruitment of volunteer soldiers in Taiwan has so far been difficult, with recent targets seldom achieved. In 2012, only 72 percent of the 15,000 target was achieved. Yet recruitment targets in the final stages are even more ambitious: 23,000 and 39,000 in 2013 and 2014, respectively. A further cause for concern is the aversion of young people to service in the most rigorous branches. The army, for example, achieved barely half of its target in 2012, while the marines and military police recruited only around 45 percent. Nonetheless, the recruitment of female soldiers has been more successful than expected, and the MND has raised the target for female personnel from 8 to 12 percent.

In terms of the quality of soldiers, according to a recent MND survey, most officers were satisfied with the training and performance of volunteers, despite the average educational level being below that of conscripts. Motivation was found to be generally

⁶⁰⁸ The Local, Report confirms 'one-week defence' analysis, 15 Feb, 2013, <<http://www.thelocal.se/46212/20130215/>>, accessed 25 Mar, 2013.

⁶⁰⁹ The Local, Russian spy plane spotted in Swedish strait, 25 Apr 2013, <<http://www.thelocal.se/47542/20130425/>>, accessed 12 Jun 2013.

good, but likely to drop after a certain period in service. This reflects a negative trend in the retention of volunteer soldiers, with rates in the last three years under 50 percent.

These difficulties relate to the military's public image. Having not participated in significant operations for decades, the public increasingly sees the military as unnecessary. Its reputation has also been damaged by various incidents, with the recent death by heatstroke of a conscript corporal provoking unprecedented national anger. To prevent further deterioration in recruitment and retention, it is therefore essential that Taiwan's military radically overhauls its culture and old fashioned management in order to regain public support.

Like Sweden, budget restraints have caused problems in implementation and impeded the MND plans to increase soldiers' pay to twice the minimum wage. Without a substantial budget increase to assist the transition, the US has expressed concern about the potential hollowing out of Taiwan's military resulting from the allocation of insufficient resources to the recruitment and retention of volunteers, and the diversion of expenditure from weapons acquisition and near-term training.

Summary of survey results

To look at the transition from soldier's psychological perspective, from the surveys conducted in Sweden and Taiwan with regard to expectation from basic military training, Swedish soldiers expected more rigorous training than Taiwanese soldiers and conscripts. In other words, Swedes were more ambitious about what they expected of basic training. In terms of the motivation to join the military, in general, Swedish soldiers showed a higher motivation to serve in the military as volunteers than Taiwanese volunteer soldiers. As for reasons to join the military and completing basic military training, a very high percentage of Swedish recruits felt that personal development and exciting training was the most important reason, and monetary factors seemed to be trivial for Swedish recruits as motives, while Taiwanese volunteer soldiers considered that money was the most important factor for them to serve. In terms of soldiers' self-assessment of their quality of new recruits, there was a very positive assessment on the general qualities of the Swedish military personnel (not their own) among surveyed recruits, indicating that Swedish soldiers felt that the general quality of soldiers is very high. Unlike Swedes' high approval rating for the quality of their soldier, Taiwanese volunteer soldiers felt that the quality of the entire new recruits was good, but with slightly lower approval rates than that of Swedes.

As for the self-assessment of working attitudes, both Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers claimed they have positive working attitudes. When it comes to the identification with military roles, the majority of the Swedish recruits identified themselves as ‘peacekeeper’ followed by ‘war fighter’; while more Taiwanese soldiers identified themselves as humanitarian aid workers than as warfighters and peacekeepers. Soldiers’ satisfaction with military service is crucial to their intention to stay longer in the military. Swedish soldiers expressed higher satisfaction with military service, including how they are treated, and the quality and facility of basic training. Generally speaking, Taiwanese soldiers are also satisfied with their military service and basic training, but to a lesser extent than that for Swedes. For Swedish recruits who intended to pursue a military career, support from family, friends and partners is important, which is similarly confirmed in Taiwan. With regard to the willingness to pursue a military career, a very high (93%) of Swedish soldiers had intentions of pursuing a military career. By contrast, only 55% of surveyed Taiwanese volunteer soldiers claimed that they intended to serve longer. Team spirit is found to be an important motivating factor which was chosen by most Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers.

The statistics gathered from this survey have shown a highly positive trend for the Swedish AVF transformation. It also shows a positive but to a less degree for Taiwan’s AVF transition. One important issue needs to be addressed here. In contrast to Swedish ex-conscripts, which account for the majority of current regular and reserve soldiers, Taiwanese conscripts, according to this survey’s results, are much less interested in joining the military as volunteer soldiers. They have more critical views of the basic training and the existing incentives offered by the armed forces were not attractive to them. They were also less likely to be inspired by their superiors to join the military. Conscripts’ affinity for traditional military values has declined, and especially their enthusiasm, indicating that they are less interested in pursuing a military career. This is a warning sign for Taiwan’s armed forces in the midst of AVF transformation, which could cause difficulty in recruiting conscripts into the AVF.

6.3 Comparisons between two cases

This study examines the implementation process of the two countries, and compares these two concurrent AVF cases as both are trying to make successful transition. Although both share some strategic similarities, both countries set different strategic goals and objectives for their AVF transitions, adopt different measures and have different metrics, and are affected or assisted by different factors and conditions. Therefore, an important question arises: ‘Which country is doing better than the

other?’ However, before answering this question, it is necessary to ask that ‘Are both countries trying to produce AVF which is in similar and comparable size?’

According to the three empirical chapters, the results show that Sweden in many aspects is doing well in terms of reform implementation. However, it seems to be unfair to simply judge the performance of implementation by these figures alone because the size of the Taiwanese armed forces is several times larger than the SAF; one can argue that it is more difficult for Taiwan because Taiwan is building a larger AVF and easier for Sweden because its target is easier. To this end, a method is needed that is broad enough to incorporate both military and demographic factors. The Military Participation Ratio (MPR), as described in Chapter 3.4, should be taken into consideration in the analysis for a fairer comparison.

Two perspectives are needed to answer the question of comparison. The first is: how are they doing in meeting their own targets? Then the second question is, overall, is one doing better than the other? Taiwan has been struggling to meet its targets for several years but Sweden’s recruitment of regular soldiers has been good in the past two years. There are reasons behind the results. With a reduced threat level, Sweden is tasked for international mission and less interested in territorial defence, Taiwan’s armed forces are unlikely to go abroad such as Afghanistan but rather frequent HA/DR operations. On the other hand, with regard to the level of military threat, Taiwan is much more worried about China than Sweden worries about Russia in terms of territorial defence, which is why its size is much larger than SAF. Taiwan is thus in a tricky situation; its AVF is not only bigger in relative numbers, it also has a larger MPR. In addition, Taiwan has the budget pressure for equipment and technology. From a conservative perspective, some people would think the armed forces do not need extra budget to carry out AVF implementation, especially some officials in the central government. However, their view is not the predominant one? That is part of the reason that the MND cannot acquire extra funding to implement AVF. To build a smaller but smarter AVF, it can cost even more than conscription. Unfortunately, the Taiwan armed forces are facing an even more difficult situation, which is that young men and women are not willing to join the military. As identified in chapter five that the much improved cross-strait relations with China has made people perceive threat differently towards the economic front.

Learning lessons from other countries

For concurrent AVF transitions, it is useful to find out how ‘have both countries looked at each other?’ because learning lessons from other AVF transformation cases is useful

to countries that are implementing a similar reform. It seems that Sweden is doing better in this regard as they have adopted the lessons from previous experiences in various ways. The Swedish experience of voluntarily recruited soldiers is limited and therefore the MOD commissioned the FOI to conduct an international comparative study on 16 countries on international experiences of voluntary recruitment, retention, and costs.⁶¹⁰ Similarly, by assigning defence attachés in 18 different countries to collect information via questionnaires, the government's Inquiry on the Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces was able to generalise certain tendencies and trends in the following themes: disseminating information, average period of employment, support to relatives, the length of international operations and transition to a civilian career.⁶¹¹ Regarding gaining public support, Ivarsson et al. suggested that it can be of interest for Sweden to study how the UK has worked to highlight the armed forces' work in wider society.⁶¹²

In addition to an international comparison on various AVF issues, experiences of specific countries were also studied. For example, visits to Denmark and the Netherlands were made to study their military personnel supply systems; the Canadian model and experience was also examined.⁶¹³ In terms of the shift from conscription to AVF, according to personnel staff of the Headquarters, the main examples looked at were the Netherlands and Canada.⁶¹⁴ This was because in the assessment of the SAF, these two countries were most similar to the Swedish society; the American experience was also taken into account. In terms of the restructuring of operational organisations from an old-styled basic training organisation to a professional and usable operational unit, the experiences from the UK and US were studied and learned.⁶¹⁵

While this thesis specifically looks at the case of Sweden and Taiwan, it is interesting to know whether these two countries are aware of that each other is concurrently undergoing a similar transition and whether they are learning from each other. Given the fact that Sweden and Taiwan rarely conduct mutual military contacts and exchange, no

⁶¹⁰ Ulf Jonsson and Peter Nordlund, 2010. *Transformation from Conscription to An All Volunteer Force – international experiences and economic consequences*. FOI, Stockholm, p.20. Countries including: Australia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, UK, Czech Republic, Germany, and USA.

⁶¹¹ *The Inquiry on Future Personnel Provision in the Swedish Armed Forces* (Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar), SOU 2010:86, pp. 29-40.

⁶¹² Malin Ivarsson and Amanda Eriksson, Who wants to be a soldier? in Magdalena Tham Lindell, Jerker Hellström, Lena Molin and Åke Wiss (eds.), *Strategic Outlook 2013*, FOI, June 2013, p.24.

⁶¹³ *Total defence obligation and volunteerism, Final Report of the Inquiry on total defence duty (Totalförsvarsplikt och frivillighet, Slutbetänkande av Utredningen om totalförsvarsplikten)*, Stockholm 2009. SOU 2009:63, p.42.

⁶¹⁴ Interview, participant SE-4, second interview.

⁶¹⁵ Interview, participant SE-7.

evidence has been found that the two countries are studying each other's case. However, there are some political and academic contacts that have made connections between both countries in terms of the mutual understanding of the AVF transition. Through the visit and talk to Taiwan's Defence Committee of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), Johan Forssell, a Swedish Member of Parliament, noticed that both armed forces are currently engaging in AVF transformation. He discussed with his Taiwanese counterparts how both armed forces might successfully recruit and retain the right personnel by exchanging Swedish experiences of military manpower system.⁶¹⁶ In terms of academic cooperation, on the occasion of a visit to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense with a courtesy call to the vice minister, Dutch military scholar Joseph Soeters noted that he acted as an intermediary of the Swedish-Taiwanese connection in terms of conducting an international study into the consequences of the abolition of conscription.⁶¹⁷

In contrast to Sweden which has sought to learn lessons from many countries, Taiwan has been inactive in reaching out to other AVF experiences. According to an MND staff who is in charge of AVF implementation, Taiwan has visited US and Japan.⁶¹⁸ Similar to what Sweden has done, the MND has assigned tasks to the military attaches to gather the information and experiences of the AVF transformation. According to Taiwanese military attaches, they have been asked to gather the AVF experiences of these countries.⁶¹⁹ Nonetheless, despite it is also in the midst of AVF transformation, Taiwan is not looking at the case of Sweden. Both countries should take advantage of this opportunity to emulate each other. For example, Sweden can learn NCO system from Taiwan and Taiwan can draw some lessons from the Swedish reservist system.

This study has contributed to the academic field by strengthening the knowledge of the decline of MAF. As for policy implications, it is hoped that policy makers and those who are in charge of the AVF implementation can take advantage of this study. But it should be made clear that policy implication is not the main purpose of this study.

⁶¹⁶ <http://johanforssell.com/2013/03/18/betraktelser-fran-taiwan/>

⁶¹⁷ Joseph Soeters, 2012. *Green about green*, iUniverse, Bloomington, p.78.

⁶¹⁸ All-volunteer force policy propaganda reference, No.1, 1 January, 2012, p.5. Also indicated by interview participant TW-1.

⁶¹⁹ Author's discussion with military attaches to the UK and France.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

From a theoretical point of view, this thesis has closed the gap in the decline of mass armed forces literature, which has rarely touched upon the issue of the post-AVF decision implementation process, let alone conducted a comparison of on-going AVF transition between an Eastern and a Western country. Two theoretical perspective based on the decline of MAF literature have underpinned this thesis. The first perspective – rooted in theories of the decline of the MAF established the research context within which the key research questions could be identified. Meanwhile, the second approach – based on lessons drawn from the western AVF transitions, provides the means of answering the key the research questions of this thesis: ‘Do the nature and manner of decisions, the contexts in which they are located, and the metrics they adopt determine and influence the eventual success of all-volunteer force transition?’ According to the evidence gathered and analysed by this study, the answer is a partial yes, as Sweden shows a relatively favourable transition result. Taiwan, on the other hand, has demonstrated that it is experiencing difficulties. Public support for the Armed Forces has been low, meeting the recruitment target has been far from satisfactory, and the overall AVF transition has become shaky. Hence, Taiwan’s MND announced in September 2013 the postponement of its AVF transition for two years. Two different initial results of these AVF transitions have, therefore indicates that this comparative study has been worth conducting.

