TY - JOUR
T1 - On the impact of corruption on managers’ and controllers’ behavior
AU - Belhaiza, Slim
AU - Charrad, Salwa
AU - M'Halla, Rym
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. This work was partly funded by King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals research grant POC19103 and the Interdisciplinary Research Center on Smart Mobility and Logistics research grant INML2107. This support is gratefully acknowledged.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI.
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager’s and the controller’s bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.
AB - In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager’s and the controller’s bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124684690&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1051/ro/2021191
DO - 10.1051/ro/2021191
M3 - Article
SN - 0399-0559
VL - 56
SP - 165
EP - 181
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research
JF - RAIRO - Operations Research
IS - 1
ER -
