TY - JOUR
T1 - Gender differences in equilibrium play and strategic sophistication variability
AU - Cubel, María
AU - Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the editor Lionel Page, two anonymous referees, Ayala Arad, Jordi Brandts, Christoph Bühren, Syngjoo Choi, Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez, Natassa Papadopoulou, Rosemarie Nagel, Lise Vesterlund and audiences at IMEBESS Florence, M-BEES Maastricht, SAET Faro, the TIBER Symposium and at the universities of the Balearic Islands, Granada, Kent, Lancaster, Middlesex and Rotterdam for their useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are completely ours. Both authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation (grant ECO2015-66281-P).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - We investigate the existence of gender differences in strategic sophistication in two weakly dominance solvable games where a prize is at stake. The first one is the two-person beauty contest, where strategies are numbers and players must perform mathematical operations. The second is the novel “gaze coach game”, where strategies are photographs of the eye region and the two players must assign emotional states to these images. We observe that females follow equilibrium play less often in the former game but not in the latter. Males display greater strategic sophistication variability. As a result, females are underrepresented among top performers in both games.
AB - We investigate the existence of gender differences in strategic sophistication in two weakly dominance solvable games where a prize is at stake. The first one is the two-person beauty contest, where strategies are numbers and players must perform mathematical operations. The second is the novel “gaze coach game”, where strategies are photographs of the eye region and the two players must assign emotional states to these images. We observe that females follow equilibrium play less often in the former game but not in the latter. Males display greater strategic sophistication variability. As a result, females are underrepresented among top performers in both games.
KW - Competition
KW - Gender bias
KW - Gender differences
KW - Strategic sophistication
KW - Variability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122150407&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.014
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.014
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85122150407
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 194
SP - 287
EP - 299
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -