The Cost of Status: When Social and Economic Interests Collide

Curt Moore, Tyge Payne, Igor Filatotchev, Ed Zajac

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
503 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Although researchers have devoted considerable attention to assessing how organizations benefit from ascriptions of high status, relatively little research has analyzed the financial costs that organizations may incur in actively managing such ascriptions. In this study, we analyze how and why organizations may pay a relatively steep economic price for the attainment and/or maintenance of social status. Specifically, we advance an original theoretical perspective, which suggests that firms engaged in economic competition are simultaneously engaged in social ceremony and that these dual processes can generate a combination of social gains (in terms of status) and economic losses (in terms of profitability). We theorize and test our perspective in the context of competitive bidding ceremonies using a unique, decade-long data set on repeated competitive market interactions among firms in the U.S. construction industry. We find support for our prediction that firms’ participation in bidding ceremonies can generate divergent outcomes, that is, higher social status and diminished economic performance. We discuss the implications of our theoretical and empirical analysis for the existing literature on social status, competitive bidding, and—more generally—on the role social forces play in competitive market behaviors and outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)869-884
JournalORGANIZATION SCIENCE
Volume30
Issue number5
Early online date2 Jul 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2019

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The Cost of Status: When Social and Economic Interests Collide'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this