Epistemic instrumentalism and the too few reasons objection

According to epistemic instrumentalism (EI), epistemic normativity and reasons – like all normative reasons – arise from and depend on facts about our ends. On that view, a fact F is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases – in particular those involving evidential reasons – in which, intuitively, F is an epistemic reason for S to φ even though φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three.