Abstract
David Hume denied that there was more than a verbal difference between virtue, or moral goodness, and talent, or goodness in relation to arts and skills. Hume used this view to construct a new theory of moral normativity – one that detached moral normativity from reason, and that explained it instead in terms of the appraisal of people as good and bad.
The paper argues that Hume was to a degree right in his view of virtue and talent - and only because of this is natural law theory as traditionally conceived possible. Hume, the supposed foe of practical reason in ethics, uncovered similarities between virtue and talent that, correctly understood, allow practical reason to take the distinctive form of a moral law.
The paper argues that Hume was to a degree right in his view of virtue and talent - and only because of this is natural law theory as traditionally conceived possible. Hume, the supposed foe of practical reason in ethics, uncovered similarities between virtue and talent that, correctly understood, allow practical reason to take the distinctive form of a moral law.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence |
| Editors | George Duke, Robert P. George |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, Cambridge |
| Chapter | 8 |
| Pages | 187-215 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781316341544 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781107120518, 9781107546462 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |