Nuclear Security and Safeguards Considerations for Novel Advanced Reactors: An overview of how the unique features of small and advanced modular reactors create opportunities to deliver optimised nuclear security and safeguards while reducing lifetime operating costs.

Interest is growing globally in a transition from large conventional nuclear power plants (LCNPP) to novel advanced reactors (NAR), comprising small modular and advanced modular reactors. Dozens of NAR designs are being developed with planned construction and operation over the next 10-20 years. NAR developers are putting significant work into safety and operational aspects of their designs, but security and safeguards are often neglected, despite these aspects being strongly interconnected. This risks creating a situation where the dependencies, synergies and challenges associated with the relationship between the safety, security and safeguards are not addressed optimally to achieve design-, operational- and cost-efficiency.
This report reviews specific nuclear security and safeguards issues that are specific to NARs and less or not relevant to LCNPPs. It does not examine individual NAR technologies, instead presenting the issues that are common across multiple designs. Starting from a discussion of the differences between NARs and LCNPPs, more than 20 security and safeguards considerations are elucidated, leading to several recommendations for NAR stakeholders. Overall, these issues demonstrate that security and safeguards should be considered early in the process, alongside safety.
The smaller power capacities of NARs mean that operational budgets will be relatively constrained. To ensure appropriate levels of safety, security and safeguards new approaches may be required to deliver these functions. To this end, developers should build security and safeguards into their design. New technological security solutions to detect threat actors as early as possible, coupled with a range of layered delay features, can slow adversaries until an adequate response can be mounted by off-site personnel, allowing a reduction in on-site personnel numbers. Developers will also need to consider the security and safeguards implications of novel NAR deployment choices, such as smaller site footprints, siting in highly isolated locations or in close proximity to non-nuclear facilities, and the mobilisation of NARs on sea or land vehicles. NAR concepts are intended to operate with fewer staff than LCNPPs, with many intending to use significantly more automated systems to support operations, which may be operated remotely by off-site staff. This increased use of digital systems underscores the importance of strong cybersecurity protections and creates a need for secure and reliable communications between the site and remote operators where relevant. There may be security advantages to reducing on-site personnel numbers, as this directly reduces the physical insider threat risk.
A range of advanced NAR technologies are under development using novel nuclear fuel materials. Many of these will potentially present a higher proliferation risk. Some fuels will not be fixed within the NAR, creating unique difficulties for nuclear materials accountancy and control and safeguarding. Furthermore, many NAR designs are planned to operate on a single fuel load for many years or even decades, creating challenges for continuity of knowledge in safeguarding.
The above considerations represent just a small number of key issues that NAR developers, potential operators, regulators, national governments and the IAEA must address. These stakeholders must work together in a spirit of open communication and collaboration to effectively address these issues whilst there is still time to integrate solutions into developing NAR designs, helping the benefits of NARs to be realised internationally.