Abstract
What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here (i) provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and (ii) gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 3293-3310 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | SYNTHESE |
Volume | 195 |
Issue number | 8 |
Early online date | 25 Jan 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2018 |
Keywords
- Acting for reasons
- Facts
- Motivating and explanatory reasons
- Normative
- Psychologism
- Rationality
- Reasons