Expert Judgement Without Values: Credences not Inductive Risks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This paper argues, against contemporary orthodoxy in the philosophy of science, that values should play no role in deciding scientific claims.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationExpertise
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophical Perspectives
EditorsMirko Farina, Andrea Lavazza, Duncan Pritchard
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter7
Pages107-125
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9780191988240
ISBN (Print)9780198877301
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Jul 2024

Keywords

  • Experts
  • Inductive Risk
  • Bayesianism
  • Value-freedom
  • Pragmatic Encroachment
  • Fake News

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