The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes

Toke Aidt, Gabriel Leon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Coups, understood as attempts to overthrow the sitting executive government by a group inside the state apparatus that includes part of the military, shape competition for office in authoritarian regimes. They do that both directly through actual coups and indirectly through the threat of a coup, which forces incumbent autocrats to balance loyalty and repression to pre-empt being overthrown. The chapter presents a framework for the study of coups and uses it to examine how coups can help select autocrats and to some extent keep them accountable. It presents a number of stylized facts about coups and summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of coups in autocracies.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Handbook of Public Choice
EditorsRoger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, Stefan Voigt
PublisherOxford Univerity Press; Oxford
Volume2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2019

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