The two cases of Sweden and Taiwan share several similarities in terms of strategic context. After the decision was made to suspend conscription in 2009, both countries adopted different ways of implementing an AVF. Sweden is reforming its defence organisational structure in a more radical way through a significant use of reservists. In contrast, Taiwan is taking a rather conservative approach by using a phased approach and downsizing while still relying on a higher proportion of active-duty personnel than is the case in Sweden. Thus Sweden’s significant use of reservists and off-the-shelf acquisition strategy has helped to relieve the financial pressure on the armed forces, especially the Army. On the other hand, Taiwan, relying on active-duty personnel,

together with the government's unwillingness to provide extra funds has made its transition more problematic. Experience tells us that an AVF is usually more expensive and complex challenge than governments anticipate. Hence, inter-governmental co-operation and coordination is crucial for the success. The Swedish government (Ministry of Finance) guaranteed the SAF to have flat budget from 2010 to 2014, which is a good example of how a strong will to push forward personnel reform can provide the key to a successful process of implementation. Although the SAF was not given a significant budget increase, by not cutting defence budget in the age of austerity this at least confirmed the government's political will to implement the reform.

Soldiers' motivation and satisfaction toward the military service is another key factor in a successful AVF transition. Surveys conducted by the MND and also by this study have both shown that Taiwanese volunteer soldiers are not highly motivated and satisfied with the military service in terms of various criteria such as lack of freedom and poor facilities at work. This is a warning sign for Taiwan's armed forces and they must face this fact and deal with it properly. Apart from the government's financial support, this study suggests that what Taiwan's MND can do is to take useful measures that do not require increases in the defence budget, such as a more flexible approach to troop management. It has been confirmed by numerous surveys and interviews with soldiers, NCOs, senior officers, and defence analysts that eliminating unnecessary and pointless tasks and 'red-tape' can significantly boost the morale and willingness of soldiers to join and remain in the military.

With respect to Taiwan, there have been unforeseen elements that may have made the transition to AVF even more difficult than anticipated. Recruitment is likely to prove a major problem, far more so than in Sweden. The Armed Forces start from a generally lower level of respect in Chinese/Taiwanese culture than in the West. Service as a soldier is traditionally regarded as low down on the social scale. This problem has been highlighted and indeed seriously exacerbated as observed in chapter five above, by an incident involving fatal abuse of a soldier by NCOs. In a short period of time this became nothing less than a national scandal.

The consequences of this national scandal for the armed forces are not yet fully apparent.

The events concerned took place right at the end of the research period for this thesis. In any event it may take years for its effects to play out. However, with the impending introduction of AVF this could hardly have come at a worse time. It is highly likely that, within the short to medium term this issue will affect very seriously the recruitment of volunteers. Not only does the narrative of abuse produced by this incident contribute to the overall negative public perception of military service in Chinese society in general and Taiwanese society in particular. It also contributes to the view that military service entails unpleasantness and restrictions upon personal freedom.

Those elements which positively impact upon Swedish recruitment, such as the prospect of service on international peacekeeping missions are entirely absent for Taiwan. Having said that, it is likely that after the ending of the international mission to Afghanistan, opportunities for active service combat related deployments will be very limited. Whilst it is likely that UN missions, or lower intensity operations such as those currently in the Balkans, will continue, opportunities for overseas, adventurous and interesting training may decrease overall. This may affect future SAF recruitment and retention. Defence planners are aware of this. As for Taiwan, in any event, for clear political reasons unless there is a vast shift in the political context, there is at best very little prospect, and in fact almost no prospect of service outside the Taiwanese islands. For young people looking for purpose and adventure, a common attractor to the armed forces in most highly developed countries, a major selling-point is almost entirely absent.

Finally, underlying these cultural and essentially political questions, there is the more day to day matter of pay and benefits. In Taiwan, as in many other developed nations, youth unemployment is high. However, the market for skilled and intelligent recruits is strong and in financial terms the armed services do not compete well. Finally, an element which was almost entirely ignored in Taiwan's planning of AVF was the falling birth rate. This is likely to become a far more important factor as the implementation of AVF moves forward.

All these matters lead to the question as to whether the decision to introduce AVF in Taiwan has been well-considered or indeed whether the necessary resources and funds

have been set-aside for its implementation, even if that implementation has been delayed. There is clearly an argument to be made that Taiwan has acted too early, or at the very least with too little research and unrealistic expectations.

With respect to the cultural, political and indeed financial issues Sweden finds itself in a far more favourable situation. Sweden has a highly developed culture of respect for the armed forces. This, combined with the emergence of Sweden over the last two decades as an active military participant in European and NATO military operations, has made the armed forces a more attractive proposition for talented young people. Allied to this has been a strong focus on the benefits of service, compared to Taiwan.

One area of research, which might produce positive results, covered only briefly in this study, is the question as to which benefits are, relative to each other, more likely to attract recruits. Clearly every country with an AVF finds itself in a highly competitive jobs market. Both Taiwan and Sweden might benefit from a study, not so much as to the experience of countries such as France and Italy concerning the structural issues of AVF, but the key element of recruitment. An AVF will only ever work if sufficient people of an adequate quality can be persuaded to sign at the recruiting office. Here, experiences of transition shade into the arguably more generic question of what attracts potential recruits and, equally importantly, what is likely to retain them.

In developed free societies, these are major issues and future research may be able to contribute to a more realistic assessment of what might, in the case of both Sweden and Taiwan, be achieved. The United Kingdom, for example, faces a potentially serious recruitment crisis,⁶²⁰ not so much in its regular forces, which retain a relatively high social status, but in its reserves. British reserve forces have been commonly used to supplement regular forces on deployment. The '2020' army reforms posit an even greater role for reserves. Yet the results of recruitment are poor and the reasons for that are a matter of some controversy. Planning for this has been characterised, some analysts say, more by hope than realism. It may well be that the UK's response to what is a potential recruitment crisis for the UK Military reserves, could offer useful lessons for both Sweden and Taiwan.

⁶²⁰ <<http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/396079/TA-recruits-to-get-5-000-golden-hello>>, accessed 30 Sep 2013

Public support of the armed forces play a key role in the success of AVF transition. As identified in Chapter five, favourable public support of the SAF and poor support for Taiwan's armed forces have become facilitating factor and impeding obstacle respectively. Therefore, one lesson can be drawn from these two cases, as results showed, is for the armed forces to gain support from the society. Better and more frequent communication is the key.

The experiences and lessons drawn from the cases of Sweden and Taiwan can provide other countries seeking the same direction to some useful pointers. Indeed this study provides the first analysis of AVF implementation that compares Western and Asian contexts, highlighting the similarities and differences in their styles of personnel transformation. The strengths of this thesis lie, perhaps in three areas; first, from the academic perspective it provides a combination of quantitative and qualitative data and analysis. Second, the thesis draws on data from a very wide range of interviews, from senior military and policy-orientated officials to conscripts by way of senior NCOs and officers and outside government, journalists and academic commentators. Finally, as stressed from the outset, the insights produced from comparisons between Western and Eastern experiences provide mutually beneficial lessons, but particularly for Taiwan.

Necessarily for a thesis based so much on two examples, discussion has not focussed on other examples of recently completed AVF transition programmes. Consequently the scope of this thesis might be considered to be rather narrow. Further research on this topic may benefit from a critical engagement with nations which have recently completed AVF and transitioned successfully, or at the very least without conspicuous failure. Germany is an example that might have been instructive. Rather than looking so closely at how AVF has been implemented, more attention might have been directed at the major gaps in the planning for it in both countries, which seem upon further reflection to be rather clear. For example, the effects on recruitment of declining birth rates. Secondly, one aspect which has been addressed only in passing is the question of operational effectiveness. Whilst this thesis has stressed the fact that AVF is more expensive, is it necessarily more operationally effective than a conscripts system in meeting today's military scenarios and requirements. In other words, whilst it may produce a more professional cadre, does this necessarily imply answering the needs of

national defence. Finally, in turn, is operational effectiveness itself a sufficient criterion? Going further and also not considered in this thesis what is the social (and potentially politically) impact of removing the responsibility of defence from the entire fit population, and placing it into the hands of what might be considered as a self-selecting and separate cadre? In some ways, Taiwan might have been considered to be analogous to Israel in its focus on territorial defence. Yet Israel is not likely to adopt an AVF partly for military reasons but also because of what it perceives to be those social and political costs of detaching defence from society.

To sum up, thesis has found that Sweden's and Taiwan's moves to AVF have therefore faced a number of similar challenges, including budget constraints and negative public perceptions of the armed forces. This has impacted, albeit to differing degrees, on their progress to date. While personnel reforms in Sweden have, for the most part and as shown by the survey results in terms of soldiers' high motivation and satisfaction, been carried out to schedule and are generally in good shape, there are concerns that a retention problem will loom after withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Taiwan's armed forces, meanwhile, face significant challenges in recruitment, with similar concerns over long-term retention, and Taiwan's MND has announced a postponement of the transition. In both cases, it is clear that for the transition to be smooth, neither soldiers' attitudes to service nor the public image of the military should be neglected. Both countries, in their adoption of divergent approaches to the implementation of a volunteer force, potentially offer important lessons to other countries considering a similar course of action. Meanwhile, the sustainability of the reforms, in terms of recruitment and retention, and their suitability for the evolving defence needs of the two countries going forward will be equally telling and remains, as yet, to be seen.

REFERENCE

Published articles

Altricher, H., A. Feldman, et al. (2013). Teachers investigate their work: An introduction to action research across the professions, Routledge.

Andreski, S. (1954). Military organization and society, University of California Pr.

Åselius, G. (2005). "Swedish strategic culture after 1945." Cooperation and Conflict **40**(1): 25-44.

Ashmore, W. C. (2009). Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks, DTIC Document.

Bacevich, A. J. (2007). Long War: A New History of United States National Security Policy Since World War II, Columbia University Press.

Bachman, J. G., J. D. Blair, et al. (1977). The all-volunteer force: A study of ideology in the military, University of Michigan Press.

Bailes, A. J., G. Herolf, et al. (2006). The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy, Oxford University Press.

Boene, B. and C. Dandeker (2000). Facing Uncertainty: Report No 2 The Swedish military in international perspective. Sweden, National Defence College.

Börjesson, S. and M. Elmquist (2012). "Aiming at innovation: a case study of innovation capabilities in the Swedish defence industry." International Journal of Business Innovation and Research **6**(2): 188-201.

Burk, J. (1992). "The decline of mass armed forces and compulsory military service." Defense analysis **8**(1): 45-59.

Caforio, G. (2006). Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, Springer.

Chen, K. (1986). China's war with Vietnam, 1979, Hoover Institute, Stanford

University.

Christiansson, M. (2009). "Far Away, So Close: Comparing Danish and Swedish Defence and Security Policies." Militaert tidsskrift **138**(3): 1-18.

Cohen, S. (2010). The New Citizen Armies: Israel's Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective, Taylor & Francis.

Dandeker, C. (1999). "Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century ("Facing Uncertainty" Report No. 1)." Karlstad: Swedish National Defence College, Department of Leadership.

Dandeker, C., N. Greenberg, et al. (2011). "The UK's Reserve Forces: Retrospect and Prospect." Armed Forces & Society **37**(2): 341-360.

Dandeker, C. and D. Mason (2003). "Diversifying the Uniform? The participation of minority ethnic personnel in the British Armed Services." Armed Forces & Society **29**(4): 481-507.

Danielsson, E. and B. Carlstedt (2011). "The Swedish reserve officer: filling vacancies or using competences." Armed Forces & Society **37**(2): 284-300.

Edmonds, M. and M. M. Tsai (2005). Taiwan's defense reform, Taylor & Francis.

Edmunds, T. (2006). "What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe." International affairs **82**(6): 1059-1075.

Fabyanic, T. A. (1976). "Manpower Trends in the British All-Volunteer Force." Armed Forces & Society **2**(4): 553-572.

Feld, M. D. (1975). "Military Professionalism and the Mass Army." Armed Forces & Society **1**(2): 191-214.

Foghelin, J. (N.D.). Defence Transformation with Frictions - The Case of Sweden. NATO Report.

Forsberg, T. and T. Vaahtoranta (2001). "Inside the EU, outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's post-neutrality." European Security **10**(1): 68-93.

Forster, A., T. Edmunds, et al. (2003). Soldiers and societies in postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and change, Palgrave Macmillan.

Gilroy, C. L., R. L. Phillips, et al. (1990). "The all-volunteer army: Fifteen years later." Armed Forces & Society **16**(3): 329-350.

Gilroy, C. L. and C. Williams (2006). Service to country: Personnel policy and the transformation of western militaries, The MIT Press.

Gooch, J. (1980). Armies in Europe, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Haltiner, K. W. (1998). "The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?" Armed Forces & Society **25**(1): 7-36.

Hedlund, E. (2013). "Civil–Military Control over the Swedish Military Profession An Analysis from the Perspective of Officer Rank and Officer Education." Armed Forces & Society **39**(1): 135-157.

Heinecken, L. (2006). King's College London. PhD thesis, 98.

Horowitz, S. A. (2009). "Implementing an All-Volunteer Force in Taiwan." 4.

Howard, M. E. (1961). The Franco-Prussian War: The German invasion of France, 1870-1871, Macmillan (New York).

Huldt, B. (2001). "Swedish Baltic Sea Policies - Return to A Historical Role?" Swedish Security Review.

Ivarsson, M. and A. Eriksson, Eds. (2013). Who wants to be s soldier?

Janowitz, M. (1960). The Professional Soldier. Glencoe, IL, Free Press.

Janowitz, M. (1983). The reconstruction of patriotism: Education for civic consciousness, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Janowitz, M. and C. C. Moskos (1979). "Five years of the all-volunteer force: 1973-1978." Armed Forces & Society **5**(2): 171-218.

- Jehn, C. and Z. Selden (2002). "The End of Conscription in Europe?" Contemporary Economic Policy **20**(2): 93-100.
- Joenniemi, P. (2006). The changing face of European conscription, Ashgate Publishing.
- Kelleher, C. M. (1978). "Mass Armies in the 1970s, The Debate in Western Europe." Armed Forces & Society **5**(1): 3-30.
- Kernic, F., P. Klein, et al. (2005). The European armed forces in transition, Lang.
- Leander, A. (2003). Disenchanted Conscription: A Military Recruitment System in Need of Justification, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS.
- Leander, A. (2004). "Drafting community: Understanding the fate of conscription." Armed Forces & Society **30**(4): 571-599.
- Malesic, M. (2003). "Conscription vs. all-volunteer forces in Europe." Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Marshall, B. (1967). In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves when Not All Serve?: Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, US Government Printing Office.
- Ministry of National Defense (2013). Ministry of National Defense 2012 performance report, Taiwan: 40.
- MoD/DASA (2004). UK Defence Statistics 2004. London, the Stationary Office.
- Morgan, M. J. (2009). The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything? Palgrave MacMillan.
- Navias, M. S. (1989). "Terminating Conscription? The British National Service Controversy 1955-56." Journal of Contemporary History **24**(2): 195-208.
- Nixon, R. M. (1980). The real war. Warner Books (New York).
- Nyström, B. (2010). The Labour Law in Sweden, Kluwer Law International.

Petersson, M. (2011). "Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War Theoretical and Practical Implications." Armed Forces & Society **37**(4): 701-724.

Reiter, E. and H. Gärtner (2001). Small states and alliances, Springer.

Rostker, B. D. and K. Yeh (2006). I want you!: the evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, Rand Corporation.

Sands, D. R. (2001). "Even military experts consider draft antiquated." Insight on the News **17**(6): 32-33.

Segal, D. R. (1989). Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and military manpower policy, University Press of Kansas Lawrence, KS.

Smith, R. (2008). The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world, Random House Digital, Inc.

Soeters, J. (2012). Green about Green: A Civilian in Military Life, iUniverse.

Sorensen, H. (2000). "Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century: Developments and arguments." Armed Forces & Society **26**(2): 313-334.

Strachan, H. (1983). European armies and the conduct of war, Routledge.

Swedish Ministry of Defence (2009). A Functional Defence. Stockholm, Sweden.

Tresch, T. S. and C. Leuprecht (2010). Europe Without Soldiers? Recruitment and Retention Across the Armed Forces of Europe, McGill-Queen's University Press.

Tsereteli, M. (2009). "The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor." The Jamestown Foundation, 3.

Van der Meulen, J. and P. Manigart (1998). "Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The Final Shift to the Mil-volunteer Force." Armed Forces & Society **24**(2): 315-332.

Van Doorn, J. (1975). "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West General Reflections." Armed Forces & Society **1**(2): 147-157.

Vasquez, J. P. (2011). "More Than Meets the Eye: Domestic Politics and the End of British Conscription." Armed Forces & Society **37**(4): 636-656.

Wedin, L. (2006). "The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts and planning: the case of Sweden." The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy: 141-150.

Williams, C. (2005). "From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO's Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces." Naval War College Review **58**(1): 35-62.

Williams, J. A. (2008). "The Military and Society Beyond the Postmodern Era." Orbis **52**(2): 199-216.

Wyss, M. (2011). "Military transformation in Europe's neutral and non-allied states." The RUSI Journal **156**(2): 44-51.

Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods, Sage.

Internet Sources

2012 National Salary Survey, Council of Labor Affairs.
<statdb.cla.gov.tw/html/svy01/i0000080139290.htm>. Accessed 17 June, 2013.

Common Wealth Magazine, 2011,
< <http://media.cw.com.tw/cw/cwdata/pdf/2011-CW-2011edu.pdf> >, accessed 13 May 2012.

Height pay for squad leaders, soldiers and sailors, 17 Oct, 2012.
<<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Aktuellt/centralanyheter/Hojd-lon-for-gruppbefal-soldater-och-sjoman/>>, accessed 22 Oct, 2012.

Ma Ying-Jeou/Hsiao Wan-Chang 2008 presidential campaign platform: Defence Policy,<<http://2008.ma19.net/policy4you/defence>>, accessed 28 June 2011.

Military News, MND, 8 March, 2013.
<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=56592>>, accessed 10 March, 2013.

NATO website,<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52535.htm>,
accessed 16 May 2012.

Recruiting from youth cohorts and current conscripts,
<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Print.aspx?cnid=2248&p=56197>>, accessed 8 March

2013.

Study on the satisfaction and training and working performance of volunteer soldiers. May 2013. Comptroller Bureau, Ministry of National Defense.

<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/UserFiles/File/%E4%B8%BB%E8%A8%88%E5%B1%80/Governmen_troops_rsc.doc>, accessed 25 May 2013

Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, PRC.

<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White&m_id=4>, accessed 6 March 2012

Taiwan's Defense Transformation and Challenges Under Ma Ying-Jeou, Fu S. Mei, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume XI, Issue 7, April 22, 2011

<<http://wisemanswisdoms.blogspot.se/2012/09/gastinlagg-officersforbundets.html>>, accessed 31 August 2012.

The ROC President's Office.

<<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284&rmid=2355>>, accessed 29 February 2012

United Evening News, 21 Oct, 2012. Insufficient recruitment incentives, 70% volunteers leave after finishing service.

<<http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/7444253.shtml#ixzz29wgNAM00>>, Accessed 20December, 2012.

Winkler, S. 2011. Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan's International Status, Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, Number 7, November.

<<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/17-taiwan-international-status-winkler>>, accessed 16 February, 2012.

Yang, Chih-Chin & Kuo, Kuo-Chen , Satisfaction of AVF, Army Bimonthly, Vol.507, Oct 2009, pp 155-168.

<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Upload/200910/%E5%9B%A0%E6%87%89%E5%8B%9F%E5%85%B5p155-168.pdf>>, accessed 5 Dec, 2012.

<<http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/engIndex/RightsAndDuties.htm>>, accessed 25 July, 2013.

<<http://theundercoverrecruiter.com/how-the-swedish-army-use-social-media-to-recruit-video/>>, accessed 14 May, 2012.

<<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2054rank.html?countryname=Sweden&countrycode=sw®ionCode=eur&rank=187#sw>>, accessed 29 August, 2013.

Sweden Government Reports

2009 Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces

A Functional Defence, Defence Bill 2008/09:140

A functional defence, Fact Sheet, MoD, Sweden, March 2009

Armed Forces 2009 Annual Report, Appendix 2: Personnel

Armed Forces 2010 Annual Report, Appendix 2: Personnel

Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report

Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report, Appendix 2: Personnel

Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report

Armed Forces 2012 Annual Report, Appendix 2: Personnel

Armed Forces budget proposal for 2013

Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014

Armed Forces Report 2012 Appendix 1, Additional Report, 15 Aug 2012

Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014, special reports, 28 February 2013

Defence Commission Report 1999:2

Defence Bill 1999/2000:30 'The New Defence'

Defence Committee, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2012/13:FöU10

Emma Jonsson, Outcomes of soldier recruitment to the Swedish Armed Forces 2012, presentation in ERGOMAS Madrid, 4-7 June 2013

Forsvarets Forum, nummer 6, October, 2012

FOI 2012 Annual Report, 2013, Stockholm

Per Lodin. Future Swedish Military Requirements – The implications for industry and international cooperation, 18 May 2011

Government Bill 2004 / 05:5

Headquarters decision, beteckning 16 320:60761, 2 July 2010

Hellström, Lena Molin and Åke Wiss (eds.), Strategic Outlook 2013, FOI, June

2013

Michael Moore speech at US - Sweden Defence Industry Conference, 'Relationship between U.S. and Swedish militaries', on 10 June 2009

Michael Moore, 2000, Revolution in the Swedish Defence, Försvarsdepartementet, Stockholm

Planning for the unknown, Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson to Lunds Akademiska Officerssällskap, on 10 April 2012

Malin Ivarsson and Amanda Eriksson, Who wants to be a soldier? in Magdalena Tham Lindell, Jerker Emma Jonsson & Berit Carlstedt, Rekryteringsunderlaget 2012, (2012 Recruitment Basis) Swedish National Defence College

Ministry of Finance 2011 Defence ESO Report, 2011

Opinioner 2012, The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Stockholm, 2013

Personalförsörjningen i ett reformerat försvar (Personnel supply in the defence reform), SOU 2010:86, pp.29-40

Regeringens proposition 2011/12:115, Soldatanställningari Försvarsmakten, 2012

SOU 2001:23. Personal for etnnyttforsvar, Forsvarsdepartementet, Stockholm

SPF 2003, Styrelsen for Psykologisktforsvar. <www.psygdef.se/opinion/>, accessed 25 May 2012

Sten Tolgfors, A usable defence, The 13th Conference of U.S.-Sweden Defence Industry, 10 June 2009, Stockholm

Styrelsenför psykologiskt försvar, SPF, Opinion 2008

Swedish Government Communication 2007/08:51, 13 March 2008

Syrén, H. 2007, Bådeoch – en liten bok om dubbla uppgifter och framtiden krav. Stockholm: The Armed Forces

Syrén, H. 2009, Vaktombyte – reflektionerefter fem årsom ÖB, Stockholm: The Armed Forces

The Defence Commission Report Defence in Use (Ds 2008:48), 16 June 2008

Total defense obligation and volunteerism, Final Report of the Inquiry on total defence duty (Totalförsvarsplikt och frivillighet, Slutbetänkande av Utredningen om totalförsvarsplikten), Stockholm 2009. SOU 2009:63

Ulf Jonsson and Peter Nordlund, 2010. Transformation from Conscription to An All Volunteer Force – international experiences and economic consequences. FOI, Stockholm

Karl Ydén & Joakim Berndtsson, 2012, When the war came - the Swedes and the new defense policy (När kriget kommit – svenskarna och den nya försvarspolitiken), in Lennart Weibull, Oscarsson & Annika Bergström (eds.) The future of shadow (framtidens skugga). Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institutet, pp.501-512.

Taiwan Government Reports

100 ROC Defense Report, 2011, MND

2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, MND

2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, MND

AVF policy propaganda material No.2, MND, 1 Jan, 2012

DPP's Defense Agenda, New Frontier Foundation, Tseng-Chang Su, June, 2013. <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/10/09/2003275057>>, accessed on 12 May 2012

Executive Yuan Report to the Legislative Yuan, Session 8, No.3, February, 2013

Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2012, Vol. 101, No.14

Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2013, Vol. 101, No.9

Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2013, Vol.102, No. 8

MND Commissioned research report, The implementation of All-volunteer force, from the perspectives of human resource, term of service and expectation, April 2010

MND policy explanation document number 12: 'Enhancing the NCO System', 2012<<http://afrc.mnd.gov.tw/TheNewIndex/News.aspx?newsid=1777>>, accessed 16 April, 2012

MND policy propaganda reference, 2012. Unpublished non-confidential document, the MND

MND 2012 Performance Report, 9 May 2013

MND Mid-Term Plan, 2013-2016, 2 Oct 2012

The assessment of the officer: NCO: Soldier ratio and the AVF implementation, IAO, MND, August 2009

The Complementary Measure of AVF, Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, 2007

The impact of MND proposed all-volunteer force on government's finance and military capability, The research and investigation project, ROC Control Yuan, 2008.

The ROC Executive Yuan administration report to the Legislature Yuan, session 3, February 2013

US Government Reports

Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Asia Defense Spending: 2000-2011, CSIS, 15 Oct 2012

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, Shirley A. Kan, July 23, 2013, Congressional Research Service

<<http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx>>

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, Taiwan's Declining Defense Spending Could Jeopardize Military Preparedness by Craig Murray, 11 June, 2013

Media sources

Andrew Bacevich's review:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/books/review/those-who-have-borne-the-battle-by-james-wright.html?_r=1&ref=review>, accessed 30 May, 2012

Apple Daily, Will you consider pursuing military career after AVF is implemented? 24 December, 2012.

<<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20121224/34725445/>>, accessed 27 December 2012

Associated Press, 13 May, 2013. Taiwan short of volunteers for the military.

<<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/13/3394726/taiwan-short-of-volunteers-for.html#storylink=cpy>>, accessed 16 May 2013

BBC News, 18 September 2006, Analysis: Sweden changes direction,

<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5356402.stm>>, accessed 1 June 2012

Central News Agency, 26 June, 2013.
<<http://news.chinatimes.com/politics/50207798/132013062600793.html>>,
accessed 26 June 2013

China Times, 3 August, 2013. Confidence crisis –only 10 per cent believe the military investigation.
<<http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501013924/112013080300410.html>>,
accessed 5 August, 2013

Gerard O'dwyer, Jan. 25, 2010, Sweden's Military To Detail Reforms.
<<http://www.defensenews.com/print/article/20100125/DEFSECT04/1250306/Sweden-s-Military-Detail-Reforms>> , accessed 3 Sep, 2012

Common Wealth Magazine, 2011,
< <http://media.cw.com.tw/cw/cwdata/pdf/2011-CW-2011edu.pdf> > , accessed 13 May 2012

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. DOD
<<http://www.acq.osd.mil/housing/housing101.htm>> , accessed 2 August, 2013

Defense News, 23 February 2013, Ministry of National Defense.
<<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=67&p=56476>> , accessed 27 February, 2013

Durnin, M, 10 November, 2011, Battle Plans Tempt Chill in U.S.-China Relations, Wall Street Journal. <
<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/11/10/battle-plans-tempt-chill-in-u-s-china-relations/> > , accessed 14 May 2012

Englund, W., 20 February, 2012. Putin promises Russian military buildup. The Washington Post

Military News Agency, MND will strive for appropriate budget to implement AVF, 14 March 2012

People's Daily, 06 March, 2012.
<<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7749766.html>> , accessed 12 March 2012

Peter Enav, Taiwan short of volunteers for the military, Associated Press, 13 May 2013

Poor recruitment; antiquated missiles; General: the weakest defence capability ever; 3 Sept 2012. <<http://www.nownews.com/2012/09/03/91-2850703.htm>> ,
accessed 5 Sept 2012

Stockholm News, 2009, 19 March.
<<http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=2893>> , accessed 28

December 2011

Svenskarnavill ha karlumpen, SvD, 23 March, 2009

Sweden's defence 'not fit for battle': expert, 30 Apr 12,
<<http://www.thelocal.se/40554/20120430/>>, accessed 22 June 2012

Taipei Times, 11 January, 2013, Concerns raised for volunteer military, p.3.
<<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/01/11/2003552274>>,
accessed 15 January 2013

Taipei Times, 29 July 2013, Poll highlights loss of faith in military,
<<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/29/2003568426/1>>,
accessed 30 July 2013

Taiwan's shift to volunteer military passes new milestone, Central News Agency,
21 February, 2013

The Swedes have softened in Nato issue (Svenskarna har mjuknat i Natofrågan),
SvD, 16 May,
2013. <http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/svenskarna-har-mjuknat-i-natofragan_8175788.svd>, accessed 20 May 2013

United Daily, 8 March, 2013. President Ma: lifting the 8% restriction on female soldiers,
<<http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/7745392.shtml#ixzz2N1bjVpQ6>>,
accessed 10 March, 2013

Taipei Times, Youth will not fight for Taiwan: poll, May 13, 2012, Page
1. Chicago Tribune, 29 July, 2013

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/industry-se.htm>>,
accessed 12 March 2012

<<http://www.nownews.com/2010/12/27/301-2676981.htm>>, accessed 30 June,
2012

<<http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/Gripen/Gripen/In-use/>>,
accessed 1 May 2012

< <http://www.thelocal.se/31614/20110124/> >, accessed 28 March 2013

<<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/07/30/2003568486>>,
accessed 30 July 2013

<<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article3663119.ece>>.
Accessed 25 Jan, 2013

<http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/news_list.asp?no=arieslu20090416195349>,,

Accessed 5 November 2012

<http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/tvbs2011/pch/tvbs_poll_center.aspx> accessed 12 October, 2012

Unpublished reports

2011 Ministry of Finance Defence ESO Report

Christopher Dandeker, January 16 2012, Military professionalism and professional military education in the 21st century: the challenges and potential responses, p. 23

Christopher Dandeker, 2012. Maritime Partnerships: Maritime Defence Cooperation in the Indian-Pacific Ocean: Taiwan and the potential of HA/DR activities for its contribution to international peace and stability. The SLOC Conference, ROC National Defense University, 23-24 September 2012

Christopher Dandeker, September 2013. The Swedish NCO-Officer partnership and the transformation of the SAF: managing the transition. Research project commissioned by the SAF Headquarters

Dandeker, C. 2012, Military professionalism and professional military education in the 21st century: the challenges and potential responses, Report to Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters

Jan Foghelin, Defence Transformation with Frictions – The Case of Sweden, NATO Report

Scott Garrett, Seeking excellence: professionalization of the US Army Non-commissioned Officer Corps in the 20th Century, pp.66-69 (N.D.)

The Role of the Non Commissioned Officer in the British Army. The UK defence forum. September 2003

Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2012, 2012. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, pp.2-3.
<<http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf>>, accessed 30 August, 2013

APPENDIX

Appendix I. List of Interviewees

Swedish Interviewee Coding	Descriptions	Institution
SE-1	Senior official of the SAF HQ	SAF Headquarters
SE-2	Senior information official of the SAF HQ	Dept of Information, Headquarters
SE-3	Senior personnel official of the SAF HQ	Dept of Personnel, Headquarters
SE-4	Senior personnel staff of the SAF HQ	Dept of Personnel, Headquarters (Interviewed twice)
SE-5	Personnel staff of the SAF HQ	Dept of Personnel, Headquarters
SE-6	Senior MoD official in military capability	Department for Military Capabilities and Operations, MoD
SE-7	Senior MoD official in Strategy and Security Policy	Department for Strategy and Security Policy, MoD
SE-8	Lt Col of Army	Army Land Warfare Centre
SE-9	Lt Col of Air Defence	Air Defence Regiment
SE-10	MP in Defence Committee of Parliament	Parliament
SE-11	Senior defence journalist	SvD
SE-12	Defence researcher of the SNDC	SNDC
SE-13	Defence analyst of FOI	FOI
SE-14	Defence researcher of the Gothenburg University	Gothenburg University
Taiwanese Interviewee Coding	Descriptions	Institution
TW-1	Senior personnel staff of the AVF implementation team	Personnel Division, MND
TW-2	Defence analyst of the AVF capability	Integrated Assessment Office, MND
TW-3	Senior personnel staff	Personnel Division, MND
TW-4	Instructor of Personnel	Management College, National

		Defense University
TW-5	Director	Armed Forces Recruitment Centre
TW-6	Legislator	Defence Committee, Legislative Yuan
TW-7	Professor in defence analysis	Yuan-Tzu University
TW-8	Professor in defence analysis	Foguang University
TW-9	Senior defence journalist	Media (TVBS)
TW-10	Sergeant Major	Communication Depot, Combined Logistics Command
TW-11	Army corporal (Male)	Army Regiment
TW-12	Army corporal (Female)	Army Regiment
TW-13	Army volunteer soldier	Army Regiment
TW-14	Air Force volunteer soldier 1	Air Force
TW-15	Air Force volunteer soldier 2	Air Force
TW-16	Navy Captain	Navy
TW-17	Air Force Colonel	Air Force
TW-18	Defence Attaché	Defence Attaché
TW-19	Air Force Staff Sergeant	Air Force

Appendix II. Questionnaire

Dear participant,

Increased co-operation between the military forces of different countries in multinational operations around the world gives rise to an increased need for shared knowledge and understanding among these forces.

As part of an international research project aiming to improve the basic military training of participating forces from Europe and Asia, this questionnaire is an important tool in gathering such shared knowledge and understanding. In order to obtain the highest quality of research, we need YOUR help in answering the questionnaire.

It is crucial that as many respondents as possible answer all of the questions. Your support in answering the following questions in a very frank and open way is greatly appreciated. Please be assured, however, that the questionnaire will remain completely anonymous, as we are interested in numbers and percentages only. Since the questionnaire has an international outlook, you may be unfamiliar with the subject of some questions. Please try to answer them to the best of your knowledge, nonetheless. Simply cross the answer which best describes your personal opinion/situation.

Thank you!

Your participation is greatly appreciated!

Socio-Demographics

1. Are you?	
<input type="checkbox"/> ₁ Male	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂ Female

2. Are you?					
<input type="checkbox"/> ₁ Conscript	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂ Volunteer soldier				
	<table> <tr> <td>Army</td> <td>Marin</td> <td>Air force</td> <td>I don't know yet</td> </tr> </table>	Army	Marin	Air force	I don't know yet
Army	Marin	Air force	I don't know yet		
2.1 What is your branch of service	<table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ₁</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ₂</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ₃</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ₄</td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄
<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄		

3. What is the year of your birth?	⇒	<input type="text"/>
------------------------------------	---	----------------------

4. Are you?	
single	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
co-habiting	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
married	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
divorced	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄

5. Where did you spend most of your childhood?	
A completely rural part of my country	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
A small village in my country	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
A town or larger community in my country	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃

6. What is your highest level of civilian education?	
Basic schooling	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
Secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
Vocational school	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
High school	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄

Postgraduate school	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
University	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
Other	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

We will now consider your military service.	Yes	No
7. Did you volunteer to attend recruit school?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
8. Were you able to join the branch of service you wanted as first choice?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
9. Among your acquaintances, does anyone work as a military professional?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2

Evaluate the following statement. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
10. The information I received prior to recruitment as a (conscript) soldier was helpful	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

11. How many weeks have you now served in military service?	⇒	<input type="text"/>
---	---	----------------------

What I expect from recruit school... Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
12.1 training from which I benefit personally	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.2 physical challenges	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.3 high psychological stress	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.4 a good team spirit	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.5 that I become more resistant to stress	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.6 that I become more self-disciplined	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.7 that I benefit from military training in civilian life	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
12.8 that my character will be strengthened by military service	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Now we want to know more about your reasons for starting basic military training.

Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not important									important
13.1 Have an adventure	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.2 Personal development	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.3 Travel to foreign countries and cultures	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.4 Friendship within your own contingent	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.5 An opportunity to earn money	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.6 Earn money to finance future studies	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.7 Comfortable lifestyle (no need to cook, wash clothes etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.8 Contribute to world peace	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.9 Contribute to the national security of (INSERT NATION)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.10 Help needy people in the area of operation	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
13.11 Had nothing else to do and no better option	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10

Influence of the environment

Did your father / grandfather also serve in the military?	Did not do military service	Soldier	Non-commissioned officer	Officer	Military professional	Don't know
---	-----------------------------	---------	--------------------------	---------	-----------------------	------------

14.1 Father	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
14.2 Grandfather	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely	Does not apply
15.1 The regular income during recruit school motivates me	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
15.2 The military is more profitable for me than private industry	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
16.1 I am highly motivated for military service	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
16.2 A good boss / teacher motivates me	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
16.3 The atmosphere in a team / group is very important to me	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
16.4 Being able to take on leadership responsibility at such a young age could motivate me to do cadre training	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Evaluate the following statements about the current situation at the recruit school. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
17.1 I'm content with my current situation at the recruit school	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.2 I'm content with the quality of the training at the recruit school	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.3 There is mutual respect for one another in our platoon	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.4 I'm proud to be a member of my branch of service	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

17.5 If I could choose again, I would choose this branch of service	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.6 My motivation in the military has declined since starting recruit school	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.7 Basic military training has increased my general military knowledge	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.8 Basic military training has increased my specific position skills	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.9 Basic military training has increased my knowledge of other nations' cultures	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.10 Basic military training has increased my social skills	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.11 Basic military training has been very relevant for peacekeeping operations	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.12 Basic military training has been very relevant for war fighting operations	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
17.13 Basic military training has been of very high quality	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Please evaluate each line individually regarding who or what is motivating you to attend basic military training at the moment. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
18.1 Squad leader	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.2 Platoon leader	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.3 Company commander	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.4 Battalion/regiment commander	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.5 Team spirit	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.6 Support from my environment	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.7 Support from my parents	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.8 Money (remuneration during service)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.9 Tradition	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.10 Personal benefit in civilian life	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

18.11 Exciting training	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
18.12 Colleagues	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Now we would like to know more about the way you see yourself as a military person.

I see myself as...										
Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all									Absolutely
19.1 a peacekeeper	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
19.2 a warfighter	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
19.3 an aid worker	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10

Evaluate the following statements.										
Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all									Absolutely
20.1 I follow military rules and regulations even if I'm not observed	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6				
20.2 I inform myself about the weekly program	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6				
20.3 I will help a colleague with a task that is too hard for him	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6				
20.4 I actively participate in group work	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6				
20.5 I am very self-disciplined and do things correctly even if I'm not monitored	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6				

Now we would like to know more about the way you perceive the quality of your country's soldiers.

Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Very low									Very high
21.1 Motivation	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.2 Ambition	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.3 Level of education	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10

21.4 Level of civilian professional skill	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.5 Level of military skill	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.6 Reliability	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.7 Morals and ethics	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.8 Social skills	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.9 Level of fairness	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.10 Level of firmness	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.11 Level of friendliness	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.12 Physical ability/level of fitness	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
21.13 Soldiers follow rules and policies	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	<input type="checkbox"/> 8	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 10

Leadership evaluation

Evaluate the following statements about the current situation in the recruit school. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely	Does not
22.1 Generally, my superiors treat me fairly and respectfully	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
22.2 The quality of cooperation in our platoon is high	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
22.3 My platoon leader has influenced my decision in favour of further military training	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
22.4 My squad leader has influenced my decision in favour of further military training	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
22.5 The more incompetent a superior is, the more motivated I am to pursue a military career in order to show that it can be done better	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
22.6 Good superiors can motivate recruits to pursue a military career	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

Team spirit

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
23.1 A good team spirit is very important for any further training in the military	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
23.2 As new recruits, we rarely go out together in our free time	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
23.3 My platoon colleagues have no influence on my decision regarding whether or not to pursue a military career	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
23.4 I'm willing to put the group's needs before my own	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

24	Are you planning to pursue a military career?				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	No (this is the end of the questionnaire)	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	Yes	➔ continue with the questionnaire

Prestige and Tradition

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
25.1 A cadre position in the military is still highly respected by society	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
25.2 I think that my environment will support a military career	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
26.1 The high prestige of an officer motivates me to also pursue a military career	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
26.2 Nowadays, tradition is no longer a reason to pursue a military career	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

26.3 Officers are still held in high regard by society	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
26.4 Pursuing a military career is a tradition in my family	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Support

Evaluate the following statements. Cross the number on the scale you agree with most.	Not at all					Absolutely
27.1 If I were to pursue a military career, it would be important that my parents supported my decision	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
27.2 If I were to pursue a military career, the support of my partner would be very important (If single, please leave blank)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6
27.3 If I were to pursue a military career, the support of my colleagues would be very important	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

Thank you very much for answering the questionnaire.
This will be very helpful in improving basic military training