Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

Damien Bol; Konstantinos Matakos; Orestis Troumpounis; Dimitrios Xefteris

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

Damien Bol, Konstantinos Matakos, Orestis Troumpounis, Dimitrios Xefteris

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Abstract

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

Original language	English
Article number	104065
Pages (from-to)	1-12
Journal	JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Volume	178
Early online date	28 Sept 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065
Publication status	Published - Oct 2019

Keywords

Disproportionality
Electoral systems
Laboratory experiment
Polarization
Proportional representation
Strategic entry

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10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

Electoral Rules Strategic Entry_BOL_Acc21Aug2019Epub28Sep2019_GREEN AAM(CC BY NC ND)Accepted author manuscript, 702 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/electoral-rules-strategic-entry-and-polarization(d3707657-894c-41eb-b05e-6c58cdee6de8).html

Cite this

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AU - Matakos, Konstantinos

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AB - How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.

KW - Disproportionality

KW - Electoral systems

KW - Laboratory experiment

KW - Polarization

KW - Proportional representation

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Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

Abstract

Keywords

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