What is Political Moralism?

One of the foremost methodological debates in contemporary political theory pits ‘political realists’ against ‘political moralists.’ This debate has proved nebulous, however, in part due its origins: moralism was largely a term coined by realists for the kind of political theory they reject, not a self-identifying tradition. Most of the realism-moralism debate has consisted of (a) realist critiques of so-called moralism, (b) critiques of realism by theorists who we might label as moralists, or (c) positive efforts to flesh out realism. Despite realist portrayals of moralism as the ‘dominant’ and ‘mainstream’ stance of contemporary political theory, this leaves the actual positive content of political moralism unclear.

In this paper, I address this gap: clarifying what ‘political moralism’ might mean for those who adhere to it, distinguishing it from some possible positions that moralists are not committed to, and offering a moderate defence of moralism as a methodological approach to political theory. I also argue that this clarification of political moralism can help explicate two key ways in which political moralism might be taken too far – i.e., in which we might criticise political theories for being excessively ‘moralistic’. Most importantly, I argue that political moralism – properly understood – is not dichotomous with political realism, and that the differences between them are not technical, such that one camp can be dismissed as making some kind of methodological mistake, but substantive and ethical. The upshot is that the integration of moralism and at least many forms of realism is both possible and desirable.