Abstract
According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by nondoxastic
states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings.’ Those who defend the
view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal
conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important
internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit
the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They
can deny that their view forces them to condone morally abhorrent behavior,
but then they undercut the defenses of their own view.
states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings.’ Those who defend the
view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal
conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important
internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit
the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They
can deny that their view forces them to condone morally abhorrent behavior,
but then they undercut the defenses of their own view.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 35-48 |
| Journal | Analytic Philosophy |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2011 |