TY - JOUR
T1 - The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service: How Russian Intelligence secured Vladimir Putin’s Regime after failing him in Ukraine
AU - Dylan, Huw
AU - Gioe, David
AU - Grossfeld, Elena
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.
PY - 2024/6/14
Y1 - 2024/6/14
N2 - Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War, which examined the systemic roots of Russia’s intelligence failure in early 2022. In this follow-on article exploring Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings – and some flaps – they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
AB - Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War, which examined the systemic roots of Russia’s intelligence failure in early 2022. In this follow-on article exploring Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings – and some flaps – they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85196120703&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/13691481241258108
DO - 10.1177/13691481241258108
M3 - Article
SN - 1369-1481
JO - British Journal of Politics and International Relations
JF - British Journal of Politics and International Relations
ER -