The irrelevance of (Straussian) hermeneutics

Many writers talk of Leo Strauss’s “hermeneutic”. This term sounds innocuous. But it can be misleading, even dangerous, deflecting attention from the real issue – Strauss’s inadequate hypothesis-testing. Talking about hypotheses not hermeneutics makes it easier to see when Strauss does not test his claims properly: he looks for evidence which fits his suspicions, finds it, and stops. At stake is more than Strauss’s work: at stake is the methodology of textual interpretation itself. Although part of this chapter challenges talk of Strauss’s hermeneutic, my bigger concerns are the ideas and language of hermeneutics more generally. We need different principles and different terms, I will suggest. After summarising my previously published critique of Strauss, I correct, clarify and extend that argument, before considering how Straussians could respond. I then argue that talk of Straussian “hermeneutics” is too broad: it does not distinguish between methodological principles, empirical hypotheses and conclusions, hence making it harder to pinpoint Strauss’s ineffective hypothesis-testing. The language of hermeneutics can even weaken criticisms of Strauss, letting his defenders off the hook. We should thus drop the language and ideas of hermeneutics: there are better ways to work out if and how to read between the lines, I suggest. If there had been better methodological principles in the 1940s and 1950s, few people would now be discussing Strauss’s esoteric interpretations.