Learning from Learning from Our Mistakes

Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn

Learning from Learning from Our Mistakes

Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn

Philosophy

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Abstract

What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be open to the idea that justified beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals
Editors	Martin Grajner , Pedro Schmechtig
Publisher	de Gruyter
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 2016

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title = "Learning from Learning from Our Mistakes",

abstract = "What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be open to the idea that justified beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs. ",

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M3 - Chapter

BT - Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals

A2 - Grajner , Martin

A2 - Schmechtig , Pedro

PB - de Gruyter

ER -

Learning from Learning from Our Mistakes

Abstract

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