TY - JOUR
T1 - Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person
AU - Antognazza, Maria Rosa
N1 - Funding Information:
This discussion is part of a broader project which will be developed in Maria Rosa Antognazza, Thinking with Assent: Renewing a Traditional Account of Knowledge and Belief (forthcoming). Thanks are due to the Mind Association for supporting my project with a Mind Senior Research Fellowship. The remarks of section 1 of the article are inspired by the writings of Sofia Vanni Rovighi, in particular Vanni Rovighi 1962, 109-132 (esp. 109-118); 1963-1979, 347-374 (esp. 350-356); 1982, 19-24. I am greatly indebted to her insights. I am grateful for the helpful feedback I received from anonymous referees and from Maria Alvarez, Adrian Haddock, Howard Hotson, Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, and Mira Magdalena Sickinger. Comments from participants to the book symposium organized by Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum (Vienna, 26-28 February 2020) and from participants to a workshop on self-knowledge organized by Johannes Roessler and Ursula Renz (Warwick University, 26-27 September 2019) have also been very helpful. Finally, my greatest debt is to Michael Ayers for many conversations on these matters and for his remarks on this article. Any shortcomings or misunderstandings are of course my sole responsibility.
Funding Information:
This discussion is part of a broader project which will be developed in Maria Rosa Antognazza, Thinking with Assent: Renewing a Traditional Account of Knowledge and Belief (forthcoming). Thanks are due to the Mind Association for supporting my project with a Mind Senior Research Fellowship. The remarks of section 1 of the article are inspired by the writings of Sofia Vanni Rovighi, in particular Vanni Rovighi 1962, 109–132 (esp. 109–118); 1963–1979, 347–374 (esp. 350–356); 1982, 19–24. I am greatly indebted to her insights. I am grateful for the helpful feedback I received from anonymous referees and from Maria Alvarez, Adrian Haddock, Howard Hotson, Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, and Mira Magdalena Sickinger. Comments from participants to the book symposium organized by Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum (Vienna, 26–28 February 2020) and from participants to a workshop on self-knowledge organized by Johannes Roessler and Ursula Renz (Warwick University, 26–27 September 2019) have also been very helpful. Finally, my greatest debt is to Michael Ayers for many conversations on these matters and for his remarks on this article. Any shortcomings or misunderstandings are of course my sole responsibility.
Publisher Copyright:
© Maria Rosa Antognazza, 2021.
PY - 2021/11/22
Y1 - 2021/11/22
N2 - This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one’s own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a ‘self’ that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of ‘first-person knowledge’ versus ‘self-knowledge.
AB - This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one’s own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a ‘self’ that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of ‘first-person knowledge’ versus ‘self-knowledge.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85120898501&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - doi:10.1163/18756735-00000143
DO - doi:10.1163/18756735-00000143
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-9227
VL - 98
SP - 516
EP - 529
JO - Grazer Philosophische Studien
JF - Grazer Philosophische Studien
IS - 4
ER